or many, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979played a crucial role in ushering in a “Second Cold War” periodlasting from the late 1970s until the mid 1980s. However, the Sovietdecision to invade was made with careful deliberation. Primary documents provide strong evidence that the Soviets felt compelled toinvade for the sake of national security, not expansionism. The invasion was not an isolated occurrence, but rather an inevitable result of thecontemporary political atmosphere and circumstance. An analysis of rising tensions in United States-Soviet relations immediately following the invasion further reveals that this deterioration was largely theconsequence of leadership choices and ideology, rather than a directrepercussion of the invasion itself. Finally, despite the corrosion of the superpower détente, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan served toimprove Cold War relations by strengthening the positions of bothNATO and Warsaw Pact allies in pursuing their own interests divergentfrom those of the superpowers. Thus, instead of ushering in a “SecondCold War,” the invasion of Afghanistan actually helped, over the long run, in ending it.Despite American accusations that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was a blatant show of expansionist force, the Sovietrationale behind the decision was in fact much more complicated. After the communist coup in Afghanistan in April 1978, the Sovietsgradually increased their support for the Afghan communist party, thePeople’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), and not withoutsome hesitance.

The events surrounding the fall of the Shah in Iranduring the winter of 1978-79 pushed the Soviets to become morecommitted to Afghanistan as fears grew that the United States would

Odd Arne Westad, “Concerning the situation in ‘A’: New Russian Evidenceon the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan,”

Cold War International History Project

,Bulletin 8/9 (Winter 1996): 129.

The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan:Superpower Crisis and the“Second Cold War”

MILY

OLLAND

exploit it to replace their lost Middle Eastern foothold.

During a visit



in the United States, head of the Communist Party of the SovietUnion (CPSU) Central Committee International Department BorisPonomarev received “a report from the KGB suggesting that Aminhad ties with US intelligence services.”

The ambiguity of Afghan tiesto the United States through Amin thrust the Soviets into a precariousbalance of power, in which maintaining a communist government



region. For the Soviets, the prospect of a communist Afghanistan was an unexpected boon, but the possibility of a United States-allied Afghanistan was dire. While the Soviets were no doubt pleasantly surprised by acommunist coup in a country with which it shared a two-thousand mileborder, they had reservations about the leadership and the potential forsuccessfully upholding a communist government from the beginning.In a CPSU Central Committee Politburo Discussion on Afghanistanfrom March 17-19, 1979, Premier Alexei Kosygin announced that hehad misgivings about the leadership and the actual situation in the Afghanistan:

Amin and [Afghan President Nur Mohammad] Taraki alike are concealing from us the true state of affairs. We still don’t know exactly what ishappening in Afghanistan. What is their assessment of the situation? After all, they continue to paint the picture in a cheerful light, whereas inreality we can see what is happening there.

The fear of United States involvement coupled with the uncertainty of facing an unstable and untrustworthy regime led the Soviets to discussthe possibility of introducing troops in March 1979 after a rebellionagainst the Communist regime in Afghanistan had broken out. In faceof the turn of instability in Afghanistan and in spite of misgivingsover the sincerity of the Afghan leadership, the need to maintain acommunist government was stressed by Soviet foreign minister Andrei

Leonid Shebarshin, “Interview with KGBGeneral Leonid Shebarshin,”Interview by Odd Arne Westad, Moscow, 7 October 1993.

Odd Arne Westad,

The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 305.

Transcript of the CPSU CC Politburo Discussions on Afghanistan, 17-19March 1979,

CWIHP Bulletin 8/9.

COLUMBIAUNDERGRADUATEJOURNALOFHISTORY

Gromyko: “Under no circumstances may we lose Afghanistan […] if we lose Afghanistan now and it turns against the Soviet Union, this will result in a sharp setback to our foreign policy.”

KGB Chairman Yuri Andropov echoed Gromyko’s sentiments, noting that, “bearing inmind that we will be labeled as an aggressor, but that in spite of that,under no circumstances can we lose Afghanistan.”

While the Soviets understood the importance of supplying andaiding the Afghan communists, the decision to provide military aidand invade was hard fought. The leadership was well aware of thereaction that the use of force would provoke in the West and was at



I completely support Comrade Andropov’s proposal to rule out such ameasure as the deployment of troops into Afghanistan. The army thereis unreliable. Thus our army, when it arrives in Afghanistan, will be the



all, and it will have to shoot at them. Comrade Andropov correctly notedthat indeed the situation in Afghanistan is not ripe for a revolution. Allthat we have done in recent years with such effort in terms of détente,arms reduction and much more – all that would be thrown back. Chinaof course would be given a nice present. All the non-aligned countries will be against us. In a word, serious consequences are to be expectedfrom such an action.

By the end of the session, on March 19, Leonid Brezhnev summarizedthat the “Politburo has correctly determined that the time is not rightfor us to become entangled in that war.”

However, circumstances in Afghanistan quickly deteriorated with the murder of President Tarakiby Amin in October 1979. Soviet fears of betrayal by Amin and the new Afghan leadership were heightened, and in a new twist, the question of who would succeed Brezhnev as leader of the Soviet Union contributedto the decision to invade Afghanistan.By late October, Defense Minister Dmitri Ustinov beganadvocating military intervention. Perhaps hoping “that an energeticaction would make him shine as the successor to Brezhnev,”

Ustinov’s

Ibid.