Questioning Moral Theories

AMELIE RORTY

Not a day passes but we find ourselves indignant about something or

other. When is our indignation justified, and when does it count as
moral indignation rather than a legitimate but non-moral gripe?
You might think that we should turn to moral theories – to the var-
ieties of utilitarian, Kantian, virtue theories, etc – to answer this
question. I shall try to convince you that this is a mistake, that
moral theory – as it is ordinarily presently conceived and studied –
does not have a specific subject matter, a specific aim, scope or bound-
aries. You might think that the difference between echt moral
indignation and other forms of disapproval is their relative strength
or the importance of their target; but moral indignation can be
quite faint, directed to a relatively minor transgression and a strongly
felt gripe may be directed to a serious but presumptively non-moral
infraction. I shall try to persuade you that morality does not consti-
tute an important and distinctive domain with a distinctive set of
over-riding norms or a privileged mode of reasoning: morality is
everywhere or nowhere in particular.1 Radical as this claim
may sound, I am not a complete Luddite about the matter.
Traditional moral theories nevertheless have important functions.
But rather than being competing ‘winner takes all’ explanatory
and normative theories, OldSpeak moral systems function heuristi-
cally. They offer a heterogeneous set of reminders, questions,
advice, ideals, warnings, considerations for deliberation. While we
try to integrate and systematize them, there is no single overarching
organizational plan.
As things now stand, we seem to have two, quite different and
perhaps conflicting conceptions of the functions of moral theories.
On the one hand, they take their subject matter as given: they are sup-
posed to describe, analyze and explain the phenomena commonly
characterized as ‘moral,’ contrasting them with what is immoral or

1
Though I do not believe that morality does not constitute a distinctive
domain, I shall use OldSpeak to refer to morality and moral practices de
dicto, without using shudder quotes. See ‘The Many Faces of Morality’,
Revue de Metaphysique et de Morale, 1994; reprinted in Mid-West Studies
in Philosophy, 20, 1996, ed. Peter French and Howard Wettstein.

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 Amelie Rorty

morally neutral. On the other hand, a moral theory is also normative:

it is meant to provide criteria for evaluating, and sometimes radically
revising and correcting the practices with which it is initially pre-
sented. In the largest sense, a moral theory is not only an analysis
of what’s immoral about immorality, but also a critique of our
common beliefs about what constitutes it. Going beyond a critical
rational reconstruction of the phenomena commonly classified as
‘moral’, it sets itself to present ideals of conduct and character for
emulation that may be strongly revisionary. What is the relation
between these two aspects of moral theory, between its descriptive
explanatory function and its idealizing normative force, between
interpreting our practices and attempting to guide and revise them?
Rawls’ method of reflective equilibrium is sometimes presented as
a model for the mutual adjustment of considered moral judgments
and practices with general regulative normative principles.2 I shall
suggest that the method is best construed as presenting normatively
charged heuristic questions and reminders in the process of practical
deliberation, rather than as a stage in the construction of a normative
moral theory. It is directed to prompting, rather than telling.

We need an example. Tracing the ramifications of attempts to dis-

tinguish a moral indignation from a legitimate but non-moral gripe
will help us to reconceive the import of moral theories. It will lead
us to – and through – three problems about the relation between
moral theory and the phenomena that it is supposed to explain, and
perhaps justify. The resolution of each problem invites the next,
and eventually introduces a fourth set of questions about the status
of moral theories.3

2
See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Harvard, 1971) 20 –21, 48 –50.
Platonic dialogues, Aristotle’s ethical treatises, Hume’s experiments and
Kant’s transcendental arguments all exemplify Rawls’ method: they begin
with descriptions of what passes for moral experience, attempt to explain
and reconcile conflicts in the phenomena and move to a theory that first
explains, and then provides norms for moral judgment and deliberation,
norms that reinterpret and sometimes realign the phenomena with which
they began.
3
For the time being and for the sake of argument, I shall speak indiffer-
ently about the concerns of moral agents engaged in deliberation and those
of moral theorists engaged in moral judgment.

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