Increasing Small Arms Lethality In Afghanistan: Taking Back The Infantry Half-Kilometer
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Comments from returning non-commissioned officers and officers reveal that about fifty percent of engagements occur past 300 meters. The enemy tactics are to engage United States forces from high ground with medium and heavy weapons, often including mortars, knowing that we are restricted by our equipment limitations and the inability of our overburdened soldiers to maneuver at elevations exceeding 6000 feet. Current equipment, training, and doctrine are optimized for engagements under 300 meters and on level terrain
There are several ways to extend the lethality of the infantry. A more effective 5.56-mm bullet can be designed which provides enhanced terminal performance out to 500 meters. A better option to increase incapacitation is to adopt a larger caliber cartridge, which will function using components of the M16/M4. The 2006 study by the Joint Service Wound Ballistics-Integrated Product Team discovered that the ideal caliber seems to be between 6.5 and 7-mm. This was also the general conclusion of all military ballistics studies since the end of World War I.
Major Thomas P. Ehrhart
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Reviews for Increasing Small Arms Lethality In Afghanistan
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- Rating: 5 out of 5 stars5/5Excellent resource documenting the continuing dilemma over Infantry Small Arms, Ammunition and Ballistics, and Tactics and Training.
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Increasing Small Arms Lethality In Afghanistan - Major Thomas P. Ehrhart
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Text originally published in 2009 under the same title.
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INCREASING SMALL ARMS LETHALITY IN AFGHANISTAN: TAKING BACK THE INFANTRY HALF-KILOMETER
BY
MAJOR THOMAS P. EHRHART, UNITED STATES ARMY
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Contents
TABLE OF CONTENTS 4
ABSTRACT 5
INTRODUCTION 7
CAPABILITY OF THE INFANTRY—1917-2003 10
World War I 10
The Interwar period 11
World War II 13
The Korean War 15
The Pentomic Era 17
Vietnam 19
Post-Vietnam 21
TAKING BACK THE INFANTRY HALF-KILOMETER 23
Equipment issues 23
M855 5.56mm Green Tip
23
Alternate Calibers 26
Optics 30
Increasing reliability of the weapon system 34
Arms Room Concept 38
Improving Doctrine 40
Squad Designated Marksman 40
Improved Battlesight zero 41
Improving Tactical Marksmanship Training 42
The Rifle Qualification Course 42
CONCLUSION 45
APPENDIX A—1949 RIFLE QUALIFICATION 50
APPENDIX B—MEU (SOC) M4 QUALIFICATION COURSE 54
REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER 55
BIBLIOGRAPHY 56
ABSTRACT
Operations in Afghanistan frequently require United States ground forces to engage and destroy the enemy at ranges beyond 300 meters. These operations occur in rugged terrain and in situations where traditional supporting fires are limited due to range or risk of collateral damage. With these limitations, the infantry in Afghanistan require a precise, lethal fire capability that exists only in a properly trained and equipped infantryman. While the infantryman is ideally suited for combat in Afghanistan, his current weapons, doctrine, and marksmanship training do not provide a precise, lethal fire capability to 500 meters and are therefore inappropriate.
Comments from returning non-commissioned officers and officers reveal that about fifty percent of engagements occur past 300 meters. The enemy tactics are to engage United States forces from high ground with medium and heavy weapons, often including mortars, knowing that we are restricted by our equipment limitations and the inability of our overburdened soldiers to maneuver at elevations exceeding 6000 feet. Current equipment, training, and doctrine are optimized for engagements under 300 meters and on level terrain
There are several ways to extend the lethality of the infantry. A more effective 5.56-mm bullet can be designed which provides enhanced terminal performance out to 500 meters. A better option to increase incapacitation is to adopt a larger caliber cartridge, which will function using components of the M16/M4. The 2006 study by the Joint Service Wound Ballistics-Integrated Product Team discovered that the ideal caliber seems to be between 6.5 and 7-mm. This was also the general conclusion of all military ballistics studies since the end of World War I.
The reorganization of the infantry squad in 1960 eliminated the M1D sniper rifle and resulted in the loss of the precision mid-range capability of the infantry squad. The modern solution to this problem is the squad designated marksman. The concept of the squad designated marksman is that a soldier receives the training necessary to engage targets beyond the 300-meter range limitation of current marksmanship programs, but below the 600 meter capability of actual snipers. As of June 2009, the equipment and training of the squad designated marksman has yet to be standardized. In field manual 3-22.9 there are only fourteen pages dedicated to training the squad designated marksman.
Any weapon system designed to perform in various environments will invariably make compromises in order to perform all requirements. The modular nature of the M4/M16 series of weapons lends itself to the arms room concept. Under the arms room concept, each soldier would have multiple weapons and optics combinations available. Commanders would have the flexibility to adjust the capabilities of the infantry squad for the anticipated environment while maintaining commonality of the manual of arms.
Finally, the current qualification course does not accurately depict the enemy on the battlefield. It is based on the 1960’s and 70’s concept of active defense strategy. Targets come up and depending on their range, remain up for a period of five to ten seconds. The modern battlefield is never this static. Soldiers fire twenty rounds from a prone or foxhole-supported position, then ten rounds from a prone-unsupported position and finally ten rounds from the kneeling position. Soldiers are conditioned to expect that their targets will not move, will only require one shot to incapacitate, and that a hit anywhere will result in that incapacitation.
The Army now has the opportunity to rectify this degradation of marksmanship capability and take back the infantry half kilometer. The ability to engage targets out to 500 meters requires significant revisions to doctrine, training, and equipment. These revisions require emphasis from the highest levels of military leadership.
INTRODUCTION
Operations in Afghanistan frequently require United States ground forces to engage and destroy the enemy, often at ranges beyond 300 meters. These operations occur in rugged terrain and in situations where traditional supporting fires are limited due to range or risk of collateral damage. With these limitations, the infantry in Afghanistan require a precise, lethal fire capability that exists only in a properly trained and equipped infantryman. The thesis of this paper is that while the infantryman is ideally suited for combat in Afghanistan, his current weapons, doctrine and marksmanship training do not provide a precise, lethal fire capability to 500 meters and are therefore inappropriate.
If the infantryman in Afghanistan is not effective in killing the enemy with small arms fire, what are the problems and how can these problems be fixed? This paper will determine if current small arms, marksmanship training, and doctrine are appropriate for combat in Afghanistan and how changes in these areas can increase small arms lethality.
An examination of past and current equipment, doctrine, training, and organization, reveals where shortcomings originate. Knowing how the Army got to where it is today, identifying current requirements, and discussing potential solutions, the Army can implement changes that will immediately increase small arms lethality of the infantry force in Afghanistan.
The mission of the infantry is to close with the enemy by means of fire and maneuver to defeat or capture