UFPPC (www.ufppc.org) — Digging Deeper CXIV: February 22, 2010, 7:00 p.m.

Ahmed Rashid,

Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia

(New York:Viking, June 2008). [A revised edition was published by Penguin in April2009, retitled

Descent into Chaos: The U.S. and the Disaster in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia.

]

[

Thesis.

This book about South and CentralAsia (referred to in this volume as "theregion) is "a mixture of reportage, analysis,and the accumulation of decades of knowledge and experience traveling in theregion and to Western capitals"(xl). Its"attempt to define history in the making . . .shows how the United States ignoredconsolidating South and Central Asia—thehomeland of global terrorism—in favor of invading Iraq" (xl-xli). This "tragedy" wasdue to neoconservatives; now "Americanpower lies shattered. The U.S. Army isoverstretched and broken, the Americanpeople are disillusioned and rudderless, U.S.credibility lies in ruins, and the world is a farmore dangerous place" (lvii).]

Maps.

6 maps.

Glossary.

11 pp.

Acronyms.

2 pp.

Introduction: Imperial Overreach andNation Building.

The U.S.'s post-9/11invasion failed to realize its aims and createda regional crisis, and the prospect of "statefailure" now faces all the countries of theregion (xxxvii-xl). The U.S. devoted to Iraqresources it should have devoted to Southand Central Asia (xli). "[C]ompared to whatis at stake in Afghanistan and Pakistan, Iraqmay well turn out to be a mere sideshow"(xlii). Rashid supported the war inAfghanistan in 2001 as "a just war and notan imperialist intervention, because onlyexternal intervention could save the Afghanpeople from the Taliban and al Qaeda andprevent the spread of al Qaeda ideology"(xliii). Review of the recent history of theregion and how the reign of the Pentagon-enabling neoconservatives in Washingtonaffected politics both in the region and athome (where they "aimed to terrify theAmerican public" [xlviii]) while ignoring theneed to facilitate nation building inAfghanistan, which could have been done for$4-5bn a year (xliii-lviii).

PART ONE: 9/11 AND WARCh. 1: A Man with a Mission: TheUnending Conflict in Afghanistan.

Hamid Karzai (b. 1957) visited the author sixweeks before 9/11 (3-6). Geography andhistory of Afghanistan (6-13). Karzai on the Taliban: "They were good people initially,but the tragedy was that very soon after [Ihelped them] they were taken over by the ISI[Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence, apowerful paramilitary intelligence agency]and became a proxy" (13). The U.S. ignoredthe growth of al Qaeda's influence with the Taliban, despite warnings (13-23).

Ch. 2: "The U.S. Will Act like a WoundedBear": Pakistan's Long Search for ItsSoul.

After 9/11, Pakistan adopted a "Yes-but" approach to cooperation with the U.S.(24-33). A review of Pakistan's history, withemphasis on the "long-lasting and damagingeffect on Pakistani society" of the 11-yearrule (1978-1988) of Gen. Zia, who claimed tohave "a mission, given, by God, to bringIslamic order to Pakistan," and who enjoyed"unstinting support" from the Reaganadministration (37; 38; 33-43).

Ch. 3: The Chief Executive'sSchizophrenia: Pakistan, the UnitedNations, and the United States before9/11.

After seizing power in a 1999 coup,Musharraf backed the Afghan Talibanunstintingly (44-60).

Ch. 4: Attack! Retaliation and Invasion.

The U.S. plan of attack on Afghanistan wasan attempt by the CIA to recover its standingpost-9/11, but neoconservative leadershipresulted in a crucial failures (61-70). Settingup nearby bases in Uzbekistan and Tajikistanto support its invasion of Afghanistan, "[t]heUnited States had arrived in Central Asia—

the first Western army to penetrate theregion since the Greek armies of Alexanderthe Great" (70). But Pakistan's ISI wasplaying a double game (70-83).

Ch. 5: The Search for a Settlement:Afghanistan and Pakistan at Odds.

When invading Afghanistan, "[t]heAmericans had decided to give anunprecedented commitment to Karzai as theonly Pashtun fighting the Taliban and apotential leader of the country" (86). The Taliban's killing of Abdul Haq (87-88).Pakistan facilitated the "Great Escape" of Taliban during the invasion (89-93).Massacres (93-95). Karzai's actions (95-96).Military analysis (97-98). Gen. TommyFranks allowed bin Laden to escape butdenied it during the 2004 presidentialcampaign (98-100). The U.S. installed Karzaiin power (101-06).

PART TWO: THE POLITICS OF THE POST-9/11 WORLDCh. 6: A Nuclear State of Mind: India,Pakistan, and the War of PermanentInstability.

The dispute over Kashmir is"crucial" to the region's stability, but no U.S.administration has ever recognized this (109-24)."After 9/11, India was stunned at how easilyand quickly the United States embracedPakistan as a strategic ally" (115). ButPakistan "lost the war of influence inWashington, as the United States built a newand long-lasting relationship with India,which had become the main U.S. ally in theregion" (123).

Ch. 7: The One-Billion-Dollar Warlords:The War within Afghanistan.

In 2002, inthe aftermath of the war, the U.S.institutionalized divisions among prosperouswarlords, while Karzai lacked state income;the U.S. under Rumsfeld, who operatedindependently, "legalize[d] warlordauthority" and funded them through theCIA's $1bn budget—his "most fatal mistake"(135; 125-39). A Loya Jirga held in Germanyelected Karzai president in June 2002 (139-44).

Ch. 8: Musharraf's Lost Moment:Political Expediency and AuthoritarianRule.

In Pakistan, the ISI continued itsdouble game (145-51). The kidnapping andkilling of Daniel Pearl in 2002 was followedby a wave of terror attacks (151-57). Thesuccess of an anti-American party, MuttahidaMajlis-e-Amal (MMA) shocked the ISI (157-61). The U.S. set up bases in Central Asia,esp. Uzbekistan (161-68).

PART THREE: THE FAILURE OF NATIONBUILDINGCh. 9: Afghanistan I: EconomicReconstruction.

Bush allowed aPresidential Decision Directive establishingan interagency process for nation building toexpire (171-73). The good advice of theauthor was ignored (173-75). A genuineopportunity for rebuilding was tragically lostfor lack of leadership (176-82). There were afew successful programs (182-87). "The realhindrance was still the CIA" (185). ZalmayKhalilzad was not up to speed (188-89). There was no "coordination with Europeancountries, the UN, or even the Afghangovernment" (190; 190-95).

Ch. 10: Afghanistan II: RebuildingSecurity.

At a 2002 G8 meeting, the U.S.shocked other countries by saying it wouldnot get involved in nation building inAfghanistan (197). Inadequate ProvincialReconstruction Teams were later set up, butwere underfunded (197-201). Building anAfghan army, and, more importantly, a policeforce, proved difficult (201-05). The Afghangovernment was riven with factions (206-09). The U.S. interfered with a U.N. program todisarm warlords (209-11). A "modern anddemocratic" constitution was adopted in January 2004 (211-18).

Ch. 11: Double-Dealing with IslamicExtremism: Al Qaeda and the Taliban inPakistan.

The ISI continued to help the Taliban (219-22). The capture on Mar. 28,2002, and subsequent torture of AbuZubaydah led to the capture of Khalid SheikhMohammed on Mar. 1, 2003 (224-26). "Tothis day none of the Islamic parties makingup the MMA acknowledge the existence of alQaeda and they maintain that 9/11 wascarried out by the CIA and Israel" and theywere not contradicted by Musharraf (227;227-29). U.S. forces grew increasinglyimpatient with Pakistani assistance toextremists (229). Assassination attempts on

Musharraf frightened the West (230-33).Pakistan's problematic educational system(234-36). The A.Q. Khan scandal broke inthe spring of 2004 (236). A new terroristgroup formed by well-educatedprofessionals, Jundallah, emerged (237).Pakistani politics (238-39).

Ch. 12: Taliban Resurgent: The TalibanReturns Home.

The Taliban regrouped andreturned to the field in 2003 in Helmand andZabul provinces, but the U.S. waspreoccupied with Iraq (240-49). "The Talibanleaders treated Quetta [in Pakistan] as theirnew capital" (250). They were no moresophisticated in 2004 than in 1994 (251). The U.S. was complacent (252-53). Afghanelections (254-61).

PART FOUR: DESCENT INTO CHAOSCh. 13: Al Qaeda's Bolt-Hole: Pakistan'sTribal Areas.

Pakistan's FATA (FederallyAdministered Tribal Areas) (265-67). Afterthe 1947 Partition, Afghanistan refused torecognize the Durand Line (the border drawnin 1893 by Sir Mortimer Durand) (267-68).South Waziristan was al Qaeda's firstsanctuary (268-70). Pakistan's first moveagainst al Qaeda in March 2004 faileddisastrously (270-71). U.S. involvement inthe area (via Pakistan) was incompetent andhelped Islamist forces (272-74). Fighting ledto a stalemate (274-76). Enmity betweenKarzai and Musharraf (277-78). "Almost alllatter-day al Qaeda terrorist plots around theworld had a FATA connection" (278; 278-80).Pakistan's army had ceased looking for binLaden after 2004; the al Qaeda menace wasgrowing again (280-82). Balochistan ismarkedly secular (283-87). Pakistan'snuclear program (287-90). "Musharraf'smost significant achievement in this periodwas to convince the army of the need forpeace with India and a resolution of theKashmir dispute" (291). An October 2005earthquake in northern Pakistan killed73,000 people; extremist groups took theopportunity to reactivate as NGOs providingrelief (291-92).

Ch. 14: America Shows the Way: TheDisappeared and the Rendered.

Thedisavowal of the Geneva Conventions "was astep backward for the United States" thatwas part of a neoconservative project toexpand the authority of the executive (293;293-97). U.S. handling of prisoners; torture(297-307). "Pakistan's military regimelearned American methods most quickly"(307; 307-10). Human rights abuses inUzbekistan (310-11). Uighurs (311-12).Guantanamo's "monstrosity" (312-16).

Ch. 15: Drugs and Thugs: Opium Fuelsthe Insurgency.

Afghanistan is the world'slargest heroin provider; the drug trade iscentered in Helmand, in the 1960s a bastionof Western-style progress (317-25). U.S. &U.K. efforts to address opium poppycultivation were ineffectual; Karzai sharesthe blame (325-32).Drug money's role inelections (332-37).

Ch. 16: Who Lost Uzbekistan? Tyrannyin Central Asia.

The overthrow of Kyrgyz'spresident in 2005 (338-40). Turkmenistan(341). A major crisis in Uzbekistan; the U.S.lacked a strategy (341-48).

Ch. 17: The Taliban Offensive: Battlingfor Control of Afghanistan, 2006-2007.

Joschka Fischer played a key role in NATO'sAugust 2003 assumption of the Afghan waras a way to compensate for Germany'sopposition to the Iraq war (349-51). But itproved difficult to find soldiers, and Rumsfeldannounced U.S. troop cuts in Afghanistanfrom 19,000 to 16,000 in February 2005, atan inopportune moment (351-54). NATOtroops "acted like scared rabbits" (354; 354-58). NATO intelligence on the Taliban wasappallingly bad (359-60). Unwillingness totake casualties led to a reliance on air powerthat alienated the population (361-62). The Taliban began to set up alternativeinstitutions of government, the war beganagain, and links to Pakistan wereunmistakable (362-71). Problems led to acrisis inside NATO (371-73).

Ch. 18: Conclusion: The Death of an Iconand a Fragile Future.

The assassination of Benazir Bhutto on Dec. 27, 2007 (374-79). The spring 2007 lawyers' demonstrations(380-81). The fall of the Red Mosque in July2007 (381-83). With the situation unravelingin both Pakistan and Afghanistan,Washington grew concerned (383-93). NATOlacked an overall strategy (393-97).International development plans forAfghanistan were not being coordinated