M i d d l e E a s t e r n O u t l o o k
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Although the Bush administration established adiplomatic quarantine of the Brotherhood afterSeptember 11, 2001, members of the U.S. Houseof Representatives held several meetings in Egyptin the spring of 2007—almost three months beforethe State Department meeting—with MuhammadSaad al-Katatni, an independent member of theEgyptian parliament and the head of its Brotherhood-affiliated bloc. On April 5, 2007, House MajorityLeader Steny Hoyer (D-Md.) broke with conven-tion and met with Katatni at the Egyptianparliament building and at the residence of U.S. ambassador to Egypt Francis J. Ricciardone.Then, on May 27, 2007, a four-member U.S. con-gressional delegation led by Representative DavidPrice (D-N.C.) met with Katatni in Cairo.Following Hoyer’s visit, the U.S. Embassy inCairo dismissed Egyptian criticism that his meet-ings presaged a reversal of U.S. policy.
2
In Novem-ber 2007, Ricciardone also played down themeetings when he claimed that U.S. contacts withnominally independent Brotherhood members did“not imply American endorsement of the views of the individual parliamentarians or their politicalaffiliates.”
3
Despite this reassurance, the meetingswith Katatni are indicative of opinion leaders, bothinside and outside the U.S. government, warmingto the idea of dialogue and reconciliation with theBrotherhood.While acknowledging doubts about its demo-cratic bona fides, recent essays and opinion piecesfeatured in
Foreign Affairs
,
The New York TimesMagazine
, and the
Boston Globe
have all suggestedthat engagement with the Egyptian Brotherhood—the progenitor of every major Islamist movementtoday—could serve U.S. interests in spreadingdemocracy to the Arab world.
4
In 2006, a muchpublicized white paper by the Carnegie Endow-ment for International Peace likewise concludedthat, despite several “gray zones” of ambiguity inIslamist thinking, a “policy of engagement withIslamist organizations, particularly with theirreformist wings, is the only constructive optionopen to organizations and governments thatbelieve democratic development in the MiddleEast is in everybody’s interest.”
5
The logic behind such reasoning rests on thesupposition that, in a region where political Islamenjoys widespread appeal, so-called moderateIslamist movements are better suited to effect po-litical change than their secular rivals. Given theseorganizations’ large constituencies, it has becomefashionable for engagement advocates to contendthat representative governments can emerge in theArab world only if groups like the Brotherhood areintegrated into the political process. In acountry with strong Islamic currents like Egypt,such a policy would appear not only sensible but
The Problem of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood
By Jeffrey Azarva and Samuel Tadros
Jeffrey Azarva (jazarva@aei.org) is a research assist-ant at AEI. Samuel Tadros (stadros@datamediasystems.net) is an Egyptian activist living in Cairo.
No. 4 • November 2007
On June 20, 2007, the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research convened a meeting of U.S. intelligence officials to weigh the prospect of formal engagement with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood,
1
known in Arabic as
al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin
. The session was the result of several years of discussion aboutengaging the group considered by many to be the fountainhead of Sunni fundamentalism.
inevitable. Yet while the movement, established byHassan al-Banna in 1928, constitutes the most organizedand well-funded opposition in the country today—thebyproduct of both its charitable services and
da’wa
(liter-ally “call to God,” or preaching) network that operateoutside state control—any examination of its rhetoricand political platforms shows U.S. outreach to be prema-ture. Despite its professed commitment to pluralismand the rule of law, the Brotherhood continues to engagein dangerous doublespeak when it comes to the mostfundamental issues of democracy.
Islamic Law and a Civil State
For all its talk of embracing liberal reform and a civil styleof governance—albeit with a
marja’iyya
, or Islamic sourceof authority, at its core—the Brotherhood remains a dog-matic organization wedded to religious ideology. Nowhereare the perils of cooperation with the Brotherhood or itsincreased participation in the political arena more discern-ible than in the group’s vision for a future Egyptian state.The Brotherhood’s first political reform initiative,issued in March 2004, provides a window into the group’sthinking.
6
Regarding the movement’s ultimate goal,supreme guide Muhammad Mahdi Akef is explicit. Hewrites that the Brotherhood’s “only hope, if [we] wish toachieve any progress in our lives, is to return to our faithand apply
sharia
[Islamic law].”
7
Akef explains that the“establishment of God’s law is the real solution to all of our suffering, whether it is due to domestic or foreignproblems. . . . This [the introduction of
sharia
] isachieved through the creation of the Muslim individual,the Muslim household, the Muslim government, and thestate which leads Islamic nations and carries the banner of
da’wa
so that the world is fortunate enough to receive thebest of Islam and its teachings.”
8
But since
sharia
has always resembled more of an ever-evolving set of rulings and interpretations than a codifiedlegal system, the Brotherhood’s appeal for Islamic law hasaroused fears of just what its implementation would entail.Akef’s initiative provides few specifics, but when he doeselaborate there is cause for concern. For instance, underthe rubric of building the “Egyptian human being,”Akef stipulates that the media be purged of all materialcontradicting Islamic rulings; in the field of educationalreform and scientific study, he seeks a greater emphasison military training and memorization of the Quran; andwith respect to cultural creativity and the arts, he calls for“conformity between the cinema and theater and theprinciples and values of Islam.”
9
Misgivings about the Brotherhood’s desire for anIslamic state by no means end there. While Akef hasmaintained that the application of Islamic law would beconsistent with that of Egyptian law—article 2 of theEgyptian constitution enshrines Islam as the official statereligion and Islamic jurisprudence as
the
principal sourceof legislation—his claim has failed to assuage fears. Presi-dent Anwar Sadat introduced the latter provision into theconstitution in 1981 not to facilitate the enactment of Islamic legislation, but to appease his Islamist oppositionas a means of undercutting leftist influence. To be sure, itseffect on the drafting of legislation since has been mini-mal. Akef’s explanation is insufficient to quell concernsabout the conflicts that could arise in lawmaking should aBrotherhood plurality deem legislation “un-Islamic.” Here,uncertainty abounds. What issues, for instance, would thegroup regard as divine and beyond the pale of elected offi-cials? More importantly, how would the constitutionalityof a controversial law be determined; that is, would inde-pendent arbiters, such as religious clergy, determine itscompatibility, or would government institutions deliver aruling? Perhaps of greater consequence, how would theBrotherhood respond to a decision that contravenesIslamic law?Since 2004, Brotherhood members have tried toresolve these quandaries, but their statements have onlyserved to muddy the issue further. The dissonancebetween the Arabic-language pronouncements of seniorofficials in the organization’s Guidance Bureau and theirsofter, more elastic, English-language interviews and publi-cations has generated greater skepticism about the move-ment’s adherence to democratic values. In a July 20, 2005,interview with the Egyptian government weekly
AkherSa’a
, Akef rekindled such doubts about an “Islamistfree-elections trap” when he claimed: “We believe indemocracy fully because it is the one that brings free andfair elections. But as for democracy without limits, whichsays that the people’s opinion is everything, we say to it‘no.’ People’s opinion is guided by
sharia
.”
10
Six months later, Akef’s words took on added signifi-cance when the Brotherhood registered unprecedented
- 2-
Any examination of the Brotherhood’srhetoric and political platforms showsU.S. outreach to be premature.
gains in the 2005 legislative elections. Independentcandidates belonging to the group captured eighty-eightseats in the 454-member parliament despite contestingjust 35 percent of the races.
11
Eager to put domestic andinternational concerns to rest after the elections, promi-nent Guidance Bureau member Abdel-Moneim Abul-Fotouh told the English-language
Al-Ahram Weekly
that, concerning Akef’s stance, “No law, no matter howdivine, can be enforced without the public’s consent.”
12
Muhammad Habib, Akef’s deputy, later seconded Abul-Fotouh’s view in an April 2007 interview with
TheNewYork TimesMagazine
when he declared that, should thePeople’s Assembly (the lower house of parliament) pro-pose a law in violation of
sharia
, the legislature wouldhave ultimate jurisdiction in reconciling the matter.“The People’s Assembly has the absolute right in thatsituation,” Habib explained. “Parliament could go toreligious scholars and hear their opinion, but it is notobliged to listen to these opinions.”
13
Abul-Fotouh’s and Habib’s comments may appearto reflect enlightened thinking, but when juxtaposedwith the Brotherhood’s most recent platform, dissemi-nated to Egyptian intellectuals in August 2007 in apreliminary draft and intended as a blueprint for acivil party, they are far less reassuring. The program,according to the independent Egyptian daily
Al-Masry Al-Youm
, calls for the creation of a “Supreme UlamaCouncil,” a body of elected religious scholars thatwould review executive decisions prior to implementa-tion for their compliance with Islamic law.
14
Theplatform states that while the body would serve in aconsultative capacity, its opinions would be compulsoryon matters governed by “proven [Islamic] texts,”
15
anamorphous term that could easily expand the council’sauthority. Muslim Brotherhood officials have defendedthe program as a trial balloon, but their claims miss thepoint. For a group sorely in need of revamping its publicimage, the mere reference to such a council, one reminis-cent of Iran’s
wilayat al-faqih
(guardianship of the jurists)system of governance, will recast discussion about itstrue intentions.The group’s actions, especially in parliament, havealso engendered little confidence in its agenda. Althoughthe Brotherhood’s growing presence in recent years hasinjected more accountability and debate into an otherwiseanemic legislature—representatives from the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) now attend committeevoting sessions with greater frequency lest their moredisciplined Muslim Brotherhood colleagues obtain aquorum—increased representation has done little tomoderate the movement’s ranks. Muslim Brotherhoodlawmakers have often used their forum in parliamentmore to rail against what they perceive as Egypt’s culturaldecadence than to offer real prescriptions for the country’sunemployment, inflation, or housing crises.A 2005 study conducted by the Al-Umma Center forStudies and Development in Cairo revealed that of thetotal number of Brotherhood interpellations during the2000–2005 parliament, approximately 80 percent dealtwith issues of culture, media, or education. The trend hascarried over to the current parliament. In November2006, Brotherhood member of parliament Ali Labanexcoriated Education Minister Yousri al-Gamal forappointing Monica Chavez, a U.S. education expert, toadminister a project reforming the country’s curricula.“The appointment of an American expert to take respon-sibility for modernizing education in Egypt is an act of treason for which the minister should be executed,” statedLaban, who is a visceral critic of the U.S. Agency forInternational Development’s efforts in Egypt.
16
Herecommended a similar punishment for Prime MinisterAhmed Nazif and Minister of Religious EndowmentsHamdi Zaqzouq after they approved tearing down a Cairomosque to make way for a downtown subway line. Labanmay be a firebrand, but his outlook for Egypt is not anaberration: other Muslim Brotherhood parliamentarianshave routinely submitted proposals to ban alcohol,Western novels, coed schooling, beauty pageants, andindividual music artists from performing in Egypt.Despite these concerns—or perhaps because of them—ambiguity in the group’s official programs persists. Thoughprogressive in the area of constitutional reform, theBrotherhood’s electoral platform for the June 2007 ShuraCouncil (the consultative upper chamber of parliament)elections continued to gloss over the contradiction interms between its calls for both
sharia
and parliamentarydemocracy. Like the 2004 reform initiative before it, theseventy-three-page manifesto confirmed the “Egyptian
- 3-
Muslim Brotherhood parliamentarianshave routinely submitted proposals toban alcohol, Western novels, coed schooling,beauty pageants, and individual music artistsfrom performing in Egypt.
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