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    Claimant's Reply to Defence in matter of Leigh Ravenscroft v CaRT.

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    Ravenscroft Reply to Defence

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    Claimant's Reply to Defence in matter of Leigh Ravenscroft v CaRT.

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    © All Rights Reserved
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    72 views17 pages

    Ravenscroft Reply To Defence

    Uploaded by

    Nigel Moore
    Claimant's Reply to Defence in matter of Leigh Ravenscroft v CaRT.

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    © All Rights Reserved
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    CLAIM NO: HC/2015/001906 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE CHANCERY DIVISION BETWEEN: LEIGH RAVENSCROFT Claimant and CANAL and RIVER TRUST Defendant REPLY TO DEFENCE 1 The Defence itemises alleged procedural faults for which apologies are due if true; the Claimant is a Litigant in Person and has endeavoured to be as helpful as possible in the initial material presented. It appears from the introductory paragraphs of the Defence that the Defendant has found no difficulty in identifying the key elements of the Claim, so that the material has in fact been of assistance, and the Defendant's ability to respond has not been compromised but rather generously helped. The matters traversed in the Claim are of serious import to the thousands of the Defendant's clientele, and the issues over the regulation and proper management of the waterways deserve to be aired and adjudicated upon, so that the public can be confident as to the meaning of the relevant legislation affecting them, and confident that the authority will act always in accordance with sound managerial principles, as well as having an appropriate understanding of their own legislation, while sensitive to the Human Rights issues when enforcing that legislation 4. For those reasons, it is submitted that it would be inappropriate to strike out the Claim or any part of it, as suggested in the Defence and in recent correspondence over the List of Issues. 5. It is probably redundant at this point, but paragraph 3 is factually incorrect; the exhibits to the ‘Statement of Case’ had been hand delivered to the Defendant's solicitors well before Mr Stoner commenced drafting their Defence. “Main navigable channel” 6. It is mistaken for the Defendant to claim, as in paragraph 8, that jurisdiction [in general] is claimed to be limited to the “main navigable channef’. The limitation is respecting the obligation for boats kept or used within the “main navigable channef’ to be registered and in possession of a current Pleasure Boat Certificate. It is not denied, for example, that relevant byelaws controlling use of the rivers are applicable outside the “main navigable channel’, nor that the limitation has no applicability to houseboats. 7. Paragraph 9 of the Defence correctly quotes the relevant portion of the 1971 Act as “This part of the Act applies to the main navigable channel of each of the inland waterways specified in Schedule 1 to this Act which channel so specified is in this Act referred to as a ‘river waterway’." {my bold] The Part of the Act referred to concerns the registration of Pleasure Boats. 8. In its following arguments on the matter, the Defence has entirely omitted any recognition that the term had already been in use by BW prior to their drafting the 1971 Act, to describe the ‘fairway’ of both canals and rivers in the General Canal Byelaws of 1965, and that a very specific formula for determining the dimensions of that fairway was particularised in the Transport Act 1968. BW, and CaRT following them, have never been in any doubt as to the understanding and application of the term, in both their primary and secondary legislation. For the past 40 years, BW/CaRT have correctly applied the term in their instructions to dredging contractors. No rationale has been presented in the Defence, for departing from this clear understanding of the term. 9. Under those circumstances, the current attempt to now explain away the term used in the 1971 Act as meaning something altogether different from what it means in their 1965 Byelaws, and in the Transport Act of 1968, is futile 10.It is not intended here, therefore, to engage with each of the arguments tendered in the Defence, although failure to address each such point should not be construed as acceptance of that point. 11. This Reply will accordingly address only the main contentions of the Defence, which seeks to suggest irrationality if the definition of the term is to be construed consistently with the Byelaws and the Transport Act 12.Paragraph 14.1 is answered by the fact that Parliament DID limit “river waterways" to the “main navigable channef' of the specified waterways; they did not need to use any alternative term such as ‘fairway’ when the term they {following BW's drafting] chose to use, had already been so specifically defined in the Transport Act. Nor had there been any confusion over use of the term within the Byelaws, which could equally have used the alternate description of ‘fairway’. 13.Paragraph 14.2 suggests it is improbable that Parliament would limit application of the registration regime to parts only of the rivers, yet the alleged difficulty of policing the registration scheme applies equally to those who bring transportable craft down slipways, or which moor in backwaters and marinas etc. which the Defence acknowledges as being outside the “main navigable channer’ 14.As to any difficulty in identifying the “limited part of any given section of river’, that possibility was recognised and provided for by the specific provision in any such case, for application to be made to the Secretary of State “for further defining the waterway by reference to a map." [Part II, s.4(2)]. That following sub-section reinforces the understanding that the limits may in some circumstances be indistinct. In the historical event, however, the application of the 1968 formula has been clear for 40 years, since the 1975 Fraenkel Report. 15.Paragraph 14.3 quotes the stated purposes of the Act as including control of both pleasure boats and houseboats. It is all the more telling then, that no such geographic limitation as applied to pleasure boats was seen necessary to apply to houseboats. Those could be [and almost inevitably are] moored outside of any navigable channel and still remain subject to registration. The clear distinction between the two cases illustrates the difference in the jurisdictional applicability. 16.Paragraph 14.4 only seeks to reinforce the argument of 14.2, and the same response applies. 17. Paragraph 14.5 overlooks the fact that in requiring registration for boats kept or used within the main navigable channel, Parliament had actually tightened the application to embrace a more extensive requirement than the Thames Conservancy Act on which the clause was modelled. 18. This more readily monitored and enforceable clause in the 1971 legislation compared with the Thames Conservancy Act must be seen as good answer to paragraph 14.6, seeing that Parliament had not regarded the Thames Conservancy Act requirements as making “no sense”, even though in that instance [in contrast to the 1971 Act] boats could be ‘kept’ within the registration area - for so long as they did not ‘use’ the river - absent the registration obligation. 19.It was, therefore, always very much easier for Thames boats kept on a mooring within the registration area, to spontaneously decide on a little trip now and then without being spotted. Neither had Parliament seen it as senseless in the Thames Conservabcy legislation, to permit moored boats to remain unregistered even though within the registration area 20. It was only in 2010 that the situation on the Thames was changed by Statutory Instrument; the change was brought about for reasons of increased revenue, not for any perceived difficulty in administration. 21.As to paragraph 15, it is to be earnestly hoped that the Defendant WILL “refer to the provisions of the Transport Act 1968." That is precisely what the Claim does, because no more precise definition - of how the term is to be applied to all the commercial and cruising waterways - could be imagined. Repeal/Amendment of the legislation 22. Paragraphs 16 to 18 are denied absolutely. This “in the alternative” argument, along with all others attempting to deny any geographic licensing limitations such as those affecting Pleasure Boats under the 1971 Act, was exhaustively agued by Mr Stoner for BW in Moore v British Waterways over 5 years’ of litigation from 2007, and HHJ Hildyard emphatically dismissed them in his 2012 Judgment as unconvincing. 23.When asked if BW wished to appeal his findings, the answer was no. It is quite simply not open to the Defendant to seek to re-litigate arguments already adjudicated on by the High Court; which arguments they lost, and failed to appeal. They must abide by the Judgment and Order that they accepted. 24.Purely for completeness - because it is averred that this argument has no place within these proceedings for the reason aforesaid, and should be struck out — the hollowness of the argument can readily be seen by simply reading the context of the relevant 1983 Act section 25. The 1983 Act s.4(1) only modified the 1971 Act regarding the duration of boat certificates, and the respective charges [which had been rigidly fixed under the terms of s.7 & 8.8 of the 1971 Act} 26.The British Waterways Act 1971 s.7 dealt with “Charges for registration of pleasure boats", any charge in respect of a particular size of boat was to be determined “not exceeding the appropriate charge in that behalf specified in Part 1 of Schedule 3 to this Act.” [my bold] 27.The British Waterways Act 1971 s.8 had specified that: “The Board, on payment to them in respect of any pleasure boat of the prescribed charge in that behalf... may grant to the applicant a pleasure boat certificate for the use of any river waterways expiring at any time before 31st December next after the date thereof: Provided that in any one year there shall not be granted in respect of any pleasure boat more than one such certificate for a period of one month, or more than two such certificates for a period of fifteen days or more than six such certificates for a period of one day.” [my bold] 28. These limitations on periods and charges are the only elements of the section that were modified by the 1983 Act, s.4(1) of which provided that: “Notwithstanding anything in the Act of 1971 or the Act of 1974 or in any other enactment relating to the Board or their inland waterways, the Board may register pleasure boats and houseboats under the Act of 1971 for such periods and on payment of such charges as they may from time to time determine: Provided that the charge payable for the registration of a pleasure boat shall not at any time exceed 60 per centum of the amount which would be payable for the licensing of such vessel on any inland waterway other than a river waterway...” 29. Any attempt to extrapolate the clear meaning of s.4 of the 1983 Act so as to render s.4 of the 1971 Act *otiose” is most egregiously misconceived, and ‘emphatically contradicted by the recognition of its survival in the 1995 Act, 30.As noted in paragraph 22 above, Mr Stoner has already argued - before HHJ Hildyard [BW Skeleton Argument paragraphs 100(3) & (6)] - that s.4 of the 1983 Act extended BW's powers to charge for registration of boats, so that the regime applied even to waters subject to otherwise unamended public rights of navigation, on the grounds that “there is no saving provision applicable . 31.The fact is that no such saving provisions were needed; the 1971 Act s.4 continues to apply un-repealed, and to apply only to the “river waterways” as. therein defined. As HHJ Hildyard remarked in his judgment 145, ... BWB is adamant that such a licence was indeed required, and the lack of it at the relevant time caused the vessels to be moored without lawful authority, justifying the section 8 notices that were served. 146. __ |. am not persuaded by this. In particular, in my view, BWB have never convincingly addressed or offered a coherent and consistent explanation of the fact that the legislation has distinguished between the various types of inland waterways under its ownership or control, and BWB's powers are differently expressed in relation to each. 147. For example, BWB offered no compelling explanation why the Act of 1971 was confined in its application to pleasure boats to those used in river waterways; nor why, to take another related example, the Act of 1975 expressly carved out "tidal waters" from the power to make bye-laws recognised and refined in its section 5(1). 148. More generally, in my view, BWB's contentions do not sufficiently take account of the discernible pattern in the legislation of leaving well alone the use of inland waterways in exercise of PRN, and of not extending the "relevant consent” scheme to the use of pleasure boats exclusively on tidal stretches in exercise of PRN.” [my bold] 32, Accordingly, his judgment concluded, paragraph 233(i) “no licence is legally required for a vessel bona fide used for navigation exclusively on tidal stretches of the GUC which have not been designated as river waterways specified in or further to the 1971 Act.” [my bold] 33.On handing down judgment, HHJ Hildyard asked BW: “Are you seeking permission to appeal?" BW responded: “! am not seeking permission. If the order is in these terms then | am not seeking permission to appeal.” 34. That order BW were not prepared to appeal stated: “That it be and is hereby declared that no licence is required for a vessel bona fide used for navigation exclusively on tidal stretches of the Grand Union Canal which have not been designated as river waterways specified in or further to the British Waterways Act 1971.” [my bold] 35.BW having declined to appeal the 2012 finding of the High Court - that Mr Stoner's argument reference the effect of the 1983 Act s.4 on the 1971 Act s.4 should be dismissed - they are not entitled to pretend now that no such judgment exists, such that the failed argument could be re-ltigated. It cannot. Houseboat Classification 36. Paragraph 19 is rejected entirely as utterly beside the point of this case. It is wholly irrelevant whether ‘Three Wise Monkeys’ should or should not have been classified as a ‘Houseboat’ [for avoidance of doubt, the suggestion that it could be so classified is denied absolutely] 37.The simple facts of the matter are that this case is brought to challenge CaRT’s dealings with ‘Three Wise Monkeys’; that boat was properly classified as a Pleasure Boat; it was ‘licensed’ by them with a Pleasure Boat Certificate; it was served a section 8 notice for failing to maintain payments for the Pleasure Boat Certificate, and payments for the alleged arrears of those payments for a Pleasure Boat Certificate were demanded and obtained as part of the price for the owner being allowed to retrieve his boat 38. Seeking now to argue what CaRT could and/or should have done is pointless; they are being held to task for what they have done. Raising the Houseboat legislation is an extraneous issue, being a waste of the Court's time and resources, forming no part of the Claimant's case, nor of any position taken by the Defendant prior to this Defence. 39. The relevant comments of Hildyard J as to the same argument are apposite. He noted: “BWB appears to accept that... a vessel with a home mooring will not necessarily be a houseboat just because it is moored for much of the time." . . . ‘at all events BWB has not invoked section 13 of the 1971 Act in this case, The notices in dispute do not relate or refer to it: they refer only to section 8." [my bold] The same applies here. Parliamentary Material 40. In the premises above, respecting the previously defined meaning of “main navigable channef’ in both primary and secondary prior legislation, all the arguments adduced within the Particulars of Claim and Statement of Case are superfluous other than to reinforce the plain meaning, as previously accepted. [Those include the references to Select Committee minutes, though these also help answer the protestations of the Defence paragraph 14.] 41. For that reason there would appear little benefit in arguing here that Parliamentary material must be admitted as an aid to interpretation of the term. For the avoidance of doubt however, it is claimed that use of such material is admissible, for all that reliance on this is not necessary to the case. 42. It is appropriate, however, to observe that the continued insistence by the Defendant in all such proceedings that such material is inadmissible, speaks volumes as to their reluctance to stand by their own submissions to Parliament. A transparent authority with nothing to hide would never shy away from scrutiny as to their own representations to Parliament regarding the intent of their privately promoted Bills. Proportionality 43. There is a significant misunderstanding implied within paragraph 23 of the Defence. The Claim does not contend that CaRT is limited to monetary claims in respect of unlicensed boats; actions to recover monies owed for licences, necessarily entail a judgment that the boat should be licensed. Moreover, the pertinent sections of both the 1971 Act in respect of river waterways, and the General Canal Byelaws of 1976 in respect of all other applicable waterways, provide for sanctions that include criminal convictions. 44. The British Waterways Act 1983, section 5(2) states regarding any default of payments or statutory requirement that ‘the Board may (without prejudice to any criminal proceedings to which that person may be liable) recover from him’ sums due. [my bold] 45. Section 5(3) of the same Act provides that “A court before which a person is convicted of an offence under any of the specified enactments arising from or involving any failure to pay a charge may, in addition to dealing with him in any other way, order him to pay to the Board. ..” [my bold] 46. It has never previously been denied by the Defendant that exercise of s.8's draconian power is to be considered a measure of last resort, involving as it does the violation of rights to personal property. 47.The obvious first resort in cases of unlicensed boats is to compel the obtaining of that licence. This is the logical, legitimate managerial purpose that is overlooked by all argument for leap-frogging to eviction from the waterways. 48. It has also been established in the Courts that the test of proportionality involves the question of whether alternative, less onerous sanctions are available to an authority before exercising powers otherwise in breach of a person's Human Rights. 49. The Claim therefore holds that for so long as applicable Statutes such as that quoted above in paragraph 45 can be applied, then application of more onerous sanctions necessarily violates the intent of the law as it must now be interpreted in light of the Human Rights Act 1998. 50. The fact that the directly applicable sanctions are NOT ‘mere’ monetary claims [as paragraph 23 of the Defence implies], serves to emphasise the unlawiulness of the gratuitous employment of maximum sanctions that bypass the offence-specific lawful avenues of enforcement. 51. The denial in paragraph 30 of the Defence that proportionality is relevant to the exercise of their powers is a sad indication of the institutional mind-set at work. The foregoing paragraphs of the Defence that purport to support that proposition are rejected 52. The rights to peaceful enjoyment of one’s possessions can certainly be over- ridden by such lawful requirements as promote a society's general well-being, 10 but bypassing the Parliamentary approved sanctions in favour of that which does most violence to the private rights [and incidentally with least gain to the authority], is clear violation of article 1 of protocol 1. Particulars 53. It is not intended here to deal with every paragraph of the ‘Particulars’ that commence on page 10 of the Defence, but this should not be construed as acceptance that any of them are agreed. Purpose of section 8 54. It is denied that the “legitimate aim of section 8 is to ensure compliance with and application of the licensing regime . . .” as claimed in paragraph 31(2). 55. The exercise of section 8 in place of the statutes that ARE specifically there to ensure such compliance, is in fact, as argued in the Claim, to the financial detriment of the authority, and succeeds only in keeping boats off the waterways, instead of ensuring that boats become lawfully fee-paying ‘occupants of them. 56. The straightforward purpose of s.8 powers is to enable the authority to remove vessels that have been abandoned, or left on the waterways without authority in circumstances - on the Claimant's case — where alternative remedies are unavailable. 57.Importantly, s.8 powers were never designed as an enforcement power for licensing, not even as a threat to frighten customers into compliance. It is an ultimate sanction only, respecting unlicensed boats, where all appropriate avenues of redress have failed 58. The truth of the foregoing is apparent from the genesis of the legislation, which had its origins decades before compulsory licensing of boats became empowered in the 1970's. Effect of monetary claims 59. Paragraph 31(8) with its various sub-paragraphs is rejected entirely as misconceived, and inaccurate even on its own argument. It ignores the wording of the relevant statutory provisions such as those referred to in paragraphs 43 to 45 above. Those procedures are NOT monetary claims only. 60. The consequence of pursuing claims against unlicensed boats under section 5 of the 1983 Act is payment of the sums owed; the imposition of a fine on the delinquent boat owner, along with a conviction for the offence; imposition of costs, and a court order to comply with the licensing requirements. 61. The net result to the authority in exercising s.5 is payment of sums owed, and retention of a fee-paying customer who would ordinarily be chastened by the experience and encouraged to avoid breach of the legislation in future. 62. The net result to the authority when exercising section 8 instead, is removal of a customer and, at best, restitution only of the expenditure incurred. The potential of future income is disbarred. As a management decision, this is very bad practice. Deprivation of possession 63. It is agreed that, as the defence paragraph 31(7) states, exercise of section 8 “does not necessarily deprive a boater of his possession” for the reason stated, but by reason of the extravagantly costly procedures followed in the employment of outside contractors [always involving removal “out of the county’], for all practical purposes the huge majority of boaters are so deprived. The sums involved are massively disproportionate 64. The Court's attention is drawn to the posters and articles published by BW and CaRT wherein section 8 procedures as employed by them, are aptly described as “seizures”, contrary to the statutory intent. 65. Attention is also drawn to the statistics published by CaRT respecting the thousands of boats seized, compared to the number successfully reclaimed upon payment of the exorbitant costs — only 9 boats were successfully reclaimed out of the 57 recorded as having been seized following court action since CaRT took over the BW network; very many more would have been seized, as in the present case, without court action, these boats not being “live-aboards" httos://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/request for a breakdown of boat s#comment-55267 Article 6 66. Paragraph 32 of the Defence is rejected. Article 6 Rights are engaged when rights to a fair trial are denied. When a person’s possessions are taken into custody the seizure must only be done by authorised persons, backed by an appropriate order of the court - the validity of the debt having been confirmed at trial. If that process is bypassed there has been no trial, fair or otherwise. 67. The actions of the Claimant in bringing this action cannot exonerate the authority in having seized his goods without prior judicial approval; paragraph 33 is insulting to common sense. This action is taken post the abuse. Statute of Marlborough 68. Contrary to the assertion of paragraph 34 of the Defence, the action in seizing ‘Three Wise Monkeys’ WAS levying distress in respect of the alleged debt comprising 4 years unpaid licence fees. It OUGHT not to have been ~ it is part of this Claim that section 8 provides ONLY for removal from the waterway or locality, and that possession of the vessel cannot be used as leverage against the alleged debt of licence arrears, nor any costs aside from those incurred in removal and storage — but it was. 69. In this respect the semantic somersaults of paragraphs 48- 50 are to be admired for their verbal athleticism but nothing else. The admission in 13 paragraph 48 ‘that the sums referred to in section 8(3) of the British Waterways Act 1983 did not include unpaid licence fees’ is the key point to the Claimant's Claim in this respect. 70.It cannot be honestly denied that retum of ‘Three Wise Monkeys’ was made explicitly conditional upon payment of the alleged licence arrears, additionally to the removal and storage costs. There was therefore nothing “inadvertent” [Defence par.50] about the commission of the crime of “conversion or trespass to goods’; there was fully conscious insistence — in the face of explicit denial of the right - that the boat would be held failing payment of the alleged debt - and the boat was not in fact released until those sums were paid, additionally to the seizure and storage costs. 71. The argument in the Defence paragraph 49 that the Claimant was liable to pay the sums alleged due in respect of licence fees is, while disputed as the main thrust of the Claim, totally irrelevant to the issue at stake. Even if, which is of course not admitted, these sums were due to be paid by the Claimant, that is a debt totally unrelated to the exercise of the powers of s.8. 72.The Defendant cannot have it both ways — either s.8 authorises seizure and holding the boat in respect of such a prior debt, or it does not. If the section DOES authorise holding of the boat until prior debts are paid, then the Torts (Interference with Goods) Act 1977, and the Tribunals Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 kick in, and demand that such action can only legitimately be taken following an Order of the Court, which Order can only be executed by a duly authorised Court officer. The Defence paragraph 49, however, appears to admit that section 8 does NOT authorise the action taken. 73.It is as a consequence of this unauthorised holding of the boat as a lien upon debts outwith “payment only of sums payable pursuant to section 8(3) of the British Waterways Act 1983" [Defence par.50] that the relevant crimes have been committed under the quoted Acts, as claimed. 74. Its utterly irrelevant to speak of the time held being no different, whether only “the sums payable pursuant to section 8(3)" were paid, or additionally the sums NOT payable under the section; the raw fact is that the boat was illegally held until sums were extracted in respect of the alleged prior debt. 75. That action places the crime firmly within the purview of Marlborough, because the seizure and holding as a lien upon the alleged prior debt was not authorised by any Court Order, as demanded under Marlborough even centuries before the modern Acts more particularly delineated the procedures to be followed. 76. Neither was the seizure and holding of the boat as lien on the alleged prior debt undertaken by authorised officers of the law, whether empowered by Court Order or not. The unidentified CaRT “Debt Collector” gives the lie to claims that the seizure was unrelated to the prior debt; the Claimant was billed for 5 hours of attendance by this anonymous officer at the scene of the seizure, at an invoiced cost of £330. 77.The obvious question is raised: why was a CaRT Debt Collection officer present at the seizure? What was his role if the seizure was unrelated to the alleged arrears? Above all, what authorisation from the Courts did this officer have? His presence and role have been resolutely ignored throughout the Defence, for all that payment of his extortionate wages was amongst those made a pre-requisite for return of the boat. 78. Marlborough deals not only with distress but with punishments [‘revenges”] - which further embraces the actions of CaRT in this and all similar cases. The appropriate sanctions provided for in the relevant law are openly regarded as derisory, as acknowledged by the County Courts in such cases as Wingfield and Ward 79. The Ward judgment notes: “Other than removal of the boat the only sanction provided for in the legislation in respect of a contravention of the Rules by a person such as the Claimant [sic — should have read ‘Defendant]] is that of a derisory fine.” [my bold] 80.It is respectfully submitted that the judge was not entitled to have so characterised Parliament's approved sanctions, nor to rely on that characterisation as justification for pursuit of more punishing avenues. His comments in that respect are nonetheless an accurate reflection of the Defendant's feelings and rationale. 81.It is submitted that when lawful punishment is openly considered “derisory” [and for the record it is denied that the Statutory fines and sanctions are justifiably so characterised] so that greater punishments are sought than are commensurate with the offence, those actions should be properly defined as “revenges’, and Court sanction sought for them. 82. The whole tenor of all correspondence and publications from CaRT, as from BW before them, illustrates that the intention of the actions taken under s.8 is that they be seen as frightening exhibitions of punitive power; revenge against those whose perceived defiance of the licensing regime cannot be adequately punished [in CaRT's eyes] by the Statutory sanctions approved by Parliament. 83.It is a matter of record that Court sanction for these extremist avenues of “enforcement” is only ever sought by CaRT in cases of ‘live-aboard’ boaters. No such sanction was sought in the instant case. Miscellaneous 84.Paragraphs 52 & 53 of the Defence refers to the Claimant's section on ‘Presumption of Probity’. It is agreed that the Defendant is not required to respond to this as an element of the Claim; the section was included [as explained therein] as a perceived necessity in circumstances where a national organisation entrusted with powers over the public is ordinarily assumed to act appropriately. 85.It is documented in the exhibits that CaRT, with the approval of its highest executive levels and Chairman, have often NOT acted appropriately, and the recorded instances of inappropriate enforcement actions need to be taken into account by the Court, lest unwarranted assumptions sway perceptions. 86. This is most especially important given the inequality of arms when individual boaters face the powerful professional representation that is routinely employed — as in this case. The natural and understandable assumptions made by Judges in these cases need exposure to the relevant background 87. The Defendant has not hesitated to highlight what it represents as a history of defiance on the part of the Claimant; it cannot equitably be justified in demanding that such allegations are kept strictly a one way street. Defendant's Statement of Truth 88.0n a lighter note [recognising that Mr Stoner and his instructing solicitors are more accustomed to represent the aggressor in such cases, leading to an obviously inadvertent error in the Defendant's ‘Statement of Truth’), it should be placed on record that the Claimant does NOT believe that the alleged facts contained in the Defence are true. Summary 89.For all and any of the above responses to the filed Defence, it is submitted that the Claimant is entitled to the Declarations and compensation sought. LEIGH RAVENSCROFT Dated this 20th day of September 2015 ‘Statement of Truth The Claimant believes that the facts contained in this Reply to Defence are true. Lh_

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