OPINION

Ex-CIA Directors: Interrogations

Saved Lives
The Senate Intelligence investigators never spoke to usthe leaders of
the agency whose policies they are now assailing for partisan reasons.
Updated Dec. 10, 2014 1:04 a.m. ET

The Senate Intelligence Committee has released its majority report on Central Intelligence
Agency detention and interrogation in the wake of 9/11. The following response is from former
CIA Directors George J. Tenet, Porter J. Goss and Michael V. Hayden (a retired Air Force
general), and former CIA Deputy Directors John E. McLaughlin, Albert M. Calland (a retired
Navy vice admiral) and Stephen R. Kappes :
The Senate Intelligence Committees report on Central Intelligence Agency detention and
interrogation of terrorists, prepared only by the Democratic majority staff, is a missed
opportunity to deliver a serious and balanced study of an important public policy question. The
committee has given us instead a one-sided study marred by errors of fact and interpretation
essentially a poorly done and partisan attack on the agency that has done the most to protect
America after the 9/11 attacks.
Examining how the CIA handled these matters is an important subject of continuing relevance to
a nation still at war. In no way would we claim that we did everything perfectly, especially in the
emergency and often-chaotic circumstances we confronted in the immediate aftermath of 9/11.
As in all wars, there were undoubtedly things in our program that should not have happened.
When we learned of them, we reported such instances to the CIA inspector general or the Justice
Department and sought to take corrective action.

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Comment [1]: The CIA has not identified any
factual errors in the final version of the Committees
report.

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Comment [2]: The facts laid out in the
Committees report are not partisan they come
primarily from the CIAs own internal records. And
in fact they show that the CIA repeatedly provided
inaccurate information to senior Bush
Administration officials, as well as both Republicans
and Democrats in Congress.

The Committee initiated this review on a bipartisan
14-1 vote. The Committees report was approved
on a bipartisan 9-6 vote, and the Committee voted
to release it on a bipartisan 11-3 vote. When the
report was publicly released on December 9, 2014,
Senators from both parties, including Senator John
McCain (R-AZ) spoke in favor of it on the Senate
floor.

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Comment [3]: The CIAs detention and
interrogation program was not initiated in the
immediate aftermath of 9/11. As detailed on pp.
11-13 of the Committees report, in the immediate
aftermath of 9/11 CIA officials determined that the
best option for holding captured detainees would
be a U.S. military facility, and that CIA interrogation
methods needed to generally comport with
commonly accepted practices deemed lawful by
U.S. courts. These determinations were reversed
by CIA officials in mid-2002.

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The country and the CIA would have benefited from a more balanced study of these programs
and a corresponding set of recommendations. The committees report is not that study. It offers
not a single recommendation.

Comment [4]: The Committees report identifies

numerous instances in which abuses and violations
were not reported or corrected. This includes
seventeen cases in which detainees were subjected
to unapproved coercive interrogation techniques,
and multiple instances in which individuals were
wrongfully detained and in some cases continued to
be held after it was determined that the CIA had no
basis for detaining them. These wrongful
detentions are addressed on pp. 16-17 and 475 of
the Committees report.

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Our view on this is shared by the CIA and the Senate Intelligence Committees Republican
minority, both of which are releasing rebuttals to the majoritys report. Both critiques are cleareyed, fact-based assessments that challenge the majoritys contentions in a nonpartisan way.
What is wrong with the committees report?
First, its claim that the CIAs interrogation program was ineffective in producing intelligence
that helped us disrupt, capture, or kill terrorists is just not accurate. The program was invaluable
in three critical ways:

Comment [5]: The Committees report does not

include conclusions about the effectiveness of the
CIAs interrogation program its conclusions
address the CIAs use of coercive interrogation
techniques. The Committees report identifies
numerous instances in which detainees who had not
been subjected (or not yet been subjected) to
coercive interrogations provided useful information.

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Comment [6]: The CIA has represented that the
use of its coercive interrogation techniques resulted
in the captures of Khalid Shaykh Muhammad, Majid
Khan, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Iyman Faris, Saleh al-
Marri, Ammar al-Baluchi, Khallad bin Attash, Sajid
Badat, and Dhiren Barot, among others. The CIAs
own records show that all of these claims were
inaccurate.

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It led to the capture of senior al Qaeda operatives, thereby removing them from the battlefield.
It led to the disruption of terrorist plots and prevented mass casualty attacks, saving American
and Allied lives.

Comment [7]: The CIA has represented that the

use of its coercive interrogation techniques resulted
in the disruption of the dirty bomb plot, the
Karachi plots, the second wave plots, the United
Kingdom urban targets plot, the Heathrow airport
plot, and the Camp Lemonier plot. The CIAs own
records show that all of these claims were
inaccurate.

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It added enormously to what we knew about al Qaeda as an organization and therefore

informed our approaches on how best to attack, thwart and degrade it.
A powerful example of the interrogation programs importance is the information obtained from
Abu Zubaydah, a senior al Qaeda operative, and from Khalid Sheikh Muhammed, known as
KSM, the 9/11 mastermind. We are convinced that both would not have talked absent the
interrogation program.

Comment [8]: The CIAs repeated claim that

coercive interrogation techniques obtained
otherwise unavailable information that saved
lives is not supported by the CIAs own records.

Some CIA detainees did provide useful background
information on al-Qaida. Some of these detainees,
such as Abu Zubaydah and Hassan Ghul, provided
significant information about al-Qaida prior to
being subjected to coercive interrogation
techniques. Most CIA detainees were subjected to
coercive interrogations immediately upon arrival in
CIA custody, so there is no basis for the suggestion
... [1]

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Information provided by Zubaydah through the interrogation program led to the capture in 2002
of KSM associate and post-9/11 plotter Ramzi Bin al-Shibh. Information from both Zubaydah
and al-Shibh led us to KSM. KSM then led us to Riduan Isamuddin, aka Hambali, East Asias
chief al Qaeda ally and the perpetrator of the 2002 Bali bombing in Indonesiain which more
than 200 people perished.

Comment [9]: CIA claims about the effectiveness

of coercive interrogations focus primarily on these
two detainees. As detailed on pp. 204-215 of the
Committees report, CIA representations about the
results of coercive interrogations against these
...two
[2]

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Comment [10]: As detailed on pp. 316-326 of
the Committees report, the CIAs claim that this
information was obtained through coercive
interrogations is not true.

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The removal of these senior al Qaeda operatives saved thousands of lives because it ended their
plotting. KSM, alone, was working on multiple plots when he was captured.

Comment [11]: As detailed on pp. 326-333 of

the Committees report, the CIAs claim that this
information was obtained through coercive
interrogations is not true.

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Heres an example of how the interrogation program actually worked to disrupt terrorist plotting.
Without revealing to KSM that Hambali had been captured, we asked him who might take over

Comment [12]: As detailed on pp. 301-311 of

the Committees report, the CIAs claim that this
information was obtained through coercive
interrogations is not true.

in the event that Hambali was no longer around. KSM pointed to Hambalis brother Rusman
Gunawan. We then found Gunawan, and information from him resulted in the takedown of a 17member Southeast Asian cell that Gunawan had recruited for a second wave, 9/11-style attack
on the U.S. West Coast, in all likelihood using aircraft again to attack buildings. Had that attack
occurred, the nightmare of 9/11 would have been repeated.
Once they had become compliant due to the interrogation program, both Abu Zubaydah and
KSM turned out to be invaluable sources on the al Qaeda organization. We went back to them
multiple times to gain insight into the group. More than one quarter of the nearly 1,700 footnotes

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Comment [13]: As detailed on pp. 246-258 of
the Committees report, the CIAs claim that this
information was obtained through coercive
interrogations is not true. Furthermore, as detailed
in the same section, the claim that this Southeast
Asian group was involved in second wave plotting
is contradicted by CIA intelligence records.

in the highly regarded 9/11 Commission Report in 2004 and a significant share of the
intelligence in the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate on al Qaeda came from detainees in the
program, in particular Zubaydah and KSM.
The majority on the Senate Intelligence Committee further claims that the takedown of bin
Laden was not facilitated by information from the interrogation program. They are wrong. There
is no doubt that information provided by the totality of detainees in CIA custody, those who were
subjected to interrogation and those who were not, was essential to bringing bin Laden to justice.
The CIA never would have focused on the individual who turned out to be bin Ladens personal
courier without the detention and interrogation program.
Specifically, information developed in the interrogation program piqued the CIAs interest in the
courier, placing him at the top of the list of leads to bin Laden. A detainee subjected to
interrogation provided the most specific information on the courier. Additionally, KSM and Abu
Faraj al-Libiboth subjected to interrogationlied about the courier at a time when both were

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Comment [14]: As detailed on pp. 204-215 of
the Committees report, CIA representations about
the results of coercive interrogations against these
two detainees are not supported by the CIAs
internal records.

Abu Zubaydah provided the same kind of
information both prior to and after the use of the
CIAs coercive interrogation techniques, though CIA
officials repeatedly claimed that some of the
information that he provided before the use of
coercive techniques was obtained after the use of
coercive techniques.

Khalid Shaykh Muhammad was subjected to the
CIAs coercive interrogation techniques immediately
upon his arrival in CIA custody, so there is no basis
for the suggestion that he would not have provided
this information without coercive interrogation
techniques. Additionally, Khalid Shaykh Muhammad
withheld and fabricated significant inaccurate
information that was disseminated in intelligence
reporting after being subjected to coercive
techniques.

providing honest answers to a large number of other critical questions. Since other detainees had
already linked the courier to KSM and Abu Faraj, their dissembling about him had great
significance.
So the bottom line is this: The interrogation program formed an essential part of the foundation
from which the CIA and the U.S. military mounted the bin Laden operation.

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Comment [15]: As detailed on pp. 378-400 of
the Committees report, the claim that information
obtained from coercive interrogations was essential
to the identification of Osama bin Ladens courier is
not true. The CIA had extensive intelligence
reporting on the courier prior to any reporting on
him from CIA detainees. And the CIA detainees who
provided the most accurate information on this
courier did so before being subjected to the CIAs
coercive interrogation techniques.

The second significant problem with the Senate Intelligence Committees report is its claim that
the CIA routinely went beyond the interrogation techniques as authorized by the Justice
Department. That claim is wrong.
President Obamas attorney general, Eric Holder , directed an experienced prosecutor, John
Durham, to investigate the interrogation program in 2009. Mr. Durham examined whether any
unauthorized techniques were used by CIA interrogators, and if so, whether such techniques

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Comment [16]: The Committees report
identifies seventeen cases in which CIA
interrogators used unauthorized coercive
techniques, techniques that had not been reviewed
or approved by the Department of Justice, and
techniques that were used in ways that were
inconsistent with Department of Justice approvals.

could constitute violations of U.S. criminal statutes. In a press release, the attorney general said
that Mr. Durham examined any possible CIA involvement with the interrogation and detention
of 101 detainees who were alleged to have been in U.S. custody after the terrorist attacks of
Sept. 11, 2001. The investigation was concluded in August 2012. It was professional and
exhaustive and it determined that no prosecutable offenses were committed.
Third, the reports argument that the CIA misled the Justice Department, the White House,
Congress, and the American people is also flat-out wrong. Much of the reports reasoning for
this claim rests on its argument that the interrogation program should not have been called
effective, an argument that does not stand up to the facts.
Fourth, the majority left out something critical to understanding the program: context.
The detention and interrogation program was formulated in the aftermath of the murders of close
to 3,000 people on 9/11. This was a time when:

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Comment [17]: The Committees report
extensively documents how information provided
by the CIA to the Justice Department, the White
House, Congress and the public was inconsistent
with the CIAs own internal records. Inaccurate
representations on the effectiveness of coercive
techniques are addressed at pp. 172-378.
Inaccurate representations to the White House in
particular are addressed at pp. 117-118 and 186-
188. Inaccurate representations to Congress, the
Justice Department, and the American people are
addressed throughout the report and at pp. 401-452
and 462-499 in particular.

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We had evidence that al Qaeda was planning a second wave of attacks on the U.S.
We had certain knowledge that bin Laden had met with Pakistani nuclear scientists and wanted
nuclear weapons.
We had reports that nuclear weapons were being smuggled into New York City.
We had hard evidence that al Qaeda was trying to manufacture anthrax.
It felt like the classic ticking time bomb scenarioevery single day.

Comment [18]: The Committees report

extensively details much of the threat reporting that
came in to the CIA in the months and years after the
9/11 attacks, and how this reporting influenced the
questioning of detainees.

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Comment [19]: The Committees report
addresses this plotting on pp. 246-258.

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Comment [20]: The Committees report
addresses reporting that al-Qaida was attempting
to obtain nuclear suitcases on p. 88.

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Comment [21]: The Committees report
addresses reporting on al-Qaida and anthrax on pp.
82-83.

In this atmosphere, time was of the essence and the CIA felt a deep responsibility to ensure that
an attack like 9/11 would never happen again. We designed the detention and interrogation
programs at a time when relationship building was not working with brutal killers who did not
hesitate to behead innocents. These detainees had received highly effective counter-interrogation
training while in al Qaeda training camps. And yet it was clear they possessed information that
could disrupt plots and save American lives.
The Senate committees report says that the CIA at that point had little experience or expertise in
capture, detention or interrogation of terrorists. We agree. But we were charged by the president
with doing these things in emergency circumstancesat a time when there was no respite from
threat and no luxury of time to act. Our hope is that no one ever has to face such circumstances
again.
The Senate committees report ignores this context.
The committee also failed to make clear that the CIA was not acting alone in carrying out the
interrogation program. Throughout the process, there was extensive consultation with the

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Comment [22]: The Committees report
documents multiple examples of detainees
providing useful information without being
subjected to coercive interrogation techniques. It
also documents numerous examples of detainees
providing useful information to foreign government
interrogators, without the apparent use of coercive
techniques, prior to being rendered to CIA custody.

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Comment [23]: As detailed on pp.410-411 and
468-469 of the Committees report, the Committee
found no records to support the CIAs claims
regarding al-Qaida interrogation resistance training.

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Comment [24]: As detailed throughout the
Committees report, the CIAs repeated claims that
the use of coercive interrogations obtained
information that disrupted plots and saved lives is
not supported by the CIAs internal records.

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Comment [25]: CIA records indicate that the use
of coercive interrogation techniques was first
proposed by the CIA, not the White House.

national security adviser, deputy national security adviser, White House counsel, and the Justice
Department.
The president approved the program. The attorney general deemed it legal.
The CIA went to the attorney general for legal rulings four timesand the agency stopped the
program twice to ensure that the Justice Department still saw it as consistent with U.S. policy,
law and our treaty obligations. The CIA sought guidance and reaffirmation of the program from
senior administration policy makers at least four times.

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Comment [26]: The Committees report details
CIA consultations with the national security adviser,
the deputy national security adviser, the White
House counsel, and the Justice Department. The
report also contains extensive information from CIA
records showing that the CIA provided inaccurate
information to both White House officials and the
Justice Department.

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Comment [27]: As the Committees report
details on pp. 409-436, the Justice Departments
legal analysis was based on inaccurate information
provided by the CIA over a period of years.

We relied on their policy and legal judgments. We deceived no one.

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The CIA reported any allegations of abuse to the Senate-confirmed inspector general and the

Comment [28]: The Committees report contains

extensive information from CIA records showing
that the CIA provided inaccurate information to
both White House officials and the Justice
Department.

Justice Department. CIA senior leadership forwarded nearly 20 cases to the Justice Department,
and career Justice officials decided that only one of these casesunrelated to the formal
interrogation programmerited prosecution. That person received a prison term.

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Comment [29]: As noted above, the
Committees report identifies seventeen cases in
which abuses or violations were not properly
reported or corrected.

The CIA briefed Congress approximately 30 times. Initially, at presidential direction the
briefings were restricted to the so-called Gang of Eight of top congressional leadersa
limitation permitted under covert-action laws. The briefings were detailed and graphic and drew
reactions that ranged from approval to no objection. The briefings held nothing back.
Congresss view in those days was very different from today. In a briefing to the Senate
Intelligence Committee after the capture of KSM in 2003, committee members made clear that
they wanted the CIA to be extremely aggressive in learning what KSM knew about additional
plots. One senator leaned forward and forcefully asked: Do you have all the authorities you
need to do what you need to do?
In September 2006, at the strong urging of the CIA, the administration decided to brief full
committee and staff directors on the interrogation program. As part of this, the CIA sought to
enter into a serious dialogue with the oversight committees, hoping to build a consensus on a
way forward acceptable to the committee majority and minority and to the congressional and
executive branches. The committees missed a chance to help shape the programthey couldnt
reach a consensus. The executive branch was left to proceed alone, merely keeping the
committees informed.
How did the committee report get these things so wrong? Astonishingly, the staff avoided
interviewing any of us who had been involved in establishing or running the program, the first
time a supposedly comprehensive Senate Select Committee on Intelligence study has been
carried out in this way.
The excuse given by majority senators is that CIA officers were under investigation by the
Justice Department and therefore could not be made available. This is nonsense. The
investigations referred to were completed in 2011 and 2012 and applied only to certain officers.
They never applied to six former CIA directors and deputy directors, all of whom could have
added firsthand truth to the study. Yet a press account indicates that the committee staff did see
fit to interview at least one attorney for a terrorist at Guantanamo Bay.

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Comment [30]: The CIAs briefings to the
Committees Chairmen and Vice Chairmen during
this time period are detailed on pp. 437-446 of the
Committees report. Available records show that
significant information was withheld in these
briefings, and significant portions of the briefings
were inaccurate.

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Comment [31]: Prior to September 2006, the
CIA refused to provide most members of Congress,
including thirteen of the fifteen senators on the
Committee, with any information about CIA
detention and interrogation activities. The CIAs
refusal to answer questions from Committee
members about KSMs interrogation is described on
p. 440.

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Comment [32]: The Committees report on pp.
446-454 details how the CIA provided inaccurate
information to the Committee, and withheld
information from the Committee, during this time
period.

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Comment [33]: The committees did in fact reach
a consensus. After all of their members were
briefed on the CIAs detention and interrogation
activities, both committees approved legislation to
ban the use of coercive interrogation by the CIA.
This legislation was approved by both the House
and the Senate, and was subsequently vetoed by
President Bush. These votes are a matter of public
record, and this process is recounted on pp. 451-453
of the Committees report.

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Comment [34]: The Department of Justice
declined to coordinate with the Committee to
identify CIA personnel who could be interviewed,
and the CIA informed the Committee that it would
not make CIA personnel available for Committee
interviews. The Committee completed its review of
CIA documents in 2012, and voted to approve the
report in December 2012.

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Comment [35]: With the exception of Mr.
Calland (who is not named in the summary report
released by the Committee on December 8) the
Committee reviewed interview transcripts or
congressional testimony from all of the authors of
this op-ed. The Committee did not formally request
interviews with the authors for its investigation, nor
did the authors contact the Committee and ask to
be interviewed.

We can only conclude that the committee members or staff did not want to risk having to deal
with data that did not fit their construct. Which is another reason why the study is so flawed.
What went on in preparing the report is clear: The staff picked up the signal at the outset that this
study was to have a certain outcome, especially with respect to the question of whether the
interrogation program produced intelligence that helped stop terrorists. The staff members then
cherry picked their way through six million pages of documents, ignoring some data and
highlighting others, to construct their argument against the programs effectiveness.
In the intelligence profession, that is called politicization.
As lamentable as the inaccuracies of the majority document areand the impact they will have
on the publics understanding of the programsome consequences are alarming:

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Comment [36]: The Committees full report is
approximately 6,700 pages, and contains
approximately 38,000 footnotes. The summary
report released on December 8 is approximately
500 pages, and contains approximately 2700
footnotes. The suggestion that the Committee
cherry-picked a handful of examples to support a
predetermined outcome does not correspond with
the length and detail of the report itself.

Many CIA officers will be concerned that being involved in legally approved sensitive actions
can open them to politically driven scrutiny and censure from a future administration.
Foreign intelligence partners will have even less confidence that Washington, already
hemorrhaging with leaks, will be able to protect their cooperation from public scrutiny. They will
cooperate less with the United States.

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Comment [37]: Again, the facts laid out in the
Committees report are not partisan and do not
serve a clear political goal they come primarily
from the CIAs own internal records. And in fact
they show that the CIA repeatedly provided
inaccurate information to senior Bush
Administration officials, as well as both Republicans
and Democrats in Congress.

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Terrorists, having acquired now the largest haven (in the Middle East and North Africa) and
string of successes they have had in a decade, will have yet another valuable recruitment tool.

Comment [38]: The United States relationships

with important foreign partners have indeed been
damaged by the CIAs use of torture. This damage
occurred several years ago, when the CIAs use of
torture was publicly exposed.

All of this means more danger for the American people and for our allies.

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Anyone who has led a U.S. intelligence agency supports strong congressional oversight. It is
essential as a check on leadership judgment in a profession that deals constantly with
uncertainty, crises and the potential for surprise. We have all experienced and benefited from that
in our careers, including at times when the judgment of overseers was critical.
When oversight works well, it is balanced, constructively critical and discreetand offers sound
recommendations. The Senate Intelligence Committees report is disrespectful of that standard.

Comment [39]: Covering up the information in

the Committees report would not deter the anti-
American terrorist groups who are already
recruiting aggressively, conducting violent
operations, and ruthlessly killing American hostages.

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Comment [40]: The way for the United States to
regain the moral high ground and rally the support
and cooperation needed to defeat international
terrorist groups is to properly reckon with the
mistakes of the past. And the way to make the CIA
stronger and more effective is to lay out and
address the serious organizational failures identified
in the Committees report.

Its fair to ask whether the interrogation program was the right policy, but the committee never
takes on this toughest of questions.

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On that important issue it is important to know that the dilemma CIA officers struggled with in

Comment [41]: The Committee clearly

concludes that coercive interrogations were not an
effective method for obtaining useful information
from CIA detainees.

the aftermath of 9/11 was one that would cause discomfort for those enamored of todays easy
simplicities: Faced with post-9/11 circumstances, CIA officers knew that many would later
question their decisionsas we now seebut they also believed that they would be morally
culpable for the deaths of fellow citizens if they failed to gain information that could stop the
next attacks.
Between 1998 and 2001, the al Qaeda leadership in South Asia attacked two U.S. embassies in

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Comment [42]: The Committees report
acknowledges the concerns that were raised by a
number of CIA officers. For example, on p. 71 the
Committee cites an email in which the CIAs chief
interrogator described the CIAs interrogation
program as a train wreak [sic] waiting to happen.

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managed another attack on the homeland in the 13 years since, despite a strong desire to do so.

Comment [43]: CIA officers were right to work

tirelessly to try to prevent additional attacks on the
United States. However, the CIAs own records
from this period contradict the CIAs claims that
coercive interrogation techniques were effective in
obtaining useful information.

The CIAs aggressive counterterrorism policies and programs are responsible for that success.

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East Africa, a U.S. warship in the port of Aden, Yemen, and the American homelandthe most
deadly single foreign attack on the U.S. in the countrys history. The al Qaeda leadership has not

Comment [44]: The CIA has played a vitally

important role in protecting the United States from
terrorist threats in the years since the 9/11 attacks.

However, if the CIAs aggressive counterterrorism
policies were read to be a synonym for the CIAs
coercive interrogation techniques, then this
sentence would be inaccurate.