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IN THE U.S.

DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
SOUTHERN DIVISION
ANDREA ANDI MOONEYHAM,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 6:14-cv-03496-MDH

v.
OZARK FIRE PROTECTION
DISTRICT,
Defendant.
SUGGESTIONS IN OPPOSITION OF DEFENDANT OZARK FIRE PROTECTION
DISTRICT TO PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
Defendant Ozark Fire Protection District (Defendant or District), by undersigned
counsel, respectfully requests, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 65, that the Court deny Plaintiffs
Motion for Preliminary Injunction as moot.

I.

Nature of the Case and Current Issue before the Court.

This is a civil action for damages based on Plaintiffs prior employment as a fire captain
in the District. Plaintiff filed her Complaint on November 24, 2014, claiming Defendants
refusal to recognize her same-sex marriage and provide the benefits provided to other married
employees and their spouses is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause and 42 U.S.C. 1983.
On December 2, 2015, Plaintiff filed with this Court a Motion for Preliminary Injunction
pursuant to Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, requesting the Court prohibit
Defendant from refusing to recognize the legal marriage of Plaintiff and ordering Defendant to
offer Plaintiff the same benefits that it offers to employees with different-sex spouses.
Subsequent to her motion, Plaintiff submitted her voluntary resignation to Defendant advising

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that her last day of employment with Defendant is January 6, 2015. Effective today, Plaintiff is
no longer employed with the Defendant.

II.

Issue.
A.

III.

Is Plaintiff entitled to a Preliminary Injunction when she is not


entitled to the relief requested?

Argument.

Defendant agrees that when considering a motion for preliminary injunction, the Court
must consider the following: (a) whether Plaintiff is likely to prevail on the merits; (b) whether
there exists a threat of irreparable harm to Plaintiff absent the injunction; (c) whether the harm to
Plaintiff outweighs the injury that granting the injunction would inflict upon Defendant; and (d)
whether the preliminary injunction is in the public interest. See Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. C L Sys.,
Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 114 (8th Cir. 1981). [T]he failure to show irreparable harm, by itself, is a
sufficient ground upon which to deny a preliminary injunction. Adam-Mellang v. Apartment
Search, Inc., 96 F.3d 297, 299 (8th Cir. 1996). Consideration of these factors does not weigh in
favor injunctive relief for the Plaintiff.

Plaintiffs voluntary resignation renders her perceived need for preliminary injunctive
relief moot, as she is not entitled to the relief she requests. Indeed, Plaintiff cannot establish
even one of the elements necessary to establish the need for a preliminary injunction. Effective
today, Plaintiff is no longer employed with the District and therefore cannot demonstrate that she
is likely to prevail on the merits, that there exists a threat of irreparable harm absent the
injunction, that the harm to Plaintiff outweighs the injury that granting the injunction would
inflict upon Defendant and that the preliminary injunction is in the public interest. Rather,
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consideration of the factors weighs heavily in favor of Defendant, as the harm inflicted upon
Defendant should the injunction be granted outweighs any harm to Plaintiff. With her
resignation, Plaintiff concedes that she will not suffer any irreparable harm.

The basis of injunctive relief in the federal courts has always been irreparable harm and
inadequacy of legal remedies. Adam-Mellang, 96 F.3d at 299; quoting Beacon Theatres, Inc. v.
Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 506-07, 79 S.Ct. 948, 954, 3 L.Ed.2d 988 (1959). Here, as in AdamMellang, Plaintiffs loss of benefits does not constitute an irreparable injury because she has an
adequate remedy at law. Id. To that end, equitable relief is not warranted here, because damages
and other relief to which Plaintiff may be entitled should she prevail on her claims will suffice.
For these reasons, Plaintiffs motion for preliminary injunction should be denied as a matter of
law.

Wherefore, Defendant Ozark Fire Protection District respectfully requests that the Court
deny Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction and grant such other relief as Defendant
Ozark Fire Protection District may show itself entitled and the Court deems to be reasonable,
appropriate, and just.

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Respectfully submitted,
Case Linden P.C.

s/Randi L. Tangney
Kevin D. Case, MO 41491; KS 14570
Randi L. Tangney, MO 60523; KS 23960
2600 Grand Boulevard, Suite 300
Kansas City, MO 64108
Tel: (816) 979-1500
Fax: (816) 979-1501
kevin.case@caselinden.com
randi.tangney@caselinden.com
Attorneys for Defendant
Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that on January 7, 2015, a true and correct copy of the above and
foregoing was served by electronic filing with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system,
which will automatically send email notification of such filing to the following attorneys of
record:
Joshua A. Block, Pro Hac Vice
ACLU Foundation
125 Broad Street, 18th Floor
New York, NY 10004
jblock@aclu.org
Attorney for Plaintiff

Gillian R. Wilcox
ACLU of Missouri Foundation
3601 Main Street
Kansas City, MO 64111
gwilcox@aclu-mo.org
Attorney for Plaintiff

Anthony E. Rothert
Grant R. Doty
Andrew McNulty
ACLU of Missouri Foundation
454 Whittier Street
St. Louis, MO 63108
arothert@aclu-mo.org
gdoty@aclu-mo.org
amcnulty@aclu-mo.org
Attorneys for Plaintiff
s/Randi L. Tangney
Randi L. Tangney

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