barker v wingo (1972)

BARKER v. WINGO (06/22/72)[1] SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES[2] No. 71-5255[3] 1972.SCT.42266 <http://www.versuslaw.com>; 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101[4] decided: June 22, 1972.[5]

BARKERv.WINGO, WARDEN

[6] CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALSFOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT.[7] James E. Milliman argued the cause for petitioner pro hac vice. Withhim on the brief were Norvie L. Lay and J. Chester Porter.[8] Robert W. Willmott, Jr., Assistant Attorney General of Kentucky,argued the cause for respondent pro hac vice. With him on the brief was Ed W. Hancock, Attorney General.[9] Briefs of amici curiae were filed by Solicitor General Griswold for theUnited States, and by Thomas D. Barr for the Lawyers Committee forCivil Rights Under Law.[10] Powell, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. White, J.,filed a concurring opinion, in which Brennan, J., joined, post, p. 536.[11] Author: Powell

[12] MR. JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.[13] Although a speedy trial is guaranteed the accused by the SixthAmendment to the Constitution,

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this Court has dealt with thatright on infrequent occasions. See Beavers v. Haubert, 198 U.S. 77(1905); Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354 (1957); United States v.Ewell, 383 U.S. 116 (1966); United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307(1971). See also United States v. Provoo, 17 F.R.D. 183 (D. Md.),aff'd, 350 U.S. 857 (1955). The Court's opinion in Klopfer v. NorthCarolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967), established that the right to a speedytrial is "fundamental" and is imposed by the Due Process Clause of theFourteenth Amendment on the States.

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See Smith v. Hooey, 393U.S. 374 (1969); Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30 (1970). As MR.JUSTICE BRENNAN pointed out in his concurring opinion inDickey, in none of these cases have we attempted to set out thecriteria by which the speedy trial right is to be judged. 398 U.S., at 40-41. This case compels us to make such an attempt.[14] I[15] On July 20, 1958, in Christian County, Kentucky, an elderly couplewas beaten to death by intruders wielding an iron tire tool. Twosuspects, Silas Manning and Willie Barker, the petitioner, werearrested shortly thereafter. The grand jury indicted them on September15. Counsel was appointed on September 17, and Barker's trial was setfor October 21. The Commonwealth had a stronger case againstManning, and it believed that Barker could not be convicted unlessManning testified against him. Manning was naturally unwilling toincriminate himself. Accordingly, on October 23, the day SilasManning was brought to trial, the Commonwealth sought and obtainedthe first of what was to be a series of 16 continuances of Barker'strial.

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Barker made no objection. By first convicting Manning, theCommonwealth would remove possible problems of self-incriminationand would be able to assure his testimony against Barker.[16] The Commonwealth encountered more than a few difficulties in itsprosecution of Manning. The first trial ended in a hung jury. A secondtrial resulted in a conviction, but the Kentucky Court of Appealsreversed because of the admission of evidence obtained by an illegalsearch. Manning v. Commonwealth, 328 S. W. 2d 421 (1959). At histhird trial, Manning was again convicted, and the Court of Appeals

again reversed because the trial court had not granted a change of venue. Manning v. Commonwealth, 346 S. W. 2d 755 (1961). Afourth trial resulted in a hung jury. Finally, after five trials, Manningwas convicted, in March 1962, of murdering one victim, and after asixth trial, in December 1962, he was convicted of murdering theother.

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[17] The Christian County Circuit Court holds three terms each year -- inFebruary, June, and September. Barker's initial trial was to take placein the September term of 1958. The first continuance postponed ituntil the February 1959 term. The second continuance was granted forone month only. Every term thereafter for as long as the Manningprosecutions were in process, the Commonwealth routinely moved tocontinue Barker's case to the next term. When the case was continuedfrom the June 1959 term until the following September, Barker,having spent 10 months in jail, obtained his release by posting a$5,000 bond. He thereafter remained free in the community until histrial. Barker made no objection, through his counsel, to the first 11continuances.[18] When on February 12, 1962, the Commonwealth moved for thetwelfth time to continue the case until the following term, Barker'scounsel filed a motion to dismiss the indictment. The motion todismiss was denied two weeks later, and the Commonwealth's motionfor a continuance was granted. The Commonwealth was grantedfurther continuances in June 1962 and September 1962, to whichBarker did not object.[19] In February 1963, the first term of court following Manning's finalconviction, the Commonwealth moved to set Barker's trial for March19. But on the day scheduled for trial, it again moved for acontinuance until the June term. It gave as its reason the illness of theex-sheriff who was the chief investigating officer in the case. To thiscontinuance, Barker objected unsuccessfully.[20] The witness was still unable to testify in June, and the trial, which hadbeen set for June 19, was continued again until the September termover Barker's objection. This time the court announced that the casewould be dismissed for lack of prosecution if it were not tried duringthe next term. The final trial date was set for October 9, 1963. On thatdate, Barker again moved to dismiss the indictment, and this time