IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE UNITED STATES

Tracy A. Fair, Mary C. Miltenberger,

Petitioners,
vs.
Barack Hussein Obama, Robert L. Walker,
Chairman of the Maryland State Board of
Elections, Linda H. Lamone, State Administrator of
Elections, John P. McDonough, Maryland Secretary
of State, Jared DeMarinis, Director of the
Candidacy and Campaign Finance Division,
Maryland State Board of Elections,
Respondents.

Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the

Maryland Court of Appeals

Petition for Writ of Certiorari

Tracy A. Fair
Petitioner
19 W Obrecht Rd
Sykesville, MD. 21784
410-552-5907

Question Presented For Review

Petitioner filed suit in January 2012 to
remove Barack Hussein Obama, II from all
Maryland ballots because he did not meet the
requirements of a natural born Citizen under
Article II, Section 1, clause 5 of the Constitution.
While this issue vis-a-vis Barack Hussein Obama, II
may now be moot, it is a classic example of an
important issue being capable of repetition, but
evading review. Given the looming Presidential
election in which at least three (3) declared
candidates are arguably not natural born Citizens,
presented for review is the following question:
WHETHER, given that the phrase natural
born Citizen appears just once in the Constitution
and the word citizen appears twenty-one (21)
times a priori prohibiting conflating the two the
question of the exact meaning of the heretofore
never defined by this Court legal-term-of-art
natural born Citizen presents a case of
extraordinary constitutional moment demanding
prompt resolution by this Court.

- ii -

Table of Contents
Questions Presented for Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
Table of Authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
Opinion below . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Jurisdiction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Constitutional Provisions, Treaties, Statutes,
Ordinances and Regulations Involved . . . . . 2
Statement of the Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Reason for Granting the Writ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
I.

The Meaning of "natural born Citizen"

Is a Question of Extraordinary
Constitutional Moment and Demands
Prompt Resolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

II.

The Phrase natural born Citizen Has

Yet to Be Defined by this Court . . . . . . . . . . 6

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Contents of Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-1
The August 27, 2012, opinion of the
Circuit Court for Carroll County,
Maryland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-2

- iii -

The April 7, 2014, opinion of the Maryland

Special Court of Appeals . . . . . . . . . . . . A-21
The May 14, 2014, opinion of the Maryland
Special Court of Appeals . . . . . . . . . . . . A-35
The August 28, 2014, opinion of the Court of
Appeals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-36
The November 20, 2014, opinion of the
Court of Appeals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-38

- iv -

Table of Authorities
Cases

Ankeny v. Governor of Indiana, 916 N.E.2d

678 (Ind. App., 2009) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126, 130 (1922)

.................................... 8

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) . . . 6

Minor v. Happersett, 88 (21 Wall.) U.S. 162,

167(1874) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219

U.S. 498, 515 (1911) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898) 3

United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 686-687
(1974) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Walters v. Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation, 473 U.S.

305, 351 (1985) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Other Authorities

The Law of Nations, Emerich de Vattel, 1758,

Chapter 19, 212 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

-1-

Petition for Writ of Certiorari to

the Maryland Court of Appeals
Petitioner, Tracy A. Fair, prays that a writ of
certiorari issue to review the judgment and opinion
of the Maryland Court of Appeals entered on
November 20, 2014.
Review is mandated because of the public
importance of the issue presented and the need for
that issues prompt resolution.
Opinion Below
The August 27, 2012, opinion of the Circuit
Court for Carroll County, Maryland is reprinted in
the appendix hereto, Appendix-2.
The April 7, 2014, opinion of the Maryland
Special Court of Appeals is reprinted in the
appendix hereto, Appendix-21.
The May 14, 2014, opinion of the Maryland
Special Court of Appeals denying rehearing is
reprinted in the appendix hereto, Appendix-35.
The August 28, 2014, opinion of the Court of
Appeals is reprinted in the appendix hereto,
Appendix-36.
The November 20, 2014, opinion of the Court
of Appeals denying rehearing is reprinted in the
appendix hereto, Appendix-38.

-2-

Jurisdiction
The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked
under Article III of the United States Constitution
and 28 U.S.C. 1257. Jurisdiction in the Circuit
Court was invoked pursuant to Maryland Code,
Courts and Judicial Proceedings Title 3, Subtitle 4
Declaratory Judgment.
Constitutional Provisions, Treaties, Statutes,
Ordinances and Regulations Involved
Article II, 1, clause 5:
No Person except a natural born
Citizen, or a Citizen of the United
States, at the time of the Adoption of
this Constitution, shall be eligible to
the Office of President; neither shall
any person be eligible to that Office
who shall not have attained to the Age
of thirty five Years, and been fourteen
Years a Resident within the United
States.
Statement of the Case
On January 26, 2012, Petitioner Tracy Fair
(Fair) filed a Complaint for Declaratory
Judgment and Injunctive Relief against Barack
Hussein Obama, II (Obama) for perjury. On
March 19, 2012, Fairs Amended Complaint was
timely filed within the 10 day period required by

-3-

Maryland Election Law 12-202 in which she sought

a declaratory judgment preventing Obama from
holding the franchise of being on the Maryland
ballot for President in 2012. The Amended
Complaint alleged that: (i) Obama was not a
natural born Citizen of the United States as
required by Article II, 1, Clause 5, of the U.S.
Constitution and (ii) there was probable cause to
believe Obamas claim that he was born within the
United States was based solely upon forged
documents. On August 27, 2012, the Circuit Court
dismissed Fairs Amended Complaint. Appendix2.
Accordingly, the federal question regarding the
definition of natural born Citizen was raised by
Fair in the Circuit Court and was passed on by that
Court in its Order of Dismissal.
In particular, holding that Obama was a
natural born Citizen, the Circuit Court concluded:
The issue of the definition of natural born
citizen is thus firmly resolved by the United
States Supreme Court . . . Appendix-18. That
conclusion was based upon the Circuit Courts in
toto adoption of the decision in Ankeny v. Governor
of Indiana, 916 N.E.2d 678 (Ind. App., 2009), in
which the Court of Appeals of Indiana held that
Obama was a natural born Citizen and thus
eligible to be President.
In that opinion, the Ankeny court cited this
Courts opinions in Minor v. Happersett, 88 (21
Wall.) U.S. 162, 167(1874) and U.S. v. Wong Kim
Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898) for the proposition that

-4-

Article II, 1s natural born Citizen phrase and

the twenty-one (21) times that just citizen is used
in the Constitution were meant by the Framers to
be considered synonymous and thus could be
conflated.
On April 7, 2014, the Court of Special Appeals
affirmed the Circuit Courts dismissal. Appendix21.
Fairs motion to reconsider was denied by the Court
of Special Appeals on May 14, 2014. Appendix-35.
On August 28, 2014, the Maryland Court of
Appeals denied certiorari. Appendix-36. Thereafter,
on November 20, 2014, the Maryland Court of
Appeals denied rehearing. Appendix-38.
Reason for Granting the Writ
There is only one compelling reason for
granting this Petition: The question of the meaning
of natural born Citizen is one which ultimately
must be heard and determined by this Court at the
earliest possible date. Looming on the horizon is
another Presidential election in which other
declared candidates Ted Cruz, Marco Rubio and
Bobby Jindal with unresolved natural born
Citizen status will be part of the public election
process. To allow delay in the resolution of this
seminal Constitutional question would be manifestly
against the best interests of the public.
Accordingly, a state court has decided an
important question of federal law that has not been,

-5-

but should be, settled by this Court.

I.

The Meaning of natural born Citizen Is a

Question of Extraordinary Constitutional
Moment and Demands Prompt Resolution

In order to be eligible to be President of the

United States, Article II, 1, clause 5 of the U.S.
Constitution requires: No person except a natural
born Citizen . . ., shall be eligible to the Office of
President. The phrase natural born Citizen is an
18th Century legal-term-of-art with a definite
meaning well known to the Framers of the
Constitution. At the time of the adoption of the
Constitution, that phrase was defined as: The
natives, or natural-born citizens, are those born in
the country, of parents who are citizens. (The Law
of Nations, Emerich de Vattel, 1758, Chapter 19,
212). Therefore, per Vattel, there are two
requirements to be President: (i) born in the United
States (ii) of two parents, both of whom must have
been United States citizens at the time of the birth.
The circumstances of the births of declared
Presidential candidates Senators Marco Rubio and
Ted Cruz, and Governor Bobby Jindal implicate
whether or not they are in fact natural born
Citizens. Rubio and Jindal were born in the
United States to parents who were not United
States citizens at the time of their respective births.
Ted Cruz was born in Canada to parents only one of
whom (his mother) was a United States citizen.
Under the law existing at the time of their birth,

-6-

each became a citizen of the United States at

birth. Marco Rubio and Bobby Jindal by the 14th
Amendment, Ted Cruz by statute. But are they
natural born Citizens eligible to be President?
Clearly, when the public interest is at play,
the ability of this Court to act swiftly is certain and
regularly exercised. Cf: Walters v. Nat'l Ass'n of
Radiation, 473 U.S. 305, 351 (1985)(This Court has
not hesitated to exercise this power of swift
intervention in cases of extraordinary constitutional
moment and in cases demanding prompt resolution
for other reasons.); United States v. Nixon, 418
U.S. 683, 686-687 (1974)(We granted both the
United States' petition for certiorari before
judgment and also the President's cross-petition for
certiorari because of the public importance of the
issues presented and the need for their prompt
resolution).
Here, what greater question of public
importance demanding prompt resolution can
there be than whether considerable time and money
will be spend on candidates who may not be eligible
for the office of President of the United States?
II.

The Phrase natural born Citizen

Has Yet to Be Defined by this Court

Chief Justice John Marshall, in delivering the

opinion of the Court in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
137, 177 (1803) stated: It cannot be presumed that
any clause in the constitution is intended to be

-7-

without effect; and therefore such construction is

inadmissible, unless the words require it. Here,
that clause of natural born Citizen so distinct
from the rest of the twenty-one (21) times citizen
is employed in the Constitution has not been
clearly defined by this Court.
When this Court has defined the words,
citizen or citizenship, no other meaning was
implied other than, membership of a nation,
whereas, the natural-born Citizen clause only
pertains to a requirement for holding Presidential
office. Only those who are natural-born Citizens
meet that qualification; but all who are citizens
whether (i) natural-born, (ii) naturalized abroad,
(iii) naturalized here, (iv) at birth, or (v) later in life,
are members of this Nation. The word citizen,
according to this Courts opinion in Minor, refers to
membership of a nation, and nothing more.
Indeed: The Constitution does not, in words,
say who shall be natural-born citizens. Resort must
be had elsewhere to ascertain that. Wong Kim Ark
at 655. Yet to date, this Court has not taken that
resort to definitely resolve this now-pressing
question.

-8-

Conclusion
Petitioner has the right, possessed by every
citizen, to require that the Government be
administered according to law and that the public
moneys be not Wasted. Fairchild v. Hughes, 258
U.S. 126, 130 (1922).
This case is one that truly is capable of
repetition, yet evading review. Southern Pacific
Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911).
Accordingly, this Court must act swiftly to review
the case below and thereby finally determine the
seminal question of the definition of natural born
Citizen prior to the Presidential election of 2016.
Accordingly, upon the foregoing, this Court
must issue a writ of certiorari to the Maryland
Court of Appeals.
Tracy A. Fair
Petitioner
19 W Obrecht Rd
Sykesville, MD. 21784

A-1
Contents of Appendix
Opinions Below
The August 27, 2012, opinion of the Circuit
Court for Carroll County, Maryland . . . . . . A-2
The April 7, 2014, opinion of the Maryland
Special Court of Appeals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-21
The May 14, 2014, opinion of the Maryland
Special Court of Appeals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-35
The August 28, 2014, opinion of the Court of
Appeals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-36
The November 20, 2014, opinion of the
Court of Appeals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-38

A-2
In the Circuit Court for
Carroll County, Maryland
Case No.: 06-C-2012-060692
Tracy Fair, et al,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Barack Hussein Obama, II, et al,
Defendants.
Opinion
This matter came on for trial before the Court
on August 17, 2012 on Plaintiffs Complaint for
Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief filed
with this Court on January 26, 2012, seeking relief
to remove Defendant, Barack Hussein Obama, II
(hereinafter President Obama) from the Maryland
ballot for the forthcoming Presidential Primary
Election, stating as a reason that President Obama
was not a natural born citizen of the United States
and not eligible to be placed on the ballot. That
Complaint was amended on March 19, 2012, an
additional Plaintiff was added, as well as numerous
State officers as parties Defendant relative to this
issue. A Motion to Dismiss, together with
supporting Memorandum was filed on April 27, 2012
by the State.

A-3
Defendant State Board of Elections argues that
Section 8-502(c)(2) has been followed, with the
certification of President Obama. The Attorney
General representing the State Defendants argues
that what is sought by Plaintiffs, TRACY FAIR
(hereinafter "Ms. Fair") and MARY C.
MILTENBERGER (hereinafter "Ms. Miltenberger")
is to have President Obama declared not to be a
natural born citizen of the United States, and
therefore, may not be certified in accordance with
that section.
The issue of President Obamas birth certificate
and whether or not he was born in the United
States has been floating about since his first election
campaign, and has generated prior litigation
incidental to his first election. In Ankeny v.
Governor of Indiana, Ind. App. LEXIS 2436, 916
N.E.2d 678 (2009), the Court of Appeals of Indiana
dealt at length with a general challenge to the
Obama candidacy; and in a well written analysis,
that Court traced the history of the concept of
"natural born citizen" applicable to the Plaintiffs
contentions. Basically, the Plaintiffs argue that
President Obama does not meet the definition of
natural born citizen, because his parents were both
not United States citizens at the time of his birth. It
is further argued that he himself may not have been
born in the United States and therefore is
disqualified. Both prongs of the argument are
addressed by the Indiana Court and the appropriate
portion is stated as follows:

A-4
B. Natural Born Citizen
Second, the Plaintiffs argue that both President
Barack Obama and Senator John McCain are
not "natural born Citizens" as required for
qualification to be President under Article II,
Section l , Clause 49 of the U.S. Constitution,
and that therefore because neither person was
constitutionally eligible to become President,
"[t]he Governor . . should [have been] prohibited
by order of [the trial court] . . . from issuing any
certificate of ascertainment, or any other
certified statement, under the State Seal of the
State of Indiana . . . ." Appellants' Appendix at
13.
Before addressing the Plaintiffs' specific
arguments, we think it helpful to point out the
context in which this claim arises. Leading up to
the 2008 Presidential Election and in the
ensuing months after, a number of lawsuits
were filed nationwide challenging both
President Barack Obama and Senator John
McCain's10 status as ''natural born Citizens"

9
The Plaintiffs cite the "natural born Citizen"
clause as Article II, Section 1, Clause 5 of the U.S.
Constitution, but it is properly cited as Article II,
Section 1, Clause 4. See also Ind. Code 3-8-1-6
10
The United States Senate passed a resolution
on April 30, 2008 which explicitly recognized Senator

A-5
under Article II of the U.S. Constitution. Sec,
e.g., Berg v. Obama, 574 F. Supp. 2d 509 (E.D.
Pa. 2008); Hollander v. McCain, 566 F. Supp. 2d
63 (D.N.H. 2008); Cohen v. Obama, No.

John McCain as a natural born citizen. S.J. Res. 511,

110th Cong. (2008). Also, the supposed authority cited
by the Plaintiffs to support their claim as to the
meaning of Article II, Section I, Clause 4 of the U.S.
Constitution does not support the argument that John
McCain is not a natural born citizen. Plaintiffs state
in their brief that the difference between being a
"citizen of the United States" and a natural born
Citizen "involves having [two] parents of U.S.
Citizenship, owing no foreign allegiance." Appellant's
Brief at 23. The plaintiffs then concede that "John
McCain ... qualifie[s] as a 'citizen of the United States,'
by being born of [two] parents who were in turn
'citizens of the United States.' by being born of [two]
parents who were in turn citizens of the United
States, and owed no foreign allegiance ...." Id. Their
brief continues that "John McCain was born 'subject to
the jurisdiction' of the United States, but he was not
born in one of the 50 States of the Union under Article
IV of the Constitution, and thus... was not a 'natural
born Citizen .... Id. At 23-24. Plaintiffs do not cite to
any authority or develop any cogent legal argument
for the proposition that a person must actually be
born within one of the fifty States in order to qualify
as a natural born citizen, and we therefore do not
address Plaintiffs argument as it relates to Senator
McCain. See Loomis, 764 N.E. 2d at 668.

A-6
08-2150, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS l00011, 2008
WL 5191864 (D.D.C. Dec. 11 , 2008), aff dty 332
Fed. Appx. 640, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 20139,
2009 WL 2870668 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 8, 2009):
Wrotnowski v. Bysiewicz, 289 Conn. 522, 958
A.2d 709 (Conn. 2008). As to President Obama's
status, the most common argument has been
waged by members of the so-called "birther"
movement who suggest that the President was
not born in the United States; they support
their argument by pointing to "the President's
alleged refusal to disclose publicly an official
birth certificate that is satisfactory to [the
birthers].'' Rhodes v. MacDonald, No.
4:09-CV-106, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84743,
2009 WL 2997605, at *1 (M.D. Ga. Sept. 16,
2009). reconsideration denied, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 85485, 2009 WL 31 11834 (M.D. Ga.
Sept. 18. 2009)
The Plaintiffs in the instant case make a
different legal argument based strictly on
constitutional interpretation. Specifically, the
crux of the Plaintiffs' argument is that
"[c]ontrary to the thinking of' most People on
the subject, there's a very clear distinction
between a 'citizen of' the United States' and a
'natural born Citizen,' and the difference
involves having [two] parents of U.S.
citizenship, owing no foreign allegiance.''
Appellants' Brief at 23. With regard to President
Barack Obama, the Plaintiffs posit that because
his father was a citizen of the United Kingdom,

A-7
President Obama is constitutionally ineligible to
assume the Office of the President.
The bases of the Plaintiffs' arguments come
from such sources as FactCheck.org, The Rocky
Mountain News, an eighteenth century treatise
by Emmerich de Vattel titled "The Law of
Nations," and various citations to nineteenth
century congressional debate.11 For the reasons
stated below, we hold that the Plaintiffs'
arguments fail to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted, and that therefore the trial
court did not err in dismissing the Plaintiffs'
complaint.
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution governs who is a citizen of the
United States. It provides that "[a]ll persons
born or naturalized in the United States and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of
the United States . . . ." U.S. CONST. amend
XIV. 1. Article II has a special requirement to
assume the Presidency: that the person be a
''natural born Citizen." U.S. CONST. art. II, 1,
c1. 4. The United States Supreme Court has
read these two provisions in tandem and held
that "[t]hus new citizens may be born or they
may be created by naturalization." Minor v.

11
Plaintiffs do not provide pinpoint citations to
the congressional debate quotations to which they
cite.

A-8

Happersett, 88 (21 Wall.) U.S. 162, 167, 22 L.

Ed. 627 (1874). In Minor, written only six years
after the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified,
the Court observed that:

The Constitution docs not, in words, say who

shall be natural-born citizens. Resort must
be had elsewhere to ascertain that. At
common-law, with the nomenclature of
which the framers of the Constitution were
familiar, it was never doubted that all
children born in a country of parents who
were its citizens became themselves, upon
their birth, citizens also. These were natives,
or natural-born citizens, as distinguished
from aliens or foreigners. Some authorities
go further and include as citizens children
born within the jurisdiction without
reference to the citizenship or their parents.
As to this class there have been doubts, but
never as to the first. For the purposes of this
case it is not necessary to solve these doubts.
Id. at 167-168. Thus, the Court left open the
issue of whether a person who is born within
the United States of alien parents is
considered a natural horn citizen.12

12
Note that the Court in Minor contemplates only
scenarios where both parents are either citizens or
aliens, rather in the case of President Obama, whose
mother was a U.S. citizen and father was a citizen of
the United Kingdom.

A-9
Then, in U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649,
18 S. Ct. 456, 42 L. Ed. 890 (1898), the United
States Supreme Court confronted the question
of ''whether a child born in the United States, of
parents of Chinese descent, who at the time of
his birth are subject to the emperor of China . . .
becomes at the time of his birth a citizen of the
United States, by virtue of the first clause of the
fourteenth amendment . . . .'' 169 U.S. at 653, 18
S. Ct. at 458. We find this case instructive. The
Court in Wong Kim Ark reaffirmed Minor in
that the meaning of the words "citizen of the
United States and "natural-born citizen of the
United States'' "must be interpreted in the light
of the common law, the principles and history of
which were familiarly known to the framers of
the constitution. Id. at 654, 18 S. Ct. at 459.
They noted that "[t]he interpretation of the
constitution or the United States is necessarily
influenced by the fact that its provisions are
framed in the language of the English common
law, and are to be read in the light of its
history." Id. at 655, 18 S. Ct. at 459 (quoting
Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465, 478, 8 S. Ct.
564, 569. 31 L. Ed. 508 (1888)). The Wong Kim
Ark Court explained:
The fundamental principle of the common
law with regard to English nationality was
birth within the allegiance-also called
ligealty, obedience, faith, or power-of
the king. The principle embraced all persons
born within the king's allegiance, and subject

A-10
to his protection. Such allegiance and
protection were mutual as expressed in the
maxim, Protectio trahit subjectionem, et
subjectio protectionem, and were not
restricted to natural-born subjects and
naturalized subjects, or to those who had
taken an oath of allegiance; but were
predicable of aliens in amity, so long as they
were within the kingdom. Children, born in
England, of such aliens, were therefore
natural-born subjects. But the children, born
within the realm, of foreign ambassadors, or
the children of alien enemies, born during
and within their hostile occupation of part of
the king's dominions, were not natural-born
subjects, because not born within the
allegiance, the obedience, or the power, or,
as would be said at this day, within the
jurisdiction, of the king.
This fundamental principle, with these
qualifications or explanations of it, was
clearly, though quaintly, stated in the
leading case known as 'Calvin's Case,' or the
'Case or the Postnati,' decided in 1608, after
a hearing in the exchequer chamber before
the lord chancellor and all the judges of
England, and reported by Lord Coke and by
Lord Ellesmere. Calvin's Case, 7 Coke, 4b-6a,
18a, 18b., Ellesmere, Postnati, 62-64., s. c. 2
How. St. Tr. 559, 607, 613-617, 639, 640,
659, 679.

A-11
The English authorities ever since are to the
like effect. Co. Lift, 8a, 128b, Lord Hale, in
Harg. Law Tracts, 210, and in 1 Hale, P. C. 6
1, 62., 1 Bl. Comm. 366, 369, 370, 374., 4 Bl.
Comm. 74, 92., Lord Kenyon, in Doe v.
Jones, 4 Tenn R. 300, 308., Cockb. Nat. 7.,
Dicey. Confl. Laws, pp. 173-177, 174.
Lord Chief Justice Cockburn . . . said: By the
common law of England, every person born
within the dominions of the crown, no
matter whether of English or of foreign
parents, and, in the latter case, whether the
parents were settled, or merely temporarily
sojourning, in the country, was an English
subject, save only the children of foreign
ambassadors (who were excepted because
their fathers carried their own nationality
with them), or a child born to a foreigner
during the hostile occupation of any part of
the territories of England. No effect appears
to have been given to descent as a source of
nationality.' Cockb. Nat. 7.
Mr. Dicey, in his careful and thoughtful
Digest of the Law of England with Reference
to the Conflict of Laws, published in 1896,
states the following propositions, his
principal rules being printed below in italics:
British subject means any person who
owes permanent allegiance to the crown.
'Permanent' allegiance is used to distinguish
the allegiance of a British subject from the

A-12
allegiance of an alien, who, because he is
within the British dominions, owes
'temporary' allegiance to the crown. 'Natural-

born British subject' means a British subject

who has become a British subject at the
moment of his birth. Subject to the
exceptions hereinafter mentioned, any
person who (whatever the nationality of his
parents) is born within the British
dominions is a natural-born British subject.

This rule contains the leading principle of

English law on the subject of British
nationality.' The exceptions afterwards
mentioned by Mr. Dicey are only these two:
'(1) Any person who (his father being an
alien enemy) is born in a part of the British
dominions, which at the time of such
person's birth is in hostile occupation, is an
alien.' '(2) Any person whose father (being an
alien) is at the time of such person's birth an
ambassador or other diplomatic agent
accredited to the crown by the sovereign of a
foreign state is (though born within the
British dominions) an alien.' And he adds:
The exceptional and unimportant instances
in which birth within the British dominions
does not of itself confer British nationality
are due to the fact that, though at common
law nationality or allegiance in substance
depended on the place of a person's birth, it
in theory at least depended, not upon the
locality of a man's birth, but upon his being
born within the jurisdiction and allegiance of

A-13
the king of England; and it might
occasionally happen that a person was born
within the dominions without being born
within the allegiance, or, in other words,
under the protection and control of the
crown.' Dicey, Confl. Laws, pp. 173-177, 741.
It thus clearly appears that by the law or
England for the last three centuries,
beginning before the settlement of this
country and continuing to the present day,
aliens, while residing in the dominions
possessed by the crown of England, were
within the allegiance, the obedience, the
faith or loyalty, the protection, the power,
and the jurisdiction of the English
sovereign; and therefore every child born in
England of alien parents was a natural-born
subject, unless the child of an ambassador or
other diplomatic agent of a foreign state, or
of an alien enemy in hostile occupation of the
place where the child was born.
III. The same rule was in force in all the
English colonies upon this continent down to
the time of the Declaration of Independence,
and in the United States afterwards, and
continued to prevail under the constitution
as originally established.13

13
According to Westlaw, Wong Kim Ark has been
cited to in over l,000 cases.

A-14

Id. at 655-658, 18 S. Ct. at 459-460.

Also, as quoted in Wong Kim Ark, Justice
Joseph Story once declared in Inglis v. Trustees
of Sailors' Snug Harbor, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 99, 7 L.
Ed. 617 (1830), that "Nothing is better settled at
the common law than the doctrine that the
children, even of aliens, born in a country, while
the parents are resident there under the
protection of the government, and owing a
temporary allegiance thereto, are subjects by
birth." Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 660, 18 S. Ct.
at 461 (quoting Inglis, 28 U.S. (3 Pct.) at 164
(Story, J., concurring)). The Court also cited
Justice Curtis's dissent in Dred Scott v.
Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 15 L. Ed. 691
(1856).
The first section of' the second article of the
constitution uses the language, 'a natural-born
citizen.' It thus assumes that citizenship may be
acquired by birth. Undoubtedly, this language of
the constitution was used in reference to that
principle of public law, well understood in this
country at the time of the adoption of the
constitution, which referred citizenship to the
place of birth. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 662,
18 S. Ct. at 462 (quoting Dred Scott, 60 C.S. (19
IIow.) at 576 (Curtis, J., dissenting)).
The Court in Wong Kim Ark also cited authority
which notes that: All persons born in the
allegiance of the king are natural-born subjects,

A-15
and all persons born in the allegiance of the
United States are natural-born citizens. Birth
and allegiance go together. Such is the rule of
the common law, and it is the common law of
this country, as well as of England. We find no
warrant for the opinion that this great principle
of the common law has ever been changed in the
United States. It has always obtained here with
the same vigor, and subject only to the same
exceptions, since as before the Revolution. Id. at
662-663, 18 S. Ct. at 462 (quotations and
citations omitted). The Court held that Mr.
Wong Kim Ark was a citizen of the United
States "at the time of his birth."14 Id. at 705. 18
S. Ct. at 478.
Based upon the language of' Article II, Section
1, Clause 4 and the guidance provided by Wong
Kim Ark, we conclude that persons born within

We note the fact that the Court in Wong Kim

Ark did not actually pronounce the plaintiff a "natural
born Citizen" using the Constitution's Article II
language is immaterial. For all but forty-four people
in our nation's history (the forty-four Presidents), the
dichotomy between who is a natural born citizen and
who is a naturalized citizen under the Fourteenth
Amendment is irrelevant. The issue addressed in
Wong Kim Ark was whether Mr. Wong Kim Ark was
a citizen of the United States on the basis that he was
born in the United States. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at
705, 18 S. Ct. at 478.
14

A-16
the borders of the United States are "natural
born Citizens" for Article II, Section 1 purposes,
regardless of the citizenship of their parents.
Just as a person "born within the British
dominions [was] a natural-born British subject"
at the time of the framing of the U.S.
Constitution, so too were those ''born in the
allegiance of the United States natural-born
citizens.15
The Plaintiffs do not mention the above United
States Supreme Court authority in their
complaint or brief; they primarily rely instead
on an eighteenth century treatise and
quotations of Members of Congress made during
the nineteenth century. To the extent that these
authorities conflict with the United States
Supreme Court's interpretation of what it
means to be a natural born citizen, we believe
that the Plaintiffs' arguments fall under the

15
We reiterate that we do not address the
question of natural born citizen status for persons
who became United States citizens at birth by virtue
of being born of United States citizen parents. despite
the fact that they were born abroad. That question
was not properly presented to this court. Without
addressing the question, however, we note that
nothing in our opinion today should be understood to
hold that being born within the fifty United States is
the only way one can receive natural born citizen
status.

A-17
category of "conclusory, non-factual assertions
or legal conclusions" that we need not accept as
true when reviewing the grant of a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim. Irish, 864
LE.2d at 1120. Thus, we cannot say that the
trial court erred when it dismissed the
Plaintiffs' case.16 See generally McCalment v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 860 N.E.2d 884 (Ind. Ct. App.
2007)(holding that the plaintiffs' arguments had
been sufficiently addressed by Indiana Supreme
Court precedent and therefore the trial court
did not err when it granted the defendant's
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim

16
We note that President Obama is not the first
U.S. President born of parents of differing citizenship.
Chester A. Arthur, the twenty-first U.S. President,
was born of a mother who was a United States citizen
and a father who was an Irish citizen. See: Thomas C.
Reeves, Gentleman Boss, The Life of Chester Alan
Arthur 3-4 ( 1975). During the election of 1880, there
arose a rumor [that Arthur] had been born in Canada,
rather than in Vermont as he claimed, and was thus
constitutionally ineligible to become the Chief
Executive." Id. at 3. Although President Arthur's
status as a natural born citizen was challenged in the
1880 Presidential Election on the grounds that he was
born in Canada rather than Vermont. the argument
was not made that because Arthurs father was an
Irish citizen he was constitutionally ineligible to be
President. See generally id.

A-18
upon which relief can be granted); see also, e.g.,
DiaznSalazar v. INS, 700 F.2d 1156, 1160 (7th
Cir. 1983)(noting in its recitation of the facts
that despite the fact father was not a citizen of
the United States, he had children who were
"natural-born citizens of the United States''),
cert. denied 462 U.S. 1132, 103 S. Ct . 3112, 77
L. Ed. 2d 1367 (1983).

The issue of the definition of "natural born

citizen" is thus firmly resolved by the United
States Supreme Court in a prior opinion, and as
this Court sees it, that holding is binding on the
ultimate issue in this case. While Ms. Fair and Ms.
Miltenberger may disagree with the holding of the
Supreme Court, from a perspective of stare decisis,
the only means by which an opinion of the Supreme
Court concerning substantive law can be overturned
is either by a subsequent holding of the Supreme
Court or an amendment to the U. S. Constitution.
Both have occurred in the past on very rare
occasions, but this Court does not believe that it has
the discretion to simply disregard a holding which
clearly applies to the definition of "natural born
citizen" as it applies to President Obama.
Further, an interesting issue arises in the
Indiana case, which given the holding in the Ankeny
case need not reach, but which this Court believes
worthy of mention. Ultimately it is the electors and
not the voters who elect the President of the United
States. That leads to a fair argument that it is the
electors assembled in their respective state capitols,

A-19
as prescribed in the Constitution, who would, of
necessity, ultimately pass on President Obama's
eligibility to be reelected to that office. The further
corollary to that argument is that Plaintiffs Fair
and Miltenberger need to address how President
Obama's prior election, his completion of the
Electoral College process, and his inauguration may
not operate to bar the relief they now seek. The
ultimate issue appears to be settled by the definition
of the Supreme Court of the United States of the
term "natural born citizen," and that would appear
to be dispositive of the matter.
Still remaining among the issues that must be
considered is the contention by the Plaintiffs that in
some manner President Obama's birth certificate is
not genuine. From a complete review of the
pleadings and related exhibits as filed in this case,
the Court cannot conclude that the Amended
Complaint filed by the Plaintiffs states a cause of
action in this regard upon which relief can be
granted, particularly in the absence of verified proof
that the birth certificate exhibited by President
Obama is not genuine. While the Plaintiffs'
arguments could raise issues of fact as to whether or
not the birth certificate is genuine, the presence or
absence of a birth certificate confirming a birth in
the United States is not dispositive of that issue. In
other words, the question is whether or not
President Obama was born in the United States and
not whether or not he has a birth certificate
confirming his birth in the United States. While, in
most cases, both are present in the case of anyone

A-20
born here, it is possible, through some error or any
number of explanations, why a birth certificate
would not reflect precisely the location of a person's
birth.
Lastly, this Court finds persuasive the
argument that the Amended Complaint filed by the
Plaintiffs is barred by the doctrine of laches.
Clearly, the time requirements of Section 12-202 of
the Election Law Article of the Annotated Code of
Maryland were not met in this case, and the Court
finds that all contentions set forth in the Motion
filed by the State Defendants are supported by the
matters of record in this case.
The Court will therefore dismiss the Amended
Complaint filed by the Plaintiffs in this matter
without leave to amend, and require the Plaintiffs to
pay the costs of is action.
/s/ THOMAS F. STANSFIELD, JUDGE

A-21
UNREPORTED
In the Court of Special Appeals
Nos. 1287
September Term, 2012
Tracy Fair et al.
Appellants,
vs.
Robert L. Walker et al.
Appellees.
_______________________/
Wright,
Nazarian,
Davis, Arrie W. (Retired, Specially Assigned),
JJ.
_____________
Opinion by Nazarian, J.
_____________
Filed: April 7, 2014
In the weeks preceding the 2012 Maryland
presidential primary election, Tracy Fair and Mary
Miltenberger (together, "Appellants") filed suit, first
against President Barack Obama, then against
several Maryland election officials. The lawsuit
challenged President Obama's eligibility to run for

A-22
re-election and objected to the Maryland primary
election ballot listing his name as an eligible
candidate. The Circuit Court for Carroll County
dismissed the lawsuit on the ground (among others)
of laches. We agree with the circuit court that
Appellants had no excuse for filing their suit so late
in the election process and that their delay
prejudiced the Maryland State Board of Elections
("State Board) and the voting public, and so we
affirm the circuit court's decision to dismiss the case
for laches. We need not and do not address
Appellants' other arguments.
I.

BACKGROUND

Maryland Secretary of State John P.

McDonough certified President Obama for inclusion
on the 2012 Democratic Maryland Presidential
Primary ballots on January 10, 2012. Appellants
filed this suit against President Obama on January
26, 2012, challenging Mr. Obama's eligibility to
serve as President. Importantly, the original
complaint named the President as the sole
defendant and did not name the State Board or any
Maryland official. On March 19, 2012, Appellants
filed an Amended Complaint For Declaratory
Judgment And Injunctive Relief' that dropped
President Obama as a defendant but added new
claims and new parties (there were no defendants
common to the two complaints). The March 19
complaint named Secretary of State McDonough
and other state election officials: Robert L. Walker,
the Chairman of the State Board; Linda H. Lamone,

A-23
the State Administrator of Elections; and Jane
DeMarinis, another State Board official (together,
"Appellees"). Appellees were served with copies of
the lawsuit on March 27, 2012, one week before the
Maryland presidential primary elections on April 3,
2012. On April 27, 2012, Appellees moved to dismiss
on a variety of grounds, including laches flowing
from the timing of the amended complaint. The
circuit court held a hearing and entered an order
granting the motion to dismiss on August 27, 2012,
citing, among other things, laches arising from
Appellants' delay in bringing suit. Appellants filed a
timely notice of appeal on September 6, 2012.1

1
Appellants list the following Questions
Presented in their brief: 1. Whether the Court erred in
deciding the time requirements under 9-209 and
12-202 of the Election Law Article, had not been met.
2. Whether the Court was misguided in its definition
of natural born citizen, by citing a case, which
obtusely admits itself, that it did not correctly
interpret Supreme Court case of [United States v.
Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898). 3. Whether [the
trial judge] erred in his agreement, that EL [8-502
was the only statute appellees were required to follow,
on verifying candidate eligibility[.] 4. Whether the
misconstruing of the definition of natural born citizen,
contributed to the court's belief that defendants had
properly followed the law[.] 5. Whether Barack
Obama's birth certificate is a computer generated
forgery and if so, is he still eligible for the Presidency.

A-24
II. DISCUSSION
On appeal, Appellants challenge the decision of
the circuit court to dismiss their suit contesting
President Obama's eligibility to appear on the
primary election ballot in Maryland. We start with
the statutory process of certifying candidates and
end with the doctrine of laches.
A. The Amended Complaint Was Filed And
Served Late In The Election Process.
Most candidates for public office must file a
certificate of candidacy-an under-oath filing
detailing information about the candidate-as a
prerequisite to appearing on the ballot. Md. Code
(2003, 2010 Repl. Vol.), 5-30l(a) of the Election
Law Article EL").2 Most, that is, but not all: the

2
The required contents of a certificate of
candidacy are enumerated in EL 5-304(c) and
include: (1) the office, including, if applicable, the
party, district, and circuit to which the candidacy
relates; (2) the year of the election; (3) the name of the
individual filing the certificate; (4) the address on the
statewide voter registration list or the current address
of that individual; (5) a statement that the individual
satisfies the requirements of law for candidacy for the
office for which the certificate is being filed; and (6)
any information requested by the State Board to
verify the accuracy of the information provided by the
individual under this subsection.

A-25
statute that creates the general filing requirement
also exempts certain categories of candidates from
it, among them candidates for President of the
United States who are nominated by a national
party convention. EL 5-301(g). National-party
Presidential candidates are exempt because the
Election Law Article, through EL 5 5-601 and
8-502(c), recognizes another method of qualifying
candidates for that office on the primary ballot.
Under EL 5-601(2), the name of a presidential
candidate nominated at a national party convention
remains on the ballot for submission to primary
election voters if "the candidate has qualified . . .
under [the requirements of] Title 8, Subtitle 5" of
the same article, EL 8-502(c)(2), which requires the
Secretary of State to identify and certify candidates
for President recognized by the state or national
news media:
The Secretary of State shall certify the name of
a presidential candidate on the ballot when the
Secretary has determined, in the Secretary's
sole discretion and consistent with party rules,
that the candidate's candidacy is generally
advocated or recognized in the news media
throughout the United States or in Maryland . .
..
Section 8-502(c)(1) directs the Secretary of State to
certify media-recognized candidates between eighty
and ninety days before the primary election. The
decision whether to certify a candidate in this
manner lies within the sole discretion of the

A-26
Secretary. EL at 8-502(c)(2). Pursuant to EL
8-502(f), the State Board certifies to the local boards
the names of any presidential candidates certified by
the Secretary under EL 8-502(c), and the names
are "printed on ballots used for the primary
election." Id.
Secretary of State McDonough certified
President Obama (and other presidential
candidates of national prominence) on January 10,
2012, in anticipation of Maryland's April 3 primary.
His decision to certify those candidates triggered the
State Board's responsibility under EL 5-303(a)(2)
and 9-207(a)(1) to certify the "content and
arrangement" of the primary ballot by January 23,
2012.3 Following certification, the State Board was
required to "publicly display the content and
arrangement of each certified ballot on its Web site"
for a two-day period, after which the ballots would
be printed. EL 9-207(c)-(e). Then, under 42 U.S.C.
1973ff-l(a)(8) (2009), the State of Maryland was
required to transmit absentee ballots to absent

3
Under EL 5-303(a)(2), certificates of
candidacy were due no "later than 9 p.m. on the
Wednesday that is 83 days before the day on which
the primary election will be held," or January 11,
2012. And under EL 9-207(a), the State Board was
obligated to "certify the content and arrangement of
each ballot . . . for [the] primary election, no more
than 11 days after the filing date provided in [EL]
5-303," or January 23, 2012.

A-27
military and overseas voters by mid-February. Early
voting in the primary election took place between
March 24, 2012 and March 29, 2012, EL
10-301.1(d)(2)4, and the primary itself was scheduled
for April 3, 2012.
Against the timeline of the primary election
process, then, this suit comes very late. Although
Appellants contend that they first filed suit on
January 26, 2012, they did not in fact challenge
President Obama's eligibility to appear on the
Maryland primary ballot until they amended their
complaint on March 19, 2012, and they served
Appellees only on March 27, 2012. These claims
surfaced more than two months after President
Obama and other candidates had already been
certified by the Secretary, more than two months
after the Board had certified the content and
arrangement of the ballot, at least a month after
absentee ballots had been sent to military and
overseas voters, after at least half of the early
primary voting period had elapsed, and only a week
before the primary itself.

4
EL 10-301.1 was amended by the Election Law
Improving Access to Voting Act, 2013 Md. Laws,
Chap. 158. The early voting period of March 24-29,
2012, derived from the language of the statute as it
existed during 2012.

A-28
B. The Delay In Filing Suit Was "Inexcusable," As
The Doctrine Of Laches Uses The Term.
Laches "'is a defense in equity against stale
claims, and is based upon grounds of sound public
policy by discouraging fusty demands for the peace
of society."' Liddy v. Lamone, 398 Md. 233,243-44
(2007) (quoting Ross v. State Bd. of Elections, 387
Md. 649, 668 (2005)). "[L]aches 'applies when there
is an unreasonable delay in the assertion of one's
rights and that delay results in prejudice to the
opposing party."' Id. at 244 (citations omitted). A
laches defense raises a "mixed question of fact and
law." Id. at 245. "Whether the elements of laches
have been established is [a question] of fact, while
the question of whether in view of the established
facts, laches should be invoked, is a question of law."
Id. at 245-46 (citations omitted). Although we defer
to all well-pleaded facts in a party's appeal of a
decision granting a motion to dismiss, Shah v.
Healthplus, Inc., 116 Md. App. 327,332 (1997)
("'Upon [an] appeal from the granting of a motion to
dismiss filed under Maryland Rule 2-322(b)(2), an
appellate court must assume the truth of all
well-pleaded relevant and material facts in the
complaint, as well as all inferences that can
reasonably be drawn therefrom."' (quoting Warner
v. Lerner, 115 Md. App. 428, 431 (1997))), the facts
relating to the timing and circumstances of
Appellants' complaint are few and undisputed
(unlike Appellants' contentions on the merits).
The first element of a successful defense of

A-29
laches is an "'inexcusable delay,"' Liddy, 398 Md. at
244 (quoting Schaeffer v. Anne Arundel County, 338
Md. 75, 83 (1995)), which in this context means a
"'lapse of time during which the plaintiff failed to
assert his [or her] rights."' Id. (quoting Hungerford
v. Hungerford, 223 Md. 316, 320-21 (1960)).
This concept of delay measures the plaintiffs
awareness of the circumstances underlying his or
her potential cause of action. "'[L]aches implies
negligence in not asserting a right within a
reasonable time after its discovery[;] a party must
have had knowledge, or the means of knowledge, of
the facts which created his cause of action in order
for him to be guilty of laches."' Ross, 387 Md. at 670
(emphasis added) (quoting Buxton v. Buxton, 363
Md. 634, 646 (2001)). Put another way, if a plaintiff
knew or reasonably could have known the facts
creating the cause of action and still did not pursue
the claim, the delay lacks justification and is, for
present purposes, "inexcusable."
The claims before us, and those joining the
Maryland state official defendants, were not filed
until March 19, 2012. Appellants claim this delay
resulted because they were waiting to obtain copies
of President Obama's certification of candidacy. But
their allegations flow from their long-held view,
which in no way depended on a certificate, that
President Obama does not meet the Constitutional
requirements for office. Moreover, in both their
amended complaint and their brief in this Court,
Appellants admit having discussions with the State

A-30
Board and the Secretary of State's Office in which
they were informed that the Secretary would
certify eligibility under EL 8-502 rather than
awaiting a certificate from the President or other
widely-known candidates.5 Appellants knew or
could readily have known (from the publicly
available text of the statute) of the time frames
built into EL 8-502, and the announced date of
Maryland's Presidential primary, and indeed, they
contend in their brief that they had been pursuing
these claims for over a year before they filed the
initial complaint (and, as they point out as well,
their theories of ineligibility have been litigated
extensively across the country since before
President Obama was elected the first time). We
recognize that Appellants are proceeding pro se and
that they moved with all possible speed once they
realized that they would be forced to pursue these

5
In the March 19 complaint, Appellants noted
that they had "discussed this issue many times with
the State Board of Elections and the Secretary of
State's Office and were told the only law they follow is
EL [I 8-502, which allows the Secretary of State to
certify an individual to be on the ballot, solely because
he's been advocated in the media[.]" In their brief,
Appellants described how they called the State Board
and "Secretary of State on a weekly basis, trying to get
copies of the [candidates'] certificates [of candidacy]
and the only answer [they] would get is that [the State
Board] followed 8-502 and that Obama was eligible."

A-31
claims on their own.6 But again, their claims do not
arise from facts or circumstances that became
known only at the eleventh hour, and we agree
with the circuit court that the delay in filing these
claims against these officials was inexcusable, as
the cases defining laches use the term.
C. The Delay In Filing Prejudiced Appellees.
From there, a party asserting laches also must
demonstrate that it suffered prejudice as a result of
the delay. This makes sense in light of the
equitable genesis of the laches defense: "'[I]f the
delay has not prejudiced the party asserting the
defense, it will not bar"' the claim of the opposing
party. Ross, 387 Md. at 670 (quoting Schaeffer, 338
Md. at 83). "Prejudice is 'generally held to be any
thing that places [the defendant] in a less favorable

6
We suspect that Appellants meant to bring
whatever claims they needed to bring, and to join any
defendants they needed, to challenge the President's
eligibility when they first filed in January. But
without deciding the question, it is far from clear that
claims filed on January 26, 2012, would have escaped
dismissal on laches grounds, even if they had joined
the right parties-at that point (measuring from filing,
not service), the Secretary had certified candidates
under EL 8-502 two weeks earlier, the Board already
had certified the content and arrangement of the
ballot, and the Board was in the midst of preparing
absentee ballots for mailing.

A-32
position."' Liddy, 398 Md. at 244-45 (quoting Ross,
387 Md. at 670).
Elections are particularly time-sensitive, and
thus particularly vulnerable to potential prejudice
from delayed "claims arising out of elections." Ross,
387 Md. at 671. As we have recognized in prior
election-based laches cases, plaintiffs seeking to
challenge elections must raise their complaints and
grievances "without delay when the election
approaches." Id. at 672. In particular, plaintiffs
must bring expeditiously "'any claim against a state
electoral procedure' . . . because '[as] time passes,
the state's interest in proceeding with the election
increases in importance as resources are committed
and irrevocable decisions are made."' Id. (quoting
Fulani v. Hogsett, 917 F.2d 1028, 1031
(7th Cir. 1990)); see also Liddy, 398 Md. at 245
(describing judicial disruptions to the election
process as potentially imposing "'unreasonable or
embarrassing demands on [the] State"' (quoting
MacGovern v. Connolly, 637 F.Supp. 111,115 (D.
Mass. 1986))). A delayed challenge to a candidate's
eligibility affects not only the candidate, but also
the voting public and the State Board, which has
statutory obligations to prepare for and oversee the
election by established and inflexible deadlines.
Ross, 387 Md. at 672-73. These realities in turn
require the courts to avoid adding "'wholly
unanticipated uncertainties at the eleventh hour."'
Id. at 671 (quoting Barthelmes v. Morris, 342
F.Supp. 153, 160-61 (D. Md. 1972)); see also Liddy,
398 Md. at 250 ('"Court orders affecting elections,

A-33
especially conflicting orders, can themselves result
in voter confusion and consequent incentive to
remain away from the polls. As an election draws
closer, that risk will increase."' (quoting Purcell v.
Gonzalez, 549 U.S. l,4-5 (1989))).
Liddy and Ross, which arose in similar
contexts, frame our analysis of prejudice to the
State election officials from late-breaking
procedural challenges to forthcoming elections.
Both cases featured similar delays in filing suit.
See Liddy, 398 Md. at 252-53 (describing the
challenge occurring eighteen days before the
election as not allowing the court sufficient time "to
consider and decide" the matter or "address the
merits" of the case); Ross, 387 Md. at 672-73
(disallowing a challenge that occurred three days
after the election). In both cases, as here, the
challengers' claims could have been raised earlier
in the election process. Liddy, 398 Md. at 253
("[A]ppellant's dilatory challenge was . . .
prejudicial, as it could have been brought long
before not just the general election but the primary
election as well."); Ross, 387 Md. at 673 (noting
that petitioner's claims "could have been protested
judicially" earlier in the election process). And in
characterizing the respective filing delays as
prejudicial, the Liddy and Ross decisions both
described the disruptive effect the challenges would
have on the election apparatus and the prejudice
that would arise to the State Board and voters in
the State. Liddy, 398 Md. at 253; Ross, 387 Md. at
672-73. We see the same prejudicial character in

A-34
the timing of the filing at issue here, and we agree
with the circuit court that Appellants' claims were
barred properly by laches.
Our decision on laches eliminates any need for
us to address Appellants' other contentions, and we
express no views on them.
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR
CARROLL COUNTY AFFIRMED.
COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANTS.

A-35
In the Court of Special Appeals
Nos. 1287
September Term, 2012
Tracy Fair et al.,
Appellants,
vs.
Robert L. Walker et al.,
Respondents.
_______________________/
ORDER
Upon consideration of Appellants' Motion of
Request for Judicial Notice and Motion for
Reconsideration of the unreported opinion filed on
April 7, 2014, it is this 14th day of May, 2014 by the
Court of Special Appeals,
ORDERED that Appellants' Motion of Request
for Judicial Notice and Motion for Reconsideration
are denied.
For a Panel of the Court
Peter B. Krauser
Chief Judge

A-36
Court of Appeals of Maryland
Petition Docket No. 193
September Term, 2014
(No. 1287, Sept. Term, 2012
Court of Special Appeals)
Tracy A. Fair and Mary C.
Miltenberger,
v.
Robert Walker, Chairman of the
Maryland State Board of Elections, et al.
ORDER
Upon consideration of the petition for a writ of
certiorari to the Court of Special Appeals, the
motion to request to exceed page limitation and the
answers filed thereto, in the above entitled case, it
is
ORDERED, by the Court of Appeals of
Maryland, that the motion to request to exceed
page limitation be, and it is hereby, denied, and it
is further
ORDERED, that the petition be, and it is
hereby, denied as there has been no showing that
review by certiorari is desirable and in the public
interest.
/s/ Mary Ellen Barbera

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Chief Judge
DATE: August 28, 2014

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Court of Appeals of Maryland
Petition Docket No. 193
September Term, 2014
(No. 1287, Sept. Term, 2012
Court of Special Appeals)
Tracy A. Fair and Mary C.
Miltenberger
v.
Robert Walker, Chairman of the
Maryland State Board of Elections, et al.
ORDER
The Court having considered the motion to
reconsider request to exceed page limitations or in
the alternative, request for leave to file corrected
petition within page limitations, motion to
reconsider petition for writ of certiorari or in the
alternative, request for leave to file amended
petition and memorandum in support of motion for
reconsideration filed in the above entitled case, it is
ORDERED, by the Court of Appeals of
Maryland, that the motion to reconsider request to
exceed page limitations or in the alternative,
request for leave to file corrected petition within
page limitations, motion to reconsider petition for
writ of certiorari or in the alternative, request for
leave to file amended petition and memorandum in
support of motion for reconsideration be, and they

A-39
are hereby, denied.
/s/ Mary Ellen Barbera
Chief Judge
DATE: November 20, 2014