New Europeans

Equality and Human Rights Commission
Policy report
Madeleine Sumption and Will Somerville

Migration Policy Institute
The UK’s new

Europeans
Progress and challenges
five years after accession
About this paper
The Equality and Human Rights Commission (the Commission) and the Migration
Policy Institute have a shared interest in immigration and the impacts of immigration
on society. This paper was prepared for the Commission but represents the views of the
authors and not official Commission policy. This is the final of three papers prepared in
connection with the major migration summit hosted by the Commission in 2009.
Contents
Executive summary 4
How do the recent migrants fare in the UK? 6
How has the recent migration affected
local communities and workers? 7
Policies to support equality in the UK 7
Introduction 8
What is special about the
recent migration? 12
Examining the numbers 13
A different kind of migration 16
Migration from Romania and Bulgaria 20
Equality implications: how are
eastern European migrants faring? 23
Economic integration 24
Short-term vulnerabilities:
precarious circumstances? 27
Exploitation (or ‘flexibility’?) 28
Long-term prospects for upward
mobility and integration 30
Integration 33
The children of A8 immigrants:
prospects for the future 34
Equality implications:
the impact of A8 migration 36
The labour market impact of the recent
migration 37
The fiscal impact of EU labour mobility 39
Local and non-economic impacts 40
Conclusions and primary policy
questions 44
Bibliography 47
Contacts 52
3
Executive
summary
www.equalityhumanrights.com
Executive summary
The recent enlargement of the European Union (EU) has
fundamentally changed migration patterns to the UK. Over the
past five years, it has brought hundreds of thousands of new
EU citizens into the UK’s society and labour market. The new
migration poses distinctive new challenges for those who work
to promote equality in the UK.
An estimated 1.5 million workers have EU freedom of movement has given recent
come to the UK from new EU member migrants substantial flexibility, and this
states since May 2004, and the number is reflected in their patterns of work and
of eastern European nationals resident in mobility. The new EU citizens’ migration
the UK has increased to about 700,000. strategies have often been distinctively
Not only have eastern Europeans made up informal. Many rely on recruitment
about half of labour immigration in recent agencies and strong social networks
years; they also differ substantially from for employment, while often exhibiting
the UK’s previous immigrant groups. ‘circular’ or ‘shuttling’ movement to and
from the UK. Many come without knowing
The catch-all term ‘eastern Europeans’ how long they will stay, while some move
refers to a heterogeneous group of between the UK and their home country
migrants who come to the UK for on a regular basis. A large proportion have
contrasting motivations and for varying found work in unskilled occupations, often
time periods. On average, however, these in areas that have not typically attracted
individuals (and especially Polish people) substantial immigration. The recent
are young and work for low wages in low- migration is still in flux, and we should
skill jobs, even if they are highly educated expect continued change and fluctuation
(in other words they ‘downgrade’ and in its nature and volume; not least in
have a lower return on their education response to the economic crisis.
achievements than other migrant groups).
Unlike other groups they work across the
country in diverse and dispersed locations.
5
The UK’s new Europeans: Progress and challenges five years after accession
How do the recent The prospects for the new European

citizens’ upward mobility and for their
migrants fare in the UK?
transition to more highly skilled work
The story of the new European citizens’ are mixed. Those who choose to stay for
economic integration is complex, and we several years or longer are potentially
cannot yet establish long-term trends with well-placed to integrate successfully, since
any certainty. Over the first five years, they are, on average, highly educated and
however, some key trends have emerged. hence better equipped to learn new skills
Eastern European workers’ employment quickly. But new migrants are also over-
rates have been very high. Newly arrived represented in jobs with limited career
immigrant cohorts take about two years prospects, and rely significantly on social
to attain unemployment rates as low or contacts to find work. This may hinder
lower than the UK-born, and by 2008 the their upward mobility.
new EU migrants as a group experienced
roughly the same unemployment rate The concept of social and economic
as their British counterparts. During integration is not clear-cut for short-term
the recession, the new Europeans’ migrants, who do not have a long period
unemployment rate remained well below over which to improve their labour market
that of British-born workers, bucking the position. Several policies can help these
usual trend of higher immigrant sensitivity workers to protect themselves against
to the business cycle. Eastern European homelessness, poverty or exploitation,
workers have been well received by however. These include appropriate
employers and are widely praised for their enforcement of labour standards, better
strong ‘work ethic’. information and advice in eastern
European languages, and access to
Despite this positive picture, areas of language training.
concern remain. The recent migrants
receive low wages and are concentrated
in unskilled work, often despite high
levels of education. In many cases the new
migrants have precarious employment
and housing arrangements, are vulnerable
to exploitation, or lack support networks
and access to information. Finally, and
contrary to received wisdom, language
barriers appear to be greater than for the
UK’s other immigrant groups.
6
How has the recent Policies to support equality

migration affected local in the UK
communities and workers? The recent migration adds to the UK’s
Despite large and unexpected inflows existing diversity, and over a decade of
since 2004, eastern European migrants experience of substantial immigration has
still make up only a small proportion of helped the public and policymakers to
the labour force. International experience adjust to EU labour mobility. To promote
suggests that labour markets can absorb equality, however, policy must focus on
immigration ‘shocks’ significantly larger helping those who are most vulnerable;
than the recent labour movement to and importantly this includes both
the UK. A relatively limited evidence immigrants and the UK-born. Such policies
base suggests that eastern European include measures to encourage upward
immigration has brought economic mobility (such as improved credential
benefits, including greater labour market recognition and workforce development
efficiency and potential increases in programmes); a re-examination of
average wages. However, the recent language acquisition policies; enforcement
migration may have reduced wages slightly efforts to curb the exploitation of a
at the bottom end of the labour market, minority of workers; and support for
especially for certain groups of vulnerable local areas with large immigrant inflows,
workers, and there is a risk that it could particularly those unused to migration.
contribute to a ‘low-skill equilibrium’ in
some economically depressed local areas.
The new EU citizens’ overall fiscal impact

is probably small but positive. Perhaps
more significant is the impact on local
areas: local public services have had
to adjust to concentrated increases in
population and larger numbers of non-
English speakers. The growing numbers of
children of eastern European immigrants
will continue to challenge local schools,
although in the long run, analysis of the
performance of the children of immigrants
indicates that many will be highly
successful.
7
Introduction
Introduction
In 2004, 10 new member states joined the European Union
(EU), eight of which were eastern European countries with
income levels well below the western European average (often
referred to as the A8).1
In 2007 they were joined by two other This wave of immigration has created new
countries: Romania and Bulgaria (the challenges for policymakers concerned
A2). EU membership brings rights to with supporting social cohesion and
freedom of movement between member equality. While the overall experience of
states2 and these accessions led to a eastern European immigration has been
wave of immigration that was not only a positive one, this report identifies a
unprecedented, but highly unexpected. number of current problems and future
About 1.5 million workers from A8 risks. We discuss three major questions:
countries have come to the UK since May
2004, and the number of A8 nationals g How are the new European citizens
resident in the UK has increased to about faring in the UK? In other words,
700,000.3 how successful has their social and
economic integration been?
The recent migration4 has been highly g What are the long-term prospects for
distinctive. The new European citizens do eastern European migrants as a group?
not face the same barriers to migration
g How has the recent migration affected
as non-EU nationals. Since EU labour
mobility makes migration easier for EU existing communities and labour
citizens, different kinds of individuals have markets around the UK? Has the recent
been able to migrate from eastern Europe immigration had a negative impact on
since accession, paving the way for new existing UK residents?
patterns of movement including short trips
and more low-skilled employment.
1
The A8 countries are: Poland, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary,
Slovakia and Slovenia. Cyprus (not northern Cyprus) and Malta also joined at the
same time, but are very small countries with higher average incomes.
2
Restrictions to new EU citizens’ labour market access are allowed during a
transitional period following accession. See Box 2: ‘Lessons from the past?
Previous accessions and their impact.’
3
See footnotes 7 and 8.
4
Throughout this paper we use the term ‘the recent migration’ to refer to post-
2004 movement of individuals from both A8 and A2 member states. Unless
otherwise specified, the terms ‘new EU citizens’, ‘recent migrants’ and ‘eastern
Europeans’ refers to both A8 and A2 collectively.
9
To answer these questions, we draw on need to register, and some non-exempt

several sources. First, we examine official workers fail to register; estimates suggest
data sources such as the Labour Force that approximately one-third of eastern
Survey (LFS), the Worker Registration European workers from new member
Scheme (WRS) and other government data states are not registered with the scheme
that provide a useful, though incomplete, (Pollard et al., 2008).
picture of the recent migration. The LFS
is a statistical survey of UK households Second, we synthesise the growing body
that provides information on individuals of literature that has emerged since
in the labour force. While it represents 2004, some of which includes important
the most detailed source of information qualitative information to complement the
on immigrant workers in the UK, it has quantitative data.
flaws; in particular, immigrants are under-
represented in the survey, which does Of course, gaps inevitably remain. In
not sample from non-private communal particular, we know less about the migrants
establishments, such as hostels, where from Romania and Bulgaria than we do
many migrants live. It also excludes about those from the A8 countries. As A2
those who do not consider the sampled migrants have come to the UK in small
address their primary residence and have numbers since 2007, the LFS sample sizes
lived there for less than six months.5 The have proved insufficient for analysing key
WRS, on the other hand, is a government variables. A2 migrants also differ from the
programme that requires most new EU A8 in two key respects. First, Romanians
member state nationals to register in order and Bulgarians face labour market
to work legally in the UK. Self-employed restrictions that strongly limit the work
workers and those who have been working they can perform in the UK, particularly at
legally for 12 continuous months do not the low-skilled end of the spectrum.6
5
For this report, we analysed Labour Force Survey data from 2004 to 2009, made
available by the UK Data Archive. Eastern European nationals are identified
by country of birth. Unless otherwise specified, our sample comprises all A8-born
individuals in the survey when referring to the migrant ‘population’, and all A8-
born labour-force participants when referring to ‘workers’. Where multiple quarters
of data are analyzed together, we restrict the sample to individuals appearing in the
survey for the first time.
6
The UK government imposed transitional restrictions on Romanian and Bulgarian
nationals’ right of access to the labour market, in part due to the unexpectedly large
inflows of A8 workers in 2004, when the UK was one of only three countries to
allow full labour market access to new EU citizens. A2 migrants can work in the
UK if they qualify for work visas through the points-based immigration system:
if they are self-employed, if they participate in one of two schemes for less skilled
employment in agriculture (the Seasonal Agricultural Workers Scheme, or SAWS)
and in food processing (the Sector Based Scheme, or SBS), or if they are a family
member of an A2 national with work authorisation (see Migration Advisory
Committee, 2008).
10
Second, migration from Romania and The report is structured as follows. Section
Bulgaria has been primarily directed to Two reviews what we know about the UK’s
Italy and Spain; a trend that seems likely new European citizens, and how these
to continue even after labour market trends are changing. Section Three asks
restrictions in the UK are lifted (Migration how the new migrants are faring: how
Advisory Committee, 2008). well they have integrated socially and
economically, and what their prospects
In other words, not only do we have a are for the future. Section Four examines
shorter experience of A2 migration, there the impact of EU labour mobility on the
are also fewer individuals on which to UK economy and on local communities.
base our analysis. As a result, this report Section Five concludes by highlighting
considers A8 migration in more detail the policy implications from an equality
than A2 migration. However, much of the perspective.
analysis in this report is relevant to both
groups, especially since A2 migration is
expected to resemble A8 migration more
closely once the 2007 restrictions are
lifted, which must happen by 2014 at
the latest.
11
What is special about
the recent migration?
What is special about the recent migration?

The new migrants from eastern Europe are different from the
UK’s other, non-European, immigrant groups: their European
Union (EU) citizenship matters. A8 migrants do not need
to apply for a visa to work in the UK; they can work in any
occupation, and they can travel from their home country
relatively cheaply.
This unique situation fundamentally 700,000, suggesting that more than half
affects the profile of individuals who had returned home.8 Polish nationals make
choose to come to the UK, the work they up roughly two-thirds of A8 immigration.
perform and the length of time they stay.
By way of example, Figure 1 (on page 14)
Examining the numbers shows the number of National Insurance
The almost unprecedented scale and numbers allocated to Polish workers since
speed of eastern European immigration 2002/3. It provides a useful estimate of
has turned heads. Our estimate is that the number of Polish people entering the
about 1.5 million A8 workers came to the UK labour market.9 By 2004/5, Polish
UK between May 2004 and September nationals were the largest recipients of
2009.7 In 2007, they made up almost National Insurance numbers and have
half of the UK’s labour immigration flow remained so ever since, by some distance
(Somerville and Sumption 2009a, p43). (see Figure 2 on page 14). The two figures
Not all of the new migrants have stayed: document the extraordinary growth in
the population of A8 migrants in the migration from a single source country.
third quarter of 2009 was approximately
7
This estimate follows the methodology of Pollard et al. (2008): we take the total
number of approved WRS applications (1,001,475), and multiply it by 1.49 to
account for an estimated 33 per cent of A8 workers who do not register with the
scheme.
8
Calculations based on the LFS.
9
National Insurance number allocations are not a perfect measure of immigration
flows, since they only show entry into legal work. Those who work in the informal
economy, and those who do not work, may not have National Insurance numbers.
13
Figure 1
National Insurance numbers allocated to Polish nationals,

2002/3 to 2008/9
National Insurance numbers allocated to Polish nationals,
250
thousands
200 2002/3 to 2008/9

250
thousands
150
200
Allocations,
100
150
50
Allocations,
100
0
50
2002/3 2003/4 2004/5 2005/6 2006/7 2007/8 2008/9
0
2002/3 2003/4 2004/5 2005/6 2006/7 2007/8 2008/9
Source: Department for Work and Pensions (2008, 2009)
Figure 2 National Insurance number allocations

2008/9
160 National Insurance number allocations
140
2008/9
120
Thousands
160
100
140
80
120
Thousands
60
100
40
80
20
60
0
40
d
ia
ce
an
lia
ly
ia
20
di
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Ita
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an
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ist
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In
ua
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ov
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0
k
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In
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Fr
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Source: Department for Work and Pensions (2008, 2009)
Approved applications to
the Worker Registration Scheme
The inflows of A8 workers applicationsdramatically.
have fluctuated
Approved to By the first quarter of 2009
approved
70,000
over the first five the
years (see Figure 3 on inflows had roughly halved year-on-year,
Worker Registration Scheme
applications
60,000
page 15 – the number of initial applications to about one-third of the 2006 peak.
approved
50,000
from A8 70,000
migrants to the Worker Similarly, National Insurance number
40,000
applications
60,000
Quarterly
Registration Scheme (WRS) for each

30,000
allocations to Polish workers declined
50,000
quarter between
20,000
40,000
May 2004 and September substantially in 2008/9 (see Figure 1).
Quarterly
2009). Inflows
10,000 peaked in 2006 at just
30,000
over 60,000 per
0 quarter, then declined
20,000
Q4
Q4
Q4
Q4
Q4
Q2
Q2
Q2
Q2
Q2
Q2
Q3
Q3
Q3
Q3
Q3
Q3
Q1
Q1
Q1
Q1
Q1
10,000
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
0
Q4
Q4
Q4
Q4
Q4
Q2
Q2
Q2
Q2
Q2
Q2
Q3
Q3
Q3
Q3
Q3
Q3
Q1
Q1
Q1
Q1
Q1
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

14
250
Allocations, thousands
200
150
100
The economic
50 crisis is likely to have played Migration from Romania and Bulgaria has
a crucial role in these trends, reducing been much smaller. There is no significant
0
labour demand2002/3in the UK (see
2003/4 Somerville
2004/5 2005/6 history of
2006/7 migration
2007/8 from these two
2008/9
and Sumption, 2009a). Experience to countries. The 2001 Census recorded about
date suggests that migration from eastern 5,000 Bulgarians and 8,000 Romanians
Europe is highly cyclical, responding to (Migration Advisory Committee, 2008),
UK economic conditions. As Figure 3
10
compared to about 58,000 Polish people
shows, inflowsNational
have alsoInsurance number allocations
been moderately (Sumption, 2009). Even after a rapid
2008/9
seasonal, increasing during the summer increase in numbers to approximately
160
when labour demand is high in industries 67,000 in 2008, the A2 still make up only
140
such as
120hospitality and agriculture. It 1 per cent of the UK’s total foreign-born
Thousands
remains
100 to be seen whether this cyclical population, compared to 11 per cent for the
trend 80
will continue over the course A8 (Migration Advisory Committee, 2008).
60
of future economic cycles. If eastern
40
European
20 migration changes are to become
more family
0 oriented over time (which we
believe to be likely: see Box 1, ‘Changing
nd
ia
ce
ia
ia
ly
ria
di
ni
sta
Ita
ak
an
al
an
la
ge
In
ua
str
ov
ki
m
migration patterns?’), this may reduce its

Po
Fr
Ni
th
Pa
Ro
Au
Sl
Li
sensitivity to UK labour demand.
Figure 3
Approved applications to
the Worker Registration Scheme
Quarterly approved
70,000
applications
60,000
50,000
40,000
30,000
20,000
10,000
0
Q4
Q4
Q4
Q4
Q4
Q2
Q2
Q2
Q2
Q2
Q2
Q3
Q3
Q3
Q3
Q3
Q3
Q1
Q1
Q1
Q1
Q1
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Source: UK Border Agency (2005) and Home Office (2009)
10
Lower inflows during the current recession are driven primarily by changes in the
flow of Polish workers (Home Office, 2009). It is worth noting that the economic
crisis did not hit Poland as hard as other Eastern European countries (growth
is expected to be positive in 2009), making the Polish labour market relatively
more attractive to potential migrants (see Fix et al., 2009).
15
A different kind of migration natives.13 As a result, they receive lower

Eastern European migration is not just wages. Eighty-nine per cent of A8 and
distinguished by its scale and speed. A2 workers earned less than £400 per
It is now well recognised that the new week in 2007, compared to 57 per cent
migrants are ‘different’ in several ways. of UK-born workers (Pollard, Latorre
The recent migrants’ characteristics have and Sriskandarajah, 2008). While the
been reviewed in detail elsewhere (see average non-A8 or A2 immigrant worker
for example, Blanchflower and Lawton, earns more than the UK-born, eastern
2008). Here, we point briefly to some key European migrants over the first years
characteristics, especially insofar as the since accession earned an average of 12.5
migrants differ from those of the UK’s per cent less (Blanchflower and Lawton,
other immigrant groups. For the most part, 2008).
we review A8 and A2 migration separately,
reflecting the differences in the knowledge This occurs despite relatively high levels
base on these two groups, and some of education. The recent migrants have
differences in their characteristics. higher education levels, on average, than
the UK-born: while the median non-
A8 immigrants are young compared to immigrant in 2008 left school at age 16, A8
the UK-born population and (to a lesser workers had a median school leaving age of
extent) to other immigrants. In 2008, 19 years of age.14 Indeed, when controlling
about 70 per cent of A8 immigrants were for individual characteristics including
between the ages of 18 and 35, compared education, recent A8 immigrants earn
to about one-third of all immigrants, the least of any immigrant group (Clark
and less than a quarter of natives.11 By and Drinkwater, 2008). In other words,
implication, they also have less labour many recent immigrants ‘downgrade’
market experience than other UK workers, their occupational status when they come
and many appear to be recent graduates. to the UK, working in jobs that do not
reflect their level of qualifications. This
The new migrants work in less skilled common phenomenon among immigrant
occupations than other immigrant populations around the world is much
groups: more than half of migrants with more pronounced for the recent migrants
jobs worked in unskilled occupations than for the UK’s other immigrant groups,
in 2008,12 compared to 20 per cent of most of whom work in relatively skilled
other immigrants and 18 per cent of occupations, as noted above.
11
Authors’ calculations from the LFS.
12
This includes: process, plant and machine operatives; assemblers; construction
workers; transport and machine drivers; other labourers; porters; bar and
restaurant staff; and cleaners.
13
Authors’ calculations from the LFS, 2008.
14
Authors’ calculations from the Labour Force Survey, 2008.
16
As a result, A8 workers have a lower Temporary migration, circular

return on education than other migration (involving several trips,
immigrants: there tends to be less sometimes on a seasonal basis) and
differentiation in wages between those uncertainty about the duration of
with more education and those with less stay are important characteristics of the
(Clarke and Drinkwater, 2008). While recent migration stream.16 EU freedom
UK-born workers are thought to earn of movement has made it easier to move
about 10 per cent more if they complete and circulate between Europe’s sending
one additional year of education, recent A8 and receiving countries. In many cases,
arrivals gain a tiny 1.1 per cent.15 Why are migration requires as little planning as
eastern Europeans employed below their the purchase of a coach ticket. As a result,
skill level? This question has not received a migrants can come for short periods (data
definitive answer, although several factors from the WRS consistently points to the
are likely to be at work. These include poor fact that large proportions only intend to
English skills of some migrants preventing stay in the UK for a few months), or with
them from using their formal undefined plans (migrant surveys have
qualifications or abilities; employers’ shown that recent A8 migrants are less
difficulty in recognising foreign certain about their future plans than other
credentials; discrimination; a reliance on immigrant groups) (see Green et al., 2007;
social networks in a situation in which Blanchflower and Lawton, 2008).
existing eastern European nationals
already work disproportionately in
low-skilled jobs; and the new migrants’
willingness to work in low-skilled jobs, in
part because they know that their stay is
temporary and sometimes because they
hope to upgrade to more skilled work after
improving their English skills.
15
This compares to 4.9 per cent for recent immigrants from Australasia, 2.8 per cent
for those from the Americas, and 1.5 per cent for immigrants from Africa. See
Clarke and Drinkwater (2008).
16
Direct comparison of eastern European migrants and other migrant groups is
difficult. Estimates using data from the 1990s, before EU enlargement, show that
among immigrants who stayed for at least a year in the UK, 40 per cent of men
and 55 per cent of women had left five years later (Dustmann and Weiss, 2007).
This number would be larger if it included migrants who stayed for less than one
year before returning home. A noteworthy example of the latter is the growing
number of corporate transferees in computer science and telecommunications,
who come to the UK on work permits for relatively short periods
(Salt, 2008, p75–76).
17
Reliable data on return migration from off, temporary migrants who stay slightly
the UK is not available. However, the longer to build capital for an investment
substantial discrepancy between the size back home. Stayers intend to remain
of the net inflows, and the size of the in the UK and have strong ambitions
A8 population as measured by the LFS, for upward social mobility. Finally,
suggests that large numbers do indeed Searchers (the largest group in their
return home. A 2008 study puts the figure research) keep their options deliberately
at 50 per cent (Pollard et al., 2008). Our open, willing to work in England or Poland
updated calculations, above, suggest that depending on the career opportunities
the same figure of roughly 50 per cent still they are able to find. In other words, the
holds as of 2009. recent migration is heterogeneous in
terms of migration strategy and intentions.
Migration has been not just temporary, but This matters when we examine policy
at times circular, with migrant workers implications and workers’ future prospects
taking several trips between the UK and in the UK, since generalisations about the
their home country. A primary reason for new migrants’ characteristics may mask
this is to perform seasonal work. Others the existence of specific vulnerable groups.
may choose circular migration to balance
work in the UK with family life in their Eastern European immigration has shown
home country. A recent survey of migrant distinctive patterns of networks and
workers in the West Midlands indicates social interaction. First, substantial
that A8 migrants were more likely than numbers of A8 migrants depend on
non-EU immigrant groups to have made recruitment agencies to find work: about
prior visits to the UK; and that the trend half of WRS registrants up to 2008 were
was strongest for workers employed in working for a temporary staffing agency
agriculture and elementary occupations, (Blanchflower and Lawton, 2008, p5).
suggesting that labour demand played an Indeed, agencies also play a role in
important role (Green et al., 2007). facilitating migration itself, often paying
for flights and initial accommodation,
Given the diversity of migration strategies, then reclaiming costs from migrants’
it is worth distinguishing between some wages. Agencies have played a strong
different ‘ideal types’ of migrant worker. role in shaping the recent migrants’
Eade, Drinkwater and Garapich (2006) location decisions. In a 2008 poll of Polish
identify four categories of Polish worker workers in rural areas, for example, the
in London, providing a useful analytical most commonly-reported reason for
reference point. Storks are short-term, living in a rural area was recruitment by
seasonal migrants, including students or an employment agency (Chappell et al.,
agricultural workers, who come to the UK 2009). For some large food-processing
for around two to six months at a time, on employers, agencies are reported to be the
several occasions, to supplement their only route into employment (Fitzgerald,
incomes at home. Hamsters are one- 2007).
18
A8 immigrants were substantially 2009). As we discuss in more detail later,

more likely to use private employment social networks can help new migrants
agencies than other immigrants or UK- to settle, but they can also indicate poor
born workers, although agencies may be integration and a lack of opportunities for
declining slightly in importance, especially labour market advancement outside of
for workers who are no longer seeking a ethnic networks.
first job in the UK. Employed A8 workers
recruited in 2005/6 had found their Typically immigrants cluster in
current job through a private agency urban areas and major cities. The
approximately 26 per cent of the time, recent migrants, however, are more
compared to 16 per cent for those recruited geographically dispersed than other
in 2007/8.17 Qualitative evidence suggests immigrant groups (although they are still
that agencies are likely to provide a first more concentrated in the major urban
UK job, while workers rely primarily areas than the UK-born). Thirty-eight
on social networks for subsequent jobs per cent of non-A8 immigrants lived in
(Green et al., 2007).18 This is consistent London in 2008, compared to 26 per cent
with a view in the economic literature of the A8, and 9 per cent of the UK-born.20
that agencies can provide immigrants a Certain rural areas received concentrated
stepping stone into the labour market inflows of A8 migrants who subsequently
(Andersson and Wadensjö, 2004; Marloes made up a significant proportion of
et al., 2004). However, the prevalence the workforce (Commission for Rural
of agency recruitment also appears to be Communities, 2007). This has important
contributing to employment insecurity implications. First, migration has begun
among workers who would prefer to have to affect many areas previously unused to
permanent jobs, as we discuss later. (and often unprepared for) new arrivals.
Indeed, one could argue that the new
Meanwhile, social networks have become immigration poses the greatest challenges
more important, particularly for Polish not in the labour market where, as we
workers: the largest group among the discuss later, new EU workers have been
recent migrants. Employed Polish absorbed quite smoothly, but rather in
migrants are about 25 per cent more likely local areas trying to respond to unexpected
to have obtained their current job through inflows of new (and often temporary)
their social network than UK-born workers residents. Second, residence in rural areas
or other, non-A8 immigrant groups.19 affects short-term integration, since it can
Polish workers’ reliance on social networks reduce access to common sources of help
increased steadily between 2004 and 2007, and information, which tend to be more
but declined slightly in 2008 (Sumption, concentrated in towns and cities.
17
Authors’ calculations from the LFS.
18
Evidence from Sweden has also found that agencies provide a stepping stone to
non-agency work. See Andersson and Wadensjö, 2004.
19
Data from the LFS, for jobs obtained in 2007; see Sumption, 2009.
20
19
Migration from Romania One crucial distinction, however, is that

A2 migrants work in more skilled
and Bulgaria occupations than the A8. Like non-A8
Romanian and Bulgarian migrants share immigrants and UK-born workers, the
several characteristics with their A8 majority of A2 workers perform jobs in
counterparts. They are predominantly the top two (of four) occupational skill
young: about 60 per cent are between the groups (Migration Advisory Committee,
ages of 18 and 35 (the distribution of ages 2008, This is most likely a function
is not statistically different from that of of the labour market restrictions
the A8).21 They have similar education that A2 migrants face. Since they
levels (the median age at which working- cannot work freely in all sectors, but
age A2 migrants left full-time education are limited primarily to highly skilled
was 19 in 2008). And they also have low occupations and self-employment (lower-
unemployment rates and high labour skilled work is permitted but limited
force participation (Migration Advisory through the Sectors Based Scheme and
Committee, 2008). Seasonal Agricultural Workers Scheme
quotas), it is not surprising that their
occupational distribution differs from that
of A8 migrants. However, labour market
restrictions must be lifted by 2014, and
at this point the population of new A2
migrants may well come to resemble the
A8 more (Migration Advisory Committee,
2008).
21
20
Box 1: Changing migration In fact, the character of A8 migration

patterns? already appears to be changing, albeit not
dramatically. One study finds that Polish
The recent migration is not a ‘fixed workers had become ‘less prepared to do
quantity’. Eastern European migration unskilled work at the national minimum
to the UK is unlikely to have reached wage’ a few years after accession, and
equilibrium in just five years. Indeed, we that more recent arrivals were less well
should expect it to change or fluctuate. qualified with lower levels of English
Two major factors in particular will proficiency, leading some employment
drive changes: the economy and the agencies to ‘switch to workers
development of a stable migration chain. from countries other than Poland’
(Blanchflower and Lawton, 2008).
New types of migrant
Migration streams develop over time, Second, migration stays may be
as a result of a complex range of becoming longer, according to tentative
factors including economic conditions, evidence. Polish government data on
institutional relationships between short-term migration suggests that while
countries, social networks and labour 63 per cent of all short-term migrants
market intermediaries. Social networks from Poland to receiving countries
shape new inflows, as settled migrants worldwide stayed abroad for less than 12
are able to help new workers to migrate months, this per centage had declined
and to find work or housing. to 54 per cent by the second quarter of
2007 (Kaczmarczyk and Okolski, 2008).
As a result, the characteristics of new Meanwhile, family-related migration is
migrants from a given source country becoming common. The proportion of
are likely to change over time (Massey WRS registrants arriving with dependant
et al., 1994; Carrington et al., 1996), as children increased from 4 per cent in
networks grow and make migration more 2004 to 15 per cent in the first quarter
attractive to new groups, such as female of 2009, suggesting more permanent
migrants with families. flows. (Note that some of the increased
proportion of family migration might be
a temporary effect if the economic crisis
has disproportionately reduced migration
among single workers who come for more
purely economic reasons.)
21
Box 1 continued
Future flows and the economy In the mid to long term, UK employers’
demand for workers at the low end of
Future flows from eastern Europe the skills spectrum is expected to rise
are highly uncertain. First, the very over the coming decade, especially in
substantial inflows in the two years industries such as personal services
following the 2004 accession are likely to (UK Commission for Employment and
have been boosted by pent-up demand Skills, 2008; Somerville and Sumption,
for work or experiences in western 2009a). This implies that UK employers
Europe, suggesting that long-run flows will continue to look to migrant workers
will settle at lower levels. from eastern Europe to fill less skilled
jobs. The Government’s current position
Meanwhile, the economic crisis has is that only intra-EU migration (and
generated additional uncertainties. not migration from third countries)
Economic conditions in both the will be sufficient to meet additional
receiving and sending countries affect demand in low-skilled employment
migration flows. While the current until further notice. However, it has
economic crisis and lower labour demand reserved the option of introducing less
in the UK has reduced migration from skilled migrants from outside the EU
eastern Europe, events in the eastern (into the third tier of the points-based
European sending countries could system), should this prove necessary.
ultimately boost migration if they hinder For example, if the inflows of eastern
economic development there in the European workers who are willing to
medium term. Ahearne et al. (2009) work in positions at the bottom of the UK
suggest that Bulgaria, Romania, the labour market declines to a level that is
Baltic States and Hungary may send considered too low. This, in turn, is likely
more migrants abroad for this reason in to depend substantially on economic
coming years. development and wage growth in the new
eastern European member states which
will make low-skilled UK jobs relatively
less attractive. The primary unknown is
how long this economic development
will take.
22
Equality implications: how are
eastern European migrants faring?
Equality implications: how are eastern European

migrants faring?
The new migration is highly distinctive: more dispersed,
more educated for the level of work the migrants perform,
more informal and probably more temporary. Each of these
characteristics affects the new European Union (EU) citizens’
prospects in the UK.
We argue in this section that while the new Perhaps this is not surprising: the new
migrants are popular with employers and migrants have been willing to work in
have been quite successful at obtaining isolated rural locations, work long or
work, it is less clear whether meaningful irregular hours, and flock to the country
social and economic integration has been during times of high labour demand.
within their reach. The majority fare They are also overeducated for the jobs
well, but their employment and housing they perform – a distinct advantage in
circumstances can be precarious, their industries such as hospitality, which
future prospects somewhat uncertain, and involve contact with customers.
a small minority remains vulnerable to
substantial short-term risks. As a result, the recent migrants have been
quite successful in accessing employment.
The evidence presented in this section Their participation in the labour force
refers exclusively to A8 migrants. This is remains well above average: 95 per cent
because of the close relationship between for men and 80 per cent for women
the new EU citizens’ prospects and their (Dustmann et al., 2009). As a recent and
migration status (including full labour strongly labour-motivated migrant group,
market access). However, much of the they comprise fewer inactive individuals
analysis will apply to Bulgarian and (old and young) and represent a much
Romanian migrants, especially once their greater proportion of employed workers
labour market restrictions are lifted. than the UK-born population. Indeed, the
A8’s employment rates are above those
Economic integration of almost all other significant immigrant
The recent migrants tend to be highly groups, with the exception of those from
popular with employers. Immigration South Africa, Australia and New Zealand
(Office for National Statistics, 2009).
studies have found again and again that
employers value A8 workers for their
excellent ‘work ethic’ (Matthews and Ruhs,
2007; Dench et al., 2006; Anderson et al.,
2006, Green et al., 2007).
24
Figure 4
Labour force profile:

A8, other immigrants and natives
70
A8
60
50 Other immigrants
40 Natives
30
20
10
0
6
ily
ed
ed
ee
ed
he
t
r1
en
oy
tir
oy
oy
am
Ot
de
ud
pl
pl
pl
Re
rf
Un
Em
em
em
St
te
af
Un
lf-
Se
ngi
ok
Lo
Source: Labour Force Survey, 2008
The unemployment picture

Decline immigrants,
is also positive. rate
in unemployment with conditional on the number of
During theduration
first five years since EUin the UK,years
of residence they have been present in the UK.
2004-2008
enlargement, the A8 population as a whole
20
has achieved relatively low unemployment For each yearly cohort, unemployment
Unemployment,
Other immigrants
rates. In 2005, the unemployment rate rates have A8
been high (sometimes over 15
per cent
15
for A8 immigrants who had arrived in per cent) in the first year of living in the
2004 or later was 10 approximately 7.6 per UK. Unemployment subsequently declines,
cent – substantially higher than the rate reaching a rate at or below that of
5
of 4.5 per cent for UK-born workers. By 22
UK-born workers after two years.23
2008, however,0 the unemployment rate The trend suggests successful integration
for the post-enlargement 0 A8 population
1 2 over time,
3 although the selective return
had declined Number of years migrant
to approximately 4.2 per has been in the UK
migration of individuals unable to find
cent, compared to 5.6 per cent for the work is also likely to play a role. By
UK-born (the difference is not statistically comparison, other immigrant groups
significant). This is largely because in the have higher initial unemployment. Their
Number of UK births to mothers from European Union
first five years, A8 workers’ unemployment unemployment also declines over time
(excluding UK and
rates declined substantially, the longerIreland) and from India
but remains significantly above overall UK
40,000
their stay in the UK. Figure 5 shows the
35,000 unemployment of just over
average
30,000 unemployment rate over the 5 per cent during the same period
25,000
2005–2008 period for A8 and other (2004–2008).24
20,000
15,000
22 10,000
The difference is statistically significant
5,00o
at the 5 per cent level. Authors’
calculations
0 from the LFS, 2005.
23 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
LFS, 2004–2008. The same trend is found for each cohort, by year of entry, from
do not reportIndia
2004 to 2007 (weEurope the data here due to sample size limitations).
24
All unemployment rates are non-seasonally adjusted.
25
In the 2008–2009 economic crisis, A8 The data on wages tell a more nuanced
workers’ unemployment rates remained story. Recent A8 migrants have typically
low, in contrast to rising unemployment earned between 60 and 70 per cent of
among British-born workers and other natives’ median wage in the same year.25
immigrant groups. By the third quarter
of 2009, British-born unemployment had By comparison, recent Pakistani
risen to 7.8 per cent, while A8 workers’ immigrants had similar relative wages
unemployment rate fluctuated
Labouraround
force profile:during the 2005–2008 period. Other
5 per cent, and theA8,unemployment
other immigrantsrate and natives
recent immigrants earned about the same
for70workers from India, Pakistan and as natives, and other immigrants from
A8
Bangladesh
60 rose to approximately 12 outside of Other
the Organisation
immigrants
for Economic
50
per cent. This lower vulnerability to the Co-operation and Development earned
Natives
40
recession
30 is likely to stem, in part, from about 80 per cent of natives’ median
the
20fact that the flows of migrants to and wage.26 Note that about two-fifths of non-
10 eastern Europe (particularly Poland)
from EU immigrants enter the UK on work
0
appear to have responded strongly to visas, many of which require a job offer
6
ily
ed
ts
ed
ee
ed
he
r1
economic circumstances. in a skilled occupation (Somerville and

en
oy
tir
oy
oy
am
Ot
de
ud
pl
pl
pl
Re
rf
Un
Em
em
em
Sumption, 2009a). This partly explains the

St
fte
Un
lf-
ga
non-EU immigrants’ higher wages – they

Se
in
ok
are more limited to highly skilled work.

Lo
Figure 5
Decline in unemployment rate with

duration of residence in the UK, 2004-2008
20
Unemployment,
Other immigrants
A8
per cent
15
10
0
0 1 2 3
Number of years migrant has been in the UK
Source: Labour Force Survey, 2008

(excluding UK and Ireland) and from India
40,000
25 35,000
LFS, 2005–2008.
30,000
26
25,000
LFS, 2008. Recent immigrants refers to those arriving in 2004 or later.
20,000
15,000
10,000
5,00o
26
0
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Tentative evidence (limited only by not necessarily a problem – indeed, it is

small sample sizes in the Labour Force an important avenue for upward mobility
Survey) suggests that A8 migrants have for some workers (Andersson, Holzer and
experienced relatively rapid wage growth Lane, 2005) – involuntary job changes
during their first years in the UK. On put workers in a precarious position. In
average, their wages have grown by an many cases, temporary agency workers
average of 5 per cent per year, compared may prefer to have permanent contracts
with 1 per cent for natives (Dustmann to gain some of the benefits and stability
et al., 2009).27 They also appear to associated with long-term employment,
have moved into more highly skilled but may find it difficult to access
occupations, although the data on this is permanent employment in industries
insufficient to draw strong conclusions as dominated by agency recruitment.
to how robust this trend will remain in the
future.28 Housing
Housing arrangements can also be
Short-term vulnerabilities: precarious. Many recent migrants live in
precarious circumstances? overcrowded temporary accommodation,
at high rents, or in poor conditions (Audit
Commission, 2007). Substantial numbers
Low-wage, temporary
live in employer-provided housing
employment
(especially in sectors such as agriculture
Low wages reduce the economic buffer that where local housing is insufficient to meet
workers can rely on to weather periods of peak seasonal demand). This magnifies
unemployment or unexpected expenses. the risks associated with unstable
Recent migrants have low wages and employment, since workers who lose their
are also strongly represented in high- jobs also lose their housing.
turnover industries such as hospitality
and agriculture. Many work for temporary
employment agencies on a series of short-
term contracts. While short job tenure is
27
Some of this higher growth is likely attributable to A8 workers’ age: younger
workers experience higher average wage growth.
28
According to the LFS, in the post-accession period almost 70 per cent of A8
immigrants interviewed during their first (calendar) year in the UK worked in
unskilled occupations, compared to just over 50 per cent for those resident for
three to four years. Note however that this may simply indicate that less-
successful immigrants are more likely to return (pushing up the average of the
remaining workers by default) and not that individuals are progressing from less
skilled to more skilled jobs. The trend also relies heavily on the stronger
performance of the 2004 and 2005 cohorts (future cohorts may be different) and
sample sizes are small.
27
Indeed, homeless agencies have noted In addition, economies of scale mean

an increase in rough sleeping among that some information or services are
eastern European nationals (Homeless most readily available to Polish speakers:
Link, 2008). In addition, migrants are the majority group. Many of the support
not eligible for certain benefits, increasing organisations that have emerged since
the risk to which they expose themselves. 2004 are aimed specifically at Polish
In particular, since many are not eligible people, while workers from smaller
for housing benefit, they can be refused sending countries appear to have many
entry from homeless shelters that rely fewer options for seeking assistance and
on public funds (Audit Commission, information (Stenning et al., 2006).
2007). By consequence, a distinctive
type of homelessness has arisen among Exploitation (or ‘flexibility’?)
A8 migrants. While UK-born homeless Certain migrant workers’ precarious
individuals experience high rates of mental circumstances, potentially combined with
health and substance abuse problems, language barriers and a lack of knowledge
it has been suggested that much of A8 about working practices in the UK, make
homelessness could be easily rectified them vulnerable to exploitation.
through better access to information and
employment (McNaughton, 2008). Exploitation cannot be quantified with
any accuracy, since many incidents
Support networks go unreported. Trade unions have
documented and highlighted numerous
Social networks can help to provide
incidents of exploitation. Academic
information and reduce migrant workers’
evidence, typically qualitative, has also
isolation. A wealth of information services
increasingly pointed to the numerous
and websites has developed to reduce the
incidents affecting eastern European
information deficit facing many of the
workers. Research points to cases of
recent migrants.
failure to pay wages, failure to pay the
minimum wage, disproportionate wage
However, some migrants may lack such
deductions for housing that is provided
support networks. For example, migrants
with the job, and dangerous or unhealthy
recruited directly from their home country
working conditions (Anderson et al., 2006;
by employers or agencies and placed in
Audit Commission, 2007; Crowley, 2008;
rural areas may find themselves isolated
Somerville, 2007).
from sources of assistance, with little
knowledge of local labour markets, public
services or other amenities. Language
barriers exacerbate these problems,
preventing migrants from accessing
information or standing up for their rights.
28
Many of these instances of exploitation occupational status as permanent (Eade et

are clearly outside of the law and al., 2006), are receiving wages well above
migrant workers can, in theory, report their home-country average, and have non-
employers to public authorities. In wage reasons to remain in the UK (such as
practice, however, migrants are reluctant learning English).
to report exploitation to the authorities,
concerned that they will lose their job if One study, for example, shows how
they complain. As an alternative to relying strong migrant networks combine with a
on complaints, the Gangmasters Licensing willingness to tolerate irregular hours and
Authority offers a more proactive model poor conditions to create a flexible labour
of public enforcement but is limited to the force for low-skilled jobs. The study cites a
‘food’ industry (agriculture, horticulture, chain-restaurant employer:
food processing and shellfish gathering
industries). ‘You’ll tend to get a situation where there’s
six or seven Poles living in the same house.
Exploitation is thought to be concentrated Five of them work for me and, if one’s
in certain industries. These include not feeling ill, they don’t even bother phoning
only factory work such as food processing, in sick. So I’ll be saying “I thought such
but also domestic work where workers are and such was working”, and they’ll say
‘dependent on the good nature of their “they’re not feeling well, so I’m doing their
employers’ (Currie, 2007). In addition, the shift”. And, so they really keep it covered.’
current recession may well have increased Matthews and Ruhs, 2007
the prevalence of exploitation, since
employers find it more necessary to cut Of course, the vast majority of workers
costs and workers are more desperate to benefit from living and working in the
keep their jobs. UK; otherwise they would not have come
in such large numbers. However, there
More ‘benign’ forms of exploitation is a risk that a constantly self-replacing
also pose a risk. A8 migrants are widely stream of A8 workers could fall into
praised for their superior ‘work ethic’ and the role of a semi-exploited (if often
‘flexibility’, as we have described. They compliant) ‘underclass’, with limited long-
are willing and able to perform certain term prospects for social mobility and
jobs that UK-born workers are thought to integration.
shun. But does ‘flexible’ sometimes mean
‘compliant’ or ‘easily exploited’? For the We turn to this issue next.
same reasons that eastern Europeans tend
to be willing to accept low wages, they
are also more likely to accept working
conditions (such as antisocial hours
or unpleasant work) that employers
cannot impose on UK-born workers:
they are young, do not see their current
29
Long-term prospects for But for the substantial population of

recent EU migrants who stay for only
upward mobility and
short periods, integration over time is less
integration relevant: migration stays are too short
Currently A8 workers are heavily over- to allow for substantial upward mobility,
represented in low-wage work, often especially if migrants work in only one or
despite high levels of education, as we two jobs before returning home. Even if
described earlier. Will this remain the case many of the new EU citizens eventually
over the long run? How successfully can stay for longer than intended, the
the A8 integrate economically, accessing return intention alone may reduce the
better job opportunities? To answer this likelihood of upward mobility: migrants
question, it is useful to distinguish between who consider themselves temporary are
short-term and long-term immigrants: thought to invest less in their own labour
those on the one hand who come for short market advancement (be it through formal
periods (either seasonally or on a one- education or informal networking and
off basis), and those who will eventually information-gathering), especially when
stay for several years or even for ever. they will not benefit from the investment
Of course, no sharp line divides the two in their country of origin (see Dustmann,
groups, and many migrants who at first put 1993). Temporary migrants are also more
themselves in the first category end up in likely to retain their home-country earning
the second, or vice versa. power as a reference point, and hence
may be willing to accept lower wages and
Short-term migrants poorer conditions.
The classic model of immigrant integration In other words, temporary migrants may
suggests that immigrants experience have greater barriers to integration. But
downward social mobility at the point of policy can aim to improve their welfare
migration (working in lower-skilled jobs in the short term by giving them the tools
than they would at home) but that their to defend themselves from homelessness,
wages increase faster than those of the poverty and exploitation. For example,
UK-born, allowing them to catch up with appropriate enforcement of labour
time. In practice, however, some groups standards (that does not rely solely on
experience this upward mobility relative employee complaints), better provision
to the UK-born, while other groups do of information and advice in multiple
not (see Papademetriou et al., 2009b). languages, and access to language training
Nonetheless, the time an immigrant to acquire at least a basic knowledge
has spent in the host country is widely of English, could all improve their
considered to be a highly important driver circumstances.
of successful integration.
30
Longer-term settlers Previous education, however – even if

Longer-term migrants have greater it is not currently valued in the labour
opportunities for upward mobility. For market – helps individuals to gain host-
country human capital that is valued. In
eastern European migrants, occupational
their studies of migrations from Latin
status will be crucial to labour market
America to the US, Duleep and Regets
advancement: they will need access to
(1994, 2002) argue that ‘source-country
progressively more skilled jobs if they
human capital is more valuable in learning
are to begin to see a return on their high
than in earning’, so that immigrants
levels of education. They will need effective
with undervalued human capital should
systems for recognising both academic and
experience faster wage growth than those
vocational credentials. And since language
with immediately transferrable skills. If
proficiency is often essential to practicing
this is true, we should expect that many
more skilled work, many will need access
of the recent EU migrants will, over time,
to language tuition (whether publicly or
acquire the language and other skills
privately provided) focused towards their
necessary to qualify for highly skilled work.
employment requirements.
On the other hand, immigrants who

Given what we currently know, how good
qualify for skilled occupations might still
are the prospects for the longer-term
face barriers to upward mobility if they do
eastern European migrants? We argue that
not have sufficient information or social
while high education levels make many of
contacts. The recent migrants have relied
them well-placed to integrate successfully,
more strongly on social networks to find
they may experience barriers to highly
work than any other significant immigrant
skilled work, in part because of their
group, as we described earlier.
reliance on social networks to find work.
Networks are a useful means of finding
work, especially for newly arrived
On the one hand, the recent migrants have
immigrants, but they can also encourage
high levels of education. As a group, they
social stratification in the long term
have not seen high returns on education
(Montgomery 1991; Topa 2001). This is
during the first few years, as we described
because information about jobs typically
earlier. Several explanations are possible:
comes from individuals who are already
insufficient language skills, a lack of social
employed in a certain field. If workers rely
contacts or knowledge about entry routes
on one another to get jobs, they are limited
into certain kinds of work, and the fact that
to the range of opportunities that their
education received in the country of origin
friends and relatives can provide.29 And
may be either less relevant to employers or
if these friends and relatives work in low-
more difficult for them to understand.
skilled occupations or live in areas where
29
According to one study, living in ethnic enclaves can improve an individual’s
employment prospects if the enclave is a high-income one, but might reduce
earnings if it is populated by low-income co-ethnics (Edin et al., 2003).
31
average incomes are low, even qualified Among those who spoke another language
individuals can fail to access skilled work. at home, about a quarter of working-age
Since the recent migrants are highly eastern Europeans reported language
concentrated in unskilled occupations, difficulties in finding or keeping a job,
their reliance on social networks, if it compared to about 6 per cent of other
continues, could mean that some are immigrants and 8 per cent of other
‘locked in’ to low-productivity, low-wage immigrants who arrived in 2004 or later.30
jobs (see Sumption, 2009). Migrants have also experienced difficulties
accessing language tuition, or committing
Language proficiency to available classes because of long or
Language skills matter greatly for both irregular working hours (Spencer et al.,
long-term and short-term immigrants. 2007; Commission for Rural Communities,
They are crucial to upward mobility and 2007). The high employee turnover in
advancement into highly skilled work. many of the jobs that the recent migrants
They also enable workers in less skilled perform reduces employers’ incentives
jobs to avoid exploitation and to access the to invest in language tuition at work.
information they need to protect their own However, employer-based language
welfare. Little useful data exists on the new tuition, whether it is funded by employers
EU migrants’ language levels. In 2006, the or migrants themselves, may be the most
LFS included some limited questions on effective way to provide access to language
language, however, and the results suggest classes for the recent migrants (Roberts,
that recent eastern European migrants 2005). Many work irregular hours in
have lower English proficiency than isolated locations and cannot access
other immigrant groups (many of whom classes in universities or town centres,
come from English-speaking countries). and work-focused language tuition is most
Approximately 80 per cent of working-age likely to improve labour market prospects.
eastern European migrants arriving in Any policy framework to improve the
2004 or later reported speaking a language prospects of the new EU citizens in the UK
other than English at home, compared to must carefully examine the availability of
about two-fifths of other immigrants and language teaching for different migrant
just under half of other immigrants who groups, and the most effective means of
arrived in 2004 or later (and hence provide provision.
a better comparison with the recently
arrived eastern Europeans).
30
Authors’ calculations from the LFS, Q3 2006.
32
Integration On the other hand, language barriers and

high concentrations of fellow nationals
How well have the new EU migrants at work may reduce eastern European
integrated socially? Integration is not workers’ opportunities for integration.
a neatly defined concept. While closely Qualitative studies on eastern Europeans’
linked to the kinds of economic integration experiences in the UK shortly after
we have described so far (including accession suggested that in many cases,
labour market participation and prospects integration was incomplete. For example,
for upward mobility), the term also a qualitative study for the Joseph
encompasses social inclusion, active Rowntree Foundation conducted shortly
citizenship, civic renewal and community after the 2004 accession found that
cohesion. In practice, integration can the ‘vast majority’ of eastern European
include everything from setting down roots interviewees spent most of their time
in a local community, building contacts with other migrants; after two years in
with UK-born workers, learning English, the country, a quarter still spent no time
and gaining mutual understanding with with British people.32 This picture does
local residents. Without a firm purchase on
not necessarily continue to represent the
the definition, we set out only some basic
recent migrants’ situation today, however,
observations.
and the evidence base on social integration
is quite thin, making it difficult to draw
At first sight, eastern Europeans do not
firm conclusions.
face the same barriers to integration as
other migrant groups. They have benefited
In the longer term, the new EU citizens’
from strong educational institutions in
high labour force participation bodes well
their home countries, have employment
for integration, while other factors we
rights almost equal to British citizens,
have described (such as low wages and
and are not visible minorities. The
the potential for limited upward mobility
widespread perception (especially among
for certain groups) present challenges. In
employers) that the recent migrants have
particular, the large number of temporary
a strong work ethic has also boosted
migrants and the prevalence of short stays
their standing. Ethnic stereotypes about
may make social integration difficult. Of
eastern Europeans tend to be ‘disarmingly
course, the risks that we have described
positive’; they are ‘keen, young, white
(including worklessness, isolation, lack
people taking whatever work is on offer
of language ability and vulnerability
and going to church every Sunday’ (Kohn,
to exploitation) all reduce the ease of
2007).31
integration.
31
This positive reception may have been dented by the recession, however: an FT/
Harris poll taken in February and March 2009 found that over half of UK
respondents opposed ‘citizens of other EU countries getting a job’ in their country
(Eaglesham, 2009).
32
The study interviewed individuals from A8 countries who had been present in the
UK since 2003.
33
The children of A8 around the UK: provisional data from

the Schools Census shows that 4.4 per
immigrants: prospects
cent of pupils whose first language was
for the future reported to be other than English spoke
To support equality in the long term, Polish, Lithuanian, Slovak or Czech34, and
policymakers must consider not just the anecdotal reports point to much larger
new migrants and their communities, concentrations in specific local areas.35
but also the children in immigrant How will these children fare as they move
families.33 through education and into the labour
market? Experience from many developed,
While we do not have good data on the immigrant-receiving countries suggests
nationality of children in the UK, birth that the success of immigrant children
statistics show that the number of children depends to a large extent on their parents’
born to foreign mothers from another EU background. In general, children whose
country has increased substantially since parents came from wealthier source
2001, with steeper increases from about countries tend to fare better. In practice
2004 (see Figure 6). By contrast, a much this often means that white children
slower increase in the number of births to from immigrant families tend to face
Indian mothers occurred over the same fewer barriers to educational and labour
period. This is highly consistent with market success than visible minorities.
the assumption that the recent migrants The reasons for this are complex, but
account for much of the increase in the certainly discrimination is likely to play
number of EU births. at least some role (for more analysis on
the children of immigrants in the UK,
As a result, we may see a substantial see Papademetriou et al., 2009b). This
change in the composition of young, suggests that integration may be relatively
second-generation immigrants over the smooth for the children of eastern
coming decade. At the same time, growing European immigrants. On the other
proportions of Worker Registration hand, the less positive experience of some
Scheme (WRS) registrants are bringing other white European groups (such as
dependant children with them. This the Portuguese) serves as a reminder that
trend is already evident in schools some acute needs may be hidden.
33
‘Children in immigrant families’ refers to both the first generation (those born
abroad who come to the UK with their parents) and the second generation (those
born in the UK to immigrant parents).
34
This is likely to be an underestimate, since many children whose first language is
other than English are either not recorded, or the language is not specified. Other
A8 languages are not specifically presented in the School Census data because the
samples are too small.
35
See, for example, Casciani (2006).
34
Une
5
0
0 1 2 3
Number of years migrant has been in the UK
Figure 6

(excluding UK and Ireland) and from India
40,000
35,000
30,000
25,000
20,000
15,000
10,000
5,00o
0
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Europe India
Source: Office for National Statistics birth statistics
However, specific challenges remain for (Crul, 2007). In addition, teachers may
the new EU migrants. The recent migration not have good information about a child’s
poses a specific challenge for educators educational history or may be unable to
because of its temporary nature, which provide him or her continuity of teaching.
makes children’s residence and hence
schooling unstable. In particular, if circular Finally, workers who migrate temporarily
migration establishes itself as a long-term are thought to invest less in their children’s
trend, we could see a new generation human capital, since they do not expect
of children who have spent significant them to remain in the host country
periods in the UK but whose schooling has where they would require a host-country
been interrupted on numerous occasions. education (Dustmann, 2007). If the
Interrupted schooling or childcare during temporary immigrants later become more
early years reduces a child’s opportunities permanent, this could hold back their
to acquire full language fluency if they children’s opportunities.
are learning English as a second language
35
The labour market impact of
the recent migration
Equality implications:
the impact of A8 migration
Equality implications: the impact of A8 migration

The unexpected scale of A8 migration prompted questions –
among policymakers and the public – about its economic and
social impacts. The current economic downturn and environment
of rising unemployment has intensified existing concerns about
any negative impacts on UK-born workers. In this section we
examine the ways in which A8 migration has affected both the
economy and local communities.
Of course, European Union (EU) labour There is no strong reason to expect a

mobility is just one part of the economic significant negative impact on wages or
integration between members of the EU. employment in response to the recent
For this reason, it does not make sense immigrant influx. Indeed, much larger
to examine the ‘costs and benefits’ of the ‘immigration shocks’ around the world
recent migration as if it were a discrete have been absorbed by receiving-country
policy choice. That said, we can usefully labour markets with relative ease. For
analyse the recent migration to suggest example, the Mariel Boatlift in 1980
how to manage the adjustment process brought 125,000 immigrants from Cuba to
more smoothly, maximise the benefits a single US city (Miami) over a period of
and reduce the negative impacts of only a few months. It increased the labour
immigration. force by 7 per cent and boosted the supply
of less-skilled workers significantly more.
The labour market impact Still, according to David Card (1990), the
of the recent migration influx had virtually no effect on wages for
The impact of immigration on host those less-skilled workers who already
countries’ labour markets has received were in the labour force. Another paper
finds that even when a sudden influx of
substantial academic attention. Public
Russian Jews boosted Israel’s population
opinion tends to support the view that
by 7.6 per cent in 1990 and 1991, during
immigrants take natives’ jobs and reduce
one of the single largest immigration
their wages, yet a large body of research
waves the world has seen, there was little
suggests that this is not the case, as we
evidence of downward pressure on Israeli
have recently outlined in previous work
wages (Gandal, Hanson and Slaughter,
produced for the Equality and Human
2004). Recent migration from the new
Rights Commission (see Somerville and
EU member states has boosted the labour
Sumption, 2009b).
force by significantly less in comparison.
37
In 2008, the recent European migrants In the end, economies are highly dynamic
made up less than 1.5 per cent of the and can absorb large numbers of new
working-age population after five years of workers without reducing average wages.
migration. Generally, the labour market is able
to expand to accommodate influxes of
Similarly, studies that have examined more migration. There is no a priori reason
gradual, steady inflows of immigration to believe that it would respond any
to a host country (often over several differently to A8 migration. Two recent
decades) have tended to find that the studies examine the specific impact of the
impact of immigration on natives’ wages recent migration, and find that it has not
or employment rates are small (see had any effect on the unemployment of
Somerville and Sumption, 2009b for a natives (Gilpin et al., 2006) or even on
review). However, certain groups may those of sub-groups of UK-born workers,
lose out, such as workers in manual such as women, the low-skilled, and the
occupations who do not have the skills to young (Lemos and Portes, 2008). Indeed,
move into more ‘communication-intensive’ Dustmann, Frattini and Preston (2008)
jobs for which immigrants compete argue that immigration in recent years
less effectively, previous immigrants has a positive impact on average wages
who may have poor language skills and across the labour market, which might be
compete for similar kinds of jobs as new the product of occupational downgrading,
immigrants, and individuals with marginal particularly among recent immigrants. If
labour force attachment, such as single immigrants are paid less than the value
mothers and teenagers. These effects of what they produce, which is a strong
are neglected in most studies, because possibility in the case of the A8 (who, as
there is insufficient data to differentiate discussed earlier, tend to be over-qualified
these groups characterised by a lower for their jobs), a ‘surplus’ is generated,
level of ‘employability’ (the two UK which accrues to UK-born workers and
studies cited certainly suffer from this employers. Even so, the recent migration
drawback). Nonetheless, the contribution also intensifies the risk that certain
of immigration alone is still thought immigrant-receiving areas will develop a
to be small. Even taking into account ‘low-skill equilibrium’: a situation in which
these potentially unmeasured effects, the local labour force has low skill levels,
ultimately other factors remain much and so local employers (or employers
more important in determining considering locating in the region) only
the economic welfare of these low- create low-productivity jobs. The result is
wage groups (Somerville and Sumption, a ‘vicious circle,’ in which employers fail
2009b). to invest in increasing the skills in their
workforce, and individuals have little
incentive to invest in their own human
capital (Stenning et al., 2006, p66; Pindus
et al., 2007).
38
According to research from the UK, The fiscal impact of

Germany and the US, firms in areas that
receive more low-skilled immigrants do
EU labour mobility
not reduce wages in response, but simply The impact of immigration on public
employ more low-skilled labour. In finances also receives substantial attention.
practice, this means that they may fail to How has the recent migration affected
adopt labour-saving technology that would public revenues and spending? Do the
have led to productivity gains and fewer recent immigrants pay more in taxes
low-skilled jobs.36 While A8 migration than they receive in benefits and public
may create a benefit to UK-born workers services? Contrary to early fears about
employed in industries that are made more ‘welfare tourism’, the recent migration
viable because of immigration, it also runs has been strongly labour-motivated, and
the risk of perpetuating the existence of welfare recipiency has been low.37 That
substantial numbers of temporary jobs said, it is remarkably difficult to determine
with unsociable hours that are increasingly immigrants’ overall fiscal impact. Tax
only attractive to migrant workers (see, for payments and cash benefits (such as tax
example, Scott, 2008). credits, unemployment or housing benefit)
can be estimated. But the implied costs
This underscores the importance of of public services such as health care
policies to develop career opportunities and education (where service providers
for low-skilled workers across the labour typically do not keep data on the origin of
force. These workers feel most threatened their clients) cannot be determined with
by migration, in part because other factors anything approaching accuracy.
(such as trade or technical change) already
make their economic circumstances In addition, not all immigrant groups have
precarious (Somerville and Sumption, the same fiscal impact. One analysis, for
2009b). example, suggests that immigrants from
non-English speaking countries are about
5 per cent less likely than the UK-born to
use disability or unemployment benefits,
once we control for factors that typically
affect reliance on welfare, such as age,
marital status and education. On the other
36
See Lewis (2003), Quispe-Agnoli and Zavodny (2002) and Dustmann and
Glitz (2008).
37
It is difficult to know the extent to which restricted benefit eligibility has affected
this trend, or whether welfare recipiency would be higher if more of the recent
migrants were eligible for benefits. What can be said, however, is that the large
numbers who migrated despite the welfare restrictions demonstrate the strong
pull of work and life in the UK, regardless of the availability of welfare benefits.
39
hand, immigrants from English-speaking Local and non-economic

countries (the vast majority from Ireland)
impacts
used welfare significantly more than the
UK-born (Barrett and McCarthy, 2008). At the local level, however, there is
Even abstracting from these problems and more variation. Some local authorities
taking immigrants as a whole, researchers have reported difficulties responding to
dispute the real impact.38 The most unexpected or concentrated increases
thorough assessment of the fiscal impact of in the immigrant population, especially
A8 migrants in particular, estimates that since the population estimates that
the recent migrants receive significantly determine funding are not frequently
less in welfare benefits and public services updated (Robinson, 2007). By way of
than the UK-born, but contribute to tax example, policing services in some areas
revenues at about the same rate as their now experience greater contact with non-
UK counterparts (Dustmann et al., 2009). English speakers, and some schools have
A8 immigrants who had been in the UK for needed to increase their capacity to teach
at least a year (and hence are more likely children with English as a second language
– although not certain – to be eligible for (Audit Commission 2007).
most benefits)39 were found to be 60 per
cent less likely than the UK-born to receive In many ways, some of the most keenly
benefits or tax credits and 58 per cent less felt impacts of A8 migration have been
likely to live in social housing. Meanwhile, social and cultural, rather than economic.
high labour force participation meant As we have discussed, A8 migrants have
that the A8 contributed to tax revenues integrated successfully into the UK labour
in proportion to their representation market, albeit primarily into low-wage
in the population, despite lower wages jobs. However, some tensions have arisen
than the UK-born. In addition, if A8 in local communities. For example,
workers experience high wage growth in overcrowded housing or in some cases
the future their tax payments will rise, rough sleeping may impact negatively on
further boosting their fiscal contribution local neighbourhoods.
(Dustmann et al., 2009).
38
See Gott and Johnson, 2002; Coleman and Rowthorn, 2004 and
Sriskandarajah et al., 2005.
39
A8 workers become eligible for benefits after 12 months of continuous
employment; therefore, some workers who have been in the UK for a year or
more, but have not been employed continuously, will not be eligible.
40
Misunderstandings about ‘laws, emergent problems before public officials.

regulations and community expectations’ Some have increased coordination between
(Audit Commission, 2007), such as how agencies (new EU citizens often have
to use rubbish collection services or specific needs, especially since many are
where parking is prohibited, have also not eligible for the same benefits as native
caused tensions, though such issues can workers or longer-term immigrants).
be mitigated by distilling and reinforcing Others have made a greater effort to share
information to new migrant groups. the costs of translation and interpretation
between agencies and local areas and
A substantial literature on local authorities’ to coordinate the dissemination of
good practice now exists: local areas information. Perhaps not surprisingly,
experiencing new or unexpected inflows do areas with past experience of migration
not have to reinvent the wheel (see Audit are thought to have been better able to
Commission, 2007; Communities and respond to the new A8 inflows, developing
Local Government, 2009; Stenning et al., policies to meet these new migrants’ needs
2006). Local authorities have responded (Audit Commission, 2007). The developing
to the new migration by exploring various national agenda on immigrant integration
strategies. For example, some have (for example, the Communities and Local
increased their information-gathering Government’s Migration Impacts Fund)40
activities, by obtaining information from is also increasingly dedicated to promoting
police agencies that are often aware of promising local practices.
40
The Migration Impacts Fund was announced at the Equality and Human Rights
Commission–Migration Policy Institute migration summit in March 2009.
41
Box 2: Lessons from It also grants them the right to resettle

the past? Previous with their families in their respective
countries of migration. Needless to say,
accessions and their
the right to migrate within the EU is at
impact the core of the European project.
2004 and 2007 were not the first, nor
the last, EU enlargements. Croatia is These freedoms, however, come with
expected to join in 2010, and several limitations. Accession agreements
states remain in the EU’s waiting room. allow existing member states to
Turkey (a country that falls in the last impose transitional restrictions on
of these categories) is particularly freedom of movement for up to seven
important. With a population of over 75 years. This occurred in four of the six
million41 and with average wage rates that accession treaties. In fact, there were
are lower than any of the recent accession no transitional measures only for the
states (Von Weizsacker, 2008), it is only first enlargement involving the UK,
natural to question whether a Europe Ireland and Denmark; or for the fourth
with Turkey could sustain the migration enlargement involving Austria, Finland
that could follow enlargement. What and Sweden (which already had free
then are the lessons from past accessions, movement for their nationals under the
including the most recent ones described terms of the European Economic Area
in this report, and how may they be Agreement). Even where transitional
applied to the questions that future arrangements have not accompanied
accession projects pose? enlargement projects, there has been
disquiet over possible immigration
Mobility in previous impacts, for example Dutch anxiety that
enlargements the UK’s Commonwealth citizens would
Europe’s internal market provides four move to the Netherlands after 1973.
freedoms: free movement of goods,
persons, services and capital. The free When Greece joined the EU in 1981 the
movement of workers, set out in Article first transitional rules to protect labour
39 of the EC Treaty, entitles nationals of markets were introduced after pressure
one member state to look for and take up from Germany and France. There was
employment in another member state. little evidence of any negative labour
market impact.
41
2009 estimate from CIA World Factbook: https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tu.html#People [Accessed 7 August 2009]
42
Box 2 continued
According to one study, the accession This more sophisticated transitional
of Greece had not resulted in any ‘clear, structure, therefore, allowed countries
common or consistent relationship to open their labour market doors at
between changing patterns of population different speeds. Since the UK was one
and labour stocks, or immigration’ of only three countries to provide full
(Migration Research Unit, 2000). labour market access in 2004, this almost
The impact of Spain and Portugal’s certainly displaced A8 flows to the UK
1985 accession was also deemed to and may have done so for the long-term,
be ‘negligible’, even after the end of as initial flows have led to established
the transitional period (Dustmann et networks that continue to attract
al., 2003). Indeed, return migration new immigrants. The lessons learned
of Spanish and Portuguese nationals from the British case could affect how
from other EU countries after 1985 member states approach the question of
may explain why the European Council migration in future enlargement projects.
of Ministers felt able to shorten the More specifically, it may persuade
transitional period by 12 months, ending policymakers to coordinate more closely
it in 1991. In short, no mass migration before choosing how and when to open
followed previous EU accessions. the borders of their respective countries.
Why was the 2004 accession 2004 was also an anomaly in that there
different? were relatively few migrants from the
The Accession Treaties with the A8 new EU member states at the moment
and A2, with transitional restrictions of accession. By contrast, earlier EU
on labour mobility, were thus based on entrants had been able to develop
past practice. One difference was that considerable migrant populations in
the seven-year transitional period was other EU countries prior to their own
broken down into three phases: the accessions. One study suggests that
so-called ‘two plus three plus two’ rule. because migration from eastern Europe
This allowed countries to opt in to free had been frustrated under communism,
movement procedures immediately a ‘pent-up’ demand to migrate abroad
or after two, five or seven years. A resulted in the huge migration response
‘standstill’ clause prevented countries to the opening of borders. This may
from reducing labour market access after explain why the migration response
opening up. during the recent enlargements was so
much larger than in previous ones, which
also involved countries with considerable
wage differentials (Ahearne et al., 2009).
43
Conclusions and primary

policy questions
Conclusions and primary policy questions

Five years after the first eastern European accessions, forecasting
migration from within the EU remains difficult.
During the coming years, migration European workers gain sufficient language
patterns are likely to change and fluctuate. ability, work experience, recognition for
Different kinds of workers may migrate, their foreign credentials or additional UK
and the balance among sending countries qualifications? Will the new migrants be
may shift. Changing economic conditions able to build up the social contacts and
throughout Europe will shape these local labour market knowledge that will
dynamics. In the mid to long term (and help them to negotiate the market for more
certainly after the current recession), skilled employment? At the same time,
demand for labour in the low-skilled jobs how successfully will local areas continue
that the recent migrants have filled in large to adjust to new migration to ensure
numbers is expected to remain strong. equality of opportunity for both migrants
On the other hand, sustained economic and existing UK residents?
development and wage growth in the new
member states could ultimately reduce Promoting equality in the context of
the ‘push’ of east–west migration within eastern European migration requires a
Europe, but it is difficult to know how strong focus on helping vulnerable workers
quickly such growth could occur. Indeed, (both immigrant and UK-born). From the
the current recession may have slowed overview we have provided in this report,
the medium-term prospects for rapid five primary policy messages emerge:
economic development in the new member
states. g Widespread temporary migration
necessitates policies that do not rely on
In the meantime, it is likely that many a migrant’s length of residence for their
of the UK’s new European citizens effectiveness. Such policies include
will continue to find low-wage work in rapid and effective credential
industries such as hospitality or food recognition, the enforcement of labour
processing, while some will move into standards and minimum wages,
more skilled work. One of the key policy and the provision of information to help
questions today is how easy this transition immigrant workers who lack UK labour
to more highly skilled work will be. In market experience to know and
other words, how easily will eastern understand their rights.
45
g A closer look at the availability of g Local areas that receive large inflows of
language tuition may be warranted: new migrants – particularly areas
how it is provided and which groups can unused to migration – could receive
access it. Policies to encourage greater support in the form of flexible
employers to provide such programs funding and technical assistance. Needs
may make the most sense for the recent will vary by area, but greater resources
migrants. In addition, greater policy might be dedicated to hiring dual-
and programme evaluation would help language teaching assistants or outreach
to ascertain what works and what to encourage more efficient use of
doesn’t to increase participation in public services. The new Migration
language-learning, as well as its Impacts Fund, announced at the
effectiveness. Equality and Human Rights
Commission–Migration Policy
g Occupational downgrading is a natural Institute migration summit in March
phenomenon arising from the migration 2009, can make some contribution to
process, and it is not feasible to these programmes.
eliminate it entirely. However, policies
can encourage upward mobility into The recent migration has been a positive
jobs where the recent migrants can be experience. Eastern European workers
most productive. These include the have been relatively well received by
improvement of credential recognition the public and by employers (although
policies, and more ‘hands-on’ efforts attitudes to both EU and non-EU
such as internship programmes and migration have hardened to some extent
government cooperation with during recent economic turmoil). It is clear
professional associations or certificate- that policymakers need to make sure that
awarding bodies. they do not become complacent about
the benefits of EU migration. Instead,
g Efforts to prevent social stratification they must work to ensure that EU labour
among both UK-born and immigrant mobility remains compatible with equality
workers in low-skilled jobs could of opportunity in the UK, for current
include policies to encourage the migrants and for their children.
employer provision of training and
the creation of ‘job ladders’ that enable
workers to gain upward mobility. Such
programmes would also be useful in
attempts to tackle the risk of ‘low-skill
equilibria’ in areas that rely heavily on
low-skilled jobs.
46
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Equality and Human Rights Commission

Madeleine Sumption and Will Somerville

The UK’s new

How do the recent The prospects for the new European

How has the recent Policies to support equality

The new EU citizens’ overall fiscal impact

To answer these questions, we draw on need to register, and some non-exempt

What is special about the recent migration?

National Insurance numbers allocated to Polish nationals,

200 2002/3 to 2008/9

Figure 2 National Insurance number allocations

Source: Department for Work and Pensions (2008, 2009)

Registration Scheme (WRS) for each

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

migration patterns?’), this may reduce its

sensitivity to UK labour demand.

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Source: UK Border Agency (2005) and Home Office (2009)

A different kind of migration natives.13 As a result, they receive lower

As a result, A8 workers have a lower Temporary migration, circular

A8 immigrants were substantially 2009). As we discuss in more detail later,

Migration from Romania One crucial distinction, however, is that

Box 1: Changing migration In fact, the character of A8 migration

Equality implications: how are eastern European

Labour force profile:

Source: Labour Force Survey, 2008

The unemployment picture

economic circumstances. in a skilled occupation (Somerville and

Sumption, 2009a). This partly explains the

non-EU immigrants’ higher wages – they

are more limited to highly skilled work.

Decline in unemployment rate with

Source: Labour Force Survey, 2008

Number of UK births to mothers from European Union

Tentative evidence (limited only by not necessarily a problem – indeed, it is

Indeed, homeless agencies have noted In addition, economies of scale mean

Many of these instances of exploitation occupational status as permanent (Eade et

Long-term prospects for But for the substantial population of

Longer-term settlers Previous education, however – even if

On the other hand, immigrants who

Integration On the other hand, language barriers and

The children of A8 around the UK: provisional data from

Number of UK births to mothers from European Union

Source: Office for National Statistics birth statistics

Equality implications: the impact of A8 migration

Of course, European Union (EU) labour There is no strong reason to expect a

According to research from the UK, The fiscal impact of

hand, immigrants from English-speaking Local and non-economic

Misunderstandings about ‘laws, emergent problems before public officials.

Box 2: Lessons from It also grants them the right to resettle

Conclusions and primary

Conclusions and primary policy questions

Robinson, D. 2007. European Union Accession State Migrants in Social Housing in

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