OCTOBER TERM, 2009Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as isbeing done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has beenprepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.See
Detroit Timber & Lumber Co.,
200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLANDNo. 08–680. Argued October 5, 2009—Decided February 24, 2010In 2003, a police detective tried to question respondent Shatzer, whowas incarcerated at a Maryland prison pursuant to a prior conviction,about allegations that he had sexually abused his son. Shatzer in-voked his
right to have counsel present during interroga-tion, so the detective terminated the interview. Shatzer was releasedback into the general prison population, and the investigation wasclosed. Another detective reopened the investigation in 2006 and at-tempted to interrogate Shatzer, who was still incarcerated. Shatzerwaived his
rights and made inculpatory statements. Thetrial court refused to suppress those statements, reasoning that
, 451 U. S. 477, did not apply because Shatzer hadexperienced a break in
custody prior to the 2006 interroga-tion. Shatzer was convicted of sexual child abuse. The Court of Ap-peals of Maryland reversed, holding that the mere passage of timedoes not end the
protections, and that, assuming,
,a break-in-custody exception to
existed, Shatzer’s releaseback into the general prison population did not constitute such abreak.
Because Shatzer experienced a break in
custody lastingmore than two weeks between the first and second attempts at inter-rogation,
does not mandate suppression of his 2006 state-ments. Pp. 4–18.(a)
created a presumption that once a suspect invokes the
right to the presence of counsel, any waiver of that right inresponse to a subsequent police attempt at custodial interrogation isinvoluntary.
’ fundamental purpose is to “[p]reserv[e] theintegrity of an accused’s choice to communicate with police onlythrough counsel,”
, 487 U. S. 285, 291, by “pre-vent[ing] police from badgering [him] into waiving his previously as-