Civil No. 06-1260 and 06-1524 (GAG)
2and independence normally associated with the States of the Union. Consequently, Supreme Court jurisprudence treating Puerto Rico disparately from States premised on the
doctrineis anachronistic and, thus, no longer applicable. Id. at 26-28.The court certified these constitutional challenges to the Attorney General of the UnitedStates, noting that the federal government’s position would be essential to the court’s ruling. See
28 U.S.C. § 2403; Fed. R. Civ. P. 51(b). The court also afforded the parties time to further addressthese issues which are clearly dispositive of the merits of the injunctive relief sought. See
of October 2, 2008 (Docket Nos. 135 and 136). The Attorney General duly responded to the Court’scertification order (Docket No. 144), as did the plaintiffs (Docket No. 148).
Before addressing plaintiffs’ contentions, however, it is essential to first provide some background on the Medicaid “wraparound” statute as it pertains to Puerto Rico.
The Medicaid Wraparound Statute and its Applicability to Puerto Rico
The Medicaid program, 42 U.S.C. § 1396
., begun in 1965, is jointly supported withfederal and state funds and directly administered by state governments. Its purpose is to providemedical assistance to indigent families with dependent children, as well as indigent disabled, blind,and aged individuals. Río Grande Community Health Center, Inc. v. Rullán, 397 F. 3d 56, 61 (1
The court notes that the two consolidated cases at hand are presently not the only
“wraparound” payment litigation cases in this district where these same constitutional issues have been raised. See also Atlantic Medical Center, Inc. v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 06-1291(GAG) (Docket No. 398 at 24-27).The Attorney General does not address the merits of the constitutional arguments. Rather,
he posits that the Commonwealth Secretary’s challenge has been improperly raised, given that in thesummary judgment context he did not present any constitutional arguments. This is correct.However, the arguments raised by the Secretary in his summary judgment motion focused onwhether the Commonwealth as a matter of fact was in compliance with the federal statute at issue. Now the plaintiffs have moved for preliminary injunctive relief and the Commonwealth, in turn, hasraised the constitutional arguments as a defense. This is certainly not improper given that the Courtmust now consider evidence as to each of the four requisites necessary for an injunction to issue, towit, (i) plaintiffs’ likelihood of success on the merits, (ii) the potential of irreparable harm to plaintiffs, (iii) the effect of an injunction to defendant, and, (iv) the effect of an injunction to the public. See Boston Duck Tours LP v. Super Duck Tours, LLC, 531 F. 3d 1,11 (1 Cir. 2008).