4GW and Grand Strategy

Conflict in the Years
Ahead
Chet Richards
J. Addams & Partners, Inc.
© 2005 Chet Richards • http://www.jaddams.com

Why I’ve called you all together here today
• Patterns, conflict and human nature

• Historical pattern, or why all the fuss about “OODA loops”?
• Moral conflict and guerrilla warfare
• The three “generations of war” – can there be a fourth?
• Collecting up the bits and pieces
– Wars of the future
– A closer look at insurgency and 4GW
• WWBD?
– PISRR
– Shih
Charts from Patterns of Conflict and Strategic Game are
copyrighted by the Estate of John R. Boyd.
Pattern
Positive
(constructive)
• National goal elements
Improve our fitness, as an organic whole, to shape and cope with an ever-changing environment.
• Grand strategy
Shape pursuit of national goal so that we not only amplify our spirit and strength (while undermining and isolating our adversaries) but also
influence the uncommitted or potential adversaries so that they are drawn toward our philosophy and are empathetic toward our success.
• Strategic aim
Diminish adversary’s capacity while improving our capacity to adapt as an organic whole, so that our adversary cannot cope—while we can cope
—with events/efforts as they unfold.
• Strategy
Penetrate adversary’s moral-mental-physical being to dissolve his moral fiber, disorient his mental images, disrupt his operations, and overload
his system, as well as subvert, shatter, seize, or otherwise subdue those moral-mental-physical bastions, connections, or activities that he
depends upon, in order to destroy internal harmony, produce paralysis, and collapse adversary’s will to resist.
• Grand tactics
Operate inside adversary’s observation-orientation-decision-action loops, or get inside his mind-time-space, to create tangles of threatening
and/or non-threatening events/efforts as well as repeatedly generate mismatches between those events/efforts adversary observes, or imagines,
and those he must react to, to survive;
thereby
Enmesh adversary in an amorphous, menacing, and unpredictable world of uncertainty, doubt, mistrust, confusion, disorder, fear, panic, chaos ...
and/or fold adversary back inside himself;
thereby
Maneuver adversary beyond his moral-mental-physical capacity to adapt or endure so that he can neither divine our intentions nor focus his
efforts to cope with the unfolding strategic design or related decisive strokes as they penetrate, splinter, isolate or envelop, and overwhelm him.
• Tactics
Observe-orient-decide-act more inconspicuously, more quickly, and with more irregularity as basis to keep or gain initiative as well as shape and
shift main effort: to repeatedly and unexpectedly penetrate vulnerabilities and weaknesses exposed by that effort or other effort(s) that tie-up,
divert, or drain-away adversary attention (and strength) elsewhere.
141
Pattern
Negative (destructive)
elements
• National goal
Improve our fitness, as an organic whole, to shape and cope with an ever-changing environment.
• Grand strategy
Shape pursuit of national goal so that we not only amplify our spirit and strength (while undermining and isolating our adversaries) but also
influence the uncommitted or potential adversaries so that they are drawn toward our philosophy and are empathetic toward our success.
• Strategic aim
Diminish adversary’s capacity while improving our capacity to adapt as an organic whole, so that our adversary cannot cope—while we can
cope—with events/efforts as they unfold.
• Strategy
Penetrate adversary’s moral-mental-physical being to dissolve his moral fiber, disorient his mental images, disrupt his operations, and
overload his system, as well as subvert, shatter, seize, or otherwise subdue those moral-mental-physical bastions, connections, or activities that
he depends upon, in order to destroy internal harmony, produce paralysis, and collapse adversary’s will to resist.
• Grand tactics
Operate inside adversary’s observation-orientation-decision-action loops, or get inside his mind-time-space, to create tangles of
threatening and/or non-threatening events/efforts as well as repeatedly generate mismatches between those events/efforts adversary observes,
or imagines, and those he must react to, to survive;
thereby
Enmesh adversary in an amorphous, menacing, and unpredictable world of uncertainty, doubt, mistrust, confusion, disorder, fear, panic,
chaos ... and/or fold adversary back inside himself;
thereby
Maneuver adversary beyond his moral-mental-physical capacity to adapt or endure so that he can neither divine our intentions nor focus his
efforts to cope with the unfolding strategic design or related decisive strokes as they penetrate, splinter, isolate or envelop, and overwhelm him.
• Tactics
Observe-orient-decide-act more inconspicuously, more quickly, and with more irregularity as basis to keep or gain initiative as well as
shape and shift main effort: to repeatedly and unexpectedly penetrate vulnerabilities and weaknesses exposed by that effort or other effort(s)
that tie-up, divert, or drain-away adversary attention (and strength) elsewhere.
141
Why grand strategy?
• Support national goal.
• Pump-up our resolve, drain-away adversary resolve, and attract

the uncommitted.
• End conflict on favorable terms.
• Ensure that conflict and peace terms do not provide seeds for
(unfavorable) future conflict.
• Harmonize constructive purpose of national vision with

destructive nature of strategy, grand tactics, and tactics.
139
Illumination
• Physically we can isolate adversaries by severing their communications

with outside world as well as by severing their internal communications to
one another. We can accomplish this by cutting them off from their allies
and the uncommitted via diplomatic, psychological, and other efforts. To
cut them off from one another we should penetrate their system by being
unpredictable, otherwise they can counter our efforts.
• Mentally we can isolate our adversaries by presenting them with
ambiguous, deceptive, or novel situations, as well as by operating at a
tempo or rhythm they can neither make out nor keep up with. Operating
inside their O-O-D-A loops will accomplish just this by disorienting or
twisting their mental images so that they can neither appreciate nor cope
with what's really going on.
• Morally our adversaries isolate themselves when they visibly improve
their well being to the detriment of others (i.e. their allies, the
uncommitted, etc.) by violating codes of conduct or behavior patterns
that they profess to uphold or others expect them to uphold.
SG 47
Generalization
• Need fighter that can both lose energy and gain energy more
quickly while outturning an adversary.
• In other words, suggests a fighter that can pick and choose
engagement opportunities—yet has fast transient (“buttonhook”)
characteristics that can be used to either force an overshoot by
an attacker or stay inside a hard turning defender.
Boyd’s study of strategy began as a

fighter pilot and an instructor at the
USAF Fighter Weapons School.
4
Idea expansion
• Idea of fast transients suggests that, in order to win, we should

operate at a faster tempo or rhythm than our adversaries—or,
better yet, get inside adversary’s observation-orientation-
decision-action time cycle or loop.
• Why? Such activity will make us appear ambiguous
(unpredictable) thereby generate confusion and disorder among
our adversaries—since our adversaries will be unable to
generate mental images or pictures that agree with the
menacing as well as faster transient rhythm or patterns they are
competing against.
In other words, “faster tempo or rhythm” is not

synonymous with “get inside adversary’s
observation-orientation-decision-action” loop.
5
Human nature
Goal
• Survive, survive on own terms, or improve our capacity for
independent action.
The competition for limited resources to satisfy these desires
may force one to:
• Diminish adversary’s capacity for independent action, or deny
him the opportunity to survive on his own terms, or make it
impossible for him to survive at all.
Implication Point
PointofofPatterns
PatternsofofConflict:
Conflict:
• Life is conflict, survival, and conquest.
IF
IFyou
youfind
findyourself
yourselfininthis
thissituation,
situation,make
make
sure
sureyou
youare
arethe
theone
onewho
whowins.
wins.
10
Comment
In addressing any questions about conflict, survival, and conquest

one is naturally led to the
Theory of evolution by natural selection

and
the conduct of war
since both treat conflict, survival, and conquest in a very

fundamental way. In this regard, many sources (a few on natural
selection and many on war) are reviewed; many points of view are
exposed.
11
Impression
• In examining these many points of view one is bombarded with the notion that:
– It is advantageous to possess a variety of responses that can be applied
rapidly to gain sustenance, avoid danger, and diminish adversary’s capacity
for independent action.
– The simpler organisms—those that make-up man as well as man working
with other men in a higher level context—must cooperate or, better yet,
harmonize their activities in their endeavors to survive as an organic
synthesis.
– To shape and adapt to change one cannot be passive; instead one must take
the initiative.
• Put more simply and directly: the above comments leave one with the impression
that variety/rapidity/harmony/initiative (and their interaction) seem to be key
qualities that permit one to shape and adapt to an ever-changing
environment.
• With this impression in mind together with our notion of getting inside an
adversary’s O-O-D-A loop we will proceed in our historical investigation.
12

• WWBD?
– PISRR
– Shih
Historical pattern
Sun Tzu The Art of War c. 400 B.C.
Theme Strategy
• Harmony and trust • Probe enemy’s organization and
• Justice and well being dispositions to unmask his
strengths, weaknesses, patterns of
• Inscrutability and enigma movement and intentions.
• Deception and subversion • “Shape” enemy’s perception of
• Rapidity and fluidity world to manipulate his plans and
actions.
• Dispersion and concentration
• Attack enemy’s plans as best policy.
• Surprise and shock
Next best disrupt his alliances. Next
best attack his army. Attack cities
only when there is no alternative.
Desired outcome
• Employ cheng and ch'i maneuvers
• Subdue enemy without to quickly and unexpectedly hurl
fighting strength against weaknesses.
• Avoid protracted war
13
Historical pattern
Early commanders Impression

• Alexander • Early commanders seem
• Hannibal consistent with ideas of Sun Tzu
• • Western commanders more

Belisarius
directly concerned with winning
• Genghis Khan the battle
• Tamerlane • Eastern commanders closer to
Sun Tzu in attempting to shatter
adversary prior to battle
Action
Cheng and ch'i*
* Cheng/ch'i maneuver schemes were employed by early commanders to expose adversary vulnerabilities and
weaknesses (a la cheng) for exploitation and decisive stroke (via ch'i).
14
Historical pattern
Keeping in mind the ideas of Sun Tzu and our

comments about early commanders, let’s take a
look at an early tactical theme and some battle
(grand tactical) situations to gain a feel for the
different ways that the cheng/ch'i game has been
(and can be) played.
© 2005 Chet Richards • http://www.jaddams.com 15

Historical pattern
Tactical theme (from about 300 B.C. to 1400 A.D.)

• Light troops (equipped with bows, javelins, light swords, etc.) perform reconnaissance,
screening, and swirling hit-and-run actions to:
– Unmask enemy dispositions and activities.
– Cloud/distort own dispositions and activities.
– Confuse, disorder enemy operations.
• Heavy troops (equipped with lances, bows, swords, etc.) protected by armor and
shields:
– Charge and smash thinned-out/scattered or disordered/bunched-up enemy
formations generated by interaction with light troops; or
– Menace enemy formations to hold them in tight, or rigid, arrays thereby make them
vulnerable to missiles of swirling light troops.
• Light and heavy troops in appropriate combination pursue, envelop, and mop-up
isolated remnants of enemy host.
Idea
• Employ maneuver action by light troops with thrust action of heavy troops to confuse,
break-up, and smash enemy formations.
16
Battle of Arbela*
October 1, 331 B.C.
Mazeus Darius Bessus
Chariots
l e xa nder
A
Companions
*Also known as the Battle of

e
rv e Lin Gaugamela
Parmenio Re s e 20
Battle of Arbela* (Phase II)
Persians Flee Persians Flee
The heavy thrust, set up by all the

other action on this page. Although
outnumbered overall, at this point,
Alexander manufactured a temporary
but decisive advantage.
Be
ss
us
Darius s
Mazeus a nion
m p
Co
nde r
Alexa
Reserve Line
o
r meni
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10 March 2005
Version 1.4 May 2005 21

Historical pattern
Genghis Khan and the Mongols
Key asymmetries Theme

• Superior mobility • Widely separated strategic
• maneuvers, with appropriate
Superior communications
stratagems, baited retreats,
• Superior intelligence hard-hitting tactical thrusts, and
• Superior leadership swirling envelopments to
uncover and exploit adversary
vulnerabilities and weaknesses.
Aim in conjunction with
• Clever and calculated use of
Conquest, as basis to
propaganda and terror to play
create, preserve, and upon adversary’s doubts, fears,
expand Mongol nation and superstitions in order to
undermine his resolve and
destroy his will to resist.
keep this in mind
25
Mongol strategic maneuver
(1219-1220)
Chagatai Jochi
Genghis
Khan
Jebe
Aral
p ian Sea
s
Ca ea
S
Kizyl-Kum
Khawarizm
State
Bokhara
Ox Samarkand
us (Modern Uzbekistan)
Ri
ve
r
500 miles
26
Technology and the art of war
• The legacy of Napoleon, Clausewitz, and Jomini’s tactical regularity and the continued use
of large stereotyped formations for tactical assault, together with the mobilization of large
armies and massing of enormous supplies through a narrow logistics network, “telegraphed”
any punch hence minimized the possibility of exploiting ambiguity, deception, and
mobility to generate surprise for a decisive edge.
• In this sense, technology was being used as a crude club that generated frightful and
debilitating casualties on all sides during the:
– American Civil War (1861-65)

– Austro-Prussian War (1866)
– Franco-Prussian War (1870)
– Boer War (1899-1902)
– Russo-Japanese War (1904-05)
– World War I (1914-18)
Point
• Evolution of tactics did not keep pace with increased weapons lethality developed and
produced by 19th century technology.
? Raises question ?
• Why were the 19th century and early 20th century commanders unable to evolve better
tactics to avoid over a half century of debilitating casualties?
49
World War I
Action Reaction
• Offensives conducted on wide • Defense organized into depth of
frontages—emphasizing few, rather successive belts of fortified terrain.
than many, harmonious yet • Massed artillery and machine-gun
independent thrusts. fire designed to arrest and pin down
• Evenness of advance maintained to attacker.
protect flanks and provide artillery • Counter-attack to win back lost
support as advance makes ground.
headway.
• Reserves thrown in whenever attack
held-up—against regions or points
of strong resistance.
Result
Stagnation and enormous attrition since advances made generally as expected
along paths of hardened resistance because of dependence upon railroads and
choice of tactics of trying to reduce strong points by massed firepower and infantry.
55
Schlieffen strategic maneuver
August 4 – September 8, 1914
Netherlands
Belgium
Germany
France
LU
Paris
France
54
World War I
a way out
Idea Authors
• Infiltration tactics • Capt. Andre Laffargue

• Gen. von Hutier?
• Gen. Ludendorff
• Guerrilla tactics • T.E. Lawrence

• Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck
56
World War I
infiltration tactics cheng
Key points
• Fire at all levels by artillery, mortars, and machine-guns is exploited to hold adversary
attention and pin him down hence—
• Fire together with gas and smoke (as well as fog and mist) represent an immediate
and ominous threat to capture adversary attention, force heads down and dramatically
obscure view, thereby cloak infiltrators movements.
• Dispersed and irregular character of moving swarms (as opposed to well defined line
abreast formations) permit infiltrators to blend against irregular and changing terrain
features as they push forward.
• Taken together, the captured attention, the obscured view, and the indistinct character
of moving dispersed/irregular swarms deny adversary the opportunity to picture what is
taking place.
ch’i
Result
• Infiltration teams appear to suddenly loom-up out of nowhere to blow thru, around, and
behind disoriented defenders.
Note: This is the essence of maneuver warfare/3GW. Good
discussions in Bruce Gudmundsson, Stormtroop Tactics,
and Stephen Biddle, Military Power.
59
Looming up
(asymmetric fast transients)
OODA “loops” in action

The Asian soldier is a master of the approach march. His
tradition is to attack out of nowhere—to suddenly appear where
he is least expected.
John Poole, Phantom Soldier, 139
Creation of the Blitzkrieg
Envelopment
(Leuctra, Cannae)
Flying Columns
(Mongols) Blitzkrieg
(Heinz Guderian)
Tank Attack with • Narrow thrusts

Motorized Vehicles • Armored recce
(J.F.C. Fuller) • Commanders
forward
• Extensive
communications
Infiltration net
(Ludendorff) • Air in lieu of (or
with) artillery
84
English Channel & Netherlands
North Sea Army Group B
Belgium
Germany
3 Panzer Corps from Army
Group A
Ardennes Forest
Sedan Luxemburg
The decisive role
was to given to
Maginot Line
Army Group A
Maj Gen F. W. von
France Mellenthin
Switzerland
Blitzkrieg
Action
• Intelligence—signal, photo, agent … reconnaissance (air and ground)—and patrol actions probe and test adversary before and during combat
operations to uncover as well as shape changing patterns of strengths, weaknesses, moves, and intentions.
• Adversary patterns, and associated changes, are weighed against friendly situation to expose attractive, or appropriate, alternatives that exploit
adversary vulnerabilities and weaknesses, hence help shape mission commitment and influence command intent.
• Mission assigned. Schwerpunkt (focus of main effort) established before and shifted during combat operations to bypass adversary strength and
strike at weakness. Nebenpunkte (other related or supporting efforts) employed to tie-up, focus, or drain-away adversary attention and strength
(elsewhere).
• Special seizure/disruption teams infiltrate (by air or other means) enemy rear areas where, with agents already in place, they: seize bridges and road
crossings, sever communications, incapacitate or blow-up power stations, seize or blow-up fuel dumps … as well as sow confusion/disorder via “false
messages and fake orders”.
• Indirect and direct air firepower efforts together with (any needed) sudden/brief preliminary artillery fires are focused in appropriate areas to impede
(or channel) adversary movement, disrupt communications, suppress forward defensive fires, obscure the advance, and divert attention.
• Armored reconnaissance or stormtrooper teams, leading armored columns, advance rapidly from least expected regions and infiltrate adversary front
to find paths of least resistance.
• Armored assault teams of tanks, infantry, anti-tank guns, and combat engineers as well as other specialists, together with close artillery and air
support, quickly open breaches (via frontal/flank fire and movement combinations) into adversary rear along paths of least resistance uncovered by
armored reconnaissance or stormtroopers.
• When breakthrough occurs, relatively independent mobile/armored teams led by armored recce with air support (recce, fire, and airlift when
necessary), blow-through to penetrate at high speed deep into adversary interior. Object is to cut lines of communication, disrupt movement, paralyze
command and envelop adversary forces and resources.
• Motorized or foot infantry further back supported by artillery and armor pour-in to collapse isolated pockets of resistance, widen the breaches and
secure the encirclement or captured terrain against possible counter-attack.
Idea
• Conquer an entire region in the quickest possible time by gaining initial surprise and exploiting the fast tempo/fluidity-of-action of armored teams,
with air support, as basis to repeatedly penetrate, splinter, envelop, and roll-up/wipe-out disconnected remnants of adversary organism in
order to confuse, disorder, and finally shatter his will or capacity to resist.
Note: maneuver warfare does not mean leaving intact

and motivated enemy forces in your rear. 70
Which lead to:
Essence of blitzkrieg
Employ a Nebenpunkte/Schwerpunkt maneuver philosophy to generate ambiguity, realize deception,
exploit superior mobility, and focus violence as basis to quickly:
• Create many opportunities to penetrate weaknesses in the form of any moral or mental
inadequacies as well as any gaps or exposed flanks that open into adversary’s vulnerable rear and
interior, hence-
• Create and exploit opportunities to repeatedly penetrate adversary organism, at all levels (tactical,
grand tactical, and strategic) and in many ways, in order to splinter, envelop, and roll-up/wipe-out
isolated remnants, thereby generate confusion and disorder, hence -
• Create and exploit opportunities to disrupt his system for communication, command, and support,
as well as undermine or seize those connections or centers that he depends upon, thus shake his will
or capacity to decisively commit his back-up echelons, operational reserves, and/or strategic reserves,
thereby magnify adversary’s confusion and disorder and convince him to give up.
Intent
Create grand tactical success then exploit and expand it into strategic success for a decisive victory.
Implication
Blitzers, by being able to infiltrate or penetrate or get inside adversary’s system, generate many moral-
mental-physical non—cooperative (or isolated) centers of gravity, as well as undermine or seize those
centers of gravity adversary depends upon, in order to magnify friction, produce paralysis, and bring about
adversary collapse.
87
Categories of conflict
Note:
Note:Boyd
Boyddid
didnot
notuse
usethe
theterm
term
“maneuver warfare” in his briefings.
“maneuver warfare” in his briefings.
Now looking back and reflecting upon the panorama of military history
we can imagine three kinds of human conflict:
– Attrition warfare—as practiced by the Emperor Napoleon, by all
sides during the 19th century and during World War I, by the
Allies during World War II, and by present-day nuclear planners.
– Maneuver conflict—as practiced by the Mongols, General
Bonaparte, Confederate General Stonewall Jackson, Union
General Ulysses S. Grant, Hitler’s Generals (in particular
Manstein, Guderian, Balck, Rommel) and the Americans under
Generals Patton and MacArthur.
– [we’ll come back to this bullet later]
With these comments in mind let’s look into the essentials of each.
Version 1.2
10 March 2005
111
Essence of attrition warfare
Note – moral purpose
Create and exploit Payoff
• Destructive force:
• Frightful and debilitating attrition via
Weapons (mechanical, chemical,
widespread destruction as basis to:
biological, nuclear, etc.) that kill, maim,
and/or otherwise generate widespread – Break enemy’s will to resist
destruction. – Seize and hold terrain objectives
• Protection:
Ability to minimize the concentrated and
explosive expression of destructive force
by taking cover behind natural or Aim
manmade obstacles, by dispersion of
people and resources, and by being Compel enemy to
obscure using camouflage, smoke, etc.,
together with cover and dispersion.
surrender and sue
• Mobility: for peace
Speed or rapidity to focus destructive force
Attrition – destruction – is the
or move away from adversary’s means, not the end.
destructive focus.
Note: “speed”
113
Observations regarding maneuver
• Ambiguity, deception, novelty, mobility, and violence (or

threat thereof) are used to generate surprise and shock.
• Fire and movement are used in combination, like cheng/ch'i
or Nebenpunkte/Schwerpunkt, to tie-up, divert, or drain-away
adversary attention and strength in order to expose as well
as menace and exploit vulnerabilities or weaknesses
elsewhere.
• Indications of success tend to be qualitative and are related
to the widespread onset of confusion and disorder, frequent
envelopments, high prisoner counts, or any other
phenomenon that suggests inability to adapt to change.
It’s the interpretation that’s important, not the

quantitative data themselves. Unlike attrition
warfare, one does not typically reinforce failure.
114
Essence of maneuver conflict
Create, exploit, and magnify Payoff
• Ambiguity: • Disorientation:
Alternative or competing impressions of events as they Mismatch between events one observes or
may or may not be. imagines and events (or efforts) he must react or
• Deception: adapt to.
• Disruption:
An impression of events as they are not.
• State of being split-apart, broken-up, or torn
Novelty:
asunder.
Impressions associated with events/ideas that are
• Overload:
unfamiliar or have not been experienced before.
• Fast transient maneuvers: A welter of threatening events/efforts beyond one’s
mental or physical capacity to adapt or endure.
Irregular and rapid/abrupt shift from one maneuver
event/state to another.
• Effort (cheng/ch'i or Nebenpunkte/Schwerpunkt):
Note: High tempo, not
An expenditure of energy or an irruption of violence— (necessarily) high speed.
focused into, or thru, features that permit an organic
whole to exist.
Aim
Generate many non-cooperative centers of gravity, as well as disorient, disrupt, or overload those that adversary
depends upon, in order to magnify friction, shatter cohesion, produce paralysis, and bring about his collapse;
or equivalently,
Uncover, create, and exploit many vulnerabilities and weaknesses, hence many opportunities, to pull adversary apart
and isolate remnants for mop-up or absorption.
117
It is true that the Russian can be
superb in defense and reckless
in mass attacks, but when faced
by surprise and unforeseen
situations he is an easy prey to
panic. Field Marshal von Manstein proved in this
operation* that Russian mass attacks should be met
by maneuver, not by rigid defense.
Panzer Battles,
Major General F. W. von Mellenthin,
p. 254
* The Kharkov Counterstroke – why this is called

February 1943 “maneuver” conflict
Second impression
Transients Intentions
• Observe, orient, decide and act more • Probe and test adversary to unmask strengths, weaknesses,
inconspicuously, more quickly, and with maneuvers, and intentions.
more irregularity ... • Employ a variety of measures that interweave menace-uncertainty-
or put another way mistrust with tangles of ambiguity-deception-novelty as basis to sever
• Operate inside adversary’s observation- adversary’s moral ties and disorient ...
orientation-decision action loops or get • Select initiative (or response) that is least expected.
inside his mind-time-space. • Establish focus of main effort together with other effort and pursue
directions that permit many happenings, offer many branches, and
threaten alternative objectives.
• Move along paths of least resistance (to reinforce and exploit
success).
• Exploit, rather than disrupt or destroy, those differences, frictions, and
obsessions of adversary organism that interfere with his ability to
cope ...
• Subvert, disorient, disrupt, overload, or seize adversary’s
… permits vulnerable, yet critical, connections, centers, and activities ... in order
to dismember organism and isolate remnants for wrap-up or
one to absorption.
• Generate uncertainty, confusion, disorder, panic, chaos ... to shatter
cohesion, produce paralysis and bring about collapse.
• Become an extraordinary commander.
132
This is the OODA loop
Orient
Observe Decide
Act
This is not the OODA loop
Orient
Observe Decide
A scheme like this would be a “stage
model.” The drawbacks of such
models are well known – see for
example, Gary Klein’s Sources of
Power, pp. 127-128.
Act
An OODA “loop” with power
Observe Orient Decide Act

Implicit Implicit
Unfolding Guidance Cultural
Guidance
Circumstances & Control Traditions & Control
Genetic
Heritage Analyses &
Observations Feed
Forward
Synthesis Feed Decision Feed Action
Forward Forward
(Hypothesis) (Test)
New
Information Previous
Experience
Outside Unfolding
Information Interaction
With
Unfolding
Environment
Interaction Feedback
With
Environment Feedback
J. R. Boyd, “the Essence of Winning and Losing,” 1995.
“Orientation is the Schwerpunkt.” Organic Design, 16.
“Emphasize implicit over explicit in order to gain a favorable mismatch in friction and
time (ours lower than any adversary’s).” Organic Design, 22.
“Interaction permits vitality and growth, while isolation leads to decay and
disintegration.” Strategic Game, 29.
What OODA “loop” speed
really means
Quickly Know what to do
understand
what’s going on And be able to
do it
Observe Orient Decide Act
Implicit Implicit
Unfolding Guidance Guidance
Circumstances & Control & Control
Feed Decision
Observations Forward
Feed Feed Action
Forward (Hypothesis) Forward
(Test)
Outside Unfolding
Information Interaction
With
Unfolding
Environment
Interaction Feedback
With
Environment Feedback
German operational philosophy
Impression
• The German operational philosophy based upon a common outlook and freedom-
of-action, and realized through their concepts of mission and Schwerpunkt,
emphasized implicit over explicit communication.
which suggests
• The secret of the German command and control system lies in what’s unstated or
not communicated to one another—to exploit lower-level initiative yet realize
higher-level intent, thereby diminish friction and reduce time, hence gain both
quickness and security.
Result
• The Germans were able to repeatedly operate inside their adversary’s observation-
orientation-decision-action loops.
or as stated by General Blumentritt,
• “The entire operational and tactical leadership method hinged upon ... rapid, concise
assessment of situations ... quick decision and quick execution, on the principle:
‘each minute ahead of the enemy is an advantage.’”
79
Idealized schematic
The FESA climate
Common outlook
II. Einheit
I. (Individual)
Fingerspitzengefühl
III. Schwerpunkt
IV. Auftrag
4GW organizational climate
Hammes
• aggressive, well trained subordinates who have a network of F, E

trust
• hard, realistic unit training that ensures those who can thrive in
the chaos of war are in leadership positions and enough time E
together to learn how each member of the team will react in a
crisis
• forward thinking commander who provides clear,
understandable, actionable guidance
S*
• freedom at all levels to take the initiative (even to deviate from
the plan) as long as it conforms with the commander’s overall A
intent
In other words, Hammes’ thesis is that the same climate that

enables maneuver warfare will be required for 4GW
* which requires F by the
commander, too, of course

• WWBD?
– PISRR
– Shih
Categories of conflict
Now looking back and reflecting upon the panorama of military history we
can imagine three kinds of human conflict:
– Attrition warfare—as practiced by the Emperor Napoleon, by all
sides during the 19th century and during World War I, by the Allies
during World War II, and by present-day nuclear planners.
– Maneuver conflict—as practiced by the Mongols, General
Bonaparte, Confederate General Stonewall Jackson, Union General
Ulysses S. Grant, Hitler’s Generals (in particular Manstein,
Guderian, Balck, Rommel) and the Americans under Generals
Patton and MacArthur.
– Moral conflict—as practiced by the Mongols, most guerrilla leaders,
a very few counter-guerrillas (such as Magsaysay) and certain
others from Sun Tzu to the present.
With these comments in mind let’s look into the essentials of each.
111
Observations related to moral conflict
Gen. Hermann Balck
Theme
• No fixed recipes for organization, communications, tactics, leadership, etc.
• Wide freedom for subordinates to exercise imagination and initiative—yet harmonize within intent of
superior commanders.
• Heavy reliance upon moral (human values) instead of material superiority as basis for cohesion and
ultimate success.
• Commanders must create a bond and breadth of experience based upon trust—not mistrust—for
cohesion.
How is this atmosphere achieved?
• By example leaders (at all levels) must demonstrate requisite physical energy, mental agility, and
moral authority, to inspire subordinates to enthusiastically cooperate and take initiatives within
superiors intent.
What is the price?
• Courage to share danger and discomfort at the front.
• Willingness to support and promote (unconventional or difficult) subordinates that accept danger,
demonstrate initiative, take risks, and come-up with new ways toward mission accomplishment.
• Dedication and resolve to face-up to and master uncomfortable circumstances that fly in the face of the
traditional solution.
Benefit
• Internal simplicity that permits rapid adaptability.
118
Essence of moral conflict
Create, exploit, and magnify Idea

• Menace: • Surface, fear, anxiety, and
alienation in order to generate
Impressions of danger to one’s well
many non-cooperative centers of
being and survival.
gravity, as well as subvert those that
• Uncertainty: adversary depends upon, thereby
Impressions, or atmosphere, magnify internal friction.
generated by events that appear
ambiguous, erratic, centers of payoff
gravity, as well as subvert
contradictory, unfamiliar, chaotic,
In order to breed these
etc.
Aim
• Mistrust:
In other words, pump up these
Atmosphere of doubt and suspicion Destroy moral bonds
that loosens human bonds among that permit an organic
members of an organic whole or whole to exist
between organic wholes.
122
Insight
• In addressing this question we find that the counterweights to menace and

uncertainty are not at all obvious unless we start with mistrust and work in
reverse order. Proceeding in this way we note that:
– The presence of mistrust implies that there is a rupture or loosening of the
human bonds or connections that permit individuals to work as an organic
whole harmony with one another. This suggests that harmony itself
represents an appropriate counterweight to mistrust.
– In dealing with uncertainty, adaptability seems to be the right
counterweight. Otherwise, how can one adjust to the unforeseen or
unpredictable nature of uncertainty? JRB comment: the counterweight to
“uncertainty” cannot be “certainty.”
– Finally, with respect to menace one cannot be passive. Instead, initiative is
needed otherwise menace may obliterate the benefits associated with
harmony and adaptability. Intuitively, this suggests that initiative is the right
counterweight here.
• Using these ideas, together with the previous ideas already uncovered, we can
modify and enrich the essence of moral conflict as follows:
124
Essence of moral conflict
Negative factors Counterweights
• Menace: • Initiative:
Impressions of danger to one’s well being Internal drive to think and take action
and survival without being urged
• Uncertainty: • Adaptability:
Impressions, or atmosphere, generated by Power to adjust or change in order to cope

events that appear ambiguous, erratic, May use a variety
with new of tools:
or unforeseen circumstances
contradictory, unfamiliar, chaotic, etc. • Harmony:
• Mistrust: • physical – movement
Interaction or firepower
of apparently disconnected
Atmosphere of doubt and suspicion that events or entities in a connected way
loosens human bonds among members of • mental – e.g., ambiguity via more
an organic whole or between organic
wholes rapid OODA loops
• or moral – propaganda,
Aim subversion & covert action, etc.
Pump-up friction via negative factors to breed fear, anxiety, and alienation in order to generate many non-cooperative
centers of gravity, as well as subvert those that adversary depends upon, thereby sever moral bonds that permit
adversary to exist as an organic whole.
Simultaneously,
build-up and play counterweights against negative factors to diminish internal friction, as well as surface courage,
confidence, and esprit, thereby make possible the human interactions needed to create moral bonds that permit us,
as an organic whole, to shape and adapt to change.
125
Prism of Conflict
Attrition
Maneuver
Moral
Any actual conflict
Note: This is my interpretation - as far as I

know, Boyd never used it.
Now that we’ve looked at the capabilities required to
wage blitzkrieg, and added the moral dimension,
let’s turn to
guerrilla warfare.
World War I Guerrilla Warfare
(a la T.E. Lawrence)
Action
• Gain support of population. Must “arrange the minds” of friend, foe and
neutral alike. Must “get inside their minds”.
• Must “be an idea or thing invulnerable, without front or back, drifting
about like a gas” (inconspicuousness and fluidity-of action). Must be
an “attack-in-depth”.
• Tactics “should be tip-and-run, not pushes but strokes” with “use of the
smallest force in the quickest time at the farthest place”.
• Should be a war of detachment (avoiding contact and presenting a threat
everywhere) using mobility/fluidity-of-action and environmental
background (vast unknown desert) as basis for “never affording a
target” and “never on the defensive except by accident and in error”.
Idea
• Disintegrate existing regime’s ability to govern.
64
Impression
• Infiltration tactics a la Ludendorff seem to be similar in

nature to irregular or guerrilla tactics a la Lawrence.
• Why? Both stress clouded/distorted signatures, mobility
and cohesion of small units as basis to insert an
amorphous yet focused effort into or thru adversary
weaknesses.
© 2005 Chet Richards • http://www.jaddams.com 65

Major advances between
World Wars I and II
Soviet revolutionary strategy
• Lenin, and after him Stalin, exploited the idea of crises and vanguards—that arise out of Marxian
contradictions within capitalism—to lay-out Soviet revolutionary strategy.
• Result:
– A scheme that emphasizes moral/psychological factors as basis to destroy a regime from within.
Lightning war (blitzkrieg)
• Infiltration tactics of 1918 were mated with:
– Tank
– Motorized Artillery – J.F.C. Fuller
– Tactical Aircraft by
– Motor Transport
– Heinz Guderian
– Better Communications
• Result:
– Blitzkrieg to generate a breakthrough by piercing a region with multiple narrow thrusts using armor,
motorized infantry, and follow-up infantry divisions supported by tactical aircraft.
Guerrilla war
• Mao Tse-Tung synthesized Sun Tzu’s ideas, classic guerrilla strategy and tactics, and Napoleonic style
mobile operations under an umbrella of Soviet revolutionary ideas to create a powerful way for waging modern
(guerrilla) war.
• Result:
– Modern guerrilla warfare has become an overall political, economic, social and military framework for
“total war”.
66
Blitzkrieg and guerrilla strategy
Note
Infiltration and isolation
• Blitz and guerrillas infiltrate a nation or regime at all levels to soften and shatter the moral
fiber of the political, economic and social structure. Simultaneously, via diplomatic,
psychological, and various sub-rosa or other activities, they strip-away potential allies thereby
isolate intended victim(s) for forthcoming blows. To carry out this program, a la Sun Tzu,
blitz, and guerrillas:
– Probe and test adversary, and any allies that may rally to his side, in order to unmask
strengths, weaknesses, maneuvers, and intentions.
– Exploit critical differences of opinion, internal contradictions, frictions, obsessions, etc., in
order to foment mistrust, sow discord and shape both adversary’s and allies’ perception
of the world thereby:
• Create atmosphere of “mental confusion, contradiction of feeling, indecisiveness,
panic”...
• Manipulate or undermine adversary’s plans and actions.
• Make it difficult, if not impossible, for allies to aid adversary during his time of trial.
Purpose
• Force capitulation when combined with external political, economic, and military pressures
or
• Weaken foe to minimize his resistance against military blows that will follow.
Version 1.4 May 2005 69

Modern guerrilla campaign
Essence
• Capitalize on corruption, injustice, incompetence, etc., (or their appearances) as basis to generate
atmosphere of mistrust and discord in order to sever moral bonds that bind people to existing regime.
Simultaneously,
• Share existing burdens with people and work with them to root out and punish corruption, remove
injustice, eliminate grievances, etc., as basis to form moral bonds between people and guerrillas in
order to bind people to guerrilla philosophy and ideals.
Intent Question:
• Shape and exploit crises environment that permits guerrilla vanguards or cadres to pure-up guerrilla
Aretheal-Qa’ida
resolve, attract orand
uncommitted, the Iraqi insurgents
drain-away accomplishing
adversary resolve as foundation to replace existing
regime withorguerrilla
evenregime.
trying to accomplish these?
Implication
• Guerrillas, by being able to penetrate the very essence of their adversary’s moral-mental-physical
being, generate many moral-mental-physical non-cooperative (or isolated) centers of gravity, as well as
subvert or seize those centers of gravity that adversary regime must depend upon, in order to magnify
friction, produce paralysis, and bring about collapse.
Yet,
• Guerrillas shape or influence moral-mental-physical atmosphere so that potential adversaries, as well
as the uncommitted, are drawn toward guerrilla philosophy and are empathetic toward guerrilla success.
91
Message
• Guerrillas must establish implicit connections or bonds with people and

countryside.
In other words
• Guerrillas must be able to blend into the emotional-cultural-intellectual
environment of people until they become one with the people.
In this sense
• People feelings and thoughts must be guerrilla feeling and thoughts while
guerrilla feelings and thoughts become people feelings and thoughts;
people aspirations must be guerrilla aspirations while guerrilla aspirations
become people aspirations; people goals must be guerrilla goals while
guerrilla goals become people goals.
Result
• Guerrillas become indistinguishable from people while government is
isolated from people.
95
Guerrilla results
Successful
Successful Unsuccessful
• American Colonies 1775-81
1775-81 • • Philippines
Philippines 1899-1902
• Spain 1808-14
1808-14 • • South
South Africa
Africa 1900-02
• Russia 1812
1812 • • Greece
Greece 1944-49
• German East Africa 1914-18
1914-18 • • Philippines*
Philippines* 1946-54
• Arabia 1916-18
1916-18 • • Malaya*
Malaya* 1948-60
• China 1927-49
1927-49
• Russia 1941-45
1941-45
• Yugoslavia 1941-45
1941-45
• Indochina 1945-54
1945-54
• Algeria 1954-62
1954-62
• Cuba 1956-59
1956-59
• South Vietnam 1958-75
Guerrilla war is the war of the broad masses of an1958-75
economically backward country standing up against a
powerfully equipped and well trained army of aggression. * Regime exercised particular care not to
inflict casualties and to protect
Vo Nguyen Giap population.
People’s War People’s Army
97
Blitz and guerrilla theme
Essence
• Avoid battles—instead penetrate adversary to subvert, disrupt, or
seize those connections, centers, and activities that provide cohesion
(e.g., psychological/moral bonds, communications, lines of
communication, command and supply centers ...)
• Exploit ambiguity, deception, superior mobility, and sudden violence to
generate initial surprise and shock followed by surprise and shock
again, again, again ...
• Roll-up/wipe-out the isolated units or remnants created by the
subversion, surprise, shock, disruption, and seizure.
Intent
• Exploit subversion, surprise, shock, disruption, and seizure to generate
confusion, disorder, panic, etc., thereby shatter cohesion, paralyze
effort, and bring about adversary collapse.
98
Counter-guerrilla campaign
Action
• Undermine guerrilla cause and destroy their cohesion by demonstrating integrity and competence of government to represent and serve
needs of people—rather than exploit and impoverish them for the benefit of a greedy elite.*
• Take political initiative to root out and visibly punish corruption. Select new leaders with recognized competence as well as popular
appeal. Ensure that they deliver justice, eliminate grievances and connect government with grass roots.*
• Infiltrate guerrilla movement as well as employ population for intelligence about guerrilla plans, operations, and organization.
• Seal-off guerrilla regions from outside world by diplomatic, psychological, and various other activities that strip-away potential allies as
well as by disrupting or straddling communications that connect these regions with outside world.
• Deploy administrative talent, police, and counter-guerrilla teams into affected localities and regions to: inhibit guerrilla communication,
coordination and movement; minimize guerrilla contact with local inhabitants; isolate their ruling cadres; and destroy their infrastructure.
• Exploit presence of above teams to build-up local government as well as recruit militia for local and regional security in order to protect
people from the persuasion and coercion efforts of the guerrilla cadres and their fighting units.
• Use special teams in a complementary effort to penetrate guerrilla controlled regions. Employ (guerrillas’ own) tactics of reconnaissance,
infiltration, surprise hit-and-run, and sudden ambush to: keep roving bands off-balance, make base areas untenable, and disrupt
communication with outside world.
• Expand these complementary security/penetration efforts into affected region after affected region in order to undermine, collapse, and
replace guerrilla influence with government influence and control.
• Visibly link these efforts with local political/economic/social reform in order to connect central government with hopes and needs of
people, thereby gain their support and confirm government legitimacy.
Idea
• Break guerrillas’ moral-mental-physical hold over the population, destroy their cohesion, and bring about their collapse via political
initiative that demonstrates moral legitimacy and vitality of government and by relentless military operations that emphasize
stealth/fast-tempo/fluidity-of-action and cohesion of overall effort.
___________
* If you cannot realize such a political program, you might consider changing sides!
108
Counter-guerrilla campaign
Action
• Undermine guerrilla cause and destroy their cohesion by demonstrating integrity and competence of government to represent
and serve needs of people—rather than exploit and impoverish them for the benefit of a greedy elite.*
• Take political initiative to root out and visibly punish corruption. Select new leaders with recognized competence as well as
popular appeal. Ensure that they deliver justice, eliminate grievances and connect government with grass roots.*
• Infiltrate guerrilla movement as well as employ population for intelligence about guerrilla plans, operations, and organization.
• Seal-off guerrilla regions from outside world by diplomatic, psychological, and various other activities that strip-away potential allies as
well as by disrupting or straddling communications that connect these regions with outside world.
• Deploy administrative talent, police, and counter-guerrilla teams into affected localities and regions to: inhibit guerrilla communication,
coordination and movement; minimize guerrilla contact with local inhabitants; isolate their ruling cadres; and destroy their infrastructure.
• Exploit presence of above teams to build-up local government as well as recruit militia for local and regional security in order to protect
people from the persuasion and coercion efforts of the guerrilla cadres and their fighting units.
• Use special teams in a complementary effort to penetrate guerrilla controlled regions. Employ (guerrillas’ own) tactics of reconnaissance,
infiltration, surprise hit-and-run, and sudden ambush to: keep roving bands off-balance, make base areas untenable, and disrupt
communication with outside world.
• Expand these complementary security/penetration efforts into affected region after affected region in order to undermine, collapse, and
replace guerrilla influence with government influence and control.
• Visibly link these efforts with local political/economic/social reform in order to connect central government with hopes and needs of
people, thereby gain their support and confirm government legitimacy.
Idea
• Break guerrillas’ moral-mental-physical hold over the population, destroy their cohesion, and bring about their collapse via political
initiative that demonstrates moral legitimacy and vitality of government and by relentless military operations that emphasize stealth/fast-
tempo/fluidity-of-action and cohesion of overall effort.
___________
* If you cannot realize such a political program, you might consider changing sides!
108
Blitz vs. guerrilla
• Same basic themes (PISRR), collapse rather than overpower enemy

• Same emphasis on cheng/ch’i
• Differences include:
Blitz/3GW Guerrilla
Penetrate Enemy forces Target society
Isolate Non-cooperative CoGs (e.g., Government from people

penetrated units, fighting units from
logistics, etc.)
Subdue/Subvert Isolated remnants Isolated elements of target society
Reorient Blitz forces, for next objective Subverted elements
Reharmonize Blitz forces (e.g., shift Schwerpunkt) Elements of society under guerrilla
control
Content High mental High moral
Version 1.4 May 2005


• WWBD?
– PISRR
– Shih
Another scheme –
the generations of war
• 1GW: smoothbore weapons; line and column; rigid discipline

with top down control. Training & élan could often close with and
defeat enemy before absorbing debilitating casualties
• 2GW: rifled weapons, automatic weapons, indirect fire artillery;

tactics still basically linear (esp. on defense), but firepower
replaced manpower as predominant element. Attempts to use
“élan” to overcome firepower were now suicidal
• 3GW: same weapons; but: non-linear tactics (infiltration/pull;

surfaces & gaps); time rather than place as basis of operational
art; emphasis on collapsing enemy rather than closing with and
destroying him (AKA blitzkrieg, maneuver warfare, modern
system)
1 & 2 GW
Note the linear tactics. Roughly 23,000
Americans were killed, wounded, missing,
or captured. The National Park Service
estimates that about 7,600 men died during
the battle or later from wounds.
Battle of Antietam
September 17, 1862

Clausewitz’s Trinity*:
State vs. State
Other state
1, 2,
3GW/Blitz/MW
Government
The
State
People Army
*simplified – see On War, Book I, Ch. I, Sec 28.

Clausewitz’s Trinity:
Insurgency
Allies
of
The
State
penetrate &
isolate
Government
Guerrilla The
State
3GW
penetrate &
isolate
People Army
3GW restores maneuver
Attrition
Maneuver
Moral
1GW
2GW
3GW
Guerrilla
Now, come with me into the fourth
generation!

4GW, according to Lind
What defines 4GW:

• The loss of the state's monopoly on war and on the first loyalty of
its citizens and the rise of non-state entities that command
people’s primary loyalty and that wage war. These entities may
be gangs, religions, races and ethnic groups within races,
localities, tribes, business enterprises, ideologies—the variety is
almost limitless.
• A return to a world of cultures, not, merely states, in conflict; and
• The manifestation of both developments—the decline of the
state and the rise of alternate, often cultural, primary loyalties—
not only “over there,” but in America itself.
The goal of 4GW is largely moral:

Fourth Generation war focuses on the moral level, where it
works to convince all parties, neutrals as well as belligerents,
that the cause for which a Fourth Generation entity is fighting is
morally superior. It turns its state enemies inward against
themselves on the moral level, making the political calculations
of the mental level irrelevant.
“What if we combined terrorism, high technology, and the following
additional elements?
• A non-national or transnational base, such as an ideology or
religion
• A direct attack on the enemy’s culture …
• Highly sophisticated psychological warfare, especially
through manipulation of the media, particularly television
news …”
“The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation,” Lind, et. al., 1989
• Therefore, in Lind’s view, 4GW could conceivably involve

engagements between organized forces using techniques that
we would call maneuver warfare (3GW) or industrial age
warfare (2GW) if:
– one opponent is something other than the military force of a
state and
– the purpose is to collapse the state enemy morally, that is to
erode their resolve and weaken or dissolve the bonds that
hold them together as a nation
• That said, Lind’s descriptions of actually fighting 4GW usually
involve some evolved form of insurgency (as we shall see.)
“Collapse a state morally”
– Moral strength: Mental capacity to overcome menace, uncertainty, and

mistrust.
– Moral victory: Triumph of courage, confidence, and esprit (de corps)
over fear, anxiety, and alienation when confronted by menace,
uncertainty, and mistrust.
– Moral defeat: Triumph of fear, anxiety, and alienation over courage,
confidence, and esprit when confronted by menace, uncertainty, and
mistrust.
– Moral values: Human values that permit one to carry on in the face of
menace, uncertainty, and mistrust.
– Moral authority: Person or body that can give one the courage,
confidence, and esprit to overcome menace, uncertainty, and mistrust.
When this happens, you just

give up and quit.
121
“Fighting” 4GW
Lind
• You can use either the de-escalation model or the “Hama”*

(annihilation) model. If you fall in between, you’re doomed.
• The de-escalation model: stresses the moral level, understands the
power of weakness, integrates troops with the local population,
draws on that integration for good cultural intelligence.
• In fighting 4GW, “less is more.” Try to keep your physical presence
small, if possible so small that you are invisible. If you can’t do that,
then keep your footprint small in time – get in and get out, fast.
• Finally, if you have to take the least desirable route, invading and
occupying another state, you must do everything you can to
preserve that state at the same time you are defeating it. As we see
in Iraq, if you destroy the state itself, there is a good chance nobody
will be able to recreate it.
*Syrian dictator Hafez al-Assad quelled an insurrection in From “FMFM 1-A,” On War # 101,
the city of Hama by leveling part of it with an artillery
barrage on January 30, 1982. Estimates of the death January 25, 2005
toll run from 10,000 to 40,000.
Still “fighting” 4GW
Lind
• Other important pieces:

– 4GW is often light infantry/Jaeger (hunter) warfare
– “Out G-ing the G” – get better at guerrilla warfare than the
guerrilla (quoting COL David Hackworth, USA, Ret.)
– Most important supporting weapon is cash
– “Force protection” is the enemy of “force integration” (with the
local population)
– HUMINT is the only “int” worth discussing
From “FMFM 1-A,” On War # 101,

January 25, 2005
Contrary to what a number of writers on 4GW have said, Fourth Generation war is not merely
a new name for insurgency or guerilla warfare. What is at stake in 4GW is not who rules the
state, but the fate of the state itself.—”Are Iraq’s Insurgents Losing?” April 5, 2005
Fourth Generation Warfare
Hammes
• It uses all available networks – political, economic, social and

military – to convince the enemy’s political decision makers that
their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the
perceived benefit.
• Note: Neither Lind nor van Creveld totally agree with the
objective
– Lind – focus is on moral level, so calculation of benefit is not
dominant or sometimes even relevant
– van Creveld – “interests” or “policies” are not the primary
cause of war
Hammes
• It is an evolved form of insurgency (208)

– practical people solving specific problems in order to defeat more
powerful enemies (3)
– But, Lind: “Contrary to what a number of writers on 4GW have said,
Fourth Generation war is not merely a new name for insurgency or
guerilla warfare.”
• Networks will be employed to carry specific messages to our policy
makers and to those who can influence the policy makers (208)
– Networks are exceptionally resilient and difficult to destroy. (183)
• Clausewitzian “decisive battles” and even 3GW maneuver campaigns
are irrelevant (208) at least until Mao’s Phase III against a state
government
• Too much central control can destroy the effectiveness of a 4GW force
(209)
Hammes
• A state will not give up its right to exist as a result of 4GW

techniques
– a final (Mao Phase III) conventional campaign will be
required (211)
– can achieve less drastic goals with 4GW
• Successful 4GW organizations focus on the movement’s long
term political viability, rather than near-term tactical
effectiveness. (222)
– see themselves not as military organizations but as webs
– unified by ideas
Hammes
• Types of 4GW threat (260)

– terrorist/insurgent movements
– states that are “moving rapidly to 4GW.”
• Forces properly restructured for 4GW can easily defeat residual
2GW/3GW threats (260-266)
– arrive early in conflict
– need fewer “heavy” force, more “medium weight” with lots of
infantry & military police, intel (particularly HUMINT), civil
affairs
– must bring to bear full set of economic, social & military
capabilities of western states
– start with Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) and add
these capabilities, along with more special operations forces
4GW – non-trinitarian warfare
van Creveld
Martin van Creveld doesn’t use the term “4GW” but has stated that
the concept is basically the same as “non-trinitarian” warfare, as
described in The Transformation of War (1991.)
– The state as we know it (government separate from ruler)
became the dominant form of political organization in Europe
only in 1648
– In many parts of the world, states were only established in
the 19th & 20th centuries through colonization/
decolonization
– Some parts of the world never developed functioning states
at all
– Even where states were established, other organizations are
coming to the fore and beginning to wage war not involving
governments, people, and armies.
Why societies go to war
van Creveld
• States
– interests; policy (Politik): cost/benefit calculations, often disguised,
implied, or backfilled
• Non-States (and sometimes states)
– grievances, objectives, glory of individuals/status in tribe
– obtaining the spoils of war: booty, slaves, territory, women, which
override and complicate any pursuit of tribal/community “policy”
– obtaining prisoners for religious or culinary reasons (150)
– doctrinal differences
– other “will of God” reasons
– justice: avenge perceived wrongs; community honor (e.g., Trojan War)
– assist an ally (WW I and to some extent WWII)
• Everybody
– existence, either as a group (insurgency) or as a state
Predictions
van Creveld
• The side with the more rational interests will lose (149)
• Wars will be waged by groups we today call “terrorists”
– tribes, religious groups, commercial groups, criminal groups,
insurgencies, etc.
– their home territories will not be continuous, impenetrable, or
very large; no clear line on a map
– leadership will be along personal & charismatic lines
• Role of women in non-trinitarian warfare (4GW, but not 2/3GW!)
will approach that of men, as it historically has in guerrilla
warfare (180)
War through the ages
van Creveld
“It is not true that war is simply a means to an end, nor do

people necessarily fight
in order to attain this objective
or that. In fact, the opposite is
often true: people very often
take up one objective or another
precisely in order that
they may fight.” (226)
4GW
Barnett
• Guerrilla or insurgency-based warfare

– Defeat enemy politically
– Not on battlefield but through years of LIC
• Incorporates notion of “war within the context of everything else”
– Military tactics subordinated to economic, political, and social
pain inflicted upon opponent
– Focus is enemy’s “societal will to wage war” (Blueprint, 20)
• Could be precluded by a sufficiently large Sys Admin force
(Blueprint, 17)
• Inside Core states, reduces to a law enforcement problem
(Blueprint, 122)
4GW
Barnett
• Problems with 4GW:

– Suggests a world in perpetual war with an “unredeemable
and inexhaustible” supply of savages (Blueprint, 21 – citing
Robert D. Kaplan)
– Prior to 9/11, 4GW theorists “were fixated on China”
(Blueprint, 21 – citing Hammes’ observation that China is our
most likely opponent among nation states and uses 4GW
principles)
– Envisions long, drawn out conflict with al-Qa’ida or its
successor (Blueprint, 88 – citing Kaplan)
• 4GW techniques possible in conflict between Core states, but
hard to see the payoff (Blueprint, 126-129)
4GW
Barnett
• Discounts religion as a strong cause of the 9/11 attacks (Map,

285; Blueprint, 87)
• “We seek to do unto al-Qa’ida what they did unto us: trigger a
System Perturbation …” (Map, 285)
• But, system perturbation is risky
– Outcome of perturbation, itself
– Effect on rest of region (and by implication, the Gap as a
whole) (Map, 290)
– “Rule-Set Reset” can be a dangerous time because “the cure
may be worse than the disease” (Blueprint, xviii)
4GW
Scheuer
• Doesn’t really consider the subject – focuses on war with certain

radical Islamic groups.
• Follows Lind and Hafez al-Assad, should military force become
necessary.
• Because we are so bad at grand strategy, we are only left with
one military option:
– “The piles of dead will include as many or more civilians as
combatants because our enemies wear no uniforms. Killing
in large numbers is not enough to defeat our Muslim foes.
With killing must come a Sherman-like razing of
infrastructure. Roads and irrigation systems; bridges, power
plants, and crops in the field; fertilizer plants and grain mills
… As noted, such actions will yield large civilian casualties,
displaced populations, and refugee flows.” (241-242)
4GW: One pattern, a la Clausewitz
4GW
LIC Supporting
country
Coup
Government
G 2/3GW
The
State
A
P
Target country,
(sometimes for bases Army
People
& sanctuary rather
than for a take over)

The “generations of war” model
From the viewpoint of Core states and nuclear powers
Nuclear
Peace of Weapons Fall of
Westphalia Proliferate USSR
state vs. state
Precursor activities – going 2 GW

back to Alexander & Sun Tzu
(and before)
1 3 GW
GW
States & maneuver
non-states State-vs-state— concepts
wage war only “legal” form New commo &
trans networks
of war
4 GW
States &
Highly irregular / non-states
partisan /guerrilla warfare; wage war
terrorism; criminal
organizations, etc.
1600 1700 1800 1900 2000

Blitz vs. guerrilla vs. 4GW
Blitz/3GW Guerrilla 4GW???

Penetrate Enemy forces Own society Society of supporting country
Isolate Non-cooperative CoGs (e.g., Government from people Non-cooperative centers of gravity
penetrated units) (e.g., institutions, organizations)
Subdue/Subvert Isolated remnants Isolated elements of society Enough NCoGs to cause supporting
country moral collapse & withdrawal
Reorient Blitz forces, for next objective Subverted elements 4GW forces: for example, expand
guerrilla or convert to 3GW in target
country
Reharmonize Blitz forces (e.g., shift Elements of society under guerrilla 4GW forces: for example to continue
Schwerpunkt) control fight in target country, or to exploit
new base areas
Content High mental High moral Moral vs. supporting country;

All vs. target country

Now, let’s collect up the
bits and pieces.

Main issue: role of military force
• Is ancient wisdom now obsolete: Whoever relies on the Tao in

governing men doesn’t try to force issues or defeat enemies by
force of arms. For every force there is a counterforce. Violence,
even well intentioned always rebounds upon oneself. Tao Te
Ching, 30
• Is Iraq really experiencing 4GW, or just classical insurgency? In
particular, what is the objective of the transnational element?
• What is the evidence that we know how to rebuild states that we
have invaded? In particular, under what conditions will the
presence of an occupying force (a Sys Admin) in and of itself
catalyze an insurgency?
• When it comes to Sys Admin, is larger better (Barnett), or should
we minimize our footprint on the ground (Lind)?
How I see it
Type “Likelihood” Severity Type of conflict

Core-Core nuclear Very low Unimaginably high MAD, then ???
exchange
Core-Gap nuclear Low High MAD, then
attack obliteration
Core-Core Very low High 2/3GW
conventional
Process politically ?? Discretionary Low – access 2/3GW, then some
bankrupt regime possibility of
High – insurgency
insurgency
Non-state non- Now,
Very highlet’s turn our attention
Physicallytolow
the types that
4GW
nuclear are significantly more likely, if not downright
certain, because we have strategies to
Non-state nuclear High, given enough
prevent Very high
or mitigate the others. Spasm against
time somebody, then
4GW
How I see it
Type “Likelihood” Severity Type of conflict

Process politically ?? Discretionary Low – access 2/3GW, then some
bankrupt regime possibility of
High – insurgency
insurgency
Non-state non- Very high Physically low 4GW
nuclear
Non-state nuclear High, given enough High Spasm against
time somebody, then
4GW
Reduce likelihood by tightly The big question here is: What is

controlling the production and the likelihood of a significant
inventory of warheads and fissile insurgency?
material worldwide.
Insurgency?
• Given sufficient time, insurgency is likely:

– Somalia, Beirut, Vietnam, Ivory Coast, Iraq, Intifada I, etc.
– Military action by the Core may be regarded as “imperialism”
or aggression, even if our motives are pure
– Heightened likelihood of insurgency if there are religious or
ethnic differences between the invader and the target
• Hypothesis: there would not be an insurgency if we quickly
“flood the country” with (effective) Sys Admin types. But
– Even then, because of the reasons noted above, as well as
nationalism and local/tribal animosities, insurgency can form
– Are we liberating the oppressed or barging into a “domestic
dispute” (e.g., intra-tribal conflict as in Somalia)?
Fourth generation warfare
• Despite claims to the contrary by some Pentagon brass (some of

whom were successful 3GW practitioners), there is a new
“generation” of warfare stalking the world
– conducted by organizations other than states, who are becoming
increasingly richer, more sophisticated, and able to employ more
lethal weapons and better physical/mental/ moral strategies.
– highly motivated by religion & perhaps the baser instincts
– networking is in their DNA (losers have already been selected
out)
• No state, including the US, is safe from 4GW
• Main point of contention: How dangerous are these
organizations in the grand scheme of things? Barnett sees them
as terrorists or insurgents, while Lind, Hammes, & van Creveld
regard them as new types of players in the arena of war.
Fourth generation warfare (II)
• 4GW is not defined by the type of force employed. Any available

tool may be used, from whispered threats to web sites to
“terrorism” & gangs to guerrilla warfare to conventional forces to
nuclear weapons. It does represent “practical people solving
specific problems” and then passing along what works and what
doesn’t. This “passing along” is the evolutionary engine.
• Guerrilla warfare (“insurgency”), however, is a factor in all forms
of 4GW and it can evolve to include any of the others (Mao
Phase III, for example.)
• Whether evolved insurgency encompasses all of 4GW is a
matter of semantics. So,
– Iraq certainly is 4GW according to Hammes’ definition
– Iraq is questionable according to Lind, because it is mostly
guerrilla warfare (i.e., “crisis of state” not the defining quality)
Fourth generation warfare (III)
• We need to give serious thought to the role of military force in

4GW and grand strategy
– Military forces are maintained to fight other military forces.
These are largely missing in 4GW.
– Use of military force against civilians and militarily weak
targets makes our 4GW opponents’ jobs easier & destroys
morale and capability of our military forces.
– Military forces can take the lead role if 4GW prematurely
morphs into classical insurgency or maneuver (or other)
warfare. However, the effect will probably be to force the
conflict back into 4GW.
– In all forms of warfare of the strong against the weak, getting
in (“access”) is the easy part. Gap military forces tend to
suppress initiative (Auftragstaktik) and so are very weak.
OK, integrate. How?
• activist/preemptive approach will often cause more problems

than it solves
– be viewed as aggression (Lind)
– good possibility to create another failed state (Lind)
– will destroy any organized force that uses it (van Creveld)
– results are unpredictable
• Afghanistan, but also Iraq, Somalia, & Beirut
• because of nationalism, tribalism, religion, honor, etc.
– any Sys Admin force large enough to do any good stands a
chance of further perturbing the invaded state in
unpredictable (and so probably not attractive) ways
• and further inflame nationalism, tribalism, religion, etc.
• and present a fat target for insurgents
WWBD?

Vs. “rogue” states

Are there alternatives?
• take nothing off the table, so if we feel the need to help things
along (e.g., to prevent misuse of nuclear material), use PISRR:
– Penetrate for populations suffering under “big men,” this
shouldn’t be that difficult
– Isolate
idea is to preserve existing system, but co-opt it
– Subvert (minus the “big man”) and steer it into the world
economy.
– Reorient
also, consider the “Theme for Disintegration &
– Reharmonize Collapse,” Patterns chart 136.
• under this approach, there will often be no need for a large and
visible Sys Admin, since most of the people who know how to
rebuild and run the system are already there.
• and there will be no need for an all-American “Leviathan” - the
USMC and SOF we have will do just fine (detailed
recommendations in A Swift, Elusive Sword).
• make moral leverage the Schwerpunkt, as the foundation for an

effective grand strategy that will:
– pump up our morale
– sap that of the opponents of integration
– attract the uncommitted
– without sowing the seeds of future unfavorable conflict
• beacon to the world or global cop?
“She is the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of
all. She is the champion and vindicator only of her own.”
John Quincy Addams, 1821
“Observe good faith and justice towards all nations; cultivate
peace and harmony with all … I hold the maxim no less
applicable to public than to private affairs, that honesty is
always the best policy.” G. Washington, 1796.
• play for shih (position/force/configuration/advantage/energy –

title of Chapter 5 in Sun Tzu.)
1. Employ cheng/ch’i
2. Employ timing and force together
3. Develop favorable situations with great potential
4. Take and maintain the initiative
David Lai, “Learning From the Stones,” p. 2
• pump up the elements on the right side of the “Theme for Vitality and
Growth” [Patterns #144]
• work on improving connections with as many “sources of order”/Core
states as possible
• continually improve our understanding of how Gap countries actually
work – ethnic/tribal, religious, legal, criminal, etc. Version 1.1
16 March 2005
• recall the ancient wisdom of the Tao te Ching: Violence, even

well intentioned always rebounds upon oneself. This represents
the distilled wisdom of practical people over thousands of years.
• if you’re must do it anyway, exploit Sun Tzu and those
thousands of years of experience:
Where we should have
– best to attack his plans
started
– next best attack his alliances
– third best alternative, attack his army
– fourth on the list – attack cities Where we in fact did start in
Iraq
Taking
Takingaastate
statewhole
wholeisissuperior;
superior;
Destroying
Destroyingititisisinferior
inferiortotothis.
this.
Sun
SunTzu
Tzu(Denma
(DenmaTrans.)
Trans.)Chapter
Chapter33
Could it work?
If we spent half as much time studying this approach as we now do

preparing to fight 2GW (and some 3GW) against Core states and
vanished empires, we might get somewhere.
The shih of battle do not exceed cheng & ch’i, yet their variations cannot be exhausted. Sun Tzu, Chapter 5
Could it work?
We integrated:
– The entire Soviet Union
(except Belarus?) and
– The entire Warsaw Pact
into the global system without invading anybody.
(In fact, a proximate cause of the fall of the Soviet system
was its successful attempt to invade and remove a “big man,”
Hafizullah Amin, in Afghanistan.)
10 are now members of NATO
and 8 also belong to the EU

QuickTime™ and a
TIFF (Uncompressed) decompressor
Epilogue:
4GW
are needed to see this picture.

Predictions (II)
van Creveld
• Distinctions between war and crime will break down (204) as will the
difference between armed forces and civilians (194)
• Battles will be replaced by skirmishes, bombings and massacres
• Intermingling with enemy forces, mixing with the civilian population,
and extreme dispersion have become the norm (208) The problem of
subversion is likely to be serious (211)
• Much of the task of defending society against non-trinitarian
warfare/4GW will fall to private security companies, with a
corresponding decrease in the utility, size, and technological
complexity (cost) of military forces
• Armies will shrink in size and wither away, to be replaced by police-
like security forces on the one hand and armed gangs on the other
(not that the difference is always clear, even today) (225)
Predictions (II)
van Creveld
Predictions (II)
van Creveld

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Conflict in the Years

© 2005 Chet Richards • http://www.jaddams.com

• Patterns, conflict and human nature

• Support national goal.

• Pump-up our resolve, drain-away adversary resolve, and attract

• End conflict on favorable terms.

• Harmonize constructive purpose of national vision with

• Physically we can isolate adversaries by severing their communications

Boyd’s study of strategy began as a

• Idea of fast transients suggests that, in order to win, we should

In other words, “faster tempo or rhythm” is not

In addressing any questions about conflict, survival, and conquest

Theory of evolution by natural selection

since both treat conflict, survival, and conquest in a very

• Patterns, conflict and human nature

• Avoid protracted war

Early commanders Impression

• • Western commanders more

Keeping in mind the ideas of Sun Tzu and our

© 2005 Chet Richards • http://www.jaddams.com 15

Tactical theme (from about 300 B.C. to 1400 A.D.)

Mazeus Darius Bessus

*Also known as the Battle of

The heavy thrust, set up by all the

Version 1.4 May 2005 21

Key asymmetries Theme

– American Civil War (1861-65)

August 4 – September 8, 1914

• Infiltration tactics • Capt. Andre Laffargue

• Guerrilla tactics • T.E. Lawrence

OODA “loops” in action

Tank Attack with • Narrow thrusts

Note: maneuver warfare does not mean leaving intact

• Ambiguity, deception, novelty, mobility, and violence (or

It’s the interpretation that’s important, not the

* The Kharkov Counterstroke – why this is called

Observe Orient Decide Act

J. R. Boyd, “the Essence of Winning and Losing,” 1995.

“Orientation is the Schwerpunkt.” Organic Design, 16.

• aggressive, well trained subordinates who have a network of F, E

In other words, Hammes’ thesis is that the same climate that

• Patterns, conflict and human nature

Create, exploit, and magnify Idea

• In addressing this question we find that the counterweights to menace and

Impressions, or atmosphere, generated by Power to adjust or change in order to cope

Any actual conflict

Note: This is my interpretation - as far as I

• Infiltration tactics a la Ludendorff seem to be similar in

© 2005 Chet Richards • http://www.jaddams.com 65

Version 1.4 May 2005 69

• Guerrillas must establish implicit connections or bonds with people and

• Same basic themes (PISRR), collapse rather than overpower enemy

Penetrate Enemy forces Target society

Isolate Non-cooperative CoGs (e.g., Government from people

Reorient Blitz forces, for next objective Subverted elements

Content High mental High moral

Version 1.4 May 2005

• Patterns, conflict and human nature

• 1GW: smoothbore weapons; line and column; rigid discipline

• 2GW: rifled weapons, automatic weapons, indirect fire artillery;

• 3GW: same weapons; but: non-linear tactics (infiltration/pull;

Version 1.4 May 2005

*simplified – see On War, Book I, Ch. I, Sec 28.