family" and the entire mink ranching industry. Theprosecutor stated: "It has been turned into a propertycrime and the guidelines treat it as a property crime butthat does not quite capture the offense that wascommitted by Mr. Viehl." (Tr. at 8.) The prosecutor thenrecounted the details of the crime, and referenced thewords painted on the McMullin's barn -- "We arewatching. ALF." (Tr. at 9.) In that context, he remarked,"It is not just a property crime, it is a threat." (Id.) Theprosecutor also provided the court with backgroundinformation on the Animal Liberation Front, the mannerin which the organization communicates anddisseminates information, and remarked that "when [*7]Mr. Viehl signed up to commit this crime, it was not justfor his own personal beliefs, it was for a broader purposeand a broader organization." (Tr. at 9.) He further stated,"that being the case . . . your sentencing decision willhave a much broader impact than just on Mr. Viehl." (Tr.at 9.) In conclusion, the government explained:In making this presentation, Judge, westill recommend the low end of theguidelines that you find applicable, but Ido not want the court to consider therequest made in the sentencingmemorandum in asking for an earlyrelease and walking out today after fourand a half months, and giving him creditfor pretrial supervision before Judge Wellstook that away from him.(Tr. at 10-11.)Following the government's presentation, exercisinghis rights under the Crime Victim Rights Act,
18 U.S.C. §3771
, Mr. McMullin, the victim in this case, offered alengthy statement. Mr. McMullin detailed the impact of the crime on his family, including the emotional impacton his young children, and the financial impact on hisfamily business. (Tr. at 13 to 19.)At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the courtexpressly acknowledged the government'srecommendation, [*8] stating: "I recognize thegovernment's recommendation for six months, but I don'tagree with it. I certainly don't agree with [defendant's]request for release." (Tr. at 24-25.) The court thenexpressed its intention to impose a sentence above theguideline range. In explaining why a sentence above theguidelines was appropriate in this case, the courtreferenced several relevant factors in
§ 3553
, includingthe seriousness of the offense, the need to promoterespect for the law, to provide just punishment, and toafford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct. (Tr. at24.) The court also referenced the presentenceinvestigation, which included information about twoseparate mink farm incidents beyond defendant'sconviction. (Tr. at 26.) Finally, the court remarked on thestatements of Mr. McMullin, and of the terror this type of crime inflicts on the victims. (Tr. at 22-23.) However, inorder to provide the defendant with an opportunity torespond to the court's stated intention, the courtpostponed the sentencing until December 11, 2009.Thereafter, on December 3, 2009, defendant filed thepresent Motion to Reassign Case for Sentencing Based onBreach of Plea Agreement. (Dkt. No. [*9] 83.)In the motion now before the court, the defendantclaims that the government's presentation during thesentencing hearing was inconsistent with its obligationunder the plea agreement to "recommend the low end of the guidelines." The defendant claims that the purpose of the government's argument was not simply to advocatefor a low-end guideline sentence, but rather was toencourage the court to sentence the defendant tosomething beyond what the government was obligated torecommend.In response, the government asserts that thedefendant opened the door to the government's argumentby asking for a below-guideline sentence of "timeserved." According to the government, by doing this, thegovernment was entitled to argue in support of what itbargained for in the plea agreement.
DISCUSSION
"[W]hen a plea rests in any significant degree on apromise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can besaid to be part of the inducement or consideration, suchpromise must be fulfilled."
Santobello v. New York, 404U.S. 257, 92 S. Ct. 495, 30 L. Ed. 2d 427 (1971)
;
United States v. Brye 146 F.3d 1207, 1209 (10th Cir. 1998.)
Additionally, "[i]n order to comply with the pleaagreement, the government cannot rely upon a 'rigidly[*10] literal construction of the language' of theagreement, nor may it accomplish 'through indirectmeans what it promised not to do directly'"
United Statesv. Hand, 913 F.2d 854, 856 (10th Cir. 1990)
(quoting
United States v. Shorteeth, 887 F.2d 253, 256 (10th Cir.1989))
.Page 32010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2264, *6
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