This Dover edition, first published in 1952, is anunabridged and unaltered republication of thesecond (1946) edition. It is reprinted by specialarrangement with Victor Gollantz, Ltd., and is forsale in the United States of America and Canada
Stundard Book Number: 486-20010-8Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 52-860
Manufactured in the United States of AmericaDover Publications, Inc.180 Varick StreetNew York,
that have passed since Language, Truthand Logic was first published,
have come to see that thequestions with which it deals are not in all respects so simple asit makes them appear; but
still believe that the point of viewwhich it expresses is substantially correct. Being in every sensea young man's book, it was written with more passion than mostphilosophers allow themselves to show, at any rate in theirpublished work, and while this probably helped to secure ita larger audience than it might have had otherwise,
think nowthat much of its argument would have been more persuasive ifit had not been presented in so harsh a form. It would, however,be very difficult for me to alter the tone of the book withoutextensively reswriting it, and the fact that, for reasons not whollydependent upon its merits, it has achieved something of thestatus of a text-book is,
hope, a sufficient justification for re-printing it as it stands. At the same time, there are
number ofpoints that seem to me to call for some further explanation, and
shall accordingly devote the remainder of this new introduc-tion to commenting briefly upon them.
The principle of verification is supposed to furnish a criterionby which it can be determined whether or not a sentence isliterally meaningful. A simple way to formulate it would be tosay that a sentence had literal meaning if and only if the propo-sition it expressed was either analytic or empirically verifiable.To this, however, it might be objected that unless a sentence wasliterally meaningful it would not express a proposition;l for itis commonly assumed that every proposition is either true orfalse, and to say that a sentence expressed what was either trueor false would entail saying that it was literally meaningful.Accordingly, if the principle of verification were formulated in
Lazerowitz, "The Principle of Veriiiability,"