RADICAL

PASSIVITY
Lévinas, Blanchot, and Agamben

Thomas Carl Wall

with a Foreword by William Flesch

STATE UNIVERSITY OF N E W Y O R K PRESS

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L i b r a r y of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication D a t a

Wall, Thomas Carl, 1 9 5 4 -

Radical passivity : Lévinas, Blanchot, and Agamben / Thomas Carl
Wall : with a foreword by William Flesch.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0 - 7 9 1 4 - 4 0 4 7 - 8 (hardcover), — ISBN 0 - 7 9 1 4 - 4 0 4 8 - 6 (pbk.)
1. Lévinas, Emmanuel. 2. Blanchot, Maurice. 3. Agamben, Giorgio.
1942- . I. Title.
B2430.L484W35 1999 98-27843
111—DC21 CIP

Al 8 <b 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

TALLINNA ÜLIKOOLI \
AKADEEMILINE }
K RAAMATUKOGU/
X
 Contents

Foreword ix
Acknowledgments xv

Introduction
Passivity 1
The Language of Poetry 10

ONE
T h e A l l e g o r y o f Being
Image 13
Duality 17
The Obscure Temporality of the Artwork 22
The Space of Art 25
The Profane 29

TWO
Levinas's Ethics
An Ambiguous Rapport 31
No One Other 34
viii CONTENTS

The Self 40
Impasse 46
Éthique 50
Death 57
Levinas and Heidegger 62 FOREWORD

Love's Characters
THREE
B l a n c h o t , L'arrêt de mort, a n d t h e I m a g e of L i t e r a t u r e 65
Writing 65
Proximity 77
En d e ç à du t e m p s 93
Image, Ipseity, and Art 106

FOUR Wallace Stevens, w h o loved M a u r i c e Blanchot, in

A g a m b e n a n d t h e Political N e u t e r 115 a b o u t 1 9 5 5 : " F r e n c h a n d English c o n s t i t u t e a single l a n g u a g e . "
Anonymity and Belonging 115 B l a n c h o t himself ( o u r o w n " e x t r e m e c o n t e m p o r a r y " a s Leslie
Whatever! 121 Hill calls h i m ) , a few y e a r s earlier: " A t r o p b o n c o m p t e , u n
Community 129 t e x t e t r a d u i t m i m e l'effort d e c r é a t i o n q u i , à p a r t i r d e l a l a n g u e
Object = x 138 c o u r a n t e , celle d a n s l a q u e l l e n o u s v i v o n s e t n o u s s o m m e s i m -
Politics 155 m e r g é s , c h e r c h e à faire n a î t r e u n e a u t r e l a n g u e , e n a p p a r e n c e
la m ê m e et p o u r t a n t , par r a p p o r t à cette langue, c o m m e son
Notes 163 a b s e n c e , s a différence p e r p é t u e l l e m e n t a c q u i s e e t c o n s t a m m e n t
Selected B i b l i o g r a p h y 183 c a c h é e . " S u c h relatively facile t r a n s l a t i o n i s t o o e a s y a p a t h t o
Index 189 s o m e t h i n g t h a t i s n e v e r t h e l e s s n o t easy, t h e w a y t h a t i n t h e
literary w o r k t h e w r i t e r will m a k e l a n g u a g e u n d e r g o " l a t r a n s -
m u t a t i o n q u i d ' u n e seule l a n g u e d o i t e n tirer d e u x , l ' u n e q u i
est lue e t c o m p r i s e s a n s d é t o u r , l ' a u t r e q u i reste i g n o r é e , t u e e t
i n a c c e s s i b l e e t d o n t l ' a b s e n c e ( l ' o m b r e d o n t p a r l e Tolstoï) est
t o u t ce q u e n o u s en s a i s i s s o n s . " It is this w h i c h Stevens is s p e a k -
ing o f a s w e l l — t h e single l a n g u a g e n a m e a b l e o n l y a s t w o ,
French a n d English.
T h e ease w i t h w h i c h t r a n s l a t i o n c a n yield m o c k - p r o f u n d i t y

ix
h a s been .1 hazard Foi English language readers oi Blanchot,
Levinas, a n d Agamben (as h a s perhaps the n a t i v e case- with
w h i c h French a n d Italian s p e a k e r s m a y read t h e m ) . The stylis-
tic infelicity of t h e English l a n g u a g e for t h e i r k i n d of w r i t i n g
h a s n o t i n f r e q u e n t l y t e n d e d t o yield i n t h e i r f o l l o w e r s a k i n d
o f e m p t y s l o g a n e e r i n g , a c l a i m t o s o m e k n o w l e d g e different
f r o m t h a t g r e a t eerie c l a r i t y s o e s s e n t i a l t o w h a t t h e y a r e say-
ing. (That French is n o t Levinas's native language m a y p u t
h i m in t h e p o s i t i o n of t h e n a r r a t o r in L'Arrêt de mort, r e s p o n -
sive in a l a n g u a g e w h o s e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y c a n n o t be a given.)
F o r y e a r s i t h a s s e e m e d t o m e , e v e r s i n c e r e a d i n g Lydia
Davis's supple a n d heroic attempts to render Blanchot in En-
glish (in a letter to Steven S h a v i r o B l a n c h o t says of her, " E l l e
sait c e q u ' i l e n est d e t r a d u i r e l ' i n t r a d u i s a b l e " ) , t h a t t h e o n l y
w a y for a n E n g l i s h l a n g u a g e r e a d e r t o r e a d B l a n c h o t h a s b e e n
w i t h i n t h a t single l a n g u a g e S t e v e n s d e s c r i b e s . T h e E n g l i s h w e
s p e a k e v e r y d a y h a d s e e m e d t o o q u i r k y for B l a n c h o t . J . L .
A u s t i n s u g g e s t s t h a t w e ' l l get s o m e w h e r e i n a e s t h e t i c s w h e n
w e s t o p t r y i n g t o figure o u t t h e m e a n i n g o f t h e b e a u t i f u l a n d
start looking to describe "the dainty a n d the d u m p y " instead,
a n d it has been the fundamentally comic genius of English as
a l i t e r a r y l a n g u a g e (even t h e E n g l i s h of S t e v e n s ) , to m a r s h a l
such categories of experience.
W e w o u l d b e t e m p t e d t o call this familiar e x p e r i e n c e , H u m e
at billiards, Austen in Bath, Trollope at a h u n t , experience
w h o s e description might be " r e a d a n d u n d e r s t o o d directly."
B l a n c h o t ' s clarities seem s o m e t h i n g else, r e s t r a i n e d w i t h o u t
r e t i c e n c e , a u s t e r e w i t h o u t h a u g h t i n e s s , careful w i t h o u t a n x i -
ety, f a s c i n a t e d w i t h o u t c a t h e x i s , i m p e r s o n a l w i t h o u t c o l d n e s s .
In B l a n c h o t t h e n a m e of s u c h a s t a t e is l o v e , a w o r d u s e d v e r y
r a r e l y i n his w o r k , a n d o n l y w i t h t h e g r e a t e s t diffidence. A n d
y e t w h a t s t a t e i s m o r e f a m i l i a r t h a n love? F a m i l i a r t o u s a n d
t h e c h a n n e l o f t h e familiar?
T h e ( flannel 1 >l the familial DC! a use you m a y use t h e sec-
o n d p e r s o n familiar w i t h the o n e you love: tutoiement. But
perhaps one way to characterize Blanchot is to note the ex-
t r e m e d e m a n d s he p l a c e s on tutoiement. In his fictions his
n a r r a t o r s c o n s i s t e n t l y insist on its rarity. In his l a t e s t essay,
" P o u r l ' a m i t i é " B l a n c h o t describes the a t m o s p h e r e o f M a y ' 6 8
as o n e in w h i c h tutoiement w a s d e m a n d e d of e v e r y o n e . It w a s
only with his friends, a n d n o t with the c o m r a d e s of t h o s e t i m e s ,
t h a t B l a n c h o t w o u l d use the formal " v o u s , " sign o f p o l i t e n e s s t o
his friends, b u t m o r e o f his f r i e n d s h i p , w h i c h c o u l d n e v e r use
" t u " o f f h a n d e d l y . A t t h e e n d o f t h e e s s a y B l a n c h o t says t h a t i t
i s o n l y L e v i n a s w h o m h e will " t u t o y e r , " h i s f r i e n d s h i p w i t h
L e v i n a s , h i s f r i e n d s h i p w i t h his o t h e r f r i e n d s , a n d his friend-
s h i p w i t h f r i e n d s h i p d e m a n d i n g this d i s t i n c t i v e , i m p e r s o n a l ,
u n f a m i l i a r , a n d u n c a n n y f o r m a l i t y w i t h f a m i l i a r i t y itself.
F r e u d calls t h e u n c a n n y t h e r e t u r n o f t h e f a m i l i a r a n d sees
t h e fact o f r e t u r n itself a s w h a t m a k e s i t u n c a n n y . F o r B l a n c h o t
i t w o u l d b e t h e alien f o r m a l i t y a t t h e h e a r t o f t h e familiar, a n d
i n d e e d a t t h e h e a r t o f t h a t m o s t f a m i l i a r o f all t h i n g s , l a n -
guage, which is uncanny. Familiar: Blanchot's narrators are
u n c o m m o n l y e b u l l i e n t , light a t h e a r t , gay. U n c a n n y : t h a t g a i -
ety itself is u n c a n n y in B l a n c h o t , m a r k of t h e p r o x i m i t y of a
r a d i c a l u n c o n c e r n w i t h any w o r l d , c o n c e r n itself a p r e s e n c e
t h a t is p u t by.
T h i s u n c a n n y familiarity, this g r a v e g a i e t y i s t h e o p p o s i t e
of Freud's n o t i o n of the u n c a n n y as the r e t u r n of the familiar:
i t is, t o use Blanchot's i m p o r t a n t o b s e r v a t i o n a b o u t N i e t z s c h e ,
t h e e t e r n a l r e t u r n ("Je c h e r c h a i , c e t t e fois, á P a b o r d e r " b e g i n s
Celui qui ne m'accompagnait pas, a story of e n d l e s s reflec-
tion, of t h o u g h t as re-flecting on t h e i n t e r m i n a b l e , i m p e r s o n a l ,
u n p r e c e d e n t e d experience o f w h a t h a p p e n s t o t h o u g h t ) , b u t n o t
t h e eternal r e t u r n of the s a m e , n o r of t h e a l r e a d y e x p e r i e n c e d ,
n o r of a w o r l d t h a t has been lost b u t is n o w resuscitated, simply
A I I rwn B w wnw
the p u r e "appearance *»f Again, the diva dame" ( S t e v e n s ) .
F r e u d s a w every e r o t u relation as Caking place b e t w e e n at
least f o u r p e o p l e : the lovers a n d t h e i r p a r e n t s . But in B l a n c h o t
true erotic relation is u n c o u n t a b l e a n d takes place w i t h o u t
t h o s e p a r e n t s w h o a r e for F r e u d t h e o n l y o n e s w h o c o u n t .
T h e r e i s t h e lover, o r n a r r a t o r , o r ( u s u a l l y a n d b y a n e x t r e m e
c o n v e n t i o n t h a t signifies t h e i n t e n s e refusal o f t h e d e p t h o f
d e p t h p s y c h o l o g y ) m a l e figure, a n d a n u t t e r l y u n p r e c e d e n t e d
other: unprecedented and so beyond the universal precedent
o f t h e dialectic o f p r e s e n c e a n d a b s e n c e .
F o r L e v i n a s s u c h a r e l a t i o n to t h e o t h e r , to autrui, is t h e
h y p e r c a t e g o r i c a l i m p e r a t i v e t o e t h i c s ; for A g a m b e n i t i s t h e
future of t h e c o m i n g c o m m u n i t y , free to be u n p r e c e d e n t e d , qual-
unque, u n c h a r a c t e r i z e d a n d i n B l a n c h o t ' s t e r m s i m p e r s o n a l .
F o r B l a n c h o t , a s for S t e v e n s , i t i s t h e r e g i o n h a u n t e d b y l o v e .
I cite Stevens b e c a u s e I myself w i s h to reflect on t h e p o s s i -
bility o f a n A m e r i c a n c o n t e x t for B l a n c h o t i a n t h o u g h t , t h e
c o n t e x t for w h i c h (in t h e first i n s t a n c e ) Wall offers t h i s e x -
t r a o r d i n a r y b o o k . Love is a v e r y r a r e w o r d in S t e v e n s as w e l l ,
b u t it is, as I say, a w o r d t h a t he a p p l i e s to B l a n c h o t , in a letter
j u s t f o u r m o n t h s b e f o r e his d e a t h . In g e n e r a l it is a w o r d t h a t
h e a p p l i e s n o t t o p e o p l e b u t t o p l a c e s ("Life i s a n affair o f
p e o p l e , n o t o f p l a c e s . B u t for m e life h a s b e e n a n affair o f
p l a c e s , a n d t h a t h a s m a d e all t h e d i f f e r e n c e " ) , a s i n " N o t e s
Towards a Supreme Fiction," where
T h e C a p t a i n l o v e d t h e ever-hill C a t a w b a ,
A n d therefore married B a w d a w h o m he found there,
A n d B a w d a l o v e d t h e c a p t a i n a s she l o v e d t h e s u n .
T h e y m a r r i e d well because the marriage-place
W a s w h a t t h e y l o v e d . I t w a s n e i t h e r h e a v e n n o r hell.
T h e y w e r e love's c h a r a c t e r s c o m e face t o face.
T h e i r love i8 an affair <>l p l a c e . , but (he m a r r i a g e p l a c e , t h e
place they love, or the p l a c e they live a n d t h a t S t e v e n s loves is
literary s p a c e : " F r o m this the poem s p r i n g s , t h a t we live in a
place / That is not o u r o w n , a n d m u c h m o r e , n o t o u r s e l v e s , /
A n d h a r d it is in s p i t e of b l a z o n e d d a y s . " In t h e p r e f a t o r y
verse t o " N o t e s " S t e v e n s a s k s ,
A n d for w h a t , e x c e p t for y o u , do I feel love?
Do I press the extremest book of the wisest m a n
Close to m e , hidden in me day a n d night?
In t h e u n c e r t a i n light of single, c e r t a i n t r u t h ,
E q u a l i n living c h a n g i n g n e s s t o t h e l i g h t
In w h i c h I m e e t y o u , in w h i c h we sit at r e s t
For a m o m e n t , in the central of o u r being,
T h e vivid t r a n s p a r e n c e t h a t y o u b r i n g i s p e a c e .
W h o m is this addressed to? W h a t is the light in w h i c h they
m e e t — t h e light n o t of t r u t h , b u t a n o t h e r light w i t h a n o t h e r
c l a r i t y ? ( " R o b i n s a n d d o v e s a r e b o t h e a r l y risers a n d a r e c o n -
noisseurs of d a y l i g h t before t h e a c t u a l p r e s e n c e of t h e s u n c o a r s -
e n s i t " says S t e v e n s in a letter.) T h e s e lines a r e a tutoiement,
a n d it's n o t t h a t w e c a n n o t k n o w w h o m t h e y ' r e a d d r e s s e d t o ,
it's t h a t t h e r e i s n o k n o w i n g , t h e a d d r e s s e e d o e s n o t b e l o n g t o
the w o r l d of k n o w l e d g e . T h e scholar writes the b o o k , Stevens
will say, h o t for a n accessible bliss, b u t t h e bliss t h e w o r k of-
fers c a n n e v e r b e a c c e s s i b l e , c a n n e v e r b e p r e s e n t .
I t i s t h e l i t e r a r y w o r k t h a t gives u s t h e m o s t i n e l u c t a b l e
model of w h a t it is t h a t there is no k n o w i n g . You c a n love a
w o r k , b u t y o u c a n n e v e r k n o w it, e v e n i f y o u l o v e it, e s p e -
cially if y o u love it, a n d t h i s is a l e s s o n n o t a b o u t t h e w o r k
(about w h i c h there is no learning) b u t a b o u t love.
F o r F r e u d t o love t h e l i t e r a r y w o r k (since i t i s t h e w o r k
t h a t S t e v e n s a d d r e s s e s his d e d i c a t i o n to) i s t o b e e n g a g e d i n
transferential fantasy, i<> love what nil', sut h fantasy. But for
L e v i n a s , Blanchot, a n d Agamben, as loi Prousl a n d Stevens b e -
fore t h e m , love o f a n o t h e r can o n l y b e i n t i m a t e d t h r o u g h t h e
s t r a n g e a n d elusive a n d a l w a y s lost love o f l i t e r a t u r e . S t e v e n s :
" I n p o e t r y y o u m u s t love t h e w o r d s , t h e i d e a s a n d i m a g e s a n d Acknowledgments
r h y t h m s w i t h all y o u r c a p a c i t y t o love a n y t h i n g a t a l l . " T h e
r e l a t i o n t o t h e o t h e r t h a t love n a m e s , a n d t h a t B l a n c h o t e x -
p l o r e s in all his fiction, c u l m i n a t i n g in L'attente l'oubli, is o n e
o f r a d i c a l passivity, i n t e r m i n a b l e a t t e n t i o n , t h e m o s t f o r m a l
a n d d e m a n d i n g m a i n t e n a n c e o f t h e s e v e r e s t familiarity. L o v e ' s
characters are, m a k e u p , literature. It is only in this strange
language, the other language, the language of literature, that
l o v e c a n b e u t t e r e d (as t h e p a r a b l e a b o u t t h e n a r r a t o r ' s a d -
d r e s s i n g C l a u d i a in h e r n a t i v e l a n g u a g e in L'Arrêt de mort
also m a k e s clear).
T h e a u t h o r w i s h e s t o e x p r e s s his g r a t i t u d e t o a
This love is w h a t Wall utters in this r e m a r k a b l e b o o k . He
n u m b e r o f friends w h o m h e e n l i s t e d for m u c h - n e e d e d h e l p .
too k n o w s w h a t it is to translate the untranslatable and he has
The f o l l o w i n g p e o p l e h a v e left t h e i r m a r k s o n t h i s b o o k : Susie
f o u n d a g r a v i t y o f style a n s w e r i n g t h e g r a v i t y o f t h e o t h e r n e s s
Brubaker, Stephen D u c a , Stephen Wall, M a g e n t a Widner, Kate
of the language he attends to. He will, I imagine, defamiliar-
G a r d n e r , K a r l D u d i c k , a n d t h e staff of t h e l e g e n d a r y Left Bank
ize—or ( w h a t is the s a m e thing) render uncannily familiar—
Books in S e a t t l e , W a s h i n g t o n .
t h e s e w o r k s for F r e n c h a n d I t a l i a n s p e a k e r s w h o will find t h e
T h e a u t h o r w o u l d also like t o t h a n k D o u g l a s Brick,
t r a n s m u t a t i o n B l a n c h o t s p e a k s of: h e will r e n d e r t h e i r l a n -
Camillo Penna, Robert Thomas, Jean-Luc Nancy, and Giorgio
guage plural as he renders English plural, able at last to trans-
A g a m b e n , w h o r e a d t h e m a n u s c r i p t a n d offered critical a n d
l a t e t h e s e figures in a n s w e r a b l e style, p r e s e r v i n g all t h e i r alterity
encouraging comments.
a n d giving b a c k to English, as Stevens also h a d d o n e , a sense
o f its o w n alterity, a p l a c e f r o m w h i c h t h e p o e m m a y c o n t i n u e W i t h affection a n d r e s p e c t , t h e a u t h o r w i s h e s t o a c k n o w l -

to spring. edge his teachers. A m o n g them are M i k e Wing, Jane Green,

R a n d y Fezel, C h a r l i e A l t i e r i , C a r l D e n n i s , a n d E v a n W a t k i n s .

WILLIAM FLESCH
BRANDÉIS UNIVERSITY

XV
 Introduction

Passivity
T h e w r i t e r s w e will e x a m i n e h e r e s h a r e a c e r t a i n
p r e o c c u p a t i o n w i t h a p o i n t o f r a d i c a l p a s s i v i t y t h a t affects
s u b j e c t i v i t y p r i o r t o a n y m e m o r y . Passive w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e
image (Maurice Blanchot), the O t h e r (Emmanuel Lévinas), a n d
being-in-language (Giorgio A g a m b e n ) , each writer c a n n o t re-
sist t u r n i n g r o u n d a n d r o u n d t h e p a r a d o x — o r t h e i n v e r t e d
e s s e n c e — o f t h i s passivity. N a m e l y : p a s s i v i t y i n t h e r a d i c a l
s e n s e , b e f o r e it is s i m p l y o p p o s e d to activity, is p a s s i v e w i t h
r e g a r d t o itself, a n d t h u s i t s u b m i t s t o itself a s t h o u g h i t w e r e
an exterior power. H e n c e , radical passivity conceals, or har-
b o r s in itself, or c o m m u n i c a t e s w i t h , a potentia; it is a l w a y s
o u t s i d e itself a n d i s its o w n o t h e r . Passive w i t h r e g a r d t o itself,
t h e e s s e n t i a l p a s s i v i t y of t h e s u b j e c t m u s t u n d e r g o itself, suf-
fer itself, feel itself as other. In t h i s s e n s e , p a s s i v i t y is p u r e l y
passionate.
O l d e r t h a n a n y ( a c t u a l ) p o s s i b i l i t y is this potentia-in-gen-
eral t h a t " g i v e s " n o t h i n g ( e x c e p t itself) a n d t h a t " i s g i v e n "

1
2 INTRODUCTION
p r i o r to a n y real state of affairs. A l w a y s older t h a n a n y activity,
t h i s r a d i c a l passivity " g i v e s " its o w n w i t h d r a w a l , t h e r e f o r e . I t
is and is not t h e subject. M o r e i n t i m a t e t h a n a n y p e r c e p t i o n ,
e x p e r i e n c e , o r feeling, r a d i c a l passivity " g i v e s " n o n p r e s e n c e ,
inequality-in-itselfness: i.e., the incalculable specificity of de-
struction. T h i s p a r a d o x w o u l d r e m a i n a m e r e l y f r u s t r a t i n g
f o r m a l i t y w e r e it n o t for t h e fact t h a t existence is t h e n a m e for
this p a s s i v i t y t h a t suffers itself o u t s i d e itself. P r i o r t o a n y given
b e i n g , in s h o r t , is t h e e x i s t e n c e t h a t d e s t r o y s itself as a p r e s -
e n c e w i t h a d e s t r u c t i o n t h a t leaves e v e r y t h i n g i n t a c t . It is a
v e r y d e s t r u c t i v e d e s t r u c t i o n — o n e t h a t c a n n o t c o n s e r v e itself
in order to destroy; one that c a n n o t but incessantly destroy
itself. I f y o u like, this p a r a d o x d e s c r i b e s t h e " p r o d u c t i o n " o f
nothing, or the " p r o d u c t i o n " of an absolute past or an ex-
t r e m e y o u t h t h a t t h e s u b j e c t never has been. T h a t is to say,
r a d i c a l passivity p r o d u c e s t h e i m a g i n a r y , p r o d u c e s s o m e t h i n g
like fiction, s o m e t h i n g t h a t r e m a i n s o n l y possibly intelligible.
W e h a v e l e a r n e d f r o m H e i d e g g e r t h a t e x i s t e n c e i s possi-
bility in general a n d t h e r e f o r e it is u n r e a l i z a b l e in p a r t i c u l a r ,
or it is i m p o s s i b l e in p a r t i c u l a r . E x i s t e n c e as t h e g e n e r a l i t y of
t h e p o s s i b l e i s precisely t h e i m p o s s i b l e : t h e u n c a n n y i m p o s s i -
bility of Da-sein—the b e i n g I myself am at my o w n m o s t . T h a t
is to say, b e f o r e I t a k e on t h e p a r t i c u l a r i t y of a p e r s o n , I a m —
a n d a m n o t — a n e x t r e m e possibility. T o say i t e v e n better, I a m
a potential p o s s i b i l i t y : t h e null e v e n t of an i n a c t u a l i t y . B u t
w h a t exposes t h i s potentia I a m a t m y o w n m o s t ? W h a t e x -
poses Da-sein}
Blanchot, Levinas, and A g a m b e n provide answers, each
of which says the same thing: W h e n there is n o t h i n g (when
there is fascination with the image, w h e n the other is rendered
a n o n y m o u s a n d b e c o m e s O t h e r , w h e n l a n g u a g e itself s p e a k s ) ,
t h e e x p e r i e n c e o f this n o t h i n g d e s t r o y s itself a s a n e x p e r i e n c e
a n d e x p o s e s a passivity t h a t in fact c o m m a n d s a r e t u r n to t h e
IN I R.ODUCTION 3
i n e x h a u s t i b l e , u n c o n t r o l l a b l e , a n d u n c a n n y passion I must be.
W h e n t h e r e i s n o t h i n g , w e a r e t r y i n g t o say, t h e r e i s a l r e a d y
n o l o n g e r n o t h i n g . N i h i l i s m i s n o t t h e f i n a l r e s t i n g p l a c e for
h u m a n being. With nihilism's global completion in t h e form
of t h e spectacle, A g a m b e n a r g u e s specifically, t h e r e is still s o m e -
thing to be destroyed with a nonconservative destruction that
will a l t e r e v e r y t h i n g w h i l e c h a n g i n g n o t a t h i n g . If y o u like,
we (but this " w e " does n o t n a m e us—it is the not-yet w h o we
still m u s t be) m u s t d e s t r o y i n a r a d i c a l m o v e m e n t t h a t leaves
n o t h i n g t o b e r e s t o r e d , n o t h i n g t o b e r e d e e m e d . W e m u s t seize
d e s t r u c t i o n a s obsessively a s p a s s i v i t y d e s t r o y s , b y failing t o
complete the w o r k of destruction.
E a c h o f t h e w r i t e r s w e shall d i s c u s s i n w h a t f o l l o w s r e -
t u r n s obsessively to the p a r a d o x we have described (some-
w h a t t o o r a p i d l y , n o d o u b t ) a s r a d i c a l passivity. T h e y h a v e
radicalized their particular disciplines to the p o i n t w h e r e we
c a n n o l o n g e r a s s o c i a t e w h a t t h e y say w i t h a n y t h i n g like w h a t
w o u l d c o m m o n l y fall u n d e r t h e h e a d i n g s " e t h i c s , " " a e s t h e t -
i c s , " o r " p o l i t i c s . " F o r e a c h , t h e s e c a t e g o r i e s a r e a l w a y s al-
r e a d y t h e t r a c e of a general or a potential r e l a t i o n t h a t a n y
p a r t i c u l a r discipline o n l y r e s t r i c t s . T h u s e a c h s p e a k s a l a n -
g u a g e at o n c e f a m i l i a r a n d a l i e n a t i n g . Each says very little, if
w e m e a n b y t h i s t h a t e a c h fails t o p r o d u c e a c o r p u s o f t h o u g h t
we m a y debate a m o n g s t ourselves. There are no pros a n d cons
w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e w o r k s w e shall d i s c u s s . T h e r e w i l l h a v e
been, however, the repeated exposure to impossibility t h a t we
may take to be an irreducible experience of an intimacy empty
of itself, a n d as fragile as it is r e p e t i t i v e .
I n o u r f i r s t c h a p t e r w e will f o l l o w L e v i n a s ' s a n a l y s i s o f t h e
a r t w o r k a s t h a t w h o s e ( e n i g m a t i c ) b e i n g i s precisely its iner-
tia, o r its inability t o e n t e r t h e r o b u s t p r e s e n t . W e will t h e n
a r g u e that t h e w e a k n e s s o r i m p o t e n c e " e x h i b i t e d " i n t h e a r t -
w o r k opens, not a w o r l d , b u t a general e t h i c s a n d p o l i t i c s .
 I he a r t w o r k "lets g o " of the object a n d t h u s interrupts the
w o r k of subjectivity. T h e w o r k ol art is purely and s i m p l y an
i m a g e , a n d a n i m a g e e l u d e s all a t t e m p t s t o g r a s p it.
I n o u r s e c o n d c h a p t e r , w e will a r g u e t h a t Levinas's e t h i c s
is i m a g i n a r y . T h a t is, like an i m a g e , Autrui will a l w a y s h a v e
r e m a i n e d u n a v a i l a b l e t o a n y p r e s e n t a n d , like a fissure i n b e -
i n g , will p r o v o k e a n infinite r a p p o r t t h a t will o v e r w h e l m t h e
s u b j e c t in a flood of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . ( T h i s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , h o w -
ever, like j e a l o u s y i n P r o u s t , will n o l o n g e r r e s e m b l e w h a t i s
c o m m o n l y m e a n t by the term.) Levinas w o u l d p r o b a b l y dis-
a g r e e w i t h o u r r e a d i n g since w e will c l a i m t h a t t h a t w h i c h
i n c e s s a n t l y e s c a p e s — A u t r u i — i s an a l t e r i t y t h a t t h e moi itself
is. We will a r g u e t h a t t h e g e r m of L e v i n a s ' s Autrement qu'être
ou au-delà de l'essence—substitution—is a radical identifica-
t i o n o f t h e self w i t h t h e O t h e r t h a t e v a c u a t e s t h e self o f
s a m e n e s s , stability, a n d self-certainty. I n b e c o m i n g r e s p o n s i b l e
f o r - t h e - O t h e r , t h e self e n c o u n t e r s a n i n c e s s a n c e t h a t r e s e m b l e s
Blanchotian dying and Agamben's capacity to " n o t not-be."
It becomes an image, in s h o r t , b u t no l o n g e r an i m a g e of itself.
It becomes an image of nothing, of no one. It becomes the
a n o n y m i t y t h a t , i n fact, Autrui a l r e a d y is. H e n c e t h e p a r a d o x
of an identification with no o n e t h a t is the thesis of o u r second
chapter.
In our third chapter, we examine Blanchot's notion of an
imaginary that precedes the real, precedes the object. In par-
t i c u l a r , w e will b e a t t e n t i v e t o a n i m a g i n a r y l a n g u a g e o r a n
i n c e s s a n t m u r m u r t h a t m u s t b e silenced i n o r d e r for t h e w o r d
to " w o r k . " This m u r m u r is poetic language: language that
has become an image of language, an image of negation.
" O l d e r " t h a n the Hegelian negative is a simulated language
that poetry cannot but speak. T h a t which poetry each time
s a y s will b e n o t h i n g m o r e t h a n t h e e m p t y t o t a l i t y o f l a n g u a g e
itself. Before a n y t h i n g is c o m m u n i c a t e d , c o m m u n i c a t i o n itself
is i ommunii a t e d . W h e n someone gestures to me, for e x a m p l e ,
h o w do 1 k n o w thai t h e r e is an a t t e m p t to c o m m u n i c a t e e v e n
il the p e r s o n s p e a k s a foreign t o n g u e ? A m u t e c o m m u n i c a t i o n
p r e c e d e s a n y dit (said). This c o m m u n i c a t i o n is u n s p o k e n b u t
i r r e d u c i b l e . It is an i m a g e of c o m m u n i c a t i o n t h a t p r e c e d e s a n y
m e s s a g e . L a n g u a g e t h a t precedes.itself, o r t h a t " b e g i n s " i n
repetition, is poetry, a n d this preemptive " s p e a k i n g " belongs
t o n o s u b j e c t i v e i n t e n t i o n t o say a n y t h i n g . O l d e r t h a n t h e s u b -
ject, i t i s a l a n g u a g e s p o k e n b y n o o n e , o r b y a n a n o n y m o u s
" s o m e o n e " ( B l a n c h o t ' s il, " h e , " t h e N e u t e r ) , w h o c a n n o t s p e a k
i n t h e first p e r s o n . U n a b l e n o t t o c o m m u n i c a t e , t h i s a n o n y m -
ity c a n n o t c e a s e " h i s " s a y i n g just a s i t i s u n a b l e t o m a n i f e s t
" h i m s e l f " i n a n y s t a t e m e n t , for " h e " i s o n l y i n s o f a r a s , a n d
for a s l o n g a s , " h e " s p e a k s . C o i n c i d i n g s o perfectly w i t h " h i m -
self," " h e " j u s t a s perfectly e s c a p e s " h i m s e l f " o r i s o u t s i d e
" h i m s e l f . " " H e " (or " S o m e o n e , " for i t i s a l w a y s a n o t h e r ) i s
perfectly i n l a n g u a g e . U n a b l e t o t u r n a r o u n d a n d g r a s p h i m -
self in a reflection w i t h o u t l o s i n g himself a g a i n , t h i s " S o m e -
o n e ' s " o n l y b e i n g is t h a t r e p e t i t i v e L e v i n a s i a n dire (saying)
t h a t u n s a y s itself. I t i s o u r t h e s i s i n this c h a p t e r t h a t t h e B l a n -
c h o t i a n w r i t e r i s t h e o n e w h o i s " c a p a b l e " o f this i n a b i l i t y t o
c e a s e t o s p e a k . R e f u s i n g all self-presence, t h i s a n o n y m i t y n e v -
e r t h e l e s s i s a h o l l o w i n g o u t t h a t m a k e s p o s s i b l e all p r e s e n c e ,
all w o r k , a n d all t h i n k i n g . " S o m e o n e , " i n s h o r t , i s l a n g u a g e
itself. " S o m e o n e ' s " b e i n g i s s o u t t e r l y a b s o r b e d i n l a n g u a g e
w i t h o u t a n y r e s i d u e t h a t t h e r e i s n o l o n g e r a n y o n e left t o s a v e
or manifest.
In this way, t h r o u g h Blanchot, we come to Agamben's
n o t i o n of a c o m m u n i t y - t o - c o m e t h a t is already " i n " language
a n d t h a t i s n o l o n g e r g r a s p a b l e a s sacrificed, r e c o g n i z e d , a n d
identified. C e n t r a l t o A g a m b e n ' s r e c e n t w o r k i s t h e n o t i o n o f
c o m p l e t e b e i n g - i n - l a n g u a g e w i t h o u t a n y r e s i d u e . W e believe
t h e r e f o r e t h a t his w o r k unfolds f r o m B l a n c h o t ' s la communauté
inavouable, although Agamben seems to wani i<> deny t i n s , in
Agamben's terms, the Bianchotian writer would be s o m e o n e
w h o c a n n o t n o t s p e a k a n d w h o has b e c o m e c a p a b l e o f this
i m p o t e n c e (like a literary G l e n n G o u l d , t o use A g a m b e n ' s o w n
e x a m p l e ) . B l a n c h o t (or " B l a n c h o t " ) i s c o m p l e t e l y a b s o r b e d i n
l a n g u a g e , is an i m a g e of himself, b u t as he is c o m p l e t e l y a b -
sorbed in language, he is outside himself a n d is thus an image
o f n o o n e . " B l a n c h o t " i s t h e n a m e o f a n infinite d i s p e r s i o n :
l a n g u a g e itself as a p u r e potentia, or as t h e e m p t i n e s s or p u r e
exteriority t h a t is not a " b e y o n d " but instead an eternal re-
t u r n to a never-having-been or an extreme youth. A g a m b e n
suggests t h a t o u r e r a — t h e era of the image, of the spectacle,
of t h e e v a c u a t i o n of all beliefs a n d p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s , i n d e e d , of
t h e R e a l itself—offers us this r e t u r n to a n e v e r - h a v i n g - b e e n as
a n e t e r n a l last h o p e . T h e e s s e n c e o f t h e S p e c t a c l e (like t h e
l o g i c o f t h e i m a g e w e e x a m i n e i n o u r first c h a p t e r ) i s t o s u b -
t r a c t o r e v e n insist o n t h e a b s e n c e o f t h e o b j e c t , a n d t h u s i m -
mediately to depart from simple representation. To be sure,
w e c a n still seek i n t h e i m a g e for t h a t o f w h i c h w e a r e c h e a t e d
(as m a n y o f m y s t u d e n t s often t r y t o find i n p r o f e s s i o n a l w r e s -
tling s o m e of the reality of G r e c o - R o m a n wrestling so t h a t
they can m a k e of Hulk H o g a n the degraded image of an Olym-
p i c c h a m p i o n ) , b u t w e c a n a l s o cease t o d o t h i s . W e c a n let t h e
p r e s t i g e of t h a t w h i c h is r e p r e s e n t e d (the m o d e l ) d i s s o l v e in
the image.
Any c o m m e n t a r y on the writings of Levinas, Blanchot,
a n d A g a m b e n will b e difficult, b e c a u s e e a c h w r i t e s i n s u c h a
w a y that our p o w e r to read is neutralized and dispersed. Each
of these thinkers writes in such a w a y t h a t c o m m u n i c a t i o n is
interrupted, a n d any formal presentation of their t h o u g h t , such
a s o u r s h e r e , i s ceaselessly p o s t p o n e d . T o p u t i t m o s t b l u n t l y ,
t h e y r e p e a t t h e m s e l v e s endlessly. ( T h i s i s p a r t i c u l a r l y t r u e o f
L e v i n a s a n d B l a n c h o t , w h o r e p e a t each other a s w e l l a s e c h o
themselves.) Foi each oi them, Striving to say the u n s a y a b l e ,
w r i t i n g is a c o m m u n i c a t i o n thai interrupts itself a n d c o m e s
back to itself in a s u s p e n s i o n that will p r e c e d e n o t h i n g a n d
t h u s refuse the p r e s e n t . The n o t i o n of r a d i c a l s u s p e n s i o n is
n o t m e r e l y a t h e o r e t i c a l nicety. It is t h e very w n p o w e r of t h e
l a n g u a g e of p o e t r y . R a d i c a l s u s p e n s i o n o p e n s us to a h o l l o w
interval of nonsalvageable time t h a t is b o t h w i t h o u t continu-
a t i o n a n d a l s o w i t h o u t c e s s a t i o n . I t will h a v e b e e n a t i m e t h a t
departs from the robust time of geometric chronology.
We bring together and overlap three thinkers here to the
e x t e n t t h a t e a c h a r t i c u l a t e s a n e x t r e m e passivity, e x p r o p r i a -
t i o n , d e - n u c l e a t i o n , or n e u t r a l i t y t h a t is p a r a d o x i c a l l y consti-
tutive of t h e self, t h e i m a g e , or t h e c o m m u n i t y . To be s u r e ,
other thinkers have devoted themselves to various versions of
r a d i c a l passivity. G e o r g e s Bataille, Gilles D e l e u z e , Luce Irigaray,
Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, and Jean-Luc N a n c y are a m o n g
those w h o have fashioned their o w n versions of the enigma.
Beyond these m o r e recent thinkers there are, of course, Heideg-
ger's t h i n k i n g o f f i n i t u d e , N i e t z s c h e ' s t h o u g h t o f t h e E t e r n a l
R e t u r n , a n d even, in a certain sense, Kant's c o n c e p t i o n of the
T r a n s c e n d e n t a l I m a g i n a t i o n (as w e shall e x a m i n e i n o u r c h a p t e r
o n A g a m b e n ) . N o d o u b t w e a r e f o r g e t t i n g still o t h e r s , b u t this
o n l y a t t e s t s t o t h e fact t h a t t h e r e c a n b e n o h i s t o r i c i z i n g o f
w h a t is precisely a p o i n t of d i s p e r s i o n : t h e s i n g u l a r i t y of an
e n i g m a t h a t " s a v e s " multiplicity s u c h t h a t even t h e t e r m " e n i g -
m a " (which w e b o r r o w from Levinas) m u s t b e s u b m i t t e d t o
its d i s p l a c e m e n t in a series of o t h e r t e r m s s u c h as dissemina-
tion, desistance, differance, point d'autrui, a n d still o t h e r s t h a t
are as well k n o w n . H e n c e the restlessness, imposition, super-
i m p o s i t i o n , d i s p a r i t y , c o n t e s t a t i o n , conflict, a n d o b l i q u e n e s s
t h a t ( d e ) c o n s t i t u t e s this p o p u l a t i o n o f t h i n k e r s . " P h i l o s o p h y
is philosophers in an intersubjective 'intrigue' t h a t n o b o d y
r e s o l v e s , w h i l e n o b o d y is a l l o w e d a l a p s e of a t t e n t i o n or a
lack <>l rigor,"' Levinas tells us. In this s e n s e , each <>| these
t h i n k e r ' s d i s c o u r s e s is an " e a c h time" ol the e n i g m a itself since
t h e e n i g m a of d e - n u c l e a t i o n is t h e very t a k i n g - p l a c e of c o m -
m u n i c a t i v i t y itself, a s w e w a n t t o s h o w . A l w a y s t h e " s a m e "
enigma, communicativity is only as trace or iteration w i t h o u t
identity. T h i s p o p u l a t i o n o f t h i n k e r s t h e n , f r o m w h i c h w e h a v e
plucked three, is a c o m m u n i t y w i t h o u t commonality, w i t h o u t
substance or essence.
I f w e focus o n t h e s e t h r e e t h i n k e r s i n p a r t i c u l a r , i t i s n o t t o
f o c u s o n a n y p a r t i c u l a r e t h i c s , l i t e r a t u r e , o r p o l i t i c s , b u t in-
stead to approach that which in each text touches on any eth-
ics, l i t e r a t u r e , o r politics w h a t e v e r , a n d w h i c h e a c h w r i t e r e x -
poses in diverse w a y s . We could, p e r h a p s , have written exclu-
sively on Heidegger, or H e i d e g g e r w i t h K a n t (of t h e Kantbuch),
o r N i e t z s c h e ( w i t h a n d a g a i n s t H e i d e g g e r ) , since t h i s p o p u l a -
t i o n ( m o r e o r less) s c h e m a t i z e s t h e a b y s s w e t o d a y i n h e r i t a n d
experience constantly in o u r thinking. Instead, we confine
o u r s e l v e s t o t h i n k e r s w h o confine t h e m s e l v e s t o p r o b l e m s t r a -
d i t i o n a l l y " s e c o n d a r y " t o f u n d a m e n t a l p h i l o s o p h y (even if, i n
fact, L e v i n a s w i s h e s t o i n s t i t u t e e t h i c s a s "first p h i l o s o p h y " ) .
I n e a c h c a s e , t h e s e " s e c o n d a r y " c o n c e r n s b e c o m e very s t r a n g e ,
u n f a m i l i a r , n o t t o say imaginary (i.e., p r o p e r l y b e l o n g i n g t o
n o c a t e g o r y a t all). E a c h t h i n k e r w e e x a m i n e h e r e i s a s t r a n g e
specialist w h o s e a t t e n t i o n t o ethical, literary, a n d political p r o b -
l e m s h a s led h i m i n t o a n o b s c u r e r e l a t i o n w i t h l a n g u a g e itself
a n d m u t a t i s m u t a n d i s w i t h t i m e . E a c h o p e n s his discipline o n t o
a dimension in which language becomes imaginary (anony-
m o u s , spoken by no one), a n d in w h i c h time diverges from the
State-time of chronological progress, increase, and improve-
m e n t t o w h i c h c a p i t a l i s t m o d e r n i t y c o m p u l s i v e l y sacrifices it-
self. T o p u t i t s u c c i n c t l y : W e a r e m o d e r n t o t h e e x t e n t t h a t w e
a r e sick w i t h c o n t i n u o u s , fleeting, a n d g e o m e t r i c t i m e , a n d w e
are O t h e r to the extent that we are—in a nutshell—finite. But
the expei ien< e ol finitude, ol pHtnordictl t e m p o r a l i t y , is, as we
k n o w from Heidegger, rigorously u n r e a c h a b l e . We are pre-
< isely not equal t o i t . It is the passion of the O u t s i d e , as B l a n c h o t
might say. But the O u t s i d e is n o t t h e B e y o n d a n d s o , simplify-
ing t h i n g s , w e will say t h a t w e a r e i n t e r e s t e d i n L e v i n a s t o t h e
e x t e n t t h a t h e fails t o r e v e a l o r i n s t i t u t e a n e t h i c a l B e y o n d ; w e
are interested in Blanchot to the extent that he involves us in
this i n c e s s a n t l i m i t i n g t h a t is t h e v e r y p a s s i o n of t h e ( n o t ) Be-
y o n d (le pas au-delà); a n d we a r e i n t e r e s t e d in A g a m b e n i n s o -
far a s h e m a k e s o f this a m b i g u o u s limit a n i n e s c a p a b l e a n d
unexcludable "belonging." M o r e narrowly, we are interested
i n a B l a n c h o t i a n " e l e m e n t a l d e p t h " t h a t p r e c e d e s access t o
a n y a c c o m p l i s h m e n t . T h a t i s t o say, w e a r e i n t e r e s t e d i n a n
a n t e r i o r i t y t h a t i n f o r m s t h e Levinasian éthique, t h e B l a n c h o t i a n
littéraire, and the Agambenian Quodlibet ens.
Beginning with Levinas's 1 9 4 8 essay "Réalité et son
o m b r e , " w e p r o c e e d t o s h o w h o w a s p e c t s o f t h a t a n a l y s i s in-
f o r m b o t h his o w n n o t i o n o f a r a p p o r t w i t h t h e O t h e r t h a t
precedes egology, a n d also informs Blanchot's n o t i o n s of writ-
i n g a n d t h e i m a g i n a r y . We t h e n will r e a d B l a n c h o t ' s L'arrêt de
mort a s a w o r k "structured" by n o n a c c o m p l i s h m e n t a n d
s t r u g g l e (or, i f y o u w i l l , " s t r u c t u r e d " b y finitude). F r o m t h e r e
we a n a l y z e A g a m b e n ' s La comunità che viene in l i g h t of H e i -
degger's reading of Kantian schematism in order to s h o w an
affinity b e t w e e n i t a n d t h e B l a n c h o t i a n i m a g i n a r y t h a t , i n t h e
e n d , w e c l a i m i s t h e v e r y " p l a c e " o f c o m m u n i c a t i v i t y a n d its
r a d i c a l passivity.
We are arguing that the point to which each thinker we
e x a m i n e l e a d s us is t h e p o i n t of c o m m u n i c a t i v i t y as such, in-
s o f a r as this p o i n t is in itself an i n t e r r u p t i o n of c o m m u n i c a -
t i o n . T h a t is to say, c o m m u n i c a t i v i t y pulverizes d i s c o u r s e . It
gives n o t h i n g t o b e t h o u g h t ; i t gives n o m e s s a g e t o w h i c h w e
m i g h t listen b u t , in effect, says: t h e r e is (il y a). C o m m u n i c a t i v i t y
as such—when- ii'h,it is c o m m u n i c a t e d is noi o u t s i d e ii but ol thought, is thingish, like anothei body, or like the words
i n s t e a d b u r i e s l a n g u a g e in itsell is poetry, the o r i g i n a l and we speak at a Mineral. Those dying, w o r d s weigh like t h i n g s in

a b s o l u t e singularity of w h a t d o e s n o t cease to t a k e place. Com- o u r mouths b e c a u s e ihey are n o l o n g e r a b l e t o refer t o a n y -

munication, t h e n , is the pure form of t h e separation of t h i n g real. The l a n g u a g e of p o e t r y is t h e very w e a k n e s s of

c o m m u n i c a t i v i t y from itself, or, in a w o r d , (chronological) t i m e . m e a n i n g t h a t r e m a i n s w h e n t h e real i s w i t h d r a w n f r o m o u r

P o e t r y , h o w e v e r , is an e x p e r i e n c e of t i m e t h a t is r a d i c a l l y d i s - p o w e r s . T h i s funereal l a n g u a g e w e i g h s i n m y m o u t h a s a t h i n g

c o n t i n u o u s . It is t h e t i m e of f u t u r i t y t h a t d o e s n o t lie in a a n d is offered to o t h e r s as a useless gift b e c a u s e it c a n no l o n g e r

future either remote or just a r o u n d the corner, but rather in disappear into the labor of referring. In the lugubrious a t m o -

t h e infinitive " t o " o f t h e " t o c o m e " (or à venir) t o w h i c h w e sphere of the funeral, w o r d s are that w h i c h maintain contact

shall refer n u m e r o u s t i m e s t h r o u g h o u t t h i s b o o k . I n p o e t r y , w i t h a p r o f o u n d l y p a r a l y z e d t i m e . N o l o n g e r a b l e t o refer,

t h a t w h i c h s p e a k s i s t h e very " t o " o f " t o s p e a k . " P o e t r y says language is imperceptibly transformed because it begins to

t h e p u r e there, o r t h e p u r e p o s s i b i l i t y o f a n y r e l a t i o n w h a t - r e s e m b l e itself. U n a b l e t o r e v e a l o r aver, w o r d s a r e l o s t b e -

ever, a n d it is o n l y to t h e p u r e there t h a t we ( " p r o p e r l y , " finitely) t w e e n m e a n i n g a n d s h o w i n g , between saying a n d seeing, a n d

belong; but we belong such that no residue remains u p o n which they depart from the straightforwardness of intentionality as

w e m a y reflect, n o r e s i d u e o r p l e a t t h a t w o u l d a l l o w u s t h e if l u r e d by a n o t h e r destiny. I n s o f a r as I c a n n o t s e p a r a t e myself

a b i l i t y t o g r a s p a n d a u t o - o r i g i n a t e o u r s e l v e s . E m p t y o f itself, f r o m t h e s e w o r d s t h a t linger o n m y t o n g u e — w o r d s t h a t a r e

o r different i n itself, w e " o r i g i n a t e , " t h u s , i n t h e i n c e s s a n t r e p - n o l o n g e r m y o w n since t h e y h a v e defected f r o m m y m e a n i n g -

e t i t i o n of t h e there. T h i s will be t h e " o r i g i n a l e x p e r i e n c e " of to-say—they involve me in t h a t other destiny of w h i c h they

which B l a n c h o t s p e a k s in L'espace littéraire. are already a part.

Recently, in a television newscast, we s a w the story of an
e l d e r l y w o m a n w h o s e h u s b a n d h a d p a s s e d a w a y o n t h e floor
o f t h e i r h o m e . She p l a c e d a b l a n k e t o v e r t h e b o d y a n d h e r e -
The Language of Poetry
m a i n e d t h e r e , as if u n d e r t h e b l a n k e t , for a n u m b e r of y e a r s

Merveilleuse hypocrite! Car elle aime la folie qu'elle u n t i l a social w o r k e r d i s c o v e r e d t h e " b i z a r r e " s i t u a t i o n . T h e
surveille. w o m a n h a d c o n t i n u e d t o live, i n t h e m e a n t i m e , m o r e o r less
—Levinas a s she h a d b e f o r e , a s b e s t she c o u l d , given t h e s o l i t u d e a n d
failing s t r e n g t h o f a d v a n c e d a g e . A p p a r e n t l y , s h e n e v e r d e n i e d

P o e t r y i s l a n g u a g e t h a t m a k e s itself felt like t h e t o herself t h a t h e r h u s b a n d w a s d e a d (as d i d t h e d u c h e s s o f

b o d i e s o f liars a n d i m p o s t o r s t h a t b r u s h u p a g a i n s t u s d a i l y o n M a r l b o r o , w h o h a d a statue m a d e of her late h u s b a n d Will-

the street. According to Levinas, the language of p o e t r y does i a m Congreve, a n d seated it at the dinner table, w h e r e she

n o t " n a m e a species w h o s e g e n u s i s r e f e r r e d t o b y t h e w o r d w o u l d converse with it as if the great dramatist had s o m e h o w

2
a r t . " I f P a u l C e l a n " s e e s n o difference b e t w e e n a p o e m a n d a s u r v i v e d his o w n d e a t h ) . T h e social w o r k e r w h o c o m m e n t e d
3
h a n d s h a k e , " it is because poetry, refractory to the categories o n t h e s i t u a t i o n h e h a d d i s c o v e r e d said, p o i g n a n t l y , t h a t t h e r e
w a s o b v i o u s l y great affection here. 01 the most demanding () N E
k i n d , we m u s t a d d . For hers is not a disturbing love. It is n o t
I s o l d e ' s or S a l o m e ' s love. H e r s , we m u s t i m a g i n e , is a m o s t
i r r e p a r a b l e , profane, a n d absolutely impoverished love (to
b o r r o w s o m e t e r m s f r o m A g a m b e n t h a t seem t o b e l o n g i n t h i s The Allegory of Being
c o n t e x t ) : l o v e for h e r h u s b a n d , for t h e u n r e d e e m e d , u n b u r i e d ,
o v e r l y p r e s e n t b o d y h e r h u s b a n d w a s , a n d w a s n o t . She d i d
n o t , i t s e e m s , l o n g for t h e w i t h d r a w n b e i n g h e r h u s b a n d h a d
b e e n , b u t i n s t e a d r e m a i n e d faithful t o t h e d e a t h h e r h u s b a n d
c o u l d n o t a c c o m p l i s h . T h i s c o u l d o n l y h a v e led h e r a s t r a y i n
h e r m a d n e s s (if w e m u s t call i t t h a t ) , s c a t t e r i n g h e r affection
everywhere in the house because her h u s b a n d could no longer
o c c u p y his p r o p e r place. W e i m a g i n e t h a t she m u s t h a v e e n j o y e d
an elemental intimacy, p r o f o u n d and w i t h o u t qualifications.
T h e peculiar intimacy a n d intensity that traditionally be-
l o n g t o l i t e r a t u r e a r e a f i d e l i t y t o a m b i g u i t y t h a t s c a t t e r s inti- Image
m a c y e v e r y w h e r e , m u l t i p l y i n g i t t o infinity, like t h e s n o w f l a k e s L e v i n a s b e g i n s his 1 9 4 8 e s s a y o n a r t , " L a r é a l i t é e t
t h a t fell d o w n u p o n B r e k h o u n o v a s h e lay d o w n u p o n N i k i t a , son o m b r e , " simply enough. As everyone k n o w s , the artist
in the tale from Tolstoy of which Blanchot is so fond. In this 4 s u b s t i t u t e s a n i m a g e for a c o n c e p t . U n i n t e r e s t e d i n t h e intelli-
s t u d y w e w o u l d like t o say very little. W e w o u l d p r e f e r t o b e gibility of t h e object, t h e a r t i s t d o e s n o t m a i n t a i n a real r e l a t i o n -
like t h e e l d e r l y w o m a n w h o d i d v e r y little for h e r h u s b a n d s h i p w i t h t h e o b j e c t b y k n o w i n g it, g r a s p i n g it, a n d p u t t i n g i t
u p o n h i s d e m i s e . She m e r e l y p l a c e d a b l a n k e t o v e r h i m . W e t o w o r k . B y s u b s t i t u t i n g a n i m a g e for t h e c o n c e p t , all r e a l
w o u l d merely w a n t to note that in the image, in the narrative, relations w i t h the object are neutralized. Artistic "disinterest"
in t h e o t h e r p e r s o n — a s it w e r e , "in p a r e n t h e s i s " (or in q u o t a - is just this blindness to concepts, Levinas says. T h e artistic
t i o n m a r k s ) or, if y o u prefer, under erasure ( b e c a u s e t h e p a r e n - g a z e n e u t r a l i z e s v i s i o n a n d p e r c e p t i o n . It is n o t an a c t . It is a
t h e s e s a r e invisible a n d c a n n o t b e a d m i t t e d i n t o t h e n a r r a t i v e nonconcerning, n o n k n o w i n g gaze. It does not cross a distance
p r o p e r , y e t i n t r o d u c e i n t o t h e s t o r y a n e l e m e n t t h a t i s felt w i t h - in order to grasp an object as does the h a n d t h a t labors or the
o u t b e i n g a c k n o w l e d g e d , like a n a p h o n i c voice t h a t says " k e e p c o n s c i o u s n e s s t h a t seizes t h e t h i n g i n a n a c t o f r e c o g n i t i o n .
me in mind but do not think a b o u t m e " ) — o n e enters a maze T h e simple, e l e m e n t a r y s u b s t i t u t i o n o f t h e i m a g e for t h e c o n c e p t
o f r u m o r a n d i n n u e n d o a s i f o n e ' s p o w e r t o r e a d , t o see, a n d i n v e r t s all directionality, all c o n s c i o u s " a i m i n g - a t . " T h e i m a g e
t o tell h a d b e c o m e defective, a o r i s t , m e t a m o r p h o s e d , a n d su- t h a t t h e a r t i s t s u b s t i t u t e s for t h e c o n c e p t i s n o t a n o t h e r o b j e c t
pererogatory. a n d d o e s n o t b e h a v e like a n o b j e c t . I n e v e r y d a y life, i n e v e r y -
d a y c o m m e r c e w i t h t h i n g s , t h e seized object t e n d s t o d i s a p p e a r

33
 a oneseli I >m a son ol passage from oneseli to anonymity [dans
into its usefulness, its fun< tion, its familiarity. A11 arrests ilii.s
le rythme il n'y a plus de SOI, mais c o n i m c un p a s s a g e de soi a
movement ol recognition and industry. In art, that w h i c h v a n -
M
I'anonymat |.'
ishes into utility a n d k n o w l e d g e r e a p p e a r s o u t s i d e its useful-
The p a r t i c i p a t i o n itself is an u n r e p r e s e n t a b l e m o v e m e n t .
n e s s , o u t s i d e all real r e l a t i o n s , in a s p a c e strictly u n c r o s s a b l e ,
In a e s t h e t i c e x i s t e n c e t h e r e is an i n d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n w h o is
infinitely fragile, o n l y p r o x i m a l l y there at all, as if its e x i s t -
p o s s e s s e d o r affected a n d t h a t w h i c h p o s s e s s e s o r affects.
e n c e h a d b e e n p a r a l y z e d , o r a s i f t h e o b j e c t led a p h a n t o m
L e v i n a s n o t e s i n p a s s i n g t h a t this s i m u l t a n e i t y o f p o s s e s s i o n
e x i s t e n c e p a r a l l e l t o its t r u t h .
a n d d i s p o s s e s s i o n h a s a r o l e in ecstatic r i t e s . A e s t h e t i c exist-
T h e i m a g e i s f u n d a m e n t a l l y o r essentially p a s s i v e . I t e l u d e s
ence involves us in an indistinction of " s a m e " a n d "other." It
all a t t e m p t s t o seize i t b e c a u s e i t o c c u p i e s e m p t y s p a c e . A n
is t h u s a t r u l y u n r e p r e s e n t a b l e m o m e n t ( b u t n o t a " b e y o n d " )
i m a g e , q u i t e simply, i s n o t h i n g . O u r r e l a t i o n w i t h t h e i m a g e
w h e r e i n t h e d e n s i t y of b e i n g in its " h e r e " is i n v a d e d by a " n o -
" m a r k s a h o l d o v e r u s r a t h e r t h a n o u r initiative [ m a r q u e u n e
1 w h e r e , " a " n o t h i n g . " R h y t h m c a n n o t b e objectified; i t c a n
emprise sur n o u s , plutôt que n o t r e initiative]," Levinas says.
o n l y b e d r a m a t i z e d , e n a c t e d , suffered. I t i s e x p e r i e n c e d a s
T h e i m a g e c o n t r a s t s w i t h c o n c e p t s or, m o r e precisely, i t i s t h e
i n d i s t i n c t i o n , a s myself-as-other. U n a b l e t o h a n g o n t o its free-
v e r y e v e n t o f c o n t r a s t i n g w i t h c o n c e p t s . Precisely t o t h e e x -
d o m , the subject experiences an exteriority in which it c a n n o t
t e n t t h a t I d o n o t a c t o n , k n o w , o r t h i n k t h e t h i n g i n its c o n -
b u t m i s t a k e itself for a n o t h e r . T h a t is, t h e s u b j e c t c e a s e s t o
cept, there is an inversion of my everyday relationship with
e x p e r i e n c e itself as itself. T o t a l l y a b s o r b e d in t h e s c e n e , c o n -
the object, a n d subjectivity is p u s h e d to an e x t r e m e pole of
s c i o u s n e s s , h a v i n g n o t h i n g t o a i m at, b e c o m e s s u p e r e r o g a t o r y ,
passivity. U n a b l e to seize an i m a g e , I p a r t i c i p a t e in its i m a g i -
a s d o e s t h e b o d y , for, a t o n c e a c t o r a n d s p e c t a t o r , t h e b o d y i s
n a r y d i m e n s i o n . T h i s passivity c a n b e o b s e r v e d , L e v i n a s p o i n t s
2 transformed into sensations belonging to no one, or belong-
o u t , i n m u s i c , d a n c e , a n d m a g i c . T o this list w e m a y a d d t r a n c e ,
ing to an a n o n y m o u s Someone w h o s e organs of perception
hysterical possession, a n d hypnotic suggestion. In short, the
h a v e d e f e c t e d . H e n c e t h e fear o f t h e a r t i s t i c m i l i e u t h a t i s a t -
i m a g e i n s p i r e s a n d i t i s just t h e i m a g e t h a t i n s p i r e s , n o t t h e
t e s t e d t o i n t h e n e r v o u s a n x i e t y s o m a n y p e o p l e feel i n t h e
o b j e c t it r e p r e s e n t s . Precisely when there is nothing and just
c r o w d e d concert hall or the august m u s e u m .
insofar as there is nothing, the image exercises its impotent
power. R h y t h m a n d p a r t i c i p a t i o n a r e t h e " e x c e p t i o n a l s t r u c - A n i m a g e , L e v i n a s s a y s , i s essentially m u s i c a l i n s o f a r a s i t

t u r e of a e s t h e t i c e x i s t e n c e [la s t r u c t u r e e x c e p t i o n e l l e de l'exis- d e t a c h e s itself f r o m t h e o b j e c t a s d o e s s o u n d f r o m t h a t w h i c h

5

t e n c e e s t h é t i q u e ] " a n d a r e a l s o t h e w a y " t h e p o e t i c o r d e r af- m a k e s the s o u n d . In the aesthetic experience, this d e t a c h m e n t

3
fects u s [ l ' o r d r e p o é t i q u e n o u s a f f e c t e ] . " T h i s i n v o l v e m e n t , i s a n e s s e n t i a l a t m o s p h e r e . I n fact, h o w e v e r , this a t m o s p h e r e

i m p o r t a n t l y , i s n o t " b e y o n d " r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . I t is, t o t h e c o n - is everywhere because images are everywhere. Indeed, the

t r a r y , t h e p r o f o u n d i n v o l v e m e n t o f t h e s u b j e c t i n its o w n r e p - w h o l e w o r l d w e a r s o n its face its o w n i m a g e a n d w e a r e t h u s

resentations. P r o f o u n d because their " e n t r y into us is o n e w i t h permitted to think a dimension of aesthetic participation t h a t

o u r entry into them [entrent en nous ou nous entrons en eux, is general a n d n o t restricted to the movie theater or concert

p e u i m p o r t e ] , " a n d t h e r e f o r e " i n this r h y t h m t h e r e i s n o l o n g e r hall. This general dimension of p r o f o u n d participation w o u l d ,

 then, subtend consciousness and industry at every moment,
Industrial language necessarily fails to tell of this i n v o l v e m e n t ,
for this p r o f o u n d p a r t i c i p a t i o n defects from "every m o m e n t "
of subjectivity (i.e., of initiative a n d p o w e r ) . T h e d e c o n c e p t u a l -
i z a t i o n of r e a l i t y t h a t a r t realizes r e s t r i c t e d l y is, in fact, a g e n -
e r a l i z e d i m p e r s o n a l i t y t h a t lies " b e l o w " all k n o w i n g . I f y o u
like, a n e c s t a t i c rite s h a d o w s all c o g n i t i o n . W h e r e b e i n g - i n -
t h e - w o r l d involves existence in concepts a n d t r u t h , ecstatic
sensations depart from each m o m e n t of being-in-the-world
a n d i n v o l v e us in a d i s i n c a r n a t i o n of t h e r e a l s i m p l y b e c a u s e
o f t h e i m a g e (the n o n o b j e c t , o r t h e m u s i c ) t h a t i s o n t h e face
o f all t h a t i s i n t h e w o r l d . B e n e a t h o r b e s i d e o n e ' s c o n c e p t u a l
commerce with the world there remains a rhythmic participa-
t i o n w h o s e i m m e d i a c y drives o u t all t h o u g h t . A e s t h e t i c e x i s t -
e n c e , in s h o r t , is p e r p e t u a l l y suggestive, affirmative, influential,
i m p e r s o n a l , a n d i m m e m o r i a l . It is as if in t h e r e a l itself a b a n d
o f Sirens h a d a l w a y s called t o u s , a s i n B l a n c h o t ' s r e t e l l i n g o f
the fabulous episode from Homer. 6
A r t realizes t h e p a r a d o x o f i m m e d i a c y — t h e p a r a d o x o f
a n i m m e d i a c y t h a t d r i v e s o u t all m e d i a t i o n a n d , e s s e n t i a l l y
e m p t y , d r i v e s o u t itself a n d i s t h u s o u t s i d e m e m o r y . D i s i n c a r -
nate a n d impersonal, aesthetic existence c a n n o t enter into any
p r e s e n t (or it " d i e s " w h e n forced t o , as do the Sirens in
Blanchot's essay). It is thus intolerable to t h o u g h t . N o t the
m i n u t e s t sliver o f reflection o r t e m p o r a l lag m a k e s r o o m for
s u b j e c t i v e initiative o r a c t i o n . T h e m u s i c l o v e r n o d o u b t feels
g r e a t p a s s i o n as s h e listens to a b e l o v e d p i e c e , b u t it is n o t
c e r t a i n t h a t s h e feels herself in t h e p a s s i o n . P a r a d o x i c a l l y , i m -
m e d i a c y u n h i n g e s m e f r o m myself. T h e p r o x i m i t y o f a r t t o
magic a n d trance indicates a trajectory wherein the subject
e x p e r i e n c e s a f a i n t i n g a w a y o f self a l t o g e t h e r , a n d a n e x p o -
sure to exteriority. T h e body has a m e m b r a n e , a skin, but the
self d o e s n o t . T h e " m a g i c a l " c o n v e r s i o n o f t h e o b j e c t i n t o a n
i m a g e , a nonobje< t, • t h i n g , triggers the i m m e d i a c y oi p a s -
s i o n a t e i n v o l v e m e n t . W h i l e r e t a i n i n g the f o r m , c o l o r s , s o u n d ,
a n d o t h e r q u a l i t i e s ol the o b j e c t , the i m a g e , in effect, " d r i v e s
t h e object out o f t h e w o r l d [chasser les o b j e t s d u m o n d e ] " a n d
7
t h u s " b r e a k s u p r e p r e s e n t a t i o n [briser l a r e p r é s e n t a t i o n ] "
because the image subtracts the object to be represented from
the representation. T h e image disincarnates the real, b u t this
is so o n l y b e c a u s e t h e real is a l w a y s a l r e a d y a p p r o a c h e d by its
i m a g e : " T h e w h o l e o f o u r w o r l d , w i t h its e l e m e n t a r y a n d in-
tellectually e l a b o r a t e d g i v e n s , c a n t o u c h u s musically, c a n b e -
c o m e a n i m a g e [ L ' e n s e m b l e d e n o t r e m o n d e , a v e c ses d o n n é e s
et élémentaires et intellectuellement élaborées, peut nous
8
toucher musicalement, devenir i m a g e ] . " Art in general real-
izes t h i s l a t e n c y a n d p e r p e t u a l l y effaces t h e difference b e t w e e n
the real a n d t h e imaginary, n a t u r e a n d mimesis. " L a réalité et
son o m b r e " is thus an introduction to the i m p o r t a n t recent
w o r k d o n e by Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe on radical, or n o n -
9
P l a t o n i c (i.e., n o n r e s t r i c t e d , t h a t is to say, general) m i m e s i s .
Duality
A sign d i r e c t l y refers to its o b j e c t , b u t an i m a g e
10
resembles it. An image resembles an object, b u t resemblance
is n o t the result of a c o m p a r i s o n b e t w e e n t w o realms: the real
a n d t h e i m a g i n a r y . T h i s is a key p o i n t for L e v i n a s in t h i s essay.
A u d i e n c e s w h o r e s p o n d t o a film b y i m m e d i a t e l y c o m p a r i n g
i t t o s o m e r e a l i t y often r e s p o n d e n e r g e t i c a l l y a n d aggressively
as if they w e r e being cheated of reality a n d only t h e p r o p e r
c o m p a r i s o n c o u l d r e s t o r e t h e r e a l t o itself a n d k e e p t h e t w o
r e a l m s s e p a r a t e . I n j e o p a r d y i s t h e p r o p e r difference b e t w e e n
t h e m . But resemblance is n o t the e n d result of a c o m p a r i s o n .
I t i s t h a t w h i c h e n g e n d e r s t h e i m a g e i n t h e first p l a c e . R e s e m -
b l a n c e b e g i n s in t h e r e a l itself:
 I 1ère is a p e r s o n w h o is wli.il lie is; bill he d o e s nol
m a k e u s forget, d o e s not a b s o r b , c o v e r over entirely
t h e objects h e h o l d s a n d t h e w a y h e h o l d s t h e m , his
gestures, limbs, gaze, t h o u g h t , skin, which escape from
u n d e r t h e i d e n t i t y of his s u b s t a n c e , w h i c h like a t o r n
s a c k is u n a b l e to c o n t a i n t h e m . [ . . . ] T h e r e is t h e n a
d u a l i t y in this p e r s o n , t h i s t h i n g , a d u a l i t y in its b e i n g .
It is w h a t it is a n d it is a s t r a n g e r to itself, a n d t h e r e is
a r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n these t w o m o m e n t s . We will say
t h e t h i n g is itself a n d is its i m a g e . A n d t h a t this r e l a t i o n -
s h i p b e t w e e n t h e t h i n g a n d its i m a g e i s r e s e m b l a n c e .
[Voici u n e p e r s o n n e q u i est c e q u ' e l l e est; m a i s elle n e
fait p a s oublier, n ' a b s o r b e p a s , n e r e c o u v r e p a s e n t i è r e -
m e n t les o b j e t s q u ' e l l e t i e n t et la m a n i è r e d o n t elle les
t i e n t , ses g e s t e s , ses m e m b r e s , s o n r e g a r d , s a p e n s é e ,
sa peau, qui s'échappent de sous l'identité de sa sub-
s t a n c e , i n c a p a b l e , c o m m e u n sac t r o u é , d e les c o n t e n i r .
[ . . . ] Il y a d o n c c e t t e p e r s o n n e , d a n s c e t t e c h o s e u n e
d u a l i t é , u n e d u a l i t é d a n s s o n ê t r e . Elle est c e q u ' e l l e est
et elle est é t r a n g è r e à e l l e - m ê m e et il y a un r a p p o r t
e n t r e ces d e u x m o m e n t s . N o u s d i r o n s q u e l a c h o s e est
elle-même et son image. Et que ce r a p p o r t entre la chose
e t s o n i m a g e est l a r e s s e m b l a n c e . ] 11
A p e r s o n or a t h i n g r e s e m b l e s itself a n d t h e r e s e m b l a n c e is
a l r e a d y its " o t h e r " d e s t i n y : t o w a r d t h e i m a g e . T h i s m o v e m e n t
of resemblance is obscure. O n e c a n n o t imagine a thing resem-
b l i n g itself. O n e s i m p l y i m a g i n e s t h e t h i n g , o f c o u r s e . T h i s
a t t e s t s t o t h e s i m u l t a n e i t y o f its b e i n g a n d its a p p e a r i n g . T h a t
which appears, however, is detachable from the thing a n d can
e n d o u t s i d e t h e t h i n g on a v i d e o t a p e or in a m u s e u m . T h a t a
t h i n g is i m a g i n a b l e , t h a t it is sensible, gives it a n o t h e r d e s t i n y
apart from its truth (from its identity), li i s a s ii thai which is
imaginable w e r e a l w a y s already left b e h i n d by the thing. Inso-
far as a t h i n g r e s e m b l e s itself, it d e p a r t s from itself a n d c a n be
q u o t e d , or p l a c e d in p a r e n t h e s i s , in an i m a g e . An i m a g e c a p -
t u r e s a n d i m m o b i l i z e s this (invisible, u n i m a g i n a b l e ) m o v e m e n t
o f a thing-resembling-itself. A r t c a p t u r e s t h a t w h i c h t r u t h
s h e d s , leaves a b a n d o n e d , l e a k s . Art, Levinas tells us s u m m a r i l y ,
" l e t s g o o f t h e p r e y for t h e s h a d o w [ l ' a r t l a c h e d o n e l a p r o i e
1 2
pour Pombre]." We are nonetheless entitled to ask: W h a t
w a s t h e p r e y ? W h a t was lost?
T h e a n s w e r t o this q u e s t i o n i s a m b i g u o u s . T h e r e is, L e v i n a s
s a y s , a d u a l i t y in b e i n g , a n o n t r u t h or a d e f e c t i o n f r o m t r u t h
t h a t i s s i m u l t a n e o u s w i t h t r u t h . S i m u l t a n e o u s w i t h being it-
self, a t h i n g r e s e m b l e s itself, or flees itself. G i o r g i o A g a m b e n
u n d e r s t a n d s t h i s t o m e a n t h a t a t h i n g i s s i m u l t a n e o u s l y itself
13
and its q u a l i t i e s w i t h o u t b e i n g t h e s a m e t h i n g a s its q u a l i t i e s .
A t h i n g , A g a m b e n s a y s , i s n o t its q u a l i t i e s , i s n o t i d e n t i c a l t o
its q u a l i t i e s , b u t a t t h e s a m e t i m e i t i s n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n its
q u a l i t i e s . W e shall r e t u r n t o this d e l i c a t e p o i n t i n o u r c h a p t e r
o n A g a m b e n . (Let u s n o t e for n o w , h o w e v e r , t h a t B l a n c h o t
reads the same ambiguity t h r o u g h the uncanniness of the ca-
14
daver. He points out that the dear departed is nothing other
t h a n t h e c a d a v e r t h a t lies i n s t a t e . Yet t h e d e p a r t e d i s c e r t a i n l y
n o t the same thing as the corpse, is not identical with the cada-
ver. T h e d e a r d e p a r t e d o n e i s g o n e , precisely. Yet, i n t h e c o r p s e ,
t h e d e p a r t e d c o m e s t o r e s e m b l e herself, o r e v e n , returns t o
herself a s h e r r e s e m b l a n c e , w h i l e a t t h e s a m e t i m e a b s e n t i n g
herself. T h e r e is a s o r t of e r o s i o n at w o r k h e r e t h a t is strictly
s p e a k i n g u n t h i n k a b l e . It is n o t a c a s e of q u a l i t i e s c l i n g i n g to
s o m e substance, sub-base, or f u n d a m e n t . It is rather t h e case
t h a t resemblance moves to replace the real, t h a t identity seems
t o b e " c o n s t i t u t e d " b y r e s e m b l a n c e o r q u a l i t i e s w i t h o u t being
those qualities or that resemblance.)
 n i i

Levinas finds, therefore, thai that w h i c h is strange, ob nait d a n s son p r o p r e reflet \ . The massive presence ol a corpse-

s c u r e (bul in no w a y ineffable), and lends itsell to art a n d to w r i n g s so m a n y tears from us b e c a u s e it o c c u p i e s fully a n d

m y t h is t h i s : Being-such-as-it-is, the real in its t r u t h , is a l r e a d y w i t h excessive c o m p l e t e n e s s the place o f t h e d e p a r t e d l o v e d

offered t o , or is in, t h e i m a g i n a r y . T h e b e i n g - i n - t h e - i m a g i n a r y o n e . T h e real is itself and it e s c a p e s itself. A r t d o e s n o t m e r e l y

of t h e r e a l is a k i n d of o r i g i n a r y e x o t i c i s m . It is t h e s t r u c t u r e reflect this e v a s i o n ; it b r i n g s it o u t a n d c o m p l e t e s it. It i n t e n s i -

o f t h e sensible a s s u c h . T h e sensible c h a r a c t e r o f t h e t h i n g , its fies it by c o m p l e t i n g it, by q u o t i n g it, by s u b s t i t u t i n g for t h e

q u a l i t i e s (red, h a r d , s o n o r o u s , a r o m a t i c ) , m a k e i t i m a g i n a b l e , t r u t h o f t h e t h i n g its i m a g e — a s i f i t w a s indifferent t o t h e

a n d t h e t r u t h o f t h e t h i n g i s n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n its b e i n g i m a g - r e a l i t y of t h e t h i n g , or as if t h e r e a l i t y of t h e t h i n g c o u n t e d for

inable as such. T h e real, being, truth, is the place w h e r e the n o t h i n g . A r t p l a c e s i n p a r e n t h e s i s t h e fugitivity o f t h e r e a l , its

imaginary takes place. T h a t which is "lost," the " p r e y " t h a t ambiguity, a n d circumscribes a " d i m e n s i o n of evasion [une
1 6

a r t " l e t s g o of" is, q u i t e simply, t h e v e r y e v e n t o f t h e i m a g i - dimension d'évasion]." Insofar as it does this, it introduces

n a r y — a n e v e n t t h a t c a n n o t b e i m a g i n e d , a n e v e n t t h e real i s i n t o t h e w o r l d the a t m o s p h e r e o f t h a t t e m p o r a l interval L e v i n a s

a l r e a d y i n v o l v e d in. (By t h e w a y , this i s t h e t o r m e n t o f t h e calls Ventretemps.

B l a n c h o t i a n w r i t e r : h e loses t h e m o s t desired m o m e n t , t h e e v e n t T o s u m u p : I n s o f a r a s a b e i n g r e s e m b l e s itself ( a p a r t f r o m

o f p o e t i c l a n g u a g e itself. H e i s t o r m e n t e d b y t h e p r e s e n c e / a b - being itself, t h a t is, a p a r t f r o m t h e t r u t h p r o p e r t o its b e i n g ,
s e n c e in t h e i m a g e of t h a t w h i c h is u n i m a g i n a b l e . In s h o r t , t h e i.e., its p r e s e n c e ) it is sensible a n d this sensibility is its n o n t r u t h ,
r e a l as-it-is i s a l w a y s a l r e a d y b e c o m i n g a n i m a g e , a n u n t r u t h . ) its s h a d o w . T h e i m a g e d o e s n o t p r e c e d e t h e r e s e m b l i n g . T h e

Being is d u a l . It is s i m u l t a n e o u s w i t h itself. I r r e d u c i b l y neutralization of space in the image is the r e s e m b l a n c e t h a t

1 7

a m b i g u o u s , it is w i t h d r a w n f r o m itself in its v e r y sensibility. "engenders the image [engendre l ' i m a g e ] . " A thing can par-

N o n t r u t h is t h e sensible c h a r a c t e r of t h e t h i n g . I n s o f a r as a t i c i p a t e in its t r u t h or in its b e i n g , b u t p a r a l l e l to t h i s a t h i n g

b e i n g r e s e m b l e s itself it is s e n s i b l e , b u t its sensibility is an o b - d e p a r t s f r o m itself i n a n e m i s s i o n t h a t i s p h a n t a s m i c a n d i s

s c u r e e s s e n c e or fugitivity t h a t " d i s i n c a r n a t e s " b e i n g . I see a n o t identical w i t h truth. T h e quasi existence of this p h a n t a s m

t h i n g as its i m a g e , n o t through it. ( T h u s , L e v i n a s s a y s t h a t t h e is a " s e m b l a n c e of e x i s t i n g [ s e m b l a n t d ' e x i s t e r ] " or a n o n t r u t h

18

i m a g e i s t h e a l l e g o r y o f b e i n g , a p o i n t t o w h i c h w e shall r e t u r n without being. (In t h e c h a p t e r o n G i o r g i o A g a m b e n , w e shall

shortly.) T h e d i s i n c a r n a t i o n o f b e i n g i s t h e v e r y i n t e n s i t y a n d s h o w t h a t the Italian philosopher m a k e s of this p h a n t a s m a

e s s e n t i a l s t r a n g e n e s s o f a r t . But a r t h a s its o w n a g g r e s s i v i t y a s p u r e r e t u r n t o b e i n g , b u t t o b e i n g p u r e l y p r o f a n e d , t h a t is,

w e l l . I n a r t , t h e sensible d o e s n o t m e r e l y d e p a r t f r o m t h e r e a l . s t r i p p e d of all ineffability a n d identity.)

It " i n s i s t s " on t h e a b s e n c e of t h e o b j e c t . S p l a s h e s of color,

s o u n d , a n d bits o f foreign m a t t e r " o c c u p y [the object's] p l a c e
fully t o m a r k its r e m o v a l , a s t h o u g h t h e r e p r e s e n t e d o b j e c t The Obscure Temporality of the Artwork
d i e d , w e r e d e g r a d e d , w e r e d i s i n c a r n a t e d i n its o w n reflection W e h a v e seen t h a t a n i m a g e i s m u s i c a l , t h a t i t i s
[occupent entièrement sa place p o u r m a r q u e r son éloignement, r h y t h m i c , b u t in t h e last a n a l y s i s , it is p l a s t i c , a s t a t u e , a " s t o p -
c o m m e s i l'objet r e p r é s e n t é m o u r a i t , s e d é g r a d a i t , s e d é s i n c a r - p a g e o f t i m e , o r r a t h e r its d e l a y b e h i n d itself [un a r r ê t d u t e m p s
 19
ou plutôi son retard sur lui même]." The u n i e thai seems (<>
be i n t r o d u c e d i n t o the arl ol novels, plays, a n d c i n e m a c a n in
no w a y " s h a t t e r t h e fixity of t h e i m a g e | n ' é b r a n l e p a s la fixité
de l'image]." 2 0
J u s t a s M o n a Lisa's smile will n e v e r b r o a d e n ,
s o will H a m l e t e t e r n a l l y a g r e e t o m e e t w i t h t h e g h o s t t h a t says
it is h i s f a t h e r ' s , a n d so e t e r n a l l y will K a n e suffer t h e loss of
his family, his p o l i t i c a l a m b i t i o n s , his e m p i r e , a n d his m a r -
r i a g e s . T h e w o r k o f a r t will forever b e a r r e s t e d i n t h e t a s k o f
a c c o m p l i s h i n g t h e w o r k o f b e i n g . I t will forever defect f r o m
t h e t i m e p r o p e r t o b e i n g . C e l l u l o i d a n d p a p e r will o f c o u r s e
d e c a y , b u t as an image t h e a r t w o r k will be forever fixed en
l'entretemps, a n d this fatality is t h e c e n t r a l c o n c e r n of Levinas's
essay on art.
Art is an instant t h a t " e n d u r e s w i t h o u t a future [dure sans
avenir]" 2 1
a n d even w i t h o u t a d u r a t i o n . For art is an image
a n d a n i m a g e is, i f w e m a y say t h i s , rigorously u n c e r t a i n . I t
does n o t even occupy space. An image is an "impersonal a n d
a n o n y m o u s instant [instant i m p e r s o n n e l et a n o n y m e ] . " 2 2
There
is thus something deadly in the puppetry that is art. Unable to
f o r c e itself i n t o t h e p r e s e n t a n d a s s u m e a f u t u r e , a r t i s t h e
intrusion of d e a t h into the familiar w o r l d . T h e t e m p o r a l i t y
a r t realizes, Levinas says, is the temporality of n i g h t m a r e . Like
t h e z7 y a, t h e i n s t a n t of fixity t h a t is t h e e v e n t of a r t s t r i p s
f r e e d o m o f its p o w e r t o a s s u m e t h e p r e s e n t m o m e n t . A r t i s
n o t the replica of a time that has been suspended halfway
t h r o u g h its c o n t i n u a t i o n a n d a b a n d o n e d a s h a l f - c o m p l e t e d like
a bridge t h a t stops in midspan. As Levinas has been s h o w i n g
u s , a r t i s t h a t w h i c h , i n t h e g e n e r a l e c o n o m y o f b e i n g , defects
from the present. It is that part of being that incessantly moves
to its en deçà, its " i n t e r s t i c e , " as if e a c h m o m e n t of ( c h r o n o -
logical) t i m e w e r e s i m u l t a n e o u s l y a m o m e n t of fate. T h i s s h o u l d
r e m i n d us of a p o i n t t h a t is i m p o r t a n t to L e v i n a s ' s w o r k as a
w h o l e . He c o n c e i v e s of t i m e as a series of i n s t a n t s s u t u r e d
together bul infinitely fragile, a l w a y s s h a l l o w e d by the possi-
bility ol congealing into an image a n d thus ol w i t h d r a w i n g
from o u r p o w e r s . ' '
Being is d u a l . It d o u b l e s up a n d r e s e m b l e s itself, a n d t h e
t e m p o r a l i t y of a r t is c a r v e d o u t of this r e p e t i t i o n . It is in t h i s
w a y t h a t t h e real itself solicits t h e a r t i s t , since i t i s a l w a y s
a l r e a d y i n v o l v e d i n its o w n s h a d o w a n d t h u s i s a l r e a d y v u l -
nerable to the temporal modification that is the image, the
narrative, the history. An artist is a p e r s o n w h o is fascinated
by the plasticity of the real. He or she is o n e w h o , as Blanchot
s a y s , "lives t h e e v e n t a s a n i m a g e [vivre u n é v é n e m e n t e n i m -
2 4
age]," t h a t is, w h o e x p e r i e n c e s t h e e v e n t i n s o f a r a s i t i s al-
ready a n i m a g e (or a l r e a d y r e s e m b l e s itself a n d i s d e t a c h e d
f r o m t h e r e a l ) . L e v i n a s p u t s i t this w a y : "Life solicits t h e n o v -
elist w h e n i t s e e m s t o h i m a s i f i t w e r e a l r e a d y s o m e t h i n g o u t
of a b o o k [La vie sollicite le r o m a n c i e r q u a n d elle lui a p p a r a î t
2 5
c o m m e s i elle s o r t a i t déjà d ' u n l i v r e ] . " This means that there
i s a l r e a d y s o m e t h i n g artificial a b o u t t h e r e a l , s o m e t h i n g a e s -
t h e t i c , u n c a n n y , p l a s t i c — i f y o u l i k e , s o m e t h i n g f a k e . Life i s
a l w a y s very n e a r l y a n o v e l , an i m a g e , a c o r p s e . P u t differently,
the real is always vulnerable to the stoppage of time—to the
i m a g e of finitude—that it w e a r s on its face. I n s o f a r as t h i s
p e r s o n r e s e m b l e s herself, she is infinitely v u l n e r a b l e , infinitely
fragile, as an i m a g e is fragile. A s t r a n g e w e a k n e s s p e r v a d e s
h e r t h a t w e c a n n o t g r a s p , a b l e e d i n g w e c a n n o t s t a n c h . She i s
n o t t h e s a m e t h i n g a s h e r r e s e m b l a n c e t o herself, b u t s h e i s
n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n it. H u m a n r e a l i t y i s n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n
t h i s infinite v u l n e r a b i l i t y , inequality-in-itself, o r difference-in-
itself. It is as if t h e face of t h i n g s w e r e a n o t h e r b o d y , a b o d y
" m a d e u p of" fragility a n d t h a t t a k e s t h e p l a c e o f p e r s o n a l
p r e s e n c e . W e m a y w i s h t o say t h a t t h i s i s a n infinite v u l n e r -
ability to death. However, the ontological signification is
d o u b l e d b y t h e fugitivity o f t h e i m a g e : a d e r e l i c t t i m e u n a b l e
to become present and that insists on the absence <>l being,
b u t a s it a b s e n c e ilsell h a d been immobilized in its a p p r o a c h
a n d c o u l d n o t even a c h i e v e the a b s e n c e the i m a g e s o d r a m a t i -
cally insists o n .
L e v i n a s g o e s o n t o say i n t h i s e s s a y t h a t a r t i s " t h e u n c e r -
t a i n t y o f [time's] c o n t i n u a t i o n [ l ' i n c e r t i t u d e d e s a c o n t i n u a -
tion]," 2 6
the possibility t h a t time can stop. This anxiety attests
t o a d i m e n s i o n o f t i m e t h a t peels itself a w a y f r o m c h r o n o l o g y
a s t h o u g h " a w h o l e set o f facts w a s a l r e a d y i m m o b i l i z e d a n d
f o r m e d a series [ c o m m e si t o u t e u n e suite de faits s ' i m m o b i l -
2 7
isaient et formaient s é r i e ] . " T h e r e a l , a t its s u r f a c e s , o n its
face, offers itself t o a r t a s i f i t w a s a l r e a d y p l a s t i c . T h e a r t i s t
p a r t i c i p a t e s solely i n t h e s h a d o w d i m e n s i o n . T h e v e r y inti-
m a c y a n d i n t e n s i t y o f a r t a r e its a t t e n t i v e n e s s t o w h a t a p p e a r s ,
to w h a t is at the surface, to t h a t w h i c h incessantly comes to
t h e s u r f a c e — r e s e m b l a n c e . It is at h e r s u r f a c e s t h a t a p e r s o n is
n e a r l y petrified, n e a r l y c a p t u r e d ( b u t i t i s h e r e t h a t she i s a l s o
e s s e n t i a l l y fugitive, for t h e i m a g e flees t h e p r e s e n t ) . T h i s i n c e s -
sant c o m i n g to the surface is the obscurity of the time of dy-
i n g , a s L e v i n a s p r o c e e d s t o m a k e clear. T h e t i m e o f d y i n g i s
n o t the cross section of a c o n t i n u u m . Instead, " T h e time of
dying itself c a n n o t give itself t h e o t h e r s h o r e . W h a t is u n i q u e
a n d p o i g n a n t i n this i n s t a n t i s d u e t o t h e fact t h a t i t c a n n o t
p a s s . In dying, t h e h o r i z o n of t h e f u t u r e is g i v e n , b u t t h e fu-
t u r e as p r o m i s e of a n e w p r e s e n t is r e f u s e d ; o n e is in t h e inter-
v a l , f o r e v e r a n interval [Le t e m p s - m ê m e d u mourir n e p e u t
p a s s e d o n n e r l ' a u t r e rive. C e q u e cet i n s t a n t a d ' u n i q u e e t d e
p o i g n a n t t i e n t au fait de ne p a s p o u v o i r passer. D a n s le mourir,
l ' h o r i z o n d e l ' a v e n i r est d o n n é e , m a i s , l ' a v e n i r e n t a n t q u e
p r o m e s s e d u p r é s e n t n o u v e a u est r e f u s é — o n est d a n s l'inter-
28
valle, à j a m a i s i n t e r v a l l e . ] . " T h i s dying, L e v i n a s s a y s , " i s t h e
g r e a t o b s e s s i o n o f t h e artist's w o r l d [la g r a n d e o b s e s s i o n d u
2 9
monde artiste]." An instant of time may not have another
s h o r e . It m a y be s u l i i i e d inlo time's I'i'iilirlfinj/s, outside any
continuum, a n d s t o p just short ol the p r e s e n t . It is as if living
t u n e w e r e s i m u l t a n e o u s l y s u t u r e d i n t o a plastic series, a c e a s e -
less interval d e p a r t i n g from a n y c o n t i n u i t y . Or it is as if b e i n g -
as-it-is, i n its t r u t h , w e r e also i r r e p a r a b l y c o n s i g n e d t o n o n t r u t h ,
t o i m m o b i l i z a t i o n i n t h e i m a g e — b u r i e d alive, a s i n P o e . A r t
realizes t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t living b e i n g c a n a l w a y s b e e x p e r i -
enced as an image, as unliving, as always already petrified—
a s i f q u a l i t i e s c l u n g t o n o t h i n g a t all.
The Space of Art
Art is then something horrible, "something i n h u m a n
3 0
a n d m o n s t r o u s [quelque chose d ' i n h u m a i n e t d e m o n s t r u e u x ] "
because it is powerless, because it c a n n o t go beyond, because
i t c a n n o t e v e n e n d . A r t i s r a d i c a l passivity. I t " s h o w s " this
p a s s i v i t y in t h e s t o p p a g e of t i m e en deçà du temps. Its v a l u e to
c i v i l i z a t i o n is a m b i g u o u s since it is u t t e r l y foreign to t h e w o r l d
o f i n i t i a t i v e . I t s h o w s t h e w o r l d t h e o b s c u r i t y o f fate n o t a s a n
elsewhere that comes from beyond to intervene in the present,
b u t a s t h e v e r y face t h e w o r l d w e a r s . A r t a c c o m p l i s h e s t h i s
feat b y w a y o f i r r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . O u t s i d e all l a b o r , a r t b e c k o n s
to us as if all life c o u l d e n d up in m y t h , in plasticity, in t h e
" r h y t h m of a reality w h i c h solicits o n l y its a d m i s s i o n i n t o a
b o o k o r a p a i n t i n g [le r h y t h m e d ' u n e r é a l i t é q u i n e sollicite
3 1
q u e s o n a d m i s s i o n d a n s u n livre o u d a n s u n t a b l e a u ] . " It is
as if a r t c o u l d r e p l a c e t h e b u i l d i n g up of a h a b i t a t , a w o r l d ,
t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of justice, g o v e r n m e n t s , t h e city itself. Ulti-
mately "horrible," art nonetheless beckons to us in the same
w a y t h a t a r h y t h m i s irresistibly e n g a g i n g .
Levinas concludes, therefore, t h a t art, aesthetic existence,
r h y t h m , simultaneous possession a n d dispossession, a n d irre-
s p o n s i b i l i t y a r e a p a r t of life a n d h a v e a p l a c e , " b u t o n l y a
 p l a c e , in l i m n . m happiness [mais u n e place seulement—dans
11
le b o n h e u r de l'homme]." ( Iriticism, insofar as it approaches
t h e a r t i s t i c event a s s u c h , r e i n t r o d u c e s the i n h u m a n i t y o f a r t
b a c k i n t o t h e w o r l d . A s w e h a v e seen, this will n o t i n v o l v e a
c o m p a r i s o n o f t h e a r t w o r k t o s o m e reality. I t involves t r e a t i n g
the a r t w o r k as a myth: "[TJhis immobile statue has to be p u t
i n m o v e m e n t a n d m a d e t o s p e a k [cette s t a t u e i m m o b i l e , i l f a u t
l a m e t t r e e n m o u v e m e n t e t l a faire p a r l e r ] . " 3 3
It involves, in
short, interrupting myth and integrating that which is exces-
sively c l o s e d t o l a n g u a g e b a c k i n t o t h e l a n g u a g e f r o m w h i c h i t
defected. 34
M y t h is t h e s o u r c e of p h i l o s o p h i c a l t r u t h , for it is,
as the m o m e n t of resemblance, the distance the real takes from
itself—its a m b i g u i t y a n d duality. A r t i s a n i n v e r s i o n o f c r e -
ation. 3 5
It presents to the world the vulnerability of congeal-
i n g i n t o a n i m a g e t h a t all c r e a t i o n i s p r e y t o , a n d p h i l o s o p h y
a n d c r i t i c i s m c a n ally t h e m s e l v e s w i t h c r e a t i o n o n l y b y " s k i p -
p i n g o v e r t h e i n t e r v a l s o f t h e m e a n w h i l e [en s a u t a n t les
intervalles de l ' e n t r e t e m p s ] . " 3 6
I n effect, this m e a n s t h a t p h i -
l o s o p h y a n d criticism c a n o n l y b e g i n b y " f o r g e t t i n g " a r t .
For, like a n i d o l , L e v i n a s s a y s , a n a r t w o r k i s " s t u p i d . " 3 7
W e m u s t a d d t h a t every artist since P y g m a l i o n h a s k n o w n t h i s .
A r t is a c a r i c a t u r e of life, n o t a n o t h e r , better, life. T h e a r t w o r k
c a n n o t a s s u m e o r t a k e o n life. I t o v e r f l o w s life o n all s i d e s ,
like w a t e r w i t h o u t a c o n t a i n e r . U n a b l e t o a t t a i n t h e p r e s e n t
m o m e n t , t h e a r t w o r k spills all t h e a s p i r a t i o n s t h e a r t i s t b u i l t
i n t o it. A r t c a n o n l y e m p t y itself of all t h e artist's efforts.
The elementary procedure of art is to substitute an image
for a c o n c e p t . But t h e a r t i s t c a n n o t b e said t o a i m a t t h e i m a g e
p e r se as a g o a l . A r t ( e x c e p t in a d v e r t i s i n g ) d o e s n o t w i s h to
limit itself t o a n i m a g e , h o w e v e r p e r f e c t o r b e a u t i f u l . N e i t h e r
d o e s t h e a r t i s t a i m a t a n elusive essence n o r ineffability, a s d o
p h i l o s o p h y a n d criticism. Art aims to r e m a i n in c o n t a c t w i t h
t h a t w h i c h is "unmade in its own image [défait selon son im-
age]" as Blanchot p u i s u . ' " An remains m c o n t a c t w i t h t h a t
w h i c h is infinitely vulnerable to disincarnation—that w h i c h is
n e i t h e r itself in its t r u t h n o r in its i m a g e (its d o u b l e , or its
o t h e r fate). T h e s u b s t i t u t i o n o f the i m a g e for t h e c o n c e p t i s
o n l y t h e first s t e p , for w h e n t h e i m a g e h a s s u c c e e d e d i n d r i v -
ing t h e o b j e c t o u t o f e x i s t e n c e , w h a t r e m a i n s ? W h a t i s t h e
image w h e n it is no longer an image of . . . ? Neither the thing
n o r its d o u b l e , t h e a r t w o r k i s a t o n c e t h e t r a c e o f n o o r i g i n . I f
a r t " l e t s g o o f t h e p r e y for t h e s h a d o w , " a n d i f t h e " i n s e c u r i t y
of a b e i n g t h a t h a s a p r e s e n t i m e n t of its fate is t h e g r e a t o b s e s -
s i o n o f t h e artist's w o r l d , " t h i s i s b e c a u s e a r t m a i n t a i n s c o n -
t a c t w i t h t h e i m a g i n a r y s p a c e left e m p t y o f all s u b s t a n c e a n d
i n h a b i t e d b y n o o n e — t h e s p a c e t h a t b e i n g spills o u t i n t o , b e -
side itself. In t h i s s p a c e ( B l a n c h o t ' s l'espace littéraire), t h e r e a l
i s a l r e a d y i m a g i n a r y a n d d e t a c h e d f r o m its t r u t h , its identity.
I n t h i s s p a c e , t h e plasticity o f m a t t e r n o l o n g e r refers t o t h e
s u b s t a n c e t o w h i c h q u a l i t i e s cling b u t t o t h e a r r e s t e d d e a t h
t h a t is the rigorous immobility of the statue. It is a m b i g u o u s
s p a c e a n d it is t h e m o s t s u b t l e of b o d i e s , for it is n e i t h e r s u b -
stance nor image but rather the liquidation of the elemental
distance that separates the t w o . This space belongs neither to
art nor to philosophy, neither to the image nor to the concept.
I n c o n t r a s t t o t h e p h i l o s o p h e r , t h e a r t i s t i s allied w i t h t h e v e r y
w e a k n e s s o f s p a c e itself: c o m m u n i c a t i o n o r s h e e r c o m m u n i c a -
t i v i t y — t h e p u r e " t h e r e i s " (il y a). ( B l a n c h o t , in o u r o p i n i o n ,
has gone further t h a n any other writer in our times t o w a r d
m a k i n g this space "speak.")
" I n e r t m a t t e r , " L e v i n a s s a y s , " a l r e a d y refers to a s u b s t a n c e
t o w h i c h its q u a l i t i e s cling. I n a s t a t u e , m a t t e r k n o w s t h e d e a t h
of i d o l s [La m a t i è r e inert se réfère déjà u n e s u b s t a n c e à l a q u e l l e
s ' a c c r o c h e n t ses q u a l i t é s . D a n s l a s t a t u e , l a m a t i è r e c o n n a î t l a
39
mort de l'idole]." T h i s m e a n s t h a t i n a r t m a t t e r will e n c o u n -
ter t h e inversion of creation t h a t is l'entretemps. In t h e i n v e r s i o n ,
apart from the inertia <>i mattet and already withdrawn from
t h e thing-for-us, t h e r e is the for no-one that characterizes t h e
N e u t e r . N e u t r a l w i t h respect to what is, a r t , w h i c h s u b s t i t u t e s
t h e i m a g e for t h e c o n c e p t , " p r e s e n t s " t h e sheer that there is,
or anteriority as such. This is the a t m o s p h e r e of art a n d this
neutralization is unmediated and immediate, and thus eludes
all c o g n i t i o n a n d all m e m o r y . T h e a r t w o r k is a t h i n g - f o r - n o -
one, and it thus induces from us involvements that do not
o r i g i n a t e i n o u r i n i t i a t i v e . T h i s a l l o w s B l a n c h o t t o say t h a t
"the image is intimate because it m a k e s of our intimacy an
e x t e r i o r p o w e r t h a t w e s u b m i t t o p a s s i v e l y [ i n t i m e est l ' i m a g e
p a r c e qu'elle fait d e n o t r e intimité u n e p u i s s a n c e extérieure q u e
nous subissons passivement]." 4 0
T h e s h e e r that there is, or t h e
il y a, is u n g r a s p a b l e . It e l u d e s every p r e s e n t y e t it is t h a t w i t h -
o u t w h i c h t h e r e will n e v e r h a v e b e e n a n y p o s s i b i l i t y a s s u c h .
A r t d o e s n o t m e r e l y p r e s e n t , a s L e v i n a s stresses, t h e p o s s i b i l -
ity t h a t t i m e c a n s t o p . I t a l s o , m o r e affirmatively, p r e s e n t s
possibility itself as t h a t w h i c h e l u d e s e v e r y t h i n g — p o s s i b i l i t y
a s (the) n o t h i n g , a s i m m e d i a t e . W h i c h a m o u n t s t o saying t h a t
n o t h i n g , or the n o t h i n g , is t h e f o r m of a n y p o s s i b l e r e l a t i o n .
Presented as arrested, the atmosphere of art presents the
return of t h a t which can never be excluded but which, at the
same time, excludes everything. In the space of literature quali-
ties cling t o n o t h i n g , t o n o b e i n g . S o m e t h i n g e l u d e s c o g n i t i o n ,
b u t m a k e s itself felt (if o b s c u r e l y ) as t h a t w h i c h is n e v e r " i t -
self," t h a t w h i c h i s o n l y " s u g g e s t e d . " S o m e t h i n g c o m e s b u t
r e m a i n s a r r e s t e d i n its " m e a n w h i l e . " F o r B l a n c h o t t h i s w i l l b e
t h e t i m e o f w r i t i n g . I t i s u n c o m m o n , unclassifiable, a n d a n o n y -
4
m o u s , like a n infinite m u r m u r , a s F o u c a u l t p u t s i t . ' I t i s w r i t -
i n g t h a t c a n n o t e n d itself a n d i s c o n t i n u a l l y o u t s i d e itself like
a thing a m o n g things. An enormity w i t h o u t p r o p o r t i o n , it is
t h e v e r y s c r a t c h i n g s o u n d w e hear, f r o m s o m e w h e r e , w h e n w e
write these things.
The Profane
For b o t h Lévinas a n d B l a n c h o t , t h e a r t i s t n e i t h e r
creates nor reveals. That w h i c h t h e p h i l o s o p h e r fixes i n t h e
eternity of the concept, art arrests in the interval of the image.
W h e r e a s p h i l o s o p h y offers u s t h e t h i n g t o k n o w a n d u s e , a r t
realizes a w i t h d r a w a l f r o m p o w e r a n d e v e n , m o r e s t r o n g l y , a
w i t h d r a w a l f r o m t h e p r e s e n t . A e s t h e t i c e x i s t e n c e is a l a p s e in
o u r ability t o m o b i l i z e t i m e . T h e i n t i m a t e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t t i m e
c a n s t o p is t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of b e i n g delivered to a t i m e w i t h o u t
us, w i t h o u t a present—impersonal and neutral. This is simu-
l a t e d t i m e , a s i m u l a t i o n of e x i s t i n g or an e x i s t e n c e o u t s i d e
initiative. It is n o t the p r o m i s e of a n e w beginning a n d it does
n o t c a r r y us to a beyond of b e i n g (ethical or o t h e r w i s e ) . It
only subtracts us from ourselves.
In La comunità che viene, G i o r g i o A g a m b e n will say t h a t
the whole of our w o r l d has been transformed into an image, a
s p e c t a c l e . T h i s i s t h e s t a r t i n g p o i n t for his p o l i t i c s . H e will s a y
t h a t t h e w o r l d h a s c o m e t o r e s e m b l e itself c o m p l e t e l y , t o t a l l y ,
a n d t h u s h a s s e p a r a t e d h u m a n a g e n c y f r o m its t r a d i t i o n a l ini-
t i a t i v e . T h a t i s t o say, t h e w h o l e o f o u r w o r l d c a n n o w b e
experienced as an image and we are no longer able to experi-
e n c e o u r s e l v e s in t h e w o r l d , for its s p a c e is n o w i m a g i n a r y .
H e n c e , A g a m b e n ' s interest in the e x p r o p r i a t i o n of experience
a n d his a t t e m p t s to rescue from this malaise a radical possibil-
ity h e calls p u r e b e i n g - i n - l a n g u a g e . H i s p o l i t i c s i s a n a t t e m p t
t o a p p r o p r i a t e t h i s e x p r o p r i a t i o n (or t h i s i m p o t e n c e o u t s i d e
a n y initiative) n o t a s a n o t h e r p o w e r , b u t a s a n u n p o w e r t h a t i s
a n a m b i g u o u s c a p a c i t y for i r r e p a r a b i l i t y . H e w i l l a s k t h a t w e
c e a s e t o seek i n t h e i m a g i n a r y for t h a t w h i c h t h e i m a g i n a r y
s u s p e n d s — i d e n t i t y — a n d instead t h a t we rejoin o u r " o l d e s t "
e x p e r i e n c e : t h e sheer p r o f a n i t y that there is. T h e s h e e r il y a is
without clamor and without pathos. It would be experienced
w h e n there is nothing i<> expei ience as in aesthetic existent e,
TWO
precisely. In his a n a l y s e s <>l a i l , I i v i n a s b r i n g s oui art's " a b i l -
i t y " t o c o n s e r v e this e x p e r i e n c e , a n d i n B l a n c h o t w e c a t c h a
g l i m p s e i n t o a life o u t s i d e i n i t i a t i v e .
F o r all t h r e e w r i t e r s , t h e s h e e r that there is t h a t every i m - Lcvinas's Ethics
age h a r b o r s is our separation from any particular experience,
today it is art that inherits, before our very eyes, the
b u t it does not p r o m i s e a concrete future to which we m a y
delirious role and character of the religious. Today it is art
relate ourselves. Nevertheless, art remains our manifest orien-
that gnaws at and transforms us.
t a t i o n t o w a r d s it. R e f u s i n g all g r a s p , a r t " s a y s " t h a t t i m e o u t - —Bataille
side t h e s y n c h r o n y o f t h e p r e s e n t c a n n o t but b e l o s t , t h a t i t i s
n o n c o n s e c u t i v e , d i s c o n t i n u o u s , a r r e s t i n g . I f y o u like, a r t — t h e Like a Nessus Tunic my skin would be.
p u r e form of any possible relation, or anteriority as such—is —Levinas
also the p u r e form of separation (from the personal a n d the
s u b j e c t i v e ) . T h a t i s t o say, a r t i s n o t o n l y t h e p r e s e n t i m e n t o f
f a t e , i t i s a l s o another d e a t h f r o m w h i c h w e c a n n o t s e p a r a t e
o u r s e l v e s a n d w h i c h w e c a n n o t finish, n o t e v e n i n d e a t h . I t i s An Ambiguous Rapport

a loss w e c a n n o t let g o of, b u t t h a t d o e s n o t h o l d u s i n it. A s i f i n r e s p o n s e t o G e o r g e s Bataille ( w h o m , t o

F o r t h e L e v i n a s o f " L a réalité e t s o n o m b r e , " t h e s i t u a t i o n m y k n o w l e d g e , h e n e v e r cites) E m m a n u e l L e v i n a s h a s a t -

of a r t in the general e c o n o m y of being is limited because it t e m p t e d t o define e t h i c s a s t h e p r i v i l e g e d site o f d e l i r i u m i n

l a c k s t h e p e r s p e c t i v e o f t h e O t h e r (Autrui) t h a t b r e a k s u p t h e our culture. H i s g r e a t b o o k Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de

spell o f a r t a n d a w a k e n s u s t o r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . B u t w e will w a n t l'essence defines t h e r a p p o r t w i t h Autrui as t h e " s e e d of folly

1

t o s h o w , i n o u r n e x t c h a p t e r , t h a t t h e r e l a t i o n w i t h Autrui i s [grain d e f o l i e ] " i n t h e s o u l . W i t h i n c r e a s i n g c o m p l e x i t y a n d

a m b i g u o u s a n d , i f w e m a y say s o , i m a g i n a r y . determination he has attempted to articulate a responsibility

i h a t realizes i n t h e e x t r e m e a n a b a n d o n m e n t o f t h e c e r t a i n t i e s
a n d i m p e r i a l i s m s o f t h e self. S t r a n g e r t h a n a r t w o u l d b e t h e
i m m e m o r i a l r a p p o r t w i t h t h e O t h e r . A s i f t o a n s w e r Bataille's
11 e q u e n t c o m p l a i n t t h a t , in spite of K a n t , we still c a n n o t i m a g -
ine a n e t h i c s t h a t i s n o t " c o m m i t t e d , " L e v i n a s h a s d e s c r i b e d
his e t h i c s as " f o r - t h e - o t h e r [pour l'autre]," b u t " f o r n o t h i n g
1
I p o u r rien]-" in s h o r t , a s o v e r e i g n e t h i c s . E t h i c a l o b l i g a t i o n
w o u l d b e , for L e v i n a s , u n c o n t a i n a b l e , a n d i n e x o r a b l y betrayed
b y m o r a l s a n d l a w s . I t w o u l d b e , i n fact, i n s t a b i l i t y itself: t h e
instability o f t h e n a k e d r e l a t i o n t o t h e O t h e r . For, w i t h Bataille,

31

Levinas l a k e s as his s t a r t i n g point the impossibility oi indil
ference to the O t h e r — t o the mortality <>l the other person—
as t h e p l a c e (or n o n p l a c e [non-lieu]) w h e r e the self is e x p o s e d
a n d lacerated. H i s version of Bataille's f a m o u s l'expérience in-
térieur is mauvaise conscience: " t h e inferiority of n o n - i n t e n t i o n a l
consciousness [l'intériorité de la conscience non-intentio-
3
n e l l e ] . " I n s i s t i n g , w i t h Bataille, t h a t t h e d e m a n d for a n e t h i c s
c a n n o t b e s u b o r d i n a t e d t o a n y t h i n g else, all o f L e v i n a s ' s w o r k
a i m s a t a r e l a t i o n t o t h e O t h e r (Autrui) " o l d e r " t h a n t h e " r e -
l a t i o n t o t h e self (egology) a n d t h e r e l a t i o n t o t h e w o r l d (cos-
4
m o l o g y ) . " T h i s o l a m i c r e l a t i o n , h e insists, i s o n e o f r e s p o n s i -
bility, a n d it s u b t e n d s a n d i n t e r r u p t s t h e relation so dispiritingly
d e s c r i b e d by F r e u d a n d o t h e r s as homo lupus homini.
L e t u s n o t e s t r a i g h t a w a y , for i t will g u i d e o u r e n t i r e r e a d -
i n g o f L e v i n a s , t h a t a s this r e l a t i o n i s " o l d e r " t h a n t h e self a n d
t h e w o r l d , this O t h e r will h a v e a l w a y s a l r e a d y s u n k i n t o i m -
m e m o r i a l i t y , p r i o r t o a n y m e m o r y o r r e p r e s s i o n . T h e "rela-
t i o n " t h e n will n o t i n v o l v e t w o t e r m s , t h e self a n d t h e o t h e r .
T h e r e l a t i o n will b e " o l d e r " t h a n a n y self. T h i s a n t e r i o r i t y
will b e , for L e v i n a s , a d i s s y m m e t r y a n d a g o o d n e s s w i t h o u t
m e a s u r e t h a t ( d e ) s t r u c t u r e s t h e self as a r e l a t i o n w i t h a never-
present Other. We add, therefore, that any relation that the I
establishes w i t h an o t h e r subject will o n l y b e t r a y the p u r e anter-
i o r i t y t h a t , i n Levinas's t h o u g h t , i m p e r i o u s l y orders m e t o t h e
Other. F u r t h e r m o r e , we m u s t note that, as i m m e m o r i a l , this
a n t e r i o r r e l a t i o n c a n only b e b e t r a y e d , a n d t h e r e f o r e a n y rela-
t i o n t o a n o t h e r r e m a i n s p a r a d o x i c a l l y faithful t o t h e L e v i n a s i a n
éthique. H e n c e , L e v i n a s offers n o c r i t i q u e o f a n y e x i s t i n g e t h -
ics o r m o r a l s , n o r d o e s h e p r o p o s e m a x i m s a c c o r d i n g t o w h i c h
w e m u s t a c t . All o f Levinas's t h o u g h t g r a v i t a t e s t o w a r d t h i s
obsessive r e l a t i o n t h a t refracts all a c t u a l r e l a t i o n s , h o l d i n g e a c h
in relation to t h a t i m m e m o r i a l relation w h i c h each c a n n o t b u t
b e t r a y . H i s e t h i c s , in s h o r t , is essentially a m b i g u o u s .
I I \ I I I A S S I I M M
lo be s u r e , this is no ethics thai w o u l d be recognized as
such by K. 1111 or Mill. In a sense, we can say t h a t in fact t h e r e
is no l e v i n a s i a n e t h i c s , as it can be said t h a t t h e r e is no p h i -
l o s o p h y oi I teidegger, since each is " f o u n d e d " on an a b y s s , a
"forgetting." Like the r e l a t i o n w i t h Being, t h e r e l a t i o n w i t h
the O t h e r is w i t h o u t an object, an a i m , or a p u r p o s e . It is a
r e l a t i o n t h a t d r a i n s c o n s c i o u s n e s s of i n t e n t i o n a l i t y , a n d it is in
this r e l a t i o n t h a t Levinas w o u l d p l a c e t h e d i s p o s s e s s i o n o f self
t h a t defines c o m m u n i c a t i v i t y a s s u c h a n d t h e o p e n i n g b e y o n d
the confines o f a n y k n o w i n g . T h e r e l a t i o n w i t h t h e O t h e r ( u n -
like t h e H e i d e g g e r i a n r e l a t i o n to Being) is n o t a p r e c o m p r e h e n -
sion, but a b r e a k u p of any c o m p r e h e n s i o n .
W e will n o t b e p i t t i n g L e v i n a s a g a i n s t Bataille o n t h e q u e s -
t i o n of a r t ( w h i c h , as we k n o w , is of limited interest to Levinas)
versus ethics. W h a t matters to each of t h e m , in spite of their
q u i t e c o n s i d e r a b l e differences, i s t h e s i n g u l a r r e l a t i o n w i t h t h e
o t h e r p e r s o n a s t h a t w h i c h i s t h e m o s t fragile a n d t h e m o s t
exposed. It is a relation that w i t h d r a w s from our p o w e r s — a
r e l a t i o n t o o fragile e v e n t o qualify a s a p r o p e r e x p e r i e n c e .
( T h i s r e l a t i o n , i n fact, e c h o e s t h e r e l a t i o n w i t h t h e i m a g e w e
h a v e d i s c u s s e d e l s e w h e r e i n this b o o k . ) I t i s i m p o s s i b l e , i n o u r
o p i n i o n , n o t t o b e f a s c i n a t e d b y L e v i n a s ' s w o r k , b y his r e l e n t -
less f o c u s o n a r e l a t i o n t h a t e x c e e d s p o w e r a n d t h a t i s o n l y
" p o s s i b l e " a s i m p o s s i b l e , b e t r a y e d , o r fictioned, b e c a u s e w h a t
Levinas runs up against, again and again, with a n d against
H e i d e g g e r , is this (as flatly s t a t e d by M i k k e l B o r c h - J a c o b s e n ) :
" T h e r e is no e t h i c s , n o r m o r a l s , of finitude [Il n ' y a p a s d'
'éthique', pas de 'morale' de la finitude]." W h a t happens in 5
L e v i n a s , w h a t p a s s e s u n d e r t h e word e t h i c s , i s n o ethics p e r
se, n o r e l a t i o n a s s u c h . W h a t h a p p e n s i s a r e l a t i o n t h a t i s n o
relation, that cannot but be betrayed, and by which I cannot
b u t be o b l i g a t e d , b e c a u s e t h e " e s s e n c e " of t h e r e l a t i o n to Autrui
is au-delà de l'essence—is b e t r a y a l "itself," or is t h a t w h i c h
 I W D
undermines and h o l l o w s out all real relations. This is precisely
h o w the o t h e r p e r s o n obligates me: for this other person is
without relation, is a l o n e a n d m o r t a l , is a l r e a d y b e y o n d my
powers and, therefore, I, t o o , am without relation. Hence my
a n x i e t y , a n d h e n c e t h e " r e s t l e s s n e s s " i n t h e self o f w h i c h
L e v i n a s s o often s p e a k s . W h a t " b i n d s " m e t o t h e o t h e r p e r s o n
i s t h e nonrelation t o t h e O t h e r , t h e n o t h i n g o r n o - r e l a t i o n t h a t
I, myself, am. My s k i n , a N e s s u s t u n i c .
We are describing, then, an ethics of betrayal. But betrayal
of w h a t ? Of nothing. Of no relation. Betrayal of t h a t relation
t h a t can only be betrayed. Betrayal of that " n o ethics" t h a t
f i n i t u d e is. F o r I am t h a t finitude t h a t defines a n d t h e r e f o r e
escapes m e . T h a t is w h a t m a k e s ethical intentionality an ex-
posure. There is no realizable relation to the other that w o u l d
b e e t h i c a l t h r o u g h a n d t h r o u g h . T h e r e will o n l y h a v e b e e n a
f i c t i o n e d , i m a g i n e d r e l a t i o n — f r a g i l e a s a n i m a g e i s fragile,
u n g r a s p a b l e , u n p o s s e s s i b l e — a reality m a d e u p o f n o t h i n g n e s s .
O u t s i d e a n y p a r t i c u l a r , defined r e l a t i o n t o t h e o t h e r , t h e r e i s
this exposure to " n o relation at all" that is an obsession w i t h
Autrui a n d t h a t b o t h o r i e n t s a n d e s c a p e s m e . I n t h e e n d t h i s
r e l a t i o n is finitude itself; b u t it is r e a d by L e v i n a s as s o m e t h i n g
like e t h i c s .
No One Other
D i a c h r o n y is the refusal of c o n j u n c t i o n , the n o n -
t o t a l i z a b l e , a n d , i n this sense, infinite. B u t i n t h e r e -
s p o n s i b i l i t y for t h e o t h e r , for a n o t h e r f r e e d o m , t h e
n e g a t i v i t y of this a n a r c h y , this refusal of t h e p r e s e n t ,
of appearing, of the immemorial, c o m m a n d s me a n d
o r d a i n s m e t o t h e other, t o t h e f i r s t o n e o n t h e s c e n e ,
a n d m a k e s m e a p p r o a c h h i m , m a k e s m e his n e i g h b o r .
I I \ I I J ;\ s s I I I I I ( S .» .">
Ii diverges from nothingness as well as from b e i n g . It
provokes tins responsibility against my will, t h a t is,
by substituting me for the o t h e r as a h o s t a g e . All my
inwardness is invested in t h e form of a d e s p i t e - m e , for-
a not her. D e s p i t e me for a n o t h e r is signification p a r
e x c e l l e n c e . And it is t h e sense of t h e " o n e s e l f , " t h a t
u i usative that d e r i v e s f r o m no n o m i n a t i v e ; it is t h e
very l a d of finding myself w h i l e losing myself.
11 a d i a c h r o n i e , c'est le refus de la c o n j o n c t i o n , le n o n -
t o t a l i s a b l e et, e n c e sens p r é c i s , Infini. M a i s d a n s l a
responsabilité p o u r Autrui—pour une autre liberté—
la n é g a t i v i t é de c e t t e a n a r c h i e , de ce refus o p p o s é au
present,—à l'apparaître—de l'immémorial, me com-
m a n d e et m ' o r d o n n e à Autrui, au premier venu, et
m ' a p p r o c h e d e lui, m e l e r e n d p r o c h a i n — s ' é c a r t e a i n s i
du néant c o m m e de l'être, p r o v o q u a n t contre m o n gré
i et te r e s p o n s a b i l i t é , c ' e s t - à - d i r e me s u b s t i t u a n t c o m m e
( >tage à A u t r u i . T o u t e m o n i n t i m i t é s'investit en c o n t r e -
inon-gré—pour-un-autre. Malgré moi, pour-un-autre—
v( >ilà la signification p a r excellence et le sens du s o i - m ê m e ,
du se—accusatif ne d é r i v a n t d ' a u c u n n o m i n a t i f — l e fait
6
m ê m e de se retrouver en se p e r d a n t . ]
R a d i c a l d i a c h r o n y (or d i a c h r o n y w i t h o u t a n y s y n c h r o n y )
i Hi i w s us to a p p r o a c h the a n t e r i o r i t y or refus oppose au present
thai defines L e v i n a s ' s e t h i c s . W e m a y c o m p a r e t h i s t o i m p e r i -
i I U S s u p e r e g o i c guilt, b u t t h e i n v o l v e m e n t d e s c r i b e d a b o v e d o e s
11« it derive f r o m my p e r s o n a l a n d r e p r e s s e d h i s t o r y of d e s i r e s .
I >i.u h r o n y t h a t e l u d e s all s y n c h r o n y is i n s t e a d t h e t r a c e of t h e
I >ther in m e , b u t " o l d e r " t h a n t h e moi. T h i s is c l e a r l y no e t h -
|< | I m i g h t ever u n d e r s t a n d or t h e o r i z e , for it is a b o v e me a n d
Dl ior to m e . I am " i t s " e c h o . It o r d e r s me a n d I do n o t e v e n
 I I V I N A S ' S I I I I I I '.

o b e y it. M o r e precisely, I am ordered, I am oriented, I iim not yei present, Il Calls a n d il is //, i.e., no o n e t h a t c a n be

s c h e m a t i z e d such that I am obligated to the lirst o t h e r 1 c a n I- m iu 11 an ( )| her b e y o n d my p o w e r s ol iileiil ilical ion. T h e r e -

f i n d . O n e m a y say, b e y o n d F r e u d a n d n e a r t o I leidegger, t h a t in! e h (or, //) is thai from which I cannot distinguish myself.

i t t h r o w s m e , -jects m e , o r casts m e before the o t h e r a n d o t h e r s . The very a n o n y m i t y ol Autrui is w h a t is so c o m m a n d i n g , so

T h i s e t h i c s , t h e n , i s " o l d e r " t h a n m y self a n d i t i s d i s p r o - Imperious, so c o n f o u n d i n g . Precisely no one c o m m a n d s m e ,

p o r t i o n a t e to my p o w e r s . It is forever s t r a n g e . I shall n e v e r n o o n e a i all, and t h e r e f o r e n o o n e f r o m w h o m I c a n s e p a r a t e

h a v e t h e m e a s u r e o f i t n o r e q u a l its d e m a n d . N o m o r a l i t y c a n myself. N o t h i n g o b l i g a t e s me a n d t h e r e f o r e I c a n n o t d i s t a n c e

c o n t a i n this " o t h e r w i s e " t h a n m e a n d t h e r e f o r e all m y m o r a l - mysell from o b l i g a t i o n — f o r I am it. I am o r d e r e d , I am o b l i -

ity is in q u e s t i o n . It d e m a n d s a N i e t z s c h e a n a f f i r m a t i o n : a q u e d , m s h o r t : / am Autrui. It is b e y o n d my p o w e r to d i s t i n -

going-under or an Untergeworfenbeit (to c o m b i n e N i e t z s c h e guish myself from this a n o n y m i t y a n d t h u s t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n —

w i t h H e i d e g g e r for a m o m e n t ) t h a t will b e m y s u b - j e c t i o n t o the election o r t h e s u b s t i t u t i o n — w i l l a l r e a d y h a v e t a k e n p l a c e .

9

Autrui. T h i s sub-ject, t o b e s u r e , i s n o t t h e m o d e r n C a r t e s i a n Il is / w h o calls, t h a t is to say, no one other.

7
s u b j e c t d e l i n e a t e d by H e i d e g g e r , b u t is i n s t e a d a r a d i c a l n a - You see, r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for L e v i n a s is just this u n p o w e r of

scence t h a t w i t h d r a w s from essence a n d i s e x t r a c t e d from b e i n g . Identification p r i o r t o myself, p r i o r t o a n y d e s i r e , t o a n y m o -

T h i s s u b j e c t i o n g o e s "all t h e w a y t o t h e l a u g h t e r t h a t refuses live or i n t e r e s t , to a n y e m p i r i c guilt. F o r L e v i n a s I am o n l y

l a n g u a g e [ j u s q u ' a u r i r e q u i refuse I e l a n g a g e ] . " 8 Insofar as I am other, o n l y i n s o f a r as I am i d e n t i f i e d / s u b s t i -

E t h i c s , for L e v i n a s , i s a c o m m a n d t h a t c a n n o t b e r e c a l l e d , tuted for this o t h e r , this n o o n e , this n o o n e o t h e r t h a n I . H e n c e

t h a t is olamic, forgotten. It is the forgetting that holds me I lie e n i g m a , t h e " k n o t [ n œ u d ] " in ipseity t h a t p h i l o s o p h y is
1 0

hostage to the Other and that constrains me beyond my p o w - forced to t h i n k . T h e O t h e r o b s e s s e s me b e c a u s e I am t h a t

ers a n d m y i n i t i a t i v e . T h i s f o r g e t t i n g i s b e y o n d m e for t h e O t h e r , w h o i s n o o n e , n o other, n o o n e o t h e r t h a n m y self

simple reason that it is n o t in my p o w e r to forget (no o n e is // ell. As L e v i n a s p u t s it: " [ T ] h e p s y c h e in t h e s o u l is t h e o t h e r

" a b l e " t o f o r g e t ; f o r g e t t i n g i s precisely a l a p s e i n o u r a b i l i t y t o m m e , a m a l a d y of identity, b o t h a c c u s e d a n d self, t h e s a m e

r e m e m b e r ) . T h u s , forgetting takes me outside egoity. It lor the other, t h e s a m e b y t h e o t h e r [le p s y c h i s m e d e l ' â m e ,

d e n u c l e a t e s t h e e g o , s t r i p p i n g it n u d e . I am o r i g i n a l l y a t h i r d - « est l ' a u t r e en m o i ; m a l a d i e de l ' i d e n t i t é — a c c u s é e et soi, le

1 1

p e r s o n n e u t e r w h o m / forget (because forgetting, o u t s i d e egoity, même p o u r l ' a u t r e , m ê m e p a r l ' a u t r e ] . "

is a f o r g e t t i n g of t h e one who f o r g e t s ; t h e " s u b j e c t " of t h e F t h i c s , in L e v i n a s ' s s e n s e , is t h e very e v e n t of t h e self. It

forgetting remains always a n o n y m o u s and is thus preeminently (ethics, t h e self) h a p p e n s to m e , as m e . T h e self ( a l w a y s al-

f o r g e t t a b l e ) . M y r e l a t i o n t o t h e O t h e r p r i o r t o m y self is, a s i t icady involved with the Other) comes to me from an outside

w e r e , c o n t r a c t e d b y this o n e w h o i s f o r g o t t e n , a n d w h o for- all I he m o r e e x t e r i o r in t h a t it p r e c e d e s a n y i n t e r i o r i t y . A ver-

g e t s . A n d t h e r e l a t i o n h e (the a n o n y m o u s il, t h e N e u t e r ) c o n - tiginous interpellation forms the enigmatic " k n o t " that is the

tracts is likewise forgotten, along with the Other. .eli or t h e ipse. R a d i c a l l y o u t s i d e , p r i o r to a n y i n s i d e , t h i s

I t calls t h e n f r o m m y p r e h i s t o r y , f r o m b e f o r e m y o r i g i n , Identification, this trauma, is just as r a d i c a l l y " f o r g o t t e n . " Yet,

from an immemorial time w h e n I, in my "extreme y o u t h , " am II is m e : in m e / b e y o n d m e . I incarnate t h a t w h i c h calls me to

.Ì n I
myself. That is w h y Lévinas can say thai ethics "is the b r e a k u p
of t h e o r i g i n a r y unity of t r a n s c e n d e n t a l a p p e r c e p t i o n , t h a t is,
it is t h e b e y o n d of e x p e r i e n c e [c'est l ' é c l a t e m e n t de l ' u n i t é
originaire de Paperception transcendentale—c'est-à-dire l'au-
1 2
delà de l ' e x p é r i e n c e ] . " 1 a m , as it were, constitutionally un-
a b l e n o t t o a n o n y m o u s l y i n c a r n a t e alterity, a n d h e r e , i n a
s t r a n g e w a y , an ethics is i n s c r i b e d — a n d exscribed. T h e self is
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n c a r n a t e . T h e very a n o n y m i t y o f a l t e r i t y — i t s
nothingness, if y o u w i l l — i s the impossibility of my indiffer-
ence to it. All t h e ego's p o w e r s of ( o e d i p a l ) i d e n t i f i c a t i o n a n d
c o m p r e h e n s i o n a r e s h a d o w e d b y this a n t e r i o r u n p o w e r .
In Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, Levinas de-
scribes a subjectivity t h a t precisely w i t h d r a w s f r o m a u t o m a n i -
festation, a n d h e c h a r a c t e r i z e s this w i t h d r a w a l — o r , a s h e m i g h t
say, t h i s h u m i l i t y — a s t h e very autrement qu'être t h a t e t h i c s
" i s . " T h e Levinasian subject eludes t h a t w h i c h is essential to
s u b j e c t i v i t y : self-certain p r e s e n c e to self in e i t h e r its C a r t e s i o -
13
Heideggerian confinement to (auto)representation, o r its r e -
14
t r e n c h m e n t , after M i c h e l H e n r y , a s a u t o a f f e c t i o n . This novel
subject of Levinas's w i t h d r a w s , then, from the very c o n c e p t of
subjectivity i n t o a n e n i g m a t h a t m a k e s t h e r e t e n t i o n o f t h e
word abusive. That which is, for Levinas, hypokeimenon,
underlying, or sub-jacent is that which enters into no present
a t all a n d i s t h u s b e y o n d s p e c u l a t i o n . A s t r a n g e s u b j e c t . A n
i m a g e of t h e s u b j e c t , o n e is t e m p t e d to say. A s t r a n g e s u b j e c t
s t r a n g e t o itself since i t i s a l w a y s o n t h e " h i t h e r s i d e " o f r e p r e -
s e n t a t i o n , b u t n o t p u r e l y a n d s i m p l y a b s e n t . I t i s its a v e r s i o n
t o light. I t i s " a n e x t r e m e s h y n e s s , " a s L e v i n a s says s o m e -
w h e r e . O u t s i d e a n y c o n c e p t o f it, i t i s e x p o s e d , v u l n e r a b l e ,
n a k e d . It is who I am a n d it is n o t , or n o t simply, my v u l n e r -
ability to d i s a p p e a r a n c e — t o death, to my inability to be there
a n y m o r e . T h i s subject, as L e v i n a s n e v e r tires of telling u s , is
n o t d e s t i n e d t o a p p e a r , a n d i s foreign t o a n y " p l a c e i n t h e
I V I IN A S S I' I I I I i . s
.mi " ii is p . H alyzed: always already no l o n g e r a b l e to be t h e r e
a n y m o r e . It is, as Levinas tells us (in w o r d s t h a t s h o u l d r e m i n d
US ol his d e s c r i p t i o n oi the w o r k of a r t ) , a " d e a t h - l i k e p a s s i v -
iiv [une passivité à m o r t | . " l s
It " i s " n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n t h i s
M I I r e n d e r o f m a n i f e s t a t i o n . T h e O t h e r o c c u p i e s its p l a c e fully,
insisting o n t h e subject's r e m o v a l f r o m its o w n m a n i f e s t a t i o n .
For L e v i n a s , t h e self is "a deposing of the ego, less than
m >il>ing as uniqueness {dé-position du Moi, le moins que rien
COmtne unicité]." 16
A c c o r d i n g to L e v i n a s , I h a v e a l w a y s al-
ready a b a n d o n e d all for-myselfness. I do n o t first e s t a b l i s h for
myself a p l a c e in t h e s u n a n d t h e n , as a m o n a d i c A r c h i m e d e a n
p o i n t , fall i n w i t h o t h e r s i n o n e w a y o r a n o t h e r . Subjectivity
here is n o t h i n g but a p r i m o r d i a l delay behind the Other. This
is absolute p a s s i v i t y (i.e., n o t r e l a t i v e to a n y activity, b u t p a s -
sivity a b s o l u t i z e d a s o t h e r t h a n , o r o v e r w h e l m i n g , t h e differ-
e n c e b e t w e e n active a n d p a s s i v e ) .
T h e Western metaphysical subject, then, according to
Levinas, h a d been incorrectly conceptualized. It w a s never
meant to c o m e to presence, a n d therefore it w a s m e a n t en-
tirely for t h e O t h e r w h o shall e t e r n a l l y p r e c e d e it. T h e s u b j e c t
w o u l d be forever devoted to an obligation t h a t w o u l d forever
e x c e e d it, since this o b l i g a t i o n w o u l d define t h e i n f e r i o r i t y i t
is. The crisis i n t o w h i c h m o d e r n i t y h a d fallen, t h e crisis of t h e
a b s e n c e o f f o u n d a t i o n s , t h e discovery t h a t t h e r e w a s n o g r o u n d
b e n e a t h o u r feet, w a s n o crisis a t all. I t w a s t h e b e l a t e d d i s c o v -
ery of a beneficence t h a t h a d e n r a p t u r e d us b e y o n d o u r s e l v e s .
( )ur v e r y i n a b i l i t y t o " u n i t e all t h e f a c u l t i e s " a n d t o p r e s e n t
o u r s e l v e s to o u r s e l v e s in t h e full light of a k n o w i n g w a s , in
fact, a " g o l d e n o p p o r t u n i t y " t o o v e r t u r n all t h i n k i n g t h a t origi-
n a t e s subjectivity i n a u t o m a n i f e s t a t i o n o r a u t o a f f e c t i o n . 17
T h e philosophical obsession w i t h the subject b r o u g h t us,
d e s p i t e ourselves a n d despite o u r a n g u i s h , face-to-face, n o t w i t h
o u r s e l v e s , b u t w i t h a n a l t e r i t y t h a t w o u l d infinitely p o s t p o n e

autonomy. An extreme humility and an unprecedented ethics
h a d r u i n e d the g r a n d e p o c h of the Subject a n d its maniacal
s t r i v i n g after itself. O n l y t h e l a n g u a g e of ethics w o u l d be e q u a l
t o t h i s a b y s s i n t o w h i c h t h e h u m a n sciences h a d fallen. Even
the language of psychoanalysis, which promised a C o p e r n i -
c a n r e v o l u t i o n t h a t w o u l d u n d e r m i n e all t h i n k i n g f o u n d e d i n
a C a r t e s i a n Cogito, h a d s l i p p e d i n t o m y t h a n d h a d r e m a i n e d
i m p r i s o n e d b y a classical s c h e m a o f t h e subject. A s N a n c y
a n d Lacoue-Labarthe (and later Borch-Jacobsen) have m a d e
clear, t h e ego's s h a d o w r e m a i n e d , i n p s y c h o a n a l y s i s f r o m F r e u d
to L a c a n , a n o t h e r ego behind the ego, a n d below the subject
t h e r e l u r k e d a n o t h e r s u b j e c t — o f d e s i r e (or even, of a desire to
be a subject). 18
O n l y t h e l a n g u a g e o f ethics w o u l d b e a b l e t o
say t h a t t h a t w h i c h p h i l o s o p h y w a s u n a b l e t o p r e s e n t t o itself
w a s n o t m e a n t t o b e p r e s e n t e d a t all. T h e n e w ethical s u b j e c t
w o u l d r e m a i n offstage, in t h e s h a d o w s , en deqa du temps, a n d
w o u l d suffer affectively all t h a t t h e e g o w o u l d c o n t r a c t i n all
its a d v e n t u r e s in t h e w o r l d . E t h i c a l subjectivity is infinite v u l -
n e r a b i l i t y . T h e a b s e n c e of f o u n d a t i o n w a s in fact a l r e a d y a
r a p p o r t . T h e r e w a s a l r e a d y a n e x p o s u r e t o t h e O t h e r inter-
r u p t i n g a n y b e g i n n i n g . A g a i n s t all o u r e x p e c t a t i o n s a n d p r e j u -
d i c e s , t h e s u b j e c t w a s n o t a g r o u n d a t all. I t w a s u n p o w e r a n d
w e a k n e s s , a n d this is t h e c a s e for a s i m p l e a n d even b a n a l
r e a s o n : t h e self d o e s n o t f o r m itself. I t h a s n o ability a t all
until the other a n d others intervene a n d bring it into exist-
e n c e . T h e self i s a n a b s o l u t e d e p e n d e n c y , a n d its d e p e n d e n c y
is an i n e x h a u s t i b l e potentia.
The Self
T h e oneself c a n n o t f o r m itself; i t i s a l r e a d y f o r m e d
w i t h a n a b s o l u t e passivity. I n t h i s sense i t i s t h e v i c t i m
I I V I N A S ' S I I III* S
ol a persecution that paralyses any a s s u m p t i o n that
i mild awaken il so thai il w o u l d posit itself for-itself.
I his passivity is thai ol an a t t a c h m e n t that h a s a l r e a d y
been m a d e , as something irreversibly p a s t , p r i o r to all
memory a n d recall. It w a s m a d e in an i r r é c u p é r a b l e
n i n e w h i c h the p r e s e n t , r e p r e s e n t e d i n recall, d o e s n o t
e q u a l , in a t i m e of b i r t h or c r e a t i o n , of w h i c h n a t u r e
or c r e a t i o n r e t a i n s a t r a c e , u n c o n v e r t i b l e i n t o a
memory.
[Le s o i - m ê m e ne p e u t p a s se faire, il est déjà fait de
passivité a b s o l u e , et, d a n s ce sens, victime d ' u n e
persécution paralysant toute assumption qui p o u r r a i t
s'éveiller en lui p o u r le p o s e r pour soi, p a s s i v i t é de
l ' a t t a c h e m e n t déjà n o u é e c o m m e i r r é v e r s i b l e m e n t
passée, en deçà de toute m é m o i r e , de t o u t rappel.
Nouée dans un temps irrécupérable que le présent,
représenté dans le rappel n'égale pas, dans un temps
de la naissance ou de la c r é a t i o n d o n t n a t u r e ou c r é a t u r e
19
garde une trace, inconvertible en souvenir.]
The self, e n i g m a t i c a l l y , " s u f f e r s " itself. It is a w o u n d t h a t
d o e s not heal. Before myself, p r i o r to a n y desire to b e , a n t e r i o r
lo any objectivity, to a n y d i s t a n c e or a n y t i m e — l i t e r a l l y ex
nihilo—the self h a p p e n s to m e . T h e self, t h e i p s e , t h e who t h a t
I am (as o p p o s e d to t h e w h a t ) is formed. It is m a d e , f a s h i o n e d ,
b e g o t t e n , willed, fictioned. U s i n g t h e l a n g u a g e of L e v i n a s , it is
w< i i m d e d a n d p e r s e c u t e d . T h e O t h e r h a s access to me b e f o r e I
d o . In-myself, I am a w e a k n e s s a n d a d e p e n d e n c y . A s u p p l e -
m e n t , in D e r r i d a ' s sense, is r e q u i r e d for me to be a s o m e o n e
a n d t h u s t h e subject c a n n o t b e t h o u g h t o u t s i d e différance. T h e
lupplement is a t r a u m a that precedes the constituted ego a n d
t h e r e f o r e p r e c e d e s all m e m o r y a n d r e p r e s s i o n . A " f o r g e t t i n g "
 L E V I N A S s I I I I I 1 S I )

for Ins politics also relies on a p r i m o r d i a l " t h e f t . " ) W h a t " r e -

precedes all remembering and .1 contact with the outside p r e -
m a i n s " o f m e a l t e r this t r a u m a i s a n e x c e p t i o n a l o b l i g a t i o n t o
c e d e s all interiority. The ego proper—the formed, h o u n d e d ,
t h e O t h e r w h o m 1, in fact, i n c a r n a t e . O n l y a b r u s q u e r e s e n t -
h e a l t h y , a r t i c u l a t e d i d e n t i t y — i s n o t its o w n . It receives itself
m e n t a g a i n s t t h e very m o t i f o f p r i m o r d i a l passivity c o u l d p o s -
f r o m w i t h o u t itself (in e v e r y s e n s e ) . A n t e r i o r t o b e i n g - f o r m e d ,
it is n o t . It is u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d , p u r e e x t e r i o r i t y — n o t even t h e sibly i g n o r e w h a t is in fact a c o m m o n p l a c e of h u m a n e x i s t -

f r a g m e n t a t i o n of an u n k n o w n e m b o d i m e n t . It is It—no o n e , ence. No one is b o r n into the world from o u t of one's o w n

n o t h i n g . Its self is b o r r o w e d , e a t e n , a b s o r b e d f r o m o t h e r s . Its self.

self proper is n o t its o w n , for in-itself it is a " n o n - q u i d d i t y , no This enigmatic birth, incarnation, and involvement with

one, clothed in purely b o r r o w e d being, which m a k e s it a n a m e - o t h e r s p r i o r t o myself, this v e r t i g i n o u s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , a c c o u n t s

less s i n g u l a r i t y by c o n f e r r i n g on it a r o l e [ n o n - q u i d d i t é — for, a m o n g o t h e r t h i n g s , t h e insistence o f a n a r c h y i n all h u -

p e r s o n n e — r e v ê t u e d ' u n ê t r e d e p u r e m p r u n t , qui m a s q u e s a m a n intersubjectivity a n d also the hyperbologic t h a t governs

s i n g u l a r i t é s a n s n o m e n lui c o n f é r a n t u n r ô l e ] . " 2 0
T h e oneself t h e ego's s u p e r e g o i c guilt. T h a t is, since it is precisely " m y -

itself i s n o o n e ( s i n g u l a r a n d u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d ) w h o i s s o m e - self" t h a t I o w e to t h e O t h e r a n d o t h e r s , o n l y complete b e i n g -

o n e ( a self, b u t a b o r r o w e d o r s t o l e n o n e — a s o m e o n e O t h e r f o r - t h e - o t h e r (or, as L e v i n a s s o m e t i m e s calls it, " m a t e r n i t y " )

w h o for t h a t r e a s o n s i n k s i n t o i m m e m o r i a l i t y i n t h e p r e - h i s - c a n a n s w e r t o t h e d e m a n d " i n s i d e " m e . But a s i t will a l w a y s

t o r y of t h e s u b j e c t ) . Autrement qu'être is t h e b e i n g - f o r m e d , or b e / w h o a m f o r - t h e - o t h e r , a r e m a i n d e r o r t r a c e o f for-

t h e v u l n e r a b i l i t y t o t h e O t h e r , " o l d e r " t h a n t h e e g o a n d al- myselfness i s u n e r a d i c a b l e , n o m a t t e r h o w n o b l e o r "selfless"

w a y s j u s t p r i o r t o a n y self-presence. B e i n g - c r e a t e d i s t h e in- I t r y t o b e . H e n c e , " t h e m o r e just I a m , t h e m o r e guilty I a m

2 1

c a r n a t i o n t h a t is t h e self. T h e self d o e s n o t identify, it is i d e n - [plus je suis j u s t e — p l u s je suis c o u p a b l e ] . " In his w a y , L e v i n a s

tified w i t h a n identification t h a t r e m a i n s a l w a y s j u s t a n t e r i o r has deconstructed the mysterious authority of Freudian

t o t h e self. T h e self d o e s n o t c o n s i s t o f t h a t t o w h i c h i t a g r e e s s u p e r e g o i c g u i l t b y p l a c i n g i t o u t s i d e its m y t h i c o e d i p a l t r i a n -

(as C. S. Peirce a r g u e s ) . It c o n s i s t s of its a b s o l u t e l y p a s s i v e g u l a t i o n . I t i s n o t s o m e f i g u r e , s o m e p e r s o n , f r o m t h e subject's

b e i n g - f o r m e d w h i c h m a k e s p o s s i b l e its ( a m b i g u o u s ) a b i l i t y t o past that has internally modeled a n d modified the subject.

identify w i t h o t h e r s a n d a l s o t o i m i t a t e t h e m . L e v i n a s i a n Autrui will n e v e r h a v e b e e n identified yet will never

be w i t h o u t identity, for I am Autrui myself, a n d o u t s i d e t h i s
It is by w a y of this " k n o t " in subjectivity t h a t L e v i n a s is
identification, I am N O T H I N G . N o t even desire. A n d there-
a b l e t o s p e a k t h e l a n g u a g e o f e t h i c s a n d say t h a t t h e s u b j e c t i s
f o r e , I a m , in myself, a n x i o u s l y u n f i g u r a b l e a n d a n - a r c h i c .
i n c a r n a t e d as e t h i c a l , w h e t h e r we like it or n o t . Subjectivity is
S t r a n g e l y , p a r a d o x i c a l l y , b u t perfectly r i g o r o u s l y , my v e r y self
responsibility-for-the-other and the Other is involved in sub-
i s b e y o n d m e , i s w i t h o u t e s s e n c e , i s o t h e r w i s e t h a n (my) b e -
jectivity like a p l a y of l i m i t s . T h r o u g h this stricto sensu u n -
i n g . T h e self is faire: b o r n , b e g o t t e n , i n c a r n a t e d - a s - m o d e l e d ,
t h i n k a b l e e n i g m a , h e c a n say t h a t t h e h u m a n i s n o t a t all wolfish
copied, echoed, repeated. An a n o n y m o u s mimesis precedes
b u t is, f r o m t h e b e g i n n i n g , f o r - t h e - o t h e r b e c a u s e its self c o m e s
a n d p e r m a n e n t l y e r o d e s all identity. M y b e i n g i s n o t m y o w n .
from t h e o t h e r w h o t h u s r o b s t h e subject o f all for-itselfness.
It is b e i n g - p o s s e s s e d , b e i n g - c a s t (in b o t h s e n s e s : like a die is
( K e e p this i n m i n d a s w e c o n c l u d e t h e c h a p t e r o n A g a m b e n ,

t h r o w n , anil as it cast into s o n i c role in a drama). Usui)', the
l a n g u a g e of H e i d e g g e r , we w o u l d say that, lor L e v i n a s , Mit-
sein is rigorously c o r r e l a t i v e w i t h Da-sein a n d Da-sein's a n x i -
ety ( w h i c h s u b t e n d s all its o n t i c affects) is precisely its l o s t n e s s
in das Man s i n c e , o u t s i d e its l o s t n e s s , it is n o t h i n g .
I a m h a u n t e d , a l t e r e d — b u t b y n o o n e , n o father, n o m o t h e r .
I a m h a u n t e d b y n o o n e o t h e r t h a n myself. T h i s i s m y u n -
g r o u n d e d , a b y s s a l , e n d l e s s passivity. M y self c o m e s t o m e a s
t h e very e v e n t o f m y b e i n g a n d t h e r e f o r e , a s c a s t , I a m e x -
p o s e d t o , a n d p e r m e a t e d by, alterity. M i s s i n g f r o m m e , t h e
h o l e i n m y b e i n g t h a t H e g e l o - K o j e v e a n p s y c h o a n a l y s i s after
L a c a n insists o n , is n o t , as is said, my self. T h e self is Other,
n o t l a c k i n g . W h a t i s " l a c k i n g , " i f t h a t i s t h e w o r d for it, i s t h e
for-itselfness p r o p e r to t h e self. T h e self is an o t h e r (je est un
autre) a n d t h e r e f o r e is n e v e r for-itself, b u t is "despite-itself-
for-another."
W e m a y r e c o g n i z e i n this f o r m i d a b l e e n i g m a t h e i n s p i r a -
tion for M i k k e l B o r c h - J a c o b s e n ' s i n c e s s a n t c o r r e c t i o n o f
F r e u d ' s n o t i o n of p r i m a r y i d e n t i f i c a t i o n . In The Freudian Sub-
ject, B o r c h - j a c o b s e n is a b l e to p o i n t o u t , by i d e n t i f y i n g i n n u -
m e r a b l e a p o r i a s i n F r e u d ' s logic a n d a n a l y s e s , t h a t , d e s p i t e
the s t u b b o r n l y held n o t i o n of an absolute Narcissus, there is
no s u b j e c t prior to " i t s " i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s . T h e e g o itself t h e n
w o u l d b e b o t h a n d n e i t h e r itself a n d other, or, a s B o r c h - J a c o b -
sen so nicely p u t s it, w o u l d be a point d'autrui: a h y p n o t i c a n d
2 2
somnambulistic contraction of otherness into sameness.
Hence my undecidability with regard to myself—my debts a n d
m y guilt, m y p a r a n o i a a n d m y e n d l e s s rivalries w i t h o t h e r s .
Borch-jacobsen is able to s h o w that t h a t at w h i c h p s y c h o -
a n a l y s i s a i m e d — t h e i n d i v i d u a l , t h e e g o — w a s w i t h o u t a self
23
o f its o w n , w a s " w i t h o u t q u a l i t i e s . " The ego had no being of
its o w n a n d this led B o r c h - j a c o b s e n t o l e a d F r e u d i n e l u c t a b l y
f r o m i n d i v i d u a l to social p s y c h o l o g y . F o r It (the id, t h e u n -
I I V I N A S ' S E I 11 I I S
c o n s c i o u s ) b e g a n to r e s e m b l e n o t h i n g so m u c h as a c r o w d , a
p r i m o r d i a l a n a r c h i c b a n d . T h e id, h a v i n g n o b e i n g o f its o w n ,
like the c r o w d o r h o r d e , i s a l w a y s a l r e a d y in-itself o u t s i d e -
itself. It is f o r m l e s s n e s s "itself" a n d it is a t h r e a t of f o r m l e s s -
n e s s , a t h r e a t of t h e d i s s o l u t i o n of t h e social b o n d .
W h a t B o r c h - j a c o b s e n c o n c l u d e s , o r forces F r e u d t o c o n -
c l u d e , is t h a t It (the id, t h e u n c o n s c i o u s ) is n o t a n o t h e r s u b j e c t
(of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ) b u r i e d i n r e p r e s s i o n a n d s p e a k i n g i n
hieroglyphs, but is instead nothing other than the nascent
i n c o m p l e t i o n a n d t h e original passivity o f t h e e g o itself. H e n c e -
forth, he concludes, there could be no rigorous Freudian dis-
t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n i n d i v i d u a l a n d social p s y c h o l o g y , b e t w e e n
S a m e a n d O t h e r . T o use t h e l a n g u a g e o f L e v i n a s , t h e n o n p l a c e
(non-lieu) w h e r e I e n c o u n t e r t h e O t h e r (Autrui) in a p a s t i m -
m e m o r i a l , o u t s i d e c o n c e p t s , is precisely myself itself.
This does not m e a n that the O t h e r has been reduced to
the Same. W h a t Levinas argues, and w h a t Borch-jacobsen
b r i l l i a n t l y e x p l o i t s in his r e a d i n g of F r e u d , is t h a t t h e S a m e is
n o l o n g e r itself. I t i s " i n q u e s t i o n . " L e v i n a s h a s a l l o w e d u s t o
r e a d t h e S a m e a s p u r e r a d i c a l e x p o s u r e t o alterity, a s infil-
t r a t e d b y alterity. I n his i n t r o d u c t i o n t o B o r c h - J a c o b s e n ' s b o o k ,
F r a n c o i s R o u s t a n g says, concisely, t h a t subjectivity i s r a d i c a l l y
a l t e r e d a n d " i s n e v e r itself e x c e p t b e c a u s e i t i s a l t e r e d , b e -
c a u s e it is o t h e r to itself, b e c a u s e it is its o w n o t h e r , a l t h o u g h
i t i s n e v e r a b l e t o r e p r e s e n t t h a t o t h e r t o itself." 24
A n d this will
forever p r e c e d e all its dialectical a d v e n t u r e s . O u t s i d e its b i r t h ,
it is n o t an i m m a n e n c e invisible to itself (as in a H e g e l i a n f o r m u -
l a t i o n ) . T h e self i s n o o n e , n o t h i n g — a l r e a d y b o t h w i t h a n d w i t h -
o u t r a p p o r t w i t h the Other. As s u p p l e m e n t e d , t h e self is s c h e m a -
t i z e d , o r d e r e d , c a t e g o r i z e d as f o r - t h e - o t h e r or as (the) rapport
itself. B u t , this r a p p o r t is a c o m m u n i c a t i o n w i t h no o n e since
t h e O t h e r is i n c a r n a t e d in t h e self, as t h e self. N o n e t h e l e s s , t h e
r a p p o r t r e m a i n s . It is n e v e r r e p r e s s e d . It is i m a g i n a r y .

So, il Levinas has given us a n y t h i n g to think u is this: there
i s n o sociality, n o c o m m u n i t y , n o c o m m u n i c a t i o n , n o d i a l o g u e
n o r dialectic t h a t is unaffected by a n o t h i n g n e s s , an a n o n y m -
ity, a d i s s y m m e t r y a n d h e n c e a d i s p r o p o r t i o n , a p a n i c , a rest-
lessness or a d e l i r i u m at t h e h e a r t of w h i c h t h e r e is a s u b j e c t in
une passivité à mort.
Impasse
As a r e s u l t of its o r i g i n a r y passivity, of its b e i n g
f o r m e d , t h e self is d e l a y e d " b e h i n d " itself. B u t , as it is n o t h i n g
o t h e r t h a n its passivity, we m u s t c o n c e i v e of t h e self as d e l a y
itself, o r — t i m e . L i k e t h e w o r k o f a r t , t h e t e m p o r a l i t y o f t h e
self is w i t h o u t a p r e s e n t . As m o d e l e d or d o u b l e d or e c h o e d
f r o m t h e O t h e r , t h e self is " o r i g i n a l l y " a r e c u r r e n c e to self.
T h e d e l a y is, i n t h e l a n g u a g e o f e t h i c s , a n o r i g i n a r y politesse,
o r a n " a f t e r y o u , sir." T h e self i s b e l a t e d , b e h i n d t h e O t h e r
a n d a n s w e r i n g t o t h e O t h e r w h o p r e c e d e s it. E x n i h i l o I r e -
s p o n d t o t h e O t h e r b e f o r e even h e a r i n g t h e O t h e r , b e f o r e r e c -
ognizing the O t h e r as other. I am thus indistinguishable from
that Other.
In spite of w h a t Levinas says here a n d there, there c a n be
n o r e v e l a t i o n o f this " h i t h e r s i d e " o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . T h e p a s -
sivity a n d v u l n e r a b i l i t y L e v i n a s insists o n a r e o t h e r t h a n I ,
other t h a n something that is in my power to accomplish. I can
n o m o r e f o r m m y self t h a n I c a n f o r g e t m y self. L i k e forget-
t i n g , b e i n g - f o r m e d is a l a p s e in p o w e r . T h i s l a p s i n g is t h e radi-
cal d i a c h r o n y o f w h i c h w e h a v e a l r e a d y s p o k e n : d i a c h r o n y
w i t h o u t s y n c h r o n y or, t o say t h e s a m e t h i n g , d i a c h r o n y a s
p e r p e t u a l d e f e c t i o n f r o m t h e p r e s e n t . T h e self a s t h i s d e l a y i s
s u b j e c t e d t o t h e O t h e r a n d t h u s c a n n o t resist b e i n g - a l t e r e d
s i n c e i t i s n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n b e i n g - a l t e r e d . Subjectivity ( b e i n g
l i v l N A s ' s ETHICS
Subjected to the Other) is a d i v i d i n g ol t h e past from the f u t u r e
bin w i t h o u t p a s s i n g i n t o a p r e s e n t . Subjectivity, in L e v i n a s ' s
s e n s e , i s t h a t w h i c h w i t h d r a w s f r o m " b e t w e e n " p a s t a n d fu-
t u r e . It is t i m e w i t h o u t a n y " n o w " p o i n t , if t h a t is i m a g i n a b l e .
I n s t e a d of a " n o w " p o i n t t h e r e is a point d'autrui—a p o i n t of
i n s t a b i l i t y a n d d i s s o l u t i o n . Subjectivity, i n t h i s s e n s e , i s t h e
b r e a k d o w n o f t h e difference b e t w e e n S a m e a n d O t h e r , t h e
b r e a k d o w n o f intersubjectivity, a n d a p r o x i m i t y t o t h e O t h e r
o u t s i d e of, or e v a c u a t e d of, a n y p r e s e n c e . T h e i m p o s s i b i l i t y of
indifference we s p o k e of earlier is t h e fact t h a t , in a r e a l c a s e ,
w e c a n n o t d o u b t t h a t a n o t h e r p e r s o n i s i n p a i n (to b o r r o w
f r o m W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s w o r k for a m o m e n t ) . It is a fact t h a t gives
n o i n f o r m a t i o n , n o c o n t e n t , n o ethical f o r m u l a . I t i s a n affect,
b u t an affect w i t h o u t a self, for I am t h e o t h e r f r o m w h o s e
suffering I c a n n o t d i s t a n c e myself by d o u b t i n g . B u t I do n o t
identify w i t h t h a t sufferer as s o m e o n e in p a r t i c u l a r . I identify,
v e r y m u c h to t h e c o n t r a r y , i n s o f a r as t h e sufferer is not o t h e r -
t h a n - I , is not a l t e r e g o . T h a t is, I identify i n s o f a r as t h e o t h e r
i s precisely n o o n e i n p a r t i c u l a r , i s b e y o n d himself a n d i s n o t
e q u a l to his suffering. / identify with the other precisely to the
extent that the other is anonymous, and thus I identify with
no one. It is o n l y w i t h g r e a t difficulty t h a t we c a n say, w i t h
Levinas, t h a t an "ethics" or a "hither side" is revealed here,
t h a t a responsibility or an obligation is born here. We can just
a s easily say t h a t n o t h i n g i s r e v e a l e d h e r e . T h a t w h i c h t h e
sufferer a n d I s h a r e or h a v e in c o m m o n — o u r " c o m m o n s u b -
jectivity" as Bataille p u t s it (or o u r b e i n g - i n - c o m m o n , as N a n c y
says)—is precisely N O T H I N G . N o b o n d . N o ethics. N o m o r a l s .
A n d it is precisely to N O T H I N G t h a t I c a n n o t r e m a i n indif-
ferent. T h e other, the sufferer, c a n d r a g m e , despite myself, i n t o
t h a t N O T H I N G t h a t w e " s h a r e . " T h e affect t h e n , w o u l d b e ,
a s B l a n c h o t p u t s it, a n " e x p e r i e n c e o f n o n e x p e r i e n c e , " o r a n
 I 11 1 \\ T '
I. !•• v i IN A s•s I I III s I

itself. The subjecl is radically no o n e , is i m a g i n a r y , is " c l o t h e d

i n c o m p l e t e e x p e r i e n c e , or an e x p e r i e n c e <>l the n o n c o m p l e t i o n
in purely borrowed b e i n g , " or is g i v e n , as L a c o u e - L a b a r t h e
t h a t I myself a m , t h a t t h e self is.
2 6
says of Da-sein, " t h e gift of n o t h i n g . " T h e s u b j e c t is w i t h o u t
F o r L e v i n a s , this i n c o m p l e t e n e s s is m y s e l f — o r is given to
q u a l i t i e s , b l a n k , a n d t h u s infinitely u n s t a b l e . A t t h e s a m e t i m e ,
m e a s t h a t w h i c h s i n g u l a r i z e s m e a n d calls m e t o myself a n d
as no o n e , the subject is deeply panicked, p a r a n o i d , a m a n of
t o m y r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . I t calls m e , i n t h e e n d , t o " t h e m a t i z a t i o n ,
c r o w d s , a t h o m e n o w h e r e — f o r t h e O t h e r h a s stolen h i m f r o m
t h o u g h t , history, a n d inscription [thématisation, pensée,
2 5 himself a t b i r t h . I a m a n d I a m n o t w h o I a m . I n s h o r t , w e
histoire et é c r i t u r e ] . " I n o t h e r w o r d s , like t h e self, w i t h t h e
c o m e very c l o s e h e r e t o m a d n e s s , o r s o m e t h i n g like m a d n e s s .
self, as t h e self, ethics is b o r n ex n i h i l o — f r o m its o w n a b s e n c e .
Ethics is b o r n from the absence of a n y p r o p e r subjective r e l a - E t h i c s will h a v e b e e n b o r n w h e r e i t w a s d i s s o l v e d : i n p r i -

t i o n . I t i s b o r n from anxiety. F r o m finitude. T h e r e i s N O T H I N G m a l (a)sociality w h e r e " e a c h o n e i s t h e o t h e r a n d n o o n e i s

t h a t f o u n d s t h e social o r d e r a n d t h a t i s t h e i n c e s s a n t m u r m u r - himself," as H e i d e g g e r d e s c r i b e s das Man. In a s e n s e , L e v i n a s

ing I " h e a r " calling me o u t of n o t h i n g to be s o m e o n e . Ethics is w i s h e s t o say t h a t this i s o u r " p r o p e r " s t a t e : " P a r a d o x i c a l l y i t

nothing and hence it is disproportionate, vertiginous, a n d anx- i s q u a alienus—foreigner a n d o t h e r — t h a t m a n i s n o t alien-

ious. This nothing m u r m u r s to me through the Other from a t e d [ P a r a d o x a l e m e n t , c'est e n t a n t q u ' a l i e n u s — é t r a n g e r e t

2 7

w h o m I a m u n a b l e t o d i s t i n g u i s h myself a n d t h i s b l i n d r a p - a u t r e — q u e l'homme n'est pas aliéné]." For Levinas, being is

p o r t reveals (without revealing) a for-the-other-for-nothing, b e i n g - c a s t , b e i n g - e n r o l l e d , b e i n g - d r a m a t i z e d . Being is (simul-

o r a g r a t u i t y , a n a b s u r d i t y , o r a n i n s a n e l a u g h t e r , t h a t lacer- t a n e o u s l y ) " o t h e r w i s e t h a n b e i n g . " Being-cast i s i n s p i r a t i o n

a t e s t h e for-itself a n d e x p o s e s i t t o n o t h i n g , t o d e a t h — t o t h a t b y t h e o t h e r a n d d e l a y b e h i n d t h e p r e s e n t : a d i a c h r o n y . Be-

a b s o l u t e p a s s i v i t y I s h a r e w i t h t h e o t h e r . For, I am t h a t O t h e r tween Geworfenheit and Verfallenheit is being-cast, being-

w h o i s t h e n n o o n e o t h e r o r n o o t h e r t h a n myself. I n s o f a r a s I formed, being-ficted—the (imaginary) space of literature, in

am identifying with no one, I t o o am no one. T h u s , / am n o t other words. Geworfenheit and Verfallenheit are, therefore,

e t h i c a l , J d o n o t s u b s t i t u t e . T h e i m p o s s i b i l i t y o f indifference strictly c o r r e l a t i v e . T h e r e i s n o c h r o n o l o g y , n o fall f r o m g r a c e

in t h e scene of suffering is a l s o an i n a b i l i t y to say I. i n t o t h r o w n n e s s (or, i n t o a r t i c u l a t i o n ) . M y " f a l l e n n e s s " i n t o

t h e " t h e y " is t h e r e v e l a t i o n of t h e nullity I a m . T h u s , b e i n g -
T h e e v e n t o f ethics t h a t h a p p e n s t o m e i s a l s o t h e inter-
c a s t , i n a c e r t a i n s e n s e , p r e c e d e s b o t h fallenness a n d t h r o w n -
r u p t i o n of ethics. I can no m o r e reveal or represent this ethics
n e s s . I t " t h r o w s " m e i n t o t h r o w n n e s s , o r a r t i c u l a t e s it.
t h a n I c a n i m a g i n e myself d e a d o r a b s e n t f r o m myself. E t h i c s ,
Fallenness is always already articulated as t h r o w n n e s s .
the response to a n o t h e r in pain, is a repetition of my b i r t h — a
B u t " o t h e r w i s e t h a n b e i n g " i s n o t , o r n o t strictly, e t h i c a l .
r e p e t i t i o n of t h a t r e p e t i t i o n t h a t I am, of t h e e c h o t h e self is.
It is a l s o t h e s u s p e n s i o n of e t h i c s . T h e r e is no " s c e n e " of e n i g -
L e v i n a s i a n e t h i c s i s t h e " p r e s e n t a t i o n " o f myself t o myself a s
m a t i c r a p p o r t t h a t c a n b e d i s p l a y e d b e f o r e us. Da-sein a n d
r e p e t i t i o n (i.e., a s u n p r e s e n t a b l e ) . T h e i m p a s s e w e w i s h t o d e -
t h e L e v i n a s i a n s u b j e c t d o n o t s i m p l y " f a l l , " t h e y a r e vertigi-
scribe, t h e n , is my b e c o m i n g self or my c o m i n g to myself as repeti-
n o u s l y a r t i c u l a t e d , singled o u t , a n d elected.
t i o n or r e c u r r e n c e . T h e subject is n o t h i n g o u t s i d e of its r e t u r n to

Ethique
T h e reality of t h e o t h e r p e r s o n , of Autrui, is, as
L e v i n a s says o f P r o u s t ' s A l b e r t i n e , m a d e u p o f t i m e , o f e v a -
nescence, if you like—of nothingness. T h a t w h i c h is other in
t h e o t h e r p e r s o n i s o t h e r n e s s "itself": t h e r a d i c a l t e m p o r a l i t y
of a d i a c h r o n y w i t h o u t s y n c h r o n i c h o r i z o n , or, in a w o r d ,
dying. Autrui is c o n s t i t u t e d as a n d by t h a t w h i c h o n l y e s c a p e s .
B e c a u s e o f t h i s , n o t i n s p i t e o f it, w e c o m e t o b e i n v o l v e d w i t h
t h e o t h e r i n t i m a t e l y a s other, o u t s i d e o f a n y c o n c e p t o r t h o u g h t
of t h e o t h e r .
In the writings of E m m a n u e l Levinas the language of eth-
ics h a s c o m e t o d e s i g n a t e ( o n e i s t e m p t e d t o say, h a s c o m e t o
t h e r e s c u e of) a singular, c o u n t e r u n i v e r s a l , n o n i n t e n t i o n a l ( t h a t
i s t o say, a i m l e s s , p u r p o s e l e s s , n o n c o n s c i o u s ) r e l a t i o n w i t h a n d
response to the other person as other (and n o t as alter ego,
a n o t h e r v e r s i o n of t h e s a m e , n o r , for t h a t m a t t e r , as a self at
all). T h i s s t r a n g e ethics ( a n d it is q u i t e precisely s t r a n g e — i t is
a s i n g u l a r r e l a t i o n , u n i q u e , u n r e c o g n i z a b l e , a n d , like t h e r e -
sult of a dice t h r o w , d o e s n o t r e l a t e to o t h e r r e l a t i o n s ) is r e a l -
ized as a " s u b s t i t u t i o n of me for t h e o t h e r s [ s u b s t i t u t i o n de
2 8
moi aux autres]," and it can only be included in any moral-
ity, politics, or c o m m u n i t y w h a t e v e r as excluded (or, as L e v i n a s
p u t s it, a s " b e t r a y e d " ) . T h i s m e a n s t h a t a n y p r o p e r r e l a t i o n -
ship with a n o t h e r already betrays w h a t is "essentially" a r a p -
p o r t w i t h o u t essence o r a n i m p r o p r i e t y t h a t precedes a n d m a k e s
possible (while at the same time m a k i n g questionable) any
r e l a t i o n s h i p w h a t e v e r . T h a t w h i c h c o n s t i t u t e s ethics, for
L e v i n a s , i s t h e " l o s s " o f p r o p r i e t y — o r its a b s e n c e , o r its p r e s -
e n c e - a s - b e t r a y e d . It is a loss t h a t p r e c e d e s t h e r e b e i n g a n y -
t h i n g to lose, or it is a r e l a t i o n " w i t h " loss t h a t s u g g e s t s t h e
very possibility any relation whatever. In any case, it is i m p o s -
sible t o say s i m p l y a n d u n e q u i v o c a l l y t h a t w h i c h L e v i n a s h a s
LÉVINAS'S ETHICS 51
given US K» think, tli.it w h i c h a n y e t h i c s o u t s i d e e s s e n c e d e -
mands.
G i o r g i o A g a m b e n p u t s i t this w a y :
T h e fact t h a t m u s t c o n s t i t u t e t h e p o i n t o f d e p a r t u r e
for a n y d i s c o u r s e o n e t h i c s i s t h a t t h e r e i s n o e s s e n c e ,
no historical or spiritual vocation, no biological des-
t i n y t h a t h u m a n s m u s t e n a c t o r realize. T h a t i s t h e
o n l y r e a s o n w h y s o m e t h i n g like e t h i c s c a n e x i s t , b e -
c a u s e i t i s clear t h a t i f h u m a n s w e r e t o b e this o r t h a t
s u b s t a n c e , t h i s o r t h a t destiny, n o e t h i c a l e x p e r i e n c e
w o u l d be possible—there w o u l d only be tasks to be
done.
[Il f a t t o da cui d e v e p a r t i r e o g n i d i s c o r s o s u l l ' e t i c a è
c h e l ' u o m o n o n è n e h a d a essere o d a r e a l i z z a r e a l c u n a
essenza, alcuna vocazione storica o spirituale, alcun
destino biologico. Solo per questo qualcosa c o m e
u n ' e t i c a p u ò esistere: p o i c h é è c h i a r o c h e s e l ' u o m o
fosse o avesse da essere q u e s t a o quella s o s t a n z a , q u e s t o
o q u e l d e s t i n o , n o n vi s a r e b b e a l c u n a e s p e r i e n z a etica
possible—vi sarebbero solo compiti da realizzare.] 29
T h e " p o i n t o f d e p a r t u r e " h e r e i s i n fact t h e a b s e n c e o f
anything t h a t w o u l d constitute a point of d e p a r t u r e , w h i c h is
w h y e t h i c s will a l w a y s h a v e b e e n , a s A g a m b e n p u t s it, " s o m e -
t h i n g like e t h i c s . " T h e r e will be s o m e t h i n g like e t h i c s b e c a u s e
t h e r e will b e n o e t h i c s proper. T h e " e t h i c a l e x p e r i e n c e , " t o b e
p o s s i b l e a t all, p r e s u p p o s e s n o e s s e n c e n o r a n y d e s t i n y t h a t
w o u l d h a v e this o r t h a t d e s i g n a t i o n . T h a t i s t o say, t h e " e t h i -
cal e x p e r i e n c e , " o u t s i d e e s s e n c e , will b e a n e x p e r i e n c e o f a n
improper, incoherent, indeterminate obligation. Outside any
p r o p e r o r a u t h e n t i c r e l a t i o n t o t h e o t h e r , t h e very p r e s e n c e o f

the o t h e r p e r s o n will he d r a i n e d oi s u b s t a n c e , and the subject
will find itself in a s i n g u l a r r e l a t i o n to t h e O t h e r w i t h o u t m e a -
sure or c o m p a r i s o n . At the limit of any c o m m u n i t y or any
relation whatever, Levinas wishes to reveal a p r o x i m i t y t h a t
c a n n o t b e m a d e p r e s e n t , b u t t h a t I c a n n o t d i v o r c e myself f r o m .
T h e ethics Levinas has in m i n d is o n e t h a t " h a p p e n s " to me
w h e n a n o t h e r p e r s o n loses his o r h e r p r o p e r r e l a t i o n t o h i m -
o r herself. T h i s e r o s i o n o f p r e s e n c e c o n s t i t u t e s a n e v e n t (or,
better, is t h e e v e n t of t h e e m p t y i n g o u t of all p r e s e n c e ) t h a t
" d e n u c l e a t e s " t h e self (moi), a n d t h u s t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p p r o p e r
w i t h t h e o t h e r p e r s o n slips i n t o a v e r t i g o , an i n d u c e m e n t , a
p r o v o c a t i o n , or a s u g g e s t i o n — s o m e t h i n g like an e t h i c a l o b l i -
g a t i o n , b u t o n l y imprecisely, loosely. In fact it is i m p o s s i b l e to
characterize w h a t " h a p p e n s " here and it is only ambiguously
t h a t t h e l a n g u a g e o f ethics i s " e q u a l t o , " o r i s t h e m e a n i n g of,
this e r o s i o n . 3 0
I t i s L e v i n a s ' s p r o j e c t t o s h o w t h a t all h u m a n
relations are always threatened by an evacuation of presence,
a n d h e insists o n o u r e t h i c a l o b l i g a t i o n t o " t h e n e x t o n e I
m e e t , " the next one on the street I h a p p e n to run into. W h a t
L e v i n a s w a n t s to say is t h a t h u m a n life is in r a p p o r t w i t h a
general i m p r o p r i e t y t h a t s u g g e s t s b o t h a n a r c h y and c o m m u -
nity, b o t h s t a b i l i t y and instability. T h a t i s t o say, a c c o r d i n g t o
L e v i n a s , t h e r e is a r e l a t i o n in r e l a t i o n to w h i c h I am a l w a y s
already in relation, or in relation to which I am absolutely
p a s s i v e . T h i s passivity is a r e s p o n s e to t h e O t h e r — b e y o n d h i m -
or h e r s e l f — t h a t I c o m e to be r e s p o n s i b l e for. But, a n d t h i s is
s t r a n g e , r e s p o n s i b l e for nothing ( t h a t is to say, not n e c e s s a r i l y
r e s p o n s i b l e t o r e s t o r e t h e o t h e r t o p r o p r i e t y , for t h a t w o u l d
p r e s u p p o s e s o m e c o m m o n essence or destiny). It is a responsi-
bility p r o p r i e t y c a n n o t satisfy.
W e r e t u r n a g a i n a n d a g a i n t o this fragile a n d i n d e f i n a b l e
relation with Autrui as that from which I cannot distinguish
myself. B e y o n d o r o t h e r w i s e t h a n d o u b t o r c e r t a i n t y , t h i s sin-
i i vi N A s•s I i M 11 s
gular relation ( r e s e m b l i n g ethics and r e n d e r i n g e t h i c s a r e s e m -
b l a n c e to itself, that is, d e n u c l e a t i n g it of essence) is a n a r c h y —
the coming (apart) of any c o m m u n i t y whatever. It h a p p e n s to
u s w h e n , for e x a m p l e , a n o t h e r p e r s o n i s i n p a i n , o r for t h a t
m a t t e r , i n ecstasy. I t h a p p e n s w h e n a n o t h e r p e r s o n i s d e p r i v e d
o f t h e d i g n i t y o f t h e self, a s w h e n d e a t h a p p r o a c h e s , o r a s
w h e n s o m e o n e forgets himself in p a s s i o n . D i s p o s s e s s e d of self,
o u t s i d e oneself, t h e o t h e r p e r s o n is, i f w e m a y say t h i s , p o s -
sessed by d i s p o s s e s s i o n , or by a n o n y m i t y . In t h e g r i p s of p a i n
o r p a s s i o n t h e o t h e r p e r s o n , n o l o n g e r h i m - o r herself, i s n o
l o n g e r self-possessed a n d s o m e t h i n g i r r e p a r a b l e h a p p e n s . T h i s
o c c u r r e d , a s w e k n o w , t o Bataille, w h o b e c a m e s o o b s e s s e d
w i t h t h e f a m o u s p h o t o g r a p h o f a m a n w h o w a s b e i n g flayed
a n d dismembered while being kept conscious with o p i u m . T h e
e x p r e s s i o n o n t h e sufferer's face, Bataille s a y s , w a s " a t o n c e
3 1
ecstatic(?) a n d i n t o l e r a b l e . " The other person became
u n s i m p l e : n e i t h e r s i m p l y living n o r d e a d , n e i t h e r i n p a i n n o r
i n e c s t a s y — b e c a m e , w e m a y say, c o m m u n i c a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e s e
p o l e s — n o l o n g e r a self b u t c o m m u n i c a t i o n "itself." T h i s e v e n t
o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n m a y h a p p e n t o u s w h e n s o m e o n e (like o n e
of t h e g l a m o r o u s p e o p l e f r o m t h e film Paris Is Burning) is
engaged in the project of passing from male to female, or the
reverse. There the other person passes beyond mere imitation
o f f e m a l e (or m a l e ) a n d a p p r o a c h e s , n o t a t h i r d s e x , b u t t h e
c o m m u n i c a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e sexes t h a t m a k e s t h a t w h i c h i s
called g e n d e r possible, w h i l e calling it i n t o q u e s t i o n . In these
e x t r a v a g a n t cases, the o t h e r p e r s o n b e c o m e s radically dis-placed,
s e e m s t o b e l o n g n o w h e r e , s e e m s t o h a v e lost a w o r l d , a n d
b e c o m e s , a s Levinas p u t s it, " n a k e d b e y o n d n u d i t y " because this
" s o m e o n e " will h a v e e x c e e d e d a n y localizable c o n t e x t s . W h e n
t h i s h a p p e n s , all p r o p e r r e l a t i o n s t o t h e o t h e r a r e s u s p e n d e d
a n d t h e r e is, b e f o r e a n y t h i n g else, a f a s c i n a t i o n . T h i s f a s c i n a -
32
tion or obsession is the " s u b s t a n c e " of Levinas's e t h i c s .
 ) 'I I W ( >
W i t h a B l a n c h o t i a n accent, I.evinas h a d given us to u n d e r -
s t a n d t h a t , b e f o r e i t i s a n y t h i n g else, o u r r e l a t i o n w i t h t h e
o t h e r p e r s o n is an i n v o l u n t a r y f a s c i n a t i o n . Autrui is a r r e s t i n g
a n d p a r a l y z i n g . W e c a n b e o v e r c o m e by, o r e x p e r i e n c e , a n
arresting fascination with a n o t h e r person w h o has "passed
b e y o n d " while remaining here. It is a fascination w i t h t h a t
w h i c h p r e s e n t s itself as o u t s i d e itself—as d r a i n e d of all reality,
as threatened or already contaminated by absence, but in such
a w a y t h a t p r e s e n c e a n d a b s e n c e cease t o b e t h e p r o p e r t e r m s
for t h e O t h e r . T h e o t h e r p e r s o n , o u t s i d e a n y s i m p l e p r e s e n t a -
tion, is " b e y o n d " while remaining here, before m e ; b u t this
" h e r e " is no l o n g e r a p r e s e n c e , it is, as it w e r e , d e l a y e d b e h i n d
itself, or is yet to c o m e . It is t h e wrcpresence of c o m m u n i c a t i v i t y .
T h e other person is threatened with becoming a spectacle—a
r e a l i t y m a d e u p o f n o t h i n g n e s s (as, for e x a m p l e , i n p r o f e s -
sional wrestling, where the spectacle comes from the draining
a w a y o f all " r e a l " w r e s t l i n g a n d c o m p e t i t i o n ) . T h e f a c e - t o -
face r a p p o r t f r o m Totality and Infinity is s u c h a s p e c t a c u l a r
r e l a t i o n . T h e r e , t h e o t h e r p e r s o n , a s visage, i s p r e s e n t e d a s
m a d e u p o f t h a t p a s s i n g a w a y t h a t d o e s n o t p a s s : t i m e . (In
p r o f e s s i o n a l w r e s t l i n g , all r e a l i t y h a v i n g b e e n d r a i n e d a w a y ,
s o m e t h i n g yet r e m a i n s t o b e seen. T h a t w h i c h i s a r r e s t i n g i s
a l w a y s t h a t w h i c h r e m a i n s t o b e seen w h i l e all i s a l r e a d y i n
f r o n t o f m e , b u t a s i f yet t o c o m e . ) B e y o n d a n y p r o p e r r e l a t i o n
t o self, a s p e c t a c l e c o m e s t o a r r e s t a n d p a r a l y z e u s : t h a t t o
w h i c h t h e r e i s n o p r o p e r r e s p o n s e . A n d t h e p a r a l y s i s w e feel i s
a p a r a l y s i s of the subject. Bataille p r o b a b l y k n e w t h i s b e t t e r
t h a n a n y o n e : " A m a n alive, w h o sees a f e l l o w - m a n d i e , c a n
s u r v i v e o n l y beside himself'[s'il v o i t s o n s e m b l a b l e m o u r i r , un
v i v a n t ne petit p l u s s u b s i s t e r q u e hors de soi]." 33
O n e d o e s n o t m e r e l y o b s e r v e a scene h e r e . For, w h e n t h e
o t h e r p e r s o n is d r a i n e d of all s u b s t a n c e , w h e n his r e a l i t y is
t h i s e r o s i o n , w h e n Autrui faces us like " t h e n e x t o n e I m e e t "
i, r. V i IN /\ 3 a i ' i i l i * i
(like a s t r a n g e r , in o t h e r w o r d s ) , (hen the b o r d e r s b e t w e e n
stage and audience are suspended and we are "involved,"
" e l e c t e d , " " s i n g u l a r i z e d . " T h e p a r a l y s i s o f t h e subject i s a n
u n c o n t r o l l a b l e r a p p o r t w i t h t h e o t h e r p e r s o n . W i t h this i s car-
ried a w a y all p r o p e r difference b e t w e e n S a m e a n d O t h e r . T h e r e
i s a n identification o f t h e S a m e w i t h t h e O t h e r t h a t d e n u c l e a t e s
t h e S a m e o f s a m e n e s s a n d r e n d e r s t h e o t h e r p e r s o n all t h e
m o r e Other in that I am the same as he (who, nonetheless,
remains other than I, other than anyone). This is an intimacy
more profound than sympathy or empathy, which presuppose
a s t a b i l i t y i n t h e S a m e w h o can identify w i t h t h e o t h e r . W h a t
h a p p e n s in L e v i n a s i a n p r o x i m i t y is an i n a b i l i t y or a n o n i n t e n -
t i o n a l i t y t h a t seizes u s f r o m t h e inside. T h i s loss o f p r o p r i e t y
is c o n t a g i o u s . It is s h a r e d like a c o m m u n a l ecstasy.
A n o n y m o u s identification is n o t a k n o w l e d g e t h a t I t o o
c a n die, or that I too can have my gender transformed. It is an
e x p e r i e n c e o f a n o n y m i t y (an e x p e r i e n c e i n t h e a b s e n c e o f t h e r e
being a n y o n e there to have the experience). It is the experi-
e n c e of b e i n g already d e a d . A n o n y m o u s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n is a
p a r a l y s i s t h a t subjects m e t o alterity " d e s p i t e myself," a n d
t h i s is t h e very s t r u c t u r e of subjectivity for L e v i n a s : d e s p i t e -
oneself-for-an other.
It is precisely t h i s s i n g u l a r r e s p o n s e or " r e l a t i o n " — p a r a -
lyzing a n d a n o n y m o u s , " d e s p i t e - m e " — t h a t L e v i n a s s e e k s t o
a p p r o p r i a t e t o t h e l a n g u a g e o f e t h i c s . H e w i s h e s t o define e t h -
ics a s a n a n o n y m o u s i n v o l v e m e n t w i t h alterity t h a t calls for
a n d dissolves all p r o p e r r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e o t h e r p e r s o n , a n d i t
" p o s e s p r o b l e m s i f o n e i s n o t t o a b a n d o n oneself t o v i o l e n c e .
I t calls for c o m p a r i s o n , m e a s u r e , k n o w i n g , l a w s , i n s t i t u t i o n s —
justice | a m o i n s d e s ' a b a n d o n n e r a l a v i o l e n c e , p o s e des p r o b -
l e m s . Elle en a p p e l l e a l o r s a la c o m p a r a i s o n , a la m e s u r e , au
3 4
savoir, a u x lois, a u x i n s t i t u t i o n s — a l a j u s t i c e ] . " T h a t is to
say, o u t s i d e p u r e a n d s i m p l e a b a n d o n m e n t t o v i o l e n c e , t o a
 I [ o b b e s i a n w a r ol .ill againsl all, there must be s o m e t h i n g like
k n o w i n g , l a w s , justice, a n d s o f o r t h — a l l o f w h i c h m u s t re-
m a i n q u e s t i o n a b l e a n d r e t a i n w i t h i n t h e m s e l v e s a call for t h e i r
r e v a l u a t i o n . T h e r e i s n o e t h i c s p r o p e r , p e r se, o r a s s u c h a n y -
w h e r e in Levinas's w o r k s . But n e i t h e r is t h e r e a p u r e a n d s i m p l e
a b s e n c e o f e t h i c s . T h e call o f t h e O t h e r will n e v e r c e a s e t o
place an incoherent d e m a n d in the soul of the subject to w h i c h
n o r e s p o n s e i s a d e q u a t e (by d e f i n i t i o n , for n o t h i n g c a n b e a d -
e q u a t e t o t h e i n c o h e r e n t ) . H i s e t h i c s , t h e r e f o r e , is, a s h e s a y s ,
a n " o b s e s s i o n . " Every r e s p o n s e t o t h e o t h e r , every r e s t o r a t i o n
t o t h e g e n e r a l , will b e t r a y t h e d e m a n d . B u t a t t h e s a m e t i m e ,
e a c h b e t r a y a l will b e a n e w r e l a t i o n w i t h t h e o t h e r a n d t h u s
e t h i c s will m i m e o r " c o n f o r m " t o m i m e s i s , t o t h e i m p r o p e r
"itself." T h e r e will b e n o r e a c h i n g e t h i c s , n o t e a c h i n g it, n o
i n s t i t u t i n g it. T h e r e will b e i n s t e a d t h e s l o w e m p t y i n g o u t o f
a n y d e t e r m i n a t e r e l a t i o n w h a t s o e v e r , a n d this e m p t y i n g o u t
will a r t i c u l a t e b y e x h a u s t i o n a n d e x c l u s i o n t h e s i n g u l a r "it-
self." T h i s d o e s n o t m e a n t h a t ethics i s a n y r e l a t i o n a t all. A n y
r e l a t i o n a t all w o u l d r e m a i n j u s t t h a t — i n d i f f e r e n t — w e r e i t
n o t for t h e p e c u l i a r g r a v i t y o f m i m e s i s : t h a t t o w h i c h n o r e l a -
tion (and no language) is adequate.
L e v i n a s ' s e t h i c s , if it is e t h i c s , will be an e x p e r i e n c e of t h i s
i m p o s s i b i l i t y : t h e r e i s n o r e l a t i o n t h a t i s e i t h e r inside o r o u t -
side t h e o b l i g a t i o n t o r e s p o n d t o t h e O t h e r t h a t i s n o t a l s o a
s u b s t i t u t i o n of me for t h e other. S u b s t i t u t i o n , in L e v i n a s , is
the very m e a s u r e of a measureless w e a k n e s s : finitude. T h a t is
t o say, t h e r e i s n o h u m a n r e l a t i o n t h a t d o e s n o t c i r c u m s c r i b e a
loss t h a t p a s s e s w i t h o u t p a s s i n g a w a y . T h a t loss i s i n s c r i b e d
in, o r a s , t h e face o f t h e o t h e r p e r s o n w h o faces m e f r o m b e -
y o n d himself a n d thereby obligates t h a t I am called on to be
substituted for him who cannot substitute for himself, and
w h o i s a b a n d o n e d t o a n infinite v u l n e r a b i l i t y t h a t i t i s b e y o n d
his p o w e r t o e q u a l ( a b a n d o n e d b e y o n d e v e n a n y v i o l e n c e t h a t
m a y h e d o n e t o him) like the m a n t o r t u r e d t o d e a t h i n C h i n a
w h o s o o b s e s s e d Bataille. I n t h e face o f t h e o t h e r , i n t h e s p e c -
tacle t h a t is an i m a g e l o s i n g its r e f e r e n c e , is t h e p r e s e n t a t i o n
o f t h e i m p o s s i b i l i t y o f f i n i t u d e : t h e O t h e r , precisely, c a n n o t b e
himself. Autrui c a n n o t be himself a n d t h e r e f o r e I am c a l l e d to
b e f o r - h i m . H e i s n o t e q u a l t o himself, b y definition, a s
Heidegger has so implacably shown. T h a t is h o w it is with the
other person, a n d t h a t is w h y he obsesses me. He is w e a k ,
i m p o v e r i s h e d , h o m e l e s s , g l o r i o u s . . . T h a t is w h a t affects me
beyond characterization and beyond description. Even the
h o m e l e s s a r e n o t e q u a l t o their h o m e l e s s n e s s — t h e y a r e a l w a y s
w o r s e off o r o t h e r w i s e affected t h a n o t h e r s (or t h e y t h e m -
selves) c a n s a y t h e y a r e . T h o s e w h o suffer c a n n o t g r a s p t h e i r
suffering, e v e n if t h e y tell us of it. On t h e " h i t h e r s i d e " of all
t h a t is said, an infinite vulnerability obsesses us b e y o n d m e a s u r e .
E t h i c s , a s L e v i n a s defines it, i s r i g o r o u s l y c o r r e l a t i v e w i t h
f i n i t u d e . T h e p a r a l y s i s o f t h e s u b j e c t i s t h e infinite v u l n e r a b i l -
ity t h a t i s f i n i t u d e — i t s o p e n n e s s t o a n y r e l a t i o n w h a t e v e r (just
o r u n j u s t , r e s p o n s i b l e o r n o t ) . A n d , t h e r e i s n o ethics o f f i n i t u d e .
T h e r e is s o m e t h i n g like a s u g g e s t i o n , a m u r m u r t h a t o b l i g e s
u s a n d c o n s t r a i n s u s t o s o m e t h i n g like e t h i c s . S o m e t h i n g , h o w -
ever, t h a t will a l w a y s h a v e " d u p e d " u s i n t h e s e n s e o f o u r
h a v i n g b e e n t a k e n in by a d u b i o u s s c h e m e in s p i t e of o u r b e s t
(or w o r s t ) i n t e n t i o n s . S o m e t h i n g will a l w a y s h a v e d r a g g e d u s
a g a i n s t o u r will i n t o a v e r t i g o f r o m w h i c h o n l y a n a m e l e s s
a n d affectless voice will s p e a k , like t h e n a r r a t i v e v o i c e f r o m
35
Blanchot.
Death
T h e space of radical ethics—a relation with others
t h a t precedes egology—is deeply, even definitively, a m b i g u o u s .
As a m b i g u o u s , it is n e u t r a l a n d n e u t r a l i z i n g . It is as m u c h a

s p a c e of d e a t h a n d dying, oi l i n i t u d c , literature, a n d m a d n e s s ,
as it is of e t h i c s . F i n i t u d e is given at b i r t h by t h e O t h e r w h o m
I f o r g e t b u t to w h o m I o w e t h e finitude I a m . I am i g n o r a n t of
m y b i r t h a s I a m o f m y d e a t h , since t h e s e define a n d t h e r e f o r e
e s c a p e m e , o r i n v o l v e m e i n a limit o v e r w h i c h I e x e r c i s e n o
36
c o n t r o l . I t i s (the) O t h e r ( s ) w h o i n v o l v e ( s ) m e i n t h e s e l i m i t s
t h a t define m e . O n l y b y a n a b u s e o f l a n g u a g e , h o w e v e r , c a n
t h i s s p a c e b e a p p r o p r i a t e d t o t h e l a n g u a g e o f e t h i c s ; for t h e
space of incarnation a n d death is singular a n d incomparable.
It belongs to no one. It is properly neither ethical n o r aes-
t h e t i c . I t i s n o m o r e t h e f i r s t sign o f e t h i c s ( a n e x t r e m e h u m i l -
ity b e f o r e t h e o t h e r ) t h a n o f h i s t r i o n i c s (the ability t o p l a y all
t h e r o l e s w i t h a n icy d e t a c h m e n t ) , o r o f m a d n e s s ( a d i s p o s s e s -
s i o n o f self a n d a r e p o s s e s s i o n b y w h o k n o w s w h a t forces o r
demons). Incarnation is irreducibly undecidable, unoccupiable,
a n d u n p r e s e n t a b l e . B u t this i s a l s o t h e s p a c e o f e x i s t e n c e w h i c h
is, a s N a n c y s a y s , " o f f e r e d b y n o o n e t o n o o n e . " I t i s offered,
b u t i t i s a l w a y s a l r e a d y lost o r s u r r e n d e r e d b e c a u s e i t b e l o n g s
t o n o o n e . I t is, N a n c y s a y s , " s h a r e d , " b u t o n l y a s t h a t w h i c h
3 7
e l u d e s all s h a r i n g . There can be no transcending this space,
since it is u n e q u a l or insufficient to itself. T h e r e f o r e , as B l a n c h o t
reminds us:
I t d o e s n o t follow, h o w e v e r , t h a t t h e c o m m u n i t y i s t h e
s i m p l e p u t t i n g i n c o m m o n , i n s i d e t h e limits i t w o u l d
p r o p o s e for itself, of a s h a r e d will to be s e v e r a l , a l b e i t
t o d o n o t h i n g , t h a t i s t o say, t o d o n o t h i n g else t h a n
m a i n t a i n t h e s h a r i n g o f ' s o m e t h i n g ' w h i c h , precisely,
seems always already to have eluded the possibility of
b e i n g c o n s i d e r e d as p a r t of a s h a r i n g : s p e e c h , silence.
[La c o m m u n a u t é n ' e s t p a s p o u r a u t a n t l a s i m p l e m i s e
e n c o m m u n , d a n s les limites q u ' e l l e s e t r a c e r a i t , d ' u n e
i i: v i N A s • s i i 111 > 5
v o l o n t é p a r t a g é e d ' ê t r e a p l u s i e u r s , fût-ce p o u r ne rien
faire, c ' e s t - à - d i r e ne rien faire d ' a u t r e q u e de m a i n t e n i r
le partage de 'quelque chose' qui précisément semble
s ' ê t r e t o u j o u r s d é j à s o u s t r a i t à la p o s s i b i l i t é d ' ê t r e
considéré c o m m e part à un partage: parole, silence.] 38
This space, without or beyond essence (au-delà de
l'essence), t h i s b e i n g - i n - c o m m o n t h a t ¿5 o n l y as " o t h e r w i s e
t h a n b e i n g , " is, for L e v i n a s , t h e p l a c e of a r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t h a t
p l a c e s me in q u e s t i o n , for o n l y t h e r e , o u t s i d e e s s e n c e , can I
meet the other as other t h a n other-I. T h e ambiguity of this
s p a c e is s h a r e a b l e o n l y as c o n t e s t e d , as i n - q u e s t i o n ( h e n c e , it
is the space n o t only of responsibility, b u t also of rivalry a n d
jealousy). D e a t h is inscribed here as well. It is the space of t h e
f i n i t u d e , w e m u s t say, i n spite o f L e v i n a s ' s p r o f o u n d a v e r s i o n
t o f u n d a m e n t a l o n t o l o g y a n d Bataille's i m p a t i e n c e w i t h H e i -
degger's "slavish" devotion to philosophy. It is finitude as t h a t
o b l i g a t i o n - t o - b e t h a t I c a n n o t ever m e e t , for i t defines m e a n d
is t h u s b e y o n d me as the inescapable voice of conscience t h a t
calls Da-sein to itself by p u t t i n g it in q u e s t i o n . It is an i m -
p r o p e r s p a c e , b e l o n g i n g t o n o o n e , a n d i s given t o Da-sein,
b u t o n l y o n c o n d i t i o n t h a t Da-sein i s r a d i c a l l y n o o n e .
U n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d s p a c e is a s p a c e of u n p o w e r , of a n a r c h y .
It is w h e r e there is exposure to e x p o s u r e . In this space, the
o t h e r p e r s o n , e n r o l l e d a s this o r t h a t m e m b e r o f s o c i e t y (or
part of some whole), is depropriated and communicates with
t h i s s p a c e i t s e l f — b e y o n d a n y self. H e r e t h e o t h e r p e r s o n i s
a p p r o a c h e d by an u n p o w e r over w h i c h he can exercise no
m a s t e r y a n d for w h i c h his r o l e d o e s n o t p r e p a r e h i m . L e v i n a s
s a y s , " t h e face is e x p o s e d , m e n a c e d , as if i n v i t i n g us to an a c t
o f v i o l e n c e fie visage est e x p o s é , m e n a c é c o m m e n o u s i n v i t a n t
3 9
à un acte de v i o l e n c e ] . " T h e entire lacerated b o d y of the
m a n t o r t u r e d i n C h i n a , w h o s e p h o t o g r a p h s Bataille h a d s e e n ,

w a s a visage in the Lcvinasian sense. I lis m u t i l a t i o n e x c i t e s a
p a s s i o n for further mutilation, even as it excites a p a s s i o n a t e
r e v u l s i o n . In this s p a c e of c o n t e s t a t i o n — o f rivalry, of jealousy,
o f t o r t u r e , o f d e a t h — t h e o t h e r p e r s o n loses himself a n d "of-
f e r s " t o m e a n o p e n i n g i n t o this s p a c e . T h e O t h e r i s s u b j e c t t o
a w i t h d r a w a l over which there is no control and of w h i c h
t h e r e i s n o k n o w l e d g e . A t t h e s a m e t i m e , h e b e g i n s t o lose his
a b i l i t y - t o - d i e , his definitive m o r t a l potentia, his " o w n m o s t "
possibility. H e b e g i n s t o lose t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t defines h i m a s
Da-sein. T h i s possibility, H e i d e g g e r tells u s , o n c e r e a l i z e d is,
h e n c e , n o l o n g e r p o s s i b l e a n d Da-sein, o n c e r e a l i z e d i n its b e -
i n g , loses itself a b s o l u t e l y b e c a u s e it is no l o n g e r able to d i e . It
i s t o t h a t definitive p o w e r l e s s n e s s t h a t I r e s p o n d . T h i s m a y b e
t h e b e g i n n i n g o f a n e t h i c s , b u t i t w o u l d b e a fatal o n e b e c a u s e
I a m n o t a b l e t o d i s t i n g u i s h myself f r o m t h a t p o w e r l e s s n e s s .
T h e o t h e r p e r s o n i s n o l o n g e r a b l e t o forestall t h e a p p r o a c h o f
d e a t h — a p a r a l y s i s t h a t , i n spite o f his l a n g u a g e , defines H e i -
d e g g e r ' s Entschlossenheit as a r a d i c a l passivity. It is to t h i s
p a s s i v i t y t h a t e x p o s e s b e y o n d n u d i t y t h a t I r e s p o n d , a n d for
w h i c h I a m r e s p o n s i b l e . I n its a p p r o a c h (as t h e p o s s i b i l i t y - t o -
die t h a t i s a l r e a d y a n i n a b i l i t y - t o - c e a s e - d y i n g ) , finitude e s c a p e s
f r o m " b e t w e e n " us, a n d h e n c e , t h e r e is a v e r t i g i n o u s (or a n o n y -
m o u s ) c o n t a c t . I identify w i t h this O t h e r n o n i n t e n t i o n a l l y , p r i o r
t o a n y d e c i s i o n , for t h e r e i s n o o n e t o identify w i t h a n d n o t h -
ing to intend. T h e r e is an e m p t y identification "despite m y -
self" t h a t i n t e r r u p t s m y " a s for m e . "
T h e response is prior to consciousness a n d it dissolves the
s o c i a l b o n d , since I identify w i t h t h e O t h e r w h o i s n o o n e a t
a l l , is a l r e a d y b e y o n d t h e s o c i a l . O u t s i d e my self, I am t h a t
O t h e r w h o , p a r a l y z e d a n d d y i n g , i s already n o l o n g e r a b l e t o
be there a n y m o r e . T h e O t h e r a n d I share this dying outside
ourselves that both touches and separates us. Resoluteness
(Entschlossenheit) e s c a p e s me a n d is a l r e a d y a r e s p o n s e to t h e
I I v I N A '. '. I I I I I I a (> i
( )ther w h o presents (my) death i<> me by r e v e a l i n g it n o t to be
m y d e a t h , n o r his, n o r a n y o n e ' s . I a m o b l i g a t e d t o b e f o r - t h e -
o t h e r , t o die i n his p l a c e , i n t h a t s p a c e w h e r e t h e o t h e r p e r s o n
is approached by an unpower that approaches me and from
w h i c h I h a v e n o p o w e r t o s e p a r a t e myself. T h i s i s n o t a c o m -
m u n i o n , nor an exchange of places. It is the corrosive a n d
s o b e r i n g r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t t h e o t h e r p e r s o n i s n o t a b l e t o die
his own d e a t h . T h a t is w h a t is so t e r r i b l e a b o u t t h e final h o u r .
4 0
T h e s o l i t u d e o f d y i n g m u s t b e s h a r e d . 1 die f o r - t h e - o t h e r a n d
in his place because the other c a n n o t . He r e m a i n s , to the end,
u n c a n n i l y alive, r e m a i n s u n a b l e t o cease t o d i e , a n d s u r r e n -
d e r s t h e o w n - m o s t n e s s (the p o s s i b i l i t y t o die) t h a t defines h i m .
D e a t h i s i m p e r s o n a l . T h a t i s w h y I m u s t b e t h e r e for h i m , w i t h
h i m . I a m called t o a c c o m p l i s h w h a t h e c a n n o t a c c o m p l i s h
himself. I m u s t s u b s t i t u t e for h i m this ability to die t h a t / a m .
I a m t h a t s u p p l e m e n t h e d e m a n d s , o b l i g e s , i n o r d e r t o be, i n
o r d e r t o r e m a i n p o s s i b l e . H o w e v e r , I offer h i m w h a t i s n o t m y
o w n , w h a t I c a n n o t offer, w h a t I a m u n a b l e t o g i v e . H e n c e w e
e n t e r a d e a t h l i k e p a s s i v i t y (une passivité à mort) t o g e t h e r . T h i s
i m p o s s i b l e o b l i g a t i o n a n d i m p o s s i b l e r e l a t i o n d o e s n o t define
me as t r a g i c . It e x p o s e s me to t h e r a d i c a l inability t h a t I must
t, —that t h a t t o w h i c h I a m ethically o b l i g a t e d i s b e y o n d m e ,
e
b e y o n d m y p o w e r . I identify w i t h t h e o t h e r i n s o f a r a s h e i s n o
o n e , i s b e y o n d himself, a n d t h e r e f o r e I t o o a m b e y o n d , a m n o
o n e , n o ipse—am myself a l r e a d y u n a b l e t o die. T o s u b s t i t u t e ,
to s u p p l e m e n t for t h e o t h e r , is to d i e , like t h e o t h e r , as O t h e r .
J u s t a s t h e o t h e r m u s t die a d e a t h n o t his o w n , s o t o o I m u s t
die a n o t h e r ' s d e a t h . S u b s t i t u t i o n , t h e " g e r m " o f L e v i n a s ' s
Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence,^ is n o t a c c o m p l i s h e d
except beyond me, outside me, despite-me-for-another. Sub-
s t i t u t i n g for t h e o t h e r , I d i e , t h u s a c c o m p l i s h i n g w h a t t h e o t h e r
c a n n o t . B u t d y i n g f o r - t h e - o t h e r , I r e m a i n u n a b l e t o die m y
o w n d e a t h . I die a w a y f r o m myself. D e a t h i s i m p e r s o n a l ; i t
 b e l o n g s lo no o n e . I l e n e e , e v e r y o n e dies an ( )thcr's d e a t h , no
o n e his o w n .
T h e e t h i c s o f s u b s t i t u t i o n i s b e t r a y e d b y a n i n t e r n a l limit.
It is an i m p a s s e . I leave t h e s c e n e . I a b a n d o n a n d b e t r a y t h e
O t h e r w h o calls t o m e . W h a t r e m a i n s i s t h e call f r o m n o o n e
t o n o o n e . A call t o w h i c h n o e t h i c s , n o o b l i g a t i o n , i s a d -
e q u a t e . T h e r e l a t i o n t o t h e O t h e r , like f i n i t u d e itself, i s b e y o n d
my g r a s p . Levinas's ethics is h a u n t e d by finitude, t h e very
finitude t h a t suggests an e t h i c s . T h e call of finitude—lacerat-
ing m e , e x p o s i n g m e , e n r o l l i n g m e , o b s e s s i n g m e — s a y s n o t h -
i n g . It is t h a t other d e a t h t h a t d i s p o s s e s s e s me of myself.
Yet I must be this e x i s t e n c e , this finitude, w h i c h is offered
by no one to no one. I am nothing—nothing other than that
being-offered, t h a t supplement, or t h a t substitution t h a t I can-
n o t a c c o m p l i s h . I am O t h e r — t h a t is, no o n e , no ipse. I am
only as substituted. T h a t is w h y I am always the first person
accused, the first person responsible. My fascinated attentive-
n e s s t o t h e O t h e r i s t h e b r e a k u p o f m y unity. T h e r e l a t i o n t o
t h e O t h e r i s singular, u n i q u e , n o n g e n e r a l i z a b l e . T h e r e i s n o
e t h i c s a s s u c h , n o e t h i c s itself. O r , this e t h i c s i s s t r u c t u r e d like
i m p r o p r i e t y , a n d t h e L e v i n a s i a n s u b j e c t i s n o t h i n g b u t its infi-
nite unfinished vulnerability.
Levinas and Heidegger
If L e v i n a s ' s e t h i c s is an e l a b o r a t e d e s c r i p t i o n of
finitude, then something about finitude—its primordial tem-
p o r a l i t y , its d i a c h r o n y , its a l w a y s - o u t s i d e - i t s e l f n e s s — s u g g e s t s
to L e v i n a s an e t h i c s . T i m e itself means ethics to L e v i n a s . Da-
sein—that b e i n g t h a t d o e s n o t h a v e its b e i n g , t h a t i s a l w a y s i n
question, t h a t is the " p u r e abyss of presence in the p r e s e n t " — 4 2
suggests to Levinas, possibly to us as well, s o m e kind of eth-
ics. If b e i n g o n l y " i s " in its p a s s i n g , or in its b e i n g - a l t e r e d , or
b e i n g - c a s t , a n d il I hi sein is Mit-einandersein, t h e n , letting go
ol a n x i e t y a b o u t lostness (as b a t a i l l e r e c o m m e n d e d ) , it w e l -
c o m e s t h e O t h e r . Ethics w o u l d b e s u g g e s t e d , a s i f h y p n o t i -
cally, by t h e call of finitude, if finitude is u n d e r s t o o d to be
rigorously articulated as Mit-einandersein.
T h e space we share/expose is the space of an instability
t h a t c a n n o t be c o m m a n d e d . It is t h e s p a c e of a r a d i c a l c o n t e s -
tation of discourses that cannot be rigorously distinguished
f r o m e a c h o t h e r . It is, if y o u like, t h e s p a c e of l a n g u a g e itself,
of w r i t i n g b e f o r e t h e letter, as D e r r i d a s a y s , or of le dire, as
L e v i n a s p r e f e r s . I n s o f a r a s Levinas's t e x t c o m e s t o d o u b l e H e i -
degger's (diachronie a n d Zeit, anarchie a n d das Man, le sujet
and Da-sein, responsabilité and Gewissenheit, and so forth)
his w o r k a m o u n t s t o a v a s t p r o t e s t a g a i n s t w h a t H e i d e g g e r
could m e a n , a p r o t e s t a g a i n s t t h e a p p r o p r i a t i o n of finitude to
" f u n d a m e n t a l o n t o l o g y . " In an essay on Lyotard, L a c o u e -
L a b a r t h e says, "I h a v e a lot of t r o u b l e n o t seeing in H e i d e g g e r ' s
' b e i n g ' , if it is still b e i n g , a n d if it is H e i d e g g e r ' s b e i n g , t h e
s a m e t h i n g a s (if n o t its very possibility) L e v i n a s ' s ' t h e o t h e r -
4 3
wise than being'. Or as an empty t r a n s c e n d e n c e . "
T h a t is, b y a c t i n g a s a c o m p e t i t o r t o H e i d e g g e r a n d t o
fundamental ontology, Levinas has exposed a n d exploited an
an-archic r a p p o r t and has attempted to undermine Heidegger,
w h o w r o t e n o e t h i c s . W h o w r o t e n o e t h i c s for t h e v e r y g o o d
reason that there is nothing adequate or equal to finitude,
n o t h i n g " o t h e r w i s e " t h a n finitude. Levinas is Heidegger in
F r e n c h , b u t this c a n u n d e r m i n e H e i d e g g e r i n G e r m a n . I n very
different w a y s , Bataille a n d L e v i n a s e a c h e c h o H e i d e g g e r . E a c h
says w h a t H e i d e g g e r will n o t say b e c a u s e i t i s u n s a y a b l e . F o r
L e v i n a s , t h e r e i s n o m e a n i n g i n t h e fact t h a t t h e r e i s n o e t h i c s
of finitude. By r e p e a t i n g H e i d e g g e r in t e r m s of e t h i c s , L e v i n a s
gives u s n o t h i n g t o t h i n k , n o t h i n g t o k n o w b e y o n d t h i s s u g -
gestion: w h y did finitude n o t suggest an ethics to Heidegger?
 We do not suggest that Levinas p u i s his own text in q u e s -
T II R E E
t i o n in o r d e r to p u t H e i d e g g e r ' s t e x t in question. We s u g g e s t
t h a t the ethics t h a t g n a w s at and transfigures Levinas is an
involuntary dramatization of being-in-question. We are sug-
g e s t i n g t h a t finitude itself is infinitely s u g g e s t i b l e . It c a n n o t
b u t suggest a " b e y o n d " o r a n " o t h e r w i s e t h a n b e i n g . " Levinas's
Blanchot, L'arrêt de mort,
e t h i c s , in its w a y , u n l e a s h e s this s u g g e s t i o n . and the Image of Literature
Artists are replicants who have found the secret of their
obsolescence.
—Massumi

Writing
W r i t i n g o b s c u r e s t h a t o f w h i c h i t s p e a k s . Yet w r i t -
i n g s a y s , e a c h t i m e , c l e a r l y a n d u n o b t r u s i v e l y , there is. It s a y s
t h i s if o n l y to d e n y it: there is n o t . . . W r i t i n g affirms e x i s t -
e n c e — t h e t h i n g itself, t h e r e a l — b u t o n l y b y t a k i n g its p l a c e .
W r i t i n g t a k e s t h e p l a c e o f t h e r e a l i n o r d e r t o say it. I t i n t r u d e s
itself b e t w e e n u s a n d t h e reality o f w h i c h i t s p e a k s . Still, o u t -
side o f w r i t i n g (before it, p r i o r t o it) w h a t h a s r e a l l y t a k e n
p l a c e ? W h a t h a p p e n e d ? W r i t i n g w o u l d like t o say t h i s t h i n g ,
b u t as it sets o u t to do this it is i m m e d i a t e l y infected by a f o r e i g n -
ness t h a t w e a k e n s i t i m m e a s u r a b l y . I n s t e a d o f s a y i n g t h e t h i n g ,
it says (or e v e n , like t h e w o r k of a r t in L e v i n a s , it insists on) its
absence by p r e s e n t i n g itself in t h e p l a c e of t h a t to w h i c h it
w o u l d like to refer. B u t , w h a t is w r i t i n g itself ( o u t s i d e of, or
j u s t s h o r t of, its r e f e r r i n g t o t h e t h i n g ) ? A n d d i d w e n o t b e g i n
this p a r a g r a p h by saying t h a t writing says, not absence, but
existence, there is? We s h o u l d h a v e said: Writing tears itself apart
from the moment it begins to speak. But w h o c a n say this?
L e t u s g o further.
W h a t i f e x i s t e n c e ¿ 5 o n l y a s a b s e n c e , a n d m o r e precisely,

65
 a s t h a t a b s e n c e that w r i t i n g s a y s , affirms, a n d " p r e s e n t s " ? O r ,
t o say t h e s a m e t h i n g a g a i n , w h a t i f e x i s t e n c e (the r e a l , t h e
t h i n g itself) is a l r e a d y t h e saying of absence, in s h o r t , w r i t -
i n g — t h e v e r y w r i t i n g w h o s e p r e s e n c e insists u p o n t h e a b s e n c e
o f t h e real? I n t h a t c a s e w r i t i n g w o u l d b e t h e v e r y t a k i n g -
p l a c e o f ( d o u b l e genitive) e x i s t e n c e : w r i t i n g t a k e s t h e p l a c e o f
existence a n d existence takes place as writing (but n o t — a n d
let us be clear a b o u t t h i s , for it is a t e m p t a t i o n to w h i c h L e v i n a s
says a e s t h e t i c e x i s t e n c e i s p r o n e — a s p u r e l y a n d s i m p l y f o r m e d
or narrated). T h a t which happens outside the text takes place
as writing b u t is n o t re-presented in the text. We could say
t h a t w r i t i n g is the very h a p p e n i n g of an outside t h a t r e m a i n s
in t h e t e x t , b u t o n l y as a silence, like t h e voix narrative of
1
w h i c h B l a n c h o t s p e a k s . W e c o u l d a l s o say t h a t w r i t i n g " f o r -
g e t s " itself a n d t h a t t h i s h a s u n t o l d c o n s e q u e n c e s ; silence af-
firms itself i n w r i t i n g w i t h o u t h a v i n g t h e s t r e n g t h t o say itself.
I n o u r first c h a p t e r w e s a w h o w i n a r t t h e c r e p u s c u l a r
paroxysmality of naked matter suddenly makes an obscure
" a p p e a r a n c e . " L e v i n a s s h o w s this t o u s i n his e v a l u a t i o n o f
a r t f r o m b o t h " L a réalité e t s o n o m b r e " a n d t h e s e c t i o n f r o m
Existence and Existents w h o s e title q u i e t l y s u m s up t h e u n i q u e
a t m o s p h e r e he finds in art: "Existence w i t h o u t a W o r l d [Ex-
istence sans M o n d e ] . " 2
He m a k e s it clear in the later w o r k
t h a t t h e n o t i o n o f m a t t e r t h a t i n t e r e s t s h i m i s n o t s o m e stuff
that is utterly refractory to mind, b u t is instead t h a t m a t t e r
which c a n only appear in poetry (but namelessly a n d w i t h o u t
3
a n y o b j e c t i v i t y ) . H e refers t o t h a t a s p e c t o f m a t t e r w h i c h i s
l i b e r a t e d w h e n , via a r t , o u r r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e w o r l d ( w i t h
usefulness a n d w o r k ) a r e n e u t r a l i z e d . A s w e h a v e seen i n o u r
first chapter, this neutralization is the very event of art a n d it
immerses us in an a t m o s p h e r e w h e r e space is w i t h o u t a hori-
zon, w h e r e "[n]aked elements, simple a n d absolute [Éléments
n u s , simples et a b s o l u s ] " detach themselves from things a n d
a r e "cast towards us like c h u n k s that h a v e w e i g h t in t h e m -
selves [se jettent sur n o u s d e s c h o s e s c o m m e d e s m o r c e a u x q u i
4
s ' i m p o s e n t p a r e u x - m ê m e s ] . " I m p o r t a n t l y , this c h a o t i c m a t -
ter i s n o n e o t h e r t h a n t h a t m a t t e r w h i c h i s " d e f i n e d b y m e c h a -
nistic l a w s w h i c h w r i n g o u t its w h o l e e s s e n c e a n d r e n d e r i t
intelligible [définie p a r les lois m é c a n i s t e s q u i e n é p u i s a i e n t e t
5
la r e n d a i e n t i n t e l l i g i b l e ] . " It is n o t , h o w e v e r , t h e s a m e thing
a s t h i s inter-essed m a t t e r . I t i s n o t t h e s a m e t h i n g a s m a t t e r
t h a t is f o r m e d , t h a t is s o m e item t h a t rests in a s e t t i n g , a w o r l d ,
a n d t h a t is, as H e i d e g g e r p u t s it, zuhandensein. Aesthetic m a t t e r
i s n o t d e s t i n e d t o t h e h a n d , t o t h e subject, o r t o a n y u s e r c o m -
m u n i t y . It is i n s t e a d m a t t e r d e s t i n e d o n l y to appear, a n d o n l y
in poetry, but w i t h o u t being named.
But this other destiny or other aspect to matter is n o t a
n e w quality that art discovers (and w o u l d , thereby, contribute
t o t h e intelligibility o f t h e w o r l d ) . I t i s n o t a q u a l i t y t h a t w o u l d
b e p o e t r y ' s offering t o science a n d p h i l o s o p h y , c u l t u r e a n d
p s y c h o l o g y . T h a t w h i c h a r t d i s c o v e r s , o r u n c o v e r s , o r lays b a r e
will n o t b e f o u n d u n d e r a n y e n c y c l o p e d i c s u b j e c t h e a d i n g . T o
p u t i t v e r y s i m p l y : a r t i s useless m a t t e r . I t i s m a d e u p o f useless
m a t t e r a n d uselessness i s n o t o n e o f m a t t e r ' s q u a l i t i e s . (It is,
6
A g a m b e n w o u l d say, s o m e t h i n g like a " h a l o [ a u r e o l a ] . " ) W e
m a y say, h o w e v e r , t h a t uselessness i s o n e o f m a t t e r ' s " p o s s i -
bilities." But w h a t does this m e a n , a n d w h a t does it m e a n t h a t
o n l y i n a r t d o e s this " p o s s i b i l i t y " a p p e a r a s s u c h ? D o e s i t m e a n
t h a t a r t realizes t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f uselessness a n d p u t s i t t o
w o r k ( a n d t h e r e b y b e t r a y s it)?
I n his e s s a y " C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f t h e W o r k o f A r t , " B l a n c h o t
says (in t e r m s t h a t a r e close t o b o t h L e v i n a s a n d H e i d e g g e r )
t h a t "if t h e s c u l p t o r uses s t o n e a n d i f t h e r o a d b u i l d e r a l s o
uses s t o n e , the first uses it in a w a y t h a t it is n o t used, c o n s u m e d ,
n e g a t e d b y u s a g e , b u t affirmed, r e v e a l e d i n its o b s c u r i t y , a s a
r o a d t h a t l e a d s o n l y t o itself [si l e s c u l p t e u r s e sert d e l a p i e r r e
 I II I \ I I
et si le c a n t o n n i e r aussi se sert de la p i e r r e , le p r e m i e r l'utilise
d e telle s o r t e q u ' e l l e n ' e s t p a s utilisée, c o n s o m m é e , niée p a r
l ' u s a g e , m a i s affirmée, révélée d a n s s o n o b s c u r i t é , c h e m i n q u i
7
n e c o n d u i t q u ' à elle m ê m e ] . " T h e a r t w o r k , l e a d i n g t h e s t o n e ,
a s i t w e r e , b a c k t o itself ( b u t d i d i t e v e r leave itself?) " m a k e s
w h a t d i s a p p e a r s i n t h e o b j e c t a p p e a r [fait a p p a r a î t r e c e q u i
8
disparaît dans l'objet]." It is material that disappears into the
object, a n d " t h e m o r e the material is appropriate—the m o r e it
n e a r s n o t h i n g n e s s [plus la m a t i è r e { . . . } est a p p r o p r i é e , p l u s
9
elle s e fait p r o c h e d e r i e n ] . " But i n t h e a r t w o r k t h i s m a t t e r i s
p r e s e r v e d . " T h e s t a t u e glorifies t h e m a r b l e , " B l a n c h o t s a y s ,
e c h o i n g b o t h L e v i n a s a n d H e i d e g g e r , a n d t h e a r t w o r k "is
e m i n e n t l y that of w h i c h it is made [est é m i n e m m e n t ce dont
]0
elle est faite]." However,
T h e painting is not m a d e from material ingredients
a d d e d to a c a n v a s ; it is t h e p r e s e n c e of this m a t t e r ,
which without it w o u l d remain hidden to us. A n d the
p o e m likewise is n o t m a d e with ideas, or with w o r d s ,
it is the point from which w o r d s begin to become their
a p p e a r a n c e , a n d t h e elemental depth u p o n w h i c h t h i s
a p p e a r a n c e i s o p e n e d w h i l e a t t h e s a m e t i m e i t closes.
[Le t a b l e a u n ' e s t p a s fait à p a r t i r de la toile et a v e c d e s
i n g r é d i e n t s m a t é r i e l s , il est la p r é s e n c e de c e t t e m a t i è r e
q u i s a n s lui n o u s r e s t e r a i t c a c h é e . E t l e p o è m e e n c o r e
n ' e s t p a s fait a v e c d e s idées, n i a v e c des m o t s , m a i s i l
e s t c e à p a r t i r d e q u o i les m o t s d e v i e n n e n t l e u r
apparence et la profondeur élémentaire sur laquelle
c e t t e a p p a r e n c e est o u v e r t e e t c e p e n d a n t s e r e f e r m e . ] 11
T h e w o r k o f a r t r e q u i r e s m a t e r i a l s j u s t like o b j e c t s d o .
Plastic, ink, canvas, a n d m a r b l e are necessary to art, a n d mar-
ier can be used in such .1 w a y that it v a n i s h e s i n t o its uses. But
art uses m a i l e r such t h a t it is wwused, w o r k l e s s , idle, useless.
Art s i m p l y c a u s e s t h e m a r b l e t o " a p p e a r , " n o t t o d i s a p p e a r
into use. In p o e t r y likewise, w o r d s , d e t a c h e d from referentiality,
s u d d e n l y m a k e a m a t e r i a l a p p e a r a n c e . It is t h e a p p e a r a n c e of
m a t t e r t h a t is, e m i n e n t l y , w h a t t h e w o r k o f a r t i s m a d e of. N o t
m a t t e r in its t h i n g l y reality, b u t in its a p p e a r i n g as such. N o t
thingliness, b u t the image of matter. Imaginary matter, if you
prefer. I t i s u n e m p l o y e d m a t t e r , o r t h a t a s p e c t o f m a t t e r t h a t
r e m a i n s a l w a y s p r i o r t o its b e i n g m a t e r i a l for t h i s o r t h a t . A r t
¿5 u n u s e d , u n e m p l o y e d , a n d idle m a t t e r . A r t , in s h o r t , is t h e
i m a g e of m a t t e r . I c a n d i s m a n t l e t h e t e m p l e a n d b u i l d a r o a d
w i t h t h e m a r b l e , b u t I c a n n o t d i s m a n t l e t h e image t h e t e m p l e
e m i n e n t l y is. I c a n c a s t c e l l u l o i d i n t o t h e fire b u t I c a n n o t m a -
n i p u l a t e t h e m o t i o n p i c t u r e itself. I c a n n o t e v e n t o u c h it.
I t a p p e a r s . I t d i s a p p e a r s . A t t h e s a m e t i m e . For, t h i s i m a g e
o f m a t t e r t h a t p r e c e d e s its d i s a p p e a r a n c e i n t o t h e o b j e c t (the
t h i n g t h a t settles i n t o t h e f a m i l i a r h o r i z o n s o f t h e w o r l d ) i s
n o t i n t u r n t h e m a t e r i a l for a p e r c e p t i o n . T h a t i s w h y B l a n c h o t
says t h a t t h e so-called elemental d e p t h i s " o p e n e d " b u t " a t t h e
s a m e t i m e it closes." Levinas says t h a t " p a r a d o x i c a l as it m a y
s e e m , p a i n t i n g is a struggle w i t h sight [si p a r a d o x a l q u e cela
puisse p a r a î t r e , la p e i n t u r e est u n e lutte avec la v i s i o n ] " for " s i g h t
s e e k s t o d r a w o u t o f t h e light b e i n g s i n t e g r a t e d i n t o a w h o l e
[elle c h e r c h e à a r r a c h e r à la l u m i è r e les ê t r e s i n t é g r é s d a n s un
1 2
ensemble]." I m a g i n a r y m a t t e r — m a t t e r t h a t i s its o w n i m a g e
a n d t h a t only appears in poetry (but remains unseen, u n o b -
served, unperceived, silent)—is m a t t e r as such, in its ipseity or
origin. ( W h a t is ipseity if n o t origin, anteriority, s o m e t h i n g as
itself, as such, p r i o r to its predicative i n v o l v e m e n t s in t h e w o r l d ? )
U s e l e s s n e s s , w e h a v e s a i d , i s n o t a q u a l i t y . I t will n o t b e
f o u n d i n a n y list o f q u a l i t i e s t h a t w o u l d d i s t i n g u i s h m a t t e r .
Yet, it is o n l y as useless t h a t m a t t e r is m a d e to a p p e a r as s u c h ,

a s i t s e l f — u n f o r m e d , u n t h i n g l y , a n d u n i l l u m i n a t e d . Useless,
aesthetic matter is neither graphic nor acoustic. To be sure, in
the temple marble is revealed as unemployed matter a n d it
c a n a p p e a r , t o t h e i n d u s t r i o u s engineer, a s m a t e r i a l for a r o a d
(especially since t h e g o d s h a v e l o n g since fled t h e t e m p l e a n d
r e p l i c a n t t e m p l e s m a d e o f o t h e r m a t e r i a l s exist e l s e w h e r e a s
m u s e u m pieces, t h u s r e n d e r i n g t h e b a r e existence o f this t e m p l e
s u p e r f l u o u s ) . T h i s i s j u s t t h e p o i n t . N o o n e sees t h e useless-
ness o f m a t t e r . O n e sees m a t e r i a l for this o r t h a t . M a t e r i a l i t y
itself h a r b o r s itself in its o w n visibility. T h a t is its o b s c u r i t y . In
its u s e l e s s n e s s , u n c l o t h e d b y f o r m s , i t w i t h d r a w s f r o m p e r c e p -
t i o n . W h e n t h e g o d s h a v e fled the t e m p l e a n d w h e n e v e n t h e i r
flight h a s b e e n f o r g o t t e n , B l a n c h o t s a y s i n this essay, t h e n t h e
t e m p l e i s n o l o n g e r a t e m p l e a n d i t r e t u r n s t o itself, w i t h o u t
e v e r h a v i n g d e p a r t e d f r o m itself, i n its sheer, o b s c u r e , a n d
u n p e r c e i v e d p r e s e n c e . I t r e t u r n s t o m a t e r i a l i t y itself, its o r i -
gin, w i t h o u t any proper n a m e or place in the world. Material-
ity (or a e s t h e t i c , o r i m a g i n a r y m a t t e r ) i s t h e n a m e g i v e n t o
m a t t e r itself—that s t r a n g e b o d y w h i c h h a s n o p r o p e r n a m e
s i n c e its p r e s e n c e r e m a i n s u n p e r c e i v e d . I n s o f a r a s i t h a s n o
p u r p o s e a n d serves n o p u r p o s e , a r t affirms t h i s n a m e l e s s n e s s :
13
t h e v e r y fact of t h e il y a, as L e v i n a s s a y s . It is an a f f i r m a t i o n
t h a t d e f o r m s all w r i t i n g a n d t h a t m a k e s o f all w r i t i n g a n e r o -
sion of t h a t propriety w h i c h places the things of the w o r l d
w i t h i n o u r grasp. Such deformed writing w o u l d be poetry: the
v e r y difference o r d i v e r g e n c e o f t h e visible f r o m t h e invisible.
In the r e n o w n e d passage that immediately follows "Exist-
ence w i t h o u t a W o r l d , " Levinas describes "existence w i t h o u t
e x i s t e n t s " ( w h i c h a m o u n t s t o t h e s a m e t h i n g , since e x i s t e n t s ,
or beings, belong to a world). He says:
L e t u s i m a g i n e all b e i n g s , t h i n g s , a n d p e r s o n s , r e v e r t -
i n g t o n o t h i n g n e s s . O n e c a n n o t p u t this r e t u r n t o n o t h -
BI A N ( I I 0 I
ingness o u t s i d e ol all e v e n t s . But w h a t ol this n o t h i n g -
ness itsell? S o m e t h i n g w o u l d h a p p e n , if o n l y t h e n i g h t
a n d silence o f n o t h i n g n e s s . T h e i n d e t e r m i n a c y o f t h i s
' s o m e t h i n g is h a p p e n i n g ' is n o t t h e i n d e t e r m i n a c y of a
s u b j e c t a n d d o e s n o t refer t o a s u b s t a n t i v e . L i k e t h e
t h i r d p e r s o n p r o n o u n in the i m p e r s o n a l form of t h e v e r b ,
i t designates n o t t h e uncertainly k n o w n a u t h o r o f t h e
a c t i o n , b u t t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f this a c t i o n itself w h i c h
s o m e h o w has no author. This impersonal, a n o n y m o u s ,
yet inextinguishable " c o n s u m m a t i o n " of being, w h i c h
m u r m u r s i n t h e d e p t h s o f n o t h i n g n e s s itself w e shall
d e s i g n a t e by t h e t e r m there is. T h e there is, i n a s m u c h
as it resists p e r s o n a l f o r m , is ' b e i n g in g e n e r a l . '
[ I m a g i n o n s l e r e t o u r a u n é a n t d e t o u s les ê t r e s : c h o s e s
e t p e r s o n n e s . I l est i m p o s s i b l e d e p l a c e r c e r e t o u r a u
n é a n t e n d e h o r s d e t o u t é v é n e m e n t . M a i s c e n é a n t lui-
m ê m e ? Q u e l q u e c h o s e s e p a s s e , fût-ce l a n u i t e t l a si-
lence du néant. L'indétermination de ce ' q u e l q u e c h o s e
s e p a s s e , ' n ' e s t p a s l ' i n d é t e r m i n a t i o n d u sujet, n e s e
r é f è r e p a s à u n s u b s t a n t i f . Elle d é s i g n e c o m m e l e
p r o n o m de la troisième personne dans la forme
impersonnelle du verbe, n o n point un auteur mal c o n n u
de l'action, mais le caractère de cette action elle-même
q u i , e n q u e l q u e m a t i è r e , n ' a p a s d ' a u t e u r , q u i est
anonyme. Cette 'consommation' impersonnelle,
a n o n y m e , m a i s i n e x t i n g u i b l e de l'être, celle qui
m u r m u r e au fond du néant lui-même, n o u s la fixons
p a r le t e r m e d ' i l y a. Mil y a, d a n s s o n refus de p r e n d r e
1 4
u n e f o r m e p e r s o n n e l l e , est 1 ' ' ê t r e e n g é n é r a l ' . ]
This crepuscular event is the writer's most quotidian mi-
i . A s w e s a w i n o u r first c h a p t e r , a r t i s t s w o r k w i t h i m a g e s .

T h e y w o r k w i t h that w h i c h resists w o r k a n d w h i c h b a l k s a t
p e r s o n a l f o r m . T h e y w o r k w i t h i n t h e i m a g i n a r y milieu t h a t
p r e c e d e s t h e w o r l d a n d its i n t e r e s t s , a milieu w h e r e n o o n e
p r o p e r l y b e l o n g s . I n his f a m o u s e s s a y " T w o V e r s i o n s o f t h e
Imaginary," Blanchot asks:
But w h a t is the image? W h e n there is nothing, the
i m a g e f i n d s i n t h i s n o t h i n g its n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n , b u t
there it disappears. The image needs the neutrality a n d
the fading of the world; it w a n t s everything to return
t o t h e i n d i f f e r e n t d e e p w h e r e n o t h i n g i s affirmed; i t
t e n d s t o w a r d t h e i n t i m a c y o f w h a t still s u b s i s t s i n t h e
void.
[ M a i s q u ' e s t - c e q u e l'image? Q u a n d il n ' y a rien, l ' i m a g e
t r o u v e là sa c o n d i t i o n , m a i s y disparaît. L'image
d e m a n d e l a n e u t r a l i t é e t l ' e f f a c e m e n t d u m o n d e , elle
v e u t q u e t o u t r e n t r e d a n s l e f o n d indifférent o ù r i e n n e
s'affirme, elle t e n d à l ' i n t i m i t é de ce q u i s u b s i s t e e n -
core dans le vide.] 1 5
In formulations t h a t have b e c o m e so familiar to us, we
m a y say t h a t t h e i m a g e , a r t , o r p o e t r y (insofar a s p o e t r y b e -
gins o n l y w h e n w o r d s b e c o m e t h e i r o w n i m a g e ) i s t h e p r e s -
e n c e o f a b s e n c e , t h e i m p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t n o t h i n g n e s s (or d e a t h )
b e p r e s e n t i n p e r s o n . O r , w e m a y say t h a t w h e n e v e r y t h i n g
d i s a p p e a r s , d i s a p p e a r a n c e itself " a p p e a r s . " T h e s e f o r m u l a t i o n s
r e m a i n helpful o n l y i n s o f a r a s w e r e m a i n a t t e n t i v e t o t h e i r
o b s c u r i t y , for t h e y d o n o t clarify t h e n o t i o n o f a n " e l e m e n t a l
d e p t h " t h a t B l a n c h o t i n v o l v e s u s in. I t r e m a i n s o u r t a s k t o
t h i n k t h a t it is in l a n g u a g e , in w r i t i n g , t h a t n a k e d e x i s t e n c e is
t o u c h e d , n o t i n t h e w o r l d (in w h i c h I c o n t i n u a l l y h i d e f r o m
m y e x p o s u r e a n d c a n flee m y r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s like J o n a h ) . B u t
r. i A IN i ii i i i / .1
at the s a m e t u n e , there is n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n t h e w o r l d , n o t h -
ing b e y o n d it, or o n l y the n o t h i n g . W r i t i n g s a y s , e a c h t i m e ,
there is (nothing else, more, or beyond). An Orphic glance
c a n d e t a c h from t h e t h i n g o f t h e w o r l d its p r e d i c a t e s , its k n o w -
ability, its f e a t u r e s a n d d i s t i n g u i s h i n g m a r k s , its h i s t o r y a n d
its f o r m — n o n e o f w h i c h a r e o t h e r t h a n i t a n d all o f w h i c h
t o u c h u p o n its ipseity. A n d it is t h e r e , in this d e t a c h m e n t , " b e -
side itself," a s a n o r i g i n a r y i m a g e , t h a t t h e t h i n g t a k e s p l a c e .
A r t " s h o w s " t h i s . T h e d e t a c h m e n t i s its " e a c h t i m e " — a sin-
gular, a r t i c u l a t e d i n s t a n t , a fatal a n d d y i n g i n s t a n t u n a b l e t o
give itself its e n d . W r i t i n g gives t h i s to us as such; b u t we c a n -
n o t g r a s p t h i s " g i f t , " for it is n o - t h i n g - l i k e . It is h o w it is. By
t h e s a m e t o k e n , t h e b e i n g o f w r i t i n g itself i s " b e s i d e itself" i n
poetry.
E x i s t e n c e (or Being) t a k e s p l a c e i n p o e t r y , n o t i n t h e w o r l d
( w h e r e it is d i s s e m i n a t e d in t h i n g s ) , b e c a u s e p o e t r y is w i t h o u t
a w o r l d a n d w i t h o u t e x i s t e n t s (or b e i n g s ) . B u t t h e r e i s n o t h i n g
o t h e r t h a n t h e w o r l d . L a n g u a g e i s t h e s a y i n g o f t h i s fatality. I t
r e t u r n s e x i s t e n c e t o "itself" (never h a v i n g left itself) j u s t a s , a t
t h e e n d o f its i t i n e r a r y , t h e t e m p l e (the W o r k ) r e t u r n s t o it-
self—to t h a t w h i c h i t a l r e a d y n o l o n g e r w a s . T h i s i s its p u r e
e x p o s u r e t o i r r e p a r a b i l i t y , a s G i o r g i o A g a m b e n w o u l d say a n d
a s w e shall d i s c u s s i n o u r n e x t c h a p t e r . T h e secret o f its o b s o -
lescence i s t h i s " a l r e a d y n o l o n g e r " t h a t d e s c r i b e s its o r i g i n .
A l r e a d y n o l o n g e r a t h i n g , n e i t h e r m e a n t n o r s h o w n , its b e i n g
i s its b e i n g - t o w a r d - i t s e l f , t o w a r d its d e a t h , t h a t a t e a c h in-
s t a n t a r r e s t s its b e i n g - t o w a r d , like t h e superfluity o f a n in-
s t a n t t h a t m u s t e n d u r e its n o l o n g e r h a v i n g t i m e . T h i s i s like-
wise the essence of Heideggerian finitude: at each instant o n e
h a s a l r e a d y r u n o u t of t i m e a n d death is possible ( b u t t h e r e is
no longer any time during which or in which to die, as Blanchot
inflects it). T h e u n c a n n y p r e s e n c e o r p e r s i s t e n c e o f t h e c o r p s e ,
o r t h e w o r k o f a r t , realizes this e n i g m a .
 16
W r i t i n g , t h e n , e x p o s e s or "exscribes" a certain resistant
m a t e r i a l i t y o f w h i c h w e c a n o n l y say " t h e r e is." W h e n w e
s p e a k o f ipseity o r o r i g i n , a s w e d o a b o v e , w e a r e i n d i c a t i n g
an a b s o l u t e past, i m m e m o r i a l l y p a s t (since it w a s never
p r e s e n t ) , a n d its o n l y " l i f e " is in its p e r s i s t e n c e in t h e i m a g e of
t h e t h i n g s o f t h e w o r l d , b u t w i t h o u t its p r o p e r l y " b e l o n g i n g "
to the world and the world's personal forms. The temple that
r e t u r n s to its o r i g i n , to its m a t e r i a l i t y , to itself, a l s o d i s a p p e a r s
i n t o itself a n d b e c o m e s its o w n u n n a m a b l e i m a g e , r e c k l e s s
a n d u n g r a s p a b l e . / cannot touch the earth, for I am it, in an
uncontrollable identification whose intimacy is its dispersion.
T h e a r t i s t c a n n o t r e a c h m a t e r i a l i t y , for m a t e r i a l i t y e x c l u d e s
a u t h o r i t y . T h e very life of m a t e r i a l i t y is its u n c a n n y p e r s i s -
t e n c e i n t h e w o r k o f a r t (or t h e c o r p s e ) a n d its d i s a p p e a r a n c e
into things t h a t rest in the horizons of the w o r l d . T h u s we
m u s t n o t envision an independent, glorious, and p u r e pre-
p r e d i c a t i v e life. W e m u s t t h i n k s o m e " i t " t h a t r e m a i n s a l w a y s ,
a s i t w e r e , " b e t w e e n l a n g u a g e s . " U n s a i d e a c h t i m e , its life i s
o n l y its t r a n s l a t a b i l i t y , its e x p o s u r e t o b e i n g s a i d . I t i s m a d e
up solely of v e r s i o n s . Its life is in t h a t v i b r a t i o n w h i c h m a k e s
i t s e n s a t i o n a l a n d leaves i t a l w a y s a t t h e t i p o f m y t o n g u e .
A g a m b e n defines i t a s " p u r e l y linguistic e x i s t e n c e " a n d o n e
that, always slipping from my t o n g u e , r e m a i n s strictly
unformulaic, but is eminently reformulaic (and w h o s e only
life i s its r e f o r m u l a t i o n s , o r its t r a c e s , a s D e r r i d a a n d L e v i n a s
w o u l d say.)
In this w a y we c o m e very close to the old p r o b l e m of
s c h e m a t i s m f r o m K a n t ' s Critique of Pure Reason a n d to t h e
1 7
mysterious "art concealed in the depths of the h u m a n s o u l . "
R e c a l l t h a t t h e s c h e m a p r o v i d e s a n i m a g e for a c o n c e p t a n d
t h a t t h e f o r m a t i o n o f t h e s c h e m a i s called s c h e m a t i s m . N o w , a
schema is not an image and schematism is not imagination,
b u t they are h a p p i l y i e l a t e d . The s c h e m a " s h a r e s " w i t h t h e
image some characteristic, but this shared characteristic h a s
its own nature. It is n e i t h e r a s i m p l e a s p e c t (a " t h i s h e r e " ) n o r
a r e p r o d u c t i o n (of a n a b s e n t " t h i s h e r e " ) . T h e s h a r e d c h a r a c -
teristic is c a l l e d , by H e i d e g g e r , in d e f a u l t of a p r o p e r n a m e of
its o w n , a schema-image.™ T h e s c h e m a - i m a g e is t h e i m a g e of
a c o n c e p t , an i m a g e of t h o u g h t , a n d it is t h a t by v i r t u e of
w h i c h a p a r t i c u l a r c a n n o l o n g e r b e j u s t a n y t h i n g a t all, a n d
b e c o m e s i n s t e a d o n e a m o n g m a n y like it. T h i s i s t h e e s s e n c e
of h u m a n intelligence: t h e s u b s u m p t i o n of particulars u n d e r
universals. By m e a n s of the schema-image, the particular b e c o m e s ,
in s h o r t , an " e x a m p l e of . . ." I m p o r t a n t l y , in b e c o m i n g an
e x a m p l e , t h e p a r t i c u l a r relinquishes its prelinguistic i n d é t e r m i n a -
t i o n a n d a c q u i r e s all i t d e t e r m i n a t i o n s b e c a u s e , a s a n e x a m p l e ,
it need not appear as in fact it actually does appear. This lib-
e r a t i o n f r o m a c t u a l i t y is necessary for it to be s u b s u m e d u n -
d e r t h e u n i v e r s a l . As an e x a m p l e , it is necessarily contingent
( t h a t is, i t m u s t b e a b l e t o a p p e a r o t h e r w i s e t h a n i n f a c t i t d o e s
a p p e a r o r i t c o u l d n o t b e r e c o g n i z e d a s w h a t i t is). T h e r e is,
t h e n , no actual s c h e m a - i m a g e . T h e s c h e m a - i m a g e is a pos-
sible p r e s e n t a t i o n o f t h e " r u l e " o f p r e s e n t a t i o n r e p r e s e n t e d b y
t h e s c h e m a . I t i s a n a n t e r i o r profile i n t o s u c h a t h i n g ( b u t t h e r e
is no such thing) as a general form of s o m e t h i n g , for e x a m p l e ,
a h o u s e - i n - g e n e r a l . T h e s c h e m a - i m a g e is a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n (Vor-
stellung) t h a t m u s t p r e c e d e a n y a c t u a l p r e s e n t a t i o n . T h i s i s
the " a r t " hidden deep in our souls. It is the " p r o d u c t i o n " of
t h a t w h i c h is, a s W i l l i a m J . R i c h a r d s o n s a y s , " n o t t h e m a t i z e d
1 9
at a l l , " o r o f t h a t w h i c h is, A g a m b e n will say, n e i t h e r univer-
20
sal n o r p a r t i c u l a r . T h e s c h e m a - i m a g e is a potentia, or, as
2 1
A g a m b e n says, a " h a l o . " It is t h e p a r t i c u l a r with all its predi-
cates, n o o n e o f w h i c h o r n o c o m b i n a t i o n o f w h i c h , h o w e v e r ,
d i s t i n g u i s h e s it as w h a t it is. It is n o t , H e i d e g g e r r e m i n d s u s , a

d e s c r i p t i o n that enumerates a list <>f characteristics. The mind
d o e s n o t w o r k from a n i m a g i n a r y i n v e n t o r y . N o p a r t i c u l a r
t h i n g c a n c l a i m t o b e t h e o n l y p o s s i b l e e x a m p l e . W e will r e -
turn to Kantian schematism when, in our next chapter, we
discuss A g a m b e n ' s politics. We bring it up n o w to indicate the
radical direction and orientation of Blanchotian t h o u g h t to-
w a r d t h e " e l e m e n t a l d e p t h s , " a n d t h e icy i m a g e t h a t p r e c e d e s
the real a n d t h a t the real sinks b a c k into in the a r t w o r k , the
p o e m , t h e récit.
W e c a n see h e r e t h a t t h e s o u r c e o f a n y d e t e r m i n a t e i m a g e ,
o b j e c t , o r for t h a t m a t t e r , a n y h i s t o r y o r n a r r a t i v e ( a n y " t h i s
h e r e " or any absent "this here"), is a "rule-image" t h a t is n o t
b o u n d t o a n y definitive r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . T h e r u l e - i m a g e i s i m -
p e r c e p t i b l e a n d i t v a n i s h e s i n t o its " w o r k " o f free c o n s t r u c -
t i o n (Freibilden). It is a b s e n t / p r e s e n t in a n y definitive a c t u a l -
ity or i m a g e e x p o s i n g t h a t i t e m to all its p o s s i b i l i t i e s , a n d it is
n o t h i n g other t h a n this e m p t y totality that remains e m p t y be-
c a u s e it is n e v e r a c t u a l i z e d or e n v i s i o n e d . It is, in t h e w o r d s of
Agamben once more, the pure heing-in-language of the non-
linguistic (l'essere-nel-linguaggio del nonlinguistico) , 2 2
Neither
an aspect n o r a r e p r o d u c t i o n , this endlessly proliferating
" d e p t h ' s " o n l y e s s e n c e i s its e x i s t e n c e i n r e f o r m u l a t i o n s — b e -
i n g n a m e d b u t r e m a i n i n g silent, o u t s i d e t h e t e x t " i n " t h e t e x t .
T h i s m e a n s t h a t its life is only e x t e n d e d a n d its e n d is only
p o s t p o n e d o r r e p r i e v e d a s i t i s e a c h t i m e (re)said. T h i s i s w h y
t h e a n o n y m o u s n a r r a t o r of L'arrêt de mort insists t h a t " t h e
t r u t h will b e t o l d , e v e r y t h i n g o f i m p o r t a n c e will b e t o l d . B u t
n o t e v e r y t h i n g h a s h a p p e n e d yet [la vérité sera d i t e , t o u t c e
q u i s'est p a s s é d ' i m p o r t a n t s e r a dit. M a i s t o u t n e s'est p a s
e n c o r e p a s s é ] , " b e c a u s e "[i]t m a y b e t h a t all t h e s e w o r d s a r e a
c u r t a i n b e h i n d w h i c h w h a t h a p p e n e d will n e v e r s t o p h a p p e n -
i n g [Il s e p e u t q u e t o u s ces m o t s s o i e n t u n r i d e a u d e r r i è r e lequel
2 3
c e q u i s'est j o u é n e c e s s e r a p l u s d e s e j o u e r ] . "
IS I A IN l . I I < > I
Proximity
The chance of regarding the world, or another
p e r s o n , from t h e i m p o s s i b l e p e r s p e c t i v e o f a n infinite d i s t a n c e ,
or a glacial r e m o t e n e s s , is at t h e h e a r t of B l a n c h o t ' s récits a n d
his w r i t i n g s o n a e s t h e t i c s , a n d i t i s a l s o t h e k e r n e l o f L e v i n a s ' s
éthique ( w h i c h w e m i g h t j u s t a s well g r o w a c c u s t o m e d t o c a l l -
i n g " i m a g i n a r y " in B l a n c h o t ' s sense, b e c a u s e it is an e t h i c s
t h a t resists p e r s o n a l a n d f a m i l i a r f o r m ) . I n fact, t o f o l l o w u p
on the remarks we m a d e on Levinas in our second chapter, we
m a y keep in m i n d as we read Blanchot t h a t the aesthetic dis-
tance or O r p h i c glance t h a t so obsesses Blanchot's n a r r a t o r s
is, i n L e v i n a s ' s t e x t , identified a s a n infinite r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , o r
even an uncontrollable c o m p u l s i o n to be for-the-other, w h i c h
c a n n e v e r b e satisfied o r u s e d u p . T h i s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o p e n s
o n t o a t i m e b e y o n d " m y d e a t h " t h a t t h e O t h e r (Autrui) " p r e -
s e n t s " in a visage (or an a s p e c t , or i m a g e , in t h e B l a n c h o t i a n
sense) t h a t e s c a p e s c o m p r e h e n s i o n a n d p e r c e p t i o n just a s d o e s
the " m a t e r i a l i t y " of w h i c h we speak in the first section of this
chapter. F u r t h e r m o r e , this time b e y o n d " m y d e a t h , " or this
t i m e t h a t is en deçà du temps (the t i m e of t h e " a l r e a d y no
l o n g e r " ) , f r o m w h i c h Autrui i n c e s s a n t l y e m e r g e s as visage, is
a l s o t h e t i m e of " s u b s t i t u t i o n " or complete b e i n g - f o r - t h e - o t h e r
t h a t f i g u r e s a s Levinas's m o s t striking a n d m o s t difficult n o t i o n .
T h i s infinite d i s t a n c e o r g l a c i a l r e m o t e n e s s i s a l s o a n e x -
t r e m e c l o s e n e s s , c o n t a c t , o r proximity i n t h e sense d e v e l o p e d
at l e n g t h by L e v i n a s in his Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de
l'essence. It " l i v e s " in c o n s c i o u s n e s s as a trace or a p e r s i s t e n t
thought t h a t c a n n o t b e t h e m a t i z e d a n d t h a t h a u n t s t h e n a r r a -
t o r in t h e s e c o n d d i v i s i o n of L'arrêt de mort. T h e o x y m o r o n i c
conjunction or disjunction of these t w o moments—closeness
a n d d i s t a n c e — i s i n t e n d e d t o i n d i c a t e a h e t e r o n o m y , or, i f y o u
prefer, a h y p o c r i t i c a l s c h e m a t h a t is, w e m a y say, t o o " w e a k "
 to be resolved in s i m p l e i m a g e s or a n n o u n c e d in t h e m e s . Us-
i n g B l a n c h o t i a n l a n g u a g e , w e c a n say t h a t p r o x i m i t y neutral-
izes s p a c e by n e u t r a l i z i n g t h e fixity of p r e s e n c e . As it will be
s p o k e n o f h e r e , p r o x i m i t y i s f o r e i g n t o ( o r i s n o t identifiable
in) i m a g e s o r t h o u g h t . ( T h e s t r a t e g i c f u n c t i o n o f t h e o x y m o -
r o n i n all o f B l a n c h o t a n d L e v i n a s — n o t t o m e n t i o n B a t a i l l e ,
Nancy, Lacoue-Labarthe, and even, sometimes, Heidegger—
is p r e c i s e l y to f a t i g u e a n d freeze t h o u g h t i n t o a s u s p e n s i o n en
deca d i a l e c t i c s . T h e " l o g i c " o f t h e o x y m o r o n i s t h e l o g i c o f
the Blanchotian image, which, detaching the things of the w o r l d
from their involvement in the w o r l d , exposes t h e m to " t h e m -
selves" prior to their m u n d a n e investments. T h e o x y m o r o n
i n d i c a t e s a s c h e m a - i m a g e — a t e r m t h a t is, o f c o u r s e , itself
o x y m o r o n i c — o r an " i m a g e " of t h o u g h t that neutralizes that
thought's thinkability. T h e o x y m o r o n is an image of w h a t re-
mains when a thought—or an image—cannot be absorbed into
discourse. T h e o x y m o r o n is a hypocritical schema t h a t de-
t a c h e s t h o u g h t f r o m its p o w e r t o c o m p r e h e n d . )
N o w , the distance referred to here is n o t the distance c o n -
s c i o u s n e s s t a k e s f r o m itself in t h e p o w e r of its for-itselfness by
w h i c h i t m a i n t a i n s itself i n its f r e e d o m a n d a u t o n o m y , a s H e g e l
t e a c h e s . T h e d i s t a n c e referred to h e r e is repulsive: it is t h e
d i s t a n c e c o n s c i o u s n e s s t a k e s f r o m w h a t is never itself, f r o m
w h a t can be described as absolute vicariousness a n d from
w h o s e a n - a r c h i c kiss t h e e g o is e x p e l l e d i n t o itself in a p r o x -
imity that cannot become transparent to consciousness. Prox-
i m i t y i s a s u r p l u s b e y o n d c o n s c i o u s n e s s ' s ability t o t h e m a t i z e ;
it is a c o n s c i o u s n e s s t h a t is a l w a y s " l o s t , " forgetful of itself, or
t r a p p e d in a d e l a y b e h i n d itself, as L e v i n a s s a y s , b e c a u s e it
c a n n o t b r i n g i n t o t h e p r e s e n t in a Vorstellung (a " p l a c i n g b e -
f o r e " ) t h a t w h i c h affects i t . 24
It "forgets" to bring that which
affects it i n t o a p r e s e n t b e c a u s e it h a s no m e m o r y of it. Be-
c a u s e of t h i s r e n d e z v o u s en deca t h e p r e s e n t , c o n s c i o u s n e s s
n e v e r returns altogether to itself. In a formulation t h a t will
not s u r p r i s e psychoanalysis, c o n s c i o u s n e s s (the e g o ) is n o t
entirely f a m i l i a r to itself b e c a u s e it " i n c l u d e s " in it an a l t e r i t y
it n e v e r i n t e n d e d .
T h e infected c o n s c i o u s n e s s i s n o t t h e / t h a t m a g i s t e r i a l l y
d i s t a n c e s itself f r o m t h e w o r l d o r f r o m a n o t h e r p e r s o n . T h e
B l a n c h o t i a n n a r r a t o r is n o t a p l a y e r in a g a m e of r e l a t i o n s . He
( a l w a y s " h e , " il, o r " i t , " a l w a y s , e v e n t o t h e n a r r a t o r , " t h e
n a r r a t o r " ) is instead involved in a separation of time f r o m
time a n d space from space that opens o n t o writing because
w r i t i n g is t h e v e r y a p p r o a c h of o b s c u r i t y . As J w r i t e , he (il)
d i s t a n c e s h i m s e l f w h i l e r e m a i n i n g near, u n a b l e t o a n n e x t h e
s p a c e of a p r e s e n t f r o m w h i c h or in w h i c h to w r i t e . J c a n n o t
write w i t h o u t this affirmation of distancing t h a t does n o t be-
l o n g t o t h i s t i m e a n d this p l a c e i n w h i c h I w r i t e . B u t t h i s i s
a l s o t h e f o r m u l a for e g o i s t e n j o y m e n t — t h e e n j o y m e n t of a
c e r t a i n h o l i d a y f r o m t h e self.
For example, one day I may return h o m e with a strange
d e s i r e t o m o v e t o a n o t h e r a p a r t m e n t a n d , after a few w e e k s , I
m a y do just that. But then I m a y wish to m o v e to yet another
a p a r t m e n t , a n d t h e n yet a n o t h e r , a n d a n o t h e r , a n d s o o n a n d
so on—until I am no longer able to " r e t u r n " " h o m e . " I m a y
e v e n , like t h e n a r r a t o r in {'arret de mort, m a i n t a i n t h r e e or
2 5
f o u r flats a t t h e s a m e t i m e . W h a t can compel someone to
m a i n t a i n several a p a r t m e n t s at o n c e , since he or she c a n n o t
i n h a b i t t h e m all s i m u l t a n e o u s l y ?
I m a y give i n t o t h i s m a d i m p u l s e b e c a u s e i n a n y o n e o f
my a p a r t m e n t s I could enjoy my absence from it as well, a n d
a t t h e s a m e t i m e . T h a t is, I c o u l d e n j o y t h e fact t h a t I n e e d n o t
sleep h e r e w h e r e I a m i n fact a c t u a l l y lying d o w n for t h e n i g h t .
I c o u l d g e t u p , d r e s s , a n d r e m o v e myself t o a n y o n e o f m y
o t h e r flats. E a c h o f t h e s e o t h e r s ( a n d t h e r e n e e d n o t b e a n y -
t h i n g special a b o u t t h e m ) s i m u l t a n e o u s l y h o u s e s m y a b s e n c e ,
 s h e l t e r i n g , for as l o n g as I ^.m afford t h e m , a n o t h e r , slightly
different, version ol this o n e thai I am in. E a c h o n e of t h e m
says t o m e : C o m e . T h i s w o u l d h e very p l e a s a n t . N o w a n d
t h e n , I m a y e v e n i g n o r e all of my flats a n d r e n t o u t a h o t e l
r o o m for a n i g h t o r t w o . O r I m a y s p e n d a n e n t i r e n i g h t w a n -
d e r i n g t h e streets w i t h o u t s l e e p i n g a n y w h e r e , p a s s i n g , s o m e -
t i m e s , i n f r o n t o f o n e o f m y a p a r t m e n t s w h e r e I will h a v e left
o n t h e l i g h t a n d t h e t e l e v i s i o n set i n o r d e r t o s a v o r all t h e
m o r e t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f b e i n g t h e r e . Y o u see, I w o u l d b e l o n g i n
any o n e a p a r t m e n t only by virtue of belonging in each of the
o t h e r s . (Is t h i s n o t t h e p l e a s u r e b i g a m i s t s seek o u t a n d enjoy?)
E a c h o f t h e s e v a r i o u s flats w o u l d h o u s e a n a n t i c i p a t i o n o f m e
a n d w o u l d welcome me inside. No d o u b t , the n a r r a t o r of
L'arrêt de mort s o u g h t o u t a n d e n j o y e d this p l e a s u r e b o r n of
i n d e c i s i o n , a n d e v e n j e a l o u s l y g u a r d e d it. ( W h e n , i n h i s a b -
s e n c e , a little girl s t a r e s i n t o a r o o m he r e n t s in a h o u s e w h e r e
o t h e r s a r e a l r e a d y living, t h e n a r r a t o r b e c o m e s f u r i o u s . H e i s
f u r i o u s b e c a u s e , g a z i n g a t his a b s e n c e , s h e t a k e s his p l a c e a n d
h e r g a z e p r e c e d e s a n d i n h a b i t s his r o o m , c o n t a m i n a t i n g h i s
26
own presence/absence.)
By virtue of r e m a i n i n g pleased w i t h t h e possibility of fleeing
f r o m flat to flat, t h e n a r r a t o r finds himself i m p l i c a t e d in a w o r l d
o f flats a n d i n v a i n w o u l d h e seek o u t t h e p r e c i s e m o m e n t h e
b e c a m e so implicated. By virtue of taking pleasure in the p o s -
sibility o f his flight f r o m r o o m t o r o o m , t h e n a r r a t o r e n c l o s e s
h i m s e l f i n h i m s e l f a n d h e e n j o y s t h e s e p a r a t i o n o f subjectivity.
T h e e n j o y m e n t i s precisely t h a t e a c h " h e r e " i s a l s o a n " e l s e -
w h e r e . " I t i s n o t t h e p r e s e n c e o f this r o o m i n its a c t u a l p a r -
t i c u l a r i t y t h a t c o n t e n t s h i m , b u t his s a v o r i n g o f its p r o x i m i t y
t o e a c h o t h e r r o o m h e r e n t s o u t . T h a t w h i c h h e enjoys i s n o t
present, is n o t c o n s u m e d or used up, n o t even partially. This is
t h e o n l y w a y t h e flat he is in c a n t r u l y " m a t e r i a l i z e . " This
a p a r t m e n t is enjoyable only insofar as it is e x e m p l a r y of any
of his othei apartments. Any this a p a n m e n t is, if y o u like, t h e
schema-image ol all the o t h e r s a n d it is e n j o y a b l e o n l y i n s o f a r
as it " t o u c h e s " all ol t h e m . S l e e p i n g t o n i g h t so c o n t e n t e d l y in
this flat, he is s i m u l t a n e o u s l y e m b r a c e d by all t h e o t h e r s . S e p a -
r a t e d f r o m its p a r t i c u l a r i t y — f r o m its i n d i v i d u a l , identifiable
existence at this or that address in the city—it does n o t then
b e c o m e insipidly ideal o r u n i v e r s a l . I n s t e a d , its " l i f e , " its " m a -
t e r i a l i t y , " i s o n l y i n its p r o x i m i t y . N e i t h e r p a r t i c u l a r n o r u n i -
versal, it is already no longer an object of consciousness. This
kind of pleasure d e p a r t s from any cognitive relation the nar-
r a t o r m a i n t a i n s w i t h a n y p a r t i c u l a r flat. T h e n a r r a t o r i s i n
a n y o n e r o o m o n l y via a d i s t a n c e f r o m / c o n t a c t w i t h all t h e
o t h e r s h e r e n t s o u t . H e i s i n t h i s r o o m t h a t i s this r o o m o n l y
b y v i r t u e o f its similarities to/differences f r o m all t h e o t h e r s .
T h i s r o o m " i n c l u d e s " t h e o t h e r s i n it, a n d i n t h i s r o o m , h e i s
the echo of himself in a n y of the other r o o m s . In this r o o m , as
Levinas says, the ego is "like the echo of a s o u n d t h a t w o u l d
precede the resonance of this s o u n d [ c o m m e l'écho d ' u n son,
2 7
qui précéderait la résonnance de ce s o n ] . "
T h e I w h o signs all t h e r e n t a l a g r e e m e n t s a n d t h e c h e c k s
t o p a y for t h e s e flats e v e r y m o n t h i s e x c l u d e d f r o m t h e p l e a -
sure of egoism. T h e subject c a n savor this i m m e n s e pleasure,
b u t o n l y f r o m a n i m m e n s e d i s t a n c e , a s if, a s B l a n c h o t s a y s , i t
w e r e s e p a r a t e d by a p l a t e of glass f r o m w h a t it n e v e r t h e l e s s
e n j o y s , for i t c a n o n l y h a v e a d e g r a d e d i m a g e o r c o n c e p t i o n o f
t h a t which it enjoys. T h e / is excluded from proximity a n d
egoist enjoyment in which it is nevertheless implicated, b u t
o n l y a t a glacial r e m o v e b e c a u s e t h a t w h i c h t h e e g o e n j o y s , i s
t o u c h e d by, i s in, r e m a i n s i n c o n c e i v a b l e t o i n t e n t i o n a l c o n -
sciousness. T h a t which is desired, sought out, a n d enjoyed
p r o x i m a l l y — i n s h o r t t h e p l a c e of jouissance—is precisely the
divergence of the particular from the universal. Or, the diver-
gence of the image from t h e concept. It is a divergence t h a t
 e a c h t u n c is s i n g u l a r a m i e x c l u s i v e . U n p e r c e i v e d , u n i n t e n d e d , the hours a n d the life w h i c h w e r e then | h i s | a r e d e a d t o o

a c c i d e n t a l , e r r o n e o u s , this d i v e r g e n c e is the very i n c a r n a t i o n [pourissent, leur histoire est m o r t e , et m o r t e s a u s s i ces h e u r s

0

of the materiality of matter. This r o o m that the n a r r a t o r en- et cette vie qui a l o r s o n t été les m i e n n e s ] . " ' He r e c o u n t s in-
j o y s is o n l y i n s o f a r as it is " b e s i d e itself," t o u c h i n g all its p o s - s t e a d e v e n t s t h a t , w e m u s t p r e s u m e , a r e n o t (yet) d e a d a n d
sibilities. t h a t d i d n o t o c c u p y his a t t e n t i o n a t t h e t i m e . T h e t h i n g s h e

S u c h e n j o y m e n t is n o t at all an e l e v a t e d feeling or a s p e - r e c o u n t s d o n o t b e l o n g t o " t h e still p l e a s a n t s h a d o w o f

3 1

cial sensitivity t o s o m e q u a l i t y o r a s p e c t o f t h i s flat i n its p a r - yesterday's world [l'ombre du m o n d d'hier plaît e n c o r e ] , "

ticularity. T h e n a r r a t o r c a n n o t identify o r c o n c e i v e o f w h a t i s but instead are things t h a t are n o t limited to the past a n d t h a t

e n j o y e d . T h e e n j o y m e n t , i n fact, i s perfectly negligible. I t h a s c o n t i n u e to attract h i m even as he a t t e m p t s " t o p u t an end to

1

n o dignity. T h a t i s w h y this e g o i s m i s s u p p o r t e d o r r e c o g n i z e d it all [ m e t t r e fin à t o u t c e l a ] " in w r i t i n g t h e récit?

by the subject only as a s h a d o w , an unfamiliarity " t o o close," W h a t t h e n a r r a t o r r e c o u n t s , a n d w o u l d like t o e n d , a r e

o r a p r o x i m i t y t h a t o v e r w h e l m s self-presence. T h e e g o i s m o f t h o s e t h i n g s t h a t d i s t r a c t e d h i m : his seeing s o m e o n e a g a i n

t h i s p l e a s u r e i s "in-itself," i s s i n g u l a r a n d a n o n y m o u s , a n d i t w h o m h e h a d f o r g o t t e n e v e n e x i s t e d , his m u l t i p l e d w e l l i n g s ,

r e m a i n s " i n itself" i n s o f a r as it is w i t h o u t s e l f - r e c o g n i t i o n , t h e s t r a n g e a n d u n p r e d i c t a b l e f l u c t u a t i o n s i n his ( a l w a y s p r e -

w i t h o u t a p l e a t of reflection, a n d is r e p u l s i v e to i n t e n t i o n a l i t y . carious) health a n d m o o d s (neither of w h i c h he takes very

( T h e n a r r a t o r ' s fury a t t h e little girl w h o spies o n h i m i n his seriously), o d d encounters with neighbors, comings a n d go-

a b s e n c e i s d i r e c t e d t o t h e fact t h a t she " s a w " h i m w h e n h e ings i n a n d o u t o f r o o m s h e a n d o t h e r s e n t e r b y m i s t a k e , a n d

w a s " n o t himself," w h e n h e w a s n o t there, j u s t a s i f she h a d his r e l a t i o n s w i t h t w o w o m e n (J. a n d N a t h a l i e ) n e i t h e r o f

s e e n his v e r y e g o i s t p l e a s u r e — w h i c h h e himself i s f o r b i d d e n w h o m h e h a s a n y i n t e n t i o n o f m a r r y i n g (even t h o u g h h e p r o -

t o " s e e . " W h a t t h e little v o y e u r s a w , i n fact, w a s a m o m e n t o f poses to one of them). N o n e of these things h a d a n y t h i n g to

extreme intimacy, which the n a r r a t o r can only convey to the d o w i t h his i m p o r t a n t a n d c o n s e q u e n t i a l w o r k a s a j o u r n a l i s t

girl's m o t h e r i n c o n v e n t i o n a l a n d b a n a l t e r m s : h e said t h a t s h e a t t h e t i m e o f t h e M u n i c h crisis. T h e s e t h i n g s h e r e c o u n t s a r e

h a d s p i e d o n h i m w h e n h e w a s i n his r o o m w i t h a w o m a n . B u t sometimes immensely pleasurable, sometimes annoying, some-

i t w a s i n fact t h e p r e s e n c e o f his a b s e n c e t h a t h e w a s " w i t h " t i m e s g r a v e , a n d i f h e i s n o w (after e i g h t y e a r s a n d n u m e r o u s

a n d t h a t t h e little girl s e e m e d t o b e f a s c i n a t e d by.) a t t e m p t s ) a b l e t o w r i t e o f t h e m , i t i s b e c a u s e h e sees t h a t t h e y

33
c o n c e r n only himself.
T o b e perfectly p e r v e r s e a b o u t it, all o f " t h e s e t h i n g s " t h a t
" h a p p e n e d t o [the n a r r a t o r ] i n 1 9 3 8 [ces é v é n e m e n t s m e s o n t While the events of the w a r years are dead, these inconse-

arrivés en 1 9 3 8 ] " 2 8
a r e perfectly n e g l i g i b l e , u n w o r t h y o f c o m - q u e n t i a l h a p p e n i n g s h a v e m a n a g e d t o live o n a n d r e m a i n

mentary, of narration. The narrator does not c o m m e n t on u n d e a d a n d u n r e c o r d e d b y v i r t u e o f t h e i r insignificance. B y

e v e n t s o f s e r i o u s p u b l i c a n d historic c o n s e q u e n c e t h a t o c c u r r e d v i r t u e o f t h e i r insignificance, t h e y e s c a p e h i s t o r i c a l s c r u t i n y

a t a r o u n d t h i s d a t e a n d t h a t " o c c u p i e d [the n a r r a t o r ' s ] a t t e n - a n d w o r m their w a y lackadaisically into the time of his writ-

t i o n all t h e t i m e [ m ' o n t o c c u p é t o u s les j o u r s ] , " 2 9

because those i n g . B u t t h e y a r e n o t i m p o r t a n t t o w r i t e a b o u t n o w , either.

e v e n t s , h e tells u s , a r e " r o t t i n g a w a y , t h e i r s t o r y i s d e a d , a n d They are w h a t the journalist did not write a b o u t at the time
 b e c a u s e they wen- inessential e v e n t s , <>i s e c o n d a r y i m p o r t a n c e ,
m e r e e v e r y d a y life. They w e r e a l r e a d y s u p p l e m e n t a r y t o t h e
t i m e o f t h e c o m i n g war. Unlike t h e M u n i c h crisis, seeing S i m o n e
a g a i n after he h a d f o r g o t t e n she even e x i s t e d is a m e r e trifle—
i t h a p p e n e d w h e n n o t h i n g m u c h else w a s h a p p e n i n g . B u t i n a
certain sense, these everyday events are purely historic. T h e y
a r e h i s t o r y p u r g e d of h i s t o r i c e v e n t s , or, t h e e v e r y d a y as t h e
p u r e p o s s i b i l i t y o f h i s t o r y . I m p o r t a n t l y , for t h e p u r p o s e o f
a p p r o a c h i n g B l a n c h o t ' s aesthetics, w e m u s t r e c o g n i z e t h a t t h e s e
everyday events already possess the characteristics of writing
and of the image. T h e y a r e of s e c o n d a r y , i n e s s e n t i a l , n o n -
primary importance, thus they already open the space of writ-
ing. T h e y are w h a t h a p p e n s w h e n n o t h i n g h a p p e n s , just a s
writing only h a p p e n s w h e n nothing h a p p e n s . T h e events t h a t
he w r i t e s of, a n d w i s h e s to be r i d of, a r e , f r o m t h e first, sec-
ondary. T h e y r e l a t e to n o t h i n g of p r i m a r y i m p o r t a n c e . If he
d i d n o t d a t e t h e récit for u s a n d m e n t i o n t h e M u n i c h crisis,
w o u l d w e k n o w t h a t t h e t i m e f r a m e o f t h e n a r r a t i v e i s t h e eve
of World War Two? The "things" the narrator writes of were,
f r o m t h e o u t s e t , " t r a c e s " i n t h e sense m a d e s o w e l l k n o w n b y
Derrida a nd Levinas.
I n his e s s a y " L a réalité e t s o n o m b r e , " L e v i n a s tells u s t h a t
life solicits t h e n o v e l i s t w h e n i t a p p e a r s t o t a k e t h e f o r m o f a
novel. 3 4
(We n e e d o n l y recall t h e n a r r a t o r f r o m À la Recher-
che du Temps Perdu, w h o is a s t o n i s h e d to r e a d a n e w s p a p e r
account of a m u r d e r that seems to him to be torn from the
pages of Dostoyevsky. He then comes to the realization that,
o f c o u r s e , D o s t o y e v s k y ' s i n s p i r a t i o n w a s precisely t h e s a m e : a
newspaper account of a murder that seemed to be torn from
t h e p a g e s o f a n o v e l t h a t h e w o u l d t h e n sit d o w n t o w r i t e . )
B l a n c h o t , h o w e v e r , never, n o t e v e n i n his e s s a y s , w r i t e s a t t h e
level o f f o r m . H e w r i t e s f r a g m e n t s , a n d h e e v e n w r i t e s frag-
m e n t a r i l y a b o u t f r a g m e n t a r y w r i t i n g . I t i s n o t f o r m t h a t solicits
Ins n a r r a t o r s . A m o r e o b s c u r e d e m a n d solicits his a t t e n t i o n .
A n a n i o r p h i c , (he f r a g m e n t ' s only life is its s e p a r a t i o n f r o m
any w h o l e , a n y n a r r a t i v e , a n y history. I t c a n n o t b e p u t i n p l a c e
and therefore d e m a n d s from the writer something other t h a n
f o r m . I t d e m a n d s d e s t r u c t i o n . I t d e m a n d s , a s w e say a t t h e
o u t s e t of this c h a p t e r , t h a t writing tear itself apart from the
moment it begins to speak:
W r i t i n g i s n o t d e s t i n e d t o leave t r a c e s , b u t t o e r a s e , b y
t r a c e s , all t r a c e s , t o d i s a p p e a r i n t h e f r a g m e n t a r y s p a c e
o f w r i t i n g m o r e definitively t h a n o n e d i s a p p e a r s i n t h e
t o m b , o r a g a i n , t o d e s t r o y , t o d e s t r o y invisibly, w i t h -
out the uproar of destruction.
[Écrire n'est p a s destiné à laisser des t r a c e s , m a i s à effa-
cer, p a r les traces, toutes traces, à disparaître d a n s l'espace
f r a g m e n t a i r e d e l'écriture, p l u s définitivement q u e d a n s
la t o m b e on ne disparaît, ou encore à détruire, détruire
36
invisiblement, sans le v a c a r m e de la d e s t r u c t i o n . ]
All t h e " t h i n g s " t h a t " h a p p e n " in L'arrêt de mort a r e frag-
m e n t s , pieces o f n o w h o l e s , s e p a r a t i o n s i n defiance o f p r e s -
e n c e s . T h a t i s w h a t gives t h i s a n d his o t h e r récits t h e i r p e c u -
liar a t m o s p h e r e , their " n e w thrill [frisson n o u v e a u ] , " as Levinas
3 7
says o f t h e m . Someone enters by mistake into another person's
r o o m a n d this h a s u n t o l d c o n s e q u e n c e s b e c a u s e n o t h i n g a b o u t
it, o r t h e t u r m o i l i t c a u s e s , a d d s u p t o a n y t h i n g c o n s e q u e n t i a l .
N o t h i n g o f w h a t t h e n a r r a t o r d e s p e r a t e l y w a n t s t o say a n d b e
r i d o f will r e s o l v e itself i n t o i m a g e s , t h o u g h t , c o m m e n t a r y ,
3 5
s c e n e s , n a r r a t i v e , or, t o s u m i t u p , text. N o t h i n g o f w h a t h e
w a n t s t o say c a n b e p r o p e r l y reflected. I n t h e e n d , t h a t w h i c h
h e w a n t s (the t r u t h , o f c o u r s e ) , h e s a y s , "is n o t c o n t a i n e d i n
t h e s e facts. I c a n i m a g i n e s u p p r e s s i n g t h e s e p a r t i c u l a r o n e s .

But il they did not h a p p e n , 01 others h a p p e n e d in their p l a c e ,
a n d a n s w e r i n g the s u m m o n s oi the all p o w e r f u l a f f i r m a t i o n
w h i c h is united with m e , they take on the same m e a n i n g a n d
t h e s t o r y i s t h e s a m e [ n ' e s t p a s d a n s ces faits. Les faits e u x -
m ê m e s , j e p u i s rêver d e les s u p p r i m e r . M a i s , s'ils n ' o n t p a s e u
lieu, d ' a u t r e s , à leur p l a c e , a r r i v e n t et, à l ' a p p e l de l'affirmation
t o u t e - p u i s s a n t e q u i est u n i e à m o i , ils p r e n n e n t le m ê m e s e n s
et l ' h i s t o i r e est la m ê m e ] . " 3 8
T h a t is w h y L'arrêt de mort is n o t
a m a s t e r f u l a t t e m p t t o recollect facts a n d i m a g e s t h a t a t t h e
t i m e seemed negligible b u t t h a t n o w h e l p u s t o e n v i s i o n 1 9 3 8
m o r e r i c h l y a n d m o r e a c c u r a t e l y . L'arrêt de mort is n o t a r e -
c o u n t i n g at all. T h e récit gives us a un frisson nouveau b e -
c a u s e it is c u r i o u s l y a n d u n c o m f o r t a b l y alive.
I f t h e n a r r a t o r i s a b l e t o s u p p r e s s c e r t a i n facts a n d a l l o w
others to replace t h e m it is because he writes w i t h o u t any final
o r a u t h e n t i c j u d g m e n t . E i t h e r this fact o r t h a t o n e c a n " t e l l "
t h e s t o r y a n d t h e s t o r y will r e m a i n " t h e s a m e " b e c a u s e " w h a t
h a p p e n e d " i s a u t o n y m i c . I t i s precisely t h e r e s i s t a n c e t o d e t e r -
m i n a t e form. T h e n a r r a t o r struggles against, a n d also unites
with, this a n a m o r p h i a as if s u m m o n e d . We are told, in a post-
s c r i p t (or a s u r p l u s t h a t w a s p r e s e n t a t t h e e n d o f t h e 1 9 4 8
version of the text, deleted in the second edition in 1 9 7 1 , a n d
t h e n r e a t t a c h e d for Lydia D a v i s ' s beautiful E n g l i s h t r a n s l a -
tion in 1978) that if we can " i m a g i n e " the h a n d that writes
3 9
t h e s t o r y t h e n r e a d i n g will b e c o m e for u s " a s e r i o u s t a s k . "
Serious because the h a n d that writes the sentences is dead,
a b s e n t . M o r e a b s e n t even t h a n t h e e n t o m b e d L a z a r u s (as Blan-
40
chot writes elsewhere) w h o m w e c a n o n l y i m a g i n e a s living
a n d n o t a s h e really is.
L'arrêt de mort d o e s n o t a w a i t r e a d e r l y i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . It
does not preserve or e n t o m b a discourse the reader is obliged
to l i b e r a t e . It is itself t h e very s p a c e of d i v e r g e n c e . M o s t b a -
nally, it is t h e d i v e r g e n c e of r e a d e r a n d writer. In a s e n s e , h o w -
IV I /\ IN 1 I I l> I
ever, luiili readet a n d w r i t e r are on the s a m e side, w h i l e di-
verging from both oi t h e m is the w r i t i n g , as S t e v e n S h a v i r o
41
h a s noted. Each oi t h e i n c i d e n t s w r i t t e n of in L'arrêt de
mort—J.'s d e a t h , r e t u r n t o life, a n d " s e c o n d " d e a t h ; t h e b o m b -
ing o f Paris a n d t h e n a r r a t o r ' s t a k i n g shelter w i t h N a t h a l i e
a n d p r o p o s i n g m a r r i a g e t o h e r i n a frenzied a n d foreign l a n -
guage; the return of S i m o n e — e a c h of these incidents is out-
side t h e o t h e r s a n d e a c h i s m e m o r a b l e o n l y i n s o f a r a s e a c h
d e t a c h e s itself f r o m a n y t i m e f r a m e . T h e t h i n g s w r i t t e n a b o u t
in t h i s récit will n o t f o r m a n a r r a t i v e . E a c h i n c i d e n t is an inter-
r u p t i o n o f s o m e t h i n g else. I n t h i s sense t h e y d i s p e n s e w i t h t h e
a u t h o r a n d p u s h h i m t o t h e s a m e side a s t h e r e a d e r w h o s e
inability to connect the events told of echo the author's o w n
i m p o t e n c e . H e n c e , L'arrêt de mort is n o t a W o r k . It is, as
B l a n c h o t p u t s it, désœuvrement. It is w n w o r k e d , idle, a n d in
this r e g a r d B l a n c h o t ' s aesthetics s q u a r e s perfectly w i t h Levinas's
a n a l y s i s of a r t . L'arrêt de mort is w o r k - l e s s . It is an i m i t a t i o n
of t h o u g h t , a s e m b l a n c e of b e i n g , a n d it is w r i t t e n in a s i m u -
l a t e d l a n g u a g e (i.e., a l a n g u a g e t h a t d o e s n o t c o m m u n i c a t e
but that simultaneously shows and conceals; w o r d s appear on
t h e p a g e only to sink back into their o w n image, so t h a t the
difference b e t w e e n b e i n g a n d a p p e a r i n g i s e r a s e d ) .
T h e text we study here does not preserve anything. It is
i n t e n d e d t o b e d e s t r u c t i v e : " t o e r a s e , b y t r a c e s , all t r a c e s . " 4 2
W e will n o t b e a b l e t o c o n c e i v e o f w h a t " t h r i l l s " u s a s w e r e a d
B l a n c h o t . H i s récit i s n o t w h a t u s e d t o b e c a l l e d a " p l u r a l "
t e x t . It d o e s n o t offer itself to a v a r i e t y of r e a d i n g s , no o n e of
w h i c h w o u l d be authentic a n d decidable, leaving the reader
adrift in playfulness. 43
I n s t e a d , t h e t e x t " p e r f o r m s " its o w n
disappearance. It "puts an end to it all" in writing, but by
putting the end in writing it remains w i t h o u t an end the nar-
r a t o r c o u l d p u t b e h i n d h i m a n d limit t o t h e p a s t . T h e récit
t h u s d i s a p p e a r s b y s e e k i n g another e n d — a n e n d y e t t o c o m e
 l i m e il a wail s is ihe lime oi I he forgetting oi l i m e , of indiffer-
in a t i m e not yet. L'arrêt de mort is the "place" oi t h e absence
e n c e lo l u n e . Il is m this sense that the B l a n c h o t i a n t e x t is so
of a p r o p e r e n d , a n d it h o l d s this p l a c e like an e c h o t h a t p r e -
extraordinarily radical. His writing addresses a time outside
c e d e s t h e s o u n d it r e s o u n d s . T h a t is to say, in r e a d i n g t h e
initiative. But this t i m e t o c o m e — a t i m e w h e n t i m e i s f o r g o t -
B l a n c h o t i a n récit, we h e a r t h e r e v e r b e r a t i o n of a s o u n d n o t
t e n — i s n o t a c h r o n o l o g i c a l e p o c h after m y d e a t h . T h e t i m e
y e t h e a r d , f r o m a t i m e b e y o n d " m y d e a t h . " T h e t e x t i s al-
awaited is always h a p p e n i n g in everyday events t h a t fragment
ready an echo of a s o u n d (a speaking, a writing) to c o m e , b u t
a n d s e p a r a t e t h e m s e l v e s f r o m a W h o l e , like the events of L'arrêt
t h a t will n e v e r b e p r e s e n t b e c a u s e i t will itself e c h o t h e e c h o
de mort t h a t " c o u l d h a v e h a p p e n e d at a m u c h e a r l i e r t i m e
t h e t e x t a l r e a d y is. N o t a p l u r a l t e x t , L'arrêt de mort is a t e x t
4 4
[car t o u t a p u r e m o n t e r à u n m o m e n t b i e n p l u s a n c i e n ] . " To
e m p t i e d o f all p r e s e n c e a n d , w h a t i s m o r e , i t v i o l e n t l y e m p t i e s
await this time is to await forgetting (l'attente l'oubli) as
t i m e of all p r e s e n c e . P u t m o r e s i m p l y a n d m o r e a b r u p t l y , L'arrêt
B l a n c h o t s o s u c c i n c t l y p u t i t i n o n e o f his m a n y r e m a r k a b l e
d e mort d e s t r o y s t i m e . T h e p a s t — t h e t h i n g s t h a t h a p p e n e d t o
titles. B u t f o r g e t t i n g i s n o t a p u n c t u a l e v e n t . I t d o e s n o t p r o p -
t h e n a r r a t o r i n 1 9 3 8 — a r e n o t offered t o t h e r e a d e r , t o t h e
erly a r r i v e a t all. H a v i n g n o d u r a t i o n , i t i s o v e r b e f o r e i t b e -
p r e s e n t , b u t i n s t e a d offered t o a f u t u r i t y w h o s e c o m i n g o u r
g i n s , a n d i t closes i n o n itself a n d s e p a r a t e s itself f r o m t i m e a s
r e a d i n g a l r e a d y e c h o e s . T h e récit i s a b s o l u t e l y i n d i f f e r e n t t o
a c h r o n o l o g i c a l flow. F o r g e t t i n g defects f r o m t i m e a n d f r o m
" m y t i m e , " " m y d e a t h . " It skips over the present m o m e n t .
i n i t i a t i v e . W h e n t h e t i m e o f f o r g e t t i n g c o m e s i t will s i m u l t a -
T h a t which "thrills" us then, when we read Blanchot, is
n e o u s l y h a v e b e e n f o r g o t t e n a n d s o t o o will h a v e b e e n f o r g o t -
the divergence a n d disjunction of past a n d future. Past a n d
t e n its a n t i c i p a t i o n .
future are unhinged because there is no present to insure con-
t i n u i t y . (It is, i n its w a y , p r o f o u n d l y p o l i t i c a l l i t e r a t u r e . T h e L e t us n o t e t h a t in a d d i t i o n to a t h r i l l , L'arrêt de mort is

evacuation of the present renders the future truly f u t u r a l — a l s o t h e site o f e x t r a o r d i n a r y s t r u g g l e s : J.'s s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t

i.e., a r a d i c a l l y u n c e r t a i n , b u t a l r e a d y t o o near, futurity.) T h e d e a t h , t h e n a r r a t o r ' s s t r u g g l e t o w r i t e t h e t e x t after s e v e r a l

t h r i l l is t h e thrill of p r o x i m i t y . T h e t e x t I r e a d is w i t h d r a w n a t t e m p t s , his struggle w i t h a n d a g a i n s t t h e " t h o u g h t " t o w h i c h

4 5

f r o m m y p r e s e n c e . I t is, a s i t w e r e , b e h i n d g l a s s : t o o c l o s e a n d h e gives " a l l [his] s t r e n g t h [ t o u t e m a f o r c e ] , " a n d his s t r u g g l e

a l s o glacially indifferent t o m e , t o m y t i m e . A s I r e a d , I e x p e - to m a i n t a i n a relationship with a w o m a n of w h o m , he says,

rience the time of the absence of time, time w i t h o u t a present. very seriously, " I c a n say t h a t b y g e t t i n g i n v o l v e d w i t h N a t h a l i e

Eternally caressed by futurity, this time will never (have) I w a s h a r d l y g e t t i n g i n v o l v e d w i t h a n y o n e [je n e m e liais
4 6

e n t e r ( e d ) t h e p r e s e n t b e c a u s e i t will a l w a y s h a v e r e m a i n e d e n p r e s q u e avec p e r s o n n e ] . " B u t let u s a l s o n o t e t h e n a r r a t o r ' s

deçà du temps. c u r i o u s i n a b i l i t y t o d e t e r m i n e t h e facts t h a t w o u l d p r o p e r l y

represent these struggles. We have already discussed the ana-
T h e f r a g m e n t s t h e t e x t r e c o r d s d o n o t — l e t u s b e clear a b o u t
m o r p h i a o f t h e " s t o r y . " Let u s n o w c o n s i d e r this i n light o f
t h i s — a w a i t a t i m e t o c o m e i n w h i c h t h e y will b e s e w n i n t o a
the narrator's worldly involvements.
W h o l e , a W o r k . L'arrêt de mort d o e s n o t a w a i t its w e l c o m e
i n t o a c o m m u n i t y , c u l t u r e , c i v i l i z a t i o n , or e v e n a l i t e r a t u r e . In a certain sense, the n a r r a t o r seems cold a n d indifferent

T h e indifference t h e t e x t s h o w s t o t h e p r e s e n t tells u s t h a t t h e t o his r o l e a s t h e n a r r a t o r w h o w o u l d j u d i c i o u s l y select t h o s e

 d e t a i l s a n d that l a n g u a g e w i n c h can fully a p p r e c i a t e t h e val-
i a n c e of J.'s fight to live, as well as the relation b e t w e e n t h e
e v e n t s h e recites a n d t h e t i m e s i n w h i c h they o c c u r (i.e., t h e
eve o f t h e w a r t h a t n o d o u b t affected t h e m all, n o t t o m e n t i o n
all t h e w o r l d o u t s i d e t h e s m a l l circle o f c h a r a c t e r s w e r e a d o f
i n this récit). N o r d o e s t h e n a r r a t o r t a k e t h e t i m e t o e x p l a i n
w h a t t h e first s e c t i o n o f t h e récit h a s t o d o w i t h t h e s e c o n d .
F u r t h e r , t h e n a r r a t o r s e e m s i n d i f f e r e n t t o his o w n h e a l t h a n d ,
w h e n h e w r i t e s o f J.'s final h o u r s a n d h e r e x t r a o r d i n a r y c o u r -
a g e , h e r e t a i n s a c e r t a i n j o u r n a l i s t i c a l o o f n e s s t h a t is, a t t h e
v e r y least, d i s a r m i n g .
All t h i s , i n fact, i s a n effect o f a n a m o r p h i a . W h a t w e r e a d
h e r e is n o t a w h o l e . It is n o t a s t o r y o/"J's c o u r a g e , t h e w a r , h i s
life, o r a n y t h i n g else. T h e e n t i r e récit r e m a i n s a t t h e t h r e s h o l d
of a story. T h e n a r r a t o r s t o p s s h o r t of p r e s e n t i n g s o m e It t h a t
t h e s t o r y w o u l d b e a b o u t . All t h a t h e w r i t e s i s j u s t a n t e r i o r t o
t h e s t o r y , j u s t en deçà t h e story. A n d y e t he tells us e v e r y t h i n g ,
a s h e p r o m i s e s t o d o o n t h e o p e n i n g p a g e . H e tells u s e v e r y -
t h i n g b e c a u s e e v e r y t h i n g i s o u t s i d e t h e story. N o t h i n g o f w h a t
h e w a n t e d t o say w a s ever p r o p e r l y f o r m e d . I t w a s s u d d e n ,
accidental a n d m o v i n g because it w a s unprepared-for, unful-
filled, a n d failed. A n d i t i s precisely t h e failure o f t h e s t o r y a n d
t h e w e a k n e s s o f l a n g u a g e t o say i t t h a t c o n t i n u a l l y e x p o s e s
h i m t o it, t o t h e s e u n p r e p a r e d - f o r e v e n t s t h a t a l t e r e d h i m b e -
yond comprehension. W h e n Blanchot writes on Kafka, he
m e n t i o n s K a f k a ' s lifelong s e l f - r e c r i m i n a t i o n s , h i s e t h i c a l c r i -
ses, his c o n f e s s i o n s o f failure, a n d his c h r o n i c i n d e c i s i v e n e s s . 47
B l a n c h o t p o i n t s o u t , h o w e v e r , t h a t i t i s p o s s i b l e t o flee o n e ' s
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s by fleeing into t h e w o r l d , i n t o o n e ' s r o l e as a
m a n of the world: diplomat, bureaucrat, journalist, university
professor, or h u s b a n d . Even those w h o m o s t zealously a n d
e n e r g e t i c a l l y p u r s u e n o b l e political a n d ethical e n d s c a n " h i d e "
like J o n a h . B u t K a f k a ' s i n d e c i s i v e n e s s a n d failure w e r e n e c e s -
sary lor linn to w i n e and to remain face-to-face w i t h his re-
s p o n s i b i l i t i e s , w h i c h he s a w clearly. To w r i t e w a s to live w i t h
his t o r m e n t a m i to affirm it to the p o i n t of l a u g h t e r , j u s t as t h e
n a r r a t o r of L'arrêt de mort lives w i t h a n d loves t h e " t h o u g h t "
t h a t "lives a n d acts like a p e r s o n even if it isn't e x a c t l y like
o n e [ n ' e s t p a s t o u t à fait u n e p e r s o n n e , m ê m e si elle agit et vit
4 8
comme elle]."
A t t h e e n d o f t h e récit, N a t h a l i e t e a r s a p a r t t h e p r e t e n s e s
s h e a n d t h e n a r r a t o r lived u n d e r i n t h e d e l i r i o u s d a y s t h a t
followed the insincere promise of marriage he m a d e to her in
the M e t r o as Paris w a s b o m b e d . D u r i n g t h a t time, the n a r r a -
t o r w a s s t r o n g l y m o v e d b y g r e a t e m o t i o n a n d affection for
N a t h a l i e . H e felt a " l i m i t l e s s i m p a t i e n c e t o s p e n d t i m e [ i m p a -
t i e n c e s a n s limite d ' u n t e m p s c o m m u n ] " w i t h h e r a n d h e i s
49
c e r t a i n she felt a n e x t r e m e a t t r a c t i o n t o h i m a s w e l l . But of
that passion he asks:
— w h a t d o e s i t m e a n ? A n d t h e w o r d ecstasy? W h o h a s
e x p e r i e n c e d t h e m o s t i n t e n s e feeling? O n l y I h a v e , a n d
I k n o w t h a t it is t h e m o s t glacial of all, b e c a u s e it h a s
t r i u m p h e d o v e r a n i m m e n s e defeat, a n d i s e v e n n o w
t r i u m p h i n g o v e r it, a n d a t e a c h i n s t a n t , a n d a l w a y s , s o
t h a t t i m e n o l o n g e r exists for it.
[quel est s o n sens? Et le m o t délire? Q u i c o n n a î t le
s e n t i m e n t le p l u s g r a n d ? M o i seul, et je sais q u ' i l est le
p l u s g l a c é , c a r il a t r i o m p h é d ' u n e i m m e n s e d é f a i t e , et
m a i n t e n a n t encore il en t r i o m p h e et à c h a q u e instant
e t t o u j o u r s , d e s o r t e q u e p o u r lui i l n ' y a p l u s d e
5 0
temps.]
T h e n a r r a t o r felt m o v e d t o live w i t h N a t h a l i e , b u t she d e -
finitively d i s r u p t e d his e n t h u s i a s m a n d " w a n t e d t o t e a r a p a r t

w i t h a / c a l o n s hand the pretenses [they] were living under
[ n ' a i t rien v o u l u de p l u s q u e déchirer, d ' u n e m a i n j a l o u s e , les
a p p a r e n c e s d a n s lesquelles n o u s v i v o n s ] , " a n d recall h i m t o
5
his " p l a c e [ l i e u ] . " ' She t h e n h a s a p l a s t e r c a s t o f her h e a d a n d
h a n d s m a d e for h i m . T h a t i s t o say, s h e offers h i m h e r e t e r n a l
d e a t h , a gift (as Levinas's a n a l y s i s of d e a t h s h o w s ) t h a t she
herself will n e v e r e x p e r i e n c e , will n e v e r c r o s s o v e r i n t o . S h e
offers h i m a s his " p l a c e " t h e t i m e o f h e r d y i n g a n d its glaciality,
w h i c h i s a l w a y s t h e m o s t p a s s i o n a t e feeling o f all since i t e x -
c l u d e s t h e o n e - w h o - d i e s f r o m it. She offers h i m a t i m e in w h i c h
she i s a l r e a d y r e m o v e d f r o m t h e w o r l d . I f t h e B l a n c h o t i a n
n a r r a t o r comes across to us as aloof a n d detached it is be-
c a u s e h e i s n o l o n g e r himself. T h e n a r r a t o r i s affected b y a n -
o t h e r t i m e i n w h i c h h e i s a b s e n t , a s w e shall see m o r e defini-
tively i n o u r n e x t s e c t i o n .
T o w r i t e o f these t h i n g s i s t o r e m a i n a t t h e t h r e s h o l d o f t h e
w o r l d a n d t o live w i t h o u t f o r m — i n t h e a b s e n c e o f t h e B o o k ,
a s B l a n c h o t p u t s it. I t i s t o r e m a i n a t t h e t h r e s h o l d o f l a n -
g u a g e , of c o m m u n i c a t i o n . N o t at all a refusal of r e s p o n s i b i l -
ity, w r i t i n g u n i t e s w i t h it, refusing t o f l e e its e x o r b i t a n c e . W r i t -
ing is the imitation of thought, the simulation of action, a n d
t h e c o n t i n u a l e x p o s u r e t o responsibility, t h a t i s t o say, t o t h e
O t h e r . W r i t i n g is B l a n c h o t ' s ethics a n d his p o l i t i c s . It is f o r m -
less w r i t i n g , h o w e v e r . I t i s r a d i c a l l y a m b i g u o u s a n d i t u n i t e s
w i t h this a m b i g u i t y . T r y t o s u m m a r i z e B l a n c h o t ' s e s s a y s . T a k e
L'espace littéraire for e x a m p l e . T h e title of t h e b o o k a n d t h e
essays i n i t c o u l d h a r d l y b e b r o a d e r i n s c o p e a n d m o r e i n c o n -
clusive, verging on interpretation b u t w i t h o u t " p r o d u c i n g " a
" r e a d i n g . " B u t this i s precisely t h e s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t t h e B o o k ,
t h e refusal of t h e p r e s e n t . It is a s t r u g g l e t h a t t a k e s p l a c e as a
m e t i c u l o u s indifference to a given c o m m u n i t y . E m p t i e d of all
determinate contents, Blanchot's workless w o r k s are already
t h e p r e s e n t a t i o n of a t i m e to c o m e , a b o o k to c o m e (le livre à
H I , /\ IN » . I I l ) I ' 1
Venir), w h e n I une is no l o n g e r anchored in the p r e s e n t , in c o n -
tinuity. This l u n e will h a v e been a t o p i c . W h e n w i t h d r a w a l
i n t o t h e w o r l d will have been f o r g o t t e n , o n e ' s r e l a t i o n t o p l a c e ,
t o r o o t e d n e s s , o r t o h o m e will h a v e b e e n r u p t u r e d b y t h e h y p o -
critical c o n t i n u i t y of p r o x i m i t y t h a t n e i t h e r u n i t e s i n t o a w h o l e
n o r s c a t t e r s i n t o d i s t i n c t p a r t s , b u t i n s t e a d e x p o s e s o n e t o all
the others such that any one is an echo of each, a n d n o n e is
original.
B u t i s t h i s n o t j u s t a n o t h e r role i n t h e w o r l d ? H o w i s i t n o t
j u s t a n o t h e r v e r s i o n of t h e p o e t as c o n s c i e n c e of his t i m e s ? A
c o n s c i e n c e w i t h o u t c o n t e n t s , if y o u like, or c o n t e n t l e s s n e s s as
c o n s c i e n c e , o r a s t h e p u r e p o s s i b i l i t y o f c o n s c i e n c e (or e v e n —
w h y not?—Gewissen-haben-wollen), but a conscience none-
theless, a n d thus assigning the p o e t a role in given society
w h e t h e r o r n o t h e o r she likes it. P e r h a p s this i s t h e c a s e , b u t
t h e r e i s n o r o o m i n t h e w o r l d for h i m o r h e r w h o , w r i t i n g ,
refuses t h e w o r l d . N o r i s t h e r e a n y r o o m o u t s i d e t h e w o r l d .
H e n c e , t h e r e is w r i t i n g , w h i c h is neither/nor. N e i t h e r c o n s c i e n c e
n o r its l a c k .
En deca du temps
T h e t i m e o f t h e " m e a n w h i l e " (I'entretemps), w h i c h
we b r o u g h t o u t in our discussion of Levinas's aesthetics a n d
e t h i c s , i s o f obsessive i m p o r t a n c e t o B l a n c h o t ' s m e d i t a t i o n s
on art and community. T h e time of the " m e a n w h i l e " is the
time " p r e s e r v e d " in the w o r k of art (Lévinas), the time of
writing and the time of dying (Blanchot), and also, we think,
t h e t i m e of la comunità che viene ( A g a m b e n ) . In h i s d i s c u s -
sion of T i a n a n m e n , A g a m b e n observes t h a t the d e m o n s t r a -
t o r s m a d e few c o n c r e t e d e m a n d s o f t h e g o v e r n m e n t a n d t h e s e
were readily g r a n t e d . 5 2
He points o u t that the students did n o t
act in o p e n confrontation to, or competition with, the state
 o v e r recognizable issues. Instead, Agamben says: "The nov- l.i mort, arrache celle-ci a I'fitat de chose ou elle voudrait se
54

elty of the coining politics is that it will no longer he ¡1 struggle pacifier]." Even death does not b r i n g an e n d to d y i n g ( w h i c h

for the conquest and control of the State, hut a struggle be- is w h y all suicides, h o w e v e r beautiful, fail to a t t a i n their s o u g h t -

tween the State and the non-State (humanity), an insurmount- after finale). That d e a t h does n o t c o m p l e t e t h e m o v e m e n t o f

able disjunction between whatever singularity and the State d y i n g d i s t u r b s t h e often t o o facilely u n d e r s t o o d n o t i o n o f h u -

organization [Poiché il fatto nuovo della politica che viene è m a n finitude: t h e e q u a t i o n o f d e a t h w i t h r e s t a n d p e a c e . F a r

che essa non sarà più lotta per la conquista o il controllo dello f r o m s e t t i n g a l i m i t t o d y i n g , d e a t h magnifies its i n c o m p l e t i o n ,

stato, ma lotta fra lo stato e il non-stato (l'umanità), disgiun- p l a c i n g it, a s i t w e r e , u n d e r g l a s s . Like t h e t i m e o f w r i t i n g a n d

zione incolmabile delle singolarità qualunque e dell'organiz- of the image, it never achieves the present m o m e n t . "It c a n n o t
5 5

zazione statale]."" (We will t a k e up A g a m b e n ' s politics at m o r e give itself t h e o t h e r s h o r e [ne p e u t p a s s e d o n n e r l ' a u t r e r i v e ] , "

l e n g t h i n o u r n e x t c h a p t e r , b u t w e w a n t t o say i n a d v a n c e t h a t Levinas says. T h e time of writing a n d the time of dying dis-

he seems to be describing a politics w i t h o u t d e t e r m i n a t e con- r u p t the continuity of time by disjoining past a n d future. R a d i -

t e n t s , a n d a s u s p e n s i o n of p o l i t i c a l t i m e as it is o r g a n i z e d by cally p o i g n a n t , I'entretemps is r a d i c a l l y u n c e r t a i n , r a d i c a l l y

t h e S t a t e . In this i n t e r r u p t i o n , we g l i m p s e a t i m e à venir, b e - unforeseeable time.

y o n d , or, en degà S t a t e - t i m e . In T i a n a n m e n S q u a r e A g a m b e n T h e time of writing a n d the time of dying are the time of

g l i m p s e d a n i m a g e , i n B l a n c h o t ' s sense; a n i m a g e t h a t , i n ef- radical divergence of past from future. They are discontinu-

fect, d e s t r o y e d S t a t e - t i m e , a n d this i s w h y t h e d e m o n s t r a t i o n o u s t i m e . T h e t i m e o f d y i n g i s o p e n t o a t i m e t h a t will n e v e r

w a s s o m a s s i v e l y c r u s h e d a n d yet h a s c o n t i n u e d t o h a u n t t h e h a v e b e e n , since i t will n o t h a v e p a s s e d t h r o u g h a p r e s e n t .

S t a t e ever since.) This time, w h i c h is an openness o n t o a time w i t h o u t a present,

i s b o t h t o o r e m o t e a n d t o o near. Void o f d u r a t i o n , t h i s d i s c o n -
T h e r e is a notion we w a n t to bring o u t in this section of
t i n u o u s t i m e h o l l o w s itself o u t , e r a s e s , o r e x s c r i b e s itself. I a m
o u r s t u d y t h a t i s essential t o A g a m b e n ' s t h o u g h t b u t i s a n t i c i -
n o t c o m p l e t e l y sensible o r c o n s c i o u s o f it. R a t h e r , t h i s d i s c o n -
p a t e d in m a n y pages of writing by Blanchot. It is the n o t i o n of
t i n u i t y o r r a d i c a l u n c e r t a i n t y i n s i n u a t e s itself i n t o c o n t i n u o u s
a n a b s o l u t e d i s j u n c t i o n . " P r e s e r v e d " i n t h e w o r k o f a r t (or
t i m e a n d i s s m u g g l e d i n t o c o n s c i o u s n e s s u n a w a r e s , just a s a
t h e i c o n , a s L é v i n a s p r e f e r s t o call t h e a r t w o r k ) , t h e r e i s t h e
skilled s e d u c e r c a n i n a u g u r a t e a s e d u c t i o n i n e v e n t h e m o s t
t i m e o f w r i t i n g o r t h e t i m e o f d y i n g t h a t " d o e s n o t let itself b e
b a n a l c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h o u t o n c e b e t r a y i n g his o r h e r i n t e n -
s i t u a t e d or affirmed in r e l a t i o n to life [ne se laisse s i t u e r ou
t i o n s . A s s h o u l d b e all t o o o b v i o u s , w e s p e a k h e r e o f s o m e -
affirmer d a n s u n r a p p o r t d e v i e ] , " a n d t h a t " d o e s n o t localize
t h i n g e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y s u b t l e . I n fact, this v o i d - t i m e i s t h e v e r y
itself as an e v e n t , n o r d o e s it last in t h e w a y of a t e m p o r a l
hollowing out of time that makes continuity possible in the
b e c o m i n g ; d y i n g d o e s n o t last, d o e s n o t e n d , a n d , p r o l o n g i n g
f i r s t p l a c e . I t i s like a n e m p t y s p e e c h o r a n i m a g i n a r y c o n v e r -
itself in d e a t h , t e a r s this a w a y f r o m t h e s t a t e of a t h i n g in
s a t i o n t h a t p r e c e d e s all i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e r e l a t i o n s . U n a b l e a s w e
w h i c h i t w o u l d like t o r e s t peacefully [ne s e localise p a s d a n s
a r e to s p e a k of it, it is n e v e r t h e l e s s affirmed in all s p e a k i n g .
un é v é n e m e n t , ni ne d u r e à la faeton d ' u n d e v e n i r t e m p o r e l :
V o i d - t i m e is i m a g i n a r y t i m e . In L e v i n a s it is t h e t i m e of t h e
m o u r i r n e d u r e p a s , n e s e t e r m i n e p a s et, s e p r o l o n g e a n t d a n s
 dire t h a t precedes (.'very dit a n d t h a t is not entirely absorbed
i n t o a n y dit. In t h e w o r k of a r t , the t i m e of w r i t i n g r e s o n a t e s ,
j u s t a s t h e s t a t u e s q u e c o r p s e magnifies t h e t i m e o f d y i n g .
If d e a t h is, or if t h e d e a d a r e , a b s o l u t e l y m a s t e r f u l , it is
b e c a u s e o n e sees i n i t t h e a b s e n c e o f a n y p l a c e i n t h e w o r l d .
T h e d e a d r e m a i n there, r e m a i n p e r c e p t i b l e , y e s , b u t o n l y i n s o -
far a s t h e y r i g o r o u s l y resist a n y r e l a t i o n t o life, t o c o n t i n u i t y .
T h e y refuse t o " d e p a r t , " a s life s p e a k s o f t h e m , a n d t h e eld-
erly w o m a n w e s p o k e o f i n o u r i n t r o d u c t i o n m u s t h a v e h a d
a n infinite r e s p e c t for t h i s r e s i s t a n c e h e r h u s b a n d m a n i f e s t e d .
O n e sees i n t h e d e a d , a s i n t h e w o r k o f a r t , a n i n s u r m o u n t a b l e
d i s j u n c t i o n . O n e c o m e s face-to-face w i t h Ventretemps: a t i m e
" w i t h o u t m e " a n d b e y o n d " m y d e a t h . " T h e rites t h a t sur-
r o u n d t h e d e a d a r e i n t e n d e d , like p h i l o s o p h y a n d c r i t i c i s m , t o
" s k i p o v e r " this e m p t y i n t e r v a l a n d m a k e o f d e a t h a n e v e n t i n
life a n d w i t h i n t h e c o n t i n u i t y life r e g a r d s itself a s . B u t n o t h i n g
c o u l d b e m o r e fragile t h a n t h i s c o n t i n u i t y . F o r p r e c e d i n g i t
(and preserved and exhibited in the cadaver) is the p a r o d y of
c o n t i n u i t y t h a t is t h e t i m e of d y i n g . It is a p a r o d y of e t e r n a l
life. In this s e n s e , o u r r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h t h e c a d a v e r is a p a r o d y
o f i n t e r subjectivity. W h a t i s a l w a y s d i s t u r b i n g a b o u t o u r rela-
t i o n w i t h t h e d e a d i s t h a t this r e l a t i o n e x p o s e s a n a l w a y s p r i o r
r e l a t i o n t h a t i s n e v e r c o n s c i o u s l y i n c l u d e d i n o u r living rela-
tions with the other person. Exposed in the corpse is the time
o f d y i n g t h a t silently i n v e r t s o u r c o n s c i o u s r e l a t i o n s . T h e d e a d
expose a scandalous discontinuity that precedes continuous
time. O u r relation w i t h the dead necessarily confronts us w i t h
d i s c o n t i n u i t y p a r e x c e l l e n c e : a t i m e w i t h o u t a p r e s e n t , en deca
du temps, r e m a i n i n g a l w a y s at t h e t h r e s h o l d of living, d u r a -
tional time.
T h e w o r k of art, likewise, exhibits this "hither side" of
t i m e t h a t L é v i n a s says i s " i n t o l e r a b l e t o t h o u g h t [ i n t o l e r a b l e à
la pensée]." 5 6
We must not be tempted to think that Lévinas
and Blanchot h a v e uncovered a n e w mode ol t h o u g h t , or a
n e w category, or an intuition hitherto unattested to in p h i l o s -
ophy. To be sure, all of Levinas's c o n c e r n w i t h an autrement
qu'être refers ( o b l i q u e l y ) to this en deçà, a n d we m u s t t h i n k
a b o u t his éthique in light of t h i s . L i k e w i s e , all of B l a n c h o t ' s
e n i g m a s c o m m u n i c a t e w i t h this " h i t h e r s i d e " a s w e l l . B u t n e i -
t h e r Levinas (in spite of a p p e a r a n c e s ) n o r B l a n c h o t h a s c o n -
structed a n y t h i n g like a corpus of t h o u g h t o u t of a " d i s c o v e r y . "
N e i t h e r of t h e m m a k e a c o n t r i b u t i o n to arts a n d letters in a n y
c o n v e n t i o n a l s e n s e , a n d this m a k e s a n y r e a d i n g o f t h e m u n -
c o n v e n t i o n a l l y difficult a s w e l l . I n o u r o w n w r i t i n g t o this
p o i n t w e h a v e b e e n d r a w n i n t o t h e c o m p l i c a t i o n s o f a n y ex-
plication du texte. We o u r s e l v e s sometimes write obliquely
a n d o x y m o r o n i c a l l y , a s d o L e v i n a s a n d B l a n c h o t . T h e expli-
cation w e i n t e n d e d r e m a i n s s t a l l e d , a n d i s still n o t p a r t o f a n y
p r o p e r l y critical c o n t e x t . I n fact, w e h a v e b e e n r e p e a t e d l y re-
pulsed b y B l a n c h o t ' s w o r k , u n a b l e t o b r i n g t o light t h e " s p a c e
of literature" he describes so well. For no matter where one
tries t o p l a c e B l a n c h o t — w i t h H e g e l , w i t h N i e t z s c h e , w i t h H e i -
57
degger, F r e u d , K a f k a , o r e v e n L e v i n a s — h e v a n i s h e s . This
r e a d e r t h u s i s exiled: n o l o n g e r a n d n o t yet e x p l i c a t i n g , n o
l o n g e r a n d n o t y e t r e a d i n g . W e e x p e r i e n c e , i n spite o f m u l t i p l e
p r e c a u t i o n s , a r e m a r k a b l e failure at t h e h e a r t of a n y a p p r o a c h
t o t h e B l a n c h o t i a n œuvre. Yet i t i s i n o u r failure t h a t w e " e n -
c o u n t e r " t h e w o r k ( a n d t h i s i s w h a t w i l l e t e r n a l l y justify
S h a v i r o ' s r e a d i n g o f B l a n c h o t i n t e r m s o f affect a n d m e t a m o r -
58
phosis). Failure is a n a m o r p h i c a n d everyone w h o fails—at
anything—struggles against the myriad of chance, uniting with
i t like a n a c c o m p l i c e o n e s u r r e p t i t i o u s l y lives w i t h . F a i l u r e
o p e n s t h e s p a c e o f l i t e r a t u r e b e c a u s e failure h a s m a n y r e a s o n s
w h e n o n l y o n e w o u l d suffice.
Still, this is o n l y a p a r t i a l e x p l a n a t i o n . To r e a d B l a n c h o t ' s
récits o r his essays i s t o h a v e t o c o m e r e p e a t e d l y t o e x t r e m e

p o i n t s o f u n c e r t a i n t y , p o i n t s w h e r e o n e really d o c s n o t k n o w
w h a t to say a n d w h e r e o n e is a priori d e p r i v e d of a n y m e a n s
t o say a n y t h i n g . T h e s e m o m e n t s o f e n i g m a a n d f r a g m e n t a t i o n
a r e s o n u m e r o u s i n B l a n c h o t ' s w o r k t h a t w e m u s t say t h e y a r e
t h e very " s u b s t a n c e " o f it. U n c e r t a i n t y o r a m b i g u i t y a r e p o i n t s
at w h i c h an encounter, a reading, a discourse, can begin to
t a k e p l a c e a n d w h e r e t h e w o r d s t h a t will s p e a k i t c a n t r u l y
begin t o b e f o u n d b e c a u s e t h e y c o m e f r o m n o w h e r e . T h e y
c o m e from the ambiguity of an imperceptible m e t a m o r p h o s i s
s u c h t h a t h a v i n g n o t h i n g t o say a n d n o m e a n s t o s a y i t itself
begins a discourse. This is w h a t " h a p p e n s " in Blanchot be-
c a u s e all his t e x t s a r e Sirenic, i n t h e sense h e h i m s e l f d e s c r i b e s
i n his e s s a y o n the f a m o u s e p i s o d e f r o m H o m e r . S o a l l u r i n g ,
Blanchot's texts remain a m b i g u o u s , void of content, hesitant,
a n d o f a n u n c e r t a i n s t a t u s (are t h e y p o e t i c ? p h i l o s o p h i c ? criti-
cal?). O n e can a p p r o a c h t h e m , to be sure, in the m a n n e r of
U l y s s e s , b y s t r a p p i n g oneself t o t h e s t u r d y m a s t o f H e g e l ,
Heidegger, Kojéve, or whomever. O n e can also spare others
a n y p e r c e p t i o n o f h i m a t all b y n o t t e a c h i n g h i m ( b e c a u s e h e i s
" u n t e a c h a b l e " ) . He is a "difficult" writer. Q u i t e . For, w h a t
B l a n c h o t reveals in his t e x t s is t h e very a t t r a c t i v e n e s s of litera-
t u r e as such, a r t a n d w r i t i n g as such, t h o u g h t as such. W h o
c a n resist this allure? W h o w o u l d n o t , like O r p h e u s i n H e l l ,
w a n t to enter the space of literature and wrest from it the
f o r m a n d f i g u r e o f t h a t w h i c h h a s s o affected o n e ? I t i s n o t
l i t e r a t u r e , p h i l o s o p h y , o r literary criticism t h a t B l a n c h o t w r i t e s ,
b u t their infinite attractiveness. Not literature, b u t its image;
n o t a t e x t , b u t a récit; n o t t h o u g h t , b u t its s i m u l a c r u m . The
Blanchotian text is the shimmering and pure appearance of
literature. It is p o e t r y as p u r e a p p e a r a n c e , p u r e s e e m i n g , p u r e
ambiguity. Neither literature nor t h o u g h t as it is n o w t h o u g h t
of, b u t as it is to c o m e , v o i d of p r e s e n c e in a t i m e a venir. A n d
s o i t i s futile a n d fatal t o a t t e m p t a n e x p l i c a t i o n o f B l a n c h o t —
Il I A N < . 1 I O I
yet w i t h o u t the attempt o n e will never c o m e to t h e m o m e n t of
u n c e r t a i n t y that i s s i m u l t a n e o u s l y , a n d n o t b y a n a l o g y , t h e
t i m e o f d y i n g a n d its e x t r a o r d i n a r y a n d s t u p e f y i n g a t t r a c t i v e -
n e s s . F o r t h e c o r p s e , m a k e no m i s t a k e , is attractive par excel-
lence, e v e n as it r e p u l s e s .
W h e n t h e n a r r a t o r of L'arrêt de mort, t h r o u g h t h e force
o f his love a n d d e s i r e , b r i n g s J . b a c k f r o m t h e d e a d , w e r e a d
t h a t h e r eyes " o p e n e d a b r u p t l y a n d t h e y o p e n e d t o reveal s o m e -
t h i n g t e r r i b l e w h i c h I will n o t t a l k a b o u t , t h e m o s t t e r r i b l e
l o o k a living b e i n g c a n receive [ b r u s q u e m e n t elles s ' o u v r i r e n t ,
e t elles s ' o u v r i r e n t s u r q u e l q u e c h o s e d e t e r r i b l e d o n t j e n e
parlerai pas, sur le regard le plus terrible q u ' u n être vivant
puisse r e c e v o i r ] . " 5 9
Like O r p h e u s , the n a r r a t o r has g o n e into
H e l l t o f i n d his b e l o v e d a n d h e h a s l o o k e d a t h e r face-to-face.
J.'s eyes l o o k a t t h e n a r r a t o r f r o m d e a t h . Eyes t h a t w o u l d l o o k
a t u s f r o m d e a t h a l l o w u s t o c o m e face-to-face w i t h d e a t h i n
p e r s o n . It is of c o u r s e a c o m m o n p l a c e t h a t o n e c l o s e t h e eyes
o f t h e d e c e a s e d s o t h a t t h e y d o n o t cruelly c o n t i n u e t o g a z e , t o
s e a r c h o u t for s o m e t h i n g t o see; for this d e a d g a z e — p u r e l y
i n d i f f e r e n t , b l a n k , a n d s u p e r f l u o u s — i s a gaze nevertheless. In
t h e face o f t h e d e a d a n d i n t h e w o r k o f a r t ( w h i c h h a s its o w n
b l a n k n e s s ) o n e i s faced w i t h t h e e t e r n a l , t h e e n d l e s s — n o t d e a t h
as absent, but death as the absence of another shore a n d with-
o u t a n y p l a c e i n life. T o c l o s e t h e eyelids o f t h e d e a d i s t o
p r e t e n d t h a t t h e d e a d sleep i n p e a c e . B u t h u m a n eyes d o n o t
sleep. E v e n i n sleep t h e y p a t h e t i c a l l y s e a r c h b e h i n d c l o s e d e y e -
lids for s o m e t h i n g t o see. H u m a n eyes a n d t h e i r g a z e d o n o t
m e r e l y , a s S a r t r e t e a c h e s , resist m y a p p r o p r i a t i o n . T h e y resist
a n y p r o p e r r e l a t i o n t o life a t all. T h e y a r e a l r e a d y little c o r p s e s .
T h e n a r r a t o r c o u l d revive J., b u t h e i s p o w e r l e s s t o r e s u s c i t a t e
her eyes, w h i c h are always already " b e y o n d " — f r o m b e y o n d
a n d v a i n l y s e a r c h i n g for a b e y o n d .
I n t h e a r r e s t e d , stupefied g a z e o f t h e d e a d o n e sees t h e
 image of a g a z e . O n e secs an i m a g i n a r y seeing. O n e secs a thai m o m e n t ol absolute uncertainty, the Outside w a s there,

g a z e t h a t is t h e g a z e of no o n e . ( A n d t h a t is w h y , in t h e m y t h , death w a s there open, impotent, and w i t h o u t intimacy. T h e

E u r i d i c e v a n i s h e s w h e n O r p h e u s l o o k s a t her, o r a t h e r g a z e — n a r r a t o r w a s greeted by the gaze he w a s d r a w n to a n d s o u g h t

for h e r s is t h e g a z e of no o n e , t h e g a z e of t h e d e a d . ) T h e r e is a for. I t w a s indifferent t o h i m , t o his p r e s e n c e , a n d i t c o n d e m n e d

d o u b l e o p e n i n g o f J.'s eyes (they " o p e n e d a b r u p t l y a n d t h e y h i m to d e a t h b e c a u s e it l o o k e d at h i m as if he was already no

o p e n e d t o r e v e a l [ b r u s q u e m e n t elles s ' o u v r i r e n t , e t elles longer there. Yes, t h e n a r r a t o r of L'arrêt de mort d o e s find J.,

s'ouvrirent sur]"), because there must be a dead, blank, anony- the J. he sought, in Hell. But he only meets her w h o disregards

m o u s g a z e t h a t h o l l o w s itself o u t a n d c r e a t e s a s p a c e for see- h i m . H e m e e t s h e r a s she is: d e a d a n d w i t h o u t h i m , o u t s i d e

i n g . I t w a s t h a t b l a n k g a z e t h a t t h e n a r r a t o r c o n f r o n t e d i n J.'s h i m utterly.

e y e s . It w a s a g a z e t h a t r e s e m b l e d J.'s b u t t h a t was not hers, T h e n a r r a t o r is n o t a w a r e of this strangeness at the time,

was not anyone's. T h e eyes t h a t l o o k e d like J.'s, for a m o - for t h e e v e n t i s t o o p r e c i s e a n d t o o i m p e r s o n a l e v e n t o b e

ment, belonged to no one. At that m o m e n t , J. became her a c k n o w l e d g e d . H e s a y s , "[I]f I h a d s h u d d e r e d a t t h a t i n s t a n t ,

o w n double, her o w n image, and it w a s the image of J. that a n d i f I h a d b e e n a f r a i d , e v e r y t h i n g w o u l d h a v e b e e n lost, b u t

stared at the n a r r a t o r with an imaginary stare. It w a s the im- my tenderness w a s so great t h a t I didn't even think a b o u t the

a g e o f J., y e s , b u t J . herself w a s a b r u p t l y eyeless. T h e eyes t h a t strangeness of w h a t w a s happening, which certainly seemed

s t a r e d w e r e n o t h e r s a n d i t w a s t h o s e a n o n y m o u s eyes t h a t t o m e a l t o g e t h e r n a t u r a l b e c a u s e o f t h a t infinite m o v e m e n t

s t a r e d a t t h e n a r r a t o r a s h e l o o k e d i n t o a face w i t h n o eyes: a w h i c h d r e w me t o w a r d h e r [si à cet i n s t a n t j ' a v a i s frémi, et si

face h e l o v e d a n d h a d b r o u g h t b a c k f r o m H e l l . j ' a v a i s é p r o u v é d e l a peur, t o u t e û t été p e r d u , m a i s m a t e n d r e s s e

était si g r a n d e que je n'eus m ê m e pas une pensée p o u r le carac-
T h e i m a g e o f a g a z e p r e c e d e d J.'s g l a n c e a t t h e n a r r a t o r
tère singulier de ce qui se passait, qui me p a r u t c e r t a i n e m e n t
a n d J.'s i m a g e p r e c e d e d h e r r e t u r n t o life. I t w a s a n i m a g e
t o u t à fait n a t u r e l , à c a u s e de ce m o u v e m e n t infini q u i me
terrible a n d u n n a m a b l e , or an "absent absence," as Foucault
6 3
60 portait à sa r e n c o n t r e ] . " T h e "infinite m o v e m e n t " h e s p e a k s
puts it. In other w o r d s , a resemblance preceded the actual
of, t h e H e l l i n t o w h i c h J. h a d s l i p p e d , is Ventretemps: a c r o s s -
a n d t h e n d i s a p p e a r e d i n t o H e l l a s J . r e t u r n e d t o life. B u t t h e
i n g t h a t is infinite, a r r e s t e d , like a (step n o t ) b e y o n d or le pas
living J . (the o t h e r s u b j e c t , t o use t h e c r u d e l a n g u a g e o f t h e
au-delà (as B l a n c h o t so n e a t l y says in t h e title of a n o t h e r of
p h i l o s o p h e r s ) i s n o t t h e w o m a n t h e n a r r a t o r s o u g h t , for J . ,
his w o r k s t h a t should p e r h a p s be r e a d as a clandestine c o m -
r e t u r n e d t o life, r e t u r n e d a t t h e s a m e t i m e t o m o r t a l i t y a n d , i n
61 p a n i o n to L'arrêt de mort).
fact, a few d a y s later, t h e n a r r a t o r h e l p s h e r t o d i e . That
w h i c h p r e c e d e d J . — h e r i m a g e a n d its i m a g i n a r y g a z e — w a s I t i s i m p o r t a n t for u s t o c o n s i d e r t h e p r e c i s i o n o f t h e e v e n t

s i m u l t a n e o u s l y h e r p a s t (herself d e a d , o r " a l r e a d y n o m o r e for these precise m o m e n t s m a k e u p t h e " s u b s t a n c e " o f

t h a n a s t a t u e [déjà p l u s q u ' u n e s t a t u e ] , " t h e n a r r a t o r s a y s ) 62 Blanchot's writings. These m o m e n t s , or m o v e m e n t s , or spaces

a n d h e r f u t u r e ( a g a i n , herself d e a d a few d a y s l a t e r ) . T h a t are precise a n d a n a m o r p h i c insofar as they c a n n o t be interro-

which preceded J.—the terrible resemblance—was w i t h o u t a gated, or even properly experienced or n a r r a t e d . T h e O u t s i d e

present, w i t h o u t being, a n d bore no relation to the present. In o f w h i c h w e s p e a k i n t h e scene(s) o f J.'s d e a t h ( s ) i s n o t o u t s i d e

 of an i n t e r i o r i t y (the narrator's or the reader's). II we a n d nu
m e r o u s o t h e r c o m m e n t a t o r s s o frequently i n v o k e t o p o g r a p h y ,
it is o n l y i m m e d i a t e l y to c o n t e s t it. L'entretemps m u s t be
t h o u g h t o f p r o x i m a l l y , i n t h e sense w e h a v e a l r e a d y d i s c u s s e d .
T h a t w h i c h h a p p e n s t o t h e n a r r a t o r d o e s n o t , a s w e see, in-
s p i r e m e m o r a b l e i m a g e s o r d a z z l i n g p r o s e . T h e t o n e o f L'arrêt
de mort is, if a n y t h i n g , d i s t a n t , b u t w i t h t h a t d i s t a n c e t h a t
Blanchot has found at the heart of intimacy and passion. W h a t
r e m a i n s a t t r a c t i v e t o t h e n a r r a t o r i s r e n d e r e d i n o u t l i n e only,
in profile o n l y (as is le visage in L e v i n a s ) . Barely p e r c e p t i b l e
s c e n e s a n d f i g u r e s a p p e a r (or a p p e a r o n l y o b l i q u e l y , o r appear
to a p p e a r ) t h r o u g h o u t all of B l a n c h o t ' s w o r k s . (Le pas au-
delà a l s o c o n t a i n s scenes o f d e a t h , c o n v e r s a t i o n s , a n d " c h a r -
a c t e r s " e v e n m o r e s p a r s e l y d r a w n t h a n t h o s e i n L'arrêt d e
mort.) W h a t " h a p p e n s " i s a l w a y s " b e t w e e n " (or i n p a r e n t h e -
ses) w h a t m i g h t b e c a l l e d a c t i o n s o r e v e n t s . W h a t m a t t e r s a n d
w h a t affects u s a s r e a d e r s , a n d w h a t affects B l a n c h o t ' s n a r r a -
t o r s i n all his récits, a r e e v e n t s t h a t t a k e p l a c e o u t s i d e a n y
c h a r a c t e r ' s i n i t i a t i v e or i n t e n t i o n . T h e n a r r a t o r of L'arrêt de
mort i s a b l e t o w r i t e a n d t o t r y t o p u t a n e n d t o t h e s e e v e n t s
b e c a u s e , h e s a y s , t h e y c o n c e r n o n l y h i m . Yet t h a t w h i c h i s
o n l y h i s , t h a t w h i c h b e l o n g s w i t h i n his o w n i n t i m a c y , i s o p e n
t o s t r a n g e r s , t o r e a d e r s . Few, i f any, w o r k s i n t h i s c e n t u r y (or
e v e r p e r h a p s ) c a u s e t h e r e a d e r t o feel m o r e a c u t e l y t h a t h e o r
s h e i s intruding o n s o m e o n e else's p r i v a c y t h a n d o t h e w o r k s
of B l a n c h o t . T h i s is i n d e e d p a r t of t h e i r " t h r i l l . " It is as if o n e
h a d entered a prohibited space or had stepped uninvited into
s o m e o n e else's a p a r t m e n t .
T h e c u r i o u s effect h e r e is o n e of a t r a n s g r e s s i o n of i n t i -
macy: witnessing that which doesn't concern one. These
"things" that happened to someone in 1938 are attractive pre-
cisely i n s o f a r a s t h e y c o n c e r n o n l y t h a t s o m e o n e . I t i s like t h e
thrill o f g o s s i p . T h e s e t h i n g s a t t r a c t m e p r e c i s e l y i n s o f a r a s I
Cannol relaie tO them. And if I can " i m a g i n e (he h a n d t h a t
6 1
w r i t e s them," ' I will o n l y find myself face-to-face w i t h a g a z e
that does not regard me, that dispenses with me. For t h a t is
the " p r i c e " of transgression: / am neglected. Reading then
becomes une tâche sérieuse because l'entretemps substitutes
itself for a n d s i m u l a t e s — i n s i s t s o n t h e a b s e n c e o f — t h e p r e s e n t .
T o b e sure, i n all a r t a s w e h a v e seen, t h e " m e a n w h i l e " r e p l a c e s
t h e p r e s e n t , t h e i m a g e s u b s t i t u t e s itself for t h e c o n c e p t . I n
Blanchot, this e n i g m a is foregrounded. By " t h i n n i n g o u t " im-
ages, scenes, characters, actions, a n d language the Bianchotian
t e x t a p p r o a c h e s t h e i m a g i n a r y a s such—where t h e r e a r e n o
i m a g e s , w h e r e n o t h i n g crystallizes i n t o definite f o r m s o r f i g u r e s ,
a n d w h e r e the time of reading is also the time of writing a n d
the time of dying. We reach the s h a d o w of the world w h e r e
initiative a n d action are already no longer possible. T h a t is to
say, r e a d i n g c o m e s t o d o u b l e t h e p a t h o s o f d y i n g . I t d o u b l e s
the inability to enter into the present and the impossibility of
finding any p r o p e r place in the w o r l d . It is the time of radical
incompletion and of worklessness.
If, as we say, o u r relation w i t h t h e d e a d is a p a r o d y of inter-
subjectivity, it is b e c a u s e it is an i m a g i n a r y r e l a t i o n : a r e l a t i o n
w i t h n o o n e . But i t i s a r e l a t i o n n o n e t h e l e s s , a n d o n e t h a t d o e s
not terminate our relations with the one w h o the dead person
w a s . It is a relation w i t h o u t relation, b u t it " p r e s e r v e s " a n d
e x h i b i t s t h a t v a c a n t t i m e en deçà du temps t h a t a l w a y s p r e -
c e d e s t h e living t i m e o f h u m a n i n t e r subjectivity. I t i s p a r o d i e
in the sense t h a t it is a relation with the other t h a t t o u c h e s h i m
o u t s i d e his subjectivity i n t h e t i m e o f d y i n g t h a t t h e o t h e r will
never c o m e to t h e e n d of. It is n o t a t i m e or a r e l a t i o n t h a t I am
ever c o n s c i o u s of in my dealings w i t h o t h e r s . It is t h u s a relation
o v e r w h i c h I can exercise no m a s t e r y w h a t s o e v e r .
T h e infinite m o v e m e n t t o w a r d , o r r e n d e z v o u s w i t h , Levi-
n a s ' s Autrui i s l i k e w i s e e t e r n a l l y p a r a l y z e d a n d w i t h o u t a n
 o u t c o m e , as is o u r r e l a t i o n with t h e artwork. It is, if y o u like
( a n d a s L é v i n a s w o u l d prefer), a m o v e m e n t t o w a r d a n O u t -
side t h a t is only ever rebegun in any conscious u n d e r t a k i n g
w i t h others in t h e w o r l d . It is a time or a m o v e m e n t " w i t h o u t
m e , " a n d its i n t i m a c y i s precisely its d i s r e g a r d o f m e . T h e e n -
c o u n t e r w i t h Autrui i s e m p t i e d b o t h o f myself a n d t h e o t h e r ,
as if I w e r e o b l i g e d , as t h e " p r i c e " of this i n t i m a c y , to f o r g e t
b o t h myself a n d t h e o t h e r . W e h a v e a l r e a d y t a k e n u p t h i s issue
i n o u r c h a p t e r o n L é v i n a s . I n its i n t i m a c y a n d a n o n y m i t y , a s
B l a n c h o t so m a t c h l e s s l y e x p r e s s e s it t h r o u g h o u t L'arrêt de
mort, w e m u s t b e a t t e n t i v e t o t h a t w h i c h p r e c e d e s all living
relations a n d to that which, as it is a n o n y m o u s , is imaginary.
T h i s justifies, w e t h i n k , o u r c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f t h e L e v i n a s i a n
éthique as imaginary.
I m m e m o r i a l l y p a r a l y z e d , i n t e r r u p t e d , h e s i t a n t , c o y (all
t h e s e t e r m s will h a v e to do for n o w ) this en deçà, or le dire, or
I m a g e , o r I m a g i n a r y i s just a s i m m e m o r i a l l y f o r g o t t e n , i g n o r e d ,
overlooked, and dispensed with as inconsequential. In one of
his essays o n B l a n c h o t , " T h e S e r v a n t a n d H e r M a s t e r , " L é v i n a s
s p e a k s o f this " f o r g e t t i n g " a s t h a t w h i c h r e s t o r e s d i a c h r o n y
to time by turning " a w a y from the past instant [détourne de
l'instant p a s s é ] . " 6 5
But, importantly, d i a c h r o n y is n o t a d u r a -
t i o n . I t h a s n e i t h e r " p r e t e n t i o n n o r r e t e n t i o n , " a s L é v i n a s says,
good student that he is of Husserl. 66
(When, here and t h e r e —
in Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence for instance—
L é v i n a s s p e a k s o f diachronie, h e m e a n s t h e " m e a n w h i l e " t h a t
w e h a v e b e e n d i s c u s s i n g i n this c h a p t e r . ) H o w e v e r , t h a t w h i c h
turns a w a y from the past also "abides in w o r d s [demeure en
6 7
une p a r o l e ] " a n d w h e n they become "attentive to their con-
dition, w o r d s c o m e to a stop a n d t u r n into pillars of salt
[ p e n c h é s s u r l e u r c o n d i t i o n , les m o t s s ' a r r ê t e n t e n s t a t u e s d e
6 8
sel]."
P o e t r y , i n c l u d i n g t h e p o e t r y o f B l a n c h o t , c a n " b e t r a y it-
sell, b e c o m e engulfed in o r d e r a n d t a k e on the a p p e a r a n c e of
a c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t |se t r a h i r et s ' e n g l o u t i r d a n s l ' o r d r e p o u r se
m o n t r e r produit culturel |" a n d poetry, of course, c a n be " a p -
plauded a n d rewarded, sold, bought [applaudi et primé, vendu,
6 9
acheté]," and so o n . This is because, Levinas says, poetry
surfaces at a precise instant b e t w e e n k n o w l e d g e a n d culture,
70
b e t w e e n seeing a n d s a y i n g . For t h a t very reason, he argues,
the t w o "pincers" are never quite closed—"le m o m e n t entre
7 1
l e v o i r e t l e d i r e o ù les m â c h o i r e s r e s t e n t , e n t r ' o u v e r t e s . "
T h e a r t w o r k i s t h e r e s i s t a n c e t o t h e i r ever c o m p l e t e l y c l o s i n g .
L i k e w i s e , w e t h i n k , t h e r e l a t i o n w i t h Autrui t h a t L e v i n a s calls
ethics is an o b s c u r e resistance to the closing of ontic categories.
T h e p o i n t w e a r e g e t t i n g t o i n this c h a p t e r i s this p o i n t o f
r e s i s t a n c e , this i n t e r m i n a b l e p a r a l y s i s t h a t m a k e s u p t h e " s u b -
s t a n c e " o f B l a n c h o t ' s œuvre a n d is, w e m a y say, t h e I m a g e o f
an Outside, and an O t h e r to the categories of t h o u g h t or of
t h e S t a t e . T h e a r t w o r k , t h e B l a n c h o t i a n récit, T i a n a n m e n , a n d
L e v i n a s i a n responsabilité a r e d i s c o n t i n u i t i e s a n d d i s j u n c t i o n s .
A g a m b e n , a s w e shall see, t h o r o u g h l y e x p l o i t s t h i s i n t e r m i -
n a b l e failure (or, a s h e will p u t it, t h i s " p o w e r t o n o t n o t - b e
72
[poter n o n non-essere]") i n his w r i t i n g s o n t h e " c o m i n g c o m -
munity." W h a t we have tried to bring o u t of the s h a d o w s in
o u r c h a p t e r o n B l a n c h o t i s t h e sense t h a t t h e t i m e o f c o n t i n u -
ity a n d i n t e r s u b j e c t i v i t y (as we p e r s i s t in c a l l i n g it) is r a d i c a l l y
u n d e r m i n e d a n d hollowed o u t by a "forgetting," or a p r o -
found "past" intolérable à la pensée.
The Image and Ipseity of Art
W e h a v e seen t h a t t h e t r a j e c t o r y o f B l a n c h o t i a n
a n d L e v i n a s i a n a e s t h e t i c s is t o w a r d a n t e r i o r i t y as such. N o t a
p r i m o r d i a l s t a t e - o f - t h i n g s , n o r a fluid a n d i n c o h e r e n t m a s s o f
data awaiting organized impression, but instead the subtlety
 of i m a g i n a r y m a t t e r (like le dire that overflows every le dit) N o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n its mimetic r a p p o r t w i t h w h a t i t i s n o t —

w h o s e d e s t i n y is n e i t h e r subjective n o r o b j e c t i v e . In t h e d i s e n - the real. Art i s reality's s h a d o w — t h a t w h i c h v a n i s h e s w h e n

gaged, more-than-passive and otherwise-than-worldly w o r k a n y light is s h e d on it.

o f a r t (as i n t h e c a d a v e r ) , this a n t e r i o r i t y i s " f r o z e n " a n d " p r e - T h e a r t w o r k is not an object. It is p u r e r a p p o r t , p u r e c o m -

s e r v e d " a s a n i c o n . Yet i t r e m a i n s u n p e r c e i v e d a n d silent, like m u n i c a t i o n , p u r e p a s s i o n . A s B l a n c h o t s o o b l i g i n g l y p u t s it:

t h e voix narrative, b e c a u s e it is n o t t h e m a t e r i a l for a p e r c e p - " I t is as if a secret l a w r e q u i r e d of t h e w o r k t h a t it a l w a y s be

t i o n . T h i s a n t e r i o r i t y en deçà du temps is n o t d e s t i n e d for t h e concealed in w h a t it shows a n d that it only s h o w w h a t m u s t

light of day, b u t neither is it the day's simple obverse. In r e m a i n c o n c e a l e d a n d t h a t finally i t o n l y s h o w s w h a t m u s t

B l a n c h o t ' s t e r m s , it is t h e autre nuit. 73 s t a y h i d d e n b y c o n c e a l i n g i t [ C o m m e s i u n e loi secrète e x i g e a i t

d'elle q u ' e l l e soit t o u j o u r s c a c h é e en ce qu'elle m o n t r e , et q u ' e l l e
W h e n Blanchot asks of the w o r k of art, " W h a t has always
n e m o n t r e aussi q u e c e qui d o i t r e s t e r c a c h é e t n e l e m o n t r e ,
e l u d e d its l a n g u a g e [ q u ' e s t - c e q u i s'est t o u j o u r s d é r o b é à s o n
7 6
enfin, q u ' e n l e d i s s i m u l a n t ] . " T h e w o r k o f a r t " r e v e a l s " its
l a n g a g e ] ? " a n d a n s w e r s , "Itself"; w h e n h e says t h a t a r t "is
o w n h i d d e n n e s s , i t " s h o w s " its o w n a b s e n c e f r o m all s h o w -
a l w a y s a n t e r i o r t o w h a t i t s p e a k s o f a n d t o itself [est t o u j o u r s
i n g , i t " s a y s " its o w n silence, a n d s o f o r t h . Before t h e w o r k o f
p l u s a n t é r i e u r q u e c e d o n t i l p a r l e e t p l u s a n t é r i e u r q u e lui-
7 4 a r t c o m m u n i c a t e s a n y t h i n g (the g o d s , e.g.) i t c o m m u n i c a t e s
même]," he is referring to anteriority insofar as art is t h a t
c o m m u n i c a t i o n . I t i s o n l y after t h a t t o w h i c h t h e w o r k o f a r t
w h i c h resists its o w n u n v e i l i n g a n d t h u s e l u d e s t h e v i c e - g r i p
refers i s f o r g o t t e n (i.e., t h e g o d s w h o h a v e fled a n d w h o s e
of s e e i n g a n d s a y i n g . For, t h e voix narrative is t h e t a l e itself,
flight t o o h a s b e e n f o r g o t t e n ) t h a t t h i s e n i g m a b e g i n s t o m a k e
t h e w o r k o f a r t itself, p r i o r t o its n a r r a t i v e " c o n t e n t s . " T h i s i s
itself felt, b e g i n s t o d r a w n e a r t o its " o r i g i n a l e x p e r i e n c e . "
n o t so v e r y s t r a n g e . All of t h e r e a l i t y of a r t (like all of t h e
75 This vanishing point is w h a t Blanchot is getting at w h e n he
r e a l i t y o f t h e self, a s w e h a v e a l r e a d y d i s c u s s e d ) is b o r r o w e d
a s k s : " W h a t will b e c o m e n o w o f a r t , n o w t h a t t h e G o d s a n d
f r o m o u t s i d e it: f r o m m a t e r i a l s , clay, m a r b l e , p i g m e n t , a n d
even their a b s e n c e are g o n e , a n d n o w t h a t m e n ' s presence offers
life itself, w h i c h s o m e t i m e s a p p e a r s t o t h e a r t i s t t o b e a l r e a d y
n o s u p p o r t [ N e p o u v a n t plus p r e n d r e a p p u i sur les d i e u x , n i
aesthetically attractive. Art is mimesis, according to one of
m ê m e sur l'absence des d i e u x ; n e p o u v a n t s ' a p p u y e r sur l ' h o m m e
t h e W e s t ' s o l d e s t d e f i n i t i o n s . A r t , q u i t e simply, h a s n o self, n o
7 7
présent qui ne lui a p p a r t i e n t plus {...} q u e va devenir l ' œ u v r e ?] "
ipse, to be r e v e a l e d . T h a t is t h e secret of its a n t e r i o r i t y , its
A fascinating question. It is at this p o i n t t h a t the w o r k of art
" o t h e r n i g h t . " Its itselfness is always to come. T h i s is t h e se-
t r u l y finds its c o n d i t i o n , its " e l e m e n t a l d e p t h s . " It b e c o m e s a
c r e t o f its i n e x h a u s t i b l e r e s o u r c e s . M i m e s i s c a n n o t b e r e v e a l e d .
p u r e i m a g e o f itself, a n d i t d i s a p p e a r s i n t o itself, i n t o its t i m e .
If t h e w o r k of a r t e l u d e s itself, a n d n e v e r s p e a k s itself in its
own l a n g u a g e , it is b e c a u s e a r t is precisely selfless. It is w i t h - Inexhaustibly communicating with w h a t it is not, the w o r k

o u t a n y t h i n g t h a t w o u l d b e p r o p e r t o it. P r i o r t o its " c o n - of art resembles, again, nothing so m u c h as a cadaver w h o s e

t e n t s , " t h e w o r k of a r t is a p u r e i m a g e of itself, an i m a g e of very materiality is the erasure of the b o r d e r b e t w e e n presence

n o t h i n g . B y t h e m o s t e l e m e n t a r y logic w e m u s t c o n c l u d e w i t h a n d a b s e n c e , life a n d d e a t h , d i s a p p e a r a n c e a n d r e t u r n , i m a g e

B l a n c h o t a n d L e v i n a s t h a t a r t itself— m i m e s i s — i s n o t h i n g . a n d reality (for t h e c a d a v e r ' s e n t i r e reality i s t h a t i t i s a n i m a g e

 of itself). Like the c o r p s e , the w o r k ol art is i n c a p a b l e of its
" n o w , " i n c a p a b l e o f b e i n g itself, i n c a p a b l e o f r e a c h i n g o r a t -
t a i n i n g its b e i n g , w h i c h a l w a y s slips b e y o n d i t w h e r e i t c a n n o t
s t e p . L i k e t h e c o r p s e , t h e w o r k o f a r t i s t h e very i m a g e o f a
s t r a n g e i n c a p a c i t y s i m p l y t o be. Like t h e d e a r d e p a r t e d , t h e
w o r k o f a r t c a n n o t d i s a p p e a r i n t o its own d i s a p p e a r a n c e , its
own e n d . T h i s i m p o t e n c e , h o w e v e r , i s its " o w n m o s t " e x p e r i -
e n c e of "itself." T h a t is, it c a n o n l y e x p e r i e n c e "itself" in its
o t h e r , as o t h e r . It c a n o n l y e x p e r i e n c e itself as o t h e r t h a n itself;
it is o n l y itself as o t h e r t h a n itself. It c a n o n l y c o m m u n i c a t e , in
s h o r t . A r t is no s o o n e r itself t h a n it is a l r e a d y petrified i n t o a
s t a t u e , a n i c o n , a p u p p e t , a toy. " S h e w h o w a s o n c e a b s o l u t e l y
alive w a s n o w n o m o r e t h a n a s t a t u e [Elle n ' é t a i t déjà p l u s
q u ' u n e s t a t u e , elle a b s o l u m e n t v i v a n t e ] , " B l a n c h o t ' s n a r r a t o r
7 8
says o f J . a t h e r d e a t h . N o s o o n e r d o e s she die t h a n s h e b e -
comes other than herself, other than anyone—totally a n o n y -
m o u s . L i k e t h e c a d a v e r , t h e w o r k of a r t itself Is t h e i m a g e of
a n image. I t i s a n i m a g i n a r y i m a g e , t o b e s u r e , a n d o n e t h a t
n o b o d y recognizes, but it is an image nonetheless a n d one
t h a t is t h a t is always " o l d e r " t h a n that of which it is the im-
age. In this w a y we can u n d e r s t a n d p e r h a p s m o r e clearly
Blanchot's "other version" of the imaginary:
T o e x p e r i e n c e a n e v e n t a s a n i m a g e i s n o t t o free o n e -
self o f t h a t e v e n t , t o d i s s o c i a t e oneself f r o m it, a s a s -
s e r t e d b y t h e e s t h e t i c v e r s i o n o f t h e i m a g e a n d t h e se-
r e n e ideal o f classical a r t , b u t n e i t h e r i s i t t o e n g a g e
oneself w i t h it t h r o u g h a free d i m e n s i o n : it is to let
oneself b e t a k e n b y it, t o g o f r o m t h e r e g i o n o f t h e
real, w h e r e we hold ourselves at a distance from things
t h e b e t t e r t o use t h e m , t o t h a t o t h e r r e g i o n w h e r e d i s -
tance holds us, this distance which is n o w unliving,
unavailable depth, an inappreciable remoteness become
in s o m e sense the sovereign a n d last p o w e r of t h i n g s .
This m o v e m e n t implies infinite d e g r e e s . T h u s p s y c h o -
a n a l y s i s says t h a t t h e i m a g e , far f r o m l e a d i n g u s o u t -
side o f t h i n g s a n d m a k i n g u s live i n t h e m o d e o f g r a t u -
i t o u s fantasy, s e e m s t o s u r r e n d e r u s p r o f o u n d l y t o o u r -
selves. T h e i m a g e i s i n t i m a t e b e c a u s e i t m a k e s o u r in-
t i m a c y a n e x t e r i o r p o w e r t h a t w e passively s u b m i t t o :
outside of us, in the b a c k w a r d m o t i o n of the w o r l d
t h a t t h e i m a g e p r o v o k e s , t h e d e p t h o f o u r p a s s i o n trails
along, astray a n d brilliant.
[Vivre u n é v é n e m e n t e n i m a g e , c e n ' e s t p a s s e d é g a g e r
d e cet é v é n e m e n t , s'en désintéresser, c o m m e l e v o u -
d r a i e n t l e v e r s i o n e s t h é t i q u e d e l ' i m a g e e t l'idéal serein
d e l ' a r t c l a s s i q u e , m a i s c e n ' e s t n o n p l u s s'y e n g a g e r
p a r u n e d é c i s i o n l i b r e : c'est s'y laisser p r e n d r e , p a s s e r
d e l a r é g i o n d u réel, o ù n o u s n o u s t e n o n s à d i s t a n c e
des choses p o u r m i e u x en disposer, à cette autre région
o ù l a d i s t a n c e n o u s t i e n t , c e t t e d i s t a n c e q u i est a l o r s
profondeur non vivante, indisponible, lointain
inappréciable devenue c o m m e la puissance souveraine
e t d e r n i è r e des c h o s e s . C e m o u v e m e n t i m p l i q u e d e s
d e g r é s infinis. L a p s y c h a n a l y s e dit ainsi q u e l ' i m a g e ,
loin d e n o u s laisser h o r s d e c a u s e e t d e n o u s faire v i v r e
s u r l e m o d e d e l a fantaisie g r a t u i t e , s e m b l e n o u s livrer
p r o f o n d é m e n t à n o u s - m ê m e s , i n t i m e est l ' i m a g e , p a r c e
q u ' e l l e fait d e n o t r e i n t i m i t é u n e p u i s s a n c e e x t é r i e u r e
que nous subissons passivement: en dehors de nous,
d a n s l e recul d u m o n d e q u ' e l l e p r o v o q u e , t r a î n e , é g a r é e
7 9
et brillante, la profondeur de nos passions.]
" O l d e r " t h a n t h e s e r e n e classical v e r s i o n o f t h e i m a g e t h a t
guarantees distance, is that which is not to be and that which
 is n o t to b e c o m e either. T h e w o r k ol an is the i m a g e of that
w h i c h is never to be, never to b e c o m e — t h a t w h i c h is ever on
t h e h i t h e r side of t i m e (en deca du temps). Eternally Mona
Lisa will be about to smile. E t e r n a l l y d e l a y e d p r i o r to b e i n g /
b e c o m i n g , she i s t h e d e g r a d e d i m a g e o f t h e e t e r n a l . N o t a t i m e -
less s t a t i c f o r m , b u t a fragment of a never to be continued and
completed whole. In t h e c o r p s e , in t h e w o r k of a r t , we see
( w i t h o u t p e r c e i v i n g ) t h a t w h i c h i m a g e s itself. I t i s n o t a n o t h e r
image, as we learn from Blanchot, b u t a n o t h e r version of the
s a m e i m a g e . It is a r e t u r n of t h e i m a g e to itself, p r i o r to its
b e i n g an i m a g e of . . . T h e " o t h e r " v e r s i o n of t h e i m a g i n a r y is
its e t e r n a l r e t u r n t o itself, t o t h e s a m e i m a g e . N o s o o n e r i s t h e
a r t w o r k finished t h a n i t i s a r r e s t e d , o t h e r t h a n itself, or, t o say
t h e s a m e t h i n g , t h e " s a m e " a s itself i n its very alterity. I n t h i s
arrested time there is no " n o w " in which the a r t w o r k can
b e c o m e . It is the repetition of the real, a n d repetition is with-
out a present.
E v e r y s t a t u e , every c a d a v e r , every p u p p e t , toy, o r a r t i f a c t —
i n d e e d , e v e r y t h i n g a n d every p e r s o n w h o falls, i f o n l y for a
m o m e n t , outside utility—returns to an inconceivable image
void of either subject or object. This is the "last p o w e r of
things." They invert the " m o t i o n of the w o r l d " a n d " r e t u r n
us to ourselves," but to ourselves insofar as there is no one to
r e t u r n t o , n o society o f i d e n t i t i e s i n w h i c h w e c a n r e c o g n i z e
ourselves. In this " o t h e r " imaginary, subject a n d object disap-
pear as such, as ob-posed and distanced. W h a t remains is pure
-jection (or t h r o w n n e s s ) , like N i e t z s c h e ' s (or H e i d e g g e r ' s ) d i c e .
A r t (the t a l e , t h e voix narrative) is t h e " f o r g e t t i n g " of s u b -
ject a n d o b j e c t a n d i s i n fact t h e i r r a d i c a l i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , fu-
sion, or desegregation. Experiencing the event as an image is
an experience in which the object is disavowed as such, as
object o p p o s e d to us in a Vorstellung ( a " p l a c i n g b e f o r e " ) , a n d
t h u s it " r e t u r n s " t h e subject to itself p r i o r to its o p - p o s i t i o n i n g .
In this way, the "experience" Blanchot refers to m u s t be p r i o r
to Kantian experience a n d w o u l d refer to t h e pure position of
the subject. To e x p e r i e n c e t h e e v e n t as an i m a g e , t h e n , is n o t
to e x p e r i e n c e an o b j e c t (since t h e o b j e c t d i s a p p e a r s i n t o it-
self), b u t to e x p e r i e n c e t h e self as t h e p u r e p a s s i v i t y of p o s i -
t i o n , or, " t h e r e n e s s . " I t i s t h u s p r i o r t o a n y e x p e r i e n c e o f t h e
w o r l d , a n d it i m m e d i a t e l y closes in on itself w i t h o u t a t r a c e . It
closes b e c a u s e t h e s u b j e c t c a n " f e e l " o n l y its o w n i n t r i n s i c a l l y
e m p t y receptivity. I t is, a s i t w e r e , t h e s h a d o w o f t h e r e c e p t i v -
ity t h a t , u n i t i n g w i t h s p o n t a n e i t y , f o r g e s t h e p r o p e r l y K a n t i a n
experience. In the language of Levinas, it is an e x t r e m e passiv-
ity t h a t c a n n o t s i m p l y b e o p p o s e d t o activity, b e c a u s e i t i s t h e
p a s s i v i t y w h o s e o n l y " q u a l i t y " i s infinite r e c e p t i v i t y o r m a l -
leability. It is t h e p a s s i v i t y of absolute instability. T h a t is to
say, t h i s e x p e r i e n c e closes i n o n itself a n d leaves n o t r a c e b e -
c a u s e i t i s n e v e r e v e n o p e n e d . I n a b s o l u t e passivity, i n its p u r e
p o s i t i o n p r i o r t o a n y o b - o r s u b - j e c t i o n , t h e " s u b j e c t " (or shall
w e say, t h e " c o m m u n i c a t a n t " ? ) i s w h a t i t i s n o t , a n d i s n o t
w h a t i t is. T h e r e is, q u i t e simply, n o c o n t a i n i n g t h e e s s e n t i a l
8 0
ambiguity, or the "essential s o l i t u d e " of communicativity.
T h e s p a c e o f l i t e r a t u r e — o r , a s w e c a n n o w say, t h e s p a c e
of absolute passivity or communicativity—is the thick, crepus-
cular, a n d p a r o x y s m a t i c materiality o f t h o u g h t t h a t t h i c k e n s i n t o
a " t h i n g " (the " t h i n g " w e c a n say, t h a t t h e n a r r a t o r o f L'arrêt
8 1
de mort "lives w i t h " ) . It is t h e e r a s u r e of t h e s u b j e c t - o b j e c t
hyphen, the erosion of mastery, the erosion of that distance
w h i c h a l l o w s u s t o h o l d t h e w o r l d a t a distance. F o r B l a n c h o t ,
as for D e r r i d a of " b e f o r e the letter," t h e n a m e of this m o v e m e n t
is writing: the paradoxical "strength" of an inexhaustible im-
p o t e n c e . O f t h i s s p a c e w e c a n o n l y say t h a t i t i s . . . , t h e r e i s .
. . , il y a. If w r i t i n g o b s c u r e s t h a t of w h i c h it s p e a k s it is
b e c a u s e w r i t i n g — w h o s e "original e x p e r i e n c e " a r t a p p r o a c h e s —
is the obscurity, or the forgetting, anterior to any memory.
 T o u s , art r e m a i n s " c o n s t a n t l y invisible [ c o n s t a m m e n t in-
visible]," S2
h i d d e n , en deck, a n d an autre unit. But we a r e d r a w n
to it nonetheless. W h e n the object is doubled and neutralized
in the image, w h e n the image w i t h d r a w s the object from the
w o r l d , a n d w h e n t h e o b j e c t d i s a p p e a r s i n t o its o w n i m a g e —
t h e n i t e x e r c i s e s its f a s c i n a t i o n , its " p o w e r l e s s p o w e r . " W r i t -
ing is the c o m i n g of an i m p o t e n c e t h a t neutralizes subjectivity
b y n e u t r a l i z i n g t h e o b j e c t . " I , " a s B l a n c h o t says, b e c o m e " h e "
[il, t h e N e u t e r ] . I n this d o u b l e d s p a c e , t h i s s h a d o w o f t h e r e a l ,
I c e a s e t o b e sub-ject a n d b e c o m e " h e " w h o i s " h i s " r a p p o r t
w i t h t h a t w h i c h h o l d s " h i m " i n its spell. For, i n t h e s p a c e o f
literature, I am t h a t " h e " to w h o m I eternally r e t u r n in this
timeless time of repetition a n d incompletion. I am " h e " in
w h o m I d o n o t r e c o g n i z e myself. Yet, I a m n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n
" h i s " return, " h i s " immemorial and eternal return. A n d " h e "
is imaginary—pure passion, pure rapport, pure communica-
t i o n . I a m " h e " w h o I a m n o t , for " h e " i s n o t ( a n d n e v e r w i l l
be) w h o " h e " is.
This does not mean that the artwork harbingers my death.
It m e a n s t h a t an Httlife, an arrested d e a t h , a p a r a l y z e d f o r c e ,
h o l l o w s o u t the time of d u r a t i o n a n d r e m a i n s my invisible,
hidden involvement with a time of radical incompletion. T h e
a r t w o r k does not harbinger death, it is my involvement with
d e a t h a l r e a d y . All o f B l a n c h o t ' s w o r k b o r d e r s o n t h i s " o t h e r
n i g h t " a n d i s c a r r i e d a l o n g i n its infinite m o v e m e n t . N o t a t
t h e e n d of a w o r l d l y itinerary, b u t at every i n s t a n t , t h e t i m e en
dega du temps d i s a p p e a r s i n t o itself, e r a s e s itself, exscribes
itself. T h i s m o v e m e n t c a n n o t b e u n v e i l e d , n o t b e c a u s e i t i s
basically w i t h d r a w n and absent, but because it does n o t be-
l o n g to t h e light at all. It is t h e t i m e of il—always a l r e a d y
f a b r i c a t e d , fictioned, w o r k e d over, a n d , as s u c h , it is irrecuper-
able t i m e .
W r i t i n g , t h e n , i s t h e very m o v e m e n t t h a t f o r g e t s "itself,"
e r a s e s "itself," fOl il is w i t h o u t a n y self. N o t s i m p l y w i t h -
d r a w n from all p r e s e n c e , this t i m e of w r i t i n g is, in t h e l a n -
guage of Agamben, an imaginary youth that never-has-been
a n d t h a t r e - m o v e s itself e a c h t i m e . I t i s t h a t w h o s e "self" i s its
re-moval. To sum it up, then, writing—or art, which can double
u p a n d p r e s e r v e e v e r y t h i n g t h a t p r e s e n t s itself t o u s — i s for-
g e t t i n g . B u t it is n o t a f o r g e t t i n g of a n y thing. It is a f o r g e t t i n g
t h a t p r e c e d e s eidetic e v i d e n c e / a f o r g e t t i n g i m m e m o r i a l l y for-
gotten/not even absent/always already forgotten/a perpetual
l a c k of v i s i o n t h a t p r e c e d e s all seeing a n d s a y i n g / . . .
B l a n c h o t i a n a e s t h e t i c s l e a d s u s t o , a n d i s c o n s t a n t l y in-
v a d e d by, a n a n t e r i o r i t y i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h p r e s e n c e , a " h i t h e r
s i d e " t h a t i s a n t e r i o r t o objectivity. I t i s t h e " l a s t p o w e r o f
t h i n g s " t o exercise a silent a n d f o r g o t t e n f a s c i n a t i o n t h a t o p e n s
the space of literature, a space evacuated of subject a n d o b -
ject, a n d t h u s a s p a c e of r a d i c a l i d e n t i f i c a t i o n a n d affectivity.
T h e w o r k o f a r t , like t h e c a d a v e r , before i t r e p r e s e n t s a n y t h i n g
( o r s c e n e , o r d r a m a , o r p e r s o n ) , f i r s t o f all c o m m u n i c a t e s c o m -
m u n i c a t i o n itself, o r b e i n g - i n - r e l a t i o n . I n s o f a r a s I a m e v a c u -
a t e d of subjectivity, I am this b e i n g - i n - r e l a t i o n itself, myself.
O l d e r t h a n a n y s p e c u l a t i o n is this obsession. If B l a n c h o t d e -
scribes this as an " o t h e r version" of the imaginary, it is only
b e c a u s e t h e r e i s n o w o r d for it. I t i s n o t d e s i r e , b u t o b s e s -
s i o n — a n in-forming t h a t precedes any object or information.
It is a dependency that precedes any psyche that w o u l d be
d e p e n d e n t . T h e r e is no subject in this " s p a c e " but instead an
infinite d e p e n d e n c y , m a l l e a b i l i t y , suggestibility, o r p u r e p a s -
sivity o f p o s i t i o n t h a t will b e e v e r a n t e r i o r t o a n y p r e s e n t .
P r i o r to subject a n d o b j e c t — a n d this is crucial to L e v i n a s i a n
e t h i c s — t h e r e is a v i o l e n t affect, i n t r u s i o n , or m o r e - t h a n - i n t i -
m a c y t h a t i s invisible, u n d e t e c t a b l e , i n e r a d i c a b l e , a n d i r r e d u c -
ible. It is an " o t h e r " b e g i n n i n g o u t s i d e a n y origin. It is n e u t e r —
" t h e r e i s . " It is a region in w h i c h the O t h e r is not only o t h e r
t h a n I but also other than he or she. Profoundly unpresentable, FOUR
this region in-forms me prior to any actual c o m m u n i c a t i o n or
d i s t a n c e . In every i m a g e t h e r e is a l r e a d y t h a t w h i c h I ( " I " ) am,
myself. T h e w r i t e r i s h e w h o s p e a k s w h i l e entirely t r a v e r s e d
a n d t r a n s f i x e d b y t h e other t h a t h e ¿5, t h e " h e " w h o i s n e v e r
Agamben and the Political Neuter
a n y o n e — n e v e r a n y o n e o t h e r t h a n I , myself, b u t w i t h o u t m e .

Anonymity and Belonging

We learn from Blanchot that to write is to pass
f r o m " I " t o " H e , " /'/, t h e N e u t e r . T h e N e u t e r i s t h e s p a c e o f
l i t e r a t u r e ( a n i m a g i n a r y s p a c e en deçà du temps), w h i c h is
i n t e r m i n a b l e , incessant, a n d p e r p e t u a l l y n o n c o n t e m p o r a r y . T h e
neuter is the time of inaction a n d no initiative. It is the s h a d o w
of time, of the real, of my h a n d , Blanchot says, as it grips the
p e n a n d w r i t e s t h e s e w o r d s . T h e w r i t e r w o u l d like t o e x p r e s s
himself w i t h w o r d s , b u t h e f i n d s o n l y t h e i r s h a d o w , t h e i r sheer
a p p e a r a n c e , a n d n o t h i n g b e y o n d . T h e writer, l i k i n g i t o r n o t ,
writes an imaginary language that he cannot put to w o r k and
t o w h i c h h e c a n n o t give life. T h e w r i t e r c a n " b e l i e v e h e i s
a s s e r t i n g himself i n l a n g u a g e , b u t w h a t h e i s a s s e r t i n g i s c o m -
p l e t e l y w i t h o u t a self [ p e u t c r o i r e q u ' i l s'affirme en ce l a n g a g e ,
m a i s c e q u ' i l affirme est t o u t à fait p r i v é d e s o i ] " a n d " h e c a n
n e v e r a g a i n e x p r e s s himself a n d h e c a n n o t a p p e a l t o y o u ei-
ther, n o r let a n y o n e else s p e a k [il ne p e u t p l u s j a m a i s s ' e x p r i m e r
et il ne p e u t pas d a v a n t a g e en appeler à toi, ni encore d o n n e r

115
 1
la p a r o l e à a u t r u i ] . " In the n e u t r a l i z i n g s p a c e <>l l i t e r a t u r e , he
loses t h e p o w e r t o say " I , " a n d lie finds h e c a n n o t " g i v e life t o
c h a r a c t e r s w h o s e f r e e d o m w o u l d b e g u a r a n t e e d b y his c r e -
ative force [ d o n n e r vie à des p e r s o n n a g e s d o n t sa force c r é a t r i c e
2
g a r a n t i r a i t l a l i b e r t é ] . " T o w r i t e , t o e n t e r t h e N e u t e r , "is t o
arrange language under fascination, and, through language,
in language, to r e m a i n in contact w i t h the absolute milieu,
where the thing becomes an image again, where the image,
w h i c h h a d b e e n a l l u s i o n t o a figure, b e c o m e s a n a l l u s i o n t o
w h a t is w i t h o u t figure [ . . . ] w h e n t h e r e is no w o r l d yet [c'est
d i s p o s e r le l a n g a g e s o u s f a s c i n a t i o n et, p a r lui, en lui, d e m e u r e r
en c o n t a c t avec le milieu absolu, là où la chose redevient im-
a g e , où l ' i m a g e , d ' a l l u s i o n à u n e figure, d e v i e n t a l l u s i o n à ce
q u i est s a n s figure et { . . . ) q u a n d il n ' y a p a s e n c o r e de
3
monde]."
T h i s o b s c u r e r e g i o n , s k e t c h e d o u t i n " T h e E s s e n t i a l Soli-
t u d e " ( a n d i n m a n y , i f n o t all, o f B l a n c h o t ' s o t h e r essays) i s
t h e r e g i o n of t h e il y a: "[AJlien to r e v e l a t i o n , n o t e v e n b e -
cause it is radically d a r k , but because it transforms everything
t h a t h a s access t o it, e v e n light, i n t o a n o n y m o u s a n d i m p e r -
s o n a l b e i n g , t h e N o t - t r u e , t h e N o t - r e a l a n d yet a l w a y s t h e r e
[étranger à t o u t e révélation, ni m ê m e parce qu'elle serait radi-
calement obscure, mais parce qu'elle transforme t o u t ce qui a
access à elle m ê m e la l u m i è r e , en l'être a n o n y m e i m p e r s o n n e l ,
4
l e N o n - v r a i , l e N o n - r é e l e t c e p e n d a n t t o u j o u r s l à ] . " (We s h o u l d
n o t e t h a t t h i s d e s c r i p t i o n o f B l a n c h o t ' s c o u l d easily h a v e b e e n
written by Levinas.) To write is to be " p o s s e s s e d " by a n o n y m -
ity, t o b e seized b y i t a n d infinitesimally r e t a r d e d . T h i s " m i -
l i e u " i s a b s o l u t e b e c a u s e i t d o e s n o t refer t o a n y p l a c e i n t h e
w o r l d . I t a b - s o l v e s itself f r o m t h e r e a l , a n d i s a n a b s e n c e o f
inside o r o u t s i d e . T o w r i t e i s t o lose oneself i n this r e g i o n w h e r e
there is n o t h i n g to be revealed, expressed, m e a n t , or s h o w n ,
b e c a u s e n o t h i n g is e v e n h i d d e n . It is t h e r e g i o n of a m b i g u i t y ,
abandoned by referent es, emptied of subject a n d o b j e c t — w h e r e
all is s u c h as u is. Irreparably so.
T h e writer, then, is " p o s s e s s e d " by no o n e , by the a n o n y -
m o u s . H e c a n n o t n a r r a t e himself, b e c a u s e h e i s n o o n e ; h e i s
Quelqu'un, S o m e o n e b u t no o n e in p a r t i c u l a r — d a s Man. T h e
Blanchotian writer is not Anna O. w h o was "possessed" by
" a n o t h e r m e " s u c h t h a t n o e x t e r i o r i z a t i o n o f this o t h e r w a s
ever p o s s i b l e for h e r i n t h e m o d e o f n a r r a t i v e , a s F r e u d ( a n d
L a c a n ) w i s h e d , b e c a u s e s h e w a s herself t h e d e m o n w h o p o s -
5
sessed h e r . W r i t i n g is n o t a c a s e of h y s t e r i a . T h e h y s t e r i c is
n o t H o m e r , w h o c o u l d p a s s f r o m first t o t h i r d p e r s o n , f r o m
p u r e t o d r a m a t i c diegesis. T h e d i s c o u r s e o f t h e h y s t e r i c , a s o f
6
a n y m u l t i p l e - p e r s o n a l i t y p a t i e n t , is n o t a mixed mode. To
w r i t e i s n o t t o p a s s f r o m " I " t o another " I . " I t i s t o p a s s f r o m
" I " to t o t h e n e u t r a l i z a t i o n o f all i d e n t i t i e s , o f all " P s . "
Writing is n o t hypnotic or ventriloquized speech. It is n o t the
7
somnambulistic discourse of someone ravished by a n o t h e r ego.
Plato's Ion w a s not demonically possessed. But Plato saw in
Ion the image of madness, an image of radical depropriation.
8
F u r t h e r m o r e , we learn from Philippe L a c o u e - L a b a r t h e that
P l a t o " c a u g h t a g l i m p s e of" a n d " r e d u c e d t o a l i t e r a r y p r o b -
l e m " t h e v e r y " t e r r o r i z i n g " p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t d i s c o u r s e itself
c o n t a i n s , or ¿5, t h e v e r y p o s s i b i l i t y of a general m i m e s i s , a
general i n s t a b i l i t y t h a t is in fact p o s i t i v e a n d p o w e r f u l e s p e -
cially i n t h o s e f a b l e s , o r " o l d w i v e s ' t a l e s , " t h a t h a v e n o a u -
t h o r , n o g u a r a n t o r s o m e w h e r e i n t h e w o r l d t o a n s w e r for t h e i r
veracity. T h e s e " p a r a d o x i c a l l y a u t h o r i t a t i v e " fables, a s L a c o u e -
L a b a r t h e describes t h e m , are begun in the m o d e "it is said"
a n d exist, t h e r e f o r e , e n t i r e l y w i t h i n d i s c o u r s e itself. T h e y a r e ,
i n fact, e x e m p l a r y o f all a u t h o r i t y . T h u s P l a t o s o u g h t t o r i d
d i s c o u r s e o f this i n s t a b i l i t y a n d t e n d e n c y t o w a r d s H o m e r i c i s m
b y t a r g e t i n g p o e t s a n d m a k i n g t h e m r e s p o n s i b l e for t h e v e r a c -
ity o f d i s c o u r s e s t h e y o n l y re-cite. I n fact, h o w e v e r , d i s c o u r s e
 is t h i s i m p u r i t y , this h e s i t a t i o n between "Ps." 1 )iscourse is neu-
tral w i t h r e g a r d to its p r o p r i e t y . T h e r e is a n a t u r a l a m b i g u i t y
in discourse with regard to authority, and to speak, or to write,
i s first t o p a s s t o this equivocality. T h e r e i s n o f i n a l w a y , m e t h o d ,
o r t e c h n i q u e t h a t c a n r i d d i s c o u r s e o f its essential a m b i g u i t y .
T o w r i t e i s t o p a s s t o this p u r e l y linguistic s p a c e w h e r e I a m
p r i o r t o myself, w h e r e s p e a k i n g i s t h e p u r e p a s s i o n o f s p e a k -
i n g - b e i n g itself, d e p r o p r i a t e d o f ail i d e n t i t y a n d n e a r t o m a d -
n e s s , if n o t a l r e a d y its i m a g e .
T o w r i t e , o r t o s p e a k , i s t o e n t e r i n t o t h a t w h i c h , i n itself,
p r e c e d e s itself. It is to be s t r i p p e d of all i d e n t i t y a n d to b e -
c o m e a p u r e i m a g e (of n o o n e ) — u n a b l e a n y m o r e t o b e , o r n o t
to be. It is to become, not another persona, but instead the
p u r e passion of c o m m u n i c a t i o n , where passion is c o m m u n i -
cation a n d w h e r e my identity is this passionate, vertiginous
" n o o n e " w h o c a n n o t a n s w e r for w h a t i s w r i t t e n . T h i s s p a c e
i s t h e p u r e a n t e r i o r i t y o r p u r e reserve f r o m w h i c h all a r t c o m e s .
It is u n l i v a b l e , u n e n d u r a b l e (i.e., it h a s no d u r a t i o n ) a n d it is
t h a t w h i c h w i t h d r a w s f r o m a n y a c t u a l s t a t e o f affairs. W r i t -
ing is a petrified t r a n s c e n d e n c e , an e v e n t t h a t is n o t e v e n p o t e n -
tially a c c o m p l i s h a b l e . I t i s a l w a y s " b e t w e e n , " o r " m e a n w h i l e . "
T o p a s s t o i l i s t o p a s s t o " h e " w h o c a r r i e s o u t a n infinite
9
m o v e m e n t ("infinite d e g r e e s , " B l a n c h o t s a y s ) . W r i t i n g m o v e s
u s t o w a r d t h a t w h i c h i s a l w a y s in-itself, t h a t w h i c h d e p e n d s
o n n o c o n d i t i o n since i t i s alien t o all a c t u a l i t y , i n i t i a t i v e , a n d
accomplishment.
W e h a v e seen i n p r e v i o u s c h a p t e r s t h a t t h e w o r k o f a r t
i m m e d i a t e l y d e t a c h e s itself f r o m t h e c o n d i t i o n s (the m a t e r i a l s
a n d t h e a c t u a l h i s t o r i c a l states-of-affairs) t h a t i t s p r a n g f r o m .
We s a w as w e l l in L'arrêt de mort t h a t , at t h e i n s t a n t of h e r
d e a t h , J . b e c a m e n o l o n g e r herself, n o l o n g e r a n y o n e . A t t h e
i n s t a n t o f h e r d e a t h she e x h i b i t e d t h a t " s h e " w h o i s q u a s i -
e t e r n a l l y p r e s e r v e d in-herself, a l w a y s a t t h e lips o f t h e a c t u a l
w i t h o u t evei attaining it. At t h e i n s t a n t of her d e a t h , J. no
longer depends on all thai she w a s , yet she is n o n e - o t h e r t h a n
"all t h a i she w a s . " She b e c o m e s , i n t h a t s e n s e , all t h a t i s s u b -
t r a c t e d f r o m her.
Likewise, the w o r k of art attains a strange independence
f r o m all t h a t w e n t i n t o it. I t n o l o n g e r b e a r s a n y d e p e n d e n c e
o n a n y r e a l c o n d i t i o n s a n d , f r o m t h e " s t a r t " o f its " l i f e " (as
a n a r t w o r k ) , i t s e p a r a t e s itself f r o m t h e w o r l d s o t h a t i t b e -
c o m e s a p u r e resemblance resembling nothing. It becomes in-
itselfness. W h e n I l o o k at a p a i n t i n g or w h e n I r e a d a n o v e l , I
p e r c e i v e w i t h o u t p e r c e i v i n g a n y t h i n g . I a m affected w i t h o u t
f i n d i n g myself i n a n y p a r t i c u l a r s t a t e o f m i n d . T h e w o r k o f
art, as we have said, is m a d e up of imaginary, fabulous matter
t h a t is indistinguishable from the sensations it evokes. Imagi-
nary matter is sensational because it c a n n o t be dissociated from
s e n s a t i o n itself (i.e., s e n s a t i o n b e f o r e it is a s e n s a t i o n o / s o m e -
thing). The w o r k of art is nothing but fabulous, imaginary,
sensational matter—matter emptied of the space it w o u l d oc-
1 0
c u p y a n d t h a t , " s i m p l e a n d a b s o l u t e , " h u r l s itself t o w a r d s u s .
I m a g i n a r y m a t t e r c o n f u s e s m a t t e r a n d s e n s a t i o n s u c h t h a t sen-
s a t i o n b e c o m e s e x t e r i o r i t y a n d t a k e s o n its o w n life i n d e p e n -
d e n t o f a n y sensum. I n t h e w o r k o f a r t t h e r e i s n o l o n g e r a n y
r e f e r e n c e t o s u b j e c t a n d o b j e c t , a n d s e n s a t i o n itself i s b o r n i n
t h e l i b e r a t i o n o f m a t t e r f r o m objectality. I m a g i n a r y m a t t e r i s
i n c o m m e n s u r a b l e w i t h objectality a n d is the very thickening
of the h y p h e n that separates/links subject-object. W h e n mat-
ter n o l o n g e r a d h e r e s t o a n o b j e c t , i t s u d d e n l y " a p p e a r s . " B u t
as it " a p p e a r s " as no object or no form, it immediately disap-
p e a r s . T h a t is, i t d o e s n o t e n t e r i n t o a n y p e r c e p t i o n , b u t r a t h e r
i t b e g i n s (or r e b e g i n s ) a n infinite c o n t e s t a t i o n o f p e r c e p t i o n .
11
L e v i n a s h a s s h o w n us t h a t " p a i n t i n g is a struggle w i t h s i g h t . "
T h i s s t r u g g l e is t h e r e t u r n of t h e dynamis of s e n s a t i o n itself,
b e f o r e s e n s a t i o n e n t e r s i n t o a n y e x p e r i e n c e (in t h e K a n t i a n
 s e n s e ) . The s t r u g g l e Levinas refers to is .1 pure affection—as
p a s s i v e as it is d y n a m i c , as d y n a m i c as it is p a s s i o n a t e . A r t
t e n d s t o w a r d this infinite, p e r s i s t e n t m o v e m e n t t h a t i s t h e af-
fection of s e n s a t i o n by t h e i m a g i n a r y m a t e r i a l i t y it itself is.
S e n s a t i o n itself, or p u r e p a s s i o n , is n e u t r a l . It is t h e e x t e r i o r i t y
o f o u r m o s t p a s s i o n a t e inferiority, a s w e shall d i s c u s s m o r e
t h o r o u g h l y later in this c h a p t e r .
O u r r a p p o r t with the a r t w o r k , as with the cadaver, is n o t
m a d e up of memories but of the sudden eruption of the imme-
m o r i a l — a r a p p o r t t h a t i s c o n t i n u a l l y s u b t r a c t e d f r o m all a c -
tual, representational states one m a y have enjoyed w i t h the
d e p a r t e d o r w i t h t h a t w h i c h t h e a r t w o r k p r i m a facie r e p r e s e n t s .
T h a t is to say, we e n t e r i n t o a r a p p o r t t h a t is autonomous a n d
w h o s e r e l a t i o n t o all lived a n d m e m o r i a l e x p e r i e n c e s o r s t a t e s
of mind is always equivocal. This rapport, which the artwork
provokes, is the becoming-equivocal of m e m o r y and percep-
t i o n . It is t h e b e c o m i n g - e q u i v o c a l or b e c o m i n g - f a b u l o u s of
the real. T h e r a p p o r t is a u t o n o m o u s because it has no subject
or o b j e c t . It is a b s o l u t e . It is n o t a r a p p o r t with a n y thing
( o t h e r t h a n its o w n o b s e s s i v e " s e l f " ) . H e n c e i t i s t h e m o s t u n -
c e r t a i n o f r a p p o r t s a n d t h e m o s t p e r s i s t e n t , since i t c a n n o t b e
absorbed into anything determinate or accomplished. It can-
n o t be p u t behind us because it is a r a p p o r t with the n o n t h i n g
t h a t s h i m m e r s " b e s i d e " the thing in a space e m p t y of space. It
c a n n o t b e p o s s e s s e d a n d p u t t o w o r k i n t h e service o f a n y
t a s k , b u t i t c a n b e a f f i r m e d — m u s t b e a f f i r m e d — o b l i q u e l y , for
i t i s w i t h o u t a n y self o r identity. Every a r t w o r k i s a n o b l i q u e
a f f i r m a t i o n o f this r a p p o r t t h a t resists definition.
W h a t if this neutralizing space, as close as possible to
m a d n e s s (if n o t its v e r y p o s s i b i l i t y a n d b e g i n n i n g ) — t h i s s p a c e
t h a t d i s c o u r s e itself o p e n s u p a n d m a i n t a i n s a n d t h a t litera-
ture purely a n d simply affirms—what if this space emptied of
all i d e n t i t i e s w e r e a l r e a d y a c o m m u n i t y ? It w o u l d be a s t r a n g e
community, 1 >ui a t ommunity nevertheless. What il that w h i c h
r e m a i n s invisible a m i u n p e r c e i v e d w a s in fact t h a t w h i c h in
any c o m m u n i t y escapes it such that o n e always already " b e -
longs" to any c o m m u n i t y whatever without, however, belong-
ing b a s e d o n a n y r e p r e s e n t a b l e c o n d i t i o n ? W h a t w o u l d i t m e a n
to belong to a community purely anonymously? To belong to
a c o m m u n i t y b e f o r e it is a c o m m u n i t y of. . . (this or t h a t ,
m e n , G o d ' s c r e a t u r e s , etc.)? A c o m m u n i t y w i t h o u t a n y essence
o r a n y p r e c o n d i t i o n s o f b e l o n g i n g ? G i o r g i o A g a m b e n profiles
for us s u c h a c o m m u n i t y in his r e m a r k a b l e b o o k La comunità
che viene. He d e s c r i b e s a c o m m u n i t y to w h i c h o n e is c a l l e d by
virtue of p u r e " b e i n g called [l'esser-detto]": the " p r o p e r t y
[ p r o p r i e t à ] , " h e says " t h a t e s t a b l i s h e s all p o s s i b l e b e l o n g i n g
[che f o n d a t u t t e l e possibili a p p a r t e n e n z e ] . " T h i s " p r o p e r t y "
h e tells u s , i s " p u r e l y l i n g u i s t i c b e i n g [ l ' e s s e r e p u r a m e n t e
linguistico]."
Whatever!
T h e " s p a c e " or structure of Agamben's b o o k is
crazy, slightly d r u n k (even a s t h e t h i n k i n g i n i t i s p r e c i s e a n d
d e l i c a t e ) . E a c h o f its brief t h r e e o r four p a g e s e c t i o n s , frag-
m e n t s , o r p a n e l s (like i n c o m i c b o o k s ) a t t e m p t s t o t h i n k t h e
same thought under various names: "Quodlibet ens," "Ex-
ample," "Ease," "Manner," "Halo," "Shekinah," " B a r t l e b y , "
"Principium Individuations, " "Image," Heidegger's as, the thus,
a n d t h e rather, a m o n g still o t h e r s . I t i s i m p o r t a n t t o r e a d e a c h
section or panel as superimposed on the others or as if each
s i m u l t a n e o u s l y o c c u p i e d t h e s a m e s p a c e (or p e r p e t u a l l y e m p t y
thought) s u c h t h a t e a c h is a n e w , d i s p a r a t e p e r s p e c t i v e b u t of
no landscape or argument. We m a y describe the b o o k as eru-
dite, or as a philosophical serendipity, b u t t h a t seems beside
t h e p o i n t , for it is as if t h e s e p a n e l s c a m e from e l s e w h e r e t h a n
 o n e m i n d or o n e t h i n k e r . T h e work, i! a n y t h i n g , is variously each i n he. 0 1 I H I o w n c o m p l e t e l y s i n g u l a r w a y . T o t h e a d u l t

e r u d i t e , a s i f A g a m b e n himself ( a n d w e k n o w n o t h i n g a b o u t w h o w a t t lies, i Ins t e n d s to petrify t h e o b j e c t a n d m a k e of it an

h i m p e r s o n a l l y ) w e r e a c r a z y a u t o - d i c t a t w h o s e poly vocal e r u - i m a g e o f itself. A n y o n e w h o h a s h a d t o t e n d m o r e t h a n t w o

diti o n a l w a y s t h r e a t e n e d t o t r a n s f o r m h i m i n t o a m u l t i p l e - children at once is a w a r e of the b r e a k u p of perception into

p e r s o n a l i t y c a s e . B u t w e insist t h a t t h e sense o f a l m o s t c o m i - r a d i c a l p e r s p e c t i v i s m a n d r a d i c a l l y p l u r a l i z e d significations.

cal e r u d i t i o n i s q u i t e t o t h e p o i n t . H e i s n o t o b s e s s e d s o m u c h O u r perspective is a perspective on that which has returned to

w i t h a n ideé fixe b u t w i t h a n I d e a t h a t p e r p e t u a l l y i n f i x e s its o r i g i n a r y i m a g e a n d i s w i t h o u t f i g u r e , a s i f o u r p e r c e p t i o n

thought, so that thoughts themselves become pure perspec- w e r e t e m p o r a r i l y b l i n d e d . W e are n o l o n g e r a b l e t o see a n

tives, or images of t h o u g h t , w i t h o u t forming any one figure. image of this or that, a n d o u r perception is o v e r w h e l m e d a n d
pulverized by pure perspectivism.
We m a y w i s h to c o m p a r e La comunità che viene to a
B a l t h u s s t r e e t scene w h e r e e a c h o f t h e c h a r a c t e r s i n t h e s t r e e t A g a m b e n ' s f r a g m e n t s , o r p a n e l s , a r e all c o m m e n t a r i e s , h e

q u i e t l y o c c u p i e s its o w n s p a c e a n d g o e s a b o u t its b u s i n e s s b u t tells u s , o n a n old m e t a p h y s i c a l p r o b l e m : t h e r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n

n

w h e r e e a c h s e e m s t o b e l o o k i n g i n t o o r m o v i n g i n t o different e s s e n c e a n d e x i s t e n c e , quid est a n d quod est. E a c h f r a g m e n t

s p a c e s s o t h a t , a s w e l o o k a t t h e c a n v a s , o u r g a z e i s petrified. r e t h i n k s this p r o b l e m ( w h i c h i s t h e p r o b l e m o f intelligibility

O u r gaze looks into no one space, b u t rather is transferred itself) a n e w , offers a n o t h e r p e r s p e c t i v e o n t h e p r o b l e m , a n d i n

from various space to various space, each tangential to the e a c h c a s e s e e k s t o liquefy t h e n o t i o n o f e s s e n c e a s s t a b l e a n d

o t h e r , b u t n o t o r g a n i c a l l y r e l a t e d . I n this w a y , e a c h c h a r a c t e r s t a b i l i z i n g , p r o p e r , erect, a n d unifying. I n s t e a d of an esse, he

b e c o m e s s i m p l e , s e r e n e , a b s o l u t e , a n d is p o s s e s s e d by a s t r a n g e a t t e m p t s t o t h i n k a " m o s t c o m m o n " o r the m o s t c o m m o n . H e

d e t a c h m e n t . O u r gaze is n o t merely passive a n d c o n t e m p l a - a t t e m p t s to t h i n k t h e W h a t e v e r or Quodlibet (qualunque or

t i v e . I t c a n n o t b u t get i n v o l v e d since i t c a n n o t e v e n f i n d w h a t quelconque), w h i c h , his t r a n s l a t o r c a u t i o n s u s , refers n o t t o

w o u l d b e called t h e s p a c e o f t h e c a n v a s . O u r eye i s d r a w n into the general or the particular, the generic or the individual, b u t

t h e c a n v a s , w h o s e " s p a c e " i s m i s s i n g , a n d w h i c h itself, t h e n , t o t h e " s i n g u l a r " i n t h e sense i n w h i c h D e l e u z e a n d B a d i o u

1 4

b e c o m e s a n e n o r m o u s eye s t a r i n g a t u s w i t h a g a z e e m p t i e d o f use the t e r m . The commonality Agamben repeatedly ap-

sight. This is Balthus's technique a n d it w a s first noticed, as p r o a c h e s in his f r a g m e n t s b o t h i n v o l v e s us in a " b e l o n g i n g "

far a s w e c a n tell, b y A n t o n i n A r t a u d , w h o c o n t r a s t s i t t o a n d also deprives us of any representable condition of belong-

t r o m p e l'oeil. 12
Instead of d u p i n g us into believing t h a t s o m e - ing. For the W h a t e v e r is just t h a t — w h a t e v e r !

thing real is there t h a t is n o t there, Balthus overcomes or over- T h e r e i s n o t h i n g m y s t e r i o u s , m a g i c a l , o r ineffable a b o u t

w h e l m s t h e d i s t a n c e d p a s s i v i t y o f c o n t e m p l a t i o n b y petrifying the Whatever. It is as c o m m o n as can be. It is the m o s t c o m -

t h e r e a l . H e a c c o m p l i s h e s this b y b r e a k i n g u p p e r s p e c t i v e i n t o m o n . It is not representable or themetizable, not because it is

f r a g m e n t s (of n o w h o l e s ) t h u s giving his c h a r a c t e r s t h e s p h i n x - w i t h d r a w n , silent, n e g a t i v e , or r e m o v e d , b u t because it is too

like q u a l i t y t h a t A r t a u d n o t i c e d i n his review. O n e c a n o b - common. It is n o t e v e n h i d d e n , a n d it offers n o t h i n g to be

serve the s a m e thing a m o n g children w h o are each fascinated thought, contemplated, or worried about. T h o u g h t need not

by, a n d t o t a l l y i n v o l v e d i n p l a y i n g w i t h , t h e s a m e o b j e c t s b u t seek after it, for it is a l r e a d y in every t h o u g h t a n d in e v e r y

 r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . Ii is not .1 g e n e r i c " g i v e n " thai we c a n a l w a y s
f a l l b a c k o n , n o r a b a n a l b a c k g r o u n d for any p o s s i b l e c o m -
m u n i t y s u c h a s " W e ' r e all h u m a n , " o r "It's a small w o r l d , " o r
" T o e a c h his o w n a s l o n g a s i t d o e s n ' t h u r t a n y o n e e l s e . " T h e
m o s t c o m m o n , like t h e il y a in L e v i n a s a n d B l a n c h o t , is w h a t
n e e d s t o b e r e p e a t e d l y a p p r o a c h e d a n d e x p o s e d , for t h e m o s t
c o m m o n i s o n l y i n its a p p r o a c h , its e x p o s u r e , its " c o m i n g . "
To a p p r o a c h the W h a t e v e r is to a p p r o a c h an ever-elsewhere
t h a t i s n o t a b s e n t , a n e v e r - h e r e t h a t i s n o t p r e s e n t . Qualunque
is the neutralization of identity t h a t is in every r e p r e s e n t a t i o n
while remaining noncontemporary with that representation.
It is o n l y g l i m p s e d in profile, or in t h e s h a d o w s of a p e r c e p -
t i o n or a feeling.
W h a t e v e r b e i n g is n o t a s u b j e c t , bypokeimenon, or s u b -
s t a n c e t h a t u n d e r l i e s all its p r e d i c a t e s a n d i s w h a t e v e r r e m a i n s
w h e n all its q u a l i t i e s a r e r e m o v e d . It is n o t a limit t h a t g r o u n d s
intelligibility. W h a t e v e r b e i n g i s b e i n g s u c h t h a t all its p r e d i -
c a t e s u n l i m i t it infinitely, u n g r o u n d or l i b e r a t e it infinitely.
W h a t e v e r b e i n g i s b e i n g t h a t f i n d s itself i n its u n l i m i t i n g . " A l l
its p r e d i c a t e s " w n d e t e r m i n e w h a t e v e r b e i n g , u n r a v e l it, a n d
expose it such that whatever being can only transcend t o w a r d
itself infinitely, t o w a r d itself s u c h a s i t i s — a n e m p t y t o t a l i t y
t h a t "all its p r e d i c a t e s " (de)constitute a n d (de)limit. W h a t e v e r
b e i n g i s b e i n g w h o s e Being i s p e r p e t u a l l y d e l a y e d , r e t a r d e d ,
or a p p r o a c h e d , for " a l l its p r e d i c a t e s " is n o t a p o s s i b i l i t y for
whatever being. Rather, it is an impossibility that continually
s h i m m e r s b e s i d e it, i n a n e m p t y i m a g i n a r y s p a c e " r e s e r v e d "
for i t b u t n e v e r o c c u p i e d .
T h i s d o e s n o t m e a n t h a t w h a t e v e r b e i n g strives m a j e s t i -
cally t o w a r d all t h a t i t c a n b e , t o w a r d a U t o p i a n self t h a t s h i m -
m e r s in an inaccessible horizon lighting up a p a t h t o w a r d s an
ideal i d e n t i t y . I n s t e a d , s o m e t h i n g q u i t e different h a p p e n s . Since
" a l l its p r e d i c a t e s " is not a p r e d i c a t e of w h a t e v e r b e i n g , a n y
particulai o u r 0! those predicates ( b e i n g - m a s c u l i n e , b e i n g -
A m e r i c a n , e.g.) e x p o s e s a relation b e t w e e n a real b e i n g a n d
an empty t o t a l i t y , a n o n t h i n g , or n o t h i n g t h a t r e n d e r s t h i s r e a l
being a whateverness. This does not drain whatever being
b l o o d l e s s a n d m a k e it, like S a r t r e ' s ego, p u r e a n d s i m p l e t r a n -
15
scendence. It means that whatever being is a pure a n d empty
relation to language, to p r e d i c a t i o n , s u c h t h a t o n l y in l a n -
g u a g e is w h a t e v e r b e i n g as it is, yet w i t h o u t b e i n g defined o n c e
a n d for all: n o t being its p r e d i c a t e s b u t being-called (this or
t h a t , " A m e r i c a n , " " m a s c u l i n e , " e.g.). W h a t e v e r b e i n g i s n o t
its q u a l i t i e s . It is its e x p o s u r e to all its q u a l i t i e s t h a t e a c h p a r -
t i c u l a r q u a l i t y r e s a y s o r re-calls. T h e e x i s t e n c e o f w h a t e v e r
b e i n g is p u r e l y l i n g u i s t i c , p u r e l y b e i n g - c a l l e d . T h u s it is in l a n -
g u a g e t h a t w h a t e v e r b e i n g f i n d s itself, suffers itself, t o u c h e s
itself in t h e p u r e p a s s i o n of b e i n g - c a l l e d . It is itself as an e m p t y
t o t a l i t y t h a t e n v e l o p s its r e a l e x i s t e n c e a s t h i s o r t h a t .
T h i s e m p t y t o t a l i t y is n o t a p u r e a n d s i m p l e v o i d . It is a
n o t h i n g or an empty space that is a d d e d to, or supplements,
a n y being whatsoever. It is a never present s u p p l e m e n t w i t h -
o u t w h i c h n o b e i n g c o u l d b e w h a t i t is. A n y p a r t i c u l a r b e i n g i s
also " w h a t e v e r is called . . . " Any particular being of course
belongs to s o m e genus of s o m e species such t h a t it c a n be
identified a s w h a t i t i n fact i s a n d c a n b e e x p e r i e n c e d a s s u c h .
B u t — a n d this is A g a m b e n ' s insight—it " b e l o n g s " to the ge-
n u s a s a n example o f it, a s a n i m a g e o r s c h e m a - i m a g e o f a n y
s u c h m e m b e r of t h a t g e n u s . It is this p a r t i c u l a r and it is an
example of w h a t e v e r is c a l l e d t h i s or t h a t p a r t i c u l a r . It is t h i s
p a r t i c u l a r ( h o u s e , e.g.) and it s e r v e s for, or s t a n d s in t h e p l a c e
of, whatever is-called ( " h o u s e , " e.g.). As s u c h it e x p o s e s its
s i n g u l a r i t y , its w h a t e v e r n e s s . I t o c c u p i e s its o w n , a n d s i m u l t a -
n e o u s l y t h e e m p t y , p l a c e of t h e e x a m p l e . It is a p a r t i c u l a r a n d
it is so-called. It is itself (idem) a n d it is w h a t e v e r b e i n g . T h i s
i s its s e c o n d life, its s e c o n d n a t u r e , A g a m b e n s a y s . I n s o f a r a s
 it is-called, it is n e i t h e r shown n o r m e a n t , is n e i t h e r this p a r
t i c u l a r n o r an insipid generality. Il only fills the e m p t y s p a c e
of t h e " w h a t e v e r is called . . ." As c a l l e d , as n a m e d , as an
e x a m p l e , i t i s n o t t h e m a t i z e d a t all. N e c e s s a r i l y , t h e e x a m p l e
(or t h e s c h e m a - i m a g e ) is t h a t in l a n g u a g e for w h i c h t h e r e is no
n a m e . It is t h e pure b e i n g - i n - l a n g u a g e of t h e n o n l i n g u i s t i c , t h e
u n n a m a b l e ( t h a t is, t h e n o n u n i v e r s a l t h a t i s n o t a p a r t i c u l a r ,
either). T h e schema-image is the image of no (representable)
figure. W e will l e a r n from o u r a n a l y s i s o f K a n t l a t e r i n t h i s
c h a p t e r t h a t an o b j e c t is itself only insofar as it need not ap-
pear as in fact it actually does appear. As s u c h , as an e x a m p l e ,
it is " g i v e n " all its possibilities as an e m p t y totality (a nonfigure)
t h a t c h a n g e s n o t h i n g b u t t h e sense o f t h e a c t u a l . A s a n e x -
a m p l e , a t h i n g is " t h e event of an o u t s i d e [I'evento di un fuori],"
A g a m b e n s a y s , b y w h i c h i t h a s access t o itself (ipse), t o " i t s
16
face, its eidos [il s u o v o l t o , il s u o eidos]" (italics in o r i g i n a l ) .
As e x e m p l a r y , a b e i n g is n o t defined by q u a l i t i e s e x c e p t
first b y p a s s i n g t h r o u g h b e i n g - c a l l e d , b y p a s s i n g t h r o u g h t h e
space of neither the particular nor the universal. A l t h o u g h a
s u c h - a n d - s u c h will be a p a r t i c u l a r c a s e , it is u n d e r s t o o d t h a t it
m u s t s e r v e for all o t h e r s o f t h e s a m e t y p e , a n d t h u s i t o c c u p i e s
t h e e m p t y p l a c e o f w h a t e v e r b e i n g — a s p a c e t h a t i s p u r e l y lin-
guistic a n d i n w h i c h i t c o m m u n i c a t e s w i t h o t h e r s i n g u l a r i t i e s
u n b o u n d by any identity. It is strictly being-called, an
u n n a m a b l e w i t h i n a n y d e n o m i n a t i o n t h a t i t m a y b e given. T h a t
is: it is a pure anteriority or infinite shortage of presence that
radically calls its identity into question. It is h e n c e c u t off f r o m
a n y real c o m m u n i t y a n d yet it is t h e m o s t - c o m m o n . It is "what-
ever is-called ..."
W h a t e v e r b e i n g is n o t a je ne sais quoi, an o b s c u r e q u a l i t y
n o o n e c a n p u t t h e i r f i n g e r o n . I t i s t h e t h i n g with all its p r e d i -
c a t e s t h a t undefine or d e l i m i t it. Quodlibet ens is t h e t h i n g
ipse, b u t o n l y i n s o f a r as it " t r a n s c e n d s t o w a r d itself" in t h e
e m p t y spa< 6 ol the e x a m p l e . T h i s e m p t y totality u n r a v e l s it of
i d e n t i t y a n d singulai r/.es it or " u n m a k e s it a c c o r d i n g to its
i m a g e , " as Blanchot w o u l d s a y . 17
It is t h e t h i n g w i t h all its
r e l a t i o n s , all its q u a l i t i e s . In t h e s p a c e of t h e e x a m p l e , t h e t h i n g
i s "all its r e l a t i o n s " a n d " a l l its q u a l i t i e s . " T o b o r r o w f r o m
one of A g a m b e n ' s o w n e x a m p l e s , 1 8
this letter p t h a t I m a k e
h e r e i s itself n o t b e c a u s e i t b e l o n g s t o a n ideal p - f o r m b u t
b e c a u s e i t b e l o n g s a m o n g , o r b o r d e r s o n , all t h e v a r i o u s dif-
ferences a n d i d i o s y n c r a s i e s in i n n u m e r a b l e v e r s i o n s of p. T h e
p h a s i d e n t i t y i n s o f a r as it b e l o n g s to an a l p h a b e t i c g e n u s , of
c o u r s e , b u t it is r e c o g n i z a b l e as w h a t it is o n l y as e n g e n d e r e d
b y a t h o u s a n d i d i o s y n c r a s i e s t h a t h a b i t u a l l y r e n d e r i t legible.
I n this w a y c o m m o n a n d p r o p e r b e c o m e i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e f r o m
each other. T h e t h o u s a n d idiosyncrasies describe an e m p t y
i n t e r w o r l d w i t h i n w h i c h w h a t i s called p m o v e s freely a n d
a c c o r d i n g t o its o w n m a n n e r . T h e e m p t y t o t a l i t y o f " i t s " i d i o -
s y n c r a s i e s a r e n o t its p r o p e r t i e s b u t its i m p r o p r i e t i e s — i t s h a -
b i t u a l resistance to p r o p r i e t y , w h i c h in fact constitutes its r e c -
o g n i z a b l e a p p e a r a n c e o n t h e p a g e . T h i s i s its s e c o n d n a t u r e ,
its s i n g u l a r i t y . T h u s A g a m b e n s h o w s u s s o m e t h i n g t h a t i s n o t
e s t a b l i s h e d o n c e a n d for all, eternally, b u t t h a t w h i c h i s al-
w a y s I'entretemps, d e l a y e d o r c o m i n g a m o n g s t "an infinite
series o f m o d a l v a r i a t i o n s [ u n a serie infinita d i o s c i l l a z i o n i
1 9
modali]." Each individual p opens o n t o an exemplarity, a
s i n g u l a r i t y , t h a t i s its o s c i l l a t i o n s — a v i c a r i o u s s p a c e w h e r e
e a c h i n d i v i d u a l p s u b s t i t u t e s itself for e a c h o t h e r p o s s i b l e p
s u c h t h a t this p a r t i c u l a r p is i n c a r n a t e d as s u b s t i t u t e d .
In this a n d in m a n y other w a y s , A g a m b e n describes c o m -
m u n i t y such t h a t each being occupies a particular place t h a t is
radically in question as it opens o n t o another space where
e a c h b e i n g i s a l w a y s a l r e a d y s u b s t i t u t e d for a n o t h e r b e i n g w h o
is in an always other place. In that " o t h e r " space, "beside
itself," as exemplary, it c o m m u n i c a t e s w i t h all o t h e r singularities.

T h i s is not an actualized c o m m u n i t y . No i n f o r m a t i o n is p a s s e d
a l o n g i n a n y real c o m m u n i c a t i o n . T h e c o m m u n i t y c o m m u n i -
c a t e s o n l y its b e l o n g i n g t o t h e m o s t - c o m m o n . I n t h e e x a m p l e ,
s i n g u l a r b e i n g is " e x p r o p r i a t e d of all i d e n t i t y ( e s p r o p r i a t e di
tutte le identità]" 2 0
a n d a b a n d o n e d to pure a n d simple be-
l o n g i n g . (It is n o t as myself, b u t as s i n g u l a r , as other, t h a t I am
exposed to the other. " I , " in short, to return to the language
o f B l a n c h o t , b e c o m e s H e , il, N e u t e r . T h e m u l t i p l e c o m m o n
space described by A g a m b e n r e m a i n s , in my o p i n i o n , close to
B l a n c h o t i a n a e s t h e t i c s , i n spite o f A g a m b e n ' s r e s e r v a t i o n s . )
In Agamben's politics, the expropriation of identity a n d
t h e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n — t o d a y s o i n e s c a p a b l e — o f t h e real i n t o its
image provide us with an unprecedented opportunity to ap-
p r o p r i a t e t h e m o s t - c o m m o n a n d t o e x p e r i e n c e t h e fact t h a t
12
one speaks. T h i s w o u l d a l s o be t h e v e r y a p p r o p r i a t i o n of ( o r
by) a n o n y m i t y t h a t a n i m a t e s all o f B l a n c h o t ' s n a r r a t o r s a n d i t
perfectly d e s c r i b e s B l a n c h o t ' s m e d i t a t i o n s o n w r i t i n g a n d t h e
s p a c e o f l i t e r a t u r e . For, w h e n one s p e a k s , n o o n e ( n o t h e n o r
she, n o t this o n e n o r t h a t one) speaks. O n e becomes w h a t e v e r
or w h o m e v e r speaker, one becomes speaking-being as such,
a n d n o t a m o r e - o r less-qualified s p e a k e r . I n d e e d , o n e i s d e -
p r o p r i a t e d o f all d e t e r m i n a t e q u a l i t i e s a n d o n e e n t e r s t h e e n -
tire space of discourse, such that the one w h o speaks c a n n o t
b e a s c e r t a i n e d o r identified, b u t c i r c u l a t e s w i t h i n d i s c o u r s e
itself. A s p u r e s p e a k i n g - b e i n g , I s p e a k w i t h o u t a n y o n e ' s b e i n g
able to trace my w o r d s back to me and hold me accountable
for t h e m , even if I s t a n d s m a c k in f r o n t of t h e o t h e r p e r s o n ,
b e c a u s e t h e experience of s p e a k i n g - b e i n g d o e s n o t refer to a
self t h a t I w o u l d b e . A s s p e a k i n g - b e i n g , u n a b l e t o refer t o a n y
reality, I w o u l d s p e a k w i t h o u t h a v i n g a n y b a s i s for s p e a k i n g ,
any reason to open my mouth. Moreover, I would speak with-
o u t having anything to communicate. My speech w o u l d carry
no information intended to inform a n o t h e r speaker, a n o t h e r
a k, n IM w i u /\ i l l ' i ii i l'ii i I I I C A I NEUTER
identity. W h e n I '.peak, no identity w o u l d s p e a k a n d I w o u l d
s p e a k an imaginary, a b s o l u t e l a n g u a g e . I w o u l d be s p e a k i n g
from t h e p l a c e o l the O t h e r w h o w o u l d r e m a i n a l w a y s else-
w h e r e . As s u c h , I w o u l d a p p r o a c h t h e o t h e r as other, o u t s i d e
a n y identity, for I w o u l d n o t be t h e s u b j e c t of a n y d i s c o u r s e .
"Older" t h a n a n y communique w o u l d b e t h i s r a p p o r t w i t h
the O t h e r outside intersubjectivity, a n d completely linguistic
b e i n g w o u l d " c o m e " t o u s like a l o n g s u p p r e s s e d r e m i n i s c e n c e
o r like a l o n g - s u p p r e s s e d p a s s i o n . C o m m u n i c a t i o n w o u l d t h e n
21
be united w i t h this passionate r a p p o r t , or for-the-other-ness,
in a s p e e c h t h a t says n o t h i n g , r e v e a l s n o t h i n g , a n d t h a t is as a
foreign l a n g u a g e w i t h i n o n e ' s n a t i v e t o n g u e (as t h e n a r r a t o r
23
of L'arrèt de mort e x p e r i e n c e s ) . This radical communicativity
w o u l d "possess" us a n d open a space that is not-yet colonized
by the State.
Community
T h e fate a n d d e s t i n y o f a c o m m u n i t y ( h u m a n b e -
ing) t h a t d o e s n o t h a v e its origin i n itself a n d c a n n o t f i n d its
o r i g i n o u t s i d e itself e x c e p t i n silence, t r a g e d y , o r a l i e n a t i o n —
in s h o r t , a negative g r o u n d — i s t h e subject of A g a m b e n ' s m e d i -
t a t i o n in his e a r l i e r b o o k Language and Death: The Place of
Negativity {Il linguaggio e la morte: Un seminario sul luogo
14
della negatività]. In t h a t b o o k , he a t t e m p t s to a p p r o a c h an
experience of language t h a t does n o t rest on a negative foun-
dation and he does not find that experience in either philoso-
p h y or poetry. Each of those traditions also traces the h u m a n
voice t h r o u g h l a n g u a g e , b u t e a c h finds o n l y ineffability, silence,
mystery, sacred action, or the tragic division of existence a n d
e s s e n c e , a n d t h e a b s o l u t e fear o f t h e H e g e l i a n t h r e a t o f t h e
N e g a t i v e t h a t m a g i c a l l y t r a n s f o r m s N o t h i n g n e s s i n t o Being.
T h a t i s t o say, n e i t h e r p h i l o s o p h y n o r p o e t r y i s a b l e t o g r a s p
 t h e t a k i n g - p l a c e <>l l a n g u a g e w i n c h w o u l d he the t a k i n g - p l a c e s u c h thai the Von e the division ol n a t u r e a n d c u l t u r e , d e n o -

of t h e h u m a n (insofar as h u m a n b e i n g is s p e a k i n g - b e i n g ) s u c h t a t i o n a n d signification, s h o w i n g a n d telling, e.g.—is a b o l i s h e d

t h a t h u m a n b e i n g w o u l d t h e n be capable of l a n g u a g e , seize w i t h o u t a t r a c e . La comunità che viene is an a t t e m p t to t h i n k

t h e f a c u l t y for l a n g u a g e , a n d u n i t e it w i t h his finitude as a habit, o u r " s e c o n d n a t u r e , " in s u c h a w a y t h a t it is n o t seized,

c o m p l e t e d f o u n d a t i o n . But, A g a m b e n says, h u m a n being, in b u t t e n d s t o w a r d itself, t o w a r d t r a n s p a r e n c y . A g a m b e n ' s b o o k

fact, does not have a voice—a n a t u r e , an e s s e n c e — n o t e v e n a i s a n a t t e m p t t o t h i n k l a n g u a g e a s ipse a n d n o t idem: l a n g u a g e

b a s i c a l l y r e m o v e d , s i l e n t , o r n e g a t i v e v o i c e (or V o i c e , a s o u t s i d e identity, o r l a n g u a g e a s t h a t w h i c h h a s n o i d e n t i t y , n o

A g a m b e n c h r i s t e n s it). In s h o r t , t h e r e is no o r i g i n a l vouloir essence. In d o i n g this, A g a m b e n is attempting to think that, if

dire, a n d t h i s , a l a s , h a s d e s t i n e d h u m a n b e i n g t o a h i s t o r y a n d it is the essence of h u m a n being to exist—Heidegger's m o s t

a State (which we n o w inherit in the form of Capital). T h u s , difficult t h o u g h t — t h e n it is in l a n g u a g e , w h i c h h a s no e s s e n c e ,

w i t h N i e t z s c h e , A g a m b e n c o n c l u d e s t h a t t h e Voice m u s t d i e . 2 5 t h a t h u m a n being b e c o m e s capable of this. Such a l a n g u a g e is

16 m e r e l y t h e " trite w o r d s t h a t we have [le trite p a r o l e c h e abbia-
B u t w h a t is l a n g u a g e w i t h o u t a Voice, w i t h o u t a Sigetics?
29
mo}." All of his b o o k is an a t t e m p t to get " b e t w e e n " existence
W h a t i s a l a n g u a g e t h a t d o e s n o t say perfectly a n d p r e s e r v e i n
a n d essence into a p a r a o n o m a s t i c interworld t h a t t r a n s c e n d s
itself a n U n s a y a b l e , a n Ineffable, a M y s t e r y ? W h a t , i n s h o r t ,
o n l y t o w a r d itself a n d d o e s n o t refer b a c k t o a n a n t e r i o r r e a l -
is a language that does not c o n d e m n h u m a n being to a State,
ity t h a t w o u l d r e m a i n ineffable a n d u n s a y a b l e , n o r t o w a r d a
a Sacer, a d e s t i n y ? W h a t is a l a n g u a g e t h a t so i m p o v e r i s h e s
fictitious signification t h a t w o u l d a n n i h i l a t e t h e r e a l a n d u n -
h u m a n b e i n g t h a t t h e " e x t r e m e l y nullifying u n v e i l i n g [ e s t r e m o
27 veil i t a s essentially N o t h i n g . T h i s i n t e r w o r l d i s p o p u l a t e d w i t h
svelamento nullificante]" that we today experience w o u l d
b e i n g s w h o s e b e i n g is o n l y in-language.
a c t u a l l y offer us a h o p e ? A h o p e n o t for an e x t r e m e H a v i n g -
been that, in the Hegelian Absolute or the Heideggerian T h o u g h t , h e tells u s , t r a d i t i o n a l l y w a n t s t o t h i n k e i t h e r

Ereignis, c o u l d be seized a n d a p p r o p r i a t e d , b u t a h o p e for a t h e e x i s t e n c e o r t h e essence. A g a m b e n w a n t s t o t h i n k t h e i r

Never-having-been, an extreme youth or an absolute infancy m u t u a l i m p l i c a t i o n , t h e e r o s i o n o f t h e i r difference, i n t h e a n -

s u c h t h a t h u m a n b e i n g w o u l d n o t yet h a v e b e e n b o r n ! 2 8
Such a m o r p h i c " s p a c e " b e t w e e n " t h e n a m e d t h i n g a n d its b e i n g -

a b e i n g — w h o never has b e e n — w o u l d speak a language t h a t n a m e d , b e t w e e n t h e n a m e a n d its r e f e r e n c e t o t h e t h i n g : b e -

does n o t presuppose w o r k , meaning, or articulation. Such a t w e e n , t h a t is, t h e n a m e ' r o s e ' i n s o f a r a s i t signifies t h e r o s e

3 0

b e i n g , n e v e r h a v i n g b e e n , w o u l d b e imaginary, i n t h a t " o t h e r " a n d t h e r o s e i n s o f a r a s i t i s signified b y t h e n a m e ' r o s e ' . "

v e r s i o n B l a n c h o t defines for u s , a n d s u c h a l a n g u a g e w o u l d b e T h i s d e l i c a t e i n t e r v a l is t h e p u r e e x p o s u r e of this to that (quod

a m b i g u o u s , since i t w o u l d a n d w o u l d n o t b e t h e voice o f h u - t o quid), e x i s t e n c e t o e s s e n c e , s u c h t h a t t h e i r m u t u a l i m p l i c a -

m a n b e i n g . I t w o u l d n o l o n g e r refer b a c k t o a self h u m a n t i o n is t h e p u r e thusness of t h e b e i n g , t h e ipseity of t h e ens. He

being w o u l d be. f i n d s i n o u r e r a a n u n p r e c e d e n t e d o p p o r t u n i t y t o seize t h e

thus: t h e p u r e b e i n g - i n - l a n g u a g e o f t h e n o n l i n g u i s t i c . N o t p u r e
A g a m b e n ' s La comunità che viene is an a t t e m p t to t h i n k
being (ousias tes ousias, substantia sine qualitate) but pure
beyond the "magical" power of the negative. It attempts to
being-in-language. T h e p u r e r e l a t i o n t h a t i s n e i t h e r d e n o t e d
t h i n k a n e x p e r i e n c e o f l a n g u a g e itself, t r a n s p a r e n t t o itself,

n o r m e a n t , n e i t h e r s h o w n n o r said. N e i t h e r the s u b j e c t — t h e
p u r e r e l a t i o n l e s s b e i n g t h a t c a n o n l y b e s h o w n a n d not s a i d —
n o r t h a t w h i c h is said of the thing in the proposition, but the
p e r f e c t l y exposed b e i n g t h a t is a l w a y s a l r e a d y in l a n g u a g e ,
always already hollowed out by representation. This "be-
t w e e n " i s n o t t h e t h i n g i n its n o n r e l a t i o n a l d e n o t a t e d n e s s , n o r
t h e t h i n g in its i d e n t i t y (its m e a n i n g ) . It is t h e t h i n g itself (ipse).
N o t pure being, but being-such: the being-such, A g a m b e n says,
of the " a s " in the question, " w h a t is being as being?" N o t ,
t h e r e f o r e , p r e l i n g u i s t i c s u b s t a n c e , n o r a n y said, b u t t h a t w h i c h
"exists" only as always already hollowed out by representa-
tion. Such beings p o p u l a t e Agamben's " c o m i n g c o m m u n i t y . "
I t m a y b e helpful h e r e t o t h i n k o f t h a t w o n d e r f u l p o p u l a -
tion w h o s e existence is purely plastic: the H o l l y w o o d c h a r a c -
ter actor. These are actors w h o s e n a m e s m a y be k n o w n to us
( T h e l m a Ritter, Elisha C o o k Jr., W a l t e r B r e n n a n ) b u t m u c h
m o r e often t h a n n o t t h e y r e m a i n u n k n o w n a n d f o r g o t t e n ,
b u r i e d i n t h e c r e d i t s a t t h e e n d o f t h e film a s w e w a l k o u t o f
t h e t h e a t e r o r p u s h t h e r e w i n d b u t t o n . Yet t h e y a r e e v e r s o
familiar a n d ever s o versatile, a p p e a r i n g y e a r after y e a r i n m o v -
ies a n d o n T V s h o w s , i n W e s t e r n s , N o i r s , h i s t o r i c a l d r a m a s ,
b i o - p i c s , w a r p i c t u r e s , b e d r o o m farces a n d a c t i o n p o t b o i l e r s .
C h a r a c t e r actors are absolutely familiar to us b u t they never
p o s s e s s " s t a r q u a l i t y . " T h e y n e v e r get billing a b o v e t h e title o r
e v e n o n t h e m a r q u e e a t all, a n d t h e y n e v e r s t a r i n t h e i r o w n
t e l e v i s i o n series o r e v e n costar. T h e y a r e n o t L o n C h a n e y , w h o
w o r k e d s o tirelessly a t t h e a r t o f self-disguise t h a t h e b e c a m e a
H o l l y w o o d l e g e n d a n d even h a d a film m a d e a b o u t h i m star-
ring J a m e s Cagney. Instead, these character actors we have in
m i n d n e v e r w o r k h a r d t o disguise t h e m s e l v e s o r t o d i s s o l v e
into a role as in " m e t h o d " acting. To the contrary, they play
t h e i r v a r i o u s r o l e s i n m u c h t h e s a m e w a y , film after f i l m , y e a r
after year, d e c a d e after d e c a d e . T h e y a r e a c t o r s w h o b e c o m e
I
ii M N IVI i n N l\ IN I i l I I I r v i I I I I I A I IN I I I I r I
I )
so I.mull II because theit reality is entirely m a d e up of t h e i r
v a r i o u s roles such that their m a n n e r i s m s , h a b i t s , l o o k s , v o c a l
t o n a l i t i e s , a n d g e s t u r e s all b e c o m e characteristic a n d as f a m i l -
iar a s t h e a c t o r s t h e m s e l v e s r e m a i n u n f a m i l i a r t o u s . T h e s e a r e
a c t o r s , i n s h o r t , w h o show u s t h e i r a n o n y m i t y a n d w e , i n t u r n ,
quite a p p r o p r i a t e l y b e c o m e absolutely indifferent to t h e m .
They always play " t y p e s " a n d they are n o t h i n g a p a r t from
t h e t y p e s t h e y play. T h e y r e m a i n s o u n k n o w n t o u s n o t b e -
cause they hide an essence, but because they are completely
e x p o s e d . (If y o u ever t r o u b l e yourself t o s e a r c h t h r o u g h t h e
c r e d i t s for s u c h a n a c t o r ' s n a m e i t i s p r o b a b l y o n l y b e c a u s e
y o u s u d d e n l y realize y o u ' v e b e e n seeing h i m o r h e r for y e a r s
without realizing it, a n d this h a s n o t h i n g to do w i t h t h e i r h a v -
i n g g i v e n a p a r t i c u l a r l y s t u n n i n g p e r f o r m a n c e . ) T h e r e is n o t h -
i n g ineffable a b o u t t h e s e a c t o r s . T h e r e i s n o r e s i d u e o f g r e a t -
n e s s , g e n i u s , o r e v e n t a l e n t t h a t clings t o t h e i r a p p e a r a n c e o n
the screen. T h e y are a void in the midst of the w h o l e ensemble
o f a c t o r s b r o u g h t t o g e t h e r for t h e p i c t u r e . W e b e c o m e a c c u s -
t o m e d t o seeing t h e m , yet w e k n o w n o t h i n g a b o u t t h e m via
biographies, cults, tabloids, talk s h o w s , or a w a r d s ceremo-
nies. W e k n o w t h e m o n l y a s i m a g e s a n d w e see t h e m o n l y a s
i m a g e s , t h a t is, as allegories of t h e m s e l v e s . E a c h r o l e is a n -
o t h e r allegory.
These marvelous actors are therefore singularities. T h e y
c a n n o t b e d i s t i n g u i s h e d a s s t a r s n o r identified w i t h a p a r t i c u -
lar r o l e (for e a c h role t h e y play is an e c h o of all t h e o t h e r s — a l l
m o r e o r less t h e s a m e ) a n d t h e y s e e m perfectly a t e a s e w i t h
"themselves." We can appreciate the star or g l a m o u r quality
o f G r a c e Kelly's p r e s e n c e o n t h e screen a n d t h e g r e a t n e s s (if
n o t t h e genius) o f L a u r e n c e Olivier's t a l e n t — s o m e e x t r a o r d i -
nary or extracinematic "essence"—but character actors are
c o m p l e t e l y a b s o r b e d i n t o t h e c e l l u l o i d , t h e stock, t h e s t e r e o -
t y p e s t h e y p l a y s o perfectly. T h e y a r e " t y p e s " a n d t h e y h a v e

a s s u m e d t h e m s e l v e s as s u c h . The character a c t o r c a n n o t In-
identified w i t h a n y p a r t i c u l a r role hut n e i t h e r d o they e v o k e
n o r e x p r e s s a n y t h i n g o t h e r t h a n the r o l e . T h e y h a v e a p u r e
relation to cinema.
T h e e x p e r i e n c e o f t h e c h a r a c t e r actor, t h e n , i s t h e e x p e r i -
ence of p u r e being-in-language—an experience, Blanchot could
say, o f t h e e v e n t a s a n i m a g e , t h a t i s t o say, a s n o t h i n g o t h e r
t h a n its q u a l i t i e s b u t s u c h t h a t t h e s e q u a l i t i e s cling t o n o r e a l -
ity, n o identity, a n d refer o n l y t o t h e m s e l v e s . L e v i n a s r e m i n d s
u s t h a t reality i s a l r e a d y its o w n such e v e n t . W e h a b i t u a l l y see
a t h i n g as its i m a g e , n o t t h r o u g h it. Reality, he h a s t o l d u s , is
d u a l — i t is itself in its t r u t h (idem) a n d in its i m a g e , " l i k e a
3 1
t o r n s a c k t h a t spills its c o n t e n t s . " Very similarly, A g a m b e n
writes:
It is as if t h e f o r m , t h e k n o w a b i l i t y , t h e f e a t u r e s of
every entity w e r e d e t a c h e d f r o m it, n o t a s a n o t h e r t h i n g ,
b u t a s a n intentio, a n a n g e l , a n i m a g e . T h e m o d e o f
b e i n g of this intentio is n e i t h e r s i m p l e e x i s t e n c e n o r
t r a n s c e n d e n c e ; it is a p a r a e x i s t e n c e or a p a r a t r a n s c e n -
d e n c e t h a t d w e l l s beside t h e t h i n g (in all t h e senses o f
t h e prefix ' p a r a - ' ) , so close t h a t it almost m e r g e s w i t h
it, g i v i n g it a h a l o . It is n o t t h e i d e n t i t y of t h e t h i n g
a n d y e t it is n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n t h e t h i n g (it is none-
other).
[È c o m e se la f o r m a , la c o n o s c i b i l i t à , la fattezza di
ogni ente si staccasse da esso, n o n c o m e un'altra cosa,
m a c o m e uWintentio, u n a n g e l o , u n ' i m m a g i n e . I l m o d o
di essere di q u e s t a intentio n o n è u n a s e m p l i c e esistenza
né u n a t r a s c e n d e n z a : è u n a p a r a e s i s t e n z a o u n a
p a r a t r a s c e n d e n z a , c h e d i m o r a a fianco alla c o s a (in
t u t t i i sensi della p r e p o s i z i o n e para), c o s i a fianco da
a * i a ivi is r in a in p i 11 i r i ) i i t t i Al NEUTER I 3 5
confondersi quasi i o n essa, d a nimbarla. Essa non e
I'identita d e l la cosa e, tuttavia, n o n e a l t r o (e non altro)
che questa.] 12
T h i s i m a g e , e v e n t , singularity, a l l e g o r y of itself, or I d e a
3 3
(as A g a m b e n u n d e r s t a n d s i t ) i s b e i n g s u c h - a s - i t - i s , its n o n e -
o t h e r n e s s , or its n o t - o t h e r w i s e n e s s . As a c h a r a c t e r - a c t o r , t h e
a c t o r b e c o m e s his o r her o w n i m a g e . C h a r a c t e r a c t o r s a r e c a p a -
ble o f t h e i r n o t - o t h e r w i s e n e s s such t h a t , w i t h o u t a n y r e s i d u e ,
t h e y n e i t h e r b e t r a y a n essence n o r a s u b s t a n c e t h e y " r e a l l y "
a r e , n o r d o t h e y identify t h e m s e l v e s w i t h a n y o n e r o l e , b u t
r a t h e r m o v e freely, h a p p i l y , i m p e r c e p t i b l y a n d i r r e p a r a b l y
within the paraonomastic interzone of thusness. They are noth-
i n g o t h e r t h a n t h e i r t y p e s , m a n n e r i s m s , a n d g e s t u r e s , a n d yet
t h e y are not t h e s e q u a l i t i e s . T h e y h a v e a s s u m e d t h e i r m a n n e r
of being improperly, habitually, w i t h o u t assuming this or t h a t
q u a l i t y a s definitive o f t h e i r identity. T h e y a r e nicely i n s o u c i -
ant, or cynical, or hypocritical with regard to image a n d real-
ity. T h e y d o n o t s t r u g g l e t o h o l d t h e t w o r e a l m s a p a r t , b u t
r a t h e r a l l o w the t w o r e a l m s t o i m p l i c a t e e a c h o t h e r . T h e y a r e
themselves the erosion of the distance that w o u l d properly
d i s t i n g u i s h t h e real f r o m t h e i m a g e . T h e y a r e n o t p o s s e s s e d b y
" a n o t h e r m e " but instead are neutral with regard to identity
b e c a u s e a s s u m i n g one's n o t - o t h e r w i s e n e s s m e a n s a s s u m i n g t h a t
w h i c h d o e s n o t refer b a c k t o a self, a n " I , " t h a t o n e w o u l d
truly be. C h a r a c t e r actors are at ease w i t h their m a n n e r of
b e i n g . I n this w a y , t h e c h a r a c t e r a c t o r r e m a i n s r i g o r o u s l y u n i -
dentifiable (and n o t simply buried in the credits at the e n d of
t h e f i l m , since t o w h o m w o u l d t h i s o r t h a t p r o p e r n a m e refer,
anyway)? Unlike star presence, character acting " s h o w s " a
nonparticular presence: a dead presence that seems to belong
t o n o p a r t i c u l a r film i t h a p p e n s t o t u r n u p in.
I n t h e s p a c e o f t h e " t y p e , " t h e h a b i t u a l , or, a s B l a n c h o t
 could say, the- "everyday," the definitive is engulfed and lost either gravitate toward the h e r o , or w h o , a c t i n g as o n e , t h e m -

a n d , even m o r e d i s a s t r o u s , the unity of space is s h a t t e r e d , since selves constitute a p o w e r ) . C h a r a c t e r a c t i n g is t h e p o w e r l e s s

these " t y p e s " c o m m u n i c a t e with each other w i t h o u t forming possibility ol d i s s o l u t i o n , of n e i t h e r / n o r , of a n o n y m i t y , t h a t

an o r g a n i c c o m m u n i t y or a unicity. T h e y " f o r m " a m o t l e y . t h r e a t e n s all m e m b e r s of all classes. ( O n The Tonight Show

T h a t is, t h e s e c h a r a c t e r s d o n o t c o m e t o g e t h e r w i t h i n a unicity, with Johnny Carson, Gene Hackman once anxiously com-

b u t r a t h e r e x i s t side b y side a s f r a g m e n t s . T h e s p a c e o f c h a r - p l a i n e d t h a t h e w a s b e c o m i n g a c h a r a c t e r actor. J o h n n y q u i c k l y

a c t e r a c t o r s dissolves t h e u n i t y o f s p a c e , a n d t h e g l a m o r o u s reassured him that that couldn't be true, because he h a d re-

p r e s e n c e of t h e G r e a t S t a r ( H u m p h r e y B o g a r t in Casablanca, c e n t l y w o n a n A c a d e m y A w a r d for Best Actor.)

J o s e p h C o t t o n in The Third Man) is a l w a y s in d a n g e r of b e i n g I n m i n o r r o l e s a n d a s bit p l a y e r s , c h a r a c t e r a c t o r s a l w a y s

d r o w n e d b y t h e s e m u l t i p l e a n d s i n g u l a r indifferences t o star- a p p e a r as r e p r o d u c e d . W h e n they t u r n up on the screen o u r

d o m a n d even to " a c t i n g . " As in a Balthus street scene, each g a z e a t t h e m i s p u r e l y superficial, u n b u r d e n e d o f t h e d r a m a o f

c h a r a c t e r a c t o r o c c u p i e s his o r h e r o w n scintillating a n d u n i q u e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n t h a t t h e g l a m o u r o f t h e s t a r e v o k e s . Character

s p a c e t h a t t h r e a t e n s t o dissolve t h e n a r r a t i v e i n t o a n infinite actors do not challenge us to see. T h e y offer o u r g a z e t h a t

series o f i n d e t e r m i n a t e a n d c h a o t i c p o s s i b i l i t i e s . I n t h e i r w a y s , w h i c h r e m a i n s t o b e seen w h e n t h e r e i s n o t h i n g t o see a n d o u r

character actors c o m m u n i c a t e destruction: the radical destruc- g a z e i s a l w a y s satisfied b y t h e m , b y t h e i r i n d e f i n i t e n e s s , b y

t i v e n e s s of a n o n c o l l e c t i v e , n o n i d e n t i f i a b l e c o m m u n i t y . T h e y t h e i r soft u n c e r t a i n p r e s e n c e . T h e s e a c t o r s m a n a g e t o b e i d e n -

a r e e a c h t h e possibility of still appearing w h e n t h e r e is no l o n g e r tified n e i t h e r w i t h t h e i r r e a l n a m e s n o r w i t h a n y n a m e t h e y

a n y o n e to be, no immanence a n d no identity to belong to. m a y be g i v e n in a film. T h e y a r e t h e u n s t a b l e shifters in c i n -

ematic grammar. Always " h e " or "she," always "the one w h o
Character-actors are employed by H o l l y w o o d to repre-
w e j u s t s a w i n . . . , " a l w a y s t h e i r n e x t and p r e v i o u s r o l e s , t h e y
s e n t t h e b u s i n e s s a n d h u m o f e v e r y d a y life. T h e y a r e p a i d t o
a r e p u r e e c h o e s o f identity, m a n i f e s t a t i o n s o f insignificance.
represent w h a t happens when nothing happens: everydayness.
W h e n w e see t h e m a g a i n o n t h e s c r e e n , i n yet a n o t h e r f i l m o r
Waiters and waitresses, cabdrivers, cooks, petty crooks, ordi-
T V s h o w (for t h e y a r e a l w a y s a n d o n l y seen repeatedly, n e v e r
nary GIs, musicians, servants, shopkeepers, secretaries, bu-
for a first t i m e ) t h e y a r e seen precisely as s o m e o n e I r e c o g n i z e
r e a u c r a t s , a n d stool pigeons: these roles c o m p r i s e a "petty
b u t h a d f o r g o t t e n e v e n e x i s t e d . But f r o m w h e r e d o I r e c o g n i z e
b o u r g e o i s i e " i n t h e H o l l y w o o d social e c o n o m y . N e i t h e r e x -
t h e m ? I t i s difficult t o say b e c a u s e t h e y a r e n o t identified w i t h
t r a s n o r c o s t a r s , t h e c h a r a c t e r a c t o r i s forever " b e t w e e n " t h e s e
a n y o n e picture o r T V show. ( N o o n e goes t o the c i n e m a t o see
t w o poles. T h e y are n o t p a r t of a m o b , a theater a u d i e n c e , a
a n A k i m Tamiroff o r a Q u e e n i e Smith f i l m . ) T h u s t h e y h a p p e n
street c r o w d ; nor are they strewn, bloody a n d motionless, on
t o a p p e a r , here a n d t h e r e , n o w a n d t h e n , a s events o f r e - c o g n i -
a n y o f c o u n t l e s s m a k e - b e l i e v e battlefields. N e i t h e r a r e t h e y
t i o n , r e p e t i t i o n , a n d difference. Radically d e p r o p r i a t e d of iden-
e v e r l e a d s , n o r h e r o e s . B e l o n g i n g t o n e i t h e r class t h e y a r e , i n
tity (right in front of o u r eyes!), radically " i m a g e d , " radically
effect, w i t h d r a w n f r o m all classes a n d t h e y a r e t h e p o s s i b i l i t y
s t e r e o t y p e d , they are just as radically " c a p a b l e " of their d e p r o -
of dissolution that threatens both the individual p o w e r of the
p r i a t i o n . T h e y a r e " c a p a b l e " o f i m p r o p r i e t y , insignificance,
h e r o or t h e l e a d e r and also t h e p o w e r of t h e collective ( w h o
 i n s u b s t a n t i a l i t y . They do not appropriate their q u a l i t i e s as s t a l e d , the i ( v C M luston from the p e r s o n a l . I n the w o r k o f a r t ,
r a d i c a l l y idcntificatory of themselves. I n s t e a d , they a r c , in- as in t h e c o r p s e ( w h e r e w h a t a p p e a r s insists u p o n t h e a b s e n c e
t h e m s e l v e s , t h e p u r e " t a k i n g - p l a c e " of t h o s e q u a l i t i e s : an a c - a n d inaccessibility o f t h a t w h i c h i s r e p r e s e n t e d ) , this " o t h e r "
t o r = x, s o r t of. T h a t is t h e secret of t h e i r lightness a n d t h e i r r e l a t i o n m a k e s itself o b s c u r e l y felt. I m p o r t a n t l y , t h i s " o t h e r "
a l w a y s familiar b u t i n s u b s t a n t i a l " l i f e . " W h i l e J a c k i e G l e a s o n ' s r e l a t i o n is a r e l a t i o n to t h e same t h i n g , a r e l a t i o n w i t h t h a t
o b e s i t y identified h i m a n d m a r k e d b o t h his c o m i c a n d d r a - shadow "behind" appearances that is nothing other than the
matic roles with an uncomfortable p a t h o s , in Sydney Green- t h i n g itself. I n s h o r t , w e shall s h o w t h a t o n e a l w a y s h a s a
s t r e e t o b e s i t y is b o r n e superficially a n d s t e r e o t y p i c a l l y , like a relation with a not-otherwiseness, or irreparability, anteced-
s i m p l e p l a y o f light a n d s h a d o w . e n t t o all d e t e r m i n a t e r e l a t i o n s . B u t t h a t " o t h e r " r a p p o r t i s a
r a p p o r t with no object. It is a r a p p o r t with nothing other t h a n
t h e self i t s e l f — b u t o u t s i d e of, a n d e x t e r i o r t o , itself.
Object = x A c c o r d i n g t o W i l l i a m R i c h a r d s o n (from w h o s e a d m i r a b l y
If The Coming Community is, as A g a m b e n s a y s , a c l e a r s u m m a r y of t h e Kantbuch we will b o r r o w h e a v i l y in
c o m m e n t a r y on s e c t i o n 9 of Being and Time a n d on p r o p o s i - w h a t follows) the key to Heidegger's study of the First Critique
3 8
tion 6.44 of Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 34
i s his r e p e a t e d i n s i s t e n c e o n t h e f i n i t u d e o f h u m a n k n o w i n g .
it is a l s o , in o u r o p i n i o n , t h o r o u g h l y p r e c e d e n t e d by H e i d e g g e r ' s T h e h u m a n knower does not create the being-to-be-known.
Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics and in particular the T h a t w h i c h is k n o w n is always objective in character, is out-
a n a l y s i s o f w h a t h e c o n s i d e r s t o b e t h e " k e r n e l " o f t h e Cri- side t h e k n o w e r , a n d i s n o t t h e k n o w e r . A s f i n i t e , h u m a n k n o w -
tique of Pure Reason, the Transcendental Schema. 3 5
In t h i s i n g m u s t b e g i n i n i n t u i t i o n , s e n s a t i o n , r e c e p t i o n , affect, p a s -
analysis, Heidegger shows t h a t at the heart of objectivity there sivity. T h e " p a s s i v e " side o f k n o w i n g i s o n t o l o g i c a l l y a n t e r i o r
is a n o n t h i n g , a n o n b e i n g , a n o n e m p i r i c a l a n d u n i n t e n d e d " m e - a n d p r i m a r y . B u t for K a n t , a s i s well k n o w n , r e c e p t i v i t y i s n o t
d i u m , " or, as K a n t calls it, an O b j e c t = x w h e r e t h e " p o w e r " sufficient for k n o w l e d g e . T h e i m m e d i a t e p r e s e n t a t i o n of a sin-
of t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l imagination (Einbildungskraft) becomes g u l a r m u s t b e d e t e r m i n e d t o b e such o r s u c h . A s d e t e r m i n e d ,
e q u i v o c a l : e q u a l l y active a n d p a s s i v e , o r p e r h a p s p u r e l y p a s - t h e i m m e d i a t e l y i n t u i t e d is t h e n r e - p r e s e n t e d as w h a t it is in
sionate. 3 6
T h e O b j e c t = x, we shall see, is t h e essentially o b j e c - g e n e r a l , in light of universality. T h i s side of k n o w i n g is t h o u g h t .
tive o r e x t e r i o r c h a r a c t e r o f w h a t i s m o s t i n t i m a t e o r interior. It is active a n d " s p o n t a n e o u s . " F r o m the r a w data of intuition
It is an always anterior presentation t h a t transforms interior- the contents of universality are constructed a n d re-presented.
ity i n t o , a s B l a n c h o t w o u l d say, " a n e x t e r i o r f o r c e t h a t w e T h o u g h t , in g e n e r a l , as R i c h a r d s o n p u t s it, is a p r e s e n t a t i o n
submit to passively." 37
W e shall see t h a t every e m p i r i c a l i n t u - (in c o n c e p t s ) of a p r e s e n t a t i o n (an i n t u i t i o n ) , a n d it is e v e n
i t i o n (every " a p p e a r a n c e " ) i s h a u n t e d b y a n a s p e c t r a l p r e s e n - m o r e f i n i t e t h a n i n t u i t i o n , since i t i s o n t o l o g i c a l l y d e p e n d e n t
t a t i o n , or pure i m a g e , t h a t realizes the possibility of the a b s e n c e o n " r a w d a t a . " O n the o t h e r h a n d , t h o u g h t i s " m o r e " p r e s e n -
of t h e object, b u t t h a t r e m a i n s nevertheless a r a p p o r t w i t h t h e t a t i v e t h a n i n t u i t i o n since i t p r o v i d e s a u n i t y t h a t h o l d s g o o d
same object. This other relation is n o n p e r s o n a l or even, better for m o r e t h a n o n e p a r t i c u l a r . H u m a n k n o w i n g i s t h e i n t i m a c y

of t h e s e p r o f o u n d l y diverse s l o p e s : passive and m u l t i p l e intu-
i t i o n , a n d active a n d unifying t h o u g h t . K a n t ' s task i s t o m a k e
clear h o w t h e y c a n p o s s i b l y b e s y n t h e s i z e d . W e notice s t r a i g h t -
a w a y t h a t , a l t h o u g h d i v e r s e , t h e t w o sides h a v e s o m e t h i n g i n
c o m m o n : each presents, and we k n o w that in Kant the p o w e r
of presentation in general belongs to the transcendental imagi-
nation as it functions in the mystery of schematizing.
But w h a t c a n b e k n o w n ? K a n t ' s a n s w e r i s f a m o u s . W e
k n o w o n l y the b e i n g - t h a t - a p p e a r s , a n ob-ject o b - p o s e d (Gegen-
stand) t o a k n o w e r . W e k n o w a p p e a r a n c e s a n d , crucially, a n
a p p e a r a n c e " c a n b e n o t h i n g b y itself, o u t s i d e o u r m o d e o f
3 9
representation." However, k n o w i n g is not ontically creative.
We do n o t create t h a t which we know. There is an essential
d i s t a n c e b e t w e e n t h e k n o w e r a n d t h e k n o w n b e c a u s e t h e finite
k n o w e r does not create the being-to-be-known. A h u m a n
k n o w e r i s n o t G o d . D i s t i n c t f r o m finite k n o w i n g , a n infinite
k n o w e r d o e s n o t k n o w o b j e c t s a t all. G o d k n o w s t h e Ent-
stand, t h e e-ject (i.e., t h e t h i n g i n s o f a r as it t a k e s its o r i g i n in
4 0
God). G o d d o e s n o t k n o w t h i n g s - t h a t - a p p e a r (i.e., objects)
b u t t h i n g s as t h e y a r e , as s u c h , i n - t h e m s e l v e s (an sich). Infinite
k n o w i n g is therefore not so much better than h u m a n k n o w -
i n g ( t h a n p e r s p e c t i v i s m ) as it is p r o f o u n d l y different, b e c a u s e
n o o b j e c t s a r e e v e n given t o G o d t o b e k n o w n . T o p u t i t differ-
ently, u n l i k e t h e finite k n o w e r , G o d d o e s n o t h a v e t o a n t i c i -
p a t e a b e i n g - t o - b e - k n o w n , since G o d is its o r i g i n . Finite k n o w -
i n g , i n c o n t r a s t , i s essentially t e m p o r a l , a n t i c i p a t o r y , a h e a d -
of-itself. The Ent-stand is p r o f o u n d l y i n a c c e s s i b l e to finite
k n o w i n g . If t h e Ent-stand is " b e h i n d " a p p e a r a n c e s t h i s d o e s
n o t m e a n t h a t i t dimly, c o n t i n u a l l y , o b l i q u e l y , a n d d i s t o r t e d l y
faces t h e i n f e r i o r h u m a n k n o w e r . It is not knowable at all.
( F o r t h e o n t o l o g y of Sein und Zeit, H e i d e g g e r says it is c o n -
c e a l e d [verdeckt].) T h e Ent-stand is s i m p l y n o t an o b j e c t a n d
hence is not available to be k n o w n . Importantly, however, the
A < i A M ii i ii \ M 11 i 11 I i' 11 i i I I ( A I N E U T E R
i'.ni stand is I he same t h i n g as the t h i n g t h a t a p p e a r s . It is t h e
s a m e t h i n g a s ihe object: " [ T ] h e thing-in-itself i s n o t a n o t h e r
object but a n o t h e r a s p e c t (rcspectus) of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n w i t h
r e g a r d to the same object." 41
T h e Ent-stand is t h e s a m e essent
a s t h e o b j e c t . I n s o f a r a s t h e Ent-stand s t a n d s o u t f r o m G o d , i t
appears as o b - p o s e d to t h e finite k n o w e r . I n d e e d , i n s o f a r as
t h e t h i n g a p p e a r s a t all, i t insists u p o n a n essential n o n k n o w l -
e d g e (or " h i d d e n n e s s " a s H e i d e g g e r prefers t o t h i n k o f it). F o r
t h e Ent-stand is a l t o g e t h e r ( a n d n o t j u s t p a r t i a l l y ) i n a c c e s s i b l e
t o h u m a n k n o w i n g . O u r r e l a t i o n t o t h e Ent-stand i s n o t a
r e l a t i o n o f k n o w l e d g e a t all. Finite k n o w i n g — b e g i n n i n g f r o m
f i n i t u d e , i n t u i t i o n , receptivity, p a s s i v i t y — d o e s n o t give u s a c -
cess t o t h i n g s - i n - t h e m s e l v e s . N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h a t w h i c h i s k n o w n
(the o b j e c t , t h e t h i n g t h a t a p p e a r s ) i s n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n t h e
Ent-stand. K a n t , of c o u r s e , in t h e First Critique, is c o n c e r n e d
less w i t h b e i n g s p e r s e t h a n w i t h o u r w a y o f k n o w i n g t h e m a s
o b j e c t s . H e c o n c e r n s himself w i t h i n v e s t i g a t i n g a n d defining
the a priori structures by which and t h r o u g h which that which
s t a n d s o u t from G o d a p p e a r s a n d i s accessible t o h u m a n k n o w -
i n g a s o b j e c t i v e a n d o b - p o s e d . S u c h k n o w i n g w o u l d t h e n si-
m u l t a n e o u s l y be a b a r r i n g of access to t h e Ent-stand. He is
n o t s o m u c h c o n c e r n e d w i t h m u t u a l p r e s e n c e a n d self-pres-
e n c e , o r " o n t i c c o m p o r t m e n t " (the p r e s e n c e o f o b j e c t s t o s u b -
jects), a s h e i s i n t e r e s t e d i n t h a t a n t e r i o r s t r u c t u r e t h a t m a k e s
t h e c o m p o r t m e n t p o s s i b l e , b e c a u s e , a s h e s a y s , "[i]n t h e w o r l d
o f s e n s e , h o w e v e r d e e p l y w e e n q u i r e i n t o its o b j e c t s , w e h a v e
to do with nothing but appearances." 4 2
B y K a n t ' s a c c o u n t , t h e n , h u m a n k n o w i n g will c o n s t i t u t e
only t h a t w h i c h m a k e s b e i n g s i n t o o b j e c t s a n d a l l o w s u s e x p e -
r i e n c e t h e m s u c h t h a t t h a t w h i c h s o c o n s t i t u t e s o b j e c t s will
a l s o c o n s t i t u t e e x p e r i e n c e . O u r e n c o u n t e r w i t h b e i n g s will n o t
c r e a t e b e i n g s n o r seize t h e m a s G o d d o e s a n d k n o w t h e m a s
t h e y a r e i n - t h e m s e l v e s . A n t e r i o r (a p r i o r i ) access is a " f a s h -
 ioning," a "making," an "instituting" oi things-as-objects. ol unity thai g u i d e s the c o n c e p t . As p u r e , t h e r u l e s c o n s t i t u t e

Anterior contact will c o m b i n e the I w o s i d e s of k n o w i n g , intu- thai w h i c h they rule. They " d i s a p p e a r " i n t o t h a t w h i c h t h e y

i t i o n a n d t h o u g h t , i n t o a unity. A n d since, for K a n t , this is a rule a n d a r e n o t h i n g o u t s i d e their w o r k . T h e y i n s c r i b e t h e m -

" p o w e r " o f t h e k n o w e r , i t will c o m e from t h e k n o w e r a n d selves in a s o m c t h i n g - t o - b e - r u l e d (i.e., a s o m e t h i n g - t o - b e - u n i -

thus must simultaneously fashion, m a k e , institute, and expe- fied). T h e t o t a l i t y of t h e s e r u l e s is t h e c a t e g o r i e s . A c a t e g o r y is

r i e n c e itself. In s h o r t , t h a t w h i c h 06-jectifies a l s o swb-jectifies. a w a y a r u l e r u l e s , a n d t h e U n d e r s t a n d i n g is s i m p l y t h e c l o s e d

N e i t h e r i n t u i t i o n a l o n e n o r t h o u g h t a l o n e c a n d o this a n d c l a i m t o t a l i t y o f t h e w a y s b y w h i c h intuitive d a t a c a n b e unified,

to be the "foundation." Each, taken independently, is always i n s c r i b e d , r u l e d . T h e Vet-stand is a " p o w e r of r u l e s " or a p o w e r

p r i o r to a n y e x p e r i e n c e (i.e., is pure). o f w a y s o r m a n n e r s o f p r e s e n t a t i o n . F u r t h e r m o r e , since e v e r y

P r i o r t o all e x p e r i e n c e , t h e i m m e d i a t e , r e c e p t i v e e n c o u n - a c t of k n o w i n g i m p l i e s a c o n s c i o u s n e s s , t h e pure c o n c e p t is

t e r w i t h a s i n g u l a r r e s u l t s in t w o t y p e s of p r e s e n t a t i o n s : s p a c e t h e c o n s c i o u s n e s s of a u n i t y a n d i m p l i e s a pure s e l f - c o n s c i o u s -

and time. Space and time are intuited but are n o t objects. They n e s s . T h u s , for K a n t , all c o n c e p t u a l unities h a v e t h e c h a r a c t e r

a r e n o t explicitly a p p r e h e n d e d . Clearly, t h e r e f o r e , t h a t w h i c h of an "I think." This "I t h i n k " is a thinking a n d n o t simply an

p u r e i n t u i t i o n i n t u i t s m u s t c o m e f r o m i n t u i t i o n itself. N o n - a c t ; it is a " p o w e r " (a potentia) he calls transcendental apper-

objects, space a n d time (outer and inner) are not k n o w a b l e . ception. T h a t is, t r a n s c e n d e n t a l a p p e r c e p t i o n i s n o t a n a c t t h a t

I n t u i t i n g t h e m , i n t u i t i o n i s h e n c e n o t affected b y a n y o b j e c t . I t c o m e s a n d g o e s b u t a potentia t h a t r e m a i n s in r e s e r v e e v e n as

is affected by t h a t w h i c h it gives to itself. S o m e t h i n g is i n t u - it w o r k s . It is a stable unity w i t h o u t which there w o u l d be no

i t e d , b u t n o t a n o b j e c t . I t i s n o t n o t h i n g a t all, b u t n e i t h e r i s i t k n o w l e d g e , for t h e r e w o u l d b e n o c o m m o n p o i n t t o serve for

a n y t h i n g t h e m a t i c . H e i d e g g e r s a y s s i m p l y t h a t i n its p u r e p a s - multiple data. T h u s the transcendental apperception is the

sivity, i n t u i t i o n i n t u i t s itself. T h a t i s , i n t u i t i o n is t h a t w h i c h it g r o u n d of the possibility of the categories.

i n t u i t s . It gives itself t h a t w h i c h it is a b l e to i n t u i t . S p a c e a n d N o w , since t h e p r o p e r l y K a n t i a n e x p e r i e n c e m u s t b e made,

time are n o t " o u t s i d e " intuition. Intuition is always already there m u s t be a p o w e r that unites pure intuition a n d p u r e
i n t h a t w h i c h i t receives. S p a c e a n d t i m e , i n s h o r t , a r e p u r e t h o u g h t s u c h t h a t a k n o w e r can e x p e r i e n c e an o b j e c t . Since
images. b o t h i n t u i t i o n a n d t h o u g h t present, H e i d e g g e r will l o o k for

O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , p u r e t h o u g h t , p r i o r t o all e x p e r i e n c e , t h e i r r o o t i n w h a t t h e y s h a r e a n d , a s w a s s a i d earlier, t h e fac-

is the discerning of a unity t h a t m o r e t h a n one individual pos- ulty of p r e s e n t a t i o n in g e n e r a l is t h e i m a g i n a t i o n . Einbildungs-

sesses in c o m m o n : a c o n c e p t . But p u r e c o n c e p t s (causality, kraft is precisely and only t h e a b i l i t y to " f a s h i o n , " " i m a g e , "

e.g.) h a v e n o e m p i r i c a l c o n t e n t ( w h i c h led H u m e , o f c o u r s e , " i n s t i t u t e , " " e s t a b l i s h , " " s e t u p , " e t c . T h i s Kraft i s n o t a n

t o d e n y t h e i r r e a l i t y ) . F o r K a n t , t h e p u r e c o n c e p t (or " n o - established fact b u t a c o n t i n u a l p r o c e s s — t h e process of sharing

t i o n " ) is s i m p l y a f u n c t i o n of unification itself. T h e " c o n t e n t s " that which pure intuition and pure thought have in common.

o f p u r e c o n c e p t s a r e " r u l e s " (i.e., n o t e m p i r i c a l i n t u i t i o n s ) . T h e imagination integrates the r a w data of pure intuition w i t h

T h e s e r u l e s a r e n o t a p r o d u c t o f reflection b u t a r e t h e v e r y t h e s y n t h e s e s o f c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n . T h i s p r o c e s s i s a n activity

w o r k i n g o f reflection. T h e r u l e i s a n a n t e c e d e n t p r e s e n t a t i o n called schematizing, a n d it is an activity t h a t is at o n c e sensible

a n d i n t e l l e c t u a l ; n is a fusing nl s e n s a t i o n with i n t e l l e c t i o n . By-
m e a n s o f t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l (or i m a g i n a r y ) s c h e m a , the t h i n g
i s a b l e t o a p p e a r a s a n o b j e c t a n d b e e x p e r i e n c e d a s w h a t i t is.
It is K a n t ' s f a m o u s
third thing which is h o m o g e n o u s on the one h a n d with
the category, and on the other h a n d with appearance,
and which makes the application of the former to the
latter possible. This mediating representation m u s t be
p u r e , t h a t is, v o i d o f all e m p i r i c a l c o n t e n t , a n d y e t a t
t h e s a m e t i m e w h i l e it m u s t in o n e r e s p e c t be intellec-
tual, it m u s t in a n o t h e r be sensible. S u c h a r e p r e s e n t a -
tion is the transcendental schema. 43
With regard to empirical concepts, the schema " p r o d u c e s "
or " p r e s c r i b e s " a n o n t h e m a t i c view, or, as H e i d e g g e r calls it, a
schema-image, 44
such that any particular can appear as w h a t
it is w i t h o u t being confined to any of the actual particularities
o f its a p p e a r a n c e . A g a m b e n , q u i t e a p p r o p r i a t e l y , calls t h i s a n
"example." 4 5
We can hardly do better than William Richard-
son's explanation of h o w the schema-image works:
A c r o s s t h e street is a h o u s e . I k n o w it to be a h o u s e ,
for i t i s p r e s e n t e d t o m e b y a n a c t o f k n o w l e d g e . B y
r e a s o n o f this p r e s e n t a t i o n , t h e h o u s e offers m e a v i e w
o f itself a s a n i n d i v i d u a l e x i s t i n g o b j e c t e n c o u n t e r e d
i n m y e x p e r i e n c e , b u t m o r e t h a n t h a t , i t offers a v i e w
o f w h a t a h o u s e ( a n y h o u s e ) l o o k s like. T h i s d o e s n o t
m e a n , of course, that the house has no individuality,
b u t o n l y t h a t , i n a d d i t i o n t o its o w n i n d i v i d u a l i t y t h e
h o u s e as p r e s e n t e d offers a v i e w of w h a t a h o u s e can
l o o k like, sc. t h e " h o w " o f a n y h o u s e a t all. I t o p e n s
up for me a s p h e r e [Umkreis] of p o s s i b l e h o u s e s . To
be Slire, One Ol these possibilities has been a c t u a l i z e d
4 6
by the h o u s e dial I see, b u t it need n o t h a v e been s o .
W i t h R i c h a r d s o n , w e m u s t e m p h a s i z e t h e " c a n " h e r e , for
it i n d i c a t e s a potentia a n d an activity by w h i c h a t h i n g is able
t o a p p e a r a s w h a t i t i s (i.e., t o " r e v e a l itself," i n H e i d e g g e r i a n
l a n g u a g e ) . I m p o r t a n t l y for R i c h a r d s o n , K a n t , H e i d e g g e r , a n d
A g a m b e n , t h i s p r e - s c r i p t i o n or " r u l e - f o r - a - h o u s e " is n o t a d e -
t e r m i n a t e c a t a l o g of c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s p r o p e r to a h o u s e . It is, in
Richardson's words, a "full s k e t c h [Auszeichen] of the total-
ity of w h a t is m e a n t by s u c h a t h i n g as ' h o u s e ' " ( e m p h a s i s
4 7
mine). T h i s " v i e w " b y w h i c h a t h i n g can a p p e a r a s w h a t i t i s
c a l l e d is, in A g a m b e n ' s a n a l y s i s , " p u r e l y l i n g u i s t i c " : "[T]he
name, insofar as it names a thing, is nothing but the thing,
insofar as it is named by the name [il nome, in quanto nomina
una cosa, e non altro che la cosa in quanto e nominata dal
4i
nome]." F u r t h e r m o r e , R i c h a r d s o n a d d s , " t h e view o f w h i c h
we are speaking here is as such neither the immediate (empiri-
cal) i n t u i t i o n of an a c t u a l s i n g u l a r o b j e c t (for it c o n n o t e s a
g e n u i n e p l u r a l i t y ) , n o r a v i e w of t h e c o n c e p t itself in its unity.
4 9
T h e view we are speaking of is not thematized at a l l . "
T h a t i s t o say, i n t h e l a n g u a g e o f A g a m b e n :
N e i t h e r p a r t i c u l a r n o r u n i v e r s a l , t h e e x a m p l e i s a sin-
g u l a r o b j e c t t h a t p r e s e n t s itself as s u c h , t h a t shows its
s i n g u l a r i t y . . . . E x e m p l a r y is w h a t is n o t defined by
a n y property, except by being called. N o t being red,
b u t being-called-red; n o t b e i n g J a c o b but being-called-
J a c o b defines t h e e x a m p l e . H e n c e its a m b i g u i t y , j u s t
w h e n o n e h a s d e c i d e d t o t a k e i t really seriously.
[Né particolare né universale, l'esempio é un oggetto
s i n g o l a r e c h e , per cosi d i r e , si dà a v e d e r e c o m e t a l e ,

monstra la sua sua singolarità.... Esemplare è ciò che
n o n è definito da a l c u n a p r o p r i e t à , t r a n n e l'esser-detto.
N o n l'esser-rosso, m a l ' e s s e r - d e t t o - r o s s o ; n o n l'esser-
J a k o b , m a P e s s e r - t i e t t o - J a k o b definisce l ' e s e m p i o . D i
q u i la s u a a m b i g u i t à , n o n a p p e n a si decida di p r e n d e r l o
50
v e r a m e n t e sul s e r i o . ]
I n s h o r t , t h e K a n t i a n s c h e m a - i m a g e defines t h e " w h a t e v e r -
i s - c a l l e d n e s s " t h a t A g a m b e n e x p l o i t s so i n g e n i o u s l y in his La
comunità che viene. B u t we m u s t go f u r t h e r still a n d r e t u r n to
Heidegger's Kantbuch.
By w a y of the schema, the unity of the empirical concept
(the w o r d ) is referred to t h e i n t u i t e d p l u r a l i t y of possibilities it
unifies w i t h o u t , h o w e v e r , b e i n g r e s t r i c t e d t o a n y o n e o r a n y
set of t h e m . In c o n t r a s t to t h i s , pure i n t u i t i o n — t i m e — i s al-
ready unified. It is i n s t e a d t h e p u r e c o n c e p t s (the c a t e g o r i e s )
that are many. T h e schematism of the categories must, there-
fore, r e q u i r e special k i n d s of s c h e m a t a or s c h e m a t a of a c h a r -
a c t e r different f r o m t h o s e o f e m p i r i c a l i n t u i t i o n . A s t h e p u r e
i n t u i t i o n of t i m e is t h e p r e s e n t a t i o n of any o b j e c t , t h e s c h e -
m a t a m u s t unite the categories t o time s o t h a t o n t o l o g i c a l p r e d i -
c a t e s m a y be a p p l i c a b l e to o b j e c t s in general. T h a t is, t h e p r o -
f o u n d u n i t y o f t i m e m u s t b e v u l n e r a b l e t o v a r i o u s modes
( " w a y s " ) of p r e s e n t a t i o n w h i l e r e m a i n i n g one t i m e (for, " a l l
times are one time"). Richardson reminds us t h a t this is the
m o s t difficult a n d a m b i g u o u s a s p e c t o f H e i d e g g e r ' s e n t i r e
a n a l y s i s of t h e Critique of Pure Reason. D o e s he w a n t to say
both t h a t t i m e i s t h e r o o t o f t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l i m a g i n a t i o n
a n d that the transcendental imagination is the r o o t of time?
R i c h a r d s o n e x p l a i n s it as f o l l o w s : since t i m e is a l r e a d y u n i -
f i e d , t h e s c h e m a t a (the " p o w e r " t o unify) h a v e n o t h i n g t o unify.
B u t as t i m e is already unified, it is a l w a y s a l r e a d y s c h e m a t i z e d ,
or is t h e (pure) i m a g e of a n y s c h e m a w h a t s o e v e r . T i m e is t h e
1
Ad A M H I N AND I 11 I I' i i I I l l ( At NEUTER
very scheme < >l the S( hema i m a g e a n d as t h e s c h e m a t a a r e sev-
e r a l , each is already temporalized. T h u s t h e s c h e m a t a " d e t e r -
m i n e time" (or, a r t i c u l a t e it) and t i m e in-forms t h a t w h i c h it is
a r t i c u l a t e d by. T i m e , a s unified, " m a k e s p o s s i b l e " t h a t w h i c h
a r t i c u l a t e s it a n d t i m e is o n l y as a r t i c u l a t e d (i.e., fused w i t h
categories such that ontological predicates can be applied to
a n y object w h a t e v e r ) . T h a t i s t o say, q u i t e obviously, t h a t t h i n k -
ing in t e r m s of form a n d content is i n a d e q u a t e to c a p t u r e this
c o n u n d r u m o f activity a n d passivity. (But i n t h i s w a y w e r e a c h
a n o t h e r a s p e c t o f A g a m b e n ' s a n a l y s i s t h a t , i n t h e e n d , will
b r i n g h i m close t o B l a n c h o t ' s n o t i o n o f t h e i m a g e , a n d o f l a
communauté inavouable insofar as e a c h p r e d i c a t e s his a n a l y -
sis on a general w e a k e n i n g of m u t u a l p r e s e n c e s . )
N o w , if the transcendental schemata m a k e possible the
application of ontological categories to "any being whatever,"
then we m u s t look into the ontological status of this " w h a t -
ever," for it is precisely t h e o n t o l o g i c a l l y known. In s h o r t , what
is an o b j e c t in general}
K a n t ' s a n s w e r i s s i m p l e a n d d i s a r m i n g . I t isn't a n y t h i n g :
N o w we are in a position to determine m o r e ad-
e q u a t e l y o u r c o n c e p t of an object in g e n e r a l . All o u r
representations have, as representations, their object,
a n d can in turn b e c o m e objects of o t h e r representa-
t i o n s . A p p e a r a n c e s a r e t h e sole o b j e c t s w h i c h c a n b e
given to us immediately, a n d t h a t in t h e m which re-
lates i m m e d i a t e l y t o t h e o b j e c t i s c a l l e d i n t u i t i o n . B u t
these appearances are not things-in-themselves; they
are only representations, which in turn have their o b -
j e c t — a n o b j e c t w h i c h c a n n o t itself b e i n t u i t e d b y u s ,
a n d w h i c h may, therefore, be n a m e d the non-empiri-
c a l , t h a t is, t r a n s c e n d e n t a l o b j e c t = x.
T h e p u r e c o n c e p t o f this t r a n s c e n d e n t a l o b j e c t ,
 I 'I '
t\ I i i\ IVI I \ I IN l\ IN I ' I I I I |- 1 I I I I I I ;\ I IN I I I I I K

which in reality throughout till our knowledge is al tion to the k n o w n will not be cognitive. It is not p r e s e n t . It is
ways one and the same, is w h a t a l o n e can confer u p o n more t h a n present; m o r e p r e s e n t t h a n a n y p r e s e n t a t i o n . It is
all o u r e m p i r i c a l c o n c e p t s in g e n e r a l r e l a t i o n s to an t h e sheer ' V a n a p p e a r " o f a n y a p p e a r a n c e w h a t e v e r . N o t a b -
o b j e c t , t h a t is, a n objective reality." ( L a t t e r e m p h a s i s s o l u t e l y n o t h i n g at all, n o r j u s t a n y t h i n g at all, it is the dis-
mine) 5 1
junction of something and nothing. "This = x," K a n t says, "is
o n l y t h e c o n c e p t of a b s o l u t e p o s i t i o n , n o t itself a self-subsist-

H e i d e g g e r will say t h a t t h e m y s t e r i o u s object = x is a " s o m e - ing object b u t only an idea of relation, to posit an object cor-
5 5

thing of which we k n o w n o t h i n g . " 5 2

As an object in general, responding to the form of intuition." Alien t o all s u b s t a n c e

t h e x is n o t a n y p a r t i c u l a r object a n d , like t h e Umkreis " h o u s e , " (i.e., n o t " s e l f - s u b s i s t i n g " ) , t h e o b j e c t = x is fragility itself.

it is n o t d e t e r m i n a b l e . It is t h e Umkreis of a n y p o s s i b l e o b j e c t . E m p t y of all c o n t e n t , t h e x is t h e sheer " t h a t t h e r e i s " (il y a, es

It is t h e s o - c a l l e d o b j e c t , or a n y o b j e c t p u r e l y i n s o f a r as it is gibt) s o m e t h i n g r a t h e r t h a n n o t h i n g , just as Da-sein, or t h e

called an o b j e c t . It is w h a t all o b j e c t s s h a r e , b u t it is in-itself a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l i m a g i n a t i o n (or, unified a p p e r c e p t i o n ) , is t h e

n o - t h i n g , n o n b e i n g , n o n o b j e c t . I t is, i n A g a m b e n ' s l a n g u a g e s h e e r " t h a t t h e r e i s " s o m e o n e r a t h e r t h a n n o o n e . Infinitely

again, "the pure being-in-language of the non-linguistic." It is fragile, t h e x is a r c h e - r e l a t i o n , a r c h e - o b l i g a t i o n t h a t t h e r e be

t h a t w h i c h , i n a n y o b j e c t , objectifies it, e n v i s i o n s i t a s s u c h , a s s u c h a t h i n g as i m a g i n a t i o n ( f o r m i n g , p r e s e n t a t i o n ) itself, or

an object. T h e object-in-general is purely imaginary, because a n y syn- itself. Similarly, Da-sein is t h e being of t h e " t h e r e , "

it is s c h e m a t i z e d p a r e x c e l l e n c e , yet it is t h a t w h i c h is n o t p r e - or, t h e p u r e p o s i t i o n of t h e self. Da-sein is t h e being of t h e

s e n t e d i n a n y p r e s e n t a t i o n . I n effect, t o b o r r o w f r o m L y o t a r d : arche-presentation "= x."

it is t h e p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h e u n p r e s e n t a b l e . H e i d e g g e r will call T h i s p r e s e n t a t i o n , n e e d l e s s t o say, i s a m b i g u o u s . N o t h i n g ,

it a " p u r e h o r i z o n " within which any object can be rendered
p r e s e n t - t o - u s . K a n t will say it is a " p u r e c o r r e l a t e " to t r a n -
s c e n d e n t a l a p p e r c e p t i o n i n s o f a r as it is a u n i t y w a i t i n g for
s o m e t h i n g t o unify, a like t h a t p r e c e d e s a n y t h i n g t o l i k e n . I n
t h a t sense it is more o b j e c t i v e t h a n a n y o b j e c t , m o r e b e i n g
t h a n a n y b e i n g , s o t h a t H e i d e g g e r will b e a b l e t o r e c h r i s t e n i t
or the N o t h i n g , is p r e s e n t e d . N o t h i n g is " b e y o n d " it, no t h i n g -
in-itself arises g h o s t l i k e b e y o n d t h e objectively k n o w n . T h e x ,
t h e s h e e r p r e s e n t a t i o n , i s s u s p e n d e d , d e l a y e d , r e t a r d e d , inter-
rupted—coming but never arriving. T h e essential distance
between the knower and that which is the preeminently o n t o -
logically k n o w n e r o d e s i n such a w a y t h a t t h e t w o sides c a n n o t
56

as Being. In "Brief iiber d e n H u m a n i s m u s " he says (in my
o w n t r a n s l a t i o n , w h i c h I leave c r u d e l y literal i n o r d e r t o e m -
p h a s i z e t h e p o i n t ) : " T h u s Being i s b e i n g - e r t h a n a n y b e i n g
[ G l e i c h w o h l ist d a s Sein s e i e n d e r als jegliches s e i e n d e ] . " 5 3
Fur-
ther, a c c o r d i n g t o R i c h a r d s o n , H e i d e g g e r will identify t h e t r a n -
s c e n d e n t a l i m a g i n a t i o n as his Da-sein. 54
b u t fuse t o g e t h e r . " P r e s e n t e d " i s t h e r e t u r n , w e c a n say, w i t h
Blanchot and Nietzsche, of w h a t does not come back (into
a n y p r e s e n t ) . N o t h i n g definitive i s p r e s e n t e d . N o f i g u r e , n o
o u t l i n e , n o b o r d e r , n o t h i n g f r a m e d . W h a t " h a p p e n s " i s (only)
t h a t t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l i m a g i n a t i o n feels itself o b l i g e d t o (or
c o n s t r a i n e d t o ) present. T h a t is to say, it feels itself, a n d t h u s

T h e o b j e c t = x is n o t a b e i n g , n o t an o b j e c t , h e n c e its r e l a - s u b m i t s to itself, as if it c a m e f r o m o u t s i d e itself—as if it was

 itself an exterior force. T h i s a u t o / h e t e r o a f f e c t i o n is p r o f o u n d l y
t e m p o r a l , m o r e o v e r , i n t h e sense o f a n e x t r e m e t e n s ( e ) - i o n , o r
a n t i c i p a t i o n . (We m u s t recall f r o m t h e p r e c e d i n g a n a l y s i s t h a t ,
unlike God's knowing, h u m a n knowing is temporal.) The
"power" of Einbildungskraft is h e r e fused w i t h an essential
i m p o t e n c e . T h e o b j e c t = x s h a r e s w i t h t h e Entstand t h e c h a r -
a c t e r i s t i c of u n k n o w a b i l i t y , b u t , as a p r e s e n t a t i o n in extremis,
i t t u r n s a w a y f r o m G o d b a c k t o w a r d o b j e c t s , b a c k t o w a r d its
c u s t o m a r y p o v e r t y . T h e o b j e c t = x is t h e i r r e p a r a b l e c o n s i g n -
m e n t t o t h i n g s , t o o b j e c t s , t o p r o f a n i t y , b u t o n l y via a d e t o u r
t h r o u g h t h e N o t h i n g , t h r o u g h n o n b e i n g . A g a m b e n says, " [ T j h e
h u m a n i s t h e o n e t h a t , b e i n g o p e n t o t h e n o n - t h i n g - l i k e , is, for
this very reason, irreparably consigned to things [{Puomo},
essendo aperto al non-cosale, e, unicamente per questo,
c o n s e g n a t o i r r e p a r a b i l m e n t e alle c o s e ] . " 5 7
We do not then, suddenly and unexpectedly, confront the
thing-in-itself, t h e sacred t h i n g , t h e Entstand as it is d i r e c t l y
offered f r o m o u t o f t h e M o s t Ineffable. T o t h e c o n t r a r y , w e
suddenly and unexpectedly confront nothing, nonbeing, that
is to say, ourselves: ourselves as the no-thing "itself." That
w h i c h all t h a t is h a s in c o m m o n is n o - t h i n g . We c o n f r o n t a
l i m i t w i t h o u t ever c o n f r o n t i n g it, for t h e limit w a s n o t h i n g ,
w a s a l w a y s a l r e a d y " i n " t h i n g s , e r a s e d i n its a p p r o a c h a n d
s u s p e n d e d en deca du temps like a p a r a l y z e d a n d p a r a l y z i n g
force. For t h a t w h i c h is presented is the sheer " t h e r e , " a n d
this p u r e " t h e r e " is the pure position of the K a n t i a n "subject"
( w h i c h w e shall i n t e r r o g a t e i n t h e n e x t s e c t i o n o f t h i s c h a p t e r )
o r t h e k n o w e r , t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l i m a g i n a t i o n , t h e Da-sein.
I m p o r t a n t l y , for A g a r n b e n ' s e n t i r e e n t e r p r i s e since Lan-
guage and Death, t h e ( w h a t e v e r ) o b j e c t = x is b o t h t h e p o i n t
o f s u b t r a c t i o n f r o m all l a n g u a g e , all identity, all p r o p r i e t y , a n d
a l s o t h e p o i n t o f i m m e r s i o n i n l a n g u a g e - i n - g e n e r a l or, s i m p l y ,
t h e s h e e r fact t h a t one speaks:
Whatevsi does noi therefore m e a n only (in t h e w o r d s
ol Alain Badiou) ' s u b t r a c t e d from t h e a u t h o r i t y of l a n -
g u a g e w i t h o u t a n y possible d e n o m i n a t i o n , i n d i s c e r n -
i b l e ' ; i t m e a n s m o r e e x a c t l y t h a t w h i c h , h o l d i n g itself
in s i m p l e h o m o n y m y , in p u r e b e i n g - c a l l e d , is precisely
a n d o n l y for t h i s r e a s o n u n n a m a b l e : t h e b e i n g - i n - l a n -
guage of the non-linguistic.
[Qualunque n o n significa q u i n d i s o l t a n t o (nelle p a r o l e
d i B a d i o u ) : ' s o t t r a t t o a l l ' a u t o r i t à della l i n g u a , senza
n o m i n a z i o n e p o s s i b l e , i n d i s c e r n i b l e ' ; esso significa, p i ù
precisamente: ciò che, tenendosi in una semplice
o m o n i m i a , nel p u r o e s s e r - d e t t o , a p p u n t o e s o l t a n t o p e r
q u e s t o è i n n o m i n a b i l e : l ' e s s e r - n e l - l i n g u a g g i o del n o n -
58
linguistico.]
He m a k e s the immediate a d d e n d u m to Badiou in order to
i n s u r e t h a t w e d o n o t t r y t o see i n this prestntation-in-extremis
a n e g a t i v e p r e s e n t a t i o n , N e g a t i v e Being, or n e g a t i v e t h e o l o g y .
T h e o b j e c t = x is t h e very t u r n i n g a w a y f r o m t h e s a c r e d for it
is t h e p r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h i n g s , of o b j e c t s (i.e., of t h a t w h i c h
is never p r e s e n t e d to G o d ) . If y o u like, t h e x " s h o w s " t h e
ungodliness of the world. It shows the irreparable profanity
o f t h e w o r l d . Via this p a r a l y z e d p r e s e n t a t i o n , t h e w o r l d i s p r e -
s e n t e d precisely such as it is. A p p e a r a n c e s c o n c e a l (only t h e )
nothing. No p r o p e r nature is revealed to us, no coming-from-
out-of-Ineffability is u n v e i l e d . In A g a r n b e n ' s l a n g u a g e a g a i n ,
only the irreducible " t h u s n e s s " of things is revealed. T h o u g h t ,
t h e n , b e f o r e i t t h i n k s a n y t h i n g , i s a b l e t o t h i n k (or i s n o t a b l e
n o t t o t h i n k ) p u r e p r o f a n i t y , o r p u r e o r d i n a r i n e s s , a s its only
extraontic thought.
T h i s m e a n s t h e n t h a t (pure) t h o u g h t i s naïveté p a r excel-
lence. T u r n i n g at o n c e to objects, it has always already forgotten

God. I r r e d u c i b l y lost among things, though) pure being-in-
l a n g u a g e — i s a b a n d o n e d , u n d e s t i n e d , s c r u p u l o u s l y tbingisli.
T h o u g h t is constrained to think nothing beyond objects. This
i s its " e x t r e m e y o u t h " — t o h a v e a l w a y s a l r e a d y e v a c u a t e d it-
self of all latency. T h o u g h t is o r i g i n a l l y p u r e l y e x p o s e d , p u r e l y
p r e s e n t e d , p u r e l y there, a n d it is " a b l e " to h o l d itself j u s t en
deçà du temps, or I'entretemps, p r i o r to its " w o r k " of figura-
tion. T h o u g h t , in short, before it is captured in the w o r l d ,
" t h i n k s " t h e p l a c e of a r t , l'espace littéraire. It is " a b l e " to
t h i n k , before t h e r e is a n y thing, " r e l a t i o n in g e n e r a l " in t h e
p u r e " t h e r e , " or // y a. T h i s " a b i l i t y " is a passivity. It is a p u r e
p a s s i o n . A p a s s i o n , h o w e v e r , t h a t is n e v e r p r e s e n t like a s t a t e -
o f - m i n d . It is t h e p u r e finding-myself-there, or b e i n g - t h e - t h e r e .
It c a n n o t n o t be-the-there (without purely a n d simply ceasing
t o b e ) . T h a t i s t o say, for a p a r a l y z e d m o m e n t , p u r e l y e x p o s e d
to all its possibilities (all its p r e d i c a t e s ) it is u n d e s t i n e d to a n y
o n e o r a n y set o f t h e m . B u t this p a r a l y z e d m o m e n t d o e s n o t
b e l o n g to a p a s t , a " w a s . " Da-sein, or t h e K a n t i a n " s u b j e c t , "
is its there incessantly, w i t h o u t , h o w e v e r , b e i n g a b l e to b r i n g
itself b e f o r e itself. It is, as H e i d e g g e r s a y s , " a h e a d of itself."
In a c e r t a i n sense, we c o u l d say t h a t it is t h e very " w o r k "
o f w h a t e v e r b e i n g precisely t o u n w o r k a n d u n d e t e r m i n e itself
b y h o l d i n g itself i n " p e r f e c t h o m o n y m i t y . " A t least, A g a m b e n
w o u l d h a v e u s t h i n k s o , a n d i n his o w n w a y h e r e l a t e s w h a t -
ever beings, "tricksters or fakes, assistants or ' t o o n s [tricksters o
p e r d i g i o r n o , a i u t a n t i o toons]" 59
(italics a n d English in o r i g i -
nal) t o t h e B l a n c h o t i a n writer, a s w e h a v e a l r e a d y d i s c u s s e d i n
o u r p r e v i o u s c h a p t e r s . W h e n " e x p r o p r i a t e d o f all identity, s o
a s t o a p p r o p r i a t e b e l o n g i n g itself [ e s p r o p r i a t e d i t u t t e l e i d e n -
tità, per appropriarsi dell'appartenenza s t e s s a ] , " 6 0
whatever
b e i n g , like t h e writer, is s u b t r a c t e d f r o m all ( r e p r e s e n t a b l e )
c o m m o n a l i t y , all identifiable c o m m u n i t y , a n d b e c o m e s radically
" c a p a b l e " of instability, fragility—that is, r e l a t i o n - i n - g e n e r a l .
, 1 v , M 1)1 I . I M \ I I I 1
I I I I I l M I I I » A I IN fi H 1 fi H I 33
Willi the expropriation ol .ill " c o n t e n t s , " all " l a t e n c y , " this
pure relation is obs( urely felt. The w o r k of a r t , as L é v i n a s h a s
s h o w n , realizes such a d e t a c h m e n t f r o m c o n d i t i o n s . It realizes
sheer a p p e a r a n c e . Radically u n s e i z a b l e , a r t realizes t h e e x t r e m e
p o s s i b i l i t y of another r e l a t i o n t h a t A g a m b e n h i s t o r i c i z e s in
his La comunità che viene. H i s " c o m i n g " c o m m u n i t y is n o t h -
i n g o t h e r t h a n t h e sheer, i m m a n e n t p o s s i b i l i t y o f b e i n g - i n - l a n -
g u a g e i n s o f a r as l a n g u a g e offers n e u t r a l i t y , a n o n y m i t y , indif-
ference w i t h r e g a r d t o identity. I t offers t h e s p e a k e r t h e " a b i l -
61
i t y " t o n o l o n g e r say " I , " j u s t a s B l a n c h o t h a s w r i t t e n .
O u r e r a , w r i t e s A g a m b e n , i s o n e i n w h i c h all r e a l i t y h a s
been t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o its image. G l a m o r o u s a n d alienating, t h e
spectacle h a s totalized itself a n d forever s e p a r a t e d h u m a n life
from the possibility of a p r e s u p p o s e d c o m m o n G o o d . O u r
" n a t u r e " — t h e fact t h a t w e s p e a k — h a s b e e n e x p r o p r i a t e d a n d
commodified and nothing of God, nothing of the sacred, had
b e e n r e v e a l e d i n t h i s " e x t r e m e l y nullifying u n v e i l i n g [ e s t r e m o
62
svelamento nullificante]." In our era, communication occu-
6 3
pies its o w n " a u t o n o m o u s s p h e r e [sfera a u t o n o m a ] " (Bau-
drillard's " h y p e r r e a l i t y " ) . T h e " w o r d " — t h e " p o w e r " t o reveal
a n y t h i n g w h a t s o e v e r — h a s a c q u i r e d its o w n materiality a n d h a s
b e c o m e a c o m m o d i t y . L a n g u a g e , the M o s t C o m m o n , h a s b e e n
t a k e n f r o m u s a n d h a s r e v e a l e d o n l y t h e n o t h i n g n e s s o f all
t h i n g s . Yet a h o p e a n d a n i n t e r v e n t i o n r e m a i n p o s s i b l e for u s .
T o b e g i n w i t h , lived e x p e r i e n c e h a s l o n g since b e e n dis-
t a n c e d i n a d v a n c e a n d h o l l o w e d o u t b y r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . (It w a s
Walter Benjamin w h o noticed those tourists, standing with
their c a m e r a s in front of great w o r k s of art, preserving an
e x p e r i e n c e t h e y w o u l d n e v e r h a v e . ) T h i s m e a n s t h a t t h e Spec-
tacle (representation in general) is the p u r e form of separa-
t i o n : " [ W ] h e n t h e real w o r l d h a s b e e n t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o a n
image a n d images become real, the practical p o w e r of h u m a n s
is s e p a r a t e d f r o m itself a n d p r e s e n t e d as a w o r l d u n t o itself
 I ( ) I
I J 'I I K
[ d o v e il m o n d o reale si è t r a s f o r m a t o in u n ' i r n m a g i n e e le
i m m a g i n i d i v e n t a n t o reali, la p o t e n z a pratica dell'uomo si dis-
t a c c a d a se stessa e si p r é s e n t a c o m e un m o n d o a se]." 6 4
This
mondo a sé h a s b e e n c a p t u r e d a n d r e g u l a t e d by a c o m p e t i t i v e
mediacracy that n o w manipulates and controls the perception
a n d the m e m o r y of the community. H u m a n s , henceforth, are
s e p a r a t e d f r o m their M o s t C o m m o n — l a n g u a g e , Logos. F u r -
t h e r m o r e , A g a m b e n a r g u e s , this m a m m o t h , m a g n i f i c e n t e x -
p r o p r i a t i o n h a s e m p t i e d t h e w o r l d o f all beliefs, t r a d i t i o n s ,
c o n t e n t s , latency, a n d s a c r e d n e s s a n d h a s r e p l a c e d t h e m w i t h
p r o d u c t s . I t h a s r e v e a l e d t h e n o t h i n g n e s s o f all t h i n g s (i.e., i t
h a s r e v e a l e d t h a t w h a t w a s " h i d d e n " i n all t h i n g s — " b e h i n d
a p p e a r a n c e s " — w a s o n l y t h e s u s c e p t i b i l i t y o f all t h i n g s t o be-
c o m i n g their o w n image, their o w n a p p e a r a n c e . W h a t w a s
" h i d d e n " w a s n o t s o m e essence, b u t s h e e r spectrality.)
T h a t which has been expropriated from h u m a n s n o w
comes back to them commodified, w o r k e d over a n d revalu-
a t e d by t h e m e d i a because language is dead and has become
its own image. O u r linguistic " n a t u r e " c o m e s b a c k to us in-
v e r t e d : a s a r t , a s u n n a t u r a l , a s n o t - o u r s . I n its " w o r k " o f e m p -
t y i n g o u t beliefs a n d t r a d i t i o n s , l a n g u a g e itself r e m a i n s n e v e r -
theless hidden a n d separated from us.
For this very reason, A g a m b e n argues, it is n o w possible
for u s t o e x p e r i e n c e l a n g u a g e i t s e l f — n o t t h i s o r t h a t c o n t e n t
o f l a n g u a g e , n o t t h i s o r t h a t t r u e o r false p r o p o s i t i o n , b u t t h e
s h e e r fact t h a t " o n e s p e a k s . " L a n g u a g e — t h a t w h i c h u n v e i l s —
r e m a i n s i n o u r e r a , still veiled. W h a t r e m a i n s u n s e e n a n d u n -
e x p e r i e n c e d i s t h a t c o m m u n i c a t i o n , e m p t i e d o f all c o n t e n t ,
"is a b l e " t o c o m m u n i c a t e itself. T h e s i n k i n g i n t o n u l l i t y o f t h e
r e a l c o m m u n i c a t e s n o m e s s a g e , n o destiny, n o t h i n g s a c r e d . I t
c o m m u n i c a t e s o n l y t h e fragility o f b e i n g - i n - r e l a t i o n . T h i s
m e a n s t h a t i t c o m m u n i c a t e s obsessively, i n c e s s a n t l y , a n d e x -
clusively the impossibility of exclusion. T h i s is A g a m b e n ' s " l e s -
s o n " loi US Snd hil quasi difference from Blanchot. M o r e " p o s i -
t i v e l y " t h a n Blanchot, hi' says t h a t t h e c o m m u n i t y of t h o s e
w h o have no c o m m o n , representable c o m m o n a l i t y is the re-
t u r n o f n o n e x c l u s i o n . Its e t e r n a l r e t u r n .
In our era, then, it is no longer the sacred dead w h o reveal
c o m m u n i t y t o u s a s w e g a t h e r t o g e t h e r i n a single ( d e c o m -
6 5
posing throng. I t i s t h e r e a l itself t h a t n o w i n c e s s a n t l y d i e s —
in its i m a g e , its c o r p s e , in l a n g u a g e itself. E x p e r i e n c e is l o n g
since d e a d . T h e r e i s (only) (the) n o t h i n g left t o e x p e r i e n c e —
ourselves, in short. Only those " c a p a b l e " of such an experi-
e n c e w i l l e n t e r A g a m b e n ' s c o m m u n i t y che viene u n h a r m e d .
T h e political task t h a t remains is destruction. T h e a p p e a r a n c e
of t h e autonomy of t h e m e d i a t i z e d spectacle m u s t be d e s t r o y e d .
L i k e t h e s a c r e d , a n d like t h e Sigetic V o i c e , t h e c o m m o d i t y /
spectacle m u s t be ushered to the grave: " [ T ] o link together
image a n d body in a space where they can no longer be sepa-
r a t e d , a n d t h u s t o forge t h e w h a t e v e r b o d y , w h o s e physis i s
resemblance—this is the good that humanity must learn to
wrest from commodities in their decline [compenetrare
i m m a g i n e e c o r p o i n u n o s p a z i o i n c u i essi n o n p o s s a n o essere
più separati e ottenere cosi in esso forgiato quel c o r p o
q u a l u n q u e , la cui physis è la s o m i g l i a n z a , q u e s t o è il b e n e c h e
6 6
l ' u m a n i t à d e v e s a p e r s t r a p p a r e alla m e r c e a l t r a m o n t o ] . "
Politics
F a r f r o m l a m e n t i n g t h e loss o f e x p e r i e n c e , t h e
w e a k e n i n g o f m u t u a l p r e s e n c e a n d self p r e s e n c e , t h e e x p r o -
p r i a t i o n o f o u r linguistic n a t u r e , a n d o u r c o n s e q u e n t alien-
a t i o n (adrift i n h y p e r s p a c e , B a u d r i l l a r d w o u l d s a y ) , A g a m b e n
a s k s u s t o w e l c o m e it. W e m u s t w e l c o m e i t b e c a u s e t h i s a l i e n -
ation alone can " r e s t o r e " us to ourselves, to ourselves insofar
a s w e a r e originally e x p r o p r i a t e d o f l a n g u a g e a n d e x p e r i e n c e .

B e i n g - e x p r o p r i a t e d is human being. That is to say, at the e n d
of t h e e r a of C a p i t a l a n d its magnificent c o n c e n t r a t i o n in t h e
Spectacle, t h e being t h a t r e t u r n s a n d the c o m m u n i t y t h a t c o m e s
is the o n e paradoxically " c o n s t i t u t e d " or "instituted" by ex-
p r o p r i a t i o n . It is t h e b e i n g w h o s e reality is p u r e l y linguistic
a n d ( p a r a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l . T h i s b e i n g , this c o m m u n i t y , h a s n o
b e i n g p r o p e r t o i t e x c e p t for its ( p a r a ) t r a n s c e n d e n t a l b o r d e r -
i n g on all its p o s s i b i l i t i e s . S u c h a b e i n g is fragile, u n s t a b l e ( a n -
a r c h i c , as L e v i n a s w o u l d s a y ) — t h e pure possibility of any re-
lation whatever. It is a b e i n g c o n s t i t u t e d by e x p r o p r i a t i o n a n d
also, simultaneously, by the impossibility of exclusion because
i t i n c e s s a n t l y b o r d e r s o n all its possibilities. W i t h o u t d e s t i n y
a n d w i t h o u t essence, the c o m m u n i t y t h a t returns is o n e never
present in the first place. Presubjective in the p r o p e r sense,
this c o m m u n i t y is qualunque! Infinitely v u l n e r a b l e , d e p e n d e n t
o n t h e s u p p l e m e n t , w e will h a v e b e e n offered, i n t h e e n d , t h e
p o s s i b i l i t y t o a p p r o p r i a t e o u r e x p r o p r i a t i o n itself, b y " h o l d -
ing ourselves in simple h o m o n y m i t y . "
I n o u r a n a l y s i s o f K a n t , w e h a v e seen t h a t t h e t r a n s c e n -
d e n t a l a p p e r c e p t i o n c a n n o t g r a s p a n o b j e c t . T h e sole " c o n -
t e n t " of its k n o w i n g is a l w a y s t h e " s a m e , " t h e o b j e c t = x: "A
something of which we can k n o w n o t h i n g , " Heidegger says.
Deprived of any actual object, transcendental apperception
can only " t h i n k " a pure " t h e r e " or a " p u r e position" that, in
fact, it itself is. D e p r i v e d of e v e n i n t e l l e c t u a l c o n t e n t (or i n t e l -
l e c t u a l i n t u i t i o n — s o m e t h i n g K a n t n e v e r a d m i t s i n t o his p h i -
losophy), this "perfectly contentless representation," he says,
C a n n o t even be called a c o n c e p t i o n , b u t m e r e l y a c o n -
s c i o u s n e s s w h i c h a c c o m p a n i e s all c o n c e p t i o n s . B y t h i s
I , o r It, w h o o r w h i c h t h i n k s , n o t h i n g m o r e i s r e p r e -
s e n t e d t h a n a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l subject of t h o u g h t = x,
which is cognized only by means of t h o u g h t s t h a t are
/ M i n M ni IN A IN 11 i 11 r r i M i i i i /\ i IN I I I I E n i -i /
predil aii!|, ami ol vvliu h, a p a r t I r o m t h e s e , we c a n n o t
form the least c o n c e p t i o n . H e n c e we a r e o b l i g e d to go
r o u n d this r e p r e s e n t a t i o n in a p e r p e t u a l circle, i n a s -
m u c h a s w e m u s t a l w a y s e m p l o y it, i n o r d e r t o f r a m e
a n y j u d g m e n t r e s p e c t i n g it. A n d this i n c o n v e n i e n c e w e
find it i m p o s s i b l e to rid ourselves of, b e c a u s e c o n s c i o u s -
ness in itself is n o t so m u c h a r e p r e s e n t a t i o n g o v e r n -
i n g a p a r t i c u l a r o b j e c t as a f o r m of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n in
general. . . . 6 7
L i k e t h e o b j e c t = x, t h e s u b j e c t = x is i n c o n c e i v a b l e o u t -
side its p r e d i c a t i o n s . I t i s n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n its p r e d i c a t i o n s ,
y e t it is n o t p u r e l y a n d s i m p l y its p r e d i c a t i o n s . T h e s u b j e c t = x
is " l i k e " t h e o b j e c t = x to t h e e x t e n t of b e i n g l i k e n e s s itself,
(i.e., a l w a y s t h e S a m e , likeness or r e s e m b l a n c e is its physis). It
is a pure resemblance resembling nothing, no thing, no object.
A m e r e x, this t r a n s c e n d e n t a l subject is n o t k n o w a b l e or
e x p e r i e n c e a b l e in itself. T h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l a p p e r c e p t i o n is a
nothing that can grasp nothing. It is that which makes pos-
sible e x p e r i e n c e , b u t i t itself i s s u b t r a c t e d f r o m a n y e x p e r i -
e n c e . W e m u s t n o t e K a n t ' s r e l u c t a n c e t o identify i t definitively.
It is, exactly, a c o n s c i o u s n e s s : I, H e , She, or It. A l w a y s t h e
S a m e , it has no identity. It is a l w a y s t h e S a m e x, t h e S a m e
nothing. T h a t which unites intuition a n d makes experience
" m i n e " i s w i t h o u t a n y identifiable self. A t t h e h e a r t o f K a n t i a n
jemeinigkeit, t h e n , i s a n i n e l i m i n a t a b l e s t r a n g e n e s s . "Mine-
n e s s " i s a n i n t i m a c y e x t e r i o r t o myself. T h i s s t r a n g e r c a n n o t
b e e x c l u d e d , for " w e m u s t a l w a y s e m p l o y it, i n o r d e r t o f r a m e
a n y j u d g m e n t r e s p e c t i n g i t . " T h e p u r e I is x, It: t o o w e a k to
g r a s p itself or k n o w itself in its own e x p e r i e n c e of itself. Its
u n i t y i s p u r e l y thought, b u t n o t objectified, a n d h e n c e i t r e -
m a i n s u n r e c o g n i z e d . I n f r a m i n g itself i t s i m u l t a n e o u s l y e l u d e s
its o w n g r a s p . It is a p a r e n t h e s i s t h a t i n c l u d e s all b u t itself. As

e n f r a m e d , it is e m p t y oí itseli and is t h u s the p m e border or
l i m i t b e t w e e n b o t h p u r e senselessness and s u p c r s e n s o r i t y , on
t h e o n e h a n d , a n d c h a o t i c s e n s a t i o n , o n t h e other. I n this w a y ,
we reencounter the p a r a d o x of time that in-forms that which
a r t i c u l a t e s i t (the c a t e g o r i e s , e.g.) s u c h t h a t t h e r e i s n o t i m e
t h a t is n o t always already articulated a n d also no category
that is not always already temporalized.
For Kant, the pure contentless "representation I," the
Umkreis o r t h e " I t h i n k " t h a t a c c o m p a n i e s all r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s
and makes them mine, remains unexaminable and is purely
a n d s i m p l y named a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l " s u b j e c t " — t h e p u r e s u b -
ject of t h e v e r b , in s h o r t , a text. B u t by w h a t m a g i c d o e s K a n t
identify t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l i m a g i n a t i o n as t h e " I " of language}
In an earlier book, Infancy and History: Essays on the
Destruction of Experience [Infamia e storia: Distruzione dell'
esperienza e origine della storia], A g a r a b e n calls o u r a t t e n t i o n
to H a m a n n ' s m e t a c r i t i q u e of K a n t ' s Critique of Pure Reason.
H a m a n n asks: h o w pure is Pure Reason? As we learn from
A g a m b e n ' s r e s u s c i t a t i o n o f t h e a r g u m e n t , for K a n t t h e p u r e
geometric unity of the " t h e r e " seems just naturally to belong
t o l a n g u a g e , s o t h a t " t r a n s c e n d e n t a l a n d linguistic s e e m t o
merge [trascendentale e lingüístico s e m b r a n o c o n f o n d e r s i ] . " 6 8
It w a s H a m a n n , according to A g a m b e n , w h o first suggested
t h e necessity o f c o n t a m i n a t i n g K a n t i a n p u r i t y b y e x a m i n i n g
its h i d d e n (or, L a c a n m i g h t say, its " f o r g o t t e n " ) r e l a t i o n t o
l a n g u a g e . H e says i t s i m p l y a n d d r a m a t i c a l l y : " R e a s o n i s l a n -
g u a g e , logos. T h i s i s t h e m a r r o w b o n e a t w h i c h I shall g n a w
u n t i l I die o f i t . " 6 9
From H a m a n n ' s intuition, Agamben takes
us directly to the notion, elaborated by Benveniste, t h a t it is in
a n d t h r o u g h l a n g u a g e t h a t t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l s u b j e c t i s insti-
t u t e d . W i t h impressive simplicity, Benveniste d e c l a r e s , " H e w h o
says ego is e g o . " 7 0
Prior to any experience, transcending any
e m p i r i c a l e x p e r i e n c e , is t h e saying of " I . " T h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l
71
subjecl is nol a p u n - unity u m l y i n g itself. It is t h e e n u n c i a t o r .
T h a t w h i c h Kant described as subject = x n e e d e d to be s u p p l e -
m e n t e d a n d r e t h o u g h t a s the o n e w h o says " I . " K a n t ' s s u b j e c t
= x, to be a subject, h a d to s p e a k (itself). B u t t h i s leaves us
w i t h a q u e s t i o n : if it is n o t (yet) a s u b j e c t (until it e n u n c i a t e s
itself), w h a t o r w h o m d i d K a n t c a t c h a t r a n s c e n d e n t a l g l i m p s e
of?
T h e p u r e " t h e r e " o f t r a n s c e n d e n t a l a p p e r c e p t i o n offers
n o c h a r a c t e r i s t i c t h a t w o u l d m a k e i t mine, m y " I . " T h e p u r e
b e i n g - t h e r e i s n o t a v a i l a b l e t o a n y subject, b u t t o a m e r e " t h e r e
m u s t be s o m e o n e " (and, moreover, someone ex-scribed, some-
o n e w h o loses t h e power t o say " I " ) . T h i s p u r e p o s i t i o n cer-
t a i n l y d o e s n o t realize t h e i m m e d i a t e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f " m y -
self," b u t i n fact realizes t h e a b s e n c e o f " m y s e l f , " a s w e h a v e
a l r e a d y n o t e d . W h a t i s m o r e , t h e sheer p o s s i b i l i t y i n g e n e r a l
o f a n y s p a t i o t e m p o r a l r e l a t i o n i s r a d i c a l l y a n d o r i g i n a r i l y in-
accessible t o a n y subject. T h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l a p p e r c e p t i o n —
I , H e , S h e , o r I t — i s n o t a s u p r a c o n c e p t t h a t i n c l u d e s all " P s "
u n d e r its u m b r e l l a . It is n o t a c o n c e p t at all. N o r a s u p r a g e n u s ,
n o r a set of all sets. It is precisely t h e r i g o r o u s impossibility of
a n y such c o n c e p t , of any s u p e r s e n s o r y generality. Totally d e v o i d
o f all c o n t e n t , o f all e x p e r i e n c e , y e t n o t a b s o l u t e l y n o t h i n g a t
all, t h i s t r a n s c e n d e n t a l a p p e r c e p t i o n i s t h e S a m e a s H e i d e g g e r ' s
72
Da-sein w h o s e " w h o " i s a l w a y s i n q u e s t i o n . It c a n n o t expe-
r i e n c e itself as itself a n d it is t h e v e r y eclipse of a u t o a f f e c t i o n .
R a d i c a l l y s u s p e n d e d , t h e Da-sein, b e i n g - t h e - t h e r e , is j u s t as
radically disinherited. Transcendental apperception, the pure
" t h e r e , " ( d e ) c o n s t i t u t e s t h e " I " t h a t institutes itself i n l a n g u a g e
by interrupting it incessantly—by paralyzing and neutralizing
it. K a n t ' s t r a n s c e n d e n t a l a p p e r c e p t i o n h a d t o b e s u p p l e m e n t e d
b y l a n g u a g e i n o r d e r t o i n s t i t u t e a n " I , " a subject. T h a t w h i c h
a c c o m p a n i e s all m y r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s a n d m a k e s t h e m m i n e h a s
t o say " I . " B u t t o w h o m , o r t o w h a t reality, will t h i s " I " refer?
 B e n v e n i s t e answers, rigorously, "To something very singular,
w h i c h is exclusively linguistic: / refers to the act of individual
d i s c o u r s e in w h i c h it is uttered a n d it designates its s p e a k e r
t h e reality it e v o k e s is t h e r e a l i t y of d i s c o u r s e . " 7 1
T h e fleeting a n d p u r e " I " t h a t K a n t a t t e m p t e d t o p o s i t i n
transcendental apperception w a s never a n y w h e r e but in lan-
g u a g e . T h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l subject, i n t h e e n d , w a s t o h a v e
b e e n m a d e u p o f w o r d s . T h e Umkreis w a s l a n g u a g e . I t w a s
t h e r e f o r e l a n g u a g e t h a t s t o l e f r o m m e all m y e x p e r i e n c e s a b
o v o . / w a s n e v e r a n y w h e r e b u t i n m y saying " I . " T h e s u b j e c t
w a s s p o k e n , u t t e r e d : H e w h o said " I . " All e x p e r i e n c e , i n s h o r t ,
w a s always already speech. There is no prelinguistic subject,
no dumb experience, and no transcendence otherwise than in
language. T h e s u b j e c t is p u r e l y linguistic b e i n g .
W h a t K a n t c a u g h t a g l i m p s e of, t h e r e f o r e , w a s n o t a t all
transcendent, but not-yet transcendence, not-yet language.
W h a t Kant caught a glimpse of was an impotence or an
o r i g i n a r y dependence o n l a n g u a g e . W h a t K a n t s k e t c h e d o u t
for us w a s a n o t - y e t s u b j e c t , a H e , S h e , or It t h a t has yet to
s p e a k a n d i s t h e r e f o r e not p u r e l y a n d s i m p l y e m b e d d e d i n
l a n g u a g e . H e c a u g h t a g l i m p s e o f t h a t w h i c h m u s t enter l a n -
g u a g e a n d w h o s e i m p o t e n c e i s its i m p o t e n t " p o w e r " t o think
( b u t n o t t o c i r c u m s c r i b e , o r limit) its " m u s t s p e a k . " T h a t i s t o
say, K a n t d e s c r i b e s for u s , in light of B e n v e n i s t e , in l i g h t of
l a n g u a g e , or, m o r e simply, i n light o f L i g h t itself, t h a t w h i c h
h a s n o V o i c e , i s given n o Voice, b u t m u s t a p p r o p r i a t e l a n -
g u a g e n o n e t h e l e s s in o r d e r to be itself. T h a t is to say, it must
appropriate that which will expropriate it of all "mineness."
" O l d e r " t h a n subjectivity is t h a t w h i c h , in h u m a n being, p r e -
cedes language. N o t a "wordless" experience, sacred and
m y s t e r i o u s , b u t t h e e x p e r i e n c e of l a n g u a g e itself.
I t i s n o t o u t s i d e l a n g u a g e , b u t a t its l i m i t t h a t A g a m b e n
seeks to p r o v o k e a politics. T h e c o m i n g being is n o t a n o t h e r
version ol the iubje< t, n o t a n e w foundation, n o r a p u r e a n d
s i m p l e absence ol foundation. C o m i n g b e i n g is t h e b e i n g t h a t
e n t e r s l a n g u a g e a n d w h o s e " t r a n s c e n d e n c e " i s its c o m p l e t e
absorption, w i t h o u t residue, in language. It is the being w h o s e
Being i s its b o r d e r i n g o n l a n g u a g e , o n " a l l its p r e d i c a t e s . " Y o u
see, t h e r e i s i n fact a n e x p e r i e n c e t h a t " r e m a i n s " w h e n all
experience has been expropriated. T h a t experience is the ex-
p e r i e n c e of e x p r o p r i a t i o n itself, or l a n g u a g e , for l a n g u a g e is
t h e e x p r o p r i a t i o n o f all p a r t i c u l a r e x p e r i e n c e s a n d i s t h e s h e e r
possibility of any particular experience. N o t this or t h a t con-
t e n t o f l a n g u a g e , n o t t h i s o r t h a t t r u e o r false p r o p o s i t i o n , b u t
t h e s h e e r a n d fragile fact t h a t " o n e s p e a k s . " T h e c o m i n g b e -
i n g will b e " c a p a b l e " o f its a b s o r p t i o n , w i t h o u t r e m a i n d e r , i n
l a n g u a g e . I t will a t t h e s a m e t i m e " r e t a i n " t h i s " c a p a b i l i t y "
(or potentia) a n d t h i n k l a n g u a g e a s s u c h . B o t h a c t i v e a n d p a s -
sive will fuse i n t o a single p a s s i o n . S u c h a b e i n g will r e m a i n
" c a p a b l e " of its passivity. It will a l w a y s t h i n k , n o t itself (in its
i d e n t i t y t h a t l a n g u a g e s i m u l t a n e o u s l y offers a n d w i t h d r a w s )
but the Same—always the Same experience of expropriation
a n d a l i e n a t i o n as o r i g i n a l .
B e c a u s e I am able to e n t e r l a n g u a g e ( a n d t h e r e is n o t h i n g
else for h u m a n b e i n g t o e n t e r ) , I a m a l s o a b l e t o t h i n k t h i s
entry. I am able to think the r e t u r n of language to language.
Such thinking involves, as Blanchot has repeatedly s h o w n , "a
loss o f t h e p o w e r t o say T , " a n d t h u s a n i m m e r s i o n i n fasci-
nation a n d a contact with an absolute milieu. No longer to be
a b l e t o say " I " i s t o t h i n k t h e S a m e ( n o o n e , a n y o n e , t h e
N e u t e r ) . T h e region of A g a m b e n ' s politics is the region of
7 4
Blanchot's "Essential S o l i t u d e " — e m p t i e d of subject a n d o b -
ject a n d r a d i c a l l y i m p e r s o n a l like T h o m a s ' s e n c o u n t e r i n t h e
first c h a p t e r of Thomas L'obscur t h a t L e v i n a s c e l e b r a t e d as so
75
fine a d e s c r i p t i o n of t h e il y a. F o r if t h e e n t r y i n t o l a n g u a g e
e s t a b l i s h e s all p o s s i b l e b e l o n g i n g o r r e l a t i o n - i n - g e n e r a l ( t h a t
w h i c h , i n s h o r t , h e a r s u p o n a n y politics o r any t l h i e s w h a t
e v e r ) , it s i m u l t a n e o u s l y a p p r o p r i a t e s us of a n y p a r t i c u l a r rela-
t i o n , p o l i t i c s , or e t h i c s . A n d t h u s p o l i t i c s is exposed. Any par-
t i c u l a r p o l i t i c s , o r a n y p o l i t i c s a s u s u a l , a s w e cynically say (as
i f i t w e r e a n a u t o n o m o u s s p h e r e c l o s e d t o us), i s o n l y p o l i t i c s Notes
so-called (as w e m u s t l e a r n t o say i f w e a r e t o e n t e r i t a n d
d e s t r o y its p h a n t a s m i c a u t o n o m y ) .
T h a t w h i c h i s offered u s i s a l w a y s t h e S a m e : n o t a n es-
s e n c e , a s h i n i n g p a t h , n o r a destiny, b u t t h e sheer p o s s i b i l i t y
of r e l a t i o n in general—a dice t h r o w . A n y p a r t i c u l a r p o l i t i c or
e t h i c is a p o i n t of c o n t a c t w i t h an a b s o l u t e m i l i e u e m p t y of all
d e t e r m i n a c y . A n y p a r t i c u l a r p o l i t i c s is a l s o t h e face, t h e eidos,
of " a n y relation at all." W i t h the notion of radical passivity
w e h a v e a t t e m p t e d t h r o u g h o u t t h i s b o o k t o d e s c r i b e a general
Introduction
r a p p o r t or an imaginary dimension where we have never been
b u t to w h i c h we are e x p o s e d prior to o u r subjective inten-
1. Emmanuel Lévinas, "Philosophy and Awakening," trans.
t i o n s . T h e u n c a n n y " a b i l i t y " t o t h i n k this r a p p o r t i s t h e " a b i l - M a r y Q u a i n t a n c e , in Who Comes After the Subject?, e d . E d u a r d o
ity" to think that which always comes. N o t the masses, nor Cadava, Peter Connor, a n d Jean-Luc N a n c y ( N e w York: Routledge,
the horde, nor the wolves, and not the hero, nor the indi- 1991), p. 215.
v i d u a l , n o r t h e survivor. T h e m o t l e y . 2. E m m a n u e l Lévinas, " T h e Servant and H e r Master," trans.

M i c h a e l H o l l a n d , in The Lévinas Reader, e d . S e à n H a n d ( C a m b r i d g e :

Basil Blackwell, 1 9 8 9 ) , p. 1 5 9 n. 3.

3. E m m a n u e l Lévinas, "Being and the Other: On Paul Celan,"

trans. Stephen Melville, Chicago Review 2 9 , n o s . 1 6 - 2 1 (winter

1978): 16.
4. Maurice Blanchot, " T h e Outside, the Night," trans. Ann
S m o c k , in The Space of Literature ( L i n c o l n : U n i v e r s i t y o f N e b r a s k a
P r e s s , 1 9 8 2 ) , p p . 1 6 4 - 6 7 ; i d e m , " L a d e h o r s , l a n u i t , " i n L'espace
Littéraire, I d é e s s e r . ( P a r i s : G a l l i m a r d , 1 9 5 5 ) , p p . 2 2 0 - 2 2 .
Chapter One. The Allegory of Being

1. Emmanuel Lévinas, "Reality a n d Its Shadow," trans.

A l p h o n s o Lingis, in H a n d , ed., Lévinas Reader, p . 1 3 3 ; i d e m , " L a

163
 rèaIite et son o m b r e , " Les Temps Modernes 4, no, 38 (November
1948): 774.
2. Lévinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p. I 33; idem, "La réalité
et son o m b r e , " p. 7 7 5 .
3. Lévinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p. 132; idem, "La réalité
et son o m b r e , " p. 774.
4. Lévinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p. 133; idem, "La réalité
et son o m b r e , " pp. 7 7 4 - 7 5 .
5. Lévinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p p . 1 3 3 - 3 4 ; idem, "La
réalité et son o m b r e , " p. 7 7 5 .
6. Maurice Blanchot, "The Song of the Sirens," trans. Lydia
Davis, in The Gaze of Orpheus, ed. P. Adams Sitney (Barrytown,
N.Y.: Station Hill Press, 1981), pp. 1 0 5 - 1 3 ; idem, "Le chant des Si-
rènes," in Le livreà venir, Idées ser. (Paris: Gallimard, 1971),pp. 9 - 1 9 .
7. Lévinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p. 134; idem, "La réalité
et son o m b r e , " p. 777.
8. Lévinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p. 134; idem, "La réalité
et son o m b r e , " p. 776.
9. This is hardly the place to summarize Philippe Lacoue-
Labarthe's carefully nuanced w o r k on the question of mimesis. We
only wish to note that he studies various attempts to restrict, reduce,
ignore, or decide on mimesis, and he characterizes each of these
attempts as profoundly political or moral gestures. See especially his
" T y p o g r a p h y , " trans. E d u a r d o C a d a v a , "Diderot: P a r a d o x a n d
Mimesis," trans. Jane P o p p , and "Transcendence Ends in Politics,"
trans. Peter Caws, in Typography: Mimesis, Philosophy, Politics, ed.
Christopher Fynsk (Cambridge: H a r v a r d University Press, 1989);
see as well idem, Heidegger, Art and Politics: The Fiction of the
Political, trans. Chris Turner (Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1990).
10. Lévinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p p . 1 3 4 - 3 5 ; idem, "La
réalité et son o m b r e , " p. 777.
1 1 . Lévinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p. 135; idem, "La réalité
et son o m b r e , " p. 7 7 8 .
12. Lévinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p. 1 4 1 ; idem, "La réalité
et son o m b r e , " p. 786.
1 3 . Giorgio Agamben, The Coming Community, trans. Michael
I I.udì, I In m y ( lui <>l Bounds s e i . (Minneapolis: University of Min-
nesota Press, I 99 I), pp. 9 7 - 9 8 . La comunità che viene (Torino: Giulio
Einaudi Editore, 1990), pp. 6 9 - 7 0 .
14. Maurice Blanchot, " T w o Versions of the Imaginary," trans.
Lydia Davis, in Sitney, éd., Gaze of Orpheus, p p . 8 2 - 8 5 ; idem, " T h e
Two Versions of the Imaginary," trans. Ann Smock, in Space of Lit-
erature , p p . 2 5 7 - 6 0 ; idem, "Les deux versions de l'imaginaire," in
L'espace littéraire , p p . 3 4 6 - 4 9 .
15. Lévinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p . 1 3 6 ; idem, "La réalité
et son o m b r e , " p. 7 7 9 .
16. Lévinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p. 1 4 1 ; idem, "La réalité
et son o m b r e , " p. 7 8 7 .
17. Lévinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p. 1 3 5 ; idem, "La réalité
et son o m b r e , " p. 7 7 8 .
18. Lévinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p. 137; idem, "La réalité
et son o m b r e , " p. 7 8 1 .
19. Lévinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p. 137; idem, "La réalité
et son o m b r e , " p. 7 8 2 .
2 0 . Lévinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p. 139; idem, "La réalité
et son o m b r e , " p. 7 8 3 - 8 4 .
2 1 . Lévinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p. 138; idem, "La réalité
et son o m b r e , " p. 7 8 2 .
2 2 . Lévinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p. 138; idem, "La réalité
et son o m b r e , " p. 782 (emphasis mine).
2 3 . On this point see Jacques Derrida, "At this very m o m e n t in
this w o r k here I a m , " t r a n s . R u b e n Berezdivin, in Re-Reading
Lévinas, ed. Robert Bernasconi and Simon Critchley (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1991), p p . 1 1 - 4 8 ; see also J o h n Llewelyn,
"Lévinas, Derrida and Others Vis-à-vis," in The Provocation of
Lévinas, ed. R o b e r t Bernasconi a n d D a v i d W o o d ( N e w York:
Routledge, 1988), p p . 1 5 3 - 5 4 .
2 4 . Blanchot, "Two Versions of the Imaginary," trans. Davis, p.
87; idem, " T h e Two Versions of the Imaginary," trans. Smock, p.
2 6 1 ; idem, "Les deux versions de l'imaginaire," p. 3 5 2 .
2 5 . Lévinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p. 139; idem, "La réalité
et son o m b r e , " p. 784.
 2 6 . Lévinas, "Reality anil lis Shadow," p. 140; idem, " l a réalité
et son o m b r e , " p. 7 8 5 .
2 7 . Lévinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p. 139; idem, "La réalité
et son o m b r e , " p. 784.
2 8 . Lévinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p. 140; idem, "La réalité
et son o m b r e , " p. 786.
2 9 . Lévinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p. 140; idem, "La réalité
et son o m b r e , " p. 7 8 5 .
3 0 . Lévinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p. 1 4 1 ; idem, "La réalité
et son o m b r e , " p. 786.
3 1 . Lévinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p. 1 4 1 - 4 2 ; idem, "La
réalité et son o m b r e , " p . 7 8 7 .
32. Lévinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p. 142; idem, "La réalité
et son o m b r e , " p. 788.
3 3 . Lévinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p. 142; idem, "La réalité
et son o m b r e , " p. 788.
34. The notion of an "interruption of m y t h " that Lévinas puts
forward here has recently been developed in an essay by Jean-Luc
N a n c y entitled " M y t h Interrupted," trans. Peter Connor, in The In-
operative Community, ed. Peter Connor, Theory and History of Lit-
erature ser. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), p p .
4 3 - 7 0 ; and also in an essay on Paul Celan by Philippe Lacoue-
Labarthe entitled " C a t a s t r o p h e , " trans. Andrea Tarnowski, in Word
Traces: Readings of Paul Celan, ed. Aris Fioretos (Baltimore: The
Johns H o p k i n s University Press, 1994), p p . 1 3 0 - 5 6 .
3 5 . Lévinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p. 132; idem, "La réalité
et son o m b r e , " p. 7 7 3 : "[A]rt does not belong to the order of revela-
tion. N o r does it belong to that of creation, which moves in just the
opposite direction [l'art n'appartient pas à l'ordre de la révélation.
N i , d'ailleurs, à celui de la création dont le mouvement se poursuit
dans un sens exactement inverse]."
3 6 . Lévinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p. 142; idem, "La réalité
et son o m b r e , " p. 788.
37. Lévinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p. 137; idem, "La réalité
et son o m b r e , " p. 7 8 1 .
3 8 . Blanchot, "Two Versions of the Imaginary," trans. Davis, p.
87; idem, " I he [\VO Versions ol d i e Imaginary," trans. Smock, p.
262; idem, "Les deux versions de l'imaginaire," p . 350 (italics in
original).
39. Lévinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p. 1 4 1 ; idem, "La réalité
et son o m b r e , " p. 786.
4 0 . Blanchot, " T w o Versions of the Imaginary," trans. Davis, p.
87; idem, " T h e T w o Versions of the Imaginary," trans. Smock, p.
2 6 2 ; idem, "Les deux versions de l'imaginaire," p. 3 5 2 .
4 1 . Michel Foucault, " M a u r i c e Blanchot: The T h o u g h t from
Outside," trans. Brian Massumi, in Foucault/Blanchot (New York:
Z o n e Books, 1987), p. 17.
Chapter Two. Levinas's Ethics
1. Emmanuel Lévinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Es-
sence, trans. Alphonso Lingis (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981),
p. 191 n. 3; idem, Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence (The
H a g u e : M a r t i n u s Nijhoff, 1974), p. 86 n. 3.
2. Lévinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, p p . 5 0 ,
1 3 6 - 4 0 ; idem, Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence, p p . 6 4 ,
1 7 4 - 7 9 (italics in original).
3. Emmanuel Lévinas, "Bad Conscience and the Inexorable,"
trans. Richard A. Cohen, in Face to Face with Lévinas, ed. Richard
A. Cohen (Albany: State University of N e w York Press, 1986), p p .
3 6 - 4 0 ; idem, "La mauvaise conscience et l'inexorable" in De Dieu
qui vient à l'idée (Paris: Vrin, 1982), pp. 2 5 8 - 6 5 .
4. Emmanuel Lévinas, "Dialogue with Emmanuel Lévinas,"
trans. Richard Kearney, in Face to Face with Lévinas, p. 2 1 .
5. Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen, " É c o u t e , " Poésie 35 (1986): 110.
6. Lévinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, p. 11;
idem, Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence, p. 14.
7. M a r t i n Heidegger, Nihilism, vol. 4 of Nietzsche, trans. Frank
A Capuzzi, ed. David Farrell Krell (San Francisco: H a r p e r and Row,
1982), p p . 9 6 - 1 1 8 .
8. Lévinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, p. 8; idem,
Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence, p. 10.
 9. It should be clear even from our analysis so far thai the lan-
guage of Levinas translates nicely into the I Iciclcggerian German of
Sein und Lett. This paragraph and the entire discussion of alterity
echoes Heidegger's Ruf (Anruf, Aufruf) and his Schuldigsein. At the
end of this chapter, we will take up the question of Levinas's affinity
(and aversion) to Heidegger.
10. Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, p. 2 5 ;
idem, Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence, p. 32.
1 1 . Levinas, Otherivise than Being or Beyond Essence, p. 69;
idem, Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence, p. 86.
12. Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, p. 1 4 8 ;
idem, Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence, p. 189.
1 3 . Heidegger, Nihilism, p p . 1 0 2 - 1 0 .
14. Two impressive books by Michel Henry take up this thesis:
The Essence of Manifestation, trans. Girard Etzkorn (The H a g u e :
M a r t i n u s Nijhoff, 1973) and Généalogie de la psychanalyse (Paris:
Presses Universitaires de France, 1985); but see also Mikkel Borch-
Jacobsen's insightful summary and critique of the argument, " T h e
Unconscious Nonetheless," trans. Douglas Brick, in The Emotional
Tie (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1992), p p . 1 2 3 - 5 4 .
1 5 . Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, p. 124;
idem, Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence, p. 159.
16. Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, p. 5 8 ;
idem, Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence, p. 75 (italics in
original).
17. Levinas, "Dialogue with Emmanuel Levinas," p. 2 8 .
18. Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen, " T h e Freudian Subject: From Poli-
tics to Ethics," trans. Richard Miller and X. P. Callahan, in Emo-
tional Tie, p p . 1 5 - 2 1 ; on this point see also Jean Luc-Nancy and
Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, The Title of the Letter, trans. François
Raffoul and David Pettigrew (Albany: State University of N e w York
Press, 1992).
19. Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, p. 104;
idem, Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence, p. 132-33.
2 0 . Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, p. 106;
idem, Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence, p. 1 3 5 .
2 1 . | evinos, < Hhârwise than Being or Beyond Essence, p. 112;
idem, Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence, p. 1 4 3 .
2 2 . Borch-Jacobsen, "The Unconscious Nonetheless," p p . 150,
197 n. 4 5 ; see also Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen, The Freudian Subject,
trans. Catherine Porter (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press,
1988), p. 26ff.
2 3 . Borch-Jacobsen, "The Freudian Subject," p. 2 6 .
2 4 . François Roustang, foreword, trans. Catherine Porter, to
Borch-Jacobsen, Freudian Subject, p. ix.
2 5 . Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, p. 16;
idem, Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence, p. 2 0 .
2 6 . Lacoue-Labarthe, "Diderot: P a r a d o x and Mimesis," p . 2 5 9 .
2 7 . Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, p. 59;
idem, Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence, p. 76.
2 8 . Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, p. 114;
idem, Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence, p. 146.
2 9 . Agamben, Coming Community, p. 4 3 ; idem, La comunità
che viene , p. 30.
30. Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, p. 193 n.
3 5 : " N o language other than ethics could be equal to the p a r a d o x
which phenomenological description enters when, starting with the
disclosure, the appearing of a neighbor, it reads it in its trace, which
orders the face according to a diachrony which cannot be synchro-
nized in representation;" idem, Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de
l'essence, p. 120 n. 35: "Aucun langage autre qu'éthique n'est à même
d'égaler le p a r a d o x e où entre la description phénoménologique qui,
p a r t a n t du dévoilement du prochain, de son apparaître, le lit dans sa
trace qui l'ordonne visage selon une diachronie non-synchronisable
dans le représentation."
3 1 . Georges Bataille, The Tears of Eros, trans. Peter C o n n o r (San
Francisco: City Lights Books, 1989), p. 206ff.
32. M u c h of this discussion of Levinas's ethics (and much of my
understanding of Blanchot) owes its inspiration to t w o sensitive ar-
ticles by William Flesch: "Proximity and Power: Shakespearean and
D r a m a t i c Space," Theater Journal 3 9 , no. 3 (October 1987); idem,
" P o s t h u m o u s Sadness," unpublished paper.
 'It Quoted bj lacques Derrida m "Introduction: Desistance,"
I i. Qu< iicd h y Maurice Blam hoi m The Unallowable < cm ina-
trans. ( Li i s 11 > i ) 11 e i lynsk, in Lacouc-Labarthe, typography, p. 2 3 .
nity, trans. Picric J o n s (BarrytOWfl, N.Y.: Station I [ill Press, I VSS),
p. 9; idem, La communauté inavouable (Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit,
1983), p. 21 (italics in original). Chapter Three. Blanchot, L'arrêt de mort, and

34. Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, p. 193 n.
3 3 ; idem, Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence, p. 116 n. 3 3 . In
this quiet note Levinas more or less admits that the olamic r a p p o r t
with the Other is anything but equaled by the language of ethics; the
rapport, in fact, is a problem for ethics to solve.
3 5 . Maurice Blanchot, "The Narrative Voice," trans. Lydia Davis,
in Sitney, ed., Gaze of Orpheus, p p . 1 3 3 - 4 4 ; idem, " T h e Narrative
Voice," trans. Susan H a n s o n , in The Infinite Conversation, Theory
a n d History of Literature ser. (Minneapolis: University of Minne-
sota Press, 1 9 9 3 ) , p p . 3 7 9 - 8 7 ; idem, "La v o i x n a r r a t i v e , " i n
L'entretien infini (Paris: Gallimard, 1969), p p . 4 2 1 - 3 7 .
36. This Other (Autrui), is, as we have been stressing, neither
this one nor that one, neither an individual nor a group or crowd,
but instead a singularity whose radical indifferentiation is the other
of any representable difference.
37. Jean-Luc Nancy, "Of B e i n g - i n - C o m m o n , " t r a n s . J a m e s
Creech, in Community at Loose Ends, ed. Miami Theory Collective
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), p p . 1-12.
3 8 . Blanchot, Unavowable Community, p. 8; idem, La commun-
auté inavouable, p. 19.
39. Emmanuel Levinas, Ethics and Infinity, trans. Richard A.
Cohen (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1982), p. 86; idem,
Éthique et infini (Paris: Librarie Arthème Fayard et Radio France,
1982), p. 80.
4 0 . B l a n c h o t , Unavowable Community, p. 11; idem,
communauté inavouable, p. 2 4 .
4 1 . Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, p. 193 n.
1; idem, Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence, p. 125 n. 1.
4 2 . Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, "History and Mimesis," trans.
E d u a r d o C a d a v a , in Looking After Nietzsche, ed. Laurence A.
Ricklels (Albany: State University of N e w York Press, 1990), p. 2 2 9 .
the Image of Literature
1. Blanchot, " T h e Narrative Voice," trans. Davis, p p . 1 3 3 - 4 4 ;
idem, " T h e Narrative Voice," trans. Hanson, p p . 3 7 9 - 8 7 ; idem, "La
voix narrative," p p . 4 2 1 - 3 7 .
2. Emmanuel Levinas, Existence and Existents, trans. Alphonso
Lingis (The Flague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1978), p p . 5 2 - 6 4 ; idem, De
l'existence à l'existant (Paris: Vrin, 1981), p p . 8 1 - 1 0 5 .
3. Levinas, Existence and Existents, p p . 5 6 - 5 7 ; idem, De
l'existence à l'existant, p. 9 1 .
4. Levinas, Existence and Existents, p. 5 6 ; idem, De l'existence
à l'existant, p. 9 1 .
5. Levinas, Existence and Existents, p. 57; idem, De l'existence
à l'existant, p. 9 1 .
6. A g a m b e n , Coming Community, pp. 53-58; idem, La
comunità che viene, p p . 3 6 - 3 9 .
7. Maurice Blanchot, "Characteristics of the Work of Art,"
t r a n s . Ann Smock, in Space of Literature, p. 2 2 4 ; idem, "Les
caractères de l'œuvre d'art," in L'espace littéraire, p. 2 9 7 .
8. Blanchot, "Characteristics of the Work of Art," p. 2 2 3 ; idem,
"Les caractères de l'œuvre d'art," p. 2 9 7 .
9. Blanchot, "Characteristics of the Work of Art," p. 2 2 3 ; idem,
"Les caractères de l'œuvre d'art," p. 2 9 6 .
10. Blanchot, "Characteristics of the Work of Art," p. 2 2 3 ; idem,
La "Les caractères de l'œuvre d'art," p. 2 9 6 .
1 1 . Blanchot, "Characteristics of the Work of Art," p. 2 2 3 ; idem,
"Les caractères de l'œuvre d'art," p. 2 9 7 .
12. Levinas, Existence and Existents, p. 5 6 ; idem, De l'existence
à l'existant, p. 90.
1 3 . Levinas, Existence and Existents, p. 57; idem, De l'existence
à l'existant, p. 9 2 .
 14. Levinas, Existence and Existents, p. 57; idem, De l'existence
à l'existant, p p . 9 3 - 9 4 .
15. Blanchot, "Two Versions of the Imaginary," trans. Davis, p.
79; idem, "The Two Versions of the Imaginary," trans. Smock, p.
2 5 4 ; idem, "Les deux versions de l'imaginaire," p. 3 4 1 .
16. J e a n - L u c Nancy, " O f B e i n g - i n - C o m m o n , " t r a n s . J a m e s
Creech, in Miami Theory Collective, ed., Community at Loose Ends,
p. 2.
17. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. N o r m a n
Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965), p. 1 8 3 .
18. M a r t i n Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics,
trans. James S. Churchill (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
1962), p p . 1 0 2 - 6 .
19. William J. Richardson, S.J., Heidegger: Through Phenom-
enology to Thought (The Hague: M a r t i n u s Nijhoff, 1963), p. 132.
2 0 . Agamben, Coming Community, p p . 1-2; idem, La comunità
che viene, p p . 3 - 4 .
2 1 . A g a m b e n , Coming Community, pp. 53-56; idem, La
comunità che viene, p p . 5 3 - 5 8 .
2 2 . A gamben, Coming Community, p. 76; idem, La comunità
che viene, p. 52.
2 3 . M a u r i c e Blanchot, Death Sentence, t r a n s . Lydia Davis
(Barrytown, N Y : Station Hill Press, 1978), p. 3 1 ; idem, L'arrêt de
mort (Paris: Gallimard, 1948), p. 54.
2 4 . Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, p p . 8 1 -
9; idem, Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence, p p . 1 0 2 - 1 3 .
2 5 . Blanchot, Death Sentence, p. 54; idem, L'arrêt de mort, p.
88.
2 6 . Blanchot, Death Sentence, p. 5 4 - 5 5 ; idem, L'arrêt de mort,
p . 89.
2 7 . Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, p. Ill;
idem, Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence, p. 1 4 1 .
2 8 . Blanchot, Death Sentence, p. 1; idem, L'arrêt de mort, p. 7.
2 9 . Blanchot, Death Sentence, p. 4 6 ; idem, L'arrêt de mort, p.
76.
30. Blanchot, Death Sentence, p. 46; idem, L'arrêt de mort, p. 7 6 .
(I. Blani hot, D$ath S,•nlrin<\ p. 46; idem, L'arrêt de mort, p.
76.
32. Blanchot, Death Sentence, p. 1; idem, L'arrêt de mort, p. 7.
3 3 . Blanchot, Death Sentence, p. 2; idem, L'arrêt de mort, p. 8.
34. Levinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p. 139; idem, "La réalité
et son o m b r e , " p. 784.
35. Marcel Proust, Remembrance of Things Past, trans. C. K.
Scott Moncrieff and Terence Kilmartin (New York: R a n d o m H o u s e ,
1981), 3:802.
36. M a u r i c e Blanchot, The Step Not Beyond, t r a n s . Lycette
Nelson (Albany: State University of N e w York Press, 1992), p. 5 0 ;
idem, Le pas au-delà (Paris: Gallimard 1973), p. 7 2 .
37. Levinas, "The Servant and Her Master," p. 1 5 3 ; idem, "La
servante et son maître," in Sur Maurice Blanchot (Montpellier: Fata
M o r g a n a , 1975), p . 34.
3 8 . Blanchot, Death Sentence, p. 79; idem, L'arrêt de mort, p.
126.
39. Blanchot, Death Sentence, p. 8 1 .
4 0 . Maurice Blanchot, "Reading," trans. Lydia Davis, in Gaze
of Orpheus, p p . 9 4 - 9 6 ; idem, "Reading," trans. Ann Smock, in Space
of Literature, p p . 1 9 4 - 9 6 ; idem, "Lire," in L'espace littéraire, p p .
256-58.
4 1 . Steven Shaviro, Passion and Excess: Blanchot, Bataille, and
Literary Theory (Tallahassee: The Florida State University Press,
1990), p p . 1 4 2 - 4 3 .
4 2 . Blanchot, Step Not Beyond, p. 5 0 ; idem, Le pas au-delà, p.
72.
4 3 . Shaviro, Passion and Excess, p p . 1 4 2 - 4 3 .
4 4 . Blanchot, Death Sentence, p. 79; idem, L'arrêt de mort, p.
126.
4 5 . Blanchot, Death Sentence, p. 79; idem, L'arrêt de mort, 127.
4 6 . Blanchot, Death Sentence, p. 80; idem, L'arrêt de mort, p.
127.
4 7 . Maurice Blanchot, "Kafka and the Work's D e m a n d , " trans.
A n n Smock, in Space of Literature, p. 5 7 - 8 3 ; idem, "Kafka et
l'exigence de l'œuvre," in L'espace littéraire, p p . 5 9 - 9 8 .
 48. Blanchot, Death Sentence, p. 32; idem, L'arrêt de mori,
55.
4 9 . Blanchot, Deaï/j Sentence, p. 72; idem, //arre/ de mort, p.
115.
50. Blanchot, Death Sentence, p. 72; idem, L'arrêt de mort, p.
116.
5 1 . Blanchot, Death Sentence, p. 79; idem, L'arrêt de mort, p.
126.
52. Agamben, Coming Community, p. 84; idem, La comunità
che viene, p. 5 8 .
5 3 . Agamben, Coming Community, p. 84; idem, La comunità
che viene, p. 5 8 .
5 4 . Blanchot, Step Not Beyond, p. 9 3 ; idem, Le pas au-delà, p.
129.
5 5 . Lévinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p. 140; idem, "La réalité
et son o m b r e , " p. 7 8 5 .
56. Lévinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, p. 199 n.
2 1 ; idem, Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence, p. 191 n. 2 1 .
57. R Adams Sitney makes this observation in his afterword to
Blanchot, Gaze of Orpheus, p. 1 7 1 .
5 8 . Shaviro, Passion and Excess, p p . 1 4 2 - 7 0 .
59. Blanchot, Death Sentence, p. 2 0 ; idem, L'arrêt de mort, p.
30.
60. Foucault, "Maurice Blanchot," p. 39.
6 1 . Blanchot, Death Sentence, p. 30; idem, L'arrêt de mort, p.
52-53.
6 2 . Blanchot, Death Sentence, p. 20; idem, L'arrêt de mort, p. 3 5 .
6 3 . Blanchot, Death Sentence, p. 2 0 ; idem, L'arrêt de mort, p.
36.
64. Blanchot, Death Sentence, p. 8 1 .
6 5 . Lévinas, " T h e Servant and H e r Master," p. 1 5 5 ; idem, "La
servante et son maître," p. 37.
6 6 . Lévinas, " T h e Servant and H e r Master," p. 155; idem, "La
servante et son maître," p. 37.
67. Lévinas, "The Servant and H e r Master," p. 1 5 5 ; idem, "La
servante et son maître," p. 37.
p, 68. I evinflS, "The Sci vani and I 1er Master," p. 155; idem, "La
servante el sun maître," p. 37.
69. Lévinas, " T h e Servant and Her Master," p. 157; idem, "La
servante et son maître," p. 40.
70. Lévinas, " T h e Servant and Her Master," p. 157; idem, "La
servante et son maitre," p. 40.
7 1 . Lévinas, "The Servant and Her Master," p. 157; idem, "La
servante et son maître," p. 4 0 .
72. Agamben, Coming Community, p. 104; idem, La comunità
che viene, p. 77.
7 3 . Blanchot, " T h e Outside, the Night," p. 1 6 3 - 7 0 ; idem, "La
dehors, la nuit," p p . 2 1 3 - 2 4 .
74. Blanchot, "Characteristics of the Work of Art," p p . 2 3 2 ;
idem, "Les caractères de l'œuvre d'art," p p . 310.
7 5 . Lévinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, p. 104
and 106; idem, Autrement qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence, p p . 1 3 2 -
33 and 135.
76. Blanchot, "Characteristics of the Work of Art," p p . 2 3 2 - 3 3 ;
idem, "Les caractères de l'œuvre d'art," p. 310.
7 7 . Blanchot, "Characteristics of the Work of Art," p. 2 3 3 ; idem,
"Les caractères de l'œuvre d'art," p. 3 1 1 .
7 8 . Blanchot, Death Sentence, p. 2 0 ; idem, L'arrêt de mort, p.
35.
79. Blanchot, "Two Versions of the Imaginary," trans. Davis, p.
87; idem, "The Two Versions of the Imaginary," trans. Smock, p p .
2 6 1 - 6 2 ; idem, "Les deux versions de l'imaginaire," p. 3 5 2 .
80. " T h e dead present is the impossibility of realizing a pres-
ence—an impossibility that is present, that is there as that which
doubles every present, the s h a d o w of the present, which the present
carries and hides in itself. W h e n I am alone, in this present, I am not
alone, but am already returning to myself in the form of Someone.
Someone is there, when I am alone. [Le présent mort est l'impossibilité
de réaliser une présence, impossibilité qui est présente, qui est là
c o m m e ce qui double tout présent, l'ombre du présent, que celui-ci
p o r t e et dissimule en lui. Q u a n d je suis seul, je ne suis pas seul, mais,
dans ce présent, je reviens déjà à moi sous la forme de Q u e l q u ' u n .
 12. Antonin Artaud, "Exposition Balthus à la Gallerie Pierre,"
Quelqu'un est là, où je suis seul.]" Maurice Blanchot, " T h e Essen-
La Nouvelle Revue français 2 2 , no. 248 (May 1934): 8 9 9 - 9 0 .
tial Solitude," trans. Lydia Davis, in Gaze <>/ Orpheus, p. 74; idem,
1 3 . Agamben, Coming Community, p. 89; idem, La comunità
"The Essential Solitude," trans. Ann Smock, in Space of Literature,
p. 3 1 ; idem, "La solitude essentielle," in L'espace littéraire, p. 2 7 . che viene, p. 6 2 .
14. Translator's note in Agamben, Corning Community, p. 1 0 7 .
8 1 . Blanchot, Death Sentence, p. 32; idem, L'arrêt de mort, p p .
55-56. 1 5 . Jean-Paul Sartre, The Transcendence of the Ego, trans. Forrest
Williams and Robert Kirkpatrick (New York: Hill and Wang, 1990).
82. Blanchot, "Characteristics of the Work of Art," p. 2 3 2 ; idem,
"Les caractères de l'œuvre d'art," p. 310. 16. Agamben, Corning Community, p p . 6 6 - 6 7 ; idem, La comu-
nità che viene, p p . 4 5 - 4 6 .
Chapter Four. Agamben and the Political Neuter 17. Blanchot, " T w o Versions of the Imaginary," p. 8 5 ; idem,
" T h e Two Versions of the Imaginary," p. 2 6 0 ; idem, "Les deux ver-
1. Blanchot, "The Essential Solitude," trans. Davis, p. 6 9 ; idem, sions de l'imaginaire," p. 3 5 0 .
" T h e Essential Solitude," trans. Smock, p p . 2 6 - 2 7 ; idem, "La soli-
18. Agamben, Coming Community, pp. 19-20; idem, La
tude essentielle," p. 2 1 .
comunità che viene, pp. 15-16.
2. Blanchot, "The Essential Solitude," trans. Davis, p. 69; idem, 19. Agamben, Coming Community, p. 19; idem, La comunità
" T h e Essential Solitude," trans. Smock, p. 27; idem, "La solitude che viene, p. 1 5 .
essentielle," p. 17. 2 0 . Agamben, Coming Community, p. 1 1 ; idem, La comunità
che viene, p p . 8-9.
3. Blanchot, "The Essential Solitude," trans. Davis, p. 77; idem,
2 1 . Agamben, Coming Community, p. 85; idem, La comunità
" T h e Essential Solitude," trans. Smock, p. 3 3 ; idem, "La solitude
essentielle," p p . 2 7 - 2 8 . che viene, p. 58
22. Agamben, Coming Community, pp. 79-83; idem, La
4. Blanchot, "The Essential Solitude," trans. Davis, p. 74; idem,
" T h e Essential Solitude," trans. Smock, p. 3 1 ; idem, "La solitude comunità che viene, p p . 5 3 - 5 7 . Let us emphasize yet again the neu-
essentielle," p. 2 4 . trality of this " o n e " w h o speaks. It is not simply the experience that
J speak, but rather that the "I speak" is neutralized such t h a t it is
5. Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen, "Hypnosis in Psychoanalysis," trans.
Angela Brewer and X. P. Callahan, in Emotional Tie, p. 50. experienced as an anonymous entry into language. As it enters lan-
guage, the individual identity " I " is overwhelmed and carried away
6. On the relation between analysis, hysteria and narrative
modes see ibid., p. 184 n. 14. by language, or, more simply, by speaking.
7. Ibid., p p . 4 9 - 6 2 . 2 3 . Blanchot, Death Sentence, p p . 6 1 - 6 3 ; idem, L'arrêt de mort,
8. Lacoue-Labarthe, "Typography," p. 1 3 3 . pp.99-103.
9. Blanchot, "Two Versions of the Imaginary," trans. Davis, p. 2 4 . Giorgio Agamben, Language and Death: The Place of Nega-
8 8 ; idem, " T h e T w o Versions of the Imaginary," trans. Smock, p. tivity, trans. Karen E. Pinkus with Michael Hardt, Theory and History
2 6 2 ; idem, "Les deux versions de l'imaginaire," p. 3 5 2 . of Literature ser. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991 ),
10. Levinas, Existence and Existents, p. 5 6 ; idem, De l'existence p p . 8 4 - 9 8 ; idem, 17 linguaggio e la morte: Un seminario sul luogo
à l'existant, p. 90. della negatività (Torino: Giulio Einaudi Editore, 1982), p p . 1 0 4 - 2 3 .
1 1 . Levinas, Existence and Existents, p. 56; idem, De l'existence 2 5 . A g a m b e n , Language and Death, pp. 9 4 - 9 5 ; i d e m , Il
à l'existant, p. 9 0 .
linguaggio e la morte, p p . 1 1 8 - 2 0 .
 26. Agamben, Language and Death, pp, 63 65; idem, // ////
guaggio e la morte, pp. 7 9 - 8 I.
2 7 . Agamben, Coming Community, p. 82; idem, comunità
che viene, p. 56.
2 8 . A g a m b e n , Language and Death, p p . 9 6 - 1 0 6 ; idem, 77
linguaggio e la morte, p p . 1 2 1 - 3 3 . Proper attention to this highly
important book would require its o w n chapter. We simply wish to
retain from this book Agamben's drive to think community (human
being) outside negativity, negative presentation, or negative theol-
ogy. He is critical of Blanchot's La communauté inavouable for re-
taining too negative a language. It is a part of our effort here to
show that what Blanchot will describe as an "inability to say I,"
Agamben will describe as an "ability to not say I." T h a t is, his La
comunità che viene answers the promise of an "infancy of the hu-
m a n " that concludes 77 linguaggio e la morte by nuancing Blanchotian
anonymity t o w a r d a latent, ambiguous, and radical potential.
2 9 . Agamben, Language and Death, p. 94; idem, 27 linguaggio e
la morte, p. 118 (italics in original).
30. Agamben, Coming Community, p p . 9 6 - 9 7 . (According to a
private conversation with Agemben's translator, the parenthetical
passage from which this quotation is taken appears only in the French
and English editions of the text.)
3 1 . Lévinas, "Reality and Its Shadow," p. 135; idem, "La réalité
et son o m b r e , " p. 777.
32. Agamben, Coming Community, p. 1 0 1 ; idem, La comunità
che viene, p. 73 (italics in original).
33. Agamben, Coming Community, pp. 76-77; idem, La
comunità che viene, pp. 5 1 - 5 2 . Agamben understands the Idea as
that " h a l o , " or supplement, or pre-scriptive image, that para-exists
in the empty space of "all its predicates." Like Lévinas and Blanchot,
he understands the concept to refer to being as it is grasped in its
intelligibility within the horizons of a world.
34. Agamben, Coming Community, p. 89; idem, La comunità
che viene, p. 62.
3 5 . Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, p p . 1 0 2 -
6.
)6, Ibid., p. 1 1 3 Lb
37. I'.I.IIK hot, "Two Versions of the Imaginary," trans. Davis, p.
87; idem, " H i e Two Versions of the Imaginary," trans. Smock, p p .
2 6 1 - 6 2 ; idem, "Les deux versions de 1'imaginaire," 356.
3 8 . Richardson, Heidegger, pp. 107ff., in the pages that follow
we will reproduce the architecture of Richardson's summary of the
Kantbuch, highlighting those aspects that intersect with our interest
in Agamben, and departing from Richardson only to quote either
Heidegger's or Kant's own words in order to more rigorously specify
the notions that interest us.
39. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 2 6 9 .
4 0 . Fleidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, p. 36 n.
17.
4 1 . Ibid., p. 37 (italics in original).
4 2 . Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 84.
4 3 . Ibid., p . 1 8 1 .
4 4 . Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, p p . 1 0 2 -
6 [italics in original].
4 5 . Agamben, Coming Community, pp. 9 - 1 2 ; idem, La comunità
che viene, p p . 7—9.
4 6 . Richardson, Heidegger, p. 1 3 1 .
4 7 . Ibid., p . 1 3 1 .
4 8 . Agamben, Coming Community, p. 77; idem, La comunità
che viene, p. 52 (italics in original).
4 9 . Richardson, Heidegger, p. 132.
5 0 . Agamben, Coming Community, p. 10; idem, La comunità
che viene, p. 8 (italics in original).
5 1 . Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 137.
52. Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, p. 1 2 7 .
5 3 . Martin Heidegger, "Brief iiber den H u m a n i s m u s , " in Weg-
marken (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1976), p. 3 5 9 .
54. Richardson, Heidegger, p. 152.
5 5 . Immanuel Kant, Opus postbumum, trans. Eckart Forster and
Michael Rosen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p.
172.
56. Richardson, Heidegger, p. 154.
 57. Agamben, < 'otning < Community, p. 103; idem, La comunità 73, Quoted In Agamben, Infancy and History, p. 46; idem,
che viene, p. 7 5 . Infanzia e storia, p. 44.
5 8 . Agamben, Corning Community, p. 76; idem, La comunità 74 Blanchot, " T h e Essential Solitude," trans. Davis, pp. 6 3 - / / ;
che viene, p. 52 [italics in originai]. idem, "The Essential Solitude," trans. Smock, pp. 2 1 - 3 4 ; idem, "La
59. Agamben, Corning Community, p. 1 1 ; idem, La comunità solitude essentielle," p p . 1 3 - 3 2 .
che viene, p. 9. 75. Levinas, Existence and Existents, p. 63 n. 7; idem, De
60. Agamben, Corning Community, p. 1 1 ; idem, L<2 comunità l'existence à l'existant, p. 103 n. 1.
che viene, p p . 8-9.
6 1 . Blanchot, "The Essential Solitude," trans. Davis, p. 69; idem,
" T h e Essential Solitude," trans. Smock, p. 2 6 ; idem, "La solitude
essentielle," p. 17.
6 2 . Agamben, Coming Community, p. 82; idem, La comunità
che viene, p. 56.
6 3 . Agamben, Corning Community, p. 82; idem, La comunità
che viene, p. 56.
6 4 . Agamben, Corning Community, p. 79; idem, La comunità
che viene, p. 5 3 .
6 5 . Borch-Jacobsen, " T h e Freudian Subject," p. 3 5 .
66. Agamben, Coming Community, p. 50; idem, La comunità
che viene, p. 3 5 .
6 7 . Quoted by Giorgio Agamben in Infancy and History: Es-
says on the Destruction of Experience, trans. Liz H e r o n (London:
Verso, 1 9 9 3 ) , p p . 3 1 - 3 2 ; idem, Infanzia e storia: Distruzione
dell'esperienza e origine della storia (Torino: Giulio Einaudi Editore,
1978), p 2 7 .
6 8 . Agamben, Infancy and History, p. 44; idem, Infanzia e storia,
pp.41-42.
69. Q u o t e d in Agamben, Infancy and History, p. 4 4 ; idem,
Infanzia e storia, p. 4 1 .
7 0 . Q u o t e d in Agamben, Infancy and History, p. 4 5 ; idem,
Infanzia e storia, p. 4 3 .
7 1 . Agamben, Infancy and History, p. 46; idem, Infanzia e storia,
pp.43-44.
72. M a r t i n Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. J o h n Macquarrie
a n d Edward Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), p p .
149-219.
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 Index
Agamben, Giorgio: La communità
che viene (The Corning
Community), 9, 29, 93-94,
121-62; // linguaggio e la
morte (Language and Death),
129-31, 178n. 28; Infanzia e
storia (Infancy and History),
158-62
an-archic, 43, 63, 78, 156
anarchy, 34, 43, 52-53, 59
Artaud, Antonin, 122-23
artwork, 3-4, 65, 93-99, 103-4,
118-21; as image, 4, 13-30,
66-70, 76, 106-14
Autrui (Other), xii, 1-2, 4, 8, 3 0 -
64, 7 7 , 1 0 4 - 5 , 1 1 4 , 170n. 36
Badiou, Alain, 123, 151
Balthus, 122-23,136
Bataille, Georges, 31-33, 47, 5 3 -
54, 57, 59-60, 63, 78
being-in-language, 1, 29, 76, 131—
32,134, 148, 153
189
Benjamin, Walter, 153-54
Benveniste, Emile, 158-60
Blanchot, Maurice: L'Arrêt de mort
(Death Sentence), x, xiv, 9,
76-93, 99-106,111,118-19,
129; L'Attente L'Oubli
(Awaiting Oblivion), xiv, 89;
"Les caractères de l'œvre de
l'art" ("Characteristics of the
Work of Art"), 67-70; Celui
qui ne m'accompagnait pas
(The One Who Was Standing
Apart From Me), xi; La
Communauté inavouble (The
Unavowable Community), 5-
6; "Les Deux Versions de
l'imaginaire" ("Two Versions
of the Imaginary"), 72;
L'Espace littéraire (The Space
of Literature), 10, 92; Le Pas
au-delà (The Step Not
Beyond), 101-2; "Pour
l'amitié," xi; "La Solitude
Blanchot, Maurice (continued)', EXLITENCT, 2, S N , <,S 66, 70-74; Imaginary, 2,4, '>, 17, 20-21, 27, Marlboro, duchesie of, 11-12
essentielle" ("The Essential aetthi in , i'i 2 1 , 2 9 - 3 0 , (><> 77, 10 I 4, 108-10, 130 Massumi, Brian, 65
Solitude"), 115-17, 161; immemorial, I (>, 31-37, 42, 45, Mill, John Stuart, 33
Thomas L'Obscur (Thomas finitude, 8- 9, I! $4, 56-64, 73 74, 104, I 12-13 moi. See self
the Obscure), 161 Flesch, William, I69n. 32 intersubjectivity, 96,103-5, 129. myth, 20, 26, 166n. 34
Bogart, Humphrey, 136 Foucault, Michel, 100 See also subject (and subjectiv-
Borch-Jacobsen, Mikkel, 33, 40, Freud, Sigmund, xi-xiv, 32, 36, 40, •ty) Nancy, Jean-Luc, 7, 40, 47, 58, 78,
44-45, 168n. 14 43-46, 97, 117 ipseity, 37, 61-62, 69-70, 74, 132 166n. 34
Brennan, Walter, 132 Nessus, 31, 34
Gleason, Jackie, 138 Kafka, Franz, 90-91, 97 Neuter, 28, 36. See also il
Cagney, James, 132 God, 140-42, 150, 151-53 Kant, Immanuel, 8-9, 33, 74-76, Nietzsche, Friedrich, xi, 36, 97,
Casablanca, 136 Greenstreet, Sydney, 138 111, 119-20, 126; Critique of 110, 130, 149
Celan, Paul, 10-11 Pure Reason, 138-52, 156-62 Nihilism, 3
Chaney, Lon, 132 Hackman, Gene, 137 Kelly, Grace, 133
character actors, 132-38 Hamann, Johann Georg, 158 Kojève, Alexandre, 44, 98 Olivier, Laurence, 133
Congreve, William, 11-12 Hegel, G. W. F., 44, 78, 97-98, Other. See Autrui
Cook, Elisha, Jr., 132 129-30 Lacan, Jacques, 40, 44,117, 158 oxymoron, 78
Cotton, Joseph, 136 Heidegger, Martin, 2, 9, 33, 36, Lacoue-Labarthe, Philippe, 7, 17,
38, 44, 49, 60, 67-68, 75-76, 4 0 , 4 9 , 6 3 , 7 8 , 1 1 7 - 1 8 , 164 Peirce, C. S., 42
Da-Sein, 2, 44, 49, 59-64, 148-52, 78, 97-98, 111, 130-31, n. 9, 166n. 34 Plato, 117
159 168n. 9; "Brief über den language: of ethics, 39-40, 42, 46, politics, 3, 8, 29, 50, 155-62
Davis, Lydia, x, 86 Humanismus," 148; and 55, 58, 169n. 30; and potentia, 1-2, 40, 60, 7 5 , 1 4 3 ,
death. See dying (and death) ethics, 62-64; Kant and the experience, 154-62; in 145,161
Deleuze, Gilles, 123 Problem of Metaphysics, 138- literature and poetry, 4-5, 7, Proust, Marcel, xiv, 4, 50; A la
Derrida, Jacques, 4 1 , 63, 74, 84, 52, 156-62 10-12. See also being-in- recherche du temps perdu, 84
111 Henry, Michel, 38, 168n. 14 language proximity, 77-93
désœvrement (work-less), 87 Hill, Leslie, ix Levinas, Emmanuel: Autrement
diachronie (diachrony), 34-36, 4 6 - Hulk Hogan, 6 qu'être ou au-delà de l'essence responsibility (responsibilite), x, 4,
47, 49-50, 63,104 Hume, David, x, 142 (Otherwise Than Being or 3 1 - 3 2 , 3 8 , 4 8 , 5 9 - 6 2 , 77, 92,
dying (and death), 4, 24-25, 5 7 - Husserl, Edmund, 104 Beyond Essence), 4, 31-64, 105
64, 92-103 77, 97, 104; De l'existence à rhythm, 14-16, 26
identification, 4, 37-40, 42^18, 55 l'existant (Existence and Richardson, William J., 75-76;
ego. See self il (He, the Neuter), 5, 36, 7 9 , 1 1 2 - Existents), 66-67; "Realité et Heidegger, 139-55, 179n. 38
en deçà du temps (hither side of 14,115-19 son ombre" ("Reality and Its Ritter, Thelma, 132
time), 25, 40, 7 7 , 8 8 , 9 3 - 1 0 6 , il y a (there is), 9, 27-30, 65, 7 0 - Shadow"), 9,13-30, 66-67, Roustang, Francois, 45
110,112, 115,150,152. See 84; "La Servante et son
73, 111, 116-17,124,149,
also I'entretemps maître" ("The Servant and Sartre, Jean-Paul, 99, 125
152, 161
Ventretemps (meanwhile, between- Her Master"), 104-5; Totalité schema-image, 74-76, 138-52
image, 1-2, 4, 13-17, 78, 84, 104-
time), 22-25, 27, 93-106,127, et Infini (Totality and Infinity), self (moi), 4, 34-46, 52, 60, 8 1 -
14,123, 134-35; as resem-
152. See also en deçà du temps 54 82, 106, 111
blance, 17-21; and time, 2 2 -
ethics (éthique), xii, 3, 8, 31-64, 25. See also artwork; schema- love, ix-xiv, 11-12 Shaviro, Steven, x, 87, 97
77, 97, 104-5,113 image Lyotard, Jean-François, 63, 148 Smith, Queenie, 137
 y
I)L I N I I I'. . \

spectacle, 6, 29, 54, 57, L53 S6 time. S i r dun In tunc; d y m j ; (and

Stevens, Wallace, ix-xiv death); en deca da temps;
subject (and subjectivity), 1-2, 4 - 5 , Ventretemps; image
1 4 , 1 6 , 3 6 , 3 8 - 4 2 , 44-49,54, Tolstoy, Leo, ix, 12
56, 62,110-14,124, 140-62.
See also intersubjectivity whatever (qualunque), xii, 94,
substitution, 4, 37, 48, 50, 56-57, 121-29, 151, 156
61-62, 77 Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 47
work-less. See désozvrement
Tamiroff, Akim, 137 writing, 65-76, 79, 84-85, 92,
Third Man, The, 136 112-13
Tiananmen, 94, 105