IN THE U.S. NAVY-MARINE CORPS COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALSWASHINGTON NAVY YARDWASHINGTON, D.C.BEFOREJ.W. ROLPH D.A. WAGNER P.D. KOVACUNITED STATESv.Arnold S. BREDSCHNEIDERPrivate First Class (E-2), U.S. Marine Corps

PUBLISHNMCCA 200700025 Decided 23 August 2007 Sentence adjudged 10 January 2000. Military Judge: S.A. Folsom.Staff Judge Advocate's Recommendation: C.J. Woods. Reviewpursuant to Article 66(c), UCMJ, of General Court-Martialconvened by Commander, 1st Force Service Support Group, MarineForces Pacific, Camp Pendleton, CA. CAPT WILLIAM HARBESON, JAGC, USN, Appellate Defense CounselLT JUSTIN E. DUNLAP, JAGC, USN, Appellate Government CounselCDR M.G. MILLER, JAGC, USN, Appellate Government CounselKOVAC, Judge:A military judge sitting as a general court-martialconvicted the appellant, pursuant to his pleas, of larceny,transporting a machinegun in interstate commerce, and possessinga firearm not registered to him in the National FirearmsRegistration and Transfer Record, in violation of Articles 121and 134, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 921 and934. The appellant was sentenced to confinement for 18 months,forfeiture of all pay and allowances, reduction to pay grade E-1,and a bad-conduct discharge. The convening authority approvedthe sentence as adjudged.In his sole assignment of error, the appellant alleges thathis right to speedy post-trial review was materially prejudiced

by the seven-year delay in post-trial processing. As relief, theappellant asks the court to disapprove the findings and sentence.We have carefully reviewed the record of trial and pleadingsof counsel. We find that the post-trial delay in this caseviolated the appellant’s due process rights and that harmresulted. Additionally, we find that the appellant’s plea to theAdditional Charge of possessing a firearm is not supported by lawand fact and it will be set aside. After reassessing thesentence, we will grant relief for the due process violation asexplained in further detail below.

Post-Trial Delay

In a post-trial delay analysis, the first question toresolve is whether the particular delay is “faciallyunreasonable.”

United States v. Young,

64 M.J. 404, 408 (C.A.A.F.2007)(citing

United States v. Moreno,

63 M.J. 129, 136 (C.A.A.F.2006)). In

Moreno

, our superior court recognized a presumptionof unreasonable delay under the following circumstances:For courts-martial completed thirty days after the dateof this opinion [11 May 2006], we will apply apresumption of unreasonable delay . . . where theaction of the convening authority is not taken within120 days of the completion of trial. We will apply asimilar presumption of unreasonable delay for courts-martial completed thirty days after the date of thisopinion where the record of trial is not docketed bythe service Court of Criminal Appeals within thirtydays of the convening authority’s action.

Id.

at 142. In this case, the presumption of unreasonable delaydoes not apply because the appellant’s court-martial wascompleted prior to the

Moreno

decision. Nevertheless, we findthat the extreme delay in this case (2,571 days from completionof the appellant’s court-martial (10 January 2000) untildocketing with this court (24 January 2007)) is faciallyunreasonable. Once we determine the delay is faciallyunreasonable, a further due process review is necessary.

Young,

64 M.J. at 408.2

Our due process review involves the consideration andbalancing of the four factors set forth in

Barker v. Wingo,

407U.S. 514, 530 (1972): (1) the length of the delay; (2) thereasons for the delay; (3) the appellant’s assertion of the rightto a timely appeal; and (4) the prejudice to the appellant.

United States v. Jones,

61 M.J. 80, 83 (C.A.A.F. 2005);

Toohey v.United States,

60 M.J. 100, 102 (C.A.A.F. 2004). Each factor mustbe analyzed and balanced to determine if it favors the Governmentor the appellant.

Moreno,

63 M.J. at 136. No single factor isnecessarily dispositive.

Id.

If this analysis leads to theconclusion that the appellant’s due process right to a speedypost-trial review has been violated, “we grant relief unless thiscourt is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that theconstitutional error is harmless.”

Young,

64 M.J. at 409(quoting

United States v. Toohey,

63 M.J. 353, 363 (C.A.A.F.2006)).The first and second factors under this analysis clearlyweigh against the Government. As noted above, the appellant wassentenced on 10 January 2000. His case then lingered for overseven years prior to docketing with this court on 24 January2007. The length of this delay is unreasonable and excessive.The Government provides no explanation for the delay but concedesthat it is unreasonable and without excuse.Under the third factor, we find no evidence in the recordthat the appellant asserted his right to a timely appeal prior tohis affidavit, dated 26 February 2007, which was filed in supportof his brief to this court. Accordingly, we find that the thirdfactor weighs against the appellant, however, not heavily.

See Moreno,

63 M.J. at 138 (finding that although the appellant didnot assert his right to timely review, this factor would notweigh heavily against him due to the Government’s post-trialreview responsibilities).

We also note that on 10 January 2000, the appellant signed an “AppellateRights Statement,” informing him of his various appellate rights and the post-trial review process. The Appellate Rights Statement also provides theaddress to the Appellate Defense Division and notification that he is entitledto an appellate defense counsel. Accordingly, there should be no doubt thatthe appellant had adequate notice concerning the appropriate authority tocontact if he was concerned about the delay in the post-trial processing ofhis case.