of answering that question."' However, after full consideration, theCourt reluctantly grants the motion, on the terms specified below.The Court begins where any court should: with the facts. Indisapproving as neither fair, reasonable, adequate nor in the publicinterest the prior proposed settlement of the first of these twocases, 09 Civ. 6829 (the "Undisclosed Bonuses" case), the Courtbewailed the absence of established facts supporting the proposal andexpressed the hope that "the truth may still emerge." S.E.C. v. Bankof AmericaCorp., 653 F. Supp. 2d 507, 512 (S.D.N.Y. 009). Sincethen, the parties have conducted extensive discovery, assisted by thehelpful decision of defendant Bank of America Corp. (the "Bank") towaive attorney-client privilege, resulting in theS.E.C.'spresentation to this Court of a 35-page Statement of Facts and a 13-page Supplemental Statement of Facts, the accuracy of which is notcontested here by the Bank.' In addition, in response to questions
David H. Nathan, Baseball Quotations 150 (1993). Berra, adisciple of the equally profound professor CaseyStengel, has hada notable impact on the development of American law.
senerally William D. Araiza et al., The Jurisprudence of YoqiBerra, 46 Emory
697 (1997)At the hearing on the instant proposed settlement heldbefore this Court on February 8, 2010, the Court asked counselfor the Bank to affirm "that you have no material quarrel withthe accuracy of the facts set forth in the SEC statement of factsand that the Court can consider those statements of fact asagreed to for the purposes of evaluating the settlement," towhich Bank counsel responded "That's correct, your Honor."Transcript ("tr."), /8/10, at
The Court presumes that if theBank felt any differently about the Supplemental Statement of