133. Lopez et.al vs.

Pan Am, 16 SCRA 431

Facts:
Then Senate Pro Tempore Lopez booked 1st class tickets from Tokyo to San Francisco. He was
traveling with wife, daughter and son-in-law.
On May 24, 1960, they arrived in Tokyo only to discover that they no longer had 1st class
accommodations. They took flight under protest ‘cause Senator had scheduled meeting and wife had
check-up at Mayo clinic
Damages claimed > breach of contract in bad faith
Issue: WON they can recover moral damages
HELD: Yes, bad faith existed
Ratio:
1) 2220: moral damages are recoverable in breach of contracts where the defendant acted fraudulently or
in bad faith
2) Badges of Bad Faith
a) Employee Herranz cancelled reservationof Lopez’ together with that of the Rufinos  only the
Rufinos cancelled
b) Despite knowledge that reserv ations have been cancelled, when lopez party called in to
confirm, they assured them of 1st class accommodations
3) Such willful non-disclosure of the cancellation or pretense that the reservations of the plaintiffs stood is
the factor to which is attributable the breach of the resulting contract
4) It is humiliating to be compelled to travel as such, contrary to what is rightfully to be expected from the
contractual undertaking
Moral damages sustained by Senator:
- social humiliation, wounded feelings, mental anguish
-senator siya ek ek
-P 100, 000
Wife: discomfort sustained in tourist class for 13 hours =physical suffering
 P50, 000
daughter/husband: P25, 000 for social humiliation
 lose of prestige?

134. Zulueta vs Pan Am, 43 SCRA 397

Facts: <person’s case>
Rafael Zulueta, with his wife & daughter were passengers aboard flight No. 841-23 from Honolulu
to Manila. Plane had 30 minute stop-over in Wake island where they (passengers) were allowed to
disembark.
Mr. Zulueta disembarked so he could relieve himself but found CR full of soldiers so he went to
beach…hmm
Flight was delayed. He was later found. “ You people almost made me miss your flight. You have
a defective announcing system and I was not paged.”
Away…away… later asked to open their bags <allegedly another person, which they (Pan Am)
were never able to identify mentioned something about a bomb>.
K. Siton, airport manager, offloaded Mr. Zulueta but allowed wife and daughter to continue with
flight.
Issue: non moral damages may be recovered.
HELD: Yes
Ratio:
1) 21: Any person who willfully causes lose or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
2) 2217: Moral damages include physical suffering mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury. Though incabale of
pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the
defendant’s wrongful act/omission.
a) rude reception (captain: What in the hell do you think you are?)
b) abusive language/scornful reference: monkeys
c) unfriendly attitude, ugly stares, unkind remarks received
 d) arbitrary/high-handed decision of leaving him at island
e) wife suffered nervous breakdown because of the embarrassment, insults, humiliations.
3) Contract between carrier involves special & peculiar obligations and duties. There’s a promise and duty
of protection and courteous treatment
4) Contract of air carriage generates a relation attended with a public duty. Neglect or malfeasance of
carrier’s employees naturally could give ground for an action for damages
1 M  500T ( he contributed to gravity)

135. Yutuk vs. manila Electric, 2 SCRA 337

Facts:
Meralco Jaime went to Yutuk’s house and told maid that he wanted to enter premises to check
meter. Yutuk told him that meter was outside. Later, electricity was cut off and when Yutuk asked him what
the trouble was, he replied with another question: Why she was paying only 50% of bills.
Yutuk thought Jaime came to fix her defective meter which she had reported to Meralco’s
collectors but Jaime told her that she was stealing electric current using by using a jumper.
Filed case for slander vs. Jaime  convicted
Meralco filed for theft > dismissed
Issue: Moral damages
Held: Yes
Ratio: While moral damages are incapable of pecuniary estimation, they are made recoverable, if they are
the proximate result of the defendant’s wrongful act or omission; and since these damages affect
aggrieved party’s moral feelings and personal pride, “ these should be weighed in the determination of the
indemnity.”
Issue: WON there was bad faith
HELD: no really but “ at the very least, the facts of case show the appellant did it with reckless negligence

Ratio:
1. when Yutuk reported incident, company showed unwillingness to entertain
* said they would only if Jaime would be convicted in slander case
2. then filed complaint for theft!
-motivated purely by malice and ill-will and as a retaliatory measure for civil axn filed by plaintiff
- filed case only 4 mos after supposed discovery thereof

250thou-exorbitant
25,000 MD
-mental anguish by reason of false imputation
- besmirched rep, ridicule, humiliation
- personal circs and reputation considered

136. Simex
Simex, engaged in exportation of food products, deposited 100thou with Bank. Later issued checks
against account. Bounced.

Bank investigation: amt not credited to account and was immdtly rectified

MD at 20thou
1. initial carelessness of bank, aggravated by lack of promtitufe in repairing error justifies award
2. MP awarded not to penalize but to compensate plaintiff for injuries
3. Corpo: no MD except when it has good repu that is debased, resulting in its social humilation
4. damages suffered
 credit line cancelled
 orders not acted upon pending receipt of payment
 reputation tarnished
 standing in biz com reduced
 prestige as reliable debtor diminished
137. magbanua
6 petitioners were share tenant of defendants. Defendants diverted free flow of water from lots which
caused land to dry up. Def then asked them to vacate areas for they could no longer plant without water.

MD YES
1. 2219 permits award for MD for acts under 21
“ any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner contrary to yada yada”
2. obvious they were denied H20 so they would vacate land.

138 Tan Koepe

Masa had been PTNR’s tenant for 10 years. He wrote asking for conversion of share tenancy relation to
one of leasehold, applied for conversion, authorized.

PETR filed 6 crim cases!

MD YES
1. unfounded successive complaints even without oral testimonies prove existence of factual basis
for MD
2. suffered humiliation of incarceration
3. motive: harassment and embarrassment and retaliatory measure for conversion award

139. Ford
Facts:
Girl slapped another girl during election.

MD YES
1. 2219: any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner contrary to xx”
2. slap is unlawful aggression
3. face personifies one’s dignity and slapping it is a personal affront
4. considering position and fact that it was election day, nothing but shame, humiliation and dishonor
would have been heaped upon her by the indignities she had to suffer.

5thou

141. bagumbayan
Family went to watch concert and waiter spilled drinks on wife

NO MD
1. embarrassment is not the mental anguish contemplated in 2217 for which MD can be recovered
2. mental suffering: distress or serious pain distinguished from annoyance, regret, or vexation

142. Vda de medina

Avarque was driving jeepney which smashed into MERALCO post resulting in passenger Medina’s death.

At that time, Cresencia had not acquired approval from PUB service commission for the sale of jeepney.
Absoulte owner was Rosario.

NO AND
1. untenable since AND cannot co-exist with compensatory damages
2. ND’s purpose is to vindicate or recognize right that has been violated, in order to preclude further
contest thereon, and not for the purpose of indemnifying plaintiff for any loss suffered by him
3. Ct’s award of compensatory/exemplary damages are in themselves judicial recognition that plaintiff’s
right was violated.

143. Northwest
respondent, then Commissioner of Public Highways, boarded plane with 1st class ticket to Tokyo. In
Okinawa, he was compelled to transfer to tourist.

ND awarded

1. valid since CT did not grant A, M, E damages

special reasons to justify award

a. position
b. no explanation why his ticket was marked as waitlisted
c. was made to pay 1st class
d. no explanation why other person had better right thereto

144. Cogeo
A cert of public convenience was issued in favor of LS to ply CC route.

LS issued resolution adopting Bandera system where coop members were allowed to queue for
passengers at pathway in exchange for 20 pesos

Assoc. responded by forming human barricade and took over operations for 10 days

ND awarded
WON respondent usurped prop right of respondent
YES

Cert of Public convenience is property and Public Service Law: can be sold because it has considerable
material value and a valuable asset—cannot be taken without due process of law

Assoc thru barricade violated right of LS to operate services.

2222: damages in every case where any property right has been invaded

145. Araneta
Araneta, import/export guy, issued $500 check which was later dishonored—account closed.

Bank apologized and rectified error but 2 similar incidents happened again.

TD awarded
1. ok in cases where definite proof of pecuniary loss cannot be offered but Ct is convince that there has
been such a loss

example: injury to commercial credit or to goodwill of firm

here: he was a merchant of long standing and good reputation

146: NPC
NPC bought stuff from International Commodities thru rep, NATL merchandising Corp.

Contract: nonpayment---LD at a rate of 2/5 of 1% of full contract price for 1st 30 days of default and 4/5 of
1% for every day thereafter

Supplier failed to deliver due to inability to secure shipping space.

LD awarded
1. if agreed upon the same should be enforced instead of awarding only nominal dams
2. NPC suffered: no production of fertilized coz sulfur not delivered
147. Singson
1. brought axn to recover actual/compens dams plus certain amount of atty’s fees. ED also claimed but
amt not specified.

ED awarded even if not alleged.

1. amount need not be proved becoz its determination depends upon CD that may be awarded
2. merely incidental or dependent upon AD/CD

148. san Miguel

Francisco Magno, City Treasurer, seized delivery trucks of SM which were levied against due to failure to
pay tax.

SM filed case for damages

Magno filed counterclaim for moral and exemplary

No exemplary-mere finding that allegations in complaint were not true and that mistake in instituting
action vs. wrong party—do not justify award

Pancific and Munsayac: emailed by MJ or JP

Radio Comm
RCPI transmitted condolence msg in hapi bday card placed in xmas gram envelope. Accepted order but
did not tell plaintiff: no more appropriate social envelopes

ED may be awarded to aggrieved party- gross negligence/ careless constitute wanton misconduct—
justifies award

153. People vs escano

4 separate crim actions for estafa were filed. Conso for joint trial

Upon finding that offended parties seek to enforce civl liabilities by way of AD, respo judge ordered clerk
to require payment of filing fees.

Filing fees not required.

- Where civil axn is instituted together with crim axn, the AD claimed are not included in the computation
of filing fees.

- are to be paid only if other items of damages are alleged in the complaint/info or if they are not so
alleged, shall constitute a first lien on judgment

154. General
Info for libel alleged 100M worth of AME damages.

D allegations were not included in info so co-accused raised issue of non-payment of docket fees.

No need for docket fees.

- when amount of damages is not alleged, the corresponding filing fees need not be paid and shall simply
constitute a 1st lien on a judgment, except in award for actual damages.
- only when the amt of damages, other than actual, is alleged in he complaint/info that corresponding filing
fees shall be paid by OP upon filing thereof in court for trial

7. Quasi-delictual liability where there are contract relations

Case 8: Singson vs BPI, 23 SCRA 1117
Nature: Appeal from Judgment of the CFI, Manila
Facts:
Singson was on the defendants in a civil case that ordered them to pay the sum of 105,539.56 to
Philippine Milling Co. As soon as the judgment became final and executory, court served a writ of
garnishment upon BPI-insofar as Villa-Abrille’s credits against bank were concerned.

Bank included Singson’s account and latter discovered this when BM Glass Service told him that the
check he issued was not honored by bank becoz it had been garnished.

Bank immediately rectified mistake, resulting in the temporary freeing of the account of the plaintiff.
Singson filed action: for damages in consequence of said illegal freezing of account. Lower court decided
that plaintiffs cannot recover upon basis of quasi-delict because relation between parties was contractual.

Issue: WON existence of contract bars commission of tort by one against the other and the consequent
recovery of damages therefor.
Held: NO
Ratio: The existence of a contract between parties does not bar the commission of a tort by one against
the other and the consequential recovery of damages therefor.

Case 9: Air France vs Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155

Nature: Petition for review by certiorari of a decision of the CA
Facts:
Rafael Carrascoso was one of the 48 Filipino pilgrims who left Manila for Lourdes. He had a first class
round trip ticket from Manila to Rome. However, when the plane was in Bangkok, the Manager forced him
to vacate his first class seat because a white man had a better right to the seat. Carrascoso filed
complaint for damages.

Issue: WON damages may be recovered on the basis of the expulsion

Held: Yes
Ratio:
• The contract of air carriage generates a relation attended with public duty. Passengers should be
protected and insured a pleasant trip.
• Wrongful expulsion is a violation of public duty by the air carrier- a quasi delict. Damages are
proper.
• doubt WON ticket was confirmed as first class is immaterial as claim is based on the wrongful
expulsion itself

Case 10: City of Manila vs IAC, 179 SCRA 428

Nature: Petition for certiorari to review the decision and the resolution of the CA.
Facts:
Wife of deceased Vivencio Sto Domingo Sr. was granted a lease for a duration of 50 years (June 6, 1971-
June 6, 2021) on a land in the North Cemetery. Sr. was buried in said lot.

However, in 1975, city officials ordered the exhumation and removal of the remains of sr. from said lot and
said lot was leased to another family, allegedly in accordance with Admin Order No. 5, Series of 1975.
Wife was shocked and enraged (malamang!)

Issue: WON operations of public cemetery are governmental or proprietary function

Held: Proprietary
Ratio: In the absence of special laws, North Cemetery is a patrimonial property created by resolution of
Municipal Board. Owned therefor in its proprietary or private character
• City entered into contract of lease- exercise of proprietary functions, city may then sue and be
sued
 • City is liable for the tortuous act committed by its agents to verify and check the duration of
contract of lease.

Interference with Contracts

Case 11: Gilchrist vs Cuddy, 29 Phil 542
Nature: Appeal from a judgment of the CFI, Iloilo
Facts:
Cuddy, owner of the film, Zigomar, entered into a contract with Gilchrist, to rent the film for a week at 125,
starting May 26.

Before said date, Cuddy returned money to Gilchrist and told him that Espejo and his partner would rent
film for 350.

Court issued mandatory injunction ordering Cuddy to deliver film to Gilchrist and an ex parte prelim
injunction restraining Espejo and partner from receiving and exhibiting film until further orders from court

Issue: WON Espejo and partner were liable for interfering with the contract between Gilchrist and Cuddy,
they not knowing the identity of one of the contracting parties
Held: Yes
Ratio:
• mere right to compete could not justify appellants in intentionally inducing Cuddy to take away
Gilchrist’s contractual rights
• liability arises from unlawful acts and no from contractual obligations, as they were under no such
obligations to induce Cuddy to violate his contract with Gilchrist

1314, CC: Any 3rd person who induces another to violate his contract shall be liable for damages to the
other contracting party.

B. Basic elements of quasi-delictual liability

1. The act or omission in the breach of a legal duty

Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

Rakes vs AG&P Co., 7 Phil 359

Nature: Appeal from a judgment of CFI, Manila

Facts:

Plaintiff’s leg was broken and was eventually amputated because of an incident at the company’s
yard. The handcar’s track sagged, tie broke, rails slid off and caught plaintiff (or somethin’ like that).

Cause: dislodging of the crosspiece or piling under the stringer by the water of the bay raised by
recent typhoon.

Plaintiff now charges defendant with negligence breach of duty on its part in failing to properly
secure load of iron to vehicles or to skillfully build tramway by maintaining, inspecting and repairing it.

p. 373.

Contributory negligence
The negligence of injured person does not operate as a bar to recovery but only in reduction of
the damages he may claim.
Liability of Employer to Worker
 arises out of contractual relations between them, regulated by 1101 (Old CC)
 this contract binds employer to provide safe appliances for use of employees

Cangco vs Manila Railroad Co., supra

Lilius vs Manila Railroad, 59 Phil 758

Nature: Appeal from a judgment of CFI, Manila
Facts:

Plaintiff was driving their Studebaker at 19-25 mi/hr to go sightseeing in Pagsanjan, Laguna. With him
were his wife and 4-year-old daughter.

He was entirely unacquainted with the conditions of the road and had no knowledge of the existence of a
railroad crossing at Dayap (view was obstructed by houses, trees and shrubs.

At about 7-8 meters from crossing, plaintiff saw an autoruck parked on left side of road with people
alighting from it. He sounded his horn for the people to get out of the way.

Locomotive No. 713 struck their car right in the center. All of them got injured. (malamang!)

Issue: WON Manila Railroad is liable for damages due to breach of legal duty
Held: YES, for its negligence and the negligence of its employees
Ratio:
 The diligence of a good father of a family, which the law requires in order to avoid damage, is not
confined to the careful and prudent selection of subordinates or employees but includes
inspection of their work and supervision of the discharge of their duties.
• no semaphore at crossing in Dayap to serve as warning of its existence in order that they
might take the necessary precautions before crossing railroad
• flagman and switchman were not at his post
• engineer did not take necessary precautions even after he knew of flagman’s and
switchman’s absence: did not slacken speed and did not continuously ring bell and blow
whistle

Yamada vs. Manila Railroad, 33 Phil 8

Nature: Appeal from 3 judgments of the CFI, Manila. Crossfield and Del Rosario, JJ.
Facts:
Plaintiffs amd 3 other companions hired a taxicab from Bachrach Garage and Taxicab Co for a trip to
Cavite Viejo. On their way back, while crossing the tracks of defendant railroad in San Juan, municipality
of Cavite Viejo, the automobile was struck by a train and the plaintiffs injured.

Issue: WON taxicab company fully discharged its duty when it furnished a suitable car and selected a
driver who had 5-6 years experience
Held: NO
Ratio:
 duty not only to furnish a suitable and proper car and select competent operator but also to
supervise and, where necessary, instruct him properly
 supervision and instruction includes promulgation of proper rules and regulations and the
formulation and publication of proper instructions for their guidance in cases where such rules are
regulations are necessary
• custom of driver to approach and pass over railroad crossings without lessening speed
and other such precautions
 • president of company even testified that none of its drivers were accustomed to stop or
even reduce speed or take any precaution in approaching and passing over the railroad
crossings, no matter of what nature, unless they here ‘the signal of the car’ (syemps,
umamin pa ang gago)

Del Rosario vs Manila Electric Co., 57 Phil 478

Nature: Appeal from a judgment of CFI, Manila
Facts:
Jose Noguera noticed that an electric wire in Dimas-Alang Street was burning and its connections
smoking. He asked one Jose Soco to report the situation to the Malabon station of the Manila Electric
Company. Msg was transmitted at 2:25 pm.
At 4 pm, wire still wasn’t fixed and Alberto del Rosario, 9 years old, touched the wire, got
electrocuted, and died upon reaching St. Luke’s.

Issue: WON there was an act/omission in breach of legal duty

Held: Yes
Ratio:
 delay in leaving the danger unguarded so long after the information of the trouble was received
constituted negligence of the part of Company
 Apparent Contributory Negligence of Child: Did not relieve company of responsibility, owing to the
child’s immature years and natural curiosity to do something out of the ordinary

Del Prado vs Manila Electric Company, 52 Phil 900

Nature: Appeal from judgment of the CFI, Manila
Facts:
Ignacio del Prado’s right foot was caught and crushed by car no. 74 and had to be amputated the
following day.

He was running across the street to catch the car but before his position had become secure, and even
before his raised right foot had reached the platform, the motorman applied the power and the car gave a
slight lurch forward. Plaintiff’s foot slipped and his hand was jerked loose from the handpost and he fell to
the ground.

Issue: WON there was breach of legal duty

Held: Yes
Ratio:
 Although motorman was not bound to stop to let the plaintiff on, it was his duty to do no act that
would have the effect of increasing the plaintiff’s peril while he was attempting to board the car.
 Premature acceleration of car was breach of this duty.
 Duty of carrier extends to persons boarding the cars as well as alighting therefrom.
 Plaintiff’s negligence in attempting o board moving car was not the proximate cause of the injury.
Direct and proximate cause was the premature acceleration.

Astudillo vs Manila Electric CO, 55 Phil 427

Nature: Appeal from a judgment of the CFI, Manila
Facts:
Juan Astudillo met his death through electrocution, when he placed his right hand on a wire connected
with an electric pole situated near Santa Lucia Gate, Intramuros.

Issue: WON there was breach of legal duty

Held: YES
Ratio:
 Pole was located close enough to public place so that a person, by reaching his arm out the full
length, would be able to take hold of one of the wires
  City Engineer: even if wire was triple braid weather proof type, if touched by a person, would
endanger life of that person by electrocution
 Compliance with a franchise, ordinance, or a statute is not conclusive proof that there was no
negligence. The fulfillment of the conditions does not render unnecessary other precautions
required by ordinary care.

2. Fault or negligence

1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is required by

the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the

place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provision of Article 1171 and 2201, par 2, shall apply.

If the law or contract does not state the diligence which I to be observed in the performance, that which is
expected of a good father of the family shall be required.

1171. Responsibility arising from fraud is demandable in all obligations. Any waiver of an action for future
fraud is void.

2201, par 2. In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall be responsible for all
damages which may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the obligation.

Wright vs Manila Electric Co., 28 Phil 122

Nature: Appeal from a judgment of the CFI, Manila
Facts:
Plaintiff drove home in a calesa. While crossing the tracks to enter his premises, the horse stumbled,
leaped forward and fell, causing vehicle to strike one of the rails with great force. Plaintiff was thrown from
the vehicle and caused the injuries complained of. Plaintiff was drunk during that time.

Issue: WON there was negligence on part of company

Held: Yes
Ratio:
 a considerable portion of the ties were above the level of the street
 mere intoxication is not negligence nor does the mere fact of intoxication establish a want of
ordinary care
 If person’s conduct is characterized by a proper degree of care and prudence, it is immaterial
whether he is drunk or sober.

Corliss vs Manila Railroad Company

Nature: Direct Appeal from a decision of the CFI, Pampanga
Facts:
Ralph Corliss, Jr., 21, was driving a jeep on his way back to Clark Air Force Base. The jeep
collided with a locomotive of Manila Railroad Company.

The crossing bars were not put down and no guard was at the gatehouse when the accident
happened.

Issue: WON there was negligence

Held: Yes, on plaintiff’s part
Ratio:
  Negligence is want of care required by the circumstances.
 Even if crossbars were not put down and that there was no guard, plaintiff still had the duty to
stop his jeep to avoid collision and that the main witness of the defendant-appellee, who drove
the engine, was not qualified to do so at the time of the accident.
 Plaintiff was sufficiently warned (locomotive had blown its siren or whistle)

Umali vs Bacani, 69 SCRA 263

Nature: Petitioner for certiorari to review the decision of the CFI, Pangasinan. Bacani, J.
Facts:
During a storm, the transmission line of the Alcala Electric Plant were blown down and fell on the electric
wire. Wire was cut, one end of which was left hanging on the post and other fell to the ground under the
fallen banana plants.

The following morning, barrio captain saw broken wire and warned people not to go near wire. He also
saw Cirpriano Baldomero, laborer at the plant, and told latter about the wire but Baldomero said he could
not do it. Instead, he was going to look for a lineman to do it.

Later, Manuel Saynes, 3 years and 8 months old, chanced upon the place, touched the wire, and got
electrocuted and subsequently died.

Issue: WON there was negligence

Held: Yes, Electric plant
Ratio:
 didn’t bother to remove banana plants which posed great danger to the electric post supporting
the electric wires
 upon knowing possible danger due to effects of storm, they did not cut off from plant the flow of
electricity
 Baldomero did not take necessary precaution to prevent anybody from approaching the live wire
 Company’s liability for injury caused by his employees’ negligence is defined in par 4, 2180:
The owner and manager of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages
caused by the employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the
occasions, of their functions.

Contributory negligence

2179. When the plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he
cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause
of the injury being the defendant’s lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts
shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.

Rakes vs AG&P Co, supra

Last Clear Chance

Picart vs. Smith, 37 Phil 809

Nature:
Facts:
Plaintiff Picart was riding a pony on a bridge. Seeing an automobile ahead, he improperly pulled his horse
over to the railing on the right. The driver of the automobile, however guided his car toward the plaintiff
without diminution of speed until he was only a few feet away. He then turned to the right but passed so
closely to the horse that the latter being frightened, jumped around and was killed by the passing car.
Picart was thrown off the horse and suffered contusions.

Issue: WON there was negligence

Held: Yes, plaintiff was on the wrong side of bridge
 defendant is also liable under doctrine of last clear chance

Ratio:
 Defendant is also liable as he had the fair opportunity to avoid the accident after he realized the
situation created by the negligence of the plaintiff could by no means then place himself in a
position of greater safety.
 Control of situation had passed to defendant and it was his duty to bring his car to an immediate
stop, or
 Seeing that there were no other persons on the bridge, to take the other side and pass sufficiently
far away from the horse to avoid the danger of collision
Test: Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have
foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing the conduct
or guarding against its consequences.

Phoenix Construction vs IAC, 148 SCRA 353

Nature: Petition for review of the decision of the IAC
Facts:
Leonardo Dionisio was on his way from a cocktails-and-dinner meeting with his boss (drove a
Volkswagen).

While he was proceeding down the general Lacuna Street, he claimed that his headlights suddenly failed
and when he switched them to bright, he saw a Ford dump truck parked on the right hand side of the
street.

Dumptruck was parked askew and no lights or any so-called early warning reflector devices were set
anywhere near the truck.

To avoid collision, he swerved his car to the left but it was too late and his car smashed into the dump
truck.

Issue: WON there was negligence

Held: Yes
• primary for Phoenix
• Contributory for car driver

Ratio:
 Employer’s failure to exercise vigilance over its employee is evident from the improper parking of
the truck on the street at night along employee’s residence
 Doctrine of last clear chance does not seem to have a role to play in a jurisdiction where the
common law concept of contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery by the plaintiff,
has itself been rejected, as it has been in 2179 of CC.

Glan People’s Lumber and Hardware vs NLRC

Nature: Petition for certiorari to review the judgment of the CA.
Facts:
Engineer Calibo was driving jeep owned by Bacnotan Consolidated Industries, Inc. With him were
Roranes and Patos.

At about 59 yards after crossing the bridge, a cargo truck from the opposite direction collided with the
jeep. Calibo was killed while his companions sustained injuries. Truck’s driver was unhurt.

Witnesses: jeep was zigzagging because driver was drunk.

Issue: WON Calibo had the last clear chance to avoid the accident
Held: Yes
Ratio:
 While still 30 meters away from truck, by stopping in his turn or swerving his jeep away from the
truck, wither of which he had sufficient time to do while running at a speed of only 30 km/hr.
 Jeep driver’s duty was to seize the opportunity of avoidance, not merely to expect truck to swerve
and leave him a clear path. (also, truck was within its own lane and driver had already applied
brakes)

Bustamante vs CA, 193 SCRA 603

Nature: Petition for certiorari to review the decision of the CA
Facts:
Driver Owner
Gravel and sand truck Montesiano Del Pilar
Mazda passenger bus Susulin Magtibay and Serrado

Truck and bus collided. The front left side portion of the body of the truck sideswiped the left sidewall of
the passenger bus, ripping off the said wall from the driver’s sear to the last rear seat. Several
passengers of the bus were thrown out and died as a result of their injuries.

• While truck was about 30 meters away, bus driver saw the truck’s front wheels wiggling and he
also observed that truck was heading towards his lane. Thinking that truck driver was just joking,
bus driver shifted from 4th to 3rd gear so he could overtake a Kubota hand tractor. While in the
process of overtaking tractor, the 2 vehicles sideswiped each other.

Issue: WON doctrine of last clear chance applies to the case at bar
Held: No
Ratio:
• case is not a suit between the owners and drivers of colliding vehicles but a suit brought by the
heirs of the deceased passengers against both owners and drivers of the vehicles.
• Court found truck driver negligent:
- was running fast
- road was descending
- vehicle was an old 1947 cargo truck whose front wheels were already wiggling

• Court also found bus driver negligent:

- should have stopped bus pr swerved it to the side of the road even down to its shoulder

McKee vs IAC, 211 SCRA 517

Nature: Petition for review from the resolution of the then IAC
Facts:
Driver Owner
Cargo truck Ruben Galang Tayag and Manalo
Ford escort Jose Koh

To avoid hitting 2 boys who suddenly darted from the right side of the road and into the lane of the car,
Jose Koh blew the horn of his car, swerved to the left and entered the lane of the truck. He attempted to
return to his lane but before he could do so, he already collided with the cargo truck.

-Truck and Ford collided in Pulong Pulo Bridge along MacArthur Highway. 3 people in the Ford escort
died including the driver, Jose Koh.-

Issue: WON Koh was negligent

Held: NO, emergency rule applies
Ratio:
 emergency rule: one who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act
without tie to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, in not
guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to
have been a better method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought by his own
negligence
- Koh adopted best means to avoid hitting the 2 boys
 cargo truck driver had last clear chance to avoid the accident
• upon seeing that car had entered his lane to avoid the boys, truck driver did not reduce
its speed before the actual impact of collision. Car driver had given emergency signals for
truck to slow down so that car could go back to its lane
• driving at 48 km/hr on a 30 km/hr bridge
- 2185, a person driving a vehicle is presumed negligent if at the time of the
mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation
Presumed negligence

2184. IN motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who was in the
vehicle, could have, by the use of due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably presumed that
a driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty of reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at least
twice within the next preceding 2 moths.

If the owner was not on the motor vehicle, the provisions of Article 2180 are applicable.

2180. The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages
caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on occasion
of their functions.

2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been
negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.

2188. There is prima facie presumption of negligence on the part of the defendant if the death or injury
results from his possession of dangerous weapons or substances, such as firearms and poison, except
when the possession or use thereof is indispensable in his occupation or business.

1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault
or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed
in 1733 and 1755.

1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to
observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers
transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case.

Such extraordinary diligence is vigilance over the goods further expressed in 1734, 1735, and 1745 nos.
5, 6, 7 while the extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers is further set forth in 1755 and
1756.

1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can
provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances.

Teague vs. Fernandez, 51 SCRA 181

Nature: Appeal from decision of CA
Facts:
The Realistic Institute was a vocational school for hair and beauty culture. It was owned and operated by
Mercedes Teague.

The 2nd floor of the building had only 1 stairway, of about 1.5 meters in width. Section 491 of the Revised
Ordinances of the City of Manila provided that for a building such as the one where the institute was, at
least 2 unobstructed stairways of not less than 1 meter and 20 cm in width should be constructed.

On Oct 24, 1955, a fire broke out in a store for surplus materials located 10 meters away from institute,
across the street.

Although no part of the Gil-Armi building caught fire, 4 students were found dead and several others
injured on account of the panic which ensued and the subsequent stampede.

Issue: WON negligence could be presumed in the case at bar

Held: YES
Ratio:
 when the standard of care is fixed by law, failure to conform to such standard is negligence,
negligence per se or negligence in and of itself, in the absence of a legal excuse.
 Death of Lourdes Fernandez was due to the gross negligence of the defendant who failed to
exercise due care and diligence for the safety of its students in not providing the building with
adequate fire exits and in not practicing fire drill exercises to avoid the stampede, aside from the
fact that the defendant did not have a permit to use building as a schoolhouse.

Res ipsa loquitur (the thing speaks for itself)

Africa vs Caltex, 16 SCRA 448
Nature: Petition for review by certiorari of a decision of the CA
Facts:
While Leandro Flores was transferring gasoline from a tank truck into the underground tank of Caltex, an
unknown person lighted a cigarette and threw the burning match stick near the main valve of the
underground tank. Fire broke out, spread to and burned several neighboring houses, including personal
properties and effects inside them.

Issue: WON the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies to the case at bar
Held: Yes
Ratio:
 res ipsa loquitur: where the thing which caused the injury complained of is shown to be under the
management of the defendant or his servants and the accident is such as in the ordinary course
of things does not happen if those who have its management or control use proper care, it affords
reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose
from want of care.
 Incident happened because of want of care on Caltex’ part.
• station was located in a very busy district near the Obrero market where it is common to
see people smoking or lighting a cigarette
• concrete walls (fire wall) were only 2 ½ meters high and could not avoid flames from
leaping over it in case of fire
• station also housed a garage and repair shop-overcrowding

Republic vs Luzon Stevedoring Co., 21 SCRA 279

Nature: Appeal from a decision of the CFI, Manila
Facts:
(oblicon case ‘to. So??? May natatandaan pa ba tayong case dun? )

Barge owned by Luzon Stevedoring was being towed down the Pasig River by tugboats ‘bangus’ and
‘Barbero.’ Barge rammed against one of the wooden piles of the Nagtahan bailey bridge, smashing posts
and causing bridge to list.
River at the time was swollen and current swift on account of a heavy downpour.

Issue: WON doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies to the case at bar
Held: Yes
Ratio:
 The unusual event that the barge, an immovable and stationary object, exclusively controlled by
appellant, rammed the bridge supports raises a presumption of negligence on the part of the
appellant or its employees manning the barge or the tugs that towed it.
 In the ordinary course of events, such a thing does not happen if proper care is used.

F.F. Cruz vs CA, 164 SCRA 731

Nature: Petition to review the decision of the CA
Facts:
Gregorio Mable repeatedly approached Eric Cruz to request that a firewall be constructed between shop
and private respondent’s residence. Request fell on deaf ears.

Fire broke out in petitioner’s shop and both shop and house were razed to the ground.

Issue: WON doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies to the case at bar
Held: Yes
Ratio:
 furniture manufacturing shop contained combustible materials such as wood chips, sawdust,
paint, varnish and fuel and lubricants
 firewall should have been constructed as required by city ordinance
 fire could have been caused by a heated motor or a lit cigarette
 workers sometimes smoked inside shop

Layugan vs IAC, 167 SCRA 363

Nature: Petition for certiorari to review the decision of the then IAC. Veloso, J.
Facts:
Plaintiff and companion wee repairing the tire of their cargo truck which was parked along the right side of
the National Highway.

Defendant’s truck bumped the plaintiff and latter was injured and hospitalized.

Issue: Won doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies to the case at bar
Held: NO
Res ipsa loquitur (Black’s): a rule of evidence whereby negligence of alleged wrongdoer may be inferred
from mere fact that accident happened provided character accident and circumstances attending it lead
reasonably to belief that in absence if negligence it would not have occurred and that thing which caused
injury is shown to have been under management and control of alleged wrongdoer.

Ratio:
 doctrine can be invoked when and only when, under the circumstance involved, direct evidence is
absent and not readily available
 Evidence on record discloses that:
• 3 or 4 meters from rear of parked truck, a lighted kerosene lamp was placed
• defendant did not check vehicle before he took it on the road and thus was not able to
discover that the brake fluid pipe on the right was cut

Assumption of risk
Afialda vs Hisole

Nature: Appeal from a judgment of the CFI, Iloilo

Facts:

Afialda was employed as caretaker of defendant spouses’ carabaos.

While tending the animals, he was gored by one of them and later died as a consequence of his injuries.

Plaintiff seeks to hold defendants liable under 1905:

The possessor of an animal, or the one who uses the same, is liable for any damages it may cause, even

if such animal should escapre from him or stray away.

This liability shall cease only in case the damage should arise from force majeure or from fault of the

person who may have suffered it.

Issue: WON defendant spouses are liable

Held: NO

Ratio:

 statute refers to possessor or user of animal

• possessor or user has the custody and control of the animal and is therefore the one in
apposition to prevent it from causing damage.
• One of the risks of the caretaker’s occupation which he had voluntarily assumed and for
which he must take the consequences

ORTALIZ v ECHARRI
July 31, 1957

FACTS:

 While driving his employer’s car, Estanda struck a child, causing physical injuries to the latter.
 Consequently, a criminal case for Slight Physical Injuries Through Reckless Imprudence was filed
against Estanda. He pleaded guilty to the charge and was subsequently convicted.

 The child’s father, plaintiff Ortaliz, filed a complaint for damages against Estanda’s employer, defendant
Echarri.

ISSUE: Won Ortaliz’s complaint has sufficient cause of action against Echarri as employer of Estanda

HELD: YES

 Article 2180 states that

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting
within their scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or
industry.

Article 2184 provides that

If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of Article 2180 applies.

Having in view the above provisions of law, the complaint of Ortaliz’s contained a sufficient cause of
action.

 The contention of Echarri that there should be allegation in the complaint that “the defendant was
engaged in some kind of industry and that employee committed the crime in the discharge of his duties
in connection with the industry,” is untenable in view of Article 2180:
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees XXX even though the former
are not engaged in any business or industry.

 Likewise, the contention of Echarri that plaintiff should have reserved the civil action is untenable in
view of Article 33:
In cases of physical injuries, a civil action for damages entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the
criminal prosecution xxx

Order of dismissal of lower court revoked.

CUISON v NORTON & HARRISON CO.

October 14, 1930

FACTS:

 A truck owned by a certain Antonio Ora was on its way to Santa Mesa carrying large pieces of lumber
belonging to Norton & Harrison Co.

 The driver, who was with two other people (Binoya and Bautista; all 3 of them are below 18), upon
noticing that the lumber had become loosened, stopped the truck for the purpose of rearranging it.

 However, before it could be rearranged, some large pieces of lumber fell from the truck and pinned
beneath it a 7-year old boy who was passing by. The boy died instantly.

 The driver and his companion in the truck were charged with the crime of homicide through reckless
imprudence to which they pleaded guilty. Subsequently, a complaint for damages was filed.

 SC would later confirm from testimony that:

1. the truck in question was owned by Antonio Ora
2. that the lumber was owned by Norton & Harrison Co.
 3. that Ora had regularly rented out his truck to Norton & Harrison Co. for the purpose of transporting
the latter’s lumber
4. that Ora was also employed by Norton & Harrison Co. as capataz (foreman) and that it was his duty
as such employee to direct the loading and transportation of lumber
5. that the driver of the truck and his companions were also in the employ of Norton & Harrison, but
they were not the men who were directed by Ora to load the lumber on the truck

 CFI absolved Norton & Harrison from the complaint which alleged that the death of the boy was caused
by its negligence.

ISSUE: Won Norton & Harrison should be held responsible

HELD: YES

 It is evident that Ora was a contractor and employee at the same time of Norton & Harrison Co.
However, he is not an independent contractor. Such distinction is important because Norton & Harrison
Co, as an employer of Ora, retained the power of directing and controlling his work.

 As an employee of Norton, Ora was charged with the duty of directing the loading and transportation of
the lumber. And it was the negligence in loading the lumber and the use of minors on the truck which
caused the death of the boy.

 For his negligence, defendant Norton & Harrison Co. is also responsible for the death.

Judgment reversed.

(mejo mahirap intindihin ang syllogism ng decision)

Villareal, concurs

 Concurs with the result but the case at bar is governed by the provisions of Article 20 in connection with
Article 17 of the Penal Code and Article 1092 of the CC, and not by Art. 1902 & 1903.

 Ora was a foreman of the defendants Norton and Harrison for the loading and unloading of their lumber
the falling of which caused the death of the boy.

 As such foreman, Ora was the agent or employee of Norton & Harrison. In the performance of his
duties as foreman, he used the services of Bautista and Binoya for the loading and unloading of said
lumber, thus making them his employees in such work, and consequently the employees of Norton
and Harrison through him.

 Since there was a criminal complaint filed, and sufficient allegation in the present action that Bautista
and Binoya committed the crime of homicide through reckless imprudence, Norton & Harrison are
therefore civilly liable for the crime of homicide through reckless imprudence committed by these 2
employees.

CHINA AIRLINES LTD v COURT OF APPEALS

May 18, 1990

FACTS:

 Jose Pagsibigan purchased a plane ticket for a Manila-Taipei-Hongkong-Manila flight from the Transaire
Travel Agency.
 The said agency contacted Philippine Airlines which at that time was a sales and ticketing agent of
China Airlines.

 PAL, through its ticketing agent Roberto Espiritu, issued to Pagsibigan the plane ticket which showed
that the latter had been booked at the June 10, 1968 5:20 PM flight of China Airlines, departing from
Manila for Taipei.

 When Pagisibigan showed up at the airport an hour before the supposed scheduled time of departure,
he was informed that the CAL plane he was supposed to take for Taipei had left at 10:20 AM that day.

 The PAL employees then made appropriate arrangements so that he could take the PAL’s flight to
Taipei the ff day. Pagsibigan took the re-scheduled flight.

 A few months after, he filed a complaint for moral damages and attorney’s fees against PAL. He alleged
that Espiritu had been grossly negligent in his duties, as a result of which he suffered besmirched
reputation, embarrasment, MA, WF and SN, thereby warranting award for moral damages.

 In its defense, PAL alleged that:

1. the departure time indicated on Pagsibigan’s plane ticket was furnished and confirmed by China
Airlines
2. that China Airlines did not inform the issuing PAL branch of the revised timetable of CAL flights

PAL asserted a cross-claim against CAL.

 China Airlines, for its part, averred

1. that all airlines, including PAL, were informed of the revised schedule of flights
2. that notices of these revised sked were furnished to all sales agent
3. that the issuing PAL branch had in fact been issuing and selling tickets based on the revised time
sked

CAL also asserted a cross claim against PAL.

 TC found PAL and Roberto Espiritu jointly and severally liable by way of exemplary damages. It did not
award moral damages. CAL was exonerated.

 CA ruled out claim for moral and exemplary damages. It awarded nominal damages.

ISSUE: Who should be held liable

HELD: PAL

With respect to CAL . . .

 SC noted that Pagsibigan has opted to seek redress by pursuing two remedies at the same time, that
is, to enforce the civil liability of CAL for breach of contract and, likewise, to recover from PAL and
Espiritu for tort or culpa aquiliana.

 In view of the proscription against double recovery, SC deemed it wise to determine the true nature of
the action instituted by Pagsibigan.

 According to SC, a perusal of the complaint of Pagisbigan will disclose that the allegations therein make
out a case for a quasi-delict.

Had Pagisibigan intended to maintain an action based on breach of contract, he could have sued CAL
alone considering that PAL is not a real party to the contract.
 It is thus evident that when Pagsibigan sensed that he cannot hold CAL liable on a quasi-delict, he
made a detour on appeal, by claiming that his action against CAL is based on breach of contract of
carriage.

 SC did not allow Pagsibigan to change his theory at this stage because it would be unfair for CAL as it
would have no opportunity to present further evidence material to the new theory.

 But there is no basis to hold CAL liable on a quasi-delict. CA exonerated CAL of any liability for fault or
negligence.

With respect to PAL and Espiritu . . .

 PAL’s main defense is that is only an agent. As a general proposition, an agent who duly acts as such is
not personally liable to 3rd persons. However, there are admitted exceptions, as in this case where the
agent is being sued for damages arising from a tort committed by his employee.

 IN an action premised on the employee’s negligence, whereby Pagsibigan seeks recovery for the
damages from both PAL and Espiritu without qualification, what is sought to be imposed is the direct
and primary liability of PAL as an employer.

 When an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law
that there was negligence on the part of the employer. This presumption, however, may be rebutted by
a clear showing on the part of the employer that it has exercised the care and diligence of a good father
of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee.

PAL failed to overcome such presumption. As found by CA, PAL was duly informed of CAL’s revised
sked, and in fact, PAL had been issuing and selling ticket based on said revised time sked.

 For his negligence, Espiritu is primarily liable to Pagisbigan under Article 2176 of the CC. For the failure
of PAL to rebut the legal presumption of negligence, it is also primarily liable under Article 2180 of CC.

 Under Article 2180, all that is required is that the employee, by his negligene, committed a quasi-delict
which caused damage to another, and this suffices to hold the employer primarily and solidarily liable
for the tortious act of the employee. PAL, however, can demand from Espiritu reimbursement of the
amount which it will have to pay the offended party’s claim.

Decision modified.

FILAMER CHRISTIAN INSTITUTE v IAC

August 17, 1992

FACTS:

 Funtecha was a working student, being a part-time janitor and scholar of Filamer Christian Institute.

 One day, Funtecha, who already had a student’s driver’s license, requested Masa, the school driver and
son of the school president, to allow him to drive the school vehicle. Assenting to the request, Masa
stopped the vehicle he was driving and allowed Funtecha to take over behind the wheel.

 However, after negotiating a sharp dangerous curb, Funtecha came upon a fast moving truck so that he
had to swerve to the right to avoid a collision. Upon swerving, they bumped a pedestrian walking in his
lane. The pedestrian died due to the accident.

ISSUE: Won Filamer Christian Institute should be held liable

HELD: YES

 First it should be noted that driving the vehicle to and from the house of the school president were both
Allan and Funtecha reside is an act in furtherance of the interest of the petitioner-school. The school
jeep had to be brought home so that the school driver can use it to fetch students in the morning of the
next school day.

 Thus, in learning how to drive while taking the vehicle home in the direction of Allan’s home, Funtecha
definitely was not having a joy ride or for enjoyment, but ultimately, for the service for which the jeep
was intended by the petitioner school.

(School president had knowledge of Funtecha’s desire to learn how to drive.)

 Court is thus constrained to conclude that the act of Funtecha in taking over the steering wheel was one
done for and in behalf of his employer for which act the school cannot deny any responsibility by
arguing that it was done beyond the scope of his janitorial duties.

 The fact that Funtecha was not the school driver does not relieve the school from the burden of
rebutting the presumption of negligence on its part. It is sufficient that the act of driving at the time of the
incident was for the benefit of the school.

 Petitioner school has failed to show that it exercised diligence of a good father of a family.

Petitioner has not shown that it has set forth rules and guidelines as would prohibit any one of its
employees from taking control over its vehicles if one is not the official driver or prohibiting the
authorized driver from letting anyone than him to drive the vehicle. Furthermore, school had failed to
show that it impose sanctions or warned its employees against the use of its vehicles by persons other
than the driver.

 Thus, Filamer has an obligation to pay damages for injury arising from the unskilled manner by which
Funtecha drove the vehicle since the law imposes upon the employers vicarious liability for acts or
omissions of its employees.

The liability of the employer, under Article 2180, is primary and solidary. However, the employer shall
have recourse against the negligent employee for whatever damages are paid to the heirs of the
plaintiff.

On Labor Code’s Rule X

 The clause “within the scope of their assigned tasks” (found in CC) for purposes of raising the
presumption of liability of an employer, includes any act done by an employee, in furtherance of the
interests of the employer or for the account of the employe at the time of the infliction of the injury or
damage

 Even if somehow, the employee driving the vehicle derived some benefit from the act, the existence of a
presumptive liability of the employer is determined by answering the question of whether or not the
servant was at the time of the accident performing any act in furtherance of his master’s business.

 Rule X, which provides for the exclusion of working scholars in the employment coverage and on which
the petitioner is anchoring its defense, is merely a guide to the enforcement of the substantive law on
labor. It is not the decisive law in a civil suit for damage instituted by an injured person during a
vehicular accident against a working student of a school and against the school itself. Present case
does not involve a labor dispute.

An implementing rule on labor cannot be used by an employer s a shield to avoid liability under the
substantive provisions of the CC.
Motion granted.

DUAVIT v COURT OF APPEALS

May 18, 1989

FACTS:

 The jeep being driven by defendant Sabiniano collided with another jeep, which had then 2 passengers
on it. As a result of the collision the passengers of the other jeep suffered injury and the automobile
itself had to be repaired because of the extensive damage.

 A case was filed against Sabiniano as driver and against Duavit as owner of the jeep.

 Duavit admitted ownership of the jeep but denied that Sabiniano was his employee.

 Sabiniano himself admitted that he took Duavit’s jeep from the garage without consent or authority of
the owner. He testified further that Duavit even filed charges against him for theft of the jeep, but which
Duavit did not push through as the parents of Sabiniano apologized to Duavit on his behalf.

 TC found Sabiniano negligent in driving the vehicle but absolved Duavit on the ground that there was
no employer-employee relationship between them, and that former took the vehicle without consent or
authority of the latter.

 CA held the two of them jointly and severally liable.

ISSUE: Won the owner of a private vehicle which figured in an accident can be held liable under Article
2180 of the CC when the said vehicle was neither driven by an employee of the owner nor taken with the
consent of the latter.

HELD: NO

 In Duquillo v Bayot (1939), SC ruled that an owner of a vehicle cannot be held liable for an accident
involving a vehicle if the same was driven without his consent or knowledge and by a person not
employed by him.

This ruling is still relevant and applicable, and hence, must be upheld.

 CA’s reliance on the cases of Erezo v Jepte and Vargas v Langcay is misplaced and cannot be
sustained.

In Erezo v Jepte case, defendant Jepte was held liable for the death of Erezo even if he was not really
the owner of the truck that killed the latter because he represented himself as its owner to the Motor
Vehicles Office and had it registered under his name; he was thus estopped from later on denying such
representation.

In Vargas, Vargas sold her jeepney to a 3rd person, but she did not surrender to the Motor Vehicles
Office the corresponding AC plates. So when the jeepney later on figured in an accident, she was held
liable by the court. holding that the operator of record continues to be the operator of vehicle in
contemplation of law, as regards the public and 3rd persons.
 The circumstances of the above cases are entirely different from those in the present case. Herein
petitioner does not deny ownership of vehicle but denies having employed or authorized the driver
Sabiniano. The jeep was virtually stolen from the petitioner’s garage.

Decision and resolution annulled and set aside.

DULAY v COURT OF APPEALS

April 3, 1995

FACTS:

 While Benigno Torzuela was on duty as security guard of “Big Bang sa Alabang”, he shot and killed
Atty. Napoleon Dulay after an altercation occurred between them in the premises of said establishment.

 The heirs of Dulay filed a complaint for damages under Article 2176 against Torzuela and Safeguard
Investigation and Secuirty Co., Inc. and/or Superguard Security Corp, alleged employers of defendant
Torzuela.

In the complaint, Safeguard and Superguard were impleaded as alternative defedants for, while
Safeguard appears to be the employer of Torzuela, Superguard impliedly acknowledged responsibility
for his acts by extending sympathies to the plaintiffs.

 Meanwhile, an Information charging Torzuela with homicide was filed with RTC Makati.

 Superguard/Safeguard alleged that a complaint of petitioner for damages based on negligence under
Article 2176 cannot lie because said article is applicable only to quasi-offenses. They alleged that
Torzuela’s act of shooting was committed with deliberate intent (dolo), and he acted beyond the scope
of his duty.

 Upon motion, TC judge dismissed the complaint against the alternative defendants on the ground that
the complaint did not state facts necessary to constitute a quasi-delict since it does not mention any
negligence on the part of Torzuela.

ISSUE: Won petitioner can sustain a valid cause of action under Article 2176 against the employer of
Torzuela

HELD: YES

 It is undisputed that Benigno Torzuela is being prosecuted for homicide for the fatal shooting of Dulay.
Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that

Section 1. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly
instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to
institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

 It is well-settled that the filing of an independent civil action before the prosecution in the criminal action
presents evidence is even far better than a compliance with the requirement of an express reservation.

This is precisely what the petitioners opted to do in this case. However, the private respondents
opposed the civil action on the ground that the same is founded on a delict and not on a quasi-delict as
the shooting was not attended by negligence.

What is then the nature of petitioner’s action?

 Contrary to the theory of private respondents, there is no justification for limiting the scope of Article
2176 of the CC to acts or omissions resulting from negligence. Well-entrenched is the doctrine that
 Article 2176 covers not only acts committed with negligence, but also acts which are voluntary and
intentional (See Elcano v Hill & Andamo v IAC)

 And, as argued by petitioners, Torzuela’s act of shooting Dulay is also actionable under Article 33 of the
CC because the term “physical injuries” found therein has already been construed to include bodily
injuries causing death (Capuno v Pepsico)

Independent civil action may be filed under Article 33 so long as the crime is not the result of criminal
negligence, as in the instant case.

 It having been established that the instant action is not ex-delicto, petitioners may proceed directly
against Torzuela and the private respondents. Because of the principle of vicarious responsibility, it is
incumbent upon Safeguard and/or Superguard to prove that they exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employee.

 The petitioner’s complaint sufficiently alleged an actionable breach on the part of Torzuela and
Superguard and/or Safeguard.

BUT WON the shooting was attended by negligence or actually done within the scope of Torzuela’s
duties; WON Superguard and/or Safeguard failed to exercise due diligence are matters that should be
resolved after trial on merits.

Case remanded to RTC for trial on merits.

DE LEON BROKERAGE CO INC v CA

February 28, 1962

FACTS:

 Angeline Steen suffered injuries as a result of the collision between the passenger jeepney she was
riding and the cargo truck owned by De Leon Brokerage and recklessly driven by its employee, Luna.

 Luna had been prosecuted and convicted of the crime of homicide with physical injuries thru reckless
imprudence. The driver of the passenger jeepney was acquitted. In this criminal action, Luna reserved
her right to file a separate civil action.

 She eventually filed an action for recovery of moral and exemplary damages against Luna and De Leon
Brokerage. To prove Luna’s negligence, she presented the judgment of conviction

 TC held the 2 solidarily liable. CA affirmed.

 At the appellate court, De Leon claimed that:

1. complaint is not clear whether she was suing for damages resulting from quasi-delict or for civil
liability arising from crime, since the averments are more characteristic of an action of the latter
nature
2. judgment of conviction inadmissible as evidence of a quasi-delict
3. Luna was not in the discharge of his duties at the time of the accident
4. it cannot be held solidarily liable with Luna

ISSUE: What is the nature of Steen’s cause of action: quasi-delict or delict

HELD: Quasi-delict

 Steen’s complaint is based on quasi-delict.

1. She alleged that she suffered injuries because of Luna’s carelessness and imprudence
2. She averred that there exists an employer-employee relationship between Luna and De Leon
 Since there is the averment in No. 2, there is a clear statement of a right of action under Article 2180 of
the CC. Complaint does not, and did not have to allege that De Leon did not exercise due diligence in
choosing and supervising Luna, because this is a matter of defense.

At any rate, whatever doubts as to the nature of Steen’s action are resolved by her prayer that the 2 be
held solidarily liable.

 Notwithstanding the presentation of the judgment of conviction, it is clear that Steen did not base her
suit on criminal conviction. The mention of criminal conviction merely tended to support her claim that
Luna had been recklessly negligent in driving the truck, which caused her injuries.

 Steen did not have to wait for the termination of the criminal proceeding or to reserve in the same her
right to file a separate civil action.

She waited for the results of the criminal action because she wanted to be sure which driver and
respective employer she could rightly sue, since both Luna and the driver of the jeep were prosecuted.

And she reserved because otherwise, the court in the criminal proceeding would have awarded her
indemnity, since the civil action for recovery of civil liability is deemed instituted with the criminal action.

 The reservation in the criminal action does not preclude a subsequent action based on a quasi-delict. It
cannot be inferred therefrom that Steen had chosen to file the very civil action she had reserved.

 At any rate, it is obvious that De Leon understood that it was being held liable under the CC because of
its affirmative defense that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family - a defense available
only to employer being sued under a quasi-delict.

 Was Luina in the performance of his duties at the time of the collision? He testified that on the day of
the accident he was instructed to go to the province. Reason for his return to Manila is not clear, but it
does not appear that he was on errand of his own.

In the absence of determinative proof that there was a cessation or suspension of his service, De Leon
must still be held liable since it failed to prove exercise of due diligence.

 Note: that owner of vehicle must also be in the vehicle at the time of the accident refers to owners of
vehicles not included in the terms of Art. 2180 as “owners of an establishment or enterprise.”

Judgment affirmed.

BAHIA v LITONJUA AND LEYNES

March 30, 1912

FACTS:

 Fausta Litonjua purchased an automobile and later turned it over to International garage, which is
owned and managed by his son Ramon Ramirez.

 As part of the daily operations of his business, Ramirez rented the automobile donated by his mother to
Mariano Leynes. Ramirez also supplied Leynes a chauffeur and a machinist for the purpose of
conveying to and from Balayan and Tuy.
 While in Balayan, the automobile refused to obey the direction of the driver in turning a corner due to a
defect in the steering gear. As a consequence, it rammed into the wall of a house against which the
daughter of plaintiff Bahia was leaning at the time. The automobile crushed the child to death.

 Bahia then filed an action against the Fausta (donor of auto), and Leynes,under who was directing and
controlling the operation of the automobile at the time of the accident. Ramirez was not made a party.

 TC found Leynes liable but dismissed complait against Fausta.

ISSUE: Who should be held responsible

HELD:

 SC opined that the action as to Fausta was properly dismissed. Although the mother purchased the
automobile, she turned it over to the garage of her son for use therein. The establishment belonged to
the son, Ramirez, and he had the full management and control of it and received all the profits
therefrom.

It appears that Fausta was not aware of the contract with Leynes. While she may have been in one
sense the owner of the machine, that fact does not, under the other facts of the case, make her
responsible for the results of the accident.

 The judgment against Leynes must be reversed and the complaint against him must be dismissed.

While is may be said that, at the time of the accident, the chauffeur who was driving the auto was a
servant of Leynes, in as much as the profits derived from the trips of the auto belonged to him and the
auto was operated under his direction, nevertheless, this fact is not conclusive in making him
responsible for the negligence of the chauffeur or for the defects in the auto itself.

 Under Article 1903 of the CC (now Article 2176), 2 things are apparent:

1. presumption of negligence on the part of the employer whenever there is an injury caused by the
negligence employee
2. presumption is juris tantum and may be rebutted.

 In the instant case, the death of the child caused by a defect in the steering gear immediately raised the
presumption that Leynes was negligence in selecting a defective automobile or in his failure to maintain
it in good condition after selection.

As to selection, SC found that defendant had exercised due diligence when he obtained the machine
from a reputable garage, which so far as appeared in good condition. The workmen were likewise
selected from a standard garage, were duly licensed, and apparently thoroughly competent.

The machine had been used but a few hours when the accident occurred and it is clear from the
evidence that the defendant had no notice, either actual or constructive of the defective condition of the
steering gear. Sufficient time had not elapsed to require an examination of the machine by the
defendant as a part of his duty of inspection and supervision.

While it does not appear that the defendant formulated rules and regulations for the guidance of the
drivers and gave them proper instructions designed for the protection of the public and the passengers,
the evidence shows that the death of the child was not caused by a failure to promulgate rules and
regulations. It was caused by a defect in the machine as to which the defendant has shown himself free
from responsibility.
METRO MANILA TRANSIT CORP v CA
June 21, 1993
FACTS:

 Nenita Custodio was a paying passenger of a public utility jeepney, then driven by Calebag and owned
by Lamayo, when it collided with a bus driven by Leonardo and owned by the Metro Manila Transit Corp
(MMTC).

 The collision happened after failure of both vehicles to slow down or blow their horns when they were
simultaneously approaching the same intersection in Taguig.

 As a result of the collision, Custodio suffered physical injuries. Assisted by her parents, since she was
still a minor, she filed a complaint for damages against the drivers of the automobiles and their
respective employers.

 At the trial court, MMTC presented its training officer and its transport supervisor who respectively
testified that:

1. it was not only careful and diligent in choosing and screening applicants for job openings,
2. but was also strict and diligent in supervising its employees,
a. by seeing to it that its employees were in proper uniforms,
b. briefed in traffic rules and regulations before the start of duty, and
c. that it checked its employees to determine WON they were positive for alcohol and
d. that they followed other rules and regulations of the Bureau of Land Transportation and of the
company.

 TC found both drivers concurrently negligent. As joint tortfeasors, both drivers, as well as Lamayo
(owner of the jeepney) were held solidarily liable for damages sustained by Custodio. MMTC was
absolved on the ground that it exercised diligence of a good father of a family in selecting and
supervising its employees.

 CA modified TC’s decision by holding MMTC solidarily liable with the other defendants on the ground
that the testimonies of the training officer and transport supervisor were not enough to overcome the
presumption of negligence; they were not able to present any evidence that its driver has complied with
all the clearances and trainings, and evidence as to the alleged written guidelines of the company.

ISSUE: Did MMTC exercise due diligence. Should it be held solidarily liable with the other defendants

HELD: No

 Conclusion of CA is more firmly grounded on jurisprudence and amply supported by evidence of record
than that of TC.

 It is procedurally required for each party in case to prove his own affirmative assertion by the degree of
evidence required by law. Such party must present all available evidence at his disposal in the manner
that may be necessary to buttress his claim.

 In the instant case, inasmuch as the witnesses’ (training supervisor and transport supervisor) dwelt on
mere generalities, they cannot be considered as sufficiently persuasive proof that MMTC observed due
diligence in the selection and supervision of employees.

 MMTC should have presented other evidence, object or documentary, to buttress an apparently biased
testimony. Declarations are not enough.

 Hence, MMTC fell short of the required evidentiary quantum as would convincingly and undoubtedly
prove its diligence.
 With the allegation and subsequent proof of negligence against the defendant driver and of an
employer-employee relationship between him and MMTC in this instance, the case is undoubtedly
based on a quasi-delict under Article 2180.
 As held in Gutierrez v Gutierrez, where the injury is due to the concurrent negligence of the drivers of
the colliding vehicles, the drivers and owners of the said vehicles shall be primarily, directly and
solidarily liable for damages and it is immaterial that one action is based on quasi-delict and the other
on culpa contractual, as the solidarity of the obligation is justified by the very nature thereof.

Judgment of CA affirmed. MMTC solidarily liable.

GUTIERREZ v CA
November 29, 1976

FACTS:

 Benigno Gutierrez was awarded by the Bureau of Public Works the contract to construct a drainage in
Manila. He engaged Domingo Balisala as project engineer.

 Under the supervision of Balisalisa, the workers of Gutierrez dug up a street by means of crane. The
earth and the mud dig up were scooped by the crane and dumped against the exterior side of the
adobe stone of A. Mabini Elementary School along the street.

 When the pile of earth and mud reached the height of the fence, the crane’s steel scooper was used to
press them down. Because of the heavy stress thus placed on the fence, a portion of it gave way and
collapsed.

 When the adobe wall collapsed, a school child who was then playing inside the school grounds, was hit
and pinned down by the falling debris of the wall. She was buried underneath and eventually died.

 The parents of the child filed a suit for actual, moral and exemplary damages against Gutierrez and
Balisalisa.

 TC ordered the 2 jointly and severally to pay the parents of the deceased moral and exemplary
damages, actual expenses, attorney’s fees and costs of suit. CA affirmed judgment.

ISSUE: Are defendants liable for moral and exemplary damages.

HELD: YES

 Employer-employee relationship existed between the them and the crane operators:

1. the contract between the government and Gutierrez stipulated that the contractor would furnish
himself his own labor plant.
2. the crane operator was actually operating and managing the heavy equipment in the construction
site of the defendants in connection with their construction job
3. defense of alleged non-existence of such relationship cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.

 SC quoted with approval the basis of TC’s award for moral and exemplary damages.

Negligence of defendants has been clearly established by evidence. Indeed, no evidence is necessary
to show that defendants were negligent in the performance of their obligation.
 They ought to have known that it was not the right thing to do-to pile up the big volume of earth against
the wall, which was fragile, being made only of adobe held together by mortar and w/out
reinforcements.

The collapse, therefore, could be reasonably expected by any person of ordinary prudence, if not
intelligence. They should have foreseen the danger but they failed to take the necessary precautions.

For this omission on their part, they should be held responsible for moral and exemplary damages.
More so with respect to Gutierrez so that other contractors similarly situated will be more careful.

Judgment affirmed.

WALTER SMITH & CO vs CADWALLADER

FACTS: On Aug. 30,1926, steamer Helen C, owned by Cadwallader, commanded by Capt. Miguel Lasa
struck the wharf of Walter Smith at the port of Olutanga, Zamboanga, in the course of its maneuvers. The
wharf was partially demolished and the timber piled on it were thrown into the water.
TC held that Cadwallader was not liable since the partial demolition was due to the excessive
weight of timber piled and bad conditions of piles supporting the wharf. The wharf was old. The steamship
slightly struck the wharf but not with such force since it was difficult for her to strike it with such force. TC
however did not make any definite findings on the negligence of the captain.
WS infers that there was negligence on the part of the captain of ship and that the impact of the
ship with the wharf was due to the excessive force with which the captain ordered the winches to work.

ISSUE: WON Cadwallader as owner of the steamship is liable for the damages caused by said steamship

HELD: No.

RATIO: This case deals with an obligation arising from culpa aquiliana or negligence and must be decided
in accordance with Art 1902-1903.
Two things are apparent from Art 1903:
1. When an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or employee, there instantly arises a
presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the
selection of the servant or employee or in supervision over him after selection or both.
2. This presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure and consequently may be rebutted.
In Art. 1903: "Owners or directors of any establishment or business are in the same way liable for
any damages caused by their employees while engaged in the branch of the service in which employed
or on the occasion of the performance of their duties.
"xxx"
"the liability imposed in this article shall cease in case the persons subject thereto prove that they
exercised all the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent the damage"
In this case, Cadwallader proved that the Capt. Lasa and all officers of Helen C were duly
licensed to hold their positions when the wharf collapsed, and they were chosen for their reputed skill in
directing and navigating the Helen C safely, carefully and efficiently.
Thus the presumption of liability against the defendant had been overcome by the exercise of
diligence and car of a good father of the family in selecting Capt. Lasa. Cadwallader is thus absolved from
all liability.

ONG vs METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT

FACTS: Metropolitan Water District owns and operates 3 swimming pools in Balara, QC.
In July 5, 1952, Dominador Ong, 14, went with his bros to the pool. Between 4:40-4:45, some
boys noticed him swimming underwater for a long time. The lifeguard Manuel Abaño was then informed
and he immediately jumped and retrieved the apparently lifeless body of Ong from the bottom. They
exerted efforts to revive him but the boy died.
ISSUE: WON the death of the Ong can be attributed to the negligence of defendant and/or its employees
so as to entitle plaintiff to recover damages.

HELD: NO

RATIO: The spouses Ong who were claiming for damages had the burden of proving that the damage is
caused by the fault or negligence of MWD or one of its employees and were not able to do so.
The operator of swimming pools will not be held liable for the drowning or death of a patron if said
operator had exercised due diligence in the selection of and supervision over, its employees and that it
had observed the diligence required by law under the circumstances - in that it had taken all necessary
precautions to avoid danger to the lives of its patrons or prevent accident which may cause their death.
In this case, there is sufficient evidence to show that MWD had taken all necessary precautions:
1. Swimming pools are equipped with ring buoy, toy roof, towing line, oxygen resuscitator and
first aid medicine kit.
2. Bottom of pool is painted w/ black colors to insure clear visibility.
3. Rules and regulations governing use of pools are on display at conspicuous places.
4. 6 trained and proficient lifeguards were employed and are on duty two at a time.
5. A male nurse and sanitary inspector were employed.
6. There is a clinic provided with oxygen resuscitator.
7. Security guards are always available.
The employees of MWD also did everything possible to bring the boy to life. Abaño gave him
manual artificial respirator, the nurse and sanitary inspector injected camphorated oil and applied oxygen
resuscitator, a doctor was sent for.
All of these show that MWD has done what is humanly possible under the circumstances to
restore life to Ong and for that reason it is unfair to hold it liable for his death.
Lastly, the Doctrine of last clear chance can never apply where the party charged is required to
act instantaneously and if the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand after the
peril is and should have been discovered.

ST. FRANCIS HIGH SCHOOL vs CA

FACTS: Ferdinand Castillo, I-C of St. Francis High School joined a picnic of 1-B and 1-C at Talaan Beach
Sariaya Quezon.
On female teacher was apparently drowning and some students came to her rescue. Ferdinand
died as a result.
The parents filed complaint against the school and the teachers contending that the death of their
son was due to the failure of petitioners to exercise proper diligence of a good father of the family.
TC found 6 teachers liable but dismissed the case against the school, principal and one teacher.
CA found school and principal liable with the teachers.

ISSUE: WON Art 2180 in relation to Art. 2176 is applicable to the case at bar

HELD: No.

RATIO: Before the employer may be held liable for the negligence of his employee under Art 2180, the act
or omission which caused the damage must have occurred while the employee was in the performance of
his assigned task.
In the case at bar, the teachers /petitioners were not in the performance of their actual task. The
incident happened not within school premises, not on a school day and while the teachers and students
were holding a purely private affair. Such picnic had no permit from the school head or the principal since
it was not a school sanctioned activity. It was also not an extra-curricular activity.
In addition, the negligence attributed to the teachers was not proven. The class adviser of 1-C did
her best and exercised diligence of a good father of a family to prevent any untoward incident or damage
to all students who joined the picnic as evidenced by:
 1. inviting 2 P.E. teachers and scout masters who have knowledge first aid application and
swimming.
2. life savers were especially brought by the teachers in case of emergency.
3. Both P.E. teachers did all what is humanely possible to save the child.

DISSENT: Padilla
The presumption in Art 2180 is not conclusive and should be overcome only by clear and
convincing evidence that the owner or manager exercised the care and diligence of a good father of the
family in the selection and supervision of the employees causing the injury or damage.
In this case, the principal knew of the picnic, was in fact invited, but did nothing about it. Principal
should have taken appropriate measures to ensure the safety of his students. His silence and negligence
in performing his role as principal head of the school must be construed as an implied consent of the
activity.
Padilla agrees with CA that no proof was presented to absolve the manager/principal.

BELIZAR vs BRAZAS

FACTS: Pedro Balizar, operator of Samar Express Transit, filed a complaint against Forencio Brazas, et
al. He claims that due to their gross negligence in not providing the ferryboat with safety devices, one of
his autotrucks while being transported, fell into the river and was submerged for 30 hrs. As a
consequence, he suffered actual and moral damages. The defendants were being sued in their capacity
as employees of Bureau of Public Highways.
Brazas filed motion to dismmiss claiming that the plaintiff has no cause of action against them
because they are being sued in their official capacities and therefor the claim for damages should be
directed against the State.
TC dismissed the complaint.

ISSUE: WON dismissal of case was correct

HELD: No.

Ratio: Although Art. 2180 CC provides for the liability of an employer for the tortious acts of his
employees, this does not exempt the employees from personal liability, especially if there are no persons
having direct supervision over them, or if there is proof of the existence of negligence on their part. So the
injured party can bring an action directly against the author of the negligent act or omission, although he
may sue as joint defendants such author and the person responsible for him.
The fact that the duties and positions of defendants were indicated does not mean that they are
being sued in their official capacities, especially as the present action is not one against the government.

CASTILEX INDUSTRIAL CORP vs VASQUEZ

FACTS: On Aug. 28, 1988, around 1:30-2 am, Romeo Vasquez was driving his motorcycle around the
Osmeña Rotunda in the normal flow and collided with the company pick-up driven by Benjamin Abad who
was going against the flow of the the traffic in the same Rotunda.
Vasquez died at the hospital on Sept. 5, 1988. Abad signed an acknowledgement of Responsible
party wherein he would pay all the expenses.
Vasquez parents commenced an action for damages against Abad and Castilex. TC held that
both must pay jointly and solidarily. CA affirmed but held that the liability of Castilex is only vicarious and
not solidary.

ISSUE: WON an employer may be held vicariously (subsidiarily) liable for the death resulting from the
negligent operation by a managerial employee of a company-issued vehicle

HELD: NO
RATIO: Art 2180 par 5 says that WON engaged in any business or industry, an employer is liable for the
torts committed by emplyees within the scope of his assigned tasks. But it is necessary to first establish
the employee-employer rel’nship. Then the plaintiff must show, to hold emplyer liable, that the employee
was acting within the scope of his assigned task when the tort complained of was committed. It is only
then that the employer can interpose the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of its
employee.
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that Abad was production manager of Castilex. At the night of
the incident, he did some overtime work at petitioner’s office. Thereafter he went to a restaurant at a place
known as a “haven for prostitutes, pimps,and drug pushers and addicts”
The Court finds that Abad was engaged in affairs of his own (had a woman in the car with him not
young enough to call him Daddy!!) or was carrying out a personal purpose not in line with his duties at the
time he figured in a vehicular accident. It was 2 am and way beyond normal working hours. His overtime
had ended.
Since there is a paucity (scarcity, insufficiency) of evidence that Abad was acting within the scope
of the functions entrusted to him, Castilex had no duty to show that it exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family in providing Abad with a service vehicle.
Thus, justice and equity require that Castilex be relieved of vicarious liability for the
consequences of the negligence of Abad in driving its vehicle.

State

MERRIT vs GOV’T OF PHIL. ISLAND

FACTS: Merrit, riding on a motorcycle at a speed of 10-12 mi/hr, collided with an ambulance of the
General Hospital which turned suddenly and unexpectedly without having sounded any whistle or horn
Merrit was severely injured. His condition had undergone depreciation and his efficiency as a
contractor was affected.
TC held that Gov’t is liable for damages sustained by plaintiff even if the collision was due to the
negligence of chauffeur.

ISSUE: WON Gov’t may be held liable in this case

HELD: NO

RATIO: Art 1903, par 5 of Old CC states that:

“The State is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent but not when the damage
should have been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained to do the act performed, in which
case the provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable”

Thus, the responsibility of the State is limited by Art 1903 to the case wherein it acts through a
special agent who, in representing the state and being bound to act as an agent thereof, executes the
trust confided to him.
Special agent is one who receives a definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to the
exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special official.
Art. 1903 does not apply to executive agent who is an employee of the active administration and
who on his own responsibility performs the functions which are inherent and naturally pertain to his office
which are regulated by law and regulations.
The chauffeur of the ambulance of the General Hospital was not a special agent thus the Gov’t is
not liable.

ROSETE V AUDITOR GENERAL

FACTS: Inside the building used by Emergency Control Administration as a bodega in which oil and
gasoline were stored, Jose Frayno ignited his cigarette-lighter near a 5-gallon drum into which gasoline
was being drained. A fire erupted burning the bodega as well as neighboring houses including the house
and personal property of Rosete.
 The storing of gasoline and other combustible materials requires the securing of license and
permit and ECA was not granted such permit.
ISSUE: WON Gov’t is liable for the damages caused by the fire

HELD: NO

RATIO: Art 1903 par 5 applies in this case

“The State is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent but not when the damage should
have been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained to do the act” performed, in which case the
provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable”

There was no showing that whatever negligence may be imputed to ECA was done by a special
agent. The officers of ECA did not act as special agents of government within the meaning in Art 1903
when they stored gasoline in the warehouse of ECA. Thus the Gov’t is not liable.

DISSENT: Perfecto, J

ECA is a special agent of the Gov’t since it was organized by the gov’t for the same substantial
purpose as Phil Relief and Rehabilitation purposes.
All persons and entities acting by commission of the gov’t such as governmental enterprises and
other organs of the gov’t created for activities ordinarily of ungovernmental nature, are special agents.
Thus, the government is liable for the damages caused by ECA.

PALAFOX vs PROVINCE OF ILOCOS NORTE

FACTS: Sabas Torralba was employed as driver of Provincial Gov’t of Ilocos Norte detailed to the Office
of District Enginner.
While driving his truck in compliance with his duties, he ran over Proceto Palafox killing him.
Palafox was convicted of homicide through reckless imprudence. Heirs bagan proceedings for damages
against provincial gov’t.

ISSUE: WON Prov’l Gov’t is liable

HELD: NO

RATIO: To attach liability to the state, a declaration must be made that Torralba was a special agent within
the scope of Art 1903 par 5. But this principle applies only to the Insular Gov’t as distinguished from prov’l
or municipal gov’ts.
The heirs of Palafox invoked the doctrine of respondeat superior, that the master shall answer,
as illustrated in Mendoza case concerning liability of municipal corporations for negligent acts of its
employees.
Mendoza held that if the negligent employee was engaged in the performance of governmental
duties as distinguished from proprietary or business functions, the government is not liable.
The construction or maintenance of roads in which the driver worked at the time of the accident is
admittedly governmental activities.
Hence, Gov’t is not liable.

REPUBLIC vs PALACIO

FACTS: Ortiz instituted action against Handong Irrigation Association to recover possession of land which
HIA allegedly entered and occupied at the inducement of Irrigation Service Unit, an agency under the
Dept. of Public Works and Communications.
 A writ of execution and order of garnishment was served against the deposits and trust funds of
ISU to pay for the damages to Ortiz .CA upheld on the basis that ISU is engaged in the private business
of purchase and sale of irrigation pumps.

ISSUE: WON State or its fund can be made liable for damages

HELD : NO

RATIO: The ISU liability in inducing HIA to invade and occupy land of Ortiz arose from torts and not from
contract.
It is a well-entrenched rule in this jurisdiction that embodied in Art 2180 of CC that the State is
only liable for torts caused by its special agents especially commissioned to carry out the acts complained
of outside of such agent’s regular duties.
There being no proof that the making of the tortuous inducement was authorized, neither the
state nor its funds can be made liable.

Other issues:
Even if the liability of the state had been judicially ascertained, the state is at liberty to determine for itself
whether to pay the judgment or not. Thus execution cannot issue on a judgment against the state.

Fontanilla v Maliaman (194 SCRA 486)

Facts:
 NIA driver Garcia bumped a bicycle ridden by petitioners’ son and Deligo. The son dies because of
injuries sustained from the accident. The SC held that NIA was negligent in the supervision of Garcia
and was therefore liable under Art 2180(6) CC in relation to Art 2176 CC. Hence, this motion for
reconsideration.
 SolGen, relying on PD 552 and Angat River Irrigation System, et al v Angat River workers’ Union,
argues that NIA does not perform solely proprietary functions but is an agency of government tasked
with governmental functions, and is therefore not liable for the tortious act of Garcia, who was not its
special agent.

Issue: Whether NIA may be held liable for damages caused by the negligent acts of its employees

Held: YES
 NIA was created for the purpose of “constructing, improving, rehabilitating, and administering all
national irrigation systems in the Philippines, including all communal and pump irrigation projects.” The
state and the community as a whole are largely benefited by the services the agency renders, but these
functions are only incidental to the principal aim of the agency, which is the irrigation of lands.
 NIA is a government agency vested with a corporate personality separate and distinct from the
government (Sec 1, RA 3601), thus is governed by the Corporation Law.
 Under Sec 2, PD 552, NIA is allowed to collect fees and other charges as may be necessary to
cover the cost of operation, maintenance, and insurance and to recover the cost of construction, etc.
NIA may also sue and be sued in court. It is authorized to exercise the powers of a corporation
under the Corporation Law, insofar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of the NIA charter.

RECON DENIED WITH FINALITY

Mercado v CA (108 Phil 414)

Facts:
Manuel, Jr. and Augusto quarreled over a pitogo. As a result, Augusto wounded Manuel, Jr. on the
right cheek with a piece of razor. Augusto was the aggressor.
The incident occurred in Lourdes Catholic School, where both were classmates.
CA holds Ciriaco, Augusto’s father and herein petitioner, liable for moral damages and expenses for
the injury inflicted by his son. Hence, this petition.
 Petitioner argues that the teacher or head of the school should be held liable because the incident
took place in a Catholic School, without the father’s fault.

Issue: Whether teachers or head of the school can be held liable under Art 2180

Held: NO
Art 2180, last par: Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for
damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.
The provision only applies to an institution of arts and trades, and not to any academic educational
institution (Exconde v Capuno).
“So long as they remain in their custody,” seems to contemplate a situation where a pupil lives and
boards with the teacher, such that the control, direction, and influence of the latter supersedes that
of the parents. The liability for tortuous acts of the student passes from the parent to the teacher.
Such a situation does not exist in the case at bar since the students go home to their parents after
class.

Decision reversed - petitioner not liable for moral damages

Palisoc v Brillantes (41 SCRA 548)

Facts:
Palisoc and Daffon were classmates at the Manila Technical Institute (MTI), a non-academic
institution. While Daffon was working on a machine at the school’s laboratory, he remarked that Palisoc
was acting like a foreman. Palisoc slightly slapped Daffon in the face. The latter retaliated with a
barrage of blows causing Palisoc to retreat. While retreating, Palisoc stumbled on an engine block and
fell unconscious. He died thereafter. The cause of death was internal injuries “probably caused by
strong fist blows.”
Daffon was of legal age at the time of the incident, hence the parents were not liable under Art
2180.
The trial court found Daffon guilty for quasi-delict (Why not a felony?), but absolved the defendants-
officials of MTI, citing the ruling in Mercado v CA.

Issue: Whether defendants-school officials are jointly and severally liable as tortfeasors

Held: YES
Valenton (head) and Quibule (teacher) are liable for damages under Art 2180 CC. Brillantes is not
liable as being a member of the school’s board of directors.
School heads and teachers, to a certain extent, stand in loco parentis to students who remain in
their custody. Custody, as used in Art 2180, means the protective and supervisory custody that the
school and its heads and teachers exercise over their students for as long as they are in attendance
in the school, including recess time.
The basis of the presumption of negligence in Art 2180 is some culpa in vigilando that the parents,
teachers, etc. are supposed to have incurred in the exercise of their authority. Where the parent places
the child under the custody of the teacher, the latter, and not the parent, should be the one responsible
for the tortuous act of the child.

Judgment modified - Daffon, Valenton, and Quibule are jointly and severally liable

Dissent (Makalintal)
The size of enrollment of educational institutions makes it highly unrealistic to consider students as
“in the custody” of teachers or school heads merely from the fact of enrollment and class attendance,
unless the latter can prove due diligence. The restrictive interpretation of Art 2180 in Mercado should be
maintained.
 Under Art 2180, parents are responsible for the tortious acts of their minor children who live in their
company. Since the basis of liability of teachers and school heads is in loco parentis, the said provision
should be applied by analogy, i.e. “so long as they remain in their custody” should be equated with “who
live in their company; and school heads and teachers should not be responsible for damages caused by
children who are no longer minors.

Amadora v CA (160 scra 315)

Facts:
Pabling Daffon shot classmate Alfredo Amadora in the auditorium of Colegio de San Jose. He was
convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence. Alfredo’s parents filed a civil action to recover
damages against CSJ, its rector, the high school principal, the dean of boys, and the physics teacher,
together with Pabling and two other students.
The CFI found the school officials liable for damages. The CA, however, reversed the CFI decision
because: 1) Art 2180 was not applicable since CSJ was not a school of arts and trades; 2) the students
were not in the custody of the school at the time of the incident since the semester had already ended;
3) there was no clear identification of the gun; and 4) the defendants had exercised the necessary
diligence in preventing the injury.
In this petition for certiorari, petitioners contend that Alfredo went to school to finish his physics
experiment as a prerequisite for graduation; hence, he was under the custody of the private
respondents. The private respondents, on the other hand, contend that Alfredo went to school to submit
his physics experiment; hence, he was no longer under their custody since the semester had already
ended.

Issue:
1) Whether Art 2180 applies to establishments which are technically not schools of arts and trades
2) Whether private respondents are liable for damages under Art 2180

Held:

1) YES
Art 2180 applies to all schools, academic as well as non-academic. Teachers, in general, shall
be liable for the acts of their students except where the school is technical in nature, in which case it is
the head thereof who shall be answerable. Following the cannon of reddendo singula singulis,
“teachers” should apply to the words “pupils and students” and “heads of establishments of arts and
trades” to the word “apprentices.”

2) NO
The same vigilance is expected from the teacher over his students, regardless of the nature of the
school where he is teaching. The injury subject of liability is caused by the student and not by the
school or any of its personnel and equipment. It may be inflicted by any student regardless of the
school where he is registered.
The student is under the custody of school authorities as long as he is under the control and
influence of the school and within its premises, whether the semester has already begun or has
already ended. As long as it can be shown that the student is in the school in the pursuit of a
legitimate student objective, in the exercise of a legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of
a legitimate student privilege, the responsibility of the school continues.
The teacher-in-charge is liable for his students’ torts as he is designated to exercise supervision
over them. Moreover, the teacher is liable regardless of the student’s age.
In this case, none of the private respondents were held liable. The rector, dean of boys, and high
school principal cannot be held liable because they were not teachers-in-charge. The physics teacher
was not negligent. The school cannot be held directly liable since Art 2180 only speaks of teacher or
head of the school of arts and trades.

PETITION DENIED - sorry na lang

PARTIAL DISSENT (Melencio-Herrera)
Restrictive meaning given to “teacher” as “teacher-in-charge” contravenes the concept of substitute
parental authority.
School may be held liable as an employer for damages caused by their employees under Art 2180.

Salvosa v IAC (166 SCRA 274)

Facts:
Jimmy Abon was the duly appointed armorer of the
Baguio Colleges Foundation ROTC. He received his appointment from the AFP, who also pays his salary
and gives him orders. He was also a commerce student of the same school.
On that fateful night of 3 March 1977, Abon shot fellow student Napoleon Castro in BCF’s parking
space. Castro died and Abon was convicted of homicide.
Castro’s heirs sue Abon, BCF, and its officers for damages. The trial court held Abon, BCF, and Ben
Salvosa (BCF Pres) liable for damages. The IAC affirmed the decision with modification. Hence, this
petition.
IAC ruled that the shooting incident occurred at about dismissal time, and was therefore within the
“recess time” referred to in Palisoc v Brillantes.

Issue: Whether petitioner can be held solidarily liable with Abon for damages under Art 2180

Held: NO
Custody refers to protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers
exercise over its students as long as they are in attendance in the school, including recess time.
Recess, as embraced in the phrase at attendance in the school, is a temporary adjournment of
school activities where the student remains within call of his mentor and is not permitted to leave the
school premises, or the area within which the school activity is conducted. By its nature, it does not
include dismissal.
The mere fact of being enrolled or being in the premises of the school without more does not
constitute attending school or being in the protective and supervisory custody of the school, as
contemplated in the law.
Abon cannot be considered to have been at attendance in the school , or in the custody of BCF,
when he shot Castro. Therefore, the petitioners cannot be held solidarily liable with Abon for damages
under Art 2180.

REVERSED - petitioners are not solidarily liable

Ylarde v Aquino (163 scra 697)

Facts:
Petitioners in this case are the parents of Novelito Ylarde, who died as a result of injuries suffered
after being crushed by a huge boulder.
Novelito was among 18 students, aged ten to eleven, requested by their teacher, herein private
respondent, Edgardo Aquino to help dig a hole beside a one-ton concrete block where the said block
may be buried. When the hole was deep enough to accommodate the block, Aquino went to see Banez
who was about 30m away. He left the boys to level the soil around the hole, and allegedly told them not
to touch the stone.
A few minutes after he left, the boys jumped into the pit. One of them jumped on top of the concrete
block causing it to slide towards the pit’s opening. The concrete block pinned Ylarde before he could get
out.
Petitioners’ suit was dismissed by the lower court for the ff reasons: 1) digging was in line with
WorkEd; 2) Aquino exercised utmost diligence; and 3) Ylarde’s death was due to his own reckless
imprudence. The CA affirmed the lower court’s decision. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether respondents are liable for damages: Aquino for negligence under Art 2176, and Soriano
(the school principal) as head of school under Art 2180
Held: Aquino - YES, Soriano - NO
Soriano is not liable since he is the head of an academic institution. Only heads of schools of arts
and trades are liable for torts committed by their students (Amadora v CA).
Aquino’s negligent act of leaving his students in such a dangerous site is the proximate cause of
Ylarde’s death. He left the children to level the soil around the excavation when it was so apparent that
the huge stone was on the brink of falling. He went to an area where he would not be able to check on
the children’s safety, and left the children close to the excavation, an obviously attractive nuisance.
Natural for the children to play around
The boulder falling into the pit was a natural consequence of its weight and the loose soil
A teacher in loco parentis should make sure that the children are protected from all harm while in
his company. In this case, petitioner was clearly negligent in his duty.

PETITION GRANTED - Aquino pays damages

PSBA v CA (205 SCRA 729)

Facts:
Carlitos Bautista, a student of PSBA, was stabbed in the school’s premises by outsiders. He dies,
prompting his parents to file an action for damages against PSBA.
PSBA files a motion to dismiss arguing that it is beyond the ambit of Art 2180 since it is an academic
institution. The lower court denied their motion to dismiss. Their motion for recon was also denied. The
CA affirmed the lower court’s decision by citing the Palisoc ruling that Art 2180 is applicable to all kinds
of educational institutions. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether PSBA can be held liable for damages

Held: YES
Art 2180 does not apply since the persons who caused the injury were not students of PSBA, for
whose acts the school could be made liable.
There is a contractual relation that exists between academic institutions and students enrolled
therein. The academic institution undertakes to provide the student with education. There is also an
implicit obligation of providing students with an atmosphere conducive to learning, i.e. provide the
proper security measures. Because of this contractual obligation, the rules on quasi-delict do not really
govern.
A contractual relation is a condition sine qua on to the school’s liability for negligence, unless the
negligence occurs in bad faith.

Petition denied

Soliman, Jr v Tuason (209 scra 47)

Facts:
Maximo Soliman, Jr., a student of Republic Central Colleges, was shot in the premises of RCC by
security guard Jimmy Solomon. He filed a civil complaint for damages against RCC, RL security
Agency, and Solomon.
RCC filed a motion to dismiss arguing that it cannot be held liable because: 1) it is not the employer
of Solomon; and 2) Art 2180 does not apply because Solomon is not a student of RCC.
The RTC granted the motion to dismiss, and denied petitioner’s motion for recon. Hence, this
petition.

Issue: Whether RCC can be held liable for damages

Held: YES
Art 2180 does not apply because Solomon is not an employee or student of RCC. As a general
rule, a client or customer of a security agency has no hand in selecting the guards that will be assigned
to it. The duty to observe due diligence in selecting the guards cannot, in the ordinary course of events,
 be demanded from the client. Instructions given by the client to the guard are no more than requests
commonly envisaged in the contract of services with the agency.
Respondent judge was in serious error when he dismissed the action on the grounds that Soliman’s
only cause of action was Art 2180. Judge should have allowed petitioner to prove acts that constitute a
breach of obligation ex contractu or ex lege on the part of RCC.

Petition granted - case remanded to RTC for further proceedings

2. effect of acquittal
Art. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been
proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be
instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the
court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint should be found
to be malicious.

Jarantilla vs CA
PETITION to review decision of CA
Facts:
 Jose Kuan Sing sideswiped by a Volkswagen Beetle driven by Jarantilla, resulting to physical
injuries
 Jarantilla accordingly sharged with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence
 Kuan Sing did not reserve right to institute a separate civil action and he intervened in the
prosecution of said crim case through a private prosecutor.
 Petitioner Jarantilla acquitted on “reasonable doubt”
 Subsequently, Sing filed Civil Case for damages involving the same subject matter and act in
previous crim case.
Issue: WON Kuan Sing can file a separate action for Civil Liability arising from the same act or omission
wherein Jarantilla was acquitted in the criminal action on reasonable doubt and no civil liability was
adjudicated or awarded in the judgment of acquittal.

Held: Yes
 If the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been
proven beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for the same act or omission may be instituted. --
It is allowed under Article 29 of the Civil Code.
 Another relevant doctrine given by jurisprudence: If the court fails to make any pronouncement,
favorable or unfavorable, as to the civil liability of the accused, then this amounts to a reservation
of the right to have the civil liability litigated and determined in a separate action. The rules
nowhere provide that if a court fails to determine the civil liability it becomes no longer
enforceable.
 There is also persuasive logic in the view that the acquittal of the accused foreclosed the civil
liability based on Article 100 RPC. If there is an acquittal, then the causative act or omission
becomes divested of its penal element and becomes in effect a quasi-delict.
 .the allegations of the complaint by Kuan Sing supports and is constitutive of a case for
quasi-delict.
Writ prayed for Denied.

People vs. Ritter

3. prejudicial questions
Art. 36. Pre-judicial questions which must be decided before any criminal prosecution may be instituted or
may proceed, shall be governed by rules of court which the Supreme Court shall promulgate and which
shall not be in conflict with the provisions of this Code.

Zapanta vs Montesa
ORIGINAL ACTION in the SC. Prohibition
Facts:
 May 1958: Olimpia Yco filed in CFI of Bulacan crim case of Bigamy against Zapanta, as he
contracted marriage with her when he was still validly married to a certain Estrella Guarin.
 June 1958: Zapanta filed in CFI of Pampanga a civil case against Yco, for the annulment of their
marriage on the ground of duress, force and intimidation. Yco filed motion to dismiss but denied.
 Sept 1958: Zapanta filed motion in crim case of Bigamy to suspend proceedings therein on the
ground that the determination of the issue involved in civil case was a prejudicial question.
Mtion denied, and Mtion for Recon denied.
 After pleading not guilty in crim case, filed this action in SC.
Issue: WON crim case should be suspended / WON there was a prejudicial question.

Held: Yes
 If there arises an issue/question in a case, the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of
the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal, then
there is a prejudicial question.
 There is a prejudicial question in the case at bar. As seen in the rule, a prejudicial question
has two elements: (1)question must be determinative of the case before the court and (2)
jurisdiction to try the same must be lodged in another court. Here, determination of force will
prove that his act of contracting a second marriage while there was a subsisting one was
involuntary. On the second element, the annulment case was filed in Pampanga.
Writ prayed for granted.

Merced vs Diez
ORIGINAL Action in the Supreme Court.
Certiorari with prohibition.
Facts:
 Jan 1958: Abundio Merced filed a complaint for annulment of his second marriage with Elizabeth
Ceasar, alleging that:
- her relatives forced, threatened, and intimidated him into signing an affidavit to the effect
that he and Liz had been living together as husband and wife for over 5 yrs.; that this
affidavit was used in securing their marriage of exceptional character, w/o need for a
marriage license; that he was forced into marrying Liz before Municipal Judge (lucky guy
)
- immediately left Liz after marriage and never lived with her
- he was asked to return to Cebu but refused, scared he might be forced to live with Liz
 Feb 1958: Elizabeth Ceasar filed crim complaint for bigamy against Merced, as he was previously
married to a Eufrocina Tan.
 Merced filed motion hold trial of crim case
 Motion Denied.
Issue: WON action to annul marriage is a prejudicial question in a prosecution to Bigamy.
Held: Yes.
 If there arises an issue/question in a case, the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the
issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal, then there is a
prejudicial question.
 Without the element of consent, a marriage would be illegal and void. But the question of
invalidity can not be decided in the criminal action for Bigamy but in a civil action for annulment.
 Since (1) the validity of the marriage cannot be determined in the criminal case and (2) since
prosecution for bigamy does not lie unless the elements of a valid second marriage appears, it is
necessary then that a decision in a civil action to the effect that the second marriage contains all
the essentials of a valid marriage must first be secured.
 SC adds that the principle of prejudicial question is to be applied even if there is only one court
before which the civil action and the criminal action are to be litigated.
Petition granted.
Ppl vs Aragon
APPEAL from the order of the CFI of Cebu
Facts:
 Aragon charged in the CFI of Cebu with the crime of Bigamy for having contracted marriage w/
Efigenia Palomer when his marriage with Martina Godinez was still subsisting.
 While case pending, Palomer filed in same CFI of Cebu a civil case to annul her marriage with
Aragon since the latter forced her to marry him through force, threats, and intimidation of bodily
harm.
 Aragon: filed motion in crim case to dismiss said case on the ground that the civil action for
annulment of the second marriage is a prejudicial question.
 Trial court denied.
Issue: WON such constitutes a prejudicial question.
Held: No.
 Aragon can not use his own malfeasance to defeat the action based on his criminal act.
 The civil action does not decide that defendant-appellant Aragon did not enter the marriage
against his will and consent, because the complaint does not allege that he was the victim of
force and intimidation; it does not determine the existence of any of the elements of the charge of
Bigamy.
 A decision thereon is not essential to the determination of the criminal charge. Thus, it is not a
prejudicial question.
 Also, dapat nag-motion for recon muna si Aragon 
Order appealed from affirmed.

Rule 111 (see ROC)

HUMAN RELATIONS
A. Basic principles; abuse of right
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall
indemnify the latter for the same.

Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

Pe vs Pe
 Plaintiffs brought this action before the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover moral,
compensatory, exemplary and corrective damages in the amount of P94,000.00, exclusive of
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.
 Plaintiffs are the parents, brothers and sisters of one Lolita Pe, 24 years old and unmarried
 Defendant Alfonso Pe is a married man and works as agent of La Perla Cigar and Cigarette
Factory. He stayed in the town of Gasan, Marinduque, in connection with occupation. Lolita was
staying with her parents in the same town. Defendant was an adopted son of a Chinaman named
Pe Beco, a collateral relative of Lolita's father.
 Because of such fact and the similarity in their family name, defendant became close to the
plaintiffs who regarded him as a member of their family. Sometime in 1952, defendant frequented
the house of Lolita --to teach him how to pray the rosary (yan ang style)
 The two eventually fell in love with each other. Started their clandestine love affair.
 Rumors reached Lolita’s parents, forbidden to see each other. Even filed deportation proceedings
against defendant. The affair continued nonetheless.
  Sometime in April, 1957, Lolita was staying with her brothers and sisters at their residence at 54-
B España Extension, Quezon City. On April 14, 1957, Lolita disappeared from said house. Found
: note on a crumpled piece of paper inside Lolita's aparador -- a letter of defendant to Lolita
 The disappearance of Lolita was reported to the police authorities and the NBI but up to the
present there is no news or trace of her whereabouts.
 Defense: granting that the facts alleged were true, they do not constitute a valid cause of action.
 trial court: Complaint not actionable-- failed to prove that defendant deliberately and in bad faith
tried to win Lolita's affection. "In the absence of proof on this point, the court may not presume
that it was the defendant who deliberately induced such relationship”

Issue: WON damages should be granted.

Held: Yes
 The circumstances under which defendant tried to win Lolita's affection cannot lead to any other
conclusion than that it was he who, thru an ingenious scheme or trickery, seduced the latter to the
extent of making her fall in love with him. This is shown by the fact that defendant frequented the
house of Lolita on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary. He was
forbidden to see Lolita, but nevertheless proceded with the love affair.
 Indeed, no other conclusion can be drawn from this chain of events than that defendant not only
deliberately, but through a clever strategy, succeeded in winning the affection and love of Lolita to
the extent of having illicit relations with her. The wrong he has caused her and her family is
indeed immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married man. Verily, he has committed an
injury to Lolita's family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as
contemplated in Article 21 of the new Civil Code.

Damages awarded:
P5,000.00 as damages and P2,500.00 as attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.

Hermosisima vs CA
PETITION for review by certiorari
Facts:
 Soledad Cabigas an Francisco Hermosisima were sweeathearts before.
 Kiko impregnated Soledad in a boat cabin (M/V Escaño, to which Kiko was apprentice pilot)..
promised to marry her, but then married Romanita Perez.
 Soledad Cabigas filed with CFI of Cebu a complaint for (1) the acknowledgement of her child,
Chris Hermosisima as natural child of Francisco Hermosisima, as well as (2) for support of said
child and (3) damages for breach of promise.
 Francisco admitted paternity and willingness to support, BUT denied ever promising Soledad
marriage.
 CFI ordered payment of P 4,500 for actual and compensatory damages, P5,000 as moral
damages, and P500 as attorney’s fees, aside from support to child (P30 / month).
 CA affirmed, even increasing the actual and moral damages. There was seduction and therefore
liable for moral damages.
Issue: WON moral damages are recoverable for breach of promise to marry.
Held: No
 Syquia case: Action for breach of promise to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from
the right to recover money or property advanced upon the faith of such promise.
SC does not find Kiko morally guilty of seduction because the CFI itself found that complainant
“surrendered herself” to petitioner because, “overwhelmed by her love for him” she “wanted to bind” him
“by having a fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy”.

Wassmer vs Valdez
Facts:
Franciso Velez and Beatriz Wassmer decided to get married on September 4, 1954.
 Two days before the wedding, Francisco left a note for his bride-to-be:
Will have to postpone wedding-My mother opposes it. Am leaving on the Convair today.
The next day, he sent her the ff. telegram:
NOTHING CHANGED REST ASSURED RETURNING VERY SOON APOLOGIZE MAMA PAPA
LOVE PAKING

Beatriz sued for damages but Velez claimed that:

 his failure to marry plaintiff was due to fortuitous event and circumstances beyond his control
 that breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong.

Issue: WON there could be an action for damages

Held: Yes, but based on Article 21
Ratio:
1. Article 21 provides: Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
2. Damages:
 invitations were printed and distributed
 dresses bought
 matrimonial bed!
 Bridal showers and gifts received

3. moral damages are recoverable

 Article 2219 (10): moral damages are recoverable in the cases mentioned in Article 21

4. exemplary damages based on 2232: defendant acted in wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive,
or malevolent manner

Gashem Shookat Baksh vs CA

Facts:
Marilou Gonzales alleged that petitioner courted her sometime in August 1987 and promised to
marry her after the end of the school semester of the same year. Petitioner visited her parents to secure
their approval to the marriage.
Subsequently, petitioner forced her to live with him. Later, petitioner began maltreating her and
during a confrontation before the barangay captain of Guilig, petitioner repudiated their marriage
agreement and told her that he was married to someone in Bacolod City.
Petitioner denied all allegation and even alleged that Gonzales had deceived him by stealing his
money and passport.

Issue: WON an action for damages exists

Held: Yes, based on Article 21
Ratio:
1. Article 21, together with Articles 19 and 20, has broadened the scope of the law on civil wrongs
2. the basis for the award was the fraud and deceit behind the promise to marry and the willful injury
to her honor and reputation
 she had sex with him not because of lust but because of moral seduction
 “man’s promise to marry is the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love
 his representation to fulfill that promise Is the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in
a sexual congress”
3. cannot be held liable for criminal seduction because girl was above 18

Velayo, etc vs Shell

see Mel’s digest. Salamat mel!!
Facts:
• The Commercial Air Lines, Inc (CALI) is a Philippine corporation engaged in the air transportation
business. The Shell Company of the Philippine Islands (defendant) is a corporation organized in
England and licensed to do business here. CALI's fuel needs are supplied by the defendant.

• 08/06/48 - CALI organized a luncheon meeting to inform all its creditors that the company was in a
state of insolvency and had to stop operation. Fitzgerald represented the defendant in such meeting.
CALI's total indebtedness to the defendant at that time was P152,641.68.

• CALI's Board of Directors explained that there was a proposed sale of CALI's assets in favor of
Philippine Air Lines. CALI's balance sheet was also presented to the creditors. The balance sheet
included a C-54 plane in the United States.

• In the same meeting, the creditors agreed on the ff:

1) That a working committee (composed of three parties) shall be created which would supervise
the preservation of CALI's assets while the creditors attempted to agree on a fair distribution of
such assets;
2) That all of the creditors present should avoid presenting its claim before an insolvency court. In
case the creditors do not come to an agreement, only then can insolvency proceedings be filed.

• Fitzgerald was appointed to represent the creditors in the working committee.

• 08/09/48 - The working committee met for the first time to study the way of making a fair division of
the assets. On the very same day, the defendant company assigned its credit against CALI in favor
of Shell Oil Company, an American Corporation, for $79,440. The next day, the credit was increased
to $85081.29.

• 08/12/48 - Shell Oil Company filed a complaint against CALI before the Superior Court of California
for the collection of the assigned credit. A writ of attachment was applied for and issued against the
C-54 plane. (As a result of this writ, the proceeds of the eventual sale of the plane would pertain
exclusively to Shell Oil, instead of all the creditors)

• Meanwhile, the stockholders of CALI decided to effect the sale of CALI's properties to PAL.

• Shortly thereafter, the Nat'l Airports Corporation (NAC, another creditor of CALI) learned of the action
in the US, so it filed its own complaint with attachment before the CFI of Manila.

• 10/07/48 - Upon learning of the action in the US, CALI filed a petition for voluntary insolvency. The
order of insolvency was issued by the court, so the complaint of NAC was directed to the insolvency
court.

• Velayo was appointed assignee of CALI in the insolvency proceedings. He immediately sought a writ
of injunction to restrain defendant from prosecuting the complaint filed in California.

• The court denied the petition for issuance of a writ of injunction because a Phil. court would not be in
a position to enforce its orders against Shell Oil Company, which is an American corp. outside of the
jurisdiction of the Phils.

• Having failed to restrain the progress of the attachment suit in California, Velayo now confines his
action to the recovery of damages against the defendant. The lower court dismissed the complaint
for damages. Hence, this appeal.

Issue: WON there was a betrayal of trust and confidence on the part of defendant company which can
be made the basis for damages.
Held: YES

Ratio:
• It is obvious that defendant effected the transfer of its credit upon learning of the precarious economic
situation of CALI. The transfer made without the knowledge of the other creditors was a shrewd and
surprise move that enabled defendant to collect almost all if not the entire amount of its credit.

(In other words, Fitzgerald and defendant company met with the other creditors for the purpose of
reaching an agreement for the fair dist'n of assets BUT at the same time, it had already divested itself
of its credit)

• The defendant took advantage of its knowledge that an insolvency proceeding was to be instituted if
the creditors did not agree as to the manner of dist'n.

• This is a clear violation of Sec. 37 of the insolvency Law, which states that:
"If any person, before the assignment is made, having notice of the commencement of proceedings in
insolvency, or having reason to believe that insolvency proceedings are about to be commenced,
embezzles or disposes of any money, goods, chattels or effects of the insolvent, he is chargeable
therewith, and liable to an action by the assignee for double the value of the property sought to be
embezzled or disposed of..."

• In addition, Art. 21 of the Civil Code provides that:

"Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage."

This provision was intended to cover the untold numbers of moral wrongs which is impossible for
human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes.

• Note: Even if the new civil code only took effect in 1950 and the acts complained of took place in
1948, the provisions of the new civil code would still apply pursuant to Art. 2253 which states that:
"But if a right should be declared for the first time in this Code, it shall be effective at once, even
though the act or event which may give rise thereto may have been done or may have occurred
under the prior legislation, provided said new right does not prejudice or impair any vested or
acquired right of the same origin."

• Hence, the court holds defendant liable to pay Velayo (as assignee of the insolvent CALI) a sum
double the amount of the value of the plane at the time the credit was transferred. (a sum equal to
the value of the plane as compensatory damages, and the same amount as exemplary damages).
Since there is no clear proof on record about the real value of the plane, the value shall be
determined in the lower court.

Note: The Court did not strictly apply Sec. 37 of Insolvency Law since what the defendant disposed of
was actually his own credit and not any property of the insolvent company. However, the effect as to
the amount of damages awarded is the same.

• NOTE: In the motion for recon filed by defendant, it was argued that the other creditors were not
prejudiced at all by the transfer of the credit. However, the SC belied this claim by explaining that if
no attachment of the plane was made, the other creditors would receive approx. 45% of their claims
and not just 30%. It is clear that the other creditors were prejudiced.

Judgment reversed. (Exemplary damages were reduced to P25000 after the motion for recon was filed)

Globe vs Mckay
Facts:
Restituto Tobias was employed by petitioner as purchasing agent and admin assistant to the
engineering operations manager.

Sometime in 1972, Tobias reported anomalies in company: fictitious purchases and other
fraudulent transactions for which it lost several thousands of pesos.

However, Herbert Hendrry, Executive Vice President and General Manager confronted him by
stating that he was the number one suspect and ordered him to take a forced one week leave, not to
communicate with the office, to leave his table drawers open, and to leave the office keys.

When he reported back to work, Hendry called him a crook and a swindler. He was also ordered to take a
lie detector test and to submit specimens of his handwriting, signature, and initials. Tobias was also told
that a hundred more suits can be field against him.

Investigation instituted by company resulted to ff:

Manila police: cleared Tobias of any participation

Private investigator: found him guilty but also stated that further investigations were to be conducted

MM Police Chief Document Examiner: Tobias not guilty. Tobias passed lie detector test.

Company still filed 6 criminal cases, 5 for estafa thru falsification of commercial documents and 1
for discovering secrets thru seizure of correspondence. All were dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.

When Tobias sought employment with RETELCO, Hendry wrote company stating that Globe
Mackay dismissed Tobias due to dishonesty.

Issue: WON petitioners are liable for damages to private respondent

Held: Yes, Article 19 and remedied by Article 20.
Ratio:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall
indemnify the latter for the same.

1. Even if they claimed that it was their right to dismiss Tobias, they abused the right that they
invoke, causing damage to Tobias and for which latter must be indemnified.
2. The imputation of guilt without basis and the pattern of harassment during the investigations of
Tobias transgress the standards o human conduct under article 19.
3. Damnum absque injuria: damages or loss which does not constitute a violation of a legal right or
amount to a legal wrong is not actionable
 NA to case at bar coz the abusive manner in which the right to dismiss was exercised amounted
to a legal wrong

Albenson vs CA
Facts:
Albenson delivered mild steel plates to Guaranteed Industries Inc. A Pacific Banking Corporation
Check was given and drawn against the account of EL Woodworks. Such check was later dishonored for
the reason “Account Closed.”
Company traced source of check and later discovered that the signature belonged to one
Eugenio Baltao.
Albenson made an extrajudical demand upon Baltao but latter denied that he issued the check or
that the signature was his.
 Company filed a complaint against Baltao for violation of BP 22.
It was later discovered that private respondent had son: Eugene Baltao III, who manages the biz
establishment, EL Woodworks.
Father filed complaint for damages.

Issue: WON petitioner is liable for damages

Held: NO
Ratio:
1. no abuse of right
2. honestly belived that it was private respondent who issued check based on ff inquiries:
 SEC records showed that president to Guaranteed was Eugene Baltao
 Bank said signature belonged to EB
 EB did not do his part in clarifying that there were in fact 3 Ebs, Jr., Sr. and the III.
3. there was no malicious prosecution: there must be proof that:
 the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person and
 that it was intiated deliberately by defendant knowing that his charges were false and groundless
Elements of abuse of right under Article 19:
1. there is a legal right or duty
2. exercised in bad faith
3. for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another

Elements under Article 21: contra bonus mores:

1. there is an act which is legal
2. but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order or public policy
3. it is done with intent to injure

B. Unjust enrichment

Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or
comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return
the same to him.

Art. 23. Even when an act or event causing damage to another's property was not due to the fault or
negligence of the defendant, the latter shall be liable for indemnity if through the act or event he was
benefited.

Art. 2154. If something is received when there is no right to demand it, and it was unduly delivered
through mistake, the obligation to return it arises. (1895)

C. Protection of disadvantaged

Art. 24. In all contractual, property or other relations, when one of the parties is at a disadvantage on
account of his moral dependence, ignorance, indigence, mental weakness, tender age or other handicap,
the courts must be vigilant for his protection.

Art. 1332. When one of the parties is unable to read, or if the contract is in a language not understood by
him, and mistake or fraud is alleged, the person enforcing the contract must show that the terms thereof
have been fully explained to the former. (n)

D. Ostentatious display of wealth

Art. 25. Thoughtless extravagance in expenses for pleasure or display during a period of acute public
want or emergency may be stopped by order of the courts at the instance of any government or private
charitable institution.
E. Respect for dignity, personality, privacy and peace of ind of another

Art. 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors
and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall
produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief:

(1) Prying into the privacy of another's residence:

(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another;

(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;

(4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs, lowly station in life, place of
birth, physical defect, or other personal condition.

Ayer vs Capulong
Facts:
MTRCB, other govt agencies, and Pres Ramos approved the making of a film entitled The Four
day Revolution.
Pursuant to this, Ayer Productions wrote Enrile about film and enclosed a synopsis.
Enrile replied and stated that no reference whatsoever should be made to him or any member of
his family much less to any matter purely personal to them.
Ayer acceded and proceed to film the picture but Enrile filed Complaint with Application for
Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Prelim Injunction stating that petitioner’s production of film
without his consent and over his objection constitutes a violation of his right to privacy.

Issue: WON the production and filming of picture constituted an unlawful intrusion upon his right to
privacy
Held: NO
Ratio:
1. film was not yet completed, thus no clear and present danger of any violation of any right to
privacy existed
2. film was about EDSA revolution and does not relate to the individual life and certainly not to the
private life of Enrile
3. intrusion is limited to what it necessary to keep film a truthful historical account
4. The right of privacy of a public figure is narrower than that of an ordinary citizen.
PUBLIC FIGURE: A person who, by his accomplishments, fame, or mode of living, or by adopting a
profession or calling which gives the public a legitimate interest in hi s doings, his affairs, and his
character has become a public personage.

Tenchavez vs Escaño
Facts:
Vicenta Escaño and Pastor Tenchavez secretly got married before a Catholic chaplain and
planned to elope.
The elopement did not materialize because Vicenta’s mother discovered such marriage. Her
parents asked the advice of one Father Reynes and subsequently agreed to recelebrate the marriage.
However, Vicenta refused to proceed with the ceremony because a letter from the students of san
Carlos College disclosed that Pastor and their matchmaker, Pacita Noel had an amorous relationship.
Vicenta left for the States, acquired a foreign divorce and married an American, Russel Leo
Moran in Nevada.
Husband field complaint:
Vs. Parents: for having dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from joining her husband and alienating her
affections
Vs. Roman Catholic Church: for having decreed annulment

Parents filed counterclaim for moral and exemplary damages.

Issue: WON there is an action for alienation of affections against parents

Held: NO
Ratio:
1. no proof of malice
2. parents themselves suggested that the marriage be celebrated again
3. also, Vicenta appeared to have acted independently and being of age, she was entitled to judge
what was best for her and ask that her decisions be respected

THERE WAS A VALID MARRIAGE between Vicenta and Pastor: remember persons…so…
 Vicenta’s refusal to perform her wifely duties, and her denial of consortium and her desertion of
husband constitute in law a wrong caused through her fault, for which the husband is entitled to
the corresponding indemnity (2176)

45,000 damages awarded to parents deemed excessive:

 filing of suit nay have wounded their feelings and caused anxiety but this has not seriously injured
their reputation or otherwise prejudiced them, lawsuits having become a common occurrence in
present society.

F. Dereliction of duty

Art. 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or employee refuses or

neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty may file an action for damages and other relief

against he latter, without prejudice to any disciplinary administrative action that may be taken.

Amaro vs Samanguit
Facts:
Jose Amaro was assaulted and shot near the city government building of Silay.
Subsequently, they went to the office of the chief of police but the latter harassed and terrorized
them. Because of that incident, they gave up their right and interest in the prosecution of the crime.
However, City Mayor advised appellee to investigate crime. Info was then filed.
Case is based on article 21 and/or 27.

Issue: WON chief of police was guilty of dereliction of duty

Held: Yes
Ratio:
1. refusal to perform official duty without just cause gives rise to an action for damages
Zulueta vs Nicholas
Facts:
Plaintiff filed a complaint for libel against the provincial governor of Rizal and the staff members of
Phil. Free Press.
Provincial fiscal rendered opinion stating that there was no prima facie case: statements were
made in good faith and for the sole purpose of serving the best interests of the public. Fiscal absolved
governor and staff.

Issue: Won there was dereliction of duty

Held: NO
Ratio:
 1. refusal to prosecute because of insufficient evidence is not refusal without just cause to perform
an official duty
2. Fiscal is also under the duty not to prosecute if there are insufficient evidence to support a case

PROVINCES, CITIES, MUNICIPALITIES

JIMENEZ v CITY OF MANILA

FACTS: Jimenez bought bagoong at the Santa Ana public market at the time that it was flooded with
ankle-deep water. As he turned around to go home, he stepped on an uncovered opening w/c could not
be seen because of dirty rainwater.
A dirty and rusty 4-inch nail, stuck inside the uncovered opening, pierced his left leg to a depth of
1½ inches. His left leg swelled and he developed fever. He was confined for 20 days, walked w/crutches
for 15 days and could not operate his school buses.
He sued City of Manila and Asiatic Integrated Corp under whose administration the Sta. Ana had
been placed by virtue of Management and Operating Contract.
TC found for respondent. CA reversed and held Asiatec liable and absolved City of Manila.

ISSUE: WON City of Manila should be jointly and solidarily liable with Asiatec

HELD: YES

RATIO: In the City of Manila v Teotico case, it was held that Art 1, Sec 4 of RA 409, which City of Manila is
invoking in this case, establishes a general rule regulating the liability of City Of Manila while Art 2189 CC
governs the liability due to “defective streets, public buildings and other public works” in particular and is
therefore decisive in this case.
It was also held that for liability under 2189 to attach, control and supervision by the province,
city or municipality over the defective public building in question is enough. It is not necessary that such
belongs to such province, city or municipality.
In the case at bar, there is no question that Sta. Ana public market remained under the control of
the City as evidenced by:

1. the contract bet Asiatec and City which explicitly states that “prior approval” of the City is still
needed in the operations.
2. Mayor Bagatsing of Manila admitted such control and supervision in his letter to Finance Sec.
Virata (“The City retains the power of supervision and control over its public markets…)
3. City employed a market master for the Sta. Ana public Market whose primary duty is to take
direct supervision and control of that particular public market
4. Sec. 30 of Tax Code “The treasurer shall exercise direct and immediate supervision,
administration and control over public markets…”
 It is thus the duty of the City to exercise reasonable care to keep the public market reasonably
safe for people frequenting the place for their marketing needs. Ordinary precautions could have been
taken during good weather to minimize danger to life and limb. The drainage hole could have been placed
under the stalls rather than the passageways. The City should have seen to it that the openings were
covered.
It was evident that the certain opening was already uncovered, and 5 months after this incident it
was still uncovered. There were also findings that during floods, vendors would remove the iron grills to
hasten the flow of water. Such acts were not prohibited nor penalized by the City. No warning sign of
impending danger was evident.
Petitioner had the right to assume there were no openings in the middle of the passageways and
if any, that they were adequately covered. Had it been covered, petitioner would not have fallen into it.
Thus the negligence of the City is the proximate cause of the injury suffered.
Asiatec and Cityy are joint tortfeasors and are solidarily liable.

PROPRIETORS OF BUILDING, FACTORY ETC.

GUILATCO v CITY OF DAGUPAN

FACTS: Gilatco, (Court Interpreter) was about to board a tricycle at a sidewalk when at Perez Blvd when
she accidentally fell into a manhole causing her right leg to be fractured. Perez Blvd is a National Road
under the control and supervision of City of Dagupan.
Such manhole is partially covered by a flowerpot leaving a gaping hole about 2 ft long and 1½
feet wide.
She was hospitalized, operated on and confined. She had been deprived of income. She sued for
damages.

ISSUE: WON Control or supervision over a national road by the City of Dagupan exists which makes City
liable under Art 2189

HELD: Yes.

RATIO: Art 2189 says : Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or
injuries, suffered by, any person by reason of the defective conditions of roads, streets, bridges, public
buildings, and other public works, under their control and supervision.
Thus, it is not even necessary that such defective road or street belongs to the City.
In the case at bar, the control and supervision of the national road exists and is provided for in the
charter of Dagupan. It provided that the laying out, construction and improvement of streets, avenues and
alleys and sidewalks, and regulation of the use thereof, may be legislated by the Municipal Board.
Such control and supervision is exercised through the City Engineer Tangco, who aside from his
official capacity as City Engineer, was also Ex Officio Highway Engineer, Ex Officio City Engineer of
Bureau of Public Works, and Building Official and received compensation for these functions.
The function of supervision over streets, public buildings and public works, pertaining through the
City Engineer is coursed through a Maintenance Foreman and a Maintenance Engineer. Although these
two officials are employees of the Nat’l Gov’t, they are detailed with the City of Dagupan and hence
receive instruction and supervision from the city through the City Engineer.
Hence the City is liable.

MUNICIPALITY OF SAN FERNANDO v FIRME

FACTS: A collision occurs involving a passenger jeepney driven by Balagot and owned by Nieverras, a
gravel and sand truck driven by Manandeg and owned by Velasquez, and a dump truck driven by
Bislig and owned by the municipality of San Fernando, La Union. Several passengers including Baniña,
died and 4 were injured.
 Heirs of Baniña instituted a complaint for damages against jeepney owner and driver. The owner
and driver of jeepney filed 3rd Party complaint against Mun. of San Fernando and driver of dump truck.
Subsequently, the case was transferred to Branch presided by Firme. The complaint was
amended to implead Mun. of San Fernando and dump truck driver as defendants who raised the
defenses of lack of cause of action, nonsuability of the State, negligence of owner and driver of the
jeepney as the proximate cause of collision.
Firme rendered Mun. of San Fernando and dump truck driver liable jointly and severally.

ISSUE: WON the respondent Court committed grave abuse of discretion when it deferred and failed to
resolve the defense of non-suability of the state

HELD: YES

RATIO: Under Art XVI sec 3 Consti Law, the State may not be sued without its consent. Consent can be
implied or expressed.
Expressed consent may be embodied in a general such as Act No. 3038 which provides for the
standing consent of the State to be sued in cases of money claims; or special law such as in the Merritt
case.
Implied consent is when gov’t enters into business contracts descending to the level of the other
contracting party or when State files a complaint opening itself to counter claim.
Municipal Corp. are suable because their charters grant them the competence to sue and be
sued. Nevertheless, they are not liable for the torts committed by them in the discharge of governmental
functions. And can be held answerable if it is shown that they were acting in proprietary capacity.
In the case at bar, the driver of dump truck was on his way to Naguilian River to get a load of
sand and gravel for the repair of San Fernando’s municipal streets, a governmental function.
The municipality cannot be held liable for the torts committed by its regular employee who was
then engaged in the discharge of governmental functions.
Hence, the judgment of Firme is reversed.

GOTESCO INVESTMENT CORP v CHATTO

FACTS: Gloria Chatto and her 15-yr old daughter, Lina, went to see a movie “Mother Dear” at Superama
I, owned by Gotesco Investment Corp. Plenty of people were watching the film so they could not find
seats at the balcony level.
Hardly 10 mins after entering the theater, the ceiling of its balcony collapsed. Pandemonium
ensued in the darkness of the theater but the two women were able to crawl their way out and walked to
nearby FEU hospital. Both were treated for physical injuries which would incapacitate them for a period of
2-4 weeks.

ISSUE: WON Gotesco is liable

HELD: Yes.

RATIO: It is settled that the owner or proprietor of a place of public amusement impliedly warrants that
the premises, appliances and amusement devices are safe for the purpose for which they are designed,
the doctrine being subject to no other exception or qualification than that he does not contract against
unknown defects not discoverable by ordinary or reasonable means.
This implied warranty has given rise to the rule that:
Where a patron of a theater or other place of public amusement is injured, and the thing that
caused the injury is wholly and exclusively under the control and management of the defendants, and the
accident is such as in the ordinary course of events would not have happened if proper care had been
exercised, its occurrence raises a presumption or permits of an inference of negligence on the part of the
defendant.
 This presumption was not overcome by Gotesco. The court found that the collapse was due to
the construction defects and not force majeure as Gotesco claimed. Such defects could have been easily
discovered if only Gotesco exercised due diligence and care in keeping and maintaining the premises.
Even if the structural designs were approved and permitted by the City engineer, this does not
prove at all that there was no defects in the construction. As disclosed by the testimony, there was no
adequate inspection of the premises before the date of the accident.
And assuming that the cause of the collapse was due to force majeure, Gotesco would still be
liable because it was guilty of negligence.

DINGCONG VS KANAAN
(thanks to Banwar)

Nature: Petition for review on Certiorari

Facts:
♦ Dingcong brothers are co-lessees in the upper floor of the house owned by Saenz
♦ Brothers established the central hotel in the building where they were the managers
♦ A guest, Echivarria, occupied room 10 of the hotel for P30 per month
♦ Kanaans occupied the lower floor of the hotel where they established a bazaar
♦ Echivarria let his faucet leak while the pipes of the hotel were undergoing repairs
♦ A bucket was placed underneath the leaking faucet to catch the dripping water – the bucket
overflowed
♦ Water seeped through the floor – the merchandise in the bazaar below got wet and damaged worth
around P1T
♦ Kanaans brought an action for damages against the managers (brothers Dingcong) and Echivarria
(person who let the faucet leak)
♦ CFI absolved 1 Dingcong brother only (kasi namatay na yung isa) but held Echivarria liable
♦ CA reversed – holding Dingcong liable for the damages

Issue: WON the manager can be held liable

Held: YES

Ratio:
♦ Dingcong, as a co-lessee and manager of the hotel has to answer for the damage caused by things
that thrown or falling from the hotel (Art. 1910 of the Codigo Civil)
♦ Echivarria was a guest of the hotel and was the direct cause of the damage
♦ But Dingcong did NOT exercise the diligence of a good father of the family
♦ He knew that the pipes of the hotel were under repair, presumed that the guest Echivarria
would use the faucet, but only provided a bucket to deal with the problem of the leaks

Judgment Affirmed

ABELLANA v MARAVE
May 29, 1974

NATURE: Petition for certiorari from an order of the CFI of Misamis Occidental

FACTS:
• A cargo truck driven by Francisco Abellana had a collision with a motorized pedicab resulting in
injuries to its passengers.

• A criminal case for physical injuries through reckless imprudence was filed with the City Court of
Ozamis City against Abellana. He was found guilty as charged with award of damages in favor of the
offended parties.

• Abellana appealed the decision with the CFI. At this stage, the offended parties filed with another
branch of CFI of Misamis Occidental a separate and independent civil action for damages in
connection with the accident. In such complaint for damages, the alleged employer of Abellana was
included as defendant.

• The defendants sought the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that there was no reservation for
the filing thereof in the City Court. They argued that it was not allowable at this stage where the
criminal case was already on appeal at the CFI.

• CFI judge denied the motion to dismiss, rationalizing that:

1. Judgment of the City Court on the criminal case was vacated on appeal. Trial de novo will be
conducted. (A new trial or retrial had in which the whole case is retried as if no trial whatever had
been had in the first instance).

2. In view of the above and since the court (CFI) has not yet begun the trial (de novo), offended
parties may expressly waive in the CFI the civil action impliedly instituted with the criminal action
and reserve their right to institute a separate action. These, they did.

• Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WON petitioners may still file a separate civil action for damages considering that the judgment of
conviction of lower court had been vacated on appeal and a trial de novo had been ordered

HELD: Yes. Section 1 Rule 111 with Section 7 Rule 123.

RATIO:

• Petitioners contention that Section 1 of Rule 111 means that a separate civil action can be filed only at
the institution of the criminal action and never on appeal to the next higher court is erroneous.

• Above interpretation ignores what is so explicitly provided in Section 7 of Rule 123: “An appealed
case shall be tried in all respects anew in the CFI as if it had been originally instituted in the court.”
This rule is supported by a number of cases: People v Carreon, Andres v Wolfe, Crisostomo v Dir. of
Prisons, People v Jamisola

• Also, the restrictive interpretation of petitioners would give rise to a serious constitutional question as
regards Article 33 of the CC: in cases of physical injuries, a civil action for damages entirely separate
and independent from the criminal action may be brought by injured party.

• The grant of power to this Court under the Constitution does not extend to any diminution, increase or
modification of substantive right, such as that provided for in Article 33.

Court should avoid construing a statute or legal norm in such a manner as would give rise to a
constitutional doubt.
• Lastly, any counsel must not ignore the basic purpose of litigation, which is to assure parties justice
accdg to law. He is not to fall prey to the vice of literalness.

Petition dismissed.

YAKULT v CA
October 5, 1990

Nature: Petition for review of the decision of the CA

FACTS:

• While driving a motorcycle owned by Yakult Phils., Larry Salvado, employee of same company,
sideswiped a 5 year old boy who was then standing on a sidewalk.

• Jan. 6, 1983 -- Salvado was charged with the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to slight physical
injuries in an information filed with the City Court of Manila.

• Oct. 19, 1984 – A complaint for damages was filed by offended party against Yakult and Salvado in
the RTC of Manila.

• May 26, 1989 – RTC rendered decision in the civil case ordering defendants to pay jointly and
severally the plaintiff.

• Defendants filed a petition for certiorari in the CA challenging the jurisdiction of the RTC over said civil
case. They contended that:

1. a civil action for damages cannot be filed independently of the criminal action under Art 33, the
criminal negligence being without malice
2. a separate civil action may not be filed unless reservation thereof is expressly made

• CA dismissed the petition. Motion for recon denied.

ISSUE: WON a civil action instituted after the criminal action was filed prosper even if there was no
reservation to file a separate civil action

HELD: Yes. Section 1 Rule 111 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure (n.b.: 1985 RCP being procedural may
apply retrospectively to the present case)

RATIO:

• In this case, the offended party has not waived the civil action, nor reserved the right to institute it
separately. Neither has the offended party instituted the civil action prior to the criminal action.

• However, the civil action in this case was filed in court before the presentation of the evidence for the
prosecution in the criminal action of which the judge presiding on the criminal case was duly
informed, so that in the disposition of the criminal action no damages was awarded.

• Actual filing of the civil action is even far better than a compliance with the requirement of an express
reservation that should be made by the offended party before the prosecution presents its evidence.
• Aforecited revised rule requiring such previous reservation also covers quasi-delict as defined under
Art 2176 arising from same act or omission of the accused, as in this case.

Petition denied.

ANDAMO v IAC
November 6, 1990

NATURE: Petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus to review the decision of the then IAC

FACTS:

• The Missionaries of Our Lady of Law Salette, Inc., a religious corporation, built, through its agents,
waterpaths and contrivances including an artificial lake, on a parcel of land which it owned.

• However, said constructions allegedly inundated an adjacent land owned by petitioner spouses
Andamo. The inundation allegedly caused a young man to drown, damaged petitioners’ crops and
plants, washed away costly fences, endangered the lives of petitioners and their laborers, among
other damages.

• July 1982 -- Petitioners then instituted a criminal action before the RTC of Cavite against the officers
and directros of the corporatio, for destruction by means of inundation under Art 325 of RPC.

• February 22, 1983 – Petitioners filed a civil for damages against same corporation.

• April 26, 1984 -- Upon corporation’s motion to dismiss or suspend the civil action, trial court issued an
order suspending further hearings in the civil case until after judgment in the related criminal case.

• August 27, 1984 – Upon motion of corporation, trial court dismissed the civil case for lack of
jurisdiction, as the criminal case which was instituted ahead of the civil case was still unresolved.

• IAC affirmed decision of TC. Motion for recon denied.

ISSUE: WON a corporation, which has built, through its agents, waterpaths, water conductors and
contrivances within its land, thereby causing inundation and damage to an adjacent land, can be held
civilly liable for damages under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the CC on quasi-delicts such that the resulting
civil case can proceed independently of the criminal case

HELD: Yes.

RATIO:

• Dismissal of the civil case is erroneous considering that it is predicated on a quasi-delict.

• A careful examination of the petitioners’ complaint shows that the civil action is one under Articles
2176 and 2177 of the CC on quasi-delicts.

All the elements of a quasi-delict are present: damages suffered, fault or negligence of defendant and
causal connection between the two, such that if proven would make a clear case of a quasi-delict or
culpa aquiliana.

• Article 2176, whenever it refers to “fault or negligence”, covers not only acts “not punishable by law”
but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligence.
 Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is
criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, (if
the tortfeasor is actually charged also criminally), to recover damages on both scores, and would be
entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two
cases vary.

(See Castillo v CA)

• As held by the SC in Azucena v Potenciano, in quasi-delicts the civil action is entirely independent of
the criminal case accdg to Articles 33 and 2177.

To subordinate the civil action contemplated in the said articles to the result of the criminal porsecution
– whether it be conviction or acquittal – would render meaningless the independent character of the civil
action and the clear injuncttion in Article 31, that his action may proceed independently of the criminal
proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.

Decision reversed and set aside.

PAL, Inc. vs CA, 1990

Facts:
Nicanor Padilla was one of the 33 persons who died while on board PAL plane that crashed on
Mt. Baco, Mindoro on November 23, 1960.
Padilla’s mother, his only heir, filed a complaint demanding 600thou as actual and compensatory
damages, plus exemplary damages and 60thou as attorney’s fees.
Trial court based its award on the life expectancy of the deceased and awarded the ff:
1. 477thou: expected income
2. 10thou: moral damages
3. 10thou: attorney’s fees
4. and to pay costs

PAL invoked US law and claimed that in determining loss of earnings arising from death, the basis
should be the life expectancy of the deceased OR the beneficiary, whichever is shorter.

Issue: WON the deceased’s life expectancy should be made the basis in determining loss of earnings.
Held: YES,
• resort to foreign jurisprudence is proper only when there is no law or decision available locally to
settle controversy

Ratio:
1. 1764 and 2206: award of damages for death is computed on the basis of the life expectancy of
the deceased

Art. 1764. Damages in cases comprised in this Section shall be awarded in accordance with Title
XVIII of this Book, concerning Damages. Article 2206 shall also apply to the death of a passenger
caused by the breach of contract by a common carrier.

Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at least three
thousand pesos, even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. In addition:

(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, and the
indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every case be assessed and
awarded by the court, unless the deceased on account of permanent physical disability not caused by the
defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of his death;

(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the provisions of Article 291, the recipient
who is not an heir called to the decedent’s inheritance by the law of testate or intestate succession, may
demand support from the person causing the death, for a period not exceeding five years, the exact
duration to be fixed by the court;

(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may demand
moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.

2. basis of actual damages proven:

 manager and auditor of Allied Overseas Trading Company and Padilla Shipping
Company testified to Padilla’s income

damages awarded based on earning capacity:

417thou
 gross annual income of 23,100 – 9200 living expenses= 13, 900 net income x 30 years
life expectancy
 with legal rate of interest of 6% per annum from the date of judgment on August 31, 1973

Heirs of Castro vs Bustos, 1969

Facts:
Bustos killed Castro and was found guilty of homicide by lower court.
As to the award of damages, the CA amended its decision and deleted:
 6thou moral damages
 13, 380 loss of earnings

Petitioners prayed that CA’s original decision be affirmed in toto.

Issue: What are the items of damages recoverable in cases of death?

Held: moral damages and loss of earnings awarded
Ratio:
When death occurs as a result of crime, the heirs are entitled to the ff damages:
1. indemnity for the death of the victim
 at least 3 thou
 even if there are mitigating circumstances

2. indemnity for loss of earning capacity plus amount for support if deceased was obliged to give
any to any person
3. exemplary damages
 fixed by court
 considered separate from fines
 when crime is attended by one or more aggravating circumstances

4. moral damages
 for mental anguish
 fixed by court
 recoverable by descendants

5. attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation

 actual amount
 only when separate civil action has been filed or when exemplary damges are awarded
6. interests in proper cases
7. moral damages loss of earning capacity are recoverable separately from the indemnity for death]
Capistrano concurs: duty of fiscal to demand payment, award should be made individually
People vs Quilaton, 1992
Facts:
Quilation killed the officer-in-charge of PROFEM and was found guilty of murder. He was further
sentenced to indeminify heirs:
 100 thou for death
 26, 445 for actual damages for burial and related expenses
 250, 000 moral damages

Issue: correctness of damages

Held:
1. actual damages of 26, 445: AFFIRMED: brother was able to present receipts of expenses
2. 100,000 indemnity for death: REDUCED to 50thou based on prevailing jurisprudence
3. 250,000 moral damages: SC said that TC lumped the ff monetary obligations under ‘moral
damages’
 loss of earning capacity: 114,000: gross earnings – living expenses
 educational support for sisters: 10thou
 mental anguish suffered: 20thou awarded, his mother suffered a mild stroke

DAMAGES

A. General Provisions
Art. 2195. The provisions of this Title shall be respectively applicable to all obligations mentioned in Article
1157.

Art. 2196. The rules under this Title are without prejudice to special provisions on damages formulated
elsewhere in this Code. Compensation for workmen and other employees in case of death, injury or
illness is regulated by
special laws. Rules governing damages laid down in other laws shall be observed insofar as they are not
in conflict with this Code.

Art. 2197. Damages may be:

(1) Actual or compensatory;
(2) Moral;
(3) Nominal;
(4) Temperate or moderate;
(5) Liquidated; or
(6) Exemplary or corrective.

Art. 2198. The principles of the general law on damages are hereby adopted insofar as they are not
inconsistent with this Code.

B. Actual and compensatory damages

Art. 2199. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate compensation only
for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such compensation is referred to as
actual or compensatory damages.
Component elements:
Art. 2200. Indemnification for damages shall comprehend not only the value of the loss suffered, but also
that of the profits which the obligee failed to obtain. (1106)

Art. 2205. Damages may be recovered:

(1) For loss or impairment of earning capacity in cases of temporary or permanent personal injury;

(2) For injury to the plaintiff's business standing or commercial credit.

General Enterprises v Lianga Bay Logging

(11 SCRA 733)
Facts:
• General Enterprises (GE) entered into a contract with Lianga Bay Logging (LB) whereby the former was
designated as distributor of the logs supplied by the latter. GE is entitled to 13% of the gross f.o.b. value
of the logs exported.
• The contract was to remain effective for two years beginning June 1, 1959. On October 27, 1959,
however, LB sent written notice to GE stating that it won’t be able to supply logs for export due to
unavailability of additional logging machinery and restrictions imposed by the Phil. Govt. Within a four-
month period, LB gave a total of five notices to GE stating various reasons for non-performance of its
obligation to supply the logs. GE, on the other hand, reminded LB to fulfill its obligations under the
contract as otherwise it would be held liable for breach.
⇒Par 8(b) of their agreement gives the valid causes for suspension of the contract, among which are:
a) the enactment of national or local law or ordinance; b) issuance of any prohibitive or restrictive
order; and c) any other cause not within the control of the party making relief from any of the
requirements of the contract.
• GE’s reminder was left unheeded. Hence, it filed an action for breach of contract and recovery of
damages with the CFI. The court ruled in its favor awarding P400k as actual damages, P100k as
exemplary damages, and P40k as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses. Hence, this appeal.

Issue: WON actual and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees are justified

Held: YES (actual and attorney’s fees), NO (exemplary)

• It should be noted that LB is guilty of breach of contract as the causes cited for non-performance of its
obligation are not among those expressly stated in the contract. Moreover, LB mentioned that it had an
excess of ≥ 1M logs per month. It also agreed to supply 200M brd ft of logs to Japanese buyers over a
five year period. Sinungaling!
• Art 2200 CC: indemnification for damages comprehends not only the value of the loss suffered but also
that of the profits which the creditor fails to obtain.
• Over a five month period beginning June 1959, GE sold over 7M brd ft of logs to Korea and earned
P79k in commissions. When LB failed to deliver the logs beginning January 1960, GE ceased to earn
any commission. Had LB continued to deliver the logs as it was bound pursuant to the
agreement, it is reasonable to expect that GE would have continued to earn its commission in
much the same manner as it used to in connection with the previous shipment of logs, which
clearly indicated that it failed to earn its commissions it should during this period of time, which
is approximately P400k (17 months remaining in contract X 2M brd ft per month X P0.01
commission per brd ft). Mathematical genius not required!
• P100k as exemplary damages is oppressive considering that LB did not act in a wanton (noodles),
oppressive, or malevolent manner. P50k is sufficient for its reprehensible act of resorting to half-truths
in order to justify its desistance from the contract.
• Attorney’s fees justified considering the importance of the litigation and the amount of time and effort
involved.
 DECISION MODIFIED

Basilan Lumber v Cagayan Timber (2 SCRA 766)

Facts:
• In the amended terms of their contract, Cagayan Timber (CT) agreed to deliver 740k brd ft of exportable
logs to Basilan Lumber (BL) by September 1, 1951. The latter, through the East Asiatic Company
(EAC), sold the logs to a Japanese buyer.
• The logs were to be loaded on the Kanatsu Maru over a two-day period. However, the ship stayed in
port for a total of eight days due to insufficient logs and poor stevedoring service.
• The CFI awarded BL additional demurrage and dead freight expenses amounting to ≈ $9k. In reversing
the CFI decision, the CA held that no damages may be recovered without satisfactory proof of the real
existence of such damages (Arts 2200 and 2201 CC). Hence, this appeal.

Issue: WON demurrage and dead freight not actually paid is recoverable in an action for breach of
contract to supply

Held: NO
• Art 2199 CC: recoverable damages must be duly proved i.e. not merely speculative
• Actual damage was caused to EAC who already paid demurrage and dead freight expenses, as
evidenced by receipts, to the Japanese buyer. There is no proof that BL had already paid EAC said
damages or that it had already been required to pay the same.
• Terms of the agreement holding CT liable for damages it may cause BL are merely declaratory of the
obligation assumed
⇒Not demandable upon breach, but upon proof of actual damage suffered

DECISION AFFIRMED

GA Machineries v Yaptinchay (126 SCRA 78)

Facts:
• Yaptinchay (Y) bought a Fordson engine from GA Machineries (GAMI) for P7,560. He relied on the
representations of the latter’s representative that the engine was brand-new.
• Y was engaged in the trucking business. The engine was installed in one of his trucks.
• Within a week from delivery, the engine started to have malfunctions which necessitated successive
trips to GAMI’s repair shop.
⇒oil leak, clutch disc, release bearing hub and trunion bolt, propeller shaft…LEMON! LEMON!
LEMON!
• Upon investigation, the ff were discovered:
1) Worn-out screw courtesy of Y’s mechanic
2) Tampered original motor number courtesy of Capt. Garcia’s macro-etching test
3) Two-tone paint (unlike brand-new engine painted with single color) courtesy of Manila Trading
Company
• Y institutes action for indemnification for damages. Trial Court orders GAMI to pay Y P54k in actual
damages, P7,590 as reimbursement for the purchase price of the engine, and P2k in attorney’s fees.
CA affirms the decision. Hence, this petition.

Issue: WON award of damages is justified

Held: YES (reimbursement), NO (actual)

• GAMI committed a breach of contract of sale. The misrepresentation of the quality of the engine is
tantamount to fraud or bad faith. Hence, the award of P7,590 is justified.
• ART 2200 CC entitles Y to recover compensatory damages for actual loss suffered and prospective
profits while Art 2201 entitles him to recover all damages which may be attributed to non-performance of
the obligation. Such damages, however, have to be proven.
• BEST EVIDENCE TEST: A person claiming damages lucro cessante must produce the best evidence of
which his case is susceptible and if that evidence warrants the inference that he has been damaged by
the loss of profits which he might with reasonable certainty have anticipated but for the defendant’s
wrongful act, he is entitled to recover.
• Award of actual damages is unwarranted under best evidence test.
⇒“Projected profit” prepared by a Mr. Macasieb (P369.88 profit per trip multiplied by the number of trips
the truck allegedly was unable to make)
⇒Average actual profits of Y’s trucks plying the Manila-Baguio route would have provided a more
reasonable basis for actual damages

DECISION MODIFIED: award of P54k deleted

SONGCO v SELLNER
December 4, 1917

FACTS:

• Songco and Sellner owned contiguous properties where a considerable quantity of sugar cane were
planted.

• Sellner wanted to mill his cane to a nearby sugar cane central. However, the central were not sure
that they could mill his cane and would not promise to take it.

• Sellner then conceived the idea of buying the cane of Songco, which was going to be milled by the
Sugar Central. Motives:

1. so that he could run his own cane in at the same time Songco’s cane should be milled by the
Central
2. so that Sellner could get a right of way over Songco’s land for conveying his own sugar tot he
central

• Accordingly, he bought Songco’s sugar cane as it stood. He executed 3 promissory notes for the
purchase price. Two of these notes were paid.

• Songco filed an action to recover the 3rd PN. In his defense, Sellner alleged that Songco falsely
represented that the cane would produce 3,000 piculs of sugar but the crop, as it turned out,
produced 2,017 piculs only.

• TC rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff. Hence, this appeal.

• Incidentally, plaintiffs sued out an attachment against the defendant, at the time of the institution of
the suit, upon the ground that he was dispossessing of his property in fraud of his creditors.

• Lower court found that the charge that the defendant was dispossessing of plaintiffs’ property was
completely refuted by proof showing that the defendant is a man of large resources and had not
attempted to convey away his property as alleged.

• It then awarded damages to the defendant equivalent to the amount actually paid out by him in
procuring the dissolution of the attachment.
• Defendant appealed, contending that the lower court erred in refusing to award him further damages
for the injury done to his credit. He alleged that one of his creditors, upon learning of the attachment,
withheld further credit and forced him to sell a large quantity of sugar at a price much lower than he
would have received if he could have carried it a few weeks longer.

ISSUE: WON defendant is entitled to further damages for the alleged injury arising out of the attachment

HELD: No

• Lower court committed no error in refusing to award damages upon the ground cited by the
defendant, as such damages were remote and speculative.

• It could hardly be foreseen as a probable consequence of the suing out of his attachment that the
creditors might withheld their credit. Plaintiff certainly cannot be held accountable for the
complications of defendant’s affairs which made possible the damage which in fact resulted.

• SC deemed it best not to disturb as well the decision of the lower court not to award punitive
damages claimed by the plaintiff on the ground that the attachment was maliciously sued out.

Judgment affirmed.

SEAVAN CARRIER, INC. v GTI SPORTSWEAR CORP.

September 28, 1984

FACTS:

• GTI Sportswear Corp. (formerly GTI Garments Corp.) contracted the services of Seavan
Carrier, Inc. for the transport of cartons of denim jeans for export..

• However, of the 294 cartons supposed to be delivered by GTI to South Harbor, Port Area, 100
cartons were lost en route to the pier.

• It would appear later that the 100 cartons were diverted by the driver of Seavan’s delivery van,
in connivance with other persons, to warehouse in V. Mapa. A confession to this effect was
signed by the driver.

• GTI filed a case for a sum of money and damages. Lower court ordered Seavan to pay plaintiff
the ff.:

1. P182k – value of 100 cartons of denim jeans lost, plus the legal rate of interest
2. P160K – Tariff and Customs duties paid by plaintiffs on the lost items
3. P2.4M – representing losses in the goodwill of plaintiff
4. 20% of the total amount – as and for attorney’s fees
5. cost of proceedings

ISSUE: WON the award of damages was correct

HELD: No

• The award of P2.4M damages against a claim and prayer involving lost merchandise valued at
only P182k and with insufficient evidence to support it is an act amounting to grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the lower court.
• In G.A. Machineries, Inc. v Yaptinchay, SC held that in order for damages under Article 2200 of
the CC to be recovered, the best evidence obtainable by the injured party must be presented.
Bare assertion of loss would not suffice.

• In the instant case, respondents failed to furnish the best evidence obtainable or even
sufficient evidence in order to warrant the award by the lower court of the amount of P2.4M.

• The only basis for the award was the testimony of the manager of the international department
of GTI that there was an order of 12,000 pieces of cotton jeans per month for the year 1978, but
the customers, after having learned the loss, the orders were completely cancelled.

• No document or written instrument was presented to prove that there were really orders of
that volume for the year 1978, and as in the Yaptinchay case, no evidence was presented to
show the average actual profits realized by the respondents during the previous years to
enable the lower court to reasonable ascertain the amount of actual damages that the latter
suffered.

• What was given in testimony were the corporation’s possible gross earnings had its foreign
customers not learned about the loss of the 100 cartons of jeans.

The evidence cannot warrant the award of damages for the loss of anticipated profits, much less
the amount of P2.4M.

Award of damages of P2.4m deleted.

Subrogation:
Art. 2207. If the plaintiff's property has been insured, and he has received indemnity from the insurance
company for the injury or loss arising out of the wrong or breach of contract complained of, the insurance
company shall be subrogated to the rights of the insured against the wrongdoer or the person who has
violated the contract. If the amount paid by the insurance company does not fully cover the injury or loss,
the aggrieved party shall be entitled to recover the deficiency from the person causing the loss or injury.

PAN MALAYAN INSURANCE CORP. v CA

April 3, 1990

FACTS:

• Canlubang Automotive Resources Corp. obtained from PanMalay an insurance for its Mitsubishi Colt
Lancer .

• While the policy was still in effect, the insured car was hit by a pick-up owned by Erlinda Fabie but
driven by another person. The car suffered damages in the amount of P42K.

• Panmalay defrayed the cost of repair of the insured car. It then demanded reimbursement from Fabie
and her driver of said amount, but to no avail.

• Panmalay filed a complaint for damages with the RTC of Makati against Fabie and the driver.
Panmalay averred that the damages caused to the insured car was settled under the “own damage”
coverage of the insurance policy.
• Private respondents filed a motion to dismiss alleging that Panmalay had no cause of action since the
“won damage” clause of the policy precluded subrogation under Art. 2207 of the CC. Indemnification
under said article is on the assumption that there was no wrongdoer or no 3rd party at fault.

• RTC dismissed Panmalay’s complaint. RTC held that payment by Panmalay under the “own damage”
clause was an admission by the insurer that the damage was caused by the assured and/or its
representatives.

• CA affirmed, albeit on a somewhat different ground. Applying the ejusdem generis rule, CA held that
Section III-I of the pplicy, which was the basis for the settlement of the claim against insurance, did
not cover damage arising from collision or overturning due to the negligence of 3 rd parties as one of
the insurable risks.

• Both tribunals concluded that Panmalay could not now invoke Art 2207 and claim reimbursement.

ISSUE: WON Panmalay was subrogated to the rights of Canlubang against the driver and his employer

HELD: Yes

• Article 2207 of the CC is founded on the well-settled principle of subrogation.

If the insured property is destroyed or damages through the fault or negligence of a party other than the
assured, then the insurer, upon payment to the assured, will be subrogated to the right of the assured to
recover from the wrongdoer to the extent that the insurer has been obligated to pay.

Payment by the insurer to the assured operates as an equitable assignment to the former of all the
remedies which the latter may have against the 3rd party whose negligence or wrongful act caused the
loss.

The right of subrogation is not dependent upon any privity of contract or upon written assignment of
claim. It accrues simply upon payment of the insurance claim by the insurer.

• There are exceptions to this rule:

1. if the assured by his won act releases the wrongdoer or 3 rd party liable for the loss or damage, from
liability
2. where the insurer pays the assured the value of the lost goods without notifying the carrier who has
in good faith settled the assured’[s claim for loss
3. where the insurer pays the assured for a loss which is not a risk covered by the policy (voluntary
pymt)

None of the exceptions are availing in the present case.

• AS TO LC RULING: When Panmalay utilized the phrase “own damage”-- a pharase which,
incidentally, is not found in the insurance policy—to define the basis for its settlement, it simply meant
that it had assumed to reimburse the costs for repairing the damage to the insured vehicle.

It is in this sense that the so-called “own damage” coverage of policy is different from the “3rd party
liability” coverage and from the “property damae” coverage.

• AS TO CA RULING: CA’s ruling that the coverage of the insured risks under Section III-I of the policy
does not include damage to the insured vehicle arising from collision or overturning due to negligent
acts of a 3rd party, has no merit.
 Not only is it an erroneous interpretation of the provisions of the section, but it also violates a
fundamental rule on the interpretation of property insurance contracts where interpretation should be
liberally in favor of the assured and strictly against the insurer in cases of disagreement between the
parties.

The meaning advanced by Panmalay regarding the coverage of Section III-I of the policy is undeniable
more beneficial to Canlubang than that insisted upon by the CA.

In any case, the very parties to the policy, Canlubang and Panmalay, were not shown to be in
disagreement regarding the meaning and coverage of Section III-I. Hence, it was improper for CA to
assert its own interpretation of the contract that is contrary to the clear understanding and intention of
the parties to it.

• Thus, SC held that Panmalay, as subrogee, has no legal obstacle from filing the complaint for
damages against the 3rd parties responsible for the damage to the car.

Attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation

Art. 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial
costs, cannot be recovered, except:

(1) When exemplary damages are awarded;

(2) When the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to
incur expenses to protect his interest;

(3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff;

(4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the plaintiff;

(5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff's plainly
valid, just and demandable claim;

(6) In actions for legal support;

(7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers and
skilled workers;

(8) In actions for indemnity under workmen's compensation and employer's liability laws;

(9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a crime;

(10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded;

(11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation should be recovered.

In all cases, the attorney's fees and expenses of litigation must be reasonable.

POLYTRADE CORP v BLANCO

FACTS: Polytrade Corp. filed four causes of action against Victoria Blanco to recover the purchase price
of rawhide it delivered to the latter. Blanco had converted such rawhide into leather and sold it.
TC found for Polytrade and Blanco was ordered to pay the purchase price + interest.
Attorneys’ fees w/c amounted to P51,961.63 or 25% of the total principal indebtedness exclusive
of interest was awarded. Defendant contends that this is exorbitant and unconscionable.
ISSUE: WON attorneys’ fees were exorbitant and unconscionable

HELD: No.

RATIO: Under Art 2227, liquidated damages whether intended as an indemnity or a penalty shall be
equitably reduced if they are iniquitous or unconscionable.
The amount and character of the services rendered, the nature and importance of litigation and
the professional standing of the attorney may be an aid in the determination of the iniquity or
unconscionableness of attorney’s fees as liquidated damages.
In this case, Polytrade’s lawyers are of high standing. In fact, this case should not have gone to
court if Blanco had complied w/ his obligations. Also, the continued maintenance of Blanco of this suit is
plainly intended for delay. Hence, the 25% rate of AF is not iniquitous and unconscionable.

NATURE OF ATTORNEY’S FEES

Attorney’s fees (AF) provided in contracts as recoverable against the other party as damages are
not the attorney’s fees recoverable as between attorney and client as provided for in the Rules of Court.
Rather, the AF here is in the nature of liquidated damages and the stipulation therefore is aptly
termed a penal clause. As long as such stipulation is not contrary to law, morals or public order, it is
strictly binding upon defendants. Such AF as damages are awarded in favor of litigant who is the
judgment creditor entitled to enforce the judgment and not his counsel.

RCPI v RODRIGUEZ

FACTS: Rufus Rodriguez, sent a cablegram to Taha in Sudan, advising him of RR’s arrival in Sudan, and
another to Merger in US advising her of the sched of int’l WALS conference.
The cablegrams were sent through RCPI which were in turn relayed to Globe for transmission for
their foreign destinations. However, because of the non-receipt of the cablegram, Taha was not able to
meet him in Sudan and the preparations for the int’l WALS conference had to be cancelled.
It turned out that the message was delivered to the address on the message but the addressee
was no longer staying there. This fact wasn’t reported to RR in Manila.
RR sued for damages and was awarded P20,000 attorney’s fees among others.
RCPI contends that that the award of AF was improper because there was no allegation in the
complaint with AF. RR also did not present any evidence to prove AF and the lower court’s decision failed
to explain why AF was being awarded.

ISSUE: WON RCPI is liable for attorney’s fees?

HELD: No.

RATIO: In the recent case of Stronghold Insurance Company Inc., v CA the court held that the reason for
the award of AF must be stated in the text of the court’s decision otherwise if it is stated only in the
dispositive portion of the decision, the same must be disallowed on appeal.
In this case, the award of F was stated only once, just below the dispositive portion of the
decision. The TC failed to justify the payment of AF by RCPI, therefore, the award of AF as part of its
liability should be allowed.

Interest
Art. 2209. If the obligation consists in the payment of a sum of money, and the debtor incurs in delay, the
indemnity for damages, there being no stipulation to the contrary, shall be the payment of the interest
agreed upon, and in the absence of stipulation, the legal interest, which is six per cent per annum. (1108)

Art. 2210. Interest may, in the discretion of the court, be allowed upon damages awarded for breach of
contract.
Art. 2211. In crimes and quasi-delicts, interest as a part of the damages may, in a proper case, be
adjudicated in the discretion of the court.

Art. 2212. Interest due shall earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded, although the
obligation may be silent upon this point. (1109a)

Art. 2213. Interest cannot be recovered upon unliquidated claims or damages, except when the demand
can be established with reasonably certainty.

REFORMINA v TOMOL, JR

FACTS: A fire occurred burning the boat FB Pacita III and fishing gear of the Reforminas.
Consequently, they filed an action for recovery of damages for injury to persons and loss of
property.
Judge Tomol, Jr awarded the Reforminas damages with legal interest from the filing of the
complaint until paid. He further rendered that by legal interest meant 6% as provided for by Art 2209 CC.
Reforminas contend that it should be 12% by virtue of Central Bank Circular No. 416.

ISSUE: WON the legal interest is 6%

HELD: YES

RATIO: C.B. Circular 416 which took effect July 29, 1974 pursuant to PD 116 which amended Act 2655
(Usury Law) which raised the legal interest fro 6% to 12% applies only to forbearances of money, goods
or credit and court judgments. Such court judgment refers only to judgments in litigations involving loans
or forbearance of any money, goods or credit.
Any other kind of monetary judgment does not fall under the coverage of said law for it is not
within the ambit of authority granted to the central Bank. Only the legislature can change the laws.
In this case, the the decision of the judge is one rendered in an action for damages arising from
injury to persons and loss of property and does not involve a loan much less forbearance of any money,
goods or credit. The law applicable is thus ART 2209 CC which states that:
“ If the obligation consists in the payment of a sum of money and the debtor incurs in delay, the
indemnity for damages there being no stipulation to the contrary shall be the payment of interest agreed
upon, and in the absence of stipulation, the legal interest which is 6% per annum.

Plana Concurring and Dissenting:

Under Sec 1 a of Act 2655 as amended by PD 116, the authority of CB is to fix a maximum rate of
interest on loans and not to prescribe a fixed interest rate.
Such authority given to CB is absolute and unqualified and therefore the delegation of power to it
is void.

Extent and scope of actual damages

1. contracts and quasi-contracts

Art. 2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for which the obligor who acted in good faith is
liable shall be those that are the natural and probable consequences of the breach of the obligation, and
which the parties have foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation was
constituted.

In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall be responsible for all damages
which may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the obligation. (1107a)

Art. 2215. In contracts, quasi-contracts, and quasi-delicts, the court may equitably mitigate the damages
under circumstances other than the case referred to in the preceding article, as in the following instances:
(1) That the plaintiff himself has contravened the terms of the contract;

(2) That the plaintiff has derived some benefit as a result of the contract;

(3) In cases where exemplary damages are to be awarded, that the defendant acted upon the advice of
counsel;

(4) That the loss would have resulted in any event;

(5) That since the filing of the action, the defendant has done his best to lessen the plaintiff's loss or
injury.

Cases:
PAL, Inc. vs CA, 1990
Facts:
Nicanor Padilla was one of the 33 persons who died while on board PAL plane that crashed on
Mt. Baco, Mindoro on November 23, 1960.
Padilla’s mother, his only heir, filed a complaint demanding 600thou as actual and compensatory
damages, plus exemplary damages and 60thou as attorney’s fees.
Trial court based its award on the life expectancy of the deceased and awarded the ff:
5. 477thou: expected income
6. 10thou: moral damages
7. 10thou: attorney’s fees
8. and to pay costs

PAL invoked US law and claimed that in determining loss of earnings arising from death, the basis
should be the life expectancy of the deceased OR the beneficiary, whichever is shorter.

Issue: WON the deceased’s life expectancy should be made the basis in determining loss of earnings.
Held: YES,
• resort to foreign jurisprudence is proper only when there is no law or decision available locally to
settle controversy

Ratio:
3. 1764 and 2206: award of damages for death is computed on the basis of the life expectancy of
the deceased

Art. 1764. Damages in cases comprised in this Section shall be awarded in accordance with Title
XVIII of this Book, concerning Damages. Article 2206 shall also apply to the death of a passenger
caused by the breach of contract by a common carrier.

Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at least three
thousand pesos, even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. In addition:

(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, and the
indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every case be assessed and
awarded by the court, unless the deceased on account of permanent physical disability not caused by the
defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of his death;

(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the provisions of Article 291, the recipient
who is not an heir called to the decedent’s inheritance by the law of testate or intestate succession, may
demand support from the person causing the death, for a period not exceeding five years, the exact
duration to be fixed by the court;
(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may demand
moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.

4. basis of actual damages proven:

 manager and auditor of Allied Overseas Trading Company and Padilla Shipping
Company testified to Padilla’s income

damages awarded based on earning capacity:

417thou
 gross annual income of 23,100 – 9200 living expenses= 13, 900 net income x 30 years
life expectancy
 with legal rate of interest of 6% per annum from the date of judgment on August 31, 1973
2. crimes and quasi-delicts
Art. 2202. In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all damages, which are the natural
and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of. It is not necessary that such damages
have been foreseen or could have reasonably been foreseen by the defendant.

Art. 2203. The party suffering loss or injury must exercise the diligence of a good father of a family to
minimize the damages resulting from the act or omission in question.

Art. 2204. In crimes, the damages to be adjudicated may be respectively increased or lessened according
to the aggravating or mitigating circumstances.

Art. 2214. In quasi-delicts, the contributory negligence of the plaintiff shall reduce the damages that he
may recover.

Art. 2215. In contracts, quasi-contracts, and quasi-delicts, the court may equitably mitigate the damages
under circumstances other than the case referred to in the preceding article, as in the following instances:

(1) That the plaintiff himself has contravened the terms of the contract;

(2) That the plaintiff has derived some benefit as a result of the contract;

(3) In cases where exemplary damages are to be awarded, that the defendant acted upon the advice of
counsel;

(4) That the loss would have resulted in any event;

(5) That since the filing of the action, the defendant has done his best to lessen the plaintiff's loss or
injury.

3. crimes and quasi-delicts resulting in death

Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at least three
thousand pesos, even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. In addition:

(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, and the indemnity
shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every case be assessed and awarded by the
court, unless the deceased on account of permanent physical disability not caused by the defendant,
had no earning capacity at the time of his death;

(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the provisions of Article 291, the recipient
who is not an heir called to the decedent’s inheritance by the law of testate or intestate succession, may
demand support from the person causing the death, for a period not exceeding five years, the exact
duration to be fixed by the court;
(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may demand
moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.

Cases:
Heirs of Castro vs Bustos, 1969
Facts:
Bustos killed Castro and was found guilty of homicide by lower court.
As to the award of damages, the CA amended its decision and deleted:
 6thou moral damages
 13, 380 loss of earnings

Petitioners prayed that CA’s original decision be affirmed in toto.

Issue: What are the items of damages recoverable in cases of death?

Held: moral damages and loss of earnings awarded
Ratio:
When death occurs as a result of crime, the heirs are entitled to the ff damages:
8. indemnity for the death of the victim
 at least 3 thou
 even if there are mitigating circumstances

9. indemnity for loss of earning capacity plus amount for support if deceased was obliged to give
any to any person
10. exemplary damages
 fixed by court
 considered separate from fines
 when crime is attended by one or more aggravating circumstances

11. moral damages

 for mental anguish
 fixed by court
 recoverable by descendants

12. attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation

 actual amount
 only when separate civil action has been filed or when exemplary damges are awarded
13. interests in proper cases
14. moral damages loss of earning capacity are recoverable separately from the indemnity for death]
Capistrano concurs: duty of fiscal to demand payment, award should be made individually

People vs Quilaton, 1992

Facts:
Quilation killed the officer-in-charge of PROFEM and was found guilty of murder. He was further
sentenced to indeminify heirs:
 100 thou for death
 26, 445 for actual damages for burial and related expenses
 250, 000 moral damages

Issue: correctness of damages

Held:
4. actual damages of 26, 445: AFFIRMED: brother was able to present receipts of expenses
5. 100,000 indemnity for death: REDUCED to 50thou based on prevailing jurisprudence
6. 250,000 moral damages: SC said that TC lumped the ff monetary obligations under ‘moral
damages’
 loss of earning capacity: 114,000: gross earnings – living expenses
  educational support for sisters: 10thou
mental anguish suffered: 20thou awarded, his mother suffered a mild stroke

G. Unfair Competition

Art. 28. Unfair competition in agricultural, commercial or industrial enterprises or in labor through the use
of force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or highhanded method shall give
rise to a right of action by the person who thereby suffers damage.

H. Separate civil actions

1. Violation of civil rights

Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs,
defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another
person shall be liable to the latter for damages:

(1) Freedom of religion;

(2) Freedom of speech;

(3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical publication;

(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;

(5) Freedom of suffrage;

(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;

(7) The right to a just compensation when private property is taken for public use;

(8) The right to the equal protection of the laws;

(9) The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures;

(10) The liberty of abode and of changing the same;

(11) The privacy of communication and correspondence;

(12) The right to become a member of associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law;

(13) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the government for redress of
grievances;

(14) The right to be free from involuntary servitude in any form;

 (15) The right of the accused against excessive bail;

(16) The right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses
face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witness in his behalf;

(17) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one's self, or from being forced to
confess guilt, or from being induced by a promise of immunity or reward to make such
confession, except when the person confessing becomes a State witness;

(18) Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and unusual punishment, unless the same is
imposed or inflicted in accordance with a statute which has not been judicially declared
unconstitutional; and

(19) Freedom of access to the courts.

In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendant's act or omission constitutes a
criminal offense, the aggrieved party has a right to commence an entirely separate and distinct civil action
for damages, and for other relief. Such civil action shall proceed independently of any criminal
prosecution (if the latter be instituted), and mat be proved by a preponderance of evidence.

The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated.

The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge unless his act or omission constitutes a
violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.

Cases:
LIM v PONCE DE LEON
August 29, 1975

FACTS:

• Jikil Taha sold to Alberto Timbangcaya a motor launch. A year later, Alberto filed a complaint with the
office of the Provincial Fiscal of Palawan alleging that after the sale Jikil forcibly took away the motor
launch from him.

• After conducting a preliminary investigation, Fiscal Francisco De Leon filed with the CFI an
information for Robbery with Force and Intimidation upon Persons against Jikil.

• When Fiscal De Leon learned that the motor launch was in the town of Balabac, he wrote the
Provincial Commander to impound and take custody of the motor launch.

• He reiterated his request the 2nd time. It was only then that the Provincial Commander issued an order
to seize and impound the motor launch. Orlando Maddela was the one who carried out the order and
accordingly seized the motor launch from Delfin Lim.

• Delfin Lim, together with Jikil Taha, exerted efforts to recover the seized motor launch, but they were
in vain. They then filed a complaint for damages against Fiscal De Leon and Detachment Cmmdr.
Maddela, alleging that the seizure of the motor launch was without a search warrant and was against
Lim’s will.

For the alleged violation of their constitutional rights, Lim and Jikil prayed for actual, moral and
exemplary damages.
• TC upheld the validity of the seizure on the ground that the authority to impound the corpus delicti in
case pending the investigation is with the Provcl Fiscal who controls the prosecution and introduces
evidence to the court.

ISSUE: WON there was a violation of a constitutional right? If so, should De Leon and Maddela be both
held liable for dmgs?

HELD: Yes. Only De Leon.

• No public official has the right to enter the premises of another without the proper search warrant or
without the owner’s consent for the purpose of search and seizure.

• Also, at the time the act complained of was committed, there was no law or rule that recognized the
authority of Provincial Fiscals to issue a search warrant. The 1935 constitution vested the power to
issue a search warrant in a judge and in no other officer.

• De Leon cannot invoke provisions of RA 732 because there is nothing in said law which confers upon
the provincial fiscals the authority to issue warrants, much less to order without warrant the seizure of
a personal property even if it is the corpus delicti of a crime.

What RA 732 did was to broaden the power of provincial fiscals to conduct preliminary investigation.

• In addition, Rule 122 of RoC states that in the seizure of a stolen property warrant is still necessary,
and such warrant may be issued by the judge alone after determination of probable cause.

• US v Delos Reyes: No amount of incriminating evidence, whatever its source, will supply the place of
such warrant.

• Argument that there is lack of time to procure a search warrant is untenable. There is also no basis
for apprehension that the m. launch will be moved out of Balabac because it had no engine.

• Pursuant to the provisions of Art 32 and 2219, a person whose constitutional rights have been
violated is entitled to actual, moral damages and exemplary damages from the public officer
or employee responsible therefor.

• But only Delfin Lim should be awarded. Jikil is not entitled to recover any damages.

Legality of seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and
that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by 3 rd
parties.

• It is impt. to note that to be held liable under Art 32 it is enough that there was a violation of the
constitutional rights of the plaintiffs, and is not requied that defendants should have acted in bad faith.

• Only Fiscal De Leon may be held liable and not Maddela because he impounded the motor launch
upon the order of his superior officer.

While a subordinate officer may be held liable for executing unlawful orders of his superior officer, there
are certain circumstances which would warrant Maddela’s exculpation from liability:

1. He was reluctant to impoun the m.launch despite repeated orders.

2. Faced with a possible disciplinary action from his commander, Maddela was left with no alternative
but to seize the vessel.
Decision reversed.

ABERCA v VER
April 15, 1988

FACTS:

• Geb. Fabian Ver ordered various intelligence units of the AFP, known as Task Force Makabansa, to
conduct pre-emptive strikes against known communist-terrorist (CT) underground houses in view of
increasing reports about CT plans to sow disturbances in MM.

• Pursuant to said order, elements of the TFM were alleged to have done the ff.:

1. raided several places, employing in most cases defectively issued judicial search warrants
2. confiscated a number of purely personal items belonging to plaintiffs
3. plaintiffs were arrested without proper warrants issued by the courts
4. while in detention, plaintiffs were denied visits of relatives and lawyers
5. plaintiffs were interrogated in violation of their rights to silence and counsel
6. military men who interrogated them employed threats, tortures and other forms of violence on them
in order to obtain indiscriminatory information or confessions and in order to punish them.
7. all violations of plaintiff’s constitutional rights were part of a concerted plan to terrorize them, and
that said plans are known to and sanctioned by defendants.

• Plaintiffs filed a civil action for actual/compensatory, moral, exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.

• A motion to dismiss was filed by defendants (thru counsel Estelito Mendoza) on the ff. grounds:

1. plaintiffs may not cause a judicial inquiry into the circumstances of their detention in the guise of a
damage suit because as to them, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended
2. assuming that courts can entertain the present action, defendants are immune from liability for acts
done in the performance of their official duties
3. complaint states no cause of action.

• Upon motion, RTC Judge Fortun dismissed the case, adopting lock, stock and barrel the arguments
of the defendants. Plaintiffs filed a motion to set aside the order.

• Later, Judge Fortun inhibited himself from the proceeding; Judge Lising took over and, without acting
on the motion to set aside Fortun’s order, declared the Order as final.

• Because their prayer went unheeded, they filed this instant petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: WON the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus bars a civil action for damages
for illegal searches conducted by military personnel and other violations of rights and liberties guaranteed
under the Constitution

WHO can be held liable: military personnel directly involved and/or their superiors as well

HELD: No; their superiors may be held liable as well

• Repsondents’ invocation of the doctrine of state immunity from suit totally misplaced.

Concededly, it may be true that they were merely responding to their duty, say in accordance with
Marcos’ Proclamation No. 2054, but this cannot be construed as a blanket license or roving commission
to disregard or transgress upon the rights and liberties of the individual citizens.
• Article 32 of the CC which renders any public officer or employee or any private individual liable in
damages for violating the Constitutional rights and liberties of another does not exempt the
respondents from responsibility.

Only judges are excluded from liability under the said article, provided their acts or omissions do not
constitute a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.

• There is no merit in respondents’ suggestion that plaintiff’s cause of action is barred by the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

The suspension of the privilege does nor render valid an otherwise illegal arrest or detention. What is
suspended is merely the right of an individual to seek release from detention through the writ of habeas
corpus as a speedy means of obtaining his liberty.

• Moreover, their rights and cause of action for damages are even explicitly recognized in PD 1755 (re:
right of action for injury arising from acts of public officer connected to Martial Law).

• Doctrine of respondeat superior inapplicable in the instant case. The doctrine has been generally
limited in its application to principal and agent or to master and servant (i.e. employer and employee)
relationship. NO such relationship exists between superior officers of the military and their
subordinates.

• Be that as it may, the decisive factor in this case is the language of Article 32, where it is not the actor
alone who must answer for damages.

Hence, it was erroneous on the TC for holding that defendants cannot be held responsible for the
wrongful acts of their subordinates because:

1. It is wrong to limit the plaintiff’s action for damages to “acts of alleged physical violence” which
constituted delict or wrong. Art. 32 clearly specifies as actionable the act of violating or in any
manner impeding or impairing any of the constitutional rights and liberties enumerated in said
Article.
2. Neither can it be said that only those shown to have participated “directly” should be held liable. Art.
32 encompasses those directly, as well as indirectly responsible for its violation.

Petition granted.

MHP GARMENTS, INC v CA

September 2, 1994

FACTS:

• MHP Garments was granted by the Boy Scouts of the Phils. an exclusive franchise to sell and
distribute official boy Scout uniforms, supplies, badges and insignias. It was also given authority to
undertake the prosecution in court of all illegal sources of scout uniforms and other scouting supplies.

• Accordingly, MHP tasked its employee, Larry de Guzman to undertake surveillance and report to the
PC of the activities of the respondents who were reported to selling Scout uniforms and paraphernalia
without authority.

• De Guzman and 3 constabulary men went to the stores of respondents and seized Scout uniforms
without warrant, causing commotion and embarassment to respondents.

• Subsequently, a criminal complaint for unfair competition was filed against respondents. Fiscal
dismissed the complaint and ordered the return of the seized articles.
• Thereafter, the respondents filed a civil case against petitioners for sums of money and damages. TC
ordered petitioners to pay. CA affirmed.

ISSUE: WON petitioners should be held liable

HELD: Yes

• SC held that the evidence did not justify the warrantless search and seizure of respondents’ goods:

1. progression of time between the receipt of the information and the raid of the stores shows there
was sufficient time to apply for a judicial warrant.
2. no probable cause for the seizure

• The members of the PC raiding team should have been included in the complaint for violation of the
respondents’ constitutional rights. Still, the omission will not exculpate MHP Garments and De
Guzman.

• TC was correct in granting damages to respondents. MHP Garments and De Guzman were indirectly
involved in transgressing the right of respondents against unreasonable searches and seizures.

1. Raid was conducted with the active participation of employee De Guzman. He did not lift a finger to
stop the seizure of the boy and girl scout items. By standing by and apparently assenting thereto,
he was liable to the same extent as the officers themselves.

2. So with the MHP Garments which even received for safekeeping the goods unreasonably seized by
the PC raiding team and De Guzman, and refused to surrender them for quite a time despite the
dismissal of its complaint against respondents.

3. If petitioners did not have a hand in the raid, they should have filed a 3rd party complaint against the
raiding team for contribution or any other relief. They did not.

Judgment affirmed with modification.

3. Defamation, fraud, and physical injuries

Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil action for damages, entirely separate
and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.

Cases:
CARANDANG v SANTIAGO AND VALENTON
May 29, 1955

FACTS:

• On September 1, 1953, CFI of Batangas found Tomas Valenton Jr. guilty of the crime of frustrated
homicide committed against the person of Cesar Carandang. Carandang appealed the decision to the
Court of Appeals.

• Pending said appeal, Carandang instituted with the CFI of Manila a complaint to recover from
Valenton and his parents damages for the bodily injuries received on occasion of the commission of
the crime of frustrated homicide.
• Valentons filed a motion to suspend the trial of the civil case, pending the termination of the criminal
case in the CA. Judge ruled that the trial of the civil case must await the result of the criminal case on
appeal. As motion for recon was denied, this petition was filed.

ISSUE: WON the civil case should await the result of the criminal case on appeal

The resolution of the above issue hinges on the interpretation of the term “physical injuries” as used in
Article 33: won the term means physical injuries in the RPC only, or any physical injury or bodily injury,
whether inflicted with intent to kill or not.

HELD: No

• Article 33 uses the words “defamation”, “fraud” and “physical injuries.” Defamation and fraud are used
in their ordinary sense because there are no specific provisions in the RPC using these terms as
means of offenses defined therein, so that these two terms must have used not tom impart any
technical meaning, but in their generic sense.

• Hence, it is evident then that the term “physical injuries” could not have been used in its specific
sense as a crime defined in the RPC.

• In other words, the term “physical injuries” should be understood to mean any bodily injury, not the
crime of physical injuries, because the terms used with the latter are general terms.

• In any case, it was the intent of the Code Commission to establish a civil action for the bodily harm
received by the complainant similar to the civil action for assault and battery, as they are understood
under American Law.

Hence, the civil action should lie whether the offense committed is that of physical injuries, or frustrated
homicide, or attempted homicide, or even death.

Writ granted.

MARCIA V CA

FACTS: Bus of Victory Liner driven by Felardo Paje collided with jeep driven by Clement Marcia. Marcia
died and two others were injured.
Information for homicide and serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence was filed.
Civil action for damages was subsequently filed.
While civil case was in progress, Paje was convicted by civil court but acquitted by CA saying that
criminal negligence is wanting and that Paje was not guilty of criminal negligence.
CFI dismissed civil case saying that Paje cannot be held civilly liable after it had ruled in the
criminal action that negligence was wanting and that the collision was a case of pure accident. Hence this
appeal.

ISSUE: WON action for damages for physical injuries resulting from negligence is an independent,
separate and distinct from criminal action in Art 33

HELD: No.

RATIO: Reckless imprudence or criminal negligence is not one of the three crimes mentioned in Art 33.
“ In cases of defamation, fraud and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate
and distinct from the criminal action may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution and shall require only preponderance of ecivence.”
 The injuries suffered by petitioners were alleged to be the result of the criminal negligence . They
were not inflicted with malice. Hence, no independent civil action for damages may be instituted in
connection therewith.
Furthermore, if the act from which the civil liability arises is declared to be non-existent in the final
judgment, then the extinction of criminal liability will carry with it the extinction of civil liability. Sec 3, Rule
111 ROC.

3. Nonfeasance of police

Art. 34. When a member of a city or municipal police force refuses or fails to render aid or protection to
any person in case of danger to life or property, such peace officer shall be primarily liable for damages,
and the city or municipality shall be subsidiarily responsible therefor. The civil action herein recognized
shall be independent of any criminal proceedings, and a preponderance of evidence shall suffice to
support such action.

4. when no independent civil action is provided

Art. 35. When a person, claiming to be injured by a criminal offense, charges another with the same, for
which no independent civil action is granted in this Code or any special law, but the justice of the peace
finds no reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has been committed, or the prosecuting attorney
refuses or fails to institute criminal proceedings, the complaint may bring a civil action for damages
against the alleged offender. Such civil action may be supported by a preponderance of evidence. Upon
the defendant's motion, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to indemnify the defendant in case
the complaint should be found to be malicious.

If during the pendency of the civil action, an information should be presented by the prosecuting attorney,
the civil action shall be suspended until the termination of the criminal proceedings.

Part 3: nuisance
A. Definition
Art. 694. A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property, or anything else
which:
(1) Injures or endangers the health or safety of others; or

(2) Annoys or offends the senses; or

(3) Shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; or

(4) Obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street, or any body of
water; or

(5) Hinders or impairs the use of property.

B. Kinds
1. Public or private
Art. 695. Nuisance is either public or private. A public nuisance affects a community or neighborhood or
any considerable number of persons, although the extent of the annoyance, danger or damage upon
individuals may be unequal. A private nuisance is one that is not included in the foregoing definition.

2. Per se or per accidens

Cases:
ILOIOLO COLD STORAGE CO VS MUNICIPAL COUNCIL
FACTS: Iloilo Cold Storage Co. constructed an ice and cold storage plant in Iloilo City. Sometime after the
plant was completed and in operation, nearby residents made complaints to the Municipal Council that
the smoke from the plant was very injurious to their health and comfort.
Council appointed committee to investigate and report upon the matters in the complaint.
Council passed a resolution giving Company 1 month to elevate their smokestacks or else their
operations will be stopped or suspended.

ISSUE: WON a municipal corporation can declare the company’s plant a nuisance as operated and
prescribe method of abating it

HELD: No.

RATIO:
Nuisance is anything that work hurt, inconvenience or damage (Blackstone)
Two classes are:
a. Nuisance per se – nuisances under any and all circumstances.
b. Nuisance per accidens – nuisance only because of the special circumstances and conditions
surrounding it

Municipal councils have under the code the power to declare and abate nuisances but they do not
have the power to find as a fact that a particular thing is a nuisance when such a thing is not a nuisance
per se. Neither can they authorize the extrajudicial condemnation and destruction of a thing as a
nuisance which in its nature situation or use is not such. These things must be determined in the ordinary
courts of law.
However, a nuisance which affects the immediate safety of persons or properties or those presenting
an emergency may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity.
In this case, the plant is not a nuisance per se. It is a legitimate industry beneficial to the people and
conducive to their health and comfort.
If it were in fact a nuisance due to the manner of its operation, that question cannot be determined by
a mere resolution of the board. The company is entitled to a fair and impartial hearing before a judicial
tribunal.

SITCHAL ET AL V AQUINO

FACTS: Six class suits were brought against the City Engineer of Manila to enjoin him from carrying out
his threat to demolish the houses of petitioners upon the ground that said houses constitute public
nuisances. Such houses were constructed on public streets and some on portions of riverbed.

ISSUE: WON Such houses are public nuisances and who may abate them

HELD: Yes.

RATIO:
Art 694 CC provides that a nuisance is any act, commission, establishment, business, condition
of property or anything else which (4) obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway
or street or any body of water.
Art 695 states that a public nuisance affects a community or neighborhood.
Such houses of petitioners constructed without governmental authority on public streets and river
beds obstruct at all times the free use by the public of said places and accordingly constitutes a nuisance
per se aside from public nuisances.
The City Enginner has the duty to abate such public nuisances as stated in the Sec 31 RA 409 or
the Revised City Charter of Manila. The provisions in Art 700 and 702 CC being general provisions must
yield to special provision specifically designed from the City of Manila.
 Sec 1122 of the Revised Ordinance of the City of Manila explicitly authorizes the city engineer to
remove, at the owner’s expenses, unauthorized obstructions, whenever the owner or person responsible
therefor shall, after official notice, refuse or neglect to remove the same.

RAMCAR V MILLAR

FACTS: RAMCAR has been engaged in auto-repair and body-building since 1938 in Ermita Manila.
Seven residents near or around the shop brought an action to abate said establishment as a
nuisance since activites of the shop give rise to much noise and annoyance during all hours of the day up
to nightime, and even on Sundays and holidays. CFI dismissed but CA reversed.

ISSUE: WON RAMCAR’s auto-repair and body-building shop is a nuisance

HELD: YES.

RATIO:
RAMCAR was granted a license to operate a garage and under Ordinance No. 2830 of Manila
such body-building shop is not within the purview of garage, which means a shop for storing, repairing
and servicing motor vehicles. The zoning ordinance of the city prohibits also its body-building operations.
The business of RAMCAR is not a nuisance per se but in the account of its location, it is a public
nuisance.
However to abate this, it is not necessary to remove all buildings and structures built in the place
where it is presently located, or those parts which may be utilized for pursuits that are not forbidden by
law or ordinance such as auto-repair.

ISSUE: WON there can be damages from nuisance

HELD: YES

RATIO: Art 697: The abatement of a nuisance does not preclude the right of any person injured to recover
damages for its past existence.
Art 2196: The rules under this title are without prejudice to special provisions on damages
formulated elsewhere in this code.

DE AYALA V BARRETTO

FACTS: De Ayala proposed the erection of a combined brewery and ice plant on Calle General Solano, a
fashionable residence street with large expensive houses. 22 residents and property owners on the same
street filed a suit or injunction against it on the ground that it’s a nuisance.

ISSUE: WON such brewery and ice plant is a nuisance

HELD: No.

RATIO: The locality in question is gradually being transformed from a fashionable residence area into an
industrial center.
There is now a coal yard, warehouse , public school, club, lumberyards, sawmills and powerplant,
electrical railroad and light co. In addition, Pasig River is in it immediate the vicinity.
One who settles in a district which has a natural watercourse, especially beneficial for
transportation purposes, or one who remains there in the light of the fact of its transformation into a
trading or manufacturing center, must submit to the ordinary annoyances and discomforts which are
incidental to the reasonable and general conduct of such business.
In addition, the locality surrounding the site of the proposed plant has not sufficiently shown that
the plant will be incongruous with it since another brewery is already in existence in the vicinity.
 The injunction will only be granted when there’s a pressing necessity and not just a trifling
discomfort.

C. Abatement

Art. 696. Every successive owner or possessor of property who fails or refuses to abate a nuisance in that
property started by a former owner or possessor is liable therefor in the same manner as the one who
created it.

Art. 697. The abatement of a nuisance does not preclude the right of any person injured to recover
damages for its past existence.

Art. 698. Lapse of time cannot legalize any nuisance, whether public or private.

Art. 699. The remedies against a public nuisance are:

(1) A prosecution under the Penal Code or any local ordinance: or

(2) A civil action; or

(3) Abatement, without judicial proceedings.

Art. 700. The district health officer shall take care that one or all of the remedies against a public nuisance
are availed of.

Art. 701. If a civil action is brought by reason of the maintenance of a public nuisance, such action shall
be commenced by the city or municipal mayor.

Art. 702. The district health officer shall determine whether or not abatement, without judicial proceedings,
is the best remedy against a public nuisance.

Art. 703. A private person may file an action on account of a public nuisance, if it is specially injurious to
himself.

Art. 704. Any private person may abate a public nuisance which is specially injurious to him by removing,
or if necessary, by destroying the thing which constitutes the same, without committing a breach of the
peace, or doing unnecessary injury. But it is necessary:

(1) That demand be first made upon the owner or possessor of the property to abate the
nuisance;

(2) That such demand has been rejected;

(3) That the abatement be approved by the district health officer and executed with the assistance
of the local police; and

(4) That the value of the destruction does not exceed three thousand pesos.

Art. 705. The remedies against a private nuisance are:

(1) A civil action; or
 (2) Abatement, without judicial proceedings.

Art. 706. Any person injured by a private nuisance may abate it by removing, or if necessary, by
destroying the thing which constitutes the nuisance, without committing a breach of the peace or doing
unnecessary injury. However, it is indispensable that the procedure for extrajudicial abatement of a public
nuisance by a private person be followed.

Art. 707. A private person or a public official extrajudicially abating a nuisance shall be liable for damages:

(1) If he causes unnecessary injury; or

(2) If an alleged nuisance is later declared by the courts to be not a real nuisance.

Cases:

D. Easement against nuisance

Art. 682. Every building or piece of land is subject to the easement which prohibits the proprietor or
possessor from committing nuisance through noise, jarring, offensive odor, smoke, heat, dust, water,
glare and other causes.

Art. 683. Subject to zoning, health, police and other laws and regulations, factories and shops may be
maintained provided the least possible annoyance is caused to the neighborhood.

Cases: