Ch. 9: "Let's Dive-Bomb theBastards."
Combat flying in the Pacific(31-40).
Ch. 10: The Test of War.
Rapidpromotion during three years and threemonths of war in the Pacific, with onlytwo weeks in the U.S., chief of staff of theFifth Air Force Service Command (40-48).
BOOK II: INHERITING A DIFFERENTWORLDCh. 11: Atomic Diplomacy.
The post-war international situation (51-54).
Ch. 12: Spies Inside the BarbedWire.
Soviet spies at Los Alamos—George Koval, Klaus Fuchs, DavidGreenglass, Theodore Hall—passedinformation to the Soviet Union (54-66).
Ch. 13: "The Balance Has BeenDestroyed."
Stalin was slow toappreciated the strategic significance of the Bomb, and the USSR was in gravelyweakened state after the war (66-69).
Ch. 14: The State That Was Stalin.
Stalin commanded an enormous effortinvolving hundreds of thousands of workers to build the bomb, overseen byBeria (69-77).
Ch. 15: A Confrontation and aMisreading.
U.S.-USSR confrontationseems "inevitable" (77). Stalingrad is theturning point in WWII (78-79). The U.S.,esp. George Kennan, misreads Stalin'sintentions (79-84). The first crisis occursover Iran; Stalin backs down (84-85).Also backs down from a Turkish Straitsconfrontation (85-87).
Ch. 16: Containing the Menace.
DeanAcheson the moving force behind the Truman Doctrine, inspired by the crisisover Greece, then the Marshall Plan (87-92). Stalin regards this as a declarationof economic warfare, and the Iron Curtaindescends (92-94).
Ch. 17: Neither Rain, Nor Snow, NorSleet, Nor Fog.
The Berlin airlift, June1948-May 1949 (94-99).
Ch. 18: Stalin Gets His Bomb.
Aug.29, 1949: successful Soviet atom bombtest (99-102). It ends the U.S. debate onbuilding the hydrogen bomb, detonatedNov. 1, 1952; Soviets do likewise on Nov.22, 1955 (102-03).
Ch. 19: The Consequences of Delusion.
Kennan, who regretted theexaggerations of his Long Telegram, is jettisoned in favor of Paul Nitze, theauthor of NSC-68, and the "delusion that[U.S. statesmen] faced an internationalCommunist conspiracy" (106) wasinstitutionalized (104-07). "In retrospect,one wonders why they clung so long totheir delusion" (107).
Ch. 20: Good Intentions Gone Awry.
Hall and his friend Saville Sax eludesdetection as Soviet spies (108-11). Butthey "may have helped to bring on theKorean war" (111; 111-13). By causingthe U.S. to quadruple its military budget,the Korean war is "a strategic disaster forStalin" (114; 113-14).
BOOK III: THE PERILS OF ANAPPRENTICESHIPCh. 21: Hap Arnold's Legacy.
Arnoldchooses Theodore von Kárman of Caltechto lead a team to interview Germanscientists after the war, then on hisrecommendation has a new AirEngineering Development Center createdat Tullahoma, TN, where German windtunnels were installed (117-24).
Ch. 22: Getting Organized.
Schrieverhelps Jimmy Doolittle convince Gen. HoytVandenburg (brother of the influentialsenator, Arthur Vandenburg) to supportthe creation of a separate R& D unit(124-29).