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P. 1
FM 1-1_Campaigning_25 January 1990

FM 1-1_Campaigning_25 January 1990

Ratings: (0)|Views: 310|Likes:
Published by manuals&manuals
Tactical success in combat is not enough, because tactical success of
itself does not guarantee victory in war. History has proved this. What
matters ultimately in war is success at the level of strategy, the level
directly concerned with attaining the aims of policy. That these two
levels of war are connected and that there is an art to the way tactical
results are used to advance the strategic purpose are beyond doubt. With
this thought as its point of departure, this book discusses this intermediate
operational level which links strategy and tactics, describing the
military campaign as the primary tool of operational
warfare.
This book, Campaigning, thus establishes the authoritative doctrinal
basis for military campaigning in the Marine Corps, particularly as
it pertains to a Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) conducting a
campaign or contributing to a campaign by a higher authority. Campaigning
is designed to be in consonance with FMFM 1, Warfighting,
and presumes understanding of the philosophy described therein. In fact,
Campaigning applies this warfighting philosophy specifically to the
operational level of war. Like FMFM l, this book is descriptive rather
than prescriptive in nature; it requires judgment in application.
Chapter 1 provides a conceptual discussion of the campaign
and the operational level of war, their relationship to strategy
and tactics, and their relevance to the Marine Corps. In many
situations, the MAGTF clearly has operational - vice merely tactical
- capabilities; therefore it is essential that Marine leaders
learn to think operationally. Chapter 2 describes the considerations
and the mental process for developing a campaign. This
mental process, and the strategic vision it derives from, are essential
to success at the operational level. Chapter 3 discusses
the operational considerations vital to conducting a campaign,
examining in detail the differences between tactical and operational
activities
Central to this book is the idea that military action, at any
level, must ultimately serve the demands of policy. Marine leaders
at all levels must understand this point and must realize that
tactical success does not exist for its own sake. The importance
of this understanding is particularly evident in conflicts at the
low end of the intensity spectrum - the revolutionary warfare
environment - where military force is not the dominant characteristic
of the struggle but is only one of several components of
national power, all of which must be fully coordinated with one
another. In a campaign Marine leaders must therefore be able to
integrate military operations with the other elements of national
power in all types of conflict.
This book makes frequent use of familiar historical examples
to put its concepts into concrete terms. But do not be deceived
into thinking this is a history book with little relevance to the
challenges facing today’s Marine Corps. These are classical examples
intended to illustrate principles with enduring and universal application. Many future crises will be “short-fuzed”
and of limited duration and scale. But make no mistake; no matter
what the size and nature of the next mission - whether it be
general war, crisis response, peacekeeping, nation building,
counter-insurgency, counter terrorism, or counter narcotics operations-
the concepts and the thought process described in this book
will apply.
This manual is designed primarily for MAGTF commanders
and their staffs and for officers serving on joint and combined
staffs. However, the method described here for devising and executing
a progressive series of actions in pursuit of a distant objective
in the face of hostile resistance and the broad vision that
this demands apply equally to commanders at all levels. Therefore,
as with FMFM 1, I expect all officers to read and reread this
book, understand its message, and apply it. Duty demands nothing
less.
Tactical success in combat is not enough, because tactical success of
itself does not guarantee victory in war. History has proved this. What
matters ultimately in war is success at the level of strategy, the level
directly concerned with attaining the aims of policy. That these two
levels of war are connected and that there is an art to the way tactical
results are used to advance the strategic purpose are beyond doubt. With
this thought as its point of departure, this book discusses this intermediate
operational level which links strategy and tactics, describing the
military campaign as the primary tool of operational
warfare.
This book, Campaigning, thus establishes the authoritative doctrinal
basis for military campaigning in the Marine Corps, particularly as
it pertains to a Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) conducting a
campaign or contributing to a campaign by a higher authority. Campaigning
is designed to be in consonance with FMFM 1, Warfighting,
and presumes understanding of the philosophy described therein. In fact,
Campaigning applies this warfighting philosophy specifically to the
operational level of war. Like FMFM l, this book is descriptive rather
than prescriptive in nature; it requires judgment in application.
Chapter 1 provides a conceptual discussion of the campaign
and the operational level of war, their relationship to strategy
and tactics, and their relevance to the Marine Corps. In many
situations, the MAGTF clearly has operational - vice merely tactical
- capabilities; therefore it is essential that Marine leaders
learn to think operationally. Chapter 2 describes the considerations
and the mental process for developing a campaign. This
mental process, and the strategic vision it derives from, are essential
to success at the operational level. Chapter 3 discusses
the operational considerations vital to conducting a campaign,
examining in detail the differences between tactical and operational
activities
Central to this book is the idea that military action, at any
level, must ultimately serve the demands of policy. Marine leaders
at all levels must understand this point and must realize that
tactical success does not exist for its own sake. The importance
of this understanding is particularly evident in conflicts at the
low end of the intensity spectrum - the revolutionary warfare
environment - where military force is not the dominant characteristic
of the struggle but is only one of several components of
national power, all of which must be fully coordinated with one
another. In a campaign Marine leaders must therefore be able to
integrate military operations with the other elements of national
power in all types of conflict.
This book makes frequent use of familiar historical examples
to put its concepts into concrete terms. But do not be deceived
into thinking this is a history book with little relevance to the
challenges facing today’s Marine Corps. These are classical examples
intended to illustrate principles with enduring and universal application. Many future crises will be “short-fuzed”
and of limited duration and scale. But make no mistake; no matter
what the size and nature of the next mission - whether it be
general war, crisis response, peacekeeping, nation building,
counter-insurgency, counter terrorism, or counter narcotics operations-
the concepts and the thought process described in this book
will apply.
This manual is designed primarily for MAGTF commanders
and their staffs and for officers serving on joint and combined
staffs. However, the method described here for devising and executing
a progressive series of actions in pursuit of a distant objective
in the face of hostile resistance and the broad vision that
this demands apply equally to commanders at all levels. Therefore,
as with FMFM 1, I expect all officers to read and reread this
book, understand its message, and apply it. Duty demands nothing
less.

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Published by: manuals&manuals on Feb 09, 2010
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Campaigning
U.S. Marine Corps
PCN 139 000060 00
Provided by www.marines.cc
 
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVYHeadquarters United States Marine CorpsWashington, D.C. 20380-000125 January 1990
FOREWORD
actical success in combat is not enough, because tactical success of itself does not guarantee victory in war 
. History has proved this. Whatmatters ultimately in war is success at the level of strategy, the leveldirectly concerned with attaining the aims of policy. That these twolevels of war are connected and that there is an art to the way tacticalresults are used to advance the strategic purpose are beyond doubt. Withthis thought as its point of departure,
this book discusses this intermedi-ate operational level which links strategy and tactics, describing themilitary campaign as the primary tool of operationalwarfare.
This book, Campaigning, thus establishes the authoritative doctri-nal basis for military campaigning in the Marine Corps, particularly asit pertains to a Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) conducting acampaign or contributing to a campaign by a higher authority. Cam-paigning is designed to be in consonance with FMFM 1, Warfighting,and presumes understanding of the philosophy described therein. In fact,Campaigning applies this warfighting philosophy specifically to theoperational level of war. Like FMFM l, this book is descriptive ratherthan prescriptive in nature; it requires judgment in application.
Provided by www.marines.cc
 
Chapter 1 provides a conceptual discussion of the campaignand the operational level of war, their relationship to strategyand tactics, and their relevance to the Marine Corps. In manysituations, the MAGTF clearly has operational - vice merely tac-tical - capabilities; therefore it is essential that Marine leaderslearn to think operationally. Chapter 2 describes the consider-ations and the mental process for developing a campaign. Thismental process, and the strategic vision it derives from, are es-sential to success at the operational level. Chapter 3 discussesthe operational considerations vital to conducting a campaign,examining in detail the differences between tactical and opera-tional activities.
Central to this book is the idea that military action, at anylevel, must ultimately serve the demands of policy
. Marine lead-ers at all levels must understand this point and must realize thattactical success does not exist for its own sake. The importanceof this understanding is particularly evident in conflicts at thelow end of the intensity spectrum - the revolutionary warfareenvironment - where military force is not the dominant charac-teristic of the struggle but is only one of several components of national power, all of which must be fully coordinated with oneanother.
 In a campaign Marine leaders must therefore be able tointegrate military operations with the other elements of national power in all types of conflict.
This book makes frequent use of familiar historical examplesto put its concepts into concrete terms.
 But do not be deceived into thinking this is a history book with little relevance to thechallenges facing today’s Marine Corps.
These are classical ex-amples intended to illustrate principles with enduring and
Provided by www.marines.cc

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