Republic of the Philippines DEC 11 205 J hte COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS Manila FIRST DIVISION. FRANCISCO S. TATAD, Petitioner, = versus ~ MARY GRACE POE LLAMANZARES, Respondent. x: ANTONIO P. CONTRERAS, Petitioner, versus - MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE- LLAMANZARES, Respondent. ee x AMADO D. VALDEZ, Petitioner, - versus - MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE- LLAMANZARES, a e SPA NO. 15-002 (DC) SPA NO. 15-007 (DC) SPA NO. 15-139 (DC)1 Poge 20f2 SPA Nos. 15-002/15:007/15-139 (DC) Tatad, Contreras, Valder vs. Poe Omnibus Resolution Firs Division NOTICE ATTY. MANUELITO R. LUNA Counsel for the Petitioner (SPA 15-002 DC) Rm. 412 FEMII Building, Annex A. Soriano Sr. Avenue Intramuros, Manila MR. ANTONIO P. CONTRERAS Petitioner (SPA 15-007 DC) Unit F. Shorea Homes, Jose Street Lopez Village, San Antonio Los Bafios, Laguna . ATTY. AMADO D. VALDEZ ATTY. MELQUIADES MARCUS N. VALDEZ II ATTY. MARK ANDREW M. SANTIAGO ATTY. LORENZE ANGELO G, DIONISIO Counsel for the Petitioner (SPA 15-139 DC) VALDEZ LAW OFFICES 6A Vernida-I, 120 Amorsolo St. Legaspi Village, Makati City ATTY. GEORGE ERWIN M. GARCIA. ‘Counsel for the Respondent GE. GARCIA LAW OFFICE Ground Floor, LAIKO Building Cabildo St, Intramuros, Manila GREETINGS: Attached is a copy of the OMNIBUS RESOLUTION of the Commission (First Division) with DISSENTING OPINION of Comm. C.R.S. LIM and SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION of Comm. L.T.F. GUIA in the above-entitled cases promulgated on December 11, 2015. Manila, December 11, 2015. FOR THE DIVISION: anicani sO, CUARESMA-LILAGAN, Acting Clerk of the Commission ( ) Bit liRepublic of the Philippines COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS Intramuros, Manila FIRST DIVISION FRANCISCO S. TATAD, Petitioner, -versus- GRACE POE LLAMANZARES, Respondent. ANTONIO P. CONTRERAS, Petitioner, ~versus- GRACE POE LLAMANZARES, Respondent. AMADO D. VALDEZ, Petitioner, ~versus- MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE LLAMANZARES, Respondent. SPA No. 15-002 (DC) For: Disqualification in accordance with Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules — of Procedure, as amended. SPA No. 15-007 (DC) For: Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy SPA No. 15-139 (DC) Petition to Deny Due Course/Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of Hon. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe- Llamanzares for not Being a Natural-Born Filipino and/or for Lack of Residency pec 14-235 PROMULGATEDRESOLUTION For resolution, by the Commission (First Division) are the separate Petitions filed by Petitioners Francisco S, Tatad (“Tatad”), Antonio P. Contreras (“Contreras”), and Amado D. Valdez (“Valdez”) against Senator Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares (“Respondent”). Petitioners Contreras and Valdez prayed for the cancellation or denial of due course of the Certificate of Candidacy (“COC”) filed by Respondent for the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines, in connection with the 9 May 2016 Synchronized Local and National Elections (2016 Elections”), pursuant to Sections 74 and 78 of the Omnibus Election Code (“OEC”). Petitioner Tatad, on the other hand, prayed for the disqualification of Respondent, under Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.’ The Facts The facts are undisputed. On 3 September 1968, Respondent was found abandoned in a church in Jaro, Iloilo City, by one Edgardo Militar? On 6 September 1968, Edgardo Militaty reported to the Civil Registrar of Iloilo City that Respondent was found on'3 September 1968. She was given the name “Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar” in her Certificate of Live Birth and was also issued a foundling certificate? On 13 May 1974, the Municipal Court of San Juan, Rizal, granted the petition for adoption of Respondent by actors Susan Roces (Jesusa Sonora Poe) and Fernando Poe Jr. (Ronald Ailan Kelley Poe). Thus Respondent's name was changed to Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poes Sometime in 1988, Respondent went to Boston College in the United States (“US”) to study. She graduated with a degree of Bachelor of Arts in Political Studies Batas Pambansa Big. 881 | Records, Vol. | at 6 Tatad vs. Llamanzares; Records, 6 in Valdez vs. Llamanzares. 1d, Valdez. vs. Llamanzares. | Id.,7 in Tatad vs. Llamanzares; Id,, Valdez vs. Llamanzares. Vol. TI, 3 in Tatad vs. Llamanzares; Id, Valdez vs. Llamanzares,On 27 July 1991, Respondent married Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares, who was a citizen of both the Philippines and the US On 29 July 1991, Respondent left the Philippines to live with her husband in the US, along with her three children: Brian (born in 1992 in the US), Hanna MacKenzie (born in 1998 in the Philippines), and Jesusa Anika (born in 2004 in the Philippines).” On 18 October 2001, Respondent became a citizen of the United States of America (“USA”) by naturalization§ On! 19 December 2001, the USA Passport Agency issued USA Passport No. 017037793 to Respondent? On 11 December 2004, Respondent's father, actor Fernando Poe Jr., was admitted at the St. Luke’s Medical Center in Quezon City. He eventually slipped into a coma.1 When Respondent learned of her father’s condition, she went back to the Philippines on 13 December 2004. The following day, Respondent's father died.” Respondent stayed in the country to comfort her grieving mother and to assist in taking care of the funeral arrangements and in the settlement of her father’s estate.'? Respondent stayed in the Philippines until 3 February 2005.12 | Respondent claims that as a result of the untimely death of her father and her need to continue giving moral support and comfort to her mother, she and her husband decided to return to the Philippines for good sometime in the first quarter of 2005.14 Respondent further alleges that she had already resigned from work in 2004. In early 2005, Brian's and Hanna's schools in the US were informed that they would be transferring to the Philippines for the next semester.'§ Respondent and her husband also began negotiating with property movers in order to arrange the relocation of their household goods, furniture, and cars from the US to the Philippines. They also Vol L,7 in Tatad vs. Llamanzares; Id., Valdez. vs. Llamanzares. 7 Vol. 3 in Tatad vs, Llamanzares; ld., Valdez vs. Lamanzares. Id., 4in Tatad vs. Llamanzares; Id., Valdez vs. Llamanzares; Records, Vol. 1. at 4 in Contreras vs. Liamanzares. 1d, Contreras vs. Llamanzares. wd, Tatad vs. Llamanzares; Id, 248 in Valdez, vs. Llamanzares; Id., 159 in Contreras vs. ‘Liamanzares. Id, Tatad vs, Llamanzares; d., Valdez vs. Llamanzares; [d,,Contreras vs. Llamanzares. Id,, 4 to 5 in Tatad vs. Llamanzares; Id., 248 to 249 in Valdez vs. Llamanzares; Id.,Contreras vs. Llamanzares. I, 5 in Tatad vs, Llamanzares; Id., 249 in Valdez. vs. Llamanzares; Id., Contreras vs. Llamanzares. Id,, Tatad vs. Llamanzares; Id,, Valdez vs. Llamanzares; id.,Contreras vs. Llamanzares. Id, Tatad vs. Llamanzares; ld., Valdez. vs. Llamanzares; Id., 160 in Contreras vs. Llamanzares,inquired with Philippine authorities as to the procedure for bringing their dogs into the country. Respondent returned to the Philippines on 24 May 2005.” Respondent's husband however stayed in the USA to finish pending projects and arrange the sale of their family home.' Meanwhile Respondent and her children lived with her mother in San Juan City. Respondent enrolled Brian in Beacon School in Taguig City in 2005 and Hanna in Assumption College in Makati City in 2005. Anika was enrolled in Learning Connection in San Juan in 2007, when she was already old enough to go to school.}? In the second half of 2005, Respondent and her husband acquired Unit 7F of One Wilson Place Condominium in San Juan2 Respondent and her family lived in Unit 7F until the construction of their family home in Corinthian Hills was completed! Sometime in the second half of 2005, Res spondent's mother discovered that her former lawyer who handled Respondent's adoption in 1974 failed to secure from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo a new Certificate of Live Birth indicating Respondent’s new name and stating that her parents are “Ronald Allan K. Poe” and “Jesusa L. Sonora.” In February 2006, Respondent travelled briefly to the US in order to supervise the disposal of some of the family’s remaining household belongings. Respondent returned to the Philippines on 11 March 200623 In late March 2006, Respondent's husband informed the United States Postal Service of the family’s abandonment of their address in the US.4 The family home in the US was sold on 27 April 2006.75 6 1d, Tatad vs. Llamanzares; Id., Valdez vs. Llamanzares; Id,, Contreras vs. Llamanzares. Id., Tatad vs. Llamanzares; Id., Valdez vs. Llamanzares; Id., Contreras vs. Llamanzares. Id., Tatad ys. Llamanzares; Id., Valdez vs. Llamanzares; Id., Contreras vs. Llamanzares. 1,5 to ia Tata ve Llomanaates Id, 249 to 250 in Veldea vs, Llamanzaren Id 160 to 161 in Contreras vs. Lamanzaves Id., 7 in Tatad vs. Llamanzares; Id., 251 in Valdez vs. Llamanzares; /d., 161 in Contreras vs. Llamanzares. Id.,Tatad vs. Llamanzares; id., Valdez vs. Llamanzares; Id., 162 in Contreras vs. Llamanzares. Id, 6t07 in Tata va Linmanonres, 1d. 7in Tatad vs. Llamanaares Id. Valdes vs. amaagares Id, Contrere ve Ulamanzares Id., 8 in Tatad vs, Llamanzares; Id., 251 to 252 in Valdez vs, Llamanzares; Id., Contreras vs. Litmaneares ; Td Tated vs, emanates I, 252m Vales vs. Uamanaares it, Coatreras vs. Lamangares * 2 *In April 2006, Respondent's husband resigned from his work in the US. He retumed to the Philippines on 4 May 2006 and began working for a Philippine company in July 200626 In early 2006, Respondent and her husband acquired a vacant lot in Corinthian Hills, where they eventually built their family home.” On 7 July 2006, Respondent took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, pursuant to Republic Act No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003 (“R.A. No. 9225”) 28 On 10 July 2006, Respondent filed with the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (“BID”) a petition for the reacquisition of her Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225. Simultaneously, Respondent also filed petitions for derivative citizenship on behalf of her three children who were all below 18 years old. On 18 July 2006, the BID issued an Order granting Respondent's petition to reacquire Philippine citizenship. The same Order likewise declared that Respondent's children were “deemed citizens of the Philippines.” On 31 July 2006, the BID issued Identification Certificates or “ICs” for Respondent and her three (3) children.! On 31 August 2006, the Commission on Elections (“Commission”) registered Respondent as a voter of Brey. Santa Lucia, San Juan City? On 13 October 2009, Respondent secured from the Department of Foreign Affairs (“DFA”) her new Philippine Passport with No. XX4731999.33 | | On 6 October 2010, Respondent was appointed Chairman of the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (“MTRCB”) by Pres. Benigno Simeon C. Aquino TIL On 20 October 2010, Respondent executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the USA and Renunciation of American Citizenship before a notary public in Pasig City. Id, Tatad vs. Llamanzares; I 1d, Vatad vs, Llamanzares; Id, Valdez vs. Llamanzares; i., Contreras vs. Llamanzares. Id, Tatad vs, Llamanzares;Id., Valdez vs. Llamanzares;Id., 163 in Contreras vs. Llamanzares, % Id, 9m Tatad vs. Llamanzares; Id, 253 in Valdez vs. Llamanzares; Id., Contreras vs. Llamanzares. ‘d.,Tatad vs. Llamanzares; i, Valdez vs. Llamanzares; I., 164 in Contreras vs. Llamanzares. nTatad vs. Llamanzares; Id, Valdez vs. Llamanzares; Id,, Contreras vs, Llamanzares. tad vs. Llamanzares; Id., 254 in Valdez vs. Llamanzares; id, Contreras vs. Liamanzares. tad vs, Llamanzares ' taci vs, Llamanzares; Id., Valdez vs. Llamanzares j ld., Contreras vs. Llamanzares. Valdez vs. Llamanzares; id, Contreras vs. Llamanzares.On 21 October 2010, Respondent submitted to the BID the notarized Affidavit of Renunciation. It was only at this time that Respondent started using her Philippine Passport instead of her US Passport.*6 On 12 July 2011, Respondent executed before the Vice Consul at the US Embassy in Manila an Oath/ Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of the United States. On the same day, Respondent executed a Questionnaire in connection with her Oath/ Affirmation where she declared that she had resided outside of the United States, or in the Philippines, “from 3 September 1988 to 29 July 1991” and from “05 2005 to present.”9” On 9 December 2011, the US Vice Consul issued to Respondent a Certificate of Loss of Nationality of the United States effective 21 October 2010.8 Between 2006 to 2010, Respondent travelled to the US five (5) times using her US Passport Respondent ran as Senator during the 13 May 2013 Elections. Respondent garnered over twenty (20) million votes, the highest among her fellow Senatorial candidates. In her COC for Senator, Respondent declared that she had been a resident of the Philippines for six (6) years and six (6) months immediately before the 13 May 2013 elections.” On 19 December 2013, the DFA issued to Respondent Diplomatic Passport No. DE0004530, which is valid until 18 December 2018. On 18 March 2014, the DFA issued in Respondent's favor Philippine Passport No. EC0588861, which is valid until 17 March 2019. On 15 October 2015, Respondent filed her COC for President of the Republic of the Philippines. Id, 11 in Tatad vs. Llamanzares; Id, Valdez vs. Llamanzares; Id, 165 in Contreras. vs. ymanzares L, Tatad vs. Llamanzares. 1d,, 12 and 13 in Tatad vs. Llamanzares; Id, 254 and 255 in Valdez vs. Llamanzares; ld., Contreras vs. Llamanzares. 1, 13 in Tatad vs. Llamarares; Id, 255 in Valder vs. Llamanzares; Id 166 in Contreras vs. “Llamanzares. 1d, 258 and 306 to 317 in Valdez vs. Llamanzares. During the 25 November 2015 hearing, counsel for Respondent admitted that she used her passport five (5) times. ” ld,, 13 to 14 in Tatad vs. Llamanzares; Id, 255 in Valdez vs. Llamanzares) Id., Contreras vs. Llamanzares. d,,9in Valdez vs. Llamanzares; Vol. I, 21 in Tatad vs. Llamanzares. @ Id, 14in Tatad vs. Llamanzares. | © id Tatad vs. Llamanzares; I, 255 in Valdez vs. Lifmanzares; I, Contreras vs, Liamancares. “Respondent attached to her COC for President an “Affidavit Affirming Renunciation of USA Citizenship” subscribed and sworn to before a notary public in Quezon City on 14 October 2015.# In her COC, Respondent declared that she is a “natural born Filipino citizen” and that her “residence in the Philippines up to the day before May 9, 2016” would be ten (10) years and eleven (11) months counted from 24 May 2005.8 i On 19 October 2015, Petitioner Tatad filed a Verified Petition for the disqualification of Respondent.‘5 On 20 October 2015, Petitioner Contreras filed a petition for the cancellation of Respondent's certificate of candidacy.” On 9 November 2015, Petitioner Valdez filed his Petition® to deny due course to and/or cancel the COC of Respondent ‘A clarificatory hearing on all three petitions before the Commission was held on 25 November 2015. The parties were directed to file their respective memoranda within ten (10) days from date of the preliminary conference, or until 3 December 2015. Thereafter the petitions were deemed submitted for resolution. On 2 December 2015, Petitioner Tatad filed his Memorandum. On 3 December 2015, Petitioner Valdez and Contreras filed their respective Memoranda. On the same date, 3 December 2015, Respondent filed her Memoranda for ali three (3) petitions. The case is now submitted for resolution. Arguments of Petitioners In SPA No. 15-002 (DC), Petitioner Tatad argues that Respondent is disqualified from running for the elective position of President of the Republic of the Philippines because she failed to comply with the citizenship and the ten (10)-year residency requirements laid down by the 1987 Constitution for the position of President. Petitioner Tatad argues that under the 1935 Constitution, natural-born citizenship is accorded only to those who are born of Filipino fathers, following the principle of jus sanguinis, Consequently since Respondent's bloodline is unknown, it is incumbent upon her to prove that she is a natural-born citizen. The fact that Respondent was adopted by Filipino citizens is of no moment. The 6 1d,, 15 in Tatad vs. Llamanzaces. Id,, 14 in Tated vs. Llamanzares; Id., Valdez vs. Llamanzares; ld., Contreras vs. Llamanzares, Id, 1 to 220 in Tatad vs. Llamanzares. 1d,, 1 to 40 in Contrerars vs. Llamanzares. 1Id,, 1to 161 in Valdez vs. Llamanzares.principle of jus sanguinis applies only to! natural filiation, and not to adoption. i Petitioner Tatad reasons that recourse to international conventions and/or treaties provides no relief in favor of Respondent. The 1961 Hague Convention is unavailing because the same is yet to be adhered to by the Philippines. The 1930 Hague Protocol Relating to Certain Case of Statelessness, the 1930 Hague Special Protocol Concerning Statelessness, and the 1961 United Nations Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness likewise do not apply. Petitioner Tatad further underscored that international conventions and treaties are not self-executory. Local legislations are required in order to effectuate treaty obligations assumed by the Philippines. Finally, Petitioner Tatad pointed out that there is no uniform state practice that automatically confers natural-born status to foundlings. Thus, Petitioner Tatad argues that Respondent cannot reacquire her Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 because the same law applies only to previously natural-born Filipino citizens. Since she was never a natural-born citizen, Respondent could not have reacquired her Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225. Lastly, Petitioner Tatad maintains that Respondent fails to meet the ten (10)-year residency requirement. Respondent declared in her COC for Senator that before the 13 May 2013 Elections she had been a resident of the Philippines for a period of six (6) years and six (6) months. When added to the period between 13 May 2013 and 9 May 2016, Respondent would only have been a resident of the Philippines for a period of nine (9) years, five (5) months, and several days. Further, Respondent's intent to maintain her US residence or domicile was clear from the fact that her husband remained in the US until 2006. Respondent's frequent trips to and from the US between 2006 to 2011 belie her claim that she has reestablished her domicile in the Philippines as early as 2005. In SPA No. 15-139 (DC), Petitioner Valdez argues that when Respondent was naturalized as an American citizen on 18 October 2001, her repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 did not bestow upon her the status of a natural-born citizen. A previously natural-born citizen who is repatriated under R.A. No. 9225 reacquires only Philippine citizenship, and not her natural-born citizen status. Petitioner Valdez further maintains that Respondent, by her own admission in her COC for Senator, declared that she has only been a resident of the Philippines for a period of six (6) years and six (6) months prior to the 13 May 2013 Elections, or from November 2006.Additionally, Petitioner Valdez argued that Respondent could not have validly reestablished her domicile in’ the Philippines prior to her reacquisition of her Philippine citizenship on 18 July 2006. As such, Respondent failed to meet the ten (10)-year residency requirement for President. The same argument was reiterated by Petitioner Contreras in SPA No. 15-007 (DC). Arguments of Respondent Respondent claims that Petitioners have the burden of proving that she is not a natural-born Filipino citizen. The circumstances of Respondent's being a foundling make room, not simply for the possibility, but the likelihood that Respondent was born to Filipino parents. Respondent avers that Petitioners ought to have alleged’ that her biological parents are foreigners or non-Filipinos; this is the only fact which would categorically and conclusively exclude her from the class of Filipino citizens recognized under the 1935 Constitution. Respondent thus relied on what she claimed as presumption of law to prove her natural-born citizenship.” Respondent also argues that under applicable treaties and generally accepted principles of international law such as the: (1)1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws (1930 Hague Convention”); (2) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”); (3) UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (“UNCRC”); (4) Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (“CRS”); and (5) 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”), she should be entitled to a nationality and as a consequence to be considered a natural- born Filipino citizen. She stresses that even if the Philippines is not a signatory to these treaties, they should be applied to her based on the premise that these have become customary laws. As a natural-bom citizen, Respondent rhaintains that she is entitled to the benefits of R.A. No, 9225 or the right to reacquire her natural-born status. Respondent argued that the various official acts, such as the BID Order dated 18 July 2006 declaring Respondent a natural-born citizen, her appointment as MTRCB Chair, the decree of adoption issued by the San Juan RTC, among others, enjoy the presumption of regularity. All these, according to Respondent, confirm her status as and thus support her position that she is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. As to the question of residency, Respondent states that she had abandoned her residence in the USA since the first quarter of 2005. She had since then # Records, Vol. Ill, 130 in Tatad vs. Llamanzares.10 already begun reestablishing her domicile of choice in the Philippines. She alleges that this is further demonstrated by her children’s arrival and schooling in the Philippines, when she and her husband purchased a condominium in San Juan City and when they started constructing their family home in Corinthian Hills. Respondent also states that she could legally reestablish her domicile of choice in the Philippines even before she renounced her US citizenship since the only determining factors affecting a change of domicile are: (a) residence or bodily presence in the new locality; (b) an intention to remain (animus manendi); and (c) an intention to abandon the old domicile (animus non revertendi). She further alleges that there was no requirement to renounce first the foreign citizenship before she acquired a new domicile by choice. Respondent further posits that the residency stated in her COC for Senator during the 2013 Elections was an honest mistake. She has been a resident for more than “6 years and 6 months” during the time when she filed it. However, she mistakenly counted her period of residence only up to the day she filed her COC. Respondent also prays that the Tatad Petition should be dismissed outright. The Tatad Petition is a Petition for Disqualification in accordance with Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended; however, it failed to cite the alleged grounds that Respondent committed under Section 68 of the OEC. Petition thus argues that the Petition should be dismissed in accordance with Section 1, Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure: A Petition to Disqualify a Candidate invoking grounds for a Petition to Deny to (sic) or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy or Petition to Declare a Candidate as a Nuisance Candidate, or a combination thereof, shall be summarily dismissed. Finally, Respondent claims that the Petitions are essentially petitions for quo warranto because they seek to establish the ineligibility of Respondent for the Presidency. The petitions therefore are beyond the jurisdiction of the Commission. A petition for quo warranto, Respondent claims, is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (“PET”). L Procedural Issues The procedural issues raised by Respondent in all three Petitions now before Us may be summed up as follows:1. Whether or not SPA No. 15-002 (Tatad vs, Poe-Llamanzares), which is a Petition for Disqualification, must be dismissed for invoking grounds proper only for a Petition under Section 78 of the OEC. 2. Whether or not the Commission has jurisdiction to rule on the citizenship qualification of Respondent. 3. Whether or not the instant Petitions must be dismissed for being in reality quo warranto petitions. IL Substantive Issues The substantive issues in all three Petitions are as follows: 1. Whether or not Respondent's Certificate of Candidacy must be cancelled and/or denied due course on the ground of material misrepresentation: a. Whether or not Respondent is a natural-born Filipino. b. Whether or not Respondent complied with the ten (10)-year residency requirement for the elective position of President. Ruling Upon careful review of the facts, the applicable laws, and relevant jurisprudence, the Commission resolves to grant the Petitions and cancel the certificate of candidacy of Respondent. We shall discuss the issues identified above in seriatim. L Procedural Issues A. Whether or not SPA No. 15-002, which is a Petition for Disqualification, must be dismissed for invoking grounds proper only for a Petition under Section 78 of the OEC.| 12 It is expedient to preliminarily address the issue as to whether the Tatad Petition (SPA No. 15-002), which is a petition for disqualification, is the proper vehicle to question and impugn the qualification and/or eligibility of Respondent. Respondent argued that the Tatad Petition failed to state any ground for the disqualification of Respondent® According to Respondent, grounds for disqualification are enumerated under Section 68 of the OEC. The Tatad Petition however made no mention of any act falling under Section 68 of the OEC. Verily, the Petition relies completely on Respondent's failure to comply with the citizenship and residency requirements. Lack of citizenship and residency however is not one of the grounds mentioned under Section 68. For failure therefore to invoke a ground for the disqualification of Respondent under Section 68 of the OEC, the Petition must be dismissed. The Commission agrees with Respondent that the Tatad Petition, although captioned as a petition for disqualification, does not invoke grounds proper for a disqualification case. Lack of residency and natural-bomn status is not a ground for the disqualification of a candidate to an elective office. The law is clear that a petition for disqualification is based on grounds enumerated under Section 68 and 12 of the OEC, as well as Section 40 of Republic Act (“R.A.”) No. 7160.51 Section 68 of the OEC provides: Sec. 68. Disqualifications. - Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having a. given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions; b. committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; c. spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; d, solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and| 104; or e. violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, subparagraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from Records, Vol. Iil, 101 to 108 in Tatad vs, Llamanzares. An Act Providing for a Local Government Code of 1991, or the Local Government Code of 1991.13 holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country |in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws. Section 12 on the other hand likewise sets forth additional grounds for the disqualification of a candidate for an elective office: See, 12. Disqualifications. - Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty. These disqualification to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from his service of sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified. In Sergio G. Amora Jr. vs. Commission on Elections et al.? the Supreme Court explained that the grounds enumerated under Section 40° of the LGC are proper bases for the disqualification of a candidate. The Tatad Petition shows that while it is denominated as a Petition for Disqualification, the ground invoked are really for the cancellation of or denial of due course of Respondent's COC. In simpler terms, the Tatad 5 G.R.No. 192280, 25 January 2011. 5 SEC. 40. Disqualifications, The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position: (a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence; (b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case; (©) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic; ' (@) Those with dual citizenship; (e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or nohpolitical cases here or abroad ( Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; and (g) The insane or feeble-minded.14 Petition is a Petition to Cancel and/or Deny Due Course to Respondent's coc. We do not however believe that the improper denomination of the Petition warrants its immediate and/or summary dismissal. Considering that the Tatad Petition impugns the citizenship and residency of Respondent, and therefore generally questions the truthfulness of her COC stating that she has the qualification and eligibility to run for and be elected President of the Republic of the Philippines, the Commission is not barred from taking cognizance of the instant Petitions. Respondent's invocation of Sergio G, Amora Jr. vs. Commission on Elections et al. Alfais T. Munder vs. Commission on Elections et al.,55 and Mike A. Fermin vs. Commission on Elections et al.S6 is misplaced. In those cases, Petitions for Disqualification were filed with the Commission against Amora, Munder, and Fermin based on grounds determined by the Court as proper for a Section 78 Petition, or a Petition to Cancel and/or Deny Due Course to a Certificate of Candidacy. The Petitions were dismissed. The dismissal of the petitions for disqualification however was anchored not on the mere erroneous invocation of grounds proper for a Section 78 Petition, but because these cases--when properly treated as Section 78 Petitions---were deemed to have been filed out of time, orlbeyond the reglementary period prescribed by law. : The power of the Commission to rule on cases based on the allegations contained in the pleadings cannot be gainsaid. The Supreme Court in many occasions has declared that Petitions are determined by their allegations, rather than solely by their caption: The cause of action in a complaint is not what the designation of the complaint states, but what the allegations in the body of the complaint define or describe. The designation or caption is not controlling, more than the allegations in the complaint themselves are, for it is not even an indispensable part of the complaint.” More specifically in Loretta P. Dela Llana vs. Commission on Elections and Rizalino F. Pablo Jr.5# the Supreme Court recognized and affirmed the G.R. No. 192280, 25 January 2011. i GIR. No, 194076 and G.R. No. 194160, 19 October 2011. GR. No, 179695 and G.R. No. 182369, 18 December 2008. Suumulong vs. Court of Appeals, GR No. 108817, 10 May 10 1994, citing Feranil us. Arcilla, 88 SCRA 770, 776 [1979]. See also Spouses Carlos Munsajud and Winnie Munsalud vs. National Housing Authority, GR. No. 163021, 27 April 2007. M G.RLNo. 152080, 28 November 2003, ages15 Commission’s authority to inquire into and determine the true nature of the cases filed before it: : The Constitution has vested to the COMELEC broad powers, involving not only the enforcement! and administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of elections, but also the resolution and determination of election controversies. It also granted the COMELEC the power and authority to promulgate its rules of procedure, with the primary objective of ensuring the expeditious disposition of election cases. Concomitant to such powers is the authority of the COMELEC to determine the true nature of the cases filed before it. Thus, it examines the allegations of every pleading filed, obviously aware that in determining the nature of the complaint or petition, its averments, rather than its title/caption, are the proper gauges. Hence this Commission is not precluded from inquiring into the merits of the case and delving into the issues raised by the parties, when the allegations in the petition sufficiently show that the controversy is properly manageable and cognizable under relevant laws, rules, and jurisprudence. The Commission therefore can and must exercise this authority and “pierce the form and go into the substance”? of the allegations contained in the petition. B. Whether or not the Commission has jurisdiction to rule on the citizenship qualification of Respondent. The second procedural issue raised by Respondent pertains to the authority of the Commission to rule on the citizenship of Respondent. The Constitution has vested the Commission with broad powers involving, not only the enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of elections, but also the resolution and determination of election controversies. Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. - A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by the person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. Spouses William Genato and Rebecca Genato vs. Rita Viola, G.R. No. 169706, 5 February 2010, citing Vlason Enterprises Corporation vs. Court of Appeals et al. G-R. No. 121662, 6 July 1999. Dela Llana vs. Commission on Elections, GR No. 152080, 28 November 2003. Emphasis suppliedThe petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election. The above-quoted provision indicates that the Commission is duty bound to deny due course to or cancel a COC should there be a finding that there is a misrepresentation as to a material fact required under Section 74 of the OEC. Section 74 provides the contents of a certificate of candidacy: Sec. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. - The certificate of candidacy shall state that the person filing it is announcing ‘his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political party to which he belongs; civil) status; his date of birth; residence; his post office address for all election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge. XXX In the case at bar, Petitioners alleges that Respondent made a misrepresentation in her COC with respect to her citizenship and residency. Respondent's representation that she is 4 natural-born citizen and that she complied with the 10-year residency period is false. Such false declaration was made by Respondent in order to mislead the electorate. Respondent however maintains that the issues pertaining to her citizenship and ultimately her eligibility are beyond the jurisdiction of this Commission. Respondent avers that the instant Petitions, which necessarily bear upon the question as to her citizenship, constitute a collateral attack against the BID Order dated 18 July 2006. This BID Order can only be assailed in a proper action before the Department of Justice (DOJ”). Respondent further argues that the determination of her eligibility’ should be addressed not by this Commission but by the PET. ! We disagree. i7 The Commission is not bound by the BID Order. The BID is a mere bureau and cannot bind the Commission or the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. To allow such a situation will only deprive the Commission of its constitutionally granted power and duty to inquire into and examine the qualifications of the candidates and to determine whether or not there is a commission of material misrepresentation. c Whether or not the Petitions must be dismissed for being in reality quo warranto petitions. Respondent sought the dismissal of the Petitions on the ground that the issues set up by Petitioners are properly cognizable only in quo warranto petitions. Respondent pointed out that quo warranto petitions may only be initiated after the proclamation of Respondent, should she win in the May 2016 Elections.*! Respondent's argument fails to convince. First, with respect to the Valdez Petition, Petitioner Valdez clearly argued for the cancellation of Respondent's COC on the ground that she had committed material misrepresentation when she declared therein that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen. Petitioner Valdez further alleged that Respondent's claim that she has been a resident of the Philippines for a period of ten (10) years and eleven (11) months is riddled with inconsistencies indicative of her deliberate attempt to mislead or hide a fact that would otherwise render her ineligible. Second, in the Tatad Petition, Petitioner Tatad impugned the truthfulness of Respondent's declaration in her COC with respect to her citizenship and residency in the Philippines. Petitioner Tatad argued against Respondent's claim of natural-born citizenship. He noted that Respondent's failure to meet the ten (10)-year residency requirement is made more evident by her declaration in her COC for Senator that she had only been a resident of the Philippines for a period of six (6) years and six (6) months. During the 25 November 2015 hearing for all three Petitions, Petitioner Tatad, through his counsel Atty. Manuelito R. Luna, argued before the Commission that Respondent misrepresented her qualifications when she Records, Vol. Ili, 141 to 144 in Tatad vs. Liamanzares; Records, Vol. I, 69 to 72 in Contreras vs. Llamanzares; Records, 584 to 557 in Valdez vs. Llamanzares. id., 32 in Valdez vs. Llamanzares. Id, Vol I, 21 in Tatad vs. Lamanzares. ae| i 18 deliberately changed the computation of her residence so as to make it appear that she met the ten (10)-year residency requirement. Finally in the Contreras Petition, Petitioner Contreras averted that Respondent's false declaration in her COC with respect to her residence is a “blatant attempt to circumvent a Constitutional requirement for the position of President.” Also during the 25 November 2015 hearing on the Petitions before the Commission, Petitioner Contreras maintained that the false information which Respondent declared in her COC hides a fact that will render her ineligible and has the effect of misleading the electorate. Also in his Memorandum, Petitioner Contreras averred that when Respondent “falsely claimed to have possessed such qualification in her COC and thus made a material misrepresentation therein, it was she who committed a grave act of misleading the sovereign Filipino people." The records therefore of all three cases clearly show that they are proper Petitions under Section 78 of the OEC for the cancellation of Respondent’s COC. Worth reiterating is the declaration made by the Supreme Court in Ramon R. Jimenez Jr. et al. vs. Juan Jose Jordana:® Oft-repeated is the doctrine that the cause of action in a civil case is determined by the allegations of the complaint, never by those of the defendant's answer. However, ambiguities and lapses in the language of these allegations may be understood or clarified through a recourse to the annexes of the complaint, related pleadings or other submissions of the plaintiff. XXX It must then bear in mind that the facts proving the existence of a cause of action do not have to be established or alleged by the complaint and/or the other pleadings at the outset but, under exceptional circumstances, even during the trial on the merits of the case. Clearly from the foregoing, the Petitions are properly brought and may be disposed of under Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the OEC. Since the allegation of material misrepresentation pertains to Respondent's citizenship and residency in the Philippines, there is therefore no merit in Respondent's ratiocination that the petitions are in reality quo warranto petitions. In Dominador G. Jalosjos Jr. vs. Commission on Elections et al., and | | | z fd,, Vol. I, 3 in Contreras vs. Llamanzares. Id., Vol. , 103 in Contreras vs. Llamanzares, GR. No, 152526, 25 November 2004. aa19 Agapito J. Cardino vs. Dominador G. Jalosjos Jr.,*” the Supreme Court settles any further controversy relating to this question: Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is to be read in relation to the constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public office. If the candidate subsequently states a material representation in the CoC that is false, the COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to deny due course to or cancel such certificate. Indeed, the Court has already likened a proceeding under Section 78 to a quo warranto proceeding under Section 253 of the OEC since they both deal with the eligibility or qualification of a candidate, with the distinction mainly in the fact that a “Section 78” petition is filed before proclamation, while a petition for quo warranto is filed after proclamation of the winning candidate. Considering the allegations of misrepresentation as to a material fact which affects the eligibility and/or qualification of Respondent to run for the elective post of President, the Commission clearly has jurisdiction to rule on the Petitions. Having disposed of the preliminary procedural matters raised by Respondent, We shall now proceed to discuss the substantive issues. I. Substantive Issues Respondent, as an aspirant to the highest elective post of President of the Republic of the Philippines, is required under Section 73 of the OEC to file a certificate of candidacy.” Section 74 of the same law directs the candidate to indicate and/or declare pertinent information in her COC and state under oath that she is eligible to the office for which she seeks election: Sec. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. - The certificate of candidacy shall state that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political party to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post office address for all election purposes; 8 GR No. 193237, 09 October 2012; G.R. No, 193536, 09 October 2012. © Emphasis supplied % See Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code.20 his profession or occupation; that he will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge. XXX, However, if the candidate makes a material misrepresentation in her COC, the same may be cancelled or denied due course pursuant to Section 78 of the OEC: Section 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. -A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by the person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election. The determination of the propriety of the cancellation of the COC on the ground of material misrepresentation involves the application of Section 74 and Section 78 of the OEC. Section 2, Article VII of the Constitution, as well as Section 63 of the OEC, likewise is referenced, because they provide for the qualifications of the President of the Philippines. Section 2, Article VII provides: Section 2. No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election. Section 63 of the OEC reiterates Section 2, Article VII of the Constitution: Sec. 63. Qualifications for President and Vice-President of the Philippines. - No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able21 to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election. The applicability of the aforequoted Section 2, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution and Section 63 of the OEC, in connection with the instant petitions for cancellation of COC, cannot be gainsaid. This is particularly in view of the Supreme Court's declaration in Jalosjos Jr. vs. Commission on Elections et al., and Cardino vs. Jalosjos Jr. that Section 78 of the OEC must be read in relation to the Constitutional and statutory provisions providing for the qualifications or eligibility for public office, thus: Lest it be misunderstood, the denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC is not based on the lack of qualifications but on a finding that the candidate made a material representation that is false, which may relate to the qualifications required of the public office he/she is running for. It is noted that the candidate states in his/her CoC that he/she is eligible for the office he/she seeks. Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is to be read in relation to the constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public office. If the candidate subsequently states a material representation in the CoC that is false, the COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to deny due course to or cancel such certificate.”' In Fernando V. Gonzalez vs. Commission on Elections et al.,72 the Supreme Court also confirmed that a petition under Section 78 of the OEC refers to the qualifications for elective office. These qualifications include matters pertaining to age, residence, and citizenship or non-citizenship of natural-born Filipino status: As to the ground of false representation in the COC under Section 78, we held in Salcedo II v. Commission on Elections that in order to justify the cancellation of COC, it is essential that the false representation mentioned therein pertain to a material matter for the sanction imposed by this provision would affect the substantive rights’ of a candidate - the right to run for the elective post for which he filed the certificate of candidacy. Although the law does not specify what would be considered as a "material representation’, the Court concluded that this refers to qualifications for elective office. Citing previous cases in which the Court interpreted this phrase, we Supra. Emphasis supplied. RGR .No. 192856, 8 March 2011.22 held that Section 78 contemplates statements regarding age, residence, and citizenship or non-possession of natural-born Filipino status. ... In determining therefore whether Respondent's COC must be cancelled on the ground of material misrepresentation as defined under Section 78 of the OEC, it is imperative that an inquiry must be made as to whether Respondent is a natural-born Filipino citizen and has complied with the ten (10)-year residency requirement. A. Whether or not Respondent is a natural-born Filipino citizen. Section 2, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that the President of the Republic of the Philippines must be a natural-born Filipino citizen, thus: Section 2. No person may be elected President unless she is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. Section 2, Article TV of the same Constitution defines what a natural-born citizen is: Section 2. Natural born citizens are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens. Respondent's recorded date of birth was 3 September 1968. At this time, the governing Constitution was the 1935 Constitution. Section 1, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution defines who are citizens of the Philippines: Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines: 1. Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this Constitution. 2. Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands. 3. Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines. 4, Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.23 5. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. The 1935 Constitution enumerated those who are citizens. Therefore those excluded from the enumeration are not Filipino citizens. It is settled that our legal system adopts the jus sanguinis principle in determining natural- born citizenship. The same bedrock principle is already operant as early as the 1935 Constitution as ruled by the SC in the consolidated cases of Tecson et al. vs. Commission on Elections: While there was, at one brief time, divergent views on whether or not jus soli was a mode of acquiring citizenship, the 1935 Constitution brought to an end to any such link with common law, by adopting, once and for all, jus sanguinis or blood relationship as being the basis of Filipino citizenship . .. Under the 1935 Constitution, therefore, only children falling under paragraph 3 of its Section 1, Article 4 may properly be regarded as a natural-born citizen. A child born of Filipino mother under the 1935 Constitution is not regarded as a natural-born Filipino because he or she needs to “elect” Philippine citizenship “upon reaching the age of majority.” Thus the 1973 Constitution” and the 1987 Constitution sought to correct this anomaly and gender inequality, which incapacitates a Filipino mother from transmitting her citizenship to her child, by expressly providing in their respective citizenship provisions that a child born of either a Filipino mother or a Filipino father is a natural-born citizen.” To be sure, it bears stressing that both the 1973 Constitution and the 1987 Constitution continued to adhere to the jus sanguinis principle in determining natural- born citizenship, thus: The signing into law of the 1935 Philippine Constitution has established the principle of jus sanguinis as basis for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship, to wi Maria Jeanette C. Tecson etal. vs. The Commission: on Elections et al, G.R. No. 161434, 3 March 2004; Zoilo Antonio Velez vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poo, G.R. No. 161634, 3 March 2004; Victorino X. Fornier vs, Hon. Commission on Elections et al., G.R. No. 161824, 3 March 2004. Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines: 1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution. 2. Those whose fathers and mothers are citizens of the Philippines. 3. Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five. 4, Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines: (1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution; (2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines; G) Those bom before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and (4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. md. m24 (1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this Constitution. (2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this Constitution had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands. (3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines. (4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship. (5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. So_also, the_principle of _jus_sanguinis, which confers citizenship by virtue of blood relationship, was subsequently retained under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.” retained under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.— Applying the foregoing disquisition in the instant case, no less than the 1987 Constitution requires that Respondent must be a natural-born citizen in order for her to qualify and be eligible for the elective position of President of the Republic of the Philippines. To be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, however, Respondent must be able to definitively show her direct blood relationship with a Filipino parent and ---consistent with Section 2, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution---demonstrate that no other act was necessary for her to complete or perfect her Filipino citizenship. This is because as a candidate for the Presidency, Respondent has the burden to positively prove that she possesses the qualifications for President, as enshrined in Section 2, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, thus: Any person who claims to be a citizen of the Philippines has the burden of proving his Philippine citizenship. Any person who claims to be qualified to run for President because he is, among others, a natural-born Philippine citizen, has the burden of proving he is a natural-born citizen. Any doubt whether or not he is natural-born citizen is resolved against him. The constitutional requirement of a natural-born citizen, being an express qualification for election as President, must be complied with strictly as defined in the Constitution. . . .7* ‘As the Supreme Court held above, the constitutional requirement of natural-born citizenship must be strictly construed and complied with. 7 Cirilo R. Valles vs. Commission on Elections et al., GR. No. 137000, 9 August 2000. Emphasis supplied. % ——Tecson et al. vs. The Commission on Elections et al., supra. Emphasis supplied.25 Extending its application to those who are not expressly included in the enumeration and definition of natural-born citizens is a disservice to the rule of law and an affront to the Constitution. It will only open the floodgates to unqualified persons whose allegiance to our country is questionable. This We must never allow Regrettably, Respondent could not definitively show her direct blood relationship with a Filipino parent, since her biological parents are unknown. Consequently, Respondent cannot claim that she is a natural- born citizen under the 1935 or the 1987 Constitution. Respondent's status as a foundling is not one of the recognized modes under the 1935 Constitution by which one acquires or is vested with natural-born citizenship status. Unless Respondent can show that she falls under any of paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 4 of the 1935 Constitution, or that a foundling with no known parentage or definitive blood relationship is an exception to the requirement of jus sanguinis, this Commission cannot declare her a natural- born citizen of the Philippines without violating its solemn duty and oath of fealty to the Constitution. The provision of the 1935 Constitution is clear. The letter of the law is unmistakable, And it is settled in our legal system that where the law is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for construction, only application: Time and time again, it has been repeatedly declared by this Court that where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation. There is only room for application. Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms, and interpretation should be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be either impossible or absurd or would lead to an injustice” Contrary to Respondent's argument, the probability that she might be born of a Filipino parent is not sufficient to prove her case. It is Respondent's duty to prove that she is a natural-born Filipino. The Constitution is unequivocal: unless one is born of a Filipino parent, he or she cannot be considered a natural-born Filipino citizen. Respondent cannot shroud her failure to meet this qualification by hiding behind the cloak of probability. The burden of proof rests on her; any doubt as to the question of her natural-born status is resolved against her. Respondent cannot invoke any presumption of natural-born citizenship: Arniando Barcellano vs. Dolores Banas, G.R. No. 165287, 14 September 2011 Records, Vol. I, 130 in Tatad vs, Llamanzares.26 ‘The constitutional requirement of a natural-born citizen, being an express qualification for election as President, must be complied with strictly as defined in the Constitution. As the Court ruled in Paa v. Chan: It is incumbent upon a person who claims Philippine citizenship to prove to the satisfaction of the Court that he is really a Filipino. No presumption can be indulged in favor of the claimant of Philippine citizenship, and any doubt regarding citizenship must be resolved in favor of the State.) The Commission likewise notes that reference to international law, treaty obligations or conventions, does very little to further the cause of Respondent. At the onset, there is nothing in international law which would support Respondent's claim of natural-born citizenship. It is likewise worth emphasizing early at this juncture that conventional international laws have only the status of statutes or legislative enactments. As such, they cannot supersede nor transcend the provisions embodied in our Constitution. In simpler terms, treaty obligations and covenants have to bow down to the Constitution: Under international law, there is no difference between treaties and executive agreements in terms of their binding effects on the contracting states concerned, as long as the negotiating functionaries have remained within their powers. Neither, on the domestic sphere, can one be held valid if it violates the Constitution. Nevertheless as mentioned, nothing in conventional international law justifies Respondent's asseveration that she, being a foundling, is a natural- born Filipino citizen, The 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) was opened for signature by the States on 19 December 1966, The Philippines became a signatory thereof on 19 December 1966 and ratified the same on 23 October 1986.8 Article 24, paragraph 3 of the ICCPR provides that every child has the right to acquire a nationality: Article 24 “Teeson etal. vs. The Commission on Elections et a, supra. Emphasis supplied. Bayan Muna vs. Albert Rontullo, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, et al., GR. No. 159618, 1 February 2011. https: /treaties.un.org /pages/viewdetails.aspx?chapter=4&src=treatyéemtdsg_no~iv- Aéslangzen, accessed on 5 December 2015.27 1. Every child shall have, without any discrimination as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, national or social origin, property or birth, the right to such measures of protection as are required by his status as a minor, on the part of his family, society and the State. 2. Every child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have a name. 3. Every child has the right to acquire a nationality. Article 24 however does not provide that every child, including a foundling, shall ipso facto be granted by the state-party with a nationality. The same provision likewise does not provide how, when, and in what manner will the child be accorded such nationality. More importantly, the ICCPR is silent and does not particularly state that such right to a nationality entitles the child to a “natural-born” citizenship status. The Philippines, it is true, bound itself to adhere to the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”). The pertinent provision in the UDHR which finds application in the case of Respondent is its Article 15, paragraph 1: Article 15. (1) Everyone has the right to a nationality. (2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality * However, as in the case of the ICCPR, Article 15, paragraph 1 of the UDHR does not provide that every child, inchuding a foundling, shall ipso facto be granted nationality by or be deemed automatically a citizen of the party- state. The same provision likewise does not provide how, when, and in what manner will the child be accorded such nationality. More importantly, the UDHR does not provide that the child shall be granted “natural-born” citizenship status by the party-state. The 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child (“UN CRC”) was signed by the Philippines on 26 January 1990 and was ratified on 21 August 1990.* Its Article 7, paragraph 2 provides that every child shall have the right from birth to acquire a nationality, to wit: hitp:/ /www.chchr.org /en/professionalinterest /pages /ccpr.aspx, accessed on 5 December 2015 ittp:/ /www.un.org/en /universal-declaration-human-rights/, accessed on 5 December 2015, htips://treaties.un.org/pages/viewdetails aspx?src=treatyéemtdsg_no=iv- T1&chapter=4éelangen, accessed on 5 December 2015. 6Article 7 1. The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right from birth to a name, the right to acquire a nationality and as far as possible, the right to know and be cared for by his or her parents. 2, States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights in accordance with their national law and their obligations under the relevant international instruments in this field, in particular where the child would otherwise be stateless.” Two things are clear from the terms of the above provision: first, the child has a right to acquire nationality from birth; and second, the party-states shall implement this right by national law. Article 7 thus---again---does not provide that the child ipso facto becomes a citizen of a party-state from birth. Neither does it commit a natural-born citizenship to the child. Article 7 of the UN CRC merely gives the child a right to acquire such nationality. Moreover, this right shall be afforded to the child born within the territory or jurisdiction of the party-state by a valid municipal law, or a legislative enactment of the party-state. Regrettably, there is no such law which has been enacted by Congress on the basis of the UN CRC which grants or allows the presumption of natural-born citizenship to foundlings. Finally, with respect to the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (“CRS”) and the 1930 Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Law (1930 Hague Convention”), suffice it to say that the Philippines is not a signatory to both such conventions, Being a non-party, both treaties are not binding to the Philippines. Respondent therefore cannot validly invoke the provisions of the CRS and the 1930 Hague Convention as binding treaty obligations which form part of the law of the land. Hence in Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines vs. Health Secretary Francisco T. Duque III et al. the Supreme Court ruled: Treaties become part of the law of the land through transformation pursuant to Article VII, Section 21 of the Constitution which provides that "[nJo treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate.” Thus, treaties or conventional international law must go through a process 8 hitp:/ /www. ohchr.org /en /professionalinterest /pages/cre.aspx, accessed on 5 December 2015, https: /treaties.un.org /pages/ViewDetails.aspx?stc=TREATY&-mtdsg_no=V- Ad&chapter-Séelang=en, accessed on 5 December 2015. https: / /treaties.un.org /pages / LON ViewDetails.aspx?stc=LON&id=512&chapter=30élang=en, accessed on 5 December 2015. % — GR.No. 173034, 9 October 2007. Emphasis supplied.2 prescribed by the Constitution for it to be transformed into municipal law that can be applied to domestic conflicts. In the instant case, the CRS and the 1930 Hague Convention were not only not ratified by the required two-third (2/3) of all members of the Philippine Senate, the Philippines also was not even a signatory of the said treaties. Necessarily, they are not treaty obligations which the Philippines has the duty to observe as a matter of conventional international law. There is hence no basis to apply them to “domestic conflicts.” Furthermore, Respondent cannot likewise find relief in customary international law to buttress her position that foundlings are natural-born citizens of the Philippines, or that the CRS and the 1930 Hague Convention and its provisions bind the Philippines. Customary international law, or generally accepted principles of international law, is deemed incorporated in our legal system and forms part of the law of the land by virtue of Section 2, Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution, thus: Section 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations. Generally accepted principles of international law become binding upon States despite not being in the character of treaty obligations, upon concurrence of the following elements: a. The established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part of States; and b. A psychological element known as the opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.” There is however no proof that the recognition of foundlings as natural- born citizens of the country where they are found has become an established, widespread, and consistent practice among states. Evidence is likewise scant, if not nil, showing that the CRS and/or the 1930 Hague Convention have attained customary international law status on account of Priscilla C. Mijares etal. vs. Hon, Santiago Javier Ranada et al., G.R. No. 139825, 12 April 2008.30 the widespread practice of member-states of vesting nationality on children porn or found within their respective jurisdiction. To reiterate, a precept or principle ascends to the status of customary international law if it is widely, consistently, and generally practiced, and if the member-states behave in such manner because they believe that it was obligatory for them to so behave (opinio juris): As previously discussed, for an international rule to be considered as customary law, it must be established that such rule is being followed by states because they consider it obligatory to comply with such rules (opinio juris) The answer to the question as to whether the CRS is widely, consistently, and generally practiced by member-states of the United Nations is easily discernible from a simple reference to the number of states which have ratified the CRS: to date, only sixty-four (64) states have ratified the CRS. This is an underwhelming number in the face of the fact that at present the United Nations has one hundred ninety-three (193) member-states.% Sixty- four (64) states thus represent only a little less than one third (1/3) of the general membership of the United Nations, a far cry from the ideal majority. With respect to the 1930 Hague Convention, we see an even lesser number of states which have ratified the same.°5 Without any showing of consistent, widespread, and general practice or adherence of states to a particular behavior, the second element of opinio juris need not, as it cannot be, be inquired into: Absent the widespread /consistent-practice-of-states factor, the second or the psychological element must be deemed non- existent, for an inquiry on why states behave the way they do presupposes, in the first place, that they are actually behaving, as a matter of settled and consistent practice, in a certain manner.* We underscore that the records are bereft of, and Respondent failed to present, sufficient evidence with which to convince us that the 1930 Hague Convention and/or the CRS have attained the status of customary international law, by showing the existence and concurrence of the two (2) elements that crystallize a practice or precept into customary international law. To reiterate, the 1935 and the 1987 Constitutions contemplate of 8 Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines vs. Duque III, supra hitps:/ /treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDelails.aspx?sre-TREATYéemtdsg_no=V- 4&cchapter=5élang=en, accessed on 5 December 2015. hitp:/ /www.un.org/en/members, accessed on 5/December 2015. https: / /treaties.un.org/pages/LONViewDelails.aspx?src=LON&id=512&chapter-308lang-en, accessed on 5 December 2015. Bayan Muna vs, Albert Romullo, supra. 331 natural-born citizenship as being founded on the principle of jus sanguinis. Foundlings do not, under the 1935 Constitution or the 1987 Constitution, fall within the purview of the definition of natural-born citizens. Should Respondent wish to prove the existence of an exception to the jus sanguinis principle so as to accommodate foundlings in the Constitutional definition of “natural-born” citizens, then the burden to prove the existence and nature of such exception rests in the court ‘of Respondent. Should Respondent claim that such exception is found in conventional international law, or that such exception is recognized under customary international law, then it is Respondent's burden to prove the existence of this customary international law. Thus in Pharmaceutical and Health Care ‘Association of the Philippines vs. Duque Ill et al.” the Court refused the proposition propounded by Respondent that the World Health Assembly Resolutions pertaining to nutrition and health claims of breast milk substitutes have become customary international law. ‘The Court, among others, pointed out that Respondent failed to prove that the WHA Resolutions have consistently and generally been practiced by the states and that such practice proceeded from the belief that they are obligatory in nature, thus: As previously discussed, for an international rule to be considered as customary law, it must be established that such rule is being followed by states because they consider it obligatory to comply with such rules (opinio juris) Respondents have not presented any evidence to prove that the WHA Resolutions, although signed by most of the member states, were in fact enforced or practiced by at least a majority of the member states; neither have respondents proven that any compliance by member states with said WHA Resolutions was obligatory in nature. XXX Consequently, legislation is necessary to transform the provisions of the WHA Resolutions into domestic law. The provisions of the WHA Resolutions cannot be considered as part of the law of the land that can be implemented by executive agencies without the need of a law enacted by the legislature. To agree with Respondent's claim that all foundlings are natural-born Filipinos by presumption of law can result to an absurd situation where 2 7 Supra, emphasis supplied.32 foundling with white skin, green eyes, with hair half blond and half purple --who was a foundling but later adopted by Filipino citizens---is a natural- bom Filipino and may run for the elective position of and even sit as President in the future. It must however be clarified that while Respondent, by the clear terms of the Constitution, cannot be regarded as a natural-born Filipino citizen, this however does not translate to relegating foundlings into statelessness. A foundling, though may not be accorded the status of a natural-born citizen, may nevertheless still be a Filipino citizen-—only not natural-born. Repatriation under Republic Act No. 9225 Following the above disquisition showing that Respondent is not a natural- bom citizen of the Philippines, it is clear that she could not have availed of the benefit of repatriation granted under R.A. No. 9225. To emphasize the context of our discussion herein, We reiterate that Respondent became a naturalized American citizen on 18 October 2001. As a consequence of her naturalization as a citizen of a foreign country, she effectively lost and divested herself of Philippine citizenship, abjured and renounced any and all allegiance and fidelity to the Philippines. On 10 July 2006, however, Respondent filed a petition for repatriation pursuant to and under the provisions of R.A. No. 9225. On 18 July 2006, the BID issued an Order granting Respondent's petition for repatriation. A review of the provision of R.A. No. 9225 reveals that the petition for repatriation could not be validly granted under the said law. Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225 declares without equivocation that repatriation or reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under the same law is limited in application to natural-born Filipino citizens only: XXX Section 2. Declaration of Policy - It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all Philippine citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act. Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship - Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have re-acquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic:" solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that 1 imposed this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.” Natural born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens ‘of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath. Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225 is explicit as it is unambiguous: the law applies as it pertains only to natural-born citizens. As previously discussed, Respondent is not and was never a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. She therefore cannot invoke R.A. No. 9225 because it does not apply to her. She could not have been validly repatriated under R.A. No. 9225. Assuming arguendo that Respondent is a natural-born citizen so that her repatriation is legally permissible pursuant to and by authority of RA. No. 9225, such repatriation still does not result in her reacquisition of her natural-born status. R.A. No. 9225 does not re-vest upon a natural-born Filipino, who was naturalized as a citizen of a foreign country her original natural-born status. R.A. No. 9225 allows only the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, and not natural-born citizenship. This is the clear import of Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225, thus: Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship - Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have re-acquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic: By virtue of the enactment of R.A. No. 9225, natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization to a foreign country can reacquie their Philippine citizenship upon taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic. Under the law, what the repatriate will! reacquire is not her natural-born status but merely Philippine citizenship. Emphasis suppliedFirst, the term used in R.A. No. 9225 is “reacquired Philippine citizenship.” Tt does not explicitly state that a person can regain her prior and original status as a natural-born citizen. Second, repatriation as a mode of reacquiring citizenship is a form of naturalization since it requires the performance of an act, ie. taking of an oath in order that a former Filipino citizen can reacquire Philippine citizenship once more. To reiterate, Section 2, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution provides that natural-born citizens are those who are citizens from birth and who need not perform any other act in order to perfect their Philippine citizenship: Section 2, Article IV: Natural born citizens are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Necessazily, a straightforward reading, of the above provision leads to the following conclusions: 1. To enjoy the status of a natural-born citizen, one must have been a natural-born citizen from birth. ‘This implies therefore that the natural-born citizenship must begin at birth and remain uninterrupted and continuous from birth. If a person, at any point in her life, ceases to be so, then she loses her natural-born citizenship. This is because she may no longer be regarded, under the clear and express terms of the Constitution, a natural-born citizen “from” birth. 2. To enjoy the status of a natural-born citizen, one must have performed no other act to perfect or acquire her citizenship. Respondent's repatriation under R.A. No. 9225, however, became the act necessary for her to perfect her Philippine citizenship. As such, the requirement that no other act must be performed for the perfection of one’s citizenship is not anymore complied with. Again under the clear terms of the Constitution, Respondent cannot be deemed to have reacquired her natural-born status. It is true that in the case of Antonio Bengson III vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal et al.2 the Supreme Court held that repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. However the Bengson case is different from the instant case of Respondent in several important respects. First, in the case of Bengson, the applicable law allowing for repatriation of ww GRNo. 142840, 7 May 200135 Teodoro Cruz (respondent therein) is R.A. 2630." The law allows for repatriation of Filipino citizens by mere taking of an oath of allegiance and Tenunciation of foreign citizenship, and registering the same with the Local Civil Registry: Section 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering the same with the Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other citizenship. Second, R.A. No. 2630 specifically applies only to persons who lost their citizenship by accepting a commission in the Armed Forces of the United States or acquiring US citizenship after having been commissioned in the Armed Forces of the US. ‘Third, R.A. No. 2630 must be read in conjunction with Commonwealth Act No. 63,3 which deals with the manner by which a Filipino citizen may lose her citizenship. One of the modes by which a Filipino may lose her citizenship is XXX (4) By rendering services to, or accepting commission in, the armed forces of a foreign country: Provided, That the rendering of service to, or the acceptance of such commission in, the armed forces of a foreign country, and the taking of an oath of allegiance incident thereto, with the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, shall not divest a Filipino of his Philippine citizenship if either of the following circumstances is present: (a) The Republic of the Philippines has a defensive and/or offensive pact of alliance with the said foreign country; or (b) The said foreign country maintains armed forces on Philippine territory with the consent of the Republic of ‘An Act Providing for Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by Persons Who Lost Such Citizenship by Rendering Service To, or Accepting Commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States ‘An Act Providing for the Ways in which Philippine Citizenship May Be Lost or Reacquired, 21 October 1936,36 the Philippines: Provided, That the Filipino citizen concerned, at the time of rendering said service, or acceptance of said commission, and taking the oath of allegiance incident thereto, states that he does so only in connection with his service to said foreign country: And provided, finally, That any Filipino citizen who is rendering service to, or is commissioned in, the armed forces of a foreign country under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b), shall not be permitted to participate nor vote in any election of the Republic of the Philippines during the period of his service to, or commission in, the armed forces of said foreign country. Upon his discharge from the service of the said foreign country, he shall be automatically entitled to the full enjoyment of his civil and political rights as a Filipino citizen; It is therefore clear from the foregoing that R.A. No. 2630 allows for the reacquisition of natural-born citizen status by those who became American citizens after rendering service or accepting commission in the Armed Forces of the US. The law hence is limited in application to specific individuals who lost their Philippine citizenship after they joined the US Armed Forces. That their “repatriation” entailed their return to their original status as natural-born citizens of the Philippines must therefore be understood within this context--that they joined the US Armed Forces with the consent of the Philippine Government and/or in pursuance of a pact alliance between the US and the Philippine Governments. In sum, assuming arguendo that Respondent was a former natural-born. citizen, she had lost such status when she became a naturalized American citizen, Her subsequent repatriation on 18 July 2006 will not result to her reacquisition of her natural-born citizen status. Having ruled that Respondent is not a natural-born citizen, We shall now discuss the issue on Respondent's compliance with the residency requirement. B. Whether or not Respondent complied with the ten (10)-year residency requirement {for the elective position of President Section 2, Article VIE of the 1987 Constitution defines the qualification of the President of the Republic of the Philippines, including the ten (10)-year residency requirement, thus:37 Section 2. No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election. The Supreme Court had, in several occasions, already explained the rationale behind the residency requirement as a qualification for public official seeking elective office. Thus in Meynardo Sabili vs. Commission on Elections and Florencio Librea,X the Supreme Court ruled: The Constitution and the law requires residence as a qualification for seeking and holding elective public office, in order to give candidates the opportunity to be familiar with the needs, difficulties, aspirations, potentials for growth and all matters vital to the welfare of their constituencies; likewise, it enables the electorate to evaluate the office seekers’ qualifications and fitness for the job they aspire for . ‘Also in the case of Aquino vs. COMELEC, the Supreme Court explained the rationale behind the residency requirement in this wise: [T]he place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election law. The manifest purpose of this deviation from the usual conceptions of residency in law as explained in Gallego vs. Vera is to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and needs of the community from taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that community for electoral gain. While there is nothing wrong with the practice of establishing residence in a given area for meeting election law requirements, this nonetheless defeats the essence of representation, which is to place through the assent of voters those most cognizant and sensitive to the needs of a particular district, if a candidate falls short of the period of residency mandated by law for him to qualify. That purpose could be obviously best met by individuals who have either had actual GR. No. 193261, 24 April 2012, citing Torayno v. Commission on Elections, 392 Phil. 343 (2000) 1 GRNo. 120265, September 18, 1995. Emphasis supplied.residence in the area for a given period or who have been domiciled in the same area either by origin or by choice. Residence under election law is therefore crucial because it is one of the mechanisms put in place by the law to ensure that candidates running for an elective office have real and sufficient familiarity with and sensitivities to actual local contexts and the needs of their constituents. Residency however under the law does not contemplate mere bodily presence in the locality. It is considered synonymous with domicile for election purposes, which imports not only intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence thereat coupled with conduct indicative of such intention." In the case at bar, it is incumbent upon Respondent to prove that she satisfied the ten (10)-year residency requirement. We reiterate however that Respondent became an American citizen on 18 October 2001. Having acquired American citizenship by naturalization, Respondent lost her Philippine citizenship. She was likewise deemed to have abandoned her domicile in the Philippines. This principle is confirmed by the Supreme Court in the case of Teodulo M. Coquilla vs. COMELEC et al.:10° In Casi v. Court of Appeals’ this Court ruled that immigration to the United States by virtue of a “greencard," which entitles one to reside permanently in that country, constitutes abandonment of domicile in the Philippines. With more reason then does naturalization in a foreign country result in an abandonment of domicile in the Philippines. Having lost her domicile when she was naturalized as an American citizen on 18 October 2001, it is Respondent's burden to prove that she has reestablished her domicile in the Philippines and satisfied the Constitutional residency requirement of'ten (10) years for the elective position of President. In simpler terms, Respondent must prove that she has elected and established a domicile in the Philippines upon her return. In Romuladez vs. RTC of Tacloban City et al.,1”7 the Court identified the essential elements for the establishment or acquisition of a new domicile, thus: In order, in turn, to acquire a new domicile by choice, there must concur (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an intention to remain. there, and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile2! In other words, there must 1 Philip G. Ronsuladez vs. Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Tacloban City, et al.. G.R. No, 104960, 14 September 1993. 1% — GRNo, 151914, 31 July 31 2002. Emphasis supplied ww Supra.39 basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at thie place chosen for the new domicile must be actual. Hence in order for a person to acquire a domicile by choice, the following must concur: 1. Residence or bodily presence in the new locality; 2. Anintention to remain there; and 3. Anintention to abandon the old domicile. The question therefore that now confronts this Commission is, assuming Respondent can be validly repatriated under R.A. No. 9225, when did she reestablish her domicile in the Philippines? Respondent claims that as far back as 24 May 2005, she had already begun reestablishing her domicile of choice in the Philippines. This was allegedly further demonstrated when her children arrived in the Philippines during the latter half of 2005 and began their schooling here, when they purchased a condominium in San Juan City in the second half of 2005, when they started the construction of their house in Corinthian Hills in 2006, and when they informed the US Postal Service in 2006 of their abandonment of their US address. These acts however are not conclusive evidence to show that Respondent had decided to establish, and in fact established, her permanent domicile in the Philippines. Further, notwithstanding all these arrangements, which were made while Respondent was a citizen of the US, it bears emphasizing that Respondent's husband remained a resident of the US in May 2005, where he kept and retained his employment. Thus Respondent's frequent travels to the US using her US passport---five (5) times according to her counsel---during this time and even after she filed her petition for repatriation, between 2006 to 2010, negate her claim that she abandoned her domicile in the US and changed the same to the Philippines on 24 May 2005.08 Assuming however that these acts reflect an intention to establish one’s domicile in the Philippines, the same regrettably cannot be given weight. This is because Respondent was still an American citizen and a foreigner at the time she allegedly commenced the reestablishment of her domicile or permanent residence in the Philippines, wt Records, 306 to 317 in Valdez vs. Hamanzares.!In order for Respondent, who was then an alien or a foreigner, to be able to establish permanent residence in the Philippines, it was necessary for her to secure prior authorization as permanent resident from the BID. Respondent did not adduce any evidence, such as a permanent resident visa issued by the Republic of the Philippines, showing that she was authorized to permanently reside in the Philippines. In her Memorandum, Respondent herself admitted that she did not have a permanent resident visa from 24 May 2005 to 7 July 2006. Necessarily therefore, as a foreigner who was authorized only to reside temporarily or as a visitor in the Philippines, Respondent could not have, as she in fact had not, established her permanent residence or domicile in the Philippines on 24 May 2005. Her alien citizenship remained a Jegal impediment which prevented her from establishing her domicile in the Philippines. The Supreme Court, in the case of Coquilla vs. Commission on Elections et al.,1 clarifies this point further: Second, it is not true, as petitioner contends, that he reestablished residence in this country in 1998 when he came back to prepare for the mayoralty elections of Oras by securing a Community Tax Certificate in that year and by “constantly declaring” to his townmates of his intention to seek repatriation and run for mayor in the May 14, 2001 elections. The status of being an alien and a non-resident can be waived either separately, when one acquires the status of a resident alien before acquiring Philippine citizenship, or at the same time when one acquires Philippine citizenship. As an alien, an individual may obtain an immigrant visa under §13 of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1948 and an Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR) and thus waive his status as a non-resident. On the other hand, he may acquire Philippine citizenship by naturalization under C.A. No. 473, as amended, or, if he is a former Philippine national, he may reacquire Philippine citizenship by repatriation or by an act of Congress, in which case he waives not only his status as an alien but also his status as a non-resident alien. In the case at bar, the only evidence of petitioner’s status when he entered the country on October 15, 1998, December 20, 1998, October 16, 1999, and June 23, 2000 is the statement “Philippine Immigration [-] Balikbayan” in his 1998-2008 U.S. passport. As for his entry on August 5, 2000, the stamp bore the added inscription “good for one year stay.” Under §2 of R.A. No. 6768 1 Records, 480 in Valdez vs. Llamanzares. m9 Supra. Emphasis supplied.41 (An Act Instituting a Balikbayan Program), the term balikbayan includes a former Filipino citizen who had been. naturalized in a foreign country and comes or returns to the Philippines and, if so, he is entitled, among others, to a “visa-free entry to the Philippines for a period of one (1) year” (§3(0)). It would appear then that when petitioner entered the country on the dates in question, he did so as a visa-free balikbayan visitor whose stay as such was valid for one year only. Hence, petitioner can only be held to have waived his status as an alien and as a non- resident only on November 10, 2000 upon taking. his oath as a citizen of the Philippines under R.A. No. 8171. He lacked the requisite residency to qualify him for the mayorship of Oras, Eastern, Samar. Without a waiver of her non-resident status before she was “repatriated” under R.A. No. 9225 by getting a permanent resident visa, Respondent thus could not have stayed in the Philippines as a permanent resident starting 24 May 2005 up to immediately before her repatriation, Applying the aforequoted pronouncement of the Court, it is evident that the earliest period that Respondent could have established her domicile, assuming that she can be validly repatriated under R.A. No. 9225, was when she reacquired her Philippine citizenship upon her repatriation on 18 July 2006. Prior to this date, her residence is by law temporary in nature; that is, her residence in the Philippines was only that of a foreign visitor whose stay is impermanent. At this juncture, it must be underscored that the reestablishment by Respondent of her domicile in the Philippines does not follow upon her repatriation as a matter of course. In Manuel B. Japzon vs. Commission on Elections et al.,11 the Supreme Court held that the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 had no automatic impact or effect on residence/domicile. One can retain his domicile abroad and not necessarily regain his domicile of origin. One only has the option to again establish a domicile of choice, thus: ‘As has already been previously discussed by this Court herein, Ty’s reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 had no automatic impact or effect on his residence/domicile. He could still retain his domicile in the USA, and he did not necessarily regain his domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines. Ty merely had the option to again establish his domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern nt GRNo, 180088, January 19, 2009. Emphasis supplied.42 Samar, Philippines, said place becoming his new domicile of choice. The length of his residence therein shall be determined from the time he made it his domicile of choice, and it shall not retroact to the time of his birth. In the more recent case of Rogelio Batin Caballero vs. Commission on Elections et al,i2 the Supreme Court reiterated this rule and declared that one seeking election to a public office must prove that she has reacquired her domicile in the Philippines, after reacquiring her Filipino citizenship: Hence, petitioner's retention of his Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225 did not automatically make him regain his residence in Uyugan, Batanes. He must still prove that after becoming a Philippine citizen on September 13, 2012, he had reestablished Uyugan, Batanes as his new domicile of choice which is reckoned from the time he made it as such. The COMELEC found that petitioner failed to present competent evidence to prove that he was able to reestablish his residence . . . . It found that it was only after reacquiring his Filipino citizenship by virtue of RA No. 9225 on September 13, 2012 that petitioner can rightfully claim that he re- established his domicile in Uyugan, Batanes, if such was accompanied by physical presence thereat, coupled with an actual intent to reestablish his domicile there. . . . Doctrinally entrenched is the rule that in a petition for certiorari, findings of fact of administrative bodies, such as respondent COMELEC in the instant case, are' final unless grave abuse of discretion has marred such factual determinations. Clearly, where there is no proof of grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, fraud or error of law in the questioned Resolutions, we may not review the factual findings of COMELEC, nor substitute its own findings on the sufficiency of evidence. To reiterate, a change of domicile is shown when there is concurrence of (a) bodily presence, (b) intent to remain in the place of residence, (¢) and intent to abandon the old domicile. Intention, however, being a state of mind and. therefore intangible is made manifest only by Respondent's overt acts. On this basis, We find that Respondent's intention to reestablish her domicile of origin was manifest only when the Commission on Elections registered Respondent as a voter of Brgy. Santa Lucia, San Juan City, on 31 August 2006. The act of registering as voter in Brgy. Santa Lucia in San i G.R_No. 209835, 22 September 2015. Emphasis supplied43 Juan City is an indicia of Respondent's intent to remain in the Philippines after she regained her Filipino citizenship. Thus, on this score, Respondent's period of domicile in the Philippines must be counted only starting 31 August 2006. Notwithstanding the foregoing, Respondent still stated under oath in her COC for President that she has been residing in the Philippines for ten (10) years and eleven (11) months as of 9 May 2016, or since 24 May 2015. This is however belied by her own admission in her COC for Senator that she had only then been a resident of the Philippines for a period of six (6) years and six (6) months counted up to 13 May 2013.3 This in effect is a declaration that her period of residence in the Philippines commenced only sometime in November 2006, and not on 24 May 2005 as she now claims. Clearly, having failed to complete the ten (10)-year residency requirement, Respondent therefore is not qualified for the elective position of President of the Republic of the Philippines. At this juncture, it may not be remiss to note that in her COC for President, Respondent declared that she is a registered voter of Brgy. Sta. Lucia, San Juan City, while at the same time indicating that her residence is in Corinthian Hills, Quezon City.4 c Whether or not Respondent's Certificate of Candidacy must be cancelled and/or denied due course on the ground of material misrepresentation. With the above disquisitions on Respondent's citizenship and residency and a finding that Respondent failed to comply with the natural-born citizenship and the ten (10)-year residency requirements for the elective position of President, the pivotal question that must now be resolved is whether or not Respondent committed material misrepresentation in her COC which warrants its cancellation. In Fernando V. Gonzalez vs. Commission on Elections et al.."° the Supreme Court clarified that material misrepresentation contemplates not just the falsity of the information declared in the COC, but also the materiality of 1 This is an admission against interest that binds Respondent pursuant to Section 26, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Evidence, which provides: Section 26. Admission of a party. — The act, declaration or omission of a party as toa relevant fact may be given in evidence against him. Itcan be gleaned from Sections 9 and 10 of Republic Act No. 8189, or the Voter's Registration Act of 1996, that registration as voter is intricately connected with the residence of the registered voter. Supra.we the said information and the deliberate attempt of the declarant candidate to mislead or deceive the electorate: Furthermore, aside from the requirement of materiality, the false representation must consist of a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. In other words, it must be made with an intention to deceive the electorate as to one’s qualification for public office. Jurisprudence therefore is clear that material misrepresentation, which warrants the denial of due course and/or cancellation of the COC, is committed when the candidate (a) falsely declares information in her COC, (b) deliberately attempts to deceive and misinform"S the electorate, and (c) the false information is material to her’ qualification” for the elective position for which she seeks election. Respondent declared in her COC that she is eligible to the position she seeks to be elected to. In item no. 7 of her COC, she declared that she has been a resident of the Philippines for ten (10) years and eleven (11) months; in item no. 8, she claimed that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen. This is a false declaration because Respondent does not possess the qualifications pertaining to natural-born citizenship and the ten (10)-year residency requirement. We must hence weigh if this false declaration translates to material misrepresentation. Jurisprudence has taught us time and again that material misrepresentation, which warrants the denial of due course and/or cancellation of the COC, is committed when the candidate (a) falsely declares information in her COC, (b) deliberately attempts to deceive and misinform"® the electorate, and (c) the false information is material to her qualification"® for the elective position for which she seeks election. As discussed above, Respondent's declaration with respect to her eligibility and qualifications for the position for which she sought election is false because she is not a natural-borm citizen of the Philippines and she lacks the ten (10)-year residency requirement for President. Second, the matter as to Respondent's citizenship and residency is material to her qualification. Failure to meet the citizenship and residency requirements, by both Constitutional and statutory fiat, renders Respondent ineligible. eid. 17 Luis R. Villafuerte vs. Commission on Elections and Miguel R. Villafuerte, G.R. No. 206698, 25 February 2014. Fernando V. Gonzalez.vs. Commission on Elections etal, supra. Luis R. Villafuerte vs. Consmission on Elections and Miguel R, Villafuerte, supra. 1With respect to the element of “deliberate attempt to deceive and misinform the electorate,” We find that Respondent deliberately attempted to deceive and mislead the electorate with respect to her citizenship and residency qualifications. She therefore committed a material misrepresentation in her COC. First, as to the issue on Respondent's citizenship, the facts are clear: Respondent's parentage or blood lineage is unknown. She was a foundling with no known blood relatives and was duly registered as such in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Hoilo City. She was later adopted by movie actors Susan Roces (Jesusa Sonora Poe) and Fernando Poe Jr. (Ronald Allan Kelley Poe) in 1974 on the strength of an adoption decree issued by the Municipal Court of San Juan, Rizal. Respondent unarguably has full knowledge of these facts—- of her being a foundling, an adopted child, and without any known blood relative. Second, the 1987 Constitution is likewise unequivocal when it declared in jts Article IV, Section 2 that the President of the Republic of the Philippines must be a natural-born Filipino citizen. This provision is straightforward and admits of no exception and ambiguity. Its letter clearly sets forth a qualification as to the required citizenship of the would-be President of the Republic: he or she must be a natural-born Filipino citizen. Nothing further can be said as to the clarity of the language in which Section 2, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution is couched. Third, Section 1, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution also clearly defines who are citizens of the Philippines. A simple reading of the provision shows that foundlings are not one of the categories enumerated therein. This easily yields the conclusion that Respondent does not qualify as a natural-born citizen as defined. The provision likewise contains no provision or indication, express ot implied, that a founding is a natural- born citizen and/or qualifies as an exception to the above rule. Fourth, it is beyond contest and a settled rule in jurisprudence that the 1935 Constitution and the whole legal system in the Philippines follow the principle of jus sanguinis with respect to natural-bomn citizenship. This has been clarified and affirmed by the SC in the case of Tecson vs. Commission on Elections et al.!20 Necessarily, the principle of jus sanguinis applies only to natural filiation, not to adoption. 1 Maria Jeanette C. Tecson etal. us. The Commission on Elections et a.; Zoilo Antonio Velez vs. Ronald ‘Allan Kelley Poe; Victorino X. Fornier vs. Hon. Comission on Elections et al. Supra.46 Fifth, jurisprudence teaches us that no presumption of natural-born citizenship is accorded to any person seeking the highest elective office of President of the Philippines. Natural-born citizenship is a qualification required by no less than the Constitution of those who wish to run and. serve as President of the Republic. Thus, any candidate for President bears the burden to prove her qualification—-that is, her natural-born citizen status. Any ambiguity on such matter is strictly construed against her. This is the clear and categorical ruling of the Supreme Court in the consolidated cases of Tecson vs. Commission on Elections et al.: Any person who claims to be a citizen of the Philippines has the burden of proving his Philippine citizenship. Any person who claims to be qualified to run for President because he is, among others, a natural-born Philippine citizen, has the burden of proving he is a natural-born citizen. Any doubt whether or not he is natural-born citizen is resolved against him. The constitutional requirement of a natural-born citizen, being an express qualification for election as President, must be complied with strictly as defined in the Constitution. . . 77 The above considerations thus, taken together, should have already immediately alerted and apprised Respondent of the fact that she, though a Filipino citizen, was not and could not have been a natural-born Filipino because she was adopted as a foundling with unknown biological parents. To emphasize, the letter of the 1935 and 1987 Constitutions are clear and. unambiguous; jurisprudence likewise are unmistakable and definite. A simple reading thereof yields what is already an obvious and apparent conclusion under the law---that Respondent is not a natural-born Filipino citizen. Yet in complete disregard of what is clear under law, the Constitution, and jurisprudence, Respondent declared in her COC for President that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen who is fully qualified to run and serve as President of the Philippines. The clarity of the law notwithstanding, Respondent chose to ignore and brush aside the Constitution and jurisprudence and misrepresent herself as natural-born Filipino citizen, learly in order to serve her purpose and suit her intent of running for the Presidency. Ignorance of the law excuses no one. Respondent is presumed and expected to know the law. She is bound by its effects and consequences in case of violation thereof. Indeed as a public servant, member of the Philippine Congress—the country’s lawmaking body and the third co- equal branch of government--Respondent is all the more charged and mid.a7 expected to know the law. Asa lawmaker, it is Respondent's duty to know, abide by, and apprise herself of the laws of the Republic. ‘As discussed previously, the law, the 1935 and 1987 Constitutions, and relevant jurisprudence are cleat and straightforward. A simple reference to these provisions with willingness to discover what is provided in the laws and a full intent to comply with and show fealty to the Constitution should have already informed Respondent as to her lack of natural-born citizenship. No amount of polemics and attempts at obfuscating what is already clear in the fundamental law and jurisprudence will hide Respondent's evident intent and attempt to circumvent the law, make a false statement on a material fact, hide her ineligibility, and mislead the electorate. As to the issue on residency, We also find that there was a deliberate attempt on the part of Respondent to misrepresent her period of residency in the Philippines. In her COC for Senator for the May 2013 Elections, Respondent declared under oath that she had been a resident of the Philippines for a period of six (6) years and six (6) months counted up to the 13 May 2013 Elections. When computed, this amounts to a declaration that her permanent residency in the Philippines commenced only sometime in November 2006. Based on this declaration, Respondent fails to meet the residency requirement for President. However in her COC for President, Respondent made a different declaration which is completely at variance with her declaration in her COC for Senator. In her COC for President, Respondent declares that she has been a resident of the Philippines for ten (10) years and eleven (11) months, or since May 2005, and therefore eligible and qualified to run and sit as President of the Republic of the Philippines. ‘The inconsistency of Respondent's residency claims in both her COCs for President and Senator clearly could not have escaped her. Respondent knew that her residency in the Philippines, as she admitted in her COC for Senator, falls short of the required ten (10)-year requirement for President. Thus to lead the electorate and this Commission to believe that she is compliant with the residency requirement, Respondent falsely declared in her COC for President that she has been a resident of the Philippines for ten (10) years and eleven (11) months as of 9 May 2016. Respondent knowingly declared this false material information in her COC in order to make it appear that she is now eligible and qualified to be President. In her Verified Answer, Respondent explained that her declaration in her COC for Senator that she had only beer a resident of the Philippines for six48 (© years and six (6) months was due to an “honest mistake” as to what she thought was the correct reckoning period for computing her residency in the Philippines. Respondent claimed that when she filed her COC for Senator, she had erroneously computed her period of residence up to the day she filed her COC, instead of on Election Day, 13 May 2013.! This explanation however does not convince. It is indeed incredible to think that Respondent, a well-educated woman and already then a public servant with full staff support, including a legal team, would not know how to correctly declare the facts material to her candidacy for the 13 May 2013 Elections. Furthermore the COC form for a senatorial candidate is very clear that what is required to be stated therein is the period of residency up to the day of the elections on 13 May 2013. Respondent thus could not have been confused as to the information sought to be declared in her COC. Additionally, six (6) years and six (6) months computed from 2 October 2012, the date Respondent filed her COC for Senator, is more or less around April 2006. This still does not match Respondent's claim that she has been a resident of the Philippines since 24 May 2005. This stark variance in Respondent's declaration of her residence and her inconsistent statements in connection therewith are clear indications of her intent and attempt to deliberately misrepresent a material matter in her COC for President for the purpose of hiding her ineligibility and mislead the electorate. This glaring disparity proves that Respondent intended and attempted to conceal the material fact that she is ineligible to run for President for failure to meet the ten (10)-year residency requirement. From the foregoing, Respondent committed material misrepresentation in her COC when she declared therein that she has been a resident of the Philippines for a period of ten (10) years and eleven (11) months as of the day of the elections on 9 May 2016. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to GRANT the Petitions and cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE- LLAMANZARES for the elective position of President of the Republic of the Philippines in connection with the 9 May 2016 Synchronized Local and National Elections. SO ORDERED. 1 Records, Vol. Il, 162 in Tatad vs. Llamanzares.49 Se Digbry Bre. CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LI Presiding Commissioner oth at Se fe. Cormremeeres © Opa 3 Leeenalligaacrttyt— ORG ROWENA AMELIA V. jommissioner GUANZON Commissioner LUI] CERTIFICATION I hereby certify that the conclusions in the above resolution were reached in consultation among the members of the First Division before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the First Division. CHRISTIAN eee Presiding Commissioner