Professional Documents
Culture Documents
1. Plaintiff seeks relief from injuries sustained from defendants violation of the Hobbs Act
and Sherman’s Act (through the Clayton Act) according to 18 USCA § 1964(c) . . . that provides
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to any person injured in his or her business or property by reason of a violation of 18 USCA §
1962 may sue therefore in any appropriate United States district court and shall recover treble the
damages sustained and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorneys' fee.
PARTIES
1. Delmo L. Zanette, the plaintiff is a citizen of Connecticut, at 1357 King St., Greenwich
06830
2. Ronald Pecunies, a citizen of New York and resides at 220 Central Park South, NY;
owns 25%, of Mercedes Benz of Geenwich [CT] that is the business office of the LLCs
3. Author K. Watson Jr., a citizen of Connecticut and resides at 718 North St, Greenwich
CT; owns “Watson Enterprises” and 75% of “Mercedes Benz of Geenwich.”
4. Steven G. Philips, a citizen of Connecticut, resides and operates a law practice at 177
Broad St, Stamford CT.
Whereby, the p-defendants are the organizers and direct beneficiaries of the criminal enterprise
that injured plaintiff.
5. Robert Kaelin, law office, CityPlace I-185 Asylam St., Hartford CT, 06103
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7. Demetrois Adamis, law office at 2900 Westchester Ave
8. Donald M. Brown Jr., law office, 1200 Summer St., suite 107, Stamford CT 06902
12. Mark Katz, law office at 196 North St., Stamford CT 06905
18. Shawn Kahanec, agent FBI, Mortgage Fruad Division Bridgeport Office
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20 Michael Panza, State’s Attorney Office, DCJ Investigator, Stamford
Whereby, plaintiff declares all the s-defendants were aware their acts were furthering the fraud
by p-defendants with the requisite degree of particularity under Rule 9(b); except s-defendant,
Anthony Carmedello. Since his misconduct is linked to the two acts of criminal harassment,
without any evidence of scienter indicating his criminal acts furthered p-defendant’s scheme to
defraud; as the others had to of know by the very nature of their wrongful acts. As:
“Malice may be inferred from wrongfully interfering with another’s property with
knowledge that one has no right to do so and such knowledge can be acquired
vicariously.” (Racoosin v. LeSchack, 103 Misc. 2d 629, 426 N.Y.S. 2d 707 (Sup. Ct.
1980).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The complained wrongdoings that the p-defendants perpetrated, is with their unlawful taking
over control of plaintiff’s property to steal its equity. This is with equity skimming of over
$600,000, which occurred from June 2004 until the present and their intended act of grand
larceny to fraudulently misappropriate for themselves about a million dollars upon the sale of
plaintiff’s property (that they unlawfully control). This ambition to extracting a million dollars
when plaintiff sells his property is verifiable as an unimpeachable material fact. As Pecunies has
established on record in his testimony before the Norwalk CT, court when in of 2007 he said: “
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Whereas, the p-defendants exploited plaintiff’s unbridled trust, along with his gracious
concessions of profoundly compromising his business interests for their financial benefit. Since
plaintiff generously extended good will to P&W by accommodating what they asked; such that
only a father would extend towards a son in a business arrangement. Yet, they turned plaintiff’s
belief in their honesty and the altruistic good will he extended to victimize him with outrageous
acts of criminal simulation. This is furthered through constructive fraud and conspiracy to
commit a breach of all the fiduciary duties that they owed plaintiff, such as being entrusted to be
the manager of his property. Thereby, perverting their fiduciary relationship with plaintiff, albeit
was based on plaintiff’s confidence and trust in them that they redounded to perpetrate numerous
acts of conversion.
Insomuch as the p-defendants, willfully and intentionally, violated plaintiff’s confidence in their
professional integrity to consummate fraudulent transactions, which abused their position of trust
to the extreme detriment of plaintiff. This is where their claim of right of ownership of plaintiff’s
property exists as a constructive trust, which is the product of fraud and deceit . . . that is
furthered by misusing the state courts and apparent bribery of plaintiff’s lawyers to perform in
support of their legal agendas. Along with being supported by the egregiously inappropriate
Since Judge Grogins denied plaintiff of his guaranteed right to be heard in court of equity in a
matter in dispute involving conflicting claims of rent payments and right to possession. Thus, in
an arbitrary and capricious manner, he decided that the stipulation should not be subjected to
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being vacated. Since he interfered with plaintiff’s right to plead his case and refute the prior
testimony of Pecunies proclaiming his bogus rights of entitlement and falsified standing. This
was on the issue if plaintiff was to be evicted from his property by the LLCs the judge knew he
owned 50%. Whereby, on the basis of plaintiff having had signed a one sided stipulation that he
was seeking to vacate. Thereby, for plaintiff to be afforded an opportunity to have a trial on the
eviction action, since he waved that right before by the stipulation settlement that he claimed not
to understand.
The basis of p-defendants’ scheme was built upon having deceived plaintiff to sign onto
documents corresponding to what the p-defendants placed before him. Whereas, all the
documents plaintiff signed were egregiously misrepresented . . . that was to such a degree that
plaintiff would never had signed them if not but for these major misrepresentations.
In addition these signed documents could have been later altered with addition text added, or
were the product of forgery. Since p-defendants filed the transference of title of the deeds from
his name to P&W’s half ownership, yet this was never presented to plaintiff would occur, and
plaintiff’s witness to all the business meetings at the time would certainly have taken notice.
On the other hand, plaintiff relied on P&W’s verbal promises that were intentionally made in bad
faith to induce plaintiff to sign the ‘contract’ where what was verbally promised was not stated.
Yet, even the terms contained in this one sided ‘contract’ were intentionally not adhered to by p-
defendants although plaintiff was in full compliance. The agreement was drawn up by p-
defendant, Phillips, dated May 27th, 2004 (the ‘contract’). Such as where p-defendants promised
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plaintiff that they would still allow plaintiff to maintain possession and residential occupancy of
the building Purdy’s Farms building until the property was sold. This is where he could live
above the Purdy’s farm store, in exchange for paying $1,000.00 a month towards the taxes.
Although for years plaintiff paid the $1,000 and oversaw However in the past plaintiff had
refused all those who asked if he wanted to sell because he did not want to abandon his way of
life with farming his land and interacting with the public in his farm store.
Whereby, the negotiations of plaintiff and P&W was with a verbal promise of buying the land,
but keeping him on as a tenant had deterred him from ever advertising his property, or seeking
out those who had approached him in the past that he arbitrarily rejected by saying he was not
interested in selling. Thus, in effect, p-defendants were the only entity that plaintiff ever
considered, even though he was once offered 3.2 million in __________ just for the farm land to
build a hotel.
was devoid of any consent or quid quo pro; but rather as shown by the ‘contract,’ contained
business expectations readily obtainable in the free market place. Essentially, plaintiff extended
made verbal promises that they had no intention to perform; such as with
made numerous verbal promises that were not incorporated in the contract or were intentionally
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Pecunies testified to
Most revealing of malicious intent to violate promises is the last line of the contract
that says:
Verbal agreements cannot be raised as incorporated within the intent of a contract according to
the Parole Rule. However, the law says that verbal agreements in conflict with a contractual
In fact the loan was never a loan because the money was mortgaged from own property a
of him to facilitate their business interests for the property purchase to be the most profitable
venture. However, they abused plaintiff’s good faith accommodations as an opportunity to usurp
his rights and powers of owning his property to be substituted with their exclusive control.
In effect, the p-defendants acted to defraud plaintiff by getting him to sign onto an agreement to
sell his property to them on May 27th, 2004. This agreement was presented to plaintiff by p-
defendants as to allow them to manage his property in the interim while they made preparations
to buy his property within a two year period (exh. A). Yet without putting up any money it gave
them exclusivity to buy in a robust market that had increased by more than 21%?? over the last
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year period. While the consensus of the experts at the time was that this property appreciation
was expected to continue; as it did substantially by double digits over the next two years.
In effect, p-defendants acted with evil intent to achieve their goal of looting the equity in
plaintiff’s property through criminal activity that §1962(c) defines as a pattern of racketeering.
Since they got control through fraud and deceit and then maintained their control through
coercion. Currently the p-defendants are pursuing a buyer for plaintiff’s property and established
their intention is to take half of the revenue its sale would create after the property’s debts.
Essentially, through constructive fraud the p-defendants coerced plaintiff under duress to accept
their domination over controlling his property according to their will. Not to mention
The tortious activities of defendants are dedicated to intimidate plaintiff to fear economic loss if
he does not cooperate with whatever they want. Since they convinced plaintiff to believe he can’t
do anything with his property without their consent; and insist they have the right to do whatever
they want with his property without even giving him notification and can call the police to have
Except with defendants acknowledging the legally requirement of notification of plaintiff for him
to approve a sale of his property with their equal share after its sale. (Such as where without
consulting plaintiff to have rewarded the father of plaintiff’s double dealing attorney, Brown;
being paid by both sides for the real estate listing to sell plaintiff’s property for a three digit
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is earmarked as who falsely testified to plaintiff’s malicious conduct that has victimized them by
his wanton compulsion to break into the property that he no longer owns but is entitled to have
any right but to have of the yielded equity produced by its sale.).
Thus, the p-defendants effectively imposed upon plaintiff that they will only allow his authority
to be restricted to where he is required to approve the sale of his property. (This would be with
signing away his last right associated to his possession corresponding to co-owning the LLCs).
Hence, plaintiff’s only option to obtain revenue from his property is to allow the sale that they
want, since they have maliciously interfered with his ability to benefit from his property.
Currently, the p-defendants have not applied the approximate $10,000.00 monthly revenue the
property was producing to pay the mortgage. (Since they deprived plaintiff from receiving these
rents and directed it to themselves that they co-mingled with their own funds). Rather, they
Clearly, these are willful and wanton acts of extortion to force plaintiff’s compliance to what p-
defendants want by his capitulation to their self-dealing designs. This was achieved by his
signing an agreement on May 27th, 2004 for Pecunies and Watson to manage his property. Then
when plaintiff attempted to buy them out in 2006 for offers of $100,000.00 and thereafter for
$600,000.00, they refused. The $600,000.00 buyout was before the property was listed and
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Yet, although p-defendants did nothing constructive, only pocketing many tens of thousands in
rental revenue in addition to$380,000.00 embezzlement, they still said $600,000.00 wasn’t
enough money for them to allow the sale to go through. (Noteworthy was that the $380,000.00
was explained to plaintiff by his own lawyer Aldamis to correspond to penalties that he accepted
and did not consider in the buy-out equation. Specifically, plaintiff was duped to believe the
penalty occurred from the six months that the p-defendants waited to pay the mortgage after
taking over management in May 2004. Consequently, the buyout would have been more around
However,
into believing that he was helpless before their proclaimed power of legal right . . . that was
confirmed by plaintiff’s lawyers who were in collusion. While all the time unbeknownst to
plaintiff until October 2009, fraudulent conveyances of titles to the LCC’s they controlled were
filed in November 10th 2004. Since, the quit-claims were produced without plaintiff’s consent or
knowledge. Then with refinancing, instead of the p-defendants securing a new fixed mortgage
for 4.75% as promised they got an open-end mortgage in the form of a deed trust for 11.5% and
clandestinely transferred ownership of his property to the LLC’s through the bogus quit claims.
Defendant’s explanation to plaintiff for the setting up the LLC’s was confined for the only
purpose to get refinancing before they purchased the property. Thereafter, plaintiff was tricked
and the good faith he extended was transformed into a criminal enterprise of extortion. Thereby,
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from p-defendants pursuit to obtain ill-gotten gains at the expense of plaintiff, they have acted to
deprive him of receiving millions by selling his property on the open market.
(a) “No action for an account, or on any simple or implied contract, or on any contract in
writing, shall be brought but within six years after the right of action accrues . . .”
As such, since the wrongful acts perpetrated by the defendants flowed out from the ‘contract’ the
appropriate statue of limitations period is the six-year statute for written contracts.
Conversion activity is applicable upon the ‘contract’ and the LLC agreement as in accordance to
§ 52-576 (a). Whereby, plaintiff redounded upon the ‘contract’ with acts of conversion. Thereby,
to conduct unauthorized acts to deprive plaintiff of his rights to his property for an indefinite
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powers of the owner to his harm. The essence of the wrong is that the property rights of
the plaintiff have been dealt with in a manner adverse to him, inconsistent with his right
of dominion and to his harm.” (Label Systems Corp. v. Aghamohammadi, 270 Conn. 291,
329 (2004).
“The elements of civil theft are identical to the elements of conversion, with the exception
that civil theft requires an additional showing of intent.” (Sullivan v. Delisa, 101 Conn.
App. 605, 620, cert, denied, 283 Conn. 908 (2007)).
“To establish a cause of action for conversion, a plaintiff must demonstrate that:
1) “The defendant, without authorization;
2) assumed and exercised ownership over property belonging to another;
3) to the exclusion of the owner's rights.” (News America Marketing In-Store, Inc. v.
Marquis, 86 Conn. App. 527 (2004), aff'd, 276 Conn. 310 (2005).
Elder Abuse
Fraud
Coercion
Harassment
‘Quit-Claims’; dated April 22, 2004 and November 3, 2004… that were known to exist by
plaintiff, but were filed by p-defendants with the County Clerk on April 27, 2004 and November
10, 2004. Yet, without the authorization and knowledge of the plaintiff, at best they tricked
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plaintiff to sign additional papers. Their existence was without his caretaker’s knowledge; who
had accompanied plaintiff to the business meetings whose sure she would have identified.
In fact, plaintiff only first learned that the tile of his property was transferred to the LLC’s in the
middle of October 2009. The reason to explain this is because plaintiff relied on all of his four
lawyers to perform due-diligence to establish his legal position. Whereby, the circumstances and
evidence validates that these lawyers were working for the opposition. Even though by first
glance of the case gives a foregone conclusion of bribery, insomuch as what they submitted in
their billing was not done; such as where Aldamis stated he researched the records and Katz
Accordingly, plaintiff has absolutely no recollection of ever signing anything except documents
was accompanied by his care taker who witnessed all the business meetings and signings. Thus,
she certainly would have taken notice if at any time it was mentioned that plaintiff was to
willfully transfer title from his possession). This was for two $20,000 loans he was to receive
that were transferred into mortgages on his property. The refinancing was for a new mortgage for
the LC’s to get the rate reduced from approximately 8.5% to less than 5%.
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(National Council on Compensation Ins., Inc. v. Caro & Graifman, P.C.,
D.Conn.2003, 259 F.Supp.2d 172).
Whereby, Philips either tricked plaintiff to sign the conveyance of tile to the p-defendants, or the
words ‘quit-claim’ were inserted thereafter, or plaintiff’s signature was the product of forgery.
Essentially this was where plaintiff transferred his ownership to the LCCs. Whereby, the LLCs
were owned: 25% by Pecunies, 25% by Watson, while plaintiff owns the other 50%.
However, the 50% ownership by Pecunies and Watson was promised to plaintiff was only to be
temporary, until refinancing was achieved and then plaintiff would own 100%. Since Pecunies
explained to plaintiff it was for the one purpose for him and Watson to get to get the lowest rate
Consequently, on the basis of the oral bargain plaintiff agreed before assigning the 50% to
Pecunies and Watson under the false pretext that as soon as the new mortgage was granted the
ownership in the LLCs’ would be changed to him owning 100%. However, when plaintiff asked
Pecunies and Watson for assignment of 100% as promised right after the refinancing was done
int
______________???, they both outright refused. Consequently, plaintiff then realized he was
dealing with immoral and dishonest individuals who were out to cheat him by exploiting the
Not surprising the contract says all oral bargains will not be honored to deprive from of our
2). bank fraud (two acts) occurred on November 17th. This is where in
November 2004 defendants fraudulently misappropriated 480,000.000 and the other $500,000
thereafter. This was achieved by the defendants employing a scheme or artifice to trick plaintiff
to sign two quit claims to thereafter defraud plaintiff by falsification of financial instruments.
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Thereby, defendants fraudulently obtain a million dollar loan that they applied for their own use
and benefit by unlawfully leveraging a lean on defendant’s property. In fact it was years later
that plaintiff first discovered the lean was placed on his property.
preapproved the addition extended credit. This in the form of an open-ended mortgage that
cannot be justified by any innocent explanations since the interest rate was usury at 11½ %, as
opposed to the 5% rate that was obtainable at the time--since the property was able to generate
$10,000 in revenue per month and its value was about 3 to 4 million.
beyond the $ they collected that was agreed to go to defendant as stated below in no. 4.
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4). Extortion and racketeering (4 of 3 acts) –18 §1951 (a) In April 2009 the
LLCs sent notice to the tenants on the property to quit paying rent to defendant and to direct the
payments to them (exh. ). Consequently, all of these tenants were intimidated to immediately
quit paying their rent to defendant. Thereby this malicious act cut of his major source of income
that he was dependent upon to meet his cost of living expenses; as he has no savings and is in
deep debt.
"The purpose of the Racketeering Act . . . is to eliminate the infiltration and illegal
legal and illegal enterprises to further criminal activities." (New Mexico v Andy Rael,
Pecunies and Watson’s personal benefit from rental revenue they collected. Specifically, that was
in excess of what was directed to paying the note of $4, monthly, taxes of $5, annually
6). Extortion and other unlawful criminal acts that injury flowed out from to
cause plaintiff injuries and pose a threat of continued activity are listed below under RICO
violations
B. JURISDICTION
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a) 18 U.S.C. Sec. 242.1 -where defendants willfully deprived plaintiff of his rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment not to be deprived of property without due process of law.
“The elements of an 18 U.S.C. § 242 offense are: (1) the defendant's acts must
of the United States; (2) the defendant's illegal acts must have been committed
under color of law; (3) the person deprived of his rights must have been an
inhabitant of a State, Territory, or District; and (4) the defendant must have acted
willfully.” (United States v. Jackson, 235 F.2d 925, 927 (8th Cir. 1956)).
“The "constitutional deprivation" element of the section 242 offense charged here
process." It is clear that the right to acquire, enjoy, own, and dispose of property is
protected by the Constitution. (United States v. Konovsky, 202 F.2d 721, 726 (7th
Cir. 1953).
b). Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) ; to vacate final judgment of eviction against petitioner from
his own property, by proving the decision was a product of a fraud upon the court (Power of a
court to vacate judgment for fraud regarded as inherent and independent of statutory provisions
authorizing the opening of judgments and, hence, judgments obtained by may be attacked at any
time. (Kenworthy v. Kenworthy (1980) 429 A.2d 837, 180 Conn. 129).;
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c) 28 USCA § 1331, which provides for the jurisdiction of the United States
district courts over RICO claims arising under the laws of the United States. (Gunther v. Dinger,
II Sherman Antitrust Act violations; criminalizes not only the acts of restraint of trade
and monopoly, but any attempt, intent, or conspiracy to engage in restraint of trade or monopoly.
(It does not explicitly define either restraint of trade or monopoly, so wide authority is granted de
facto to the Government and Courts). This law prohibits contracts or agreements that restrain
trade “unreasonably.” Violations are determined when the wrongdoer tries to maintain or acquire
a monopoly position through “unreasonable methods.” For the courts, a key factor in
determining what is unreasonable is whether the practice has a legitimate business justification.
Whereby, defendants acted in conspiracy to further the common goal of restraining plaintiff from
the ability to benefit from a market value return from the equity in his property. This is through
malicious conduct of interference and illegitimately imposing their control and pecuniary
involvement to benefit by fraudulent claims of right, based on agreements, contracts and misuse
of the State Courts. This was vigorously perpetrated with activities to affect an illegal restraint
with trade by interfering with free competition in plaintiff’s business with his property and its
commercial transactions.
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Section § 2 - Monopolizing Trade ;
Whereby, the p-defendants without any legitimate business justification have imposed their
dominance to maintain a monopoly position to control the sale of plaintiff’s property. This was
achieved over the last 3½ years, through methods constituting a “coercive monopoly,” made
possible by the collusion of plaintiff’s lawyers. In fact, all of the p-defendants’ claim of right is
bogus and is fraudulently based on the existence of the LCCs . . . that came about through a
breeched contractual agreement to buy or sell plaintiff’s property by May 2006; and the
“Suits by persons injured” –for violations of the Sherman act is applicable under Section 4 of the
Clayton Act, Title 15 U.S.C. chapter 1, §15: . . . (b) “any person who shall be injured in his
business or property by reason of anything forbidden in antitrust laws may sue therefore in any
district court…, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of the
suit, including reasonable attorney fee.” (Corresponds to commerce and trade, involving
monopolies and combinations in restraint of trade; and injuries to flow out from these actions)
Essentially, the offended conduct of defendants is in a conspiracy under the auspices of the
LCCs’ for the furtherance of the LLCs’ intent of establishment to create interference with trade.
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Specifically, this interference is where the agenda of the LLCs’ existence is applied as a
constructive trust to impose a restraint in plaintiff’s ability to sell his own property.
This is where the contractual agreement between opposing parties had set up the LCCs as a 50-
50 partnership, which is in effect a trust corpus exploited to act in bad faith of the ‘contract.’
Thereby, to undermine, block, and usurp plaintiff of exercising his rights, privileges and desire to
sell his property himself on the “open market” independent of their dreaded involvement. This
would be in accordance to plaintiff’s independent will and legitimate rights to engage in trade
unfettered by the p-defendant’s dominance and exclusive control under the color of the LLCs.
Yet, even if the best light scenario was considered on the face of the LLCs being 50-50 owned
between parties, such as ‘e.g.’ if there was equal investment. Still p-defendants’ conduct with the
shutting out plaintiff from having any say or involvement with the sale of his property, or
Not to mention, defendants conduct is averse to the principals of corporate and contract law.
Since they require plaintiff must be adjoined in any decision made. Whereby, mutual consent is
required for any decisions concerning any property equally owned by two parties. However, the
ongoing and present situation of the 50-50 partnership is where p-defendants act independent of
plaintiff’s expressed interests of what he wants. In fact, once plaintiff signed as a member of the
LCCs, no other inclusion ever occurred, neither was he sent the filed reports, only fist seeing
them in January 2010. In fact it can be said that all the conduct of p-defendants with doing
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Consequently, it appears all of p-defendants activities under the auspices of the ‘contract’ and in
the name of the LCCs, is to force plaintiff to yield their evil and malicious intentions. Since
through extortionist conduct, they have clearly defined their intentions to extract the lion’s share
of the equity out of plaintiff’s property. Such as, to illegitimately receive proceeds from the sale
of plaintiff’s property. This is from by having positioned themselves to maintain total control of
its ability to be the only privileged party to collect rents-even if they are not applying it to the
property debts as contractual agreed under the contract. Essentially p-defendants act with
perverting the law as artifice to exploit for extortion and to control its sale as if they were the
rightful owners.
Thereafter its sale, it is a material fact of record that they intend to misappropriate to themselves
half of the revenue the property produces upon its sale through fraud and deceit. (Not to mention
they are in a position to impose a sale with a kickback to themselves if they so desire; and are
paying off one of their conspirators with a real estate commission at plaintiff’s expense).
In effect, the p-defendants, under the color of the existence of the LCCs refer to this as the basis
for them to usurp plaintiff’s rights and powers to control his own property. Whereby, Pecunies
and all four of plaintiff’s lawyers gave false declarations to harm his legal position and
fraudulently support the case of his opposition. This is verified by the record of the Norwalk
Court. Where everyone except plaintiff played fast and loose with the truth. Such as saying p-
defendant promised for in return for p-defendants saving property from foreclosure was that after
the property was sold they would be entitiled to half of what it could be sold for. promised by
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plaintiff that they could have half of the equity created upon the sale of his property in return for
their involvement.
(but does not define unfair, restraint in trade, or monopoly). The Supreme Court ruled violations
of the Sherman Act are violations of Section 5 of FTC laws. This is under:
Whereby, the p-defendants conducted a “coercive monopoly” to prohibit plaintiff from selling
his property independent of their fiduciary involvement (which was self-dealing). This is with
“unfair methods of competition [and] with unfair or deceptive acts or practices,” in or affecting
[interstate] commerce. Consequently according to this law, their business conduct as persons, the
‘contract,’ and the LLCs as a functioning corporation, engaged in conduct that egregiously
estate market to require they get a share of any money he receives that they arbitrarily determine.
Essentially, they ran roughshod over the principals of fair play and the laws protecting his rights.
Thereby, to force plaintiff’s compliance to their demands, they used tactics of harassment,
threats, and intimidation. Although, the greatest pressure that defendants are bringing to bear on
plaintiff is with abusing the authority of the LLCs to make him homeless and destitute. Since,
defendants violated the agreement made before the contract that plaintiff could live off the
$2,600.00 monthly revenue from collected rents. This is where P&G would receive $6,700.00
monthly rents to pay of the properties debts (mostly embezzled) and plaintiff could collect the
rest. Yet, they forced these tenants who were paying rent to plaintiff to quit in April 2009, by
imposing such a demand; yet this was with plaintiff’s primary income.
Insomuch as under the Sherman Act, the prohibited activities perpetrated by defendants was with
defendants utilized these afore stated entities to carry out unfair methods of competition, in or
affecting commerce, to cause plaintiff to sustain injury. Whereby, the defendants acted in consort
to defraud plaintiff, by applying a palpable degree of deceitful conduct and with unconscionable
In effect, the prohibited activities of defendants were dedicated to ensure they financially
benefited from when plaintiff’s property was sold. Thus, through racketeering activities they
acted to guarantee they would share in his financial windfall. This was acted out in a scheme to
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deprive plaintiff of exercising the option to sell his property independent of defendants control
and involvement. Most noteworthy is that Pecunies laid bare his intentions in _______ of 2007 to
cheat plaintiff. This is when he testified on the Norwalk court record and said: “
This purposed one million compensation to plaintiff for his property is in sharp contrast to the
amount he would have received if not but for his signing the ‘contract’; and the subsequent
imposed control of the LLC’s. (This is with considering the property’s production of $9,000.00
monthly rental revenue applied towards covering the property’s debts from May 2004, instead of
going into P&G’s pockets). Insomuch as the four million sale in _____ 2006 was interfered by
the LLCs without any legitimate justification. Consequently, plaintiff would have netted about
three million without defendants’ involvement, based on a deviously deigned sales agreement
Not to mention, the purposed sale of plaintiff’s property through the ‘contract’ and the LLCs
produced absolutely no benefit for plaintiff whatsoever, only creating emotional distress. Since
the ‘contract’ was presented by the defendants in bad faith to gain an unfair advantage to exploit
and mistreat plaintiff. Thereby, through the ‘contract’s’ creation of the LLCs, it was applied as
an artifice to a scheme to impose financial losses upon plaintiff. Thereafter, the lost revenue of
plaintiff could then be directed towards defendants’ benefit and agenda to obtain ill-gotten
financial enrichment at plaintiff’s expense. This appears to be by any means possible; even with
driving him to an early grave, where he would not be able to contest their fraudulent claims.
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Wherefore, plaintiff was maliciously injured by defendants’ violation of antitrust laws.
Specifically, by their outrageous misuse and intentional perversion of the ‘contract,’ presented
as a purchase agreement, and their activities in the operation of the corporation LCCs. Whereby,
as persons they acted as empowered by right under the color of the existence of the “contract’
and the LLCs as corporations. This is with their abuse to establish the basis for defendants’
dominion over plaintiff’s right to sell his property and privilege to benefit from its potential
In effect, defendant’s control and interference is contributed to their material misconduct with
constructive fraud and extortion . . . that was intended to create a coercive monopoly and restrain
plaintiff from benefiting from selling his property in the open marketplace.
III. Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 violations where :
use of civil RICO action (18 USCS § 1964) as a tool for everyday fraud cases brought
against respected and legitimate enterprises allegedly engaged in pattern of specifically identified
criminal conduct. (Sedima, S. P. R. L. v Imrex Co. (1985) 473 US 479, 87 L Ed 2d 346, 105 S Ct
3275). . .Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) applies to allegations of fraud brought under § 1964, part of
in 18 USCS § 1964 the civil remedies are where the district courts of the United States
shall have jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violations of section §1962 of this chapter by
issuing appropriate orders, including, but not limited to: ordering any person to divest himself of
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any interest, direct or indirect, in any enterprise; imposing reasonable restrictions on the future
activities or investments of any person, including, but not limited to, prohibiting any person from
engaging in the same type of endeavor as the enterprise engaged in, the activities of which affect
with any enterprise to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such
enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity. In order to state a RICO claim
under § 1962, a plaintiff must first demonstrate statutory standing under RICO.
Whereas, plaintiff has standing for a civil RICO action because he meets the two threshold
showings established in Maio v. Aetna: (1) that the plaintiff suffered an injury to his business
and to the equity from his property; and (2) that the plaintiff’s injury was proximately caused by
the defendant’s violation of § 1962. (Maio v. Aetna, Inc., 221 F.3d 472, 483 (3d Cir. 2000).
“Section 1961(4) states that an enterprise "includes any individual, partnership, corporation,
association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact though
not a legal entity." The entities which have been held to be RICO enterprises are numerous and
include individuals and corporations. (United States v. Pryba, 674 F. Supp. 1504 (E.D. Va.
1987), affd, 900 F.2d 748 (4th Cir.), cert, denied. 498 U.S. 924 (1990) ; . . . partnerships,
28
(Silverman v. Niswonger, 761 F. Supp. 464 (E.D. Mich. 1991) ; courts.” (United States v.
Blackwood, 768 F.2d United States v. Brennan, 629 F. Supp. 283 (E.D.N.Y.), offd, 798 F.2d 581
Wherefore, the RICO enterprise in this matter could be considered to exist as: ‘individuals and
corporations’; ‘partnerships’ and by activities carried out in the ‘courts.’ The defendants act on
behalf of, and under the purview of the LLCs, where they are associated together for a common
“(i) the existence of an enterprise engaged in or affecting interstate commerce; (ii) that
defendants were employed by or associated with the enterprise; (iii) that the defendant
participated, directly or indirectly, in the conduct or the affairs of the enterprise; and (iv)
racketeering acts. (Sedima, S.P. R. L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 (1985).
in accordance to §1961(4), the LLCs’ can be defined as a RICO ‘enterprise’ and all the
defendants are involved with the LLCs as associated in fact. Outside of plaintiff having 50%
ownership in the LLCs, he has been completely shut out from having any say or involvement in
all of its business. Rather, the LLCs’ affairs and activities have been under the total purview of
the defendants. In effect, the LLCs from its conception has existed as essentially defendants
29
color of right to empower them with the authority (albeit bogus) to dominate over plaintiff and
The fact history with the circumstances and evidence indicates the defendants function as a
continuing unit; and that the LLC’s are utilized as their platform. Thereby, the LLCs’ existence
has cloaked the defendants with an appearance of legitimacy. Since the activities of the
defendants in doing business with plaintiff in the name of the LLCs is with conducting a criminal
enterprise.
Essentially, the existence of the LLCs is what defendants utilize as a “structure” to base their
operations upon that is a separate entity apart from their pattern of criminal activity. Essentially,
the LLCs are a façade of legitimacy, fabricated with bad faith intentions from fraud and deceit.
Consequently, defendants in the name of the LLCs perpetrated criminal acts, constituting a
pattern of racketeering activity. Since the activity by defendants in the name of the LLCs
involved similar purposes, results, participants and targeted plaintiff as its victim.
In effect, the defendants’ actions to support the agenda of the enterprise involved deception and
an extortion scheme perpetrated against plaintiff. This is where defendants continued to use
wrongful threats and some members acted surreptitiously to support the interests of the
enterprise. Not to mention, deceit was material to the success of the conspiracy. Consequently,
the result of all of the acts of misconduct by the defendants is that through intimidation, for over
five years, they have extorted plaintiff out of exercising and benefiting from the rights to his
30
property. As the predicate acts defendants perpetrated conspiracy to further the extortion involve
theft, bribery and various types of fraud done in a palpable and pervasive pattern.
Consequently, the LLCs can be viewed as an enterprise that is associated with all of the
defendants’ actions. Essentially, the LLCs’ exists with an established hierarchical structure, as
where the p-defendants maintain a role of authority. This is where the p-defendants can be
assumed to have the authority for decision-making and controlling and directing group affairs on
Thus, the overall relationship of the p-defendants with the s-defendants and their collective
actions constitutes an ongoing organization which had organized framework for making
decisions and overseeing and coordinating the commission of various predicate offenses.
Furthermore, the wrongful activities in the name of LLCs have existed as an ongoing and
continuous basis rather than ad hoc basis. (See Ricobene, 709 F.2d at 222).
The prohibited activities, set forth by §1962, is where p-defendants conspired in a criminal
conspiracy in violation of §1962. Insomuch as they unlawfully received income derived directly,
or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity to steal from plaintiff. This is where they
redirected funds that plaintiff was legally entitled to receive for their own use and benefit; such
as from the rental revenue generated by plaintiff’s property. Since the p-defendants utilized the
LLCs as an enterprise to unlawfully demanded rent from the tenants in a pattern of racketeering.
Specifically the most obscene instance is where defendants boldly interfered even without the
slightest justification they could refer to in a constructive context of right. In a nutshell, the
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indictable criminal activities of a RICO nature, perpetrated by defendants are brazen acts of
d) 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b) (2) - extortion obtaining property from another with his consent
induced, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force fear.. or under the color of
official right.
transaction in criminally derived property of a value greater than $10,000 and is derived from
by trickery, scheme, and fraudulent quit claims the material fact that after the agreement expired
in may of 2006
32
2). In violation of §1001(a) (2) Defendants made materially false, fictitious, or
3). In violation of §1001(a) (3) makes or uses any false writing or document
knowing the same to contain any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry of :
following:
a). that they had the right and authority to demand for rents being paid
b).
All of the defendants acted in a conspiracy that according to § 2. Principals committed offenses
against the laws of the United States criminal code. This is where they acted in concert to further
the goals of the conspiracy by aiding, abetting, counseling, commanding, to induce or procure its
commission. Furthermore, all of the defendants willfully and intentionally caused the criminal
acts produced by the conspiracy to be done. Consequently all participants perpetrating wrongful
acts in furtherance of the goals of the conspiracy are punishable as the principal wrongdoers.
33
Petitioner is complaining of defendants "racketeering activity", as defined in section 1961 (l) and
in the Hobbs Act (18 U.S.C. § 1951); where they acted in a conspiracy to further the
plaintiff’s rights and powers to his property, under the color of law and right, as:
"Generally under section 1961 (1) racketeering activity consist of no more or less than
the commission of a predicate act." (Selma, SPRL v Imrex Co., Inc, 473 U.S. 479,495
[1985]).
to violate § 1961 (1) (A). Whereas, their activities constituted crimes of attempted robbery and
attempted extortion and consummated acts of robbery and extortion. Moreover, defendants
committed specific penal violations under § 1961 (1) (B) of Title 18 of the U.S. Code that are
listed below…and with consideration of the circumstances and the evidence can be considered as
indictable:
According to defendants own accounting Philips received $103,000 under the pretext of being a
trustee that was unlawfully debited upon plaintiff and to date is applied to his use and benefit.
(exh )Consequently, this can be concluded that it was to influenced Philips to commit fraudulent
notarization on the authenticity of instruments that he had to have known were fraudulent, This
was where he applied official acts of being a notary to aid in committing, or collude in, or allow,
or make opportunity for the commission of a fraud, on the United States; via the County clerk
34
who participated with exercising her official duty. This was manifested by accepting the filling
Whereby, through a scheme to defraud the p-defendants obtained funds "under the custody or
control of" a bank that were debited upon plaintiff on or about November 17, 2004. This was
achieved by plaintiff authorizing release of funds from a bank to cover refinancing with a new
mortgage. Yet p-defendants violated this authorization and took $380,000 more for their own use
and benefit; plus they opened a line of credit of another $520,000.00 by putting a 2 million lean
on plaintiff’s property. To wit now the $520,000.000 line of credit is now exhausted by P&G’s
neglect to apply the approximately $7,000.00 monthly rental revenue they collected that they
Thereby, perpetrating two acts of fraud involving bank fraud by their unlawful securing and
profiting from an open-end mortgage they secured in 2004. Although the open end total amount
of approximately $900,000.00 was not drawn upon, they clandestinely stole $380,000.00 of the
excess cash generated from their refinancing the mortgage. Since the p-defendants
misrepresented to plaintiff that the refinancing that they had him authorize was only to obtain a
lower mortgage rate. Insomuch as defendants duped plaintiff to believe that his authorizing the
refinancing and the setting up of the LLCs was only for that purpose.
35
Whereby, the open-end mortgage that the p-defendants obtained is a security instrument, subject
to being traded, not the type of note corresponding to a common mortgage. This loan was
absolutely not authorized by plaintiff, rather plaintiff was duped to cooperate with signing the
documents they wanted under the falsehood it was to reduce the mortgage rate from 8½ % to
below 5%. However, they obtained a usury rate of 11 ½ %, established a note that is as a deed
Wherefore, p-defendants exploited the LLCs as an enterprise for the commission of the stated
embezzlement, which involved interstate commerce. This is by the financial institution of M&T
Real Trust, located in Buffalo New York, requiring a wire transfer of funds between states.
Whereas according to statues, p-defendants embezzlement on face constitutes wire and mail
The hundreds in thousands in rents that W&P collected did not go towards paying the mortgage
as was agreed, instead this money was embezzled by them. Consequently, the $520,000 balance
was applied from the open-end credit in lieu of mortgage payments for the property to now be in
default and foreclosure. In addition, it can be concluded that these ill-gotten funds defendants
obtained from the mortgage derivative and rental revenue were applied to maintain their RICO
enterprise. Since, these were funds that directly or indirectly, could be used to maintain their
interest and control of the enterprise; such as with the court costs in housing court and
n). § 1503 - obstruction of justice and corruptly influencing Officers of the Court.
36
o). § 1512 - tampering with a witness, and victim..);
Defendants conspired to injure, oppress, threaten, and intimidate plaintiff, in the free exercise or
enjoyment of his rights and privileges corresponding to ownership of his property . . .that is
secured to him by the Constitution and/or laws of the United States. Moreover, defendants,
willfully acted with intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise or enjoyment of his rights and
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v) § 242. - Deprivation of rights under color of law-
This is where defendants willfully subjected plaintiff to the deprivation of his rights,
privileges, and immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States.
The extortion existed from the point in time in ________? of 200_______? when plaintiff
realized that the p-defendants were acting in bad faith. Consequently, plaintiff communicated the
desire he no longer be bound to the agreement. Yet, defendants were able to impress upon
plaintiff the belief that he was bound by the agreement and with the collaboration of a plaintiff’s
own lawyers communicated to him the belief that he could not do anything with his property
independent of the will of the p-defendants. Thereby, the result was that defendant was coerced
In addition, defendant’s extortion of plaintiff was clearly defined by their acts during the course
of the legal proceeding to evict plaintiff and gain an unlawful advantage to cheat plaintiff.
This was in Norwalk Housing Court and later in the Connecticut Superior Court Mediation
38
The goal of this litigation is to prove defendants committed extortion under color of official right
by misusing the authority and powers of the court to deprive plaintiff of his rights and powers.
This was achieved by perverting the discretionary powers of the judges as public officers to
innocently participate in ruling according to the designs of their scheme. As the artifices to
scheme are the falsified court instruments, and a massive degree of fraud upon the court. This is
where plaintiff’s own lawyers Adamis, Brown and Heisler to participated in the scheme. Since
they coerced plaintiff to sign onto stipulations; such that agreed to open the door for defendants
In addition, the pleadings and relief that defendants sought was to utilize a court order to stifle
plaintiff was achieved by the signed stipulation. This was to prohibit plaintiff from
communicating the facts corresponding to right of title or that he was expecting $1.9 million
after the properties sale. Since it would be a concern of defendants that plaintiff should not
contradict their expressed ambitions that they intended to only share half of what would be left
over after the 1.5 million note was paid off. This is where defendants imposed a $400,000 debt
upon plaintiff that they pocketed for their own benefit. Or any other information plaintiff might
say about the status of his ownership in the property or the property sales co-venture.
Even though the co-venture agreement was moot having expired years before in May 2006, the
LCC still existed under the color of law and defendants imposed their authority to control
plaintiffs property against his wishes that was substantiated as a matter of defendants legal right
by plaintiff’s own lawyers. Since, they acted in collusion to defraud plaintiff by the defendants
39
forcing their control over his property. This is where plaintiff’s lawyers told him that there was
Moreover, the fact history supports the conclusion that defendants executed a devious scheme to
sell the disputed property and appropriate to themselves half of the equity. Albeit after the
approximately 1.5 million debt that they incurred was met. Now with considering that defendants
have already pocketed $500,000 means that if they share two million net of the sale they would
walk away with 1.5 million. Yet, this is without putting up a cent of their money and
simultaneously depriving plaintiff from receiving three million. This is the money plaintiff
would have been paid in 2006, if not but for their malicious interference, which substituted with
Since in order for the defendants to sell the property they would need the unreserved
authorization of plaintiff to verify that there was clear title that was legitimately obtained. Yet,
the fact that defendants did not achieve their final goal with selling the property does not mean
they cannot be held liable for extortion to appropriate the equity from the sale of the property.
This is even after the agreement lapsed, along with the 3 year statute of limitation for fraudulent
conveyance in civil court and 5 years for criminal prosecution. This time of defendants’ inaction
was directly due to the apparent complicity with supporting the defendants’ agenda.
The additional $500,000 line of credit via a preapproved leveraging of a lean on the property was
not exploited. This can be established as material fact by the court records involving defendant’s
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testimonies. Specifically, with declaring the intention based on a bogus claimed agreement and
entitlement to share half of the profits from the sale of both properties is a crime; as:
“In the Hobbs act” the mere threat of an effect on interstate commerce will make the
statute applicable even if the actual effect never occurs. (United States v. Staszcuk, 517
In fact, plaintiff was routinely subjected to mental dominance and emotional abuse by his lawyer,
defendant, Donald Brown. Brown’s mistreatment of plaintiff constituted elder abuse, since he
shamelessly bullied Plaintiff to coerce compliance to his demands. Such as when Brown would
dictate to plaintiff what to do, say or sign something he frequently would scream ‘fuc*ing’
profanities to coerce plaintiff ‘s compliance to his demands through his own will, averse to
Shamelessly, plaintiff’s lawyer, Brown, bullied and exploited his vulnerability to be easily
subjected to comply with coercion to force compliance. This was by his dominating his will to
eventually overpower the weak and timid mind of plaintiff. Thereby, Brown routinely pressured
plaintiff into arbitrary compliance, such as with forcing him to sign the stipulation by
unrelentingly badgering him until he complied. Moreover, Brown misrepresented to plaintiff that
it was of importune necessity and urgency he sign the stipulation, because if he did not they
would be able to suck out all the equity out of his property and he would lose everything. Thus,
defendant was tricked to have feared that if he did not comply with the demands of his lawyer to
sign the stipulation this would cause him to endure a devastating economic disaster as a result.
41
Robert Kalin who represented them in their actions as an attorney at law is by defacto a public
attorney, and an officer of the court, who is issued a commission, is certified and licensed for a
fixed tenure by the state. Kalin perpetrated fraud upon the court to create the facade of how some
standing in a cause of action according to the law. Steven Phillips perverted plaintiff’s trust when
he had him sign papers for two loans and at each time tricked him to sign a quit-claim by
The mortgage note defendants obtained was averse to the agreement that it was to be strictly for
refinancing at a rate below 5%, was in all actuality a security for a credit derivative. Specifically,
a financial instrument that is equity based derived from the tangible assets of leveraged real
estate.
Even, though the known market value of plaintiff’s property had an underlying value of about
$4,000,000, and about 1.1 million in notes owed. This made a 1.5 million mortgage not a high
risk as consistent to the type of note defendants obtained. Yet, M & T Real Estate leveraged a
two million dollar lean on the two properties to secure its note.
In effect, the defendants achieved authorization from plaintiff to refinance by promising plaintiff
of securing a mortgage rate of less than 5%. This was consistent to what was available on the
mortgage market at the time. Yet, the refinancing was transformed into a security note, a
fungible, negotiable instrument representing financial value of two million dollars. This is on the
basis of M & T Real Estate putting up $1, 480, 000, and 00.00 to set up the derivative. This
42
clearly was not a mortgage refinancing, rather a negotiable instrument representing a financial
It shocks the conscience that the rate of the note was set at 11 & 1/2% for 2 years of only
interest, which was ½ % below the maxim legal rate of the usury 12% for high risk. Yet, this is
in spite of the fact that the legal rate at the time was 8%, and interest rates of 4.75% fixed for 2
years were readily available. Especially since the amount obtained was about 38% of the true
appraised value of the property. Consequently, obtaining a low rate of 4.75 or better for 2 years
could have been easily secured as a normal mortgage without any consequential lean placed on
the properties.
Noteworthy, is that the commercially published statistics of the National Monthly Averages of in
November 2004: 5.26% 15 year FRM ; 5.83% 30 years FRM ; and 4.23% 1 year ARM.
Whereby, when Steven Philips signed on to the two quit-claims, he abused and perverted his
power, authority and the public’s trust of sovereignty to attest to the genuineness of documents.
Since, by Philips signing onto the quit-claims he implemented his official power as a certified
notary. Consequently, he committed two incorporated offenses to constitute a predicate act under
18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1) and under § 1951 by his extortion of Del under color of official right. This
was consummated by Philips filing under the color of law, two instruments with the County
Clerk that he misused the clerk’s discretionary authority without her knowledge. Not to mention
defendants Phillips has limited power of attorney and the other name of Philips has power over
the
43
The extortion was carried out by defendants under the color of official right that is in violation of
the The Hobbs Act (18 U.S.C. § 1951), § 50.03 Instruction 50-18 Definition of “Extortion Under
Extortion under color of official right is the use of one's position as a public official, or the
authority of public office, to obtain money or services not due the official or his public office.
(United States v. Middlemiss, 217 F.3d 112 (2d Cir. 2000) ; United States v. Scacchetti, 668 F.2d
Defendants’ misconduct constituted various proscribed activities of extortion; this was achieved
by fraudulently attesting to right of total control of the property, depriving plaintiff of any rights
whatsoever. In effect, mental dominance of plaintiff to block plaintiff from affirming his
plaintiff’s rights to his equity and powers inherent to owning property by substituting his rights
with theirs. Such as by defendants collecting numerous hundreds of thousands of its equity for
Defendants even evicted plaintiff from his own property by misuse of the judicial process.
Plaintiff’s own lawyers participated with the opposition’s perpetration of a fraud upon the court.
Consequently, plaintiff was forced to live in a cheap hotel for 6 months until he gained enough
self confidence to move back into his previous home on 1357 King. In effect, Plaintiff moved
back onto his other property than the one he was evicted from occupying seven months ago.
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C. NATURE OF THE CASE
This action is based on mortgage and security fraud, fraudulent conveyance of tile of two
Defendants while acting under color of law, willfully and unlawfully exacted and took
$380,000.00 by deceitfully leveraging a two leans against plaintiff’s property. This was a
derivative, an open end mortgage, cashed at 1.5 Million and pre approval for up to another
$500,000.00 upon demand of Pecunies who signed onto the instrument as the ‘executive
In effect, defendants’ under the color of right perverted their positions as ‘managers’ to pocket
funds yielded as a surplus of rents, in the numerous tens of thousands to be determined. Not to
mention blatant acts constituting racketeering, such as with demanding by legal notice, and other
coercive pressuring resulted in all of the tenants who were the primary source of plaintiff’s
45
revenue immediately quit and every since “paying him their rent, and thereby, redirect this rent
--------extracting revenue harassing plaintiff to force him to vacate his own property Thereby,
defendants willfully deprived plaintiff of his right under the Fourteenth Amendment not to be
deprived of property without due process of law, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 242.
The elements of an 18 U.S.C. Sec. 242 offense are: (1) the defendant's acts must have deprived
someone of a right secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States; (2) the
defendant's illegal acts must have been committed under color of law; (3) the person deprived of
his rights must have been an inhabitant of a State, Territory, or District; and (4) the defendant
must have acted willfully.” (United States v. Jackson, 235 F.2d 925, 927 (8th Cir. 1956)).
The "constitutional deprivation" element of the section 242 offense charged here consists of three
concepts: the right to "property," a "deprivation," and "due process." It is clear that the right to
acquire, enjoy, own, and dispose of property is protected by the Constitution. (United States v.
In effect, this is exactly how defendants in an unrelenting manner and for over the last five and a
half years wantonly injured plaintiff to defraud him by coercive dominance and intimidation.
46
-------- to their extorting plaintiff out of his rights and powers by forcing him to submit to their
taking over his property and assets. Thereby, defendants extracted the equity out of plaintiff’s
property for their own use and benefit. .As a result of defendants’ malicious mistreatment of
plaintiff his prior prosperous quality of life was substituted with feelings of outrage, anger,
Defendants were outrageously cruel in the manner they mistreated plaintiff to achieve their goal
of illegitimately taking over plaintiff’s property and terrorize him to cause a premature death.
Since, plaintiff early death would clearly support the evil designs defendants have implemented
This was done in a palpable and pervasive pattern of dishonesty, sustained by a myriad of
clear that defendants are engaged in a criminal enterprise where each defendant carried out
specific acts in its furtherance. This was with acts of collusion of plaintiff’s own lawyers with
other defendants, and fraud upon the court. Since all the lawyers performed the important steps
conduct verifies the existence of a conspiracy engaged in an enterprise to deprive plaintiff of the
rights to his property. The issue of fraud upon the court has been determined as a matter of law
“Whenever any officer of the court commits fraud during a proceeding in the court,
he/she is engaged in "fraud upon the court. . . Fraud upon the court is fraud which is
47
directed to the judicial machinery itself. ... It is where the court or a member is corrupted
or influenced or influence is attempted or where the judge has not performed his judicial
function --- thus where the impartial functions of the court have been directly corrupted."
(Bulloch v. United States, 763 F.2d 1115, 1121 (10th Cir. 1985)). . . [It] embrace(s) that
species of fraud which does, or attempts to, defile the court itself, or is a fraud perpetrated
by officers of the court so that the judicial machinery can not perform in the usual manner
its impartial task of adjudging cases that are presented for adjudication a decision
produced by fraud upon the court is not in essence a decision at all, and never becomes
In addiction fraud on the court corresponds to Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure--decided in the 2nd Circuit court: [That] rule 60(b) provides for relief from a
judgment on the basis of fraud.” (Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238,
244-46 64 S.Ct. 997, 1000-01, 88 L.Ed. 1250 (1944); Serzysko v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 461
F.2d 699, 702 (2d Cir.) (per curiam), cert, denied, 409 U.S. 883, 93 S.Ct. 173, 34 L.Ed. 2d 139
Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) provides that a party to an action may by motion seek to vacate a judgment
on the grounds of: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, (2) newly discovered
evidence, or (3) fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct of an adverse party, within one year of
the entry of a final judgment.”. . . “Relief from a final judgment may also be obtained at any time
by way of an independent action to set aside a judgment for "fraud upon the court.". . .
48
D. CAUSE OF ACTION
Plaintiff alleges that under federal statutes many of his constitutional rights, privileges, and
immunities have been violated and that the facts form the basis of criminally conducting a
scheme and artifices that includes fraudulent security instruments, constituting interference with
interstate commerce:
For over the last 5 &1/2 years the defendants engaged in a conspiracy with a palpable pervasive
pattern of outrageous criminal activity to inflict harm onto plaintiff. Their misconduct is
Thereafter, plaintiff’s property has been misapplied for their exclusive use and benefit as if they
were the owners. Clearly, such misconduct is prohibited by RICO, as with: 1) acquiring or
the affairs of the enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity, and (3) conspiring to do
any of the above. These are the activities constituting a RICO offense, determined in United
States v. Vogt, 910 F.2d 1184, 1196 (4th Cir. 1990); United States v. Zang, 703 F. 2d. 1186).
RICO also permits civil suits; by anyone injured in his business or property because of a RICO
coercion, intimidation. . . ." 74 C.J.S.Racketeer (1951). Congress' intent, which was to eliminate
labor racketeering, is found in the House and Senate Reports on the Anti-Racketeering Act of
1934, Pub. L. No. 73-376, 48 Stat. 979, which was the precursor of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. §
1951 (1982).
49
Defendants extorted control and rights of ownership from plaintiff by coercing him under the
color of law, and by perpetrating a hoax in Housing Court with fraud upon the court to extort
Whereby, a violation of civil RICO in §1962 (c) requires (1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3)
through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity. The plaintiff must, of course, allege each of these
elements to state a claim. Conducting an enterprise that affects interstate commerce is obviously
not in itself a violation of §1962, nor is mere commission of the predicate offenses.
Accordingly, plaintiff’s standing is that he: “can recover to the extent that, he has been injured
in his business or property by the conduct constituting the violation.” (473 U. S. 479, 496-97,
105 S, Ct 325. 3285) This is consistent to the RICO misconduct of defendants, which caused
plaintiff to endure devastating harm to his property of equity and quality of life.
Thus, this action arises under Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No.
"The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, which forbids a person to conduct an
"enterprise" through, or make use of income derived from, "a pattern of racketeering activity."
50
Wherefore, plaintiff is pursuing the relief RICO affords with granting caused, threatened or
unfulfilled expressed evil intentions, plus triple damages and attorney fees. Accordingly, plaintiff
can show defendants extorted many hundreds of thousands of dollars through a pattern of
business expectations; such as with blocking plaintiff from being able to carry out his intent to
sell the property in 2006 to several interested parties. This would have been for at least four
million. Thus, their malicious interference was the proximate of not selling the property. Even
the fair market expectation to be well over a million. In addition, to act to deprive monies from
the revenue from the rentals miss appropriated for personal application by Pecunies and Watson.
Since a RICO civil action can’t be pursued in Connecticut Courts, plaintiff embraces his right to
Organizations Act conspiracy occurred in U.S., and Congress surely intended that there
Intercontinental, S.A. v Alvarez Renta (2008, CA11 Fla) 530 F3d 1339, 21 FLW Fed C
812.
51
It has been five years since defendants obtained $380,000.00 from a financial institution in
another state through unlawful securities transaction to impose this gain as a debt upon plaintiff.
This 3.8K fiduciary misappropriation was achieved by clandestinely placing a two million dollar
This said financial instrument was an open-end mortgage, preauthorizing Pecunies to collect
another $500,000.00 upon demand. On the other hand it was devastatingly destructive to
million was cured after a security instrument was created in the form of an open-end mortgage
with M&T bank that initially granted $1, 480,000. The instrument provided for additional
However, plaintiff’s authorization for refinancing was based on refinancing the $960,000.00
note on his property. This was at approximately eight and a half percent and $5000 monthly
“To prove constructive fraud, for purpose showing a fraudulent conveyance, a plaintiff
must show that the conveyance was made without substantial consideration and that the
Guadio (1990) 580 A.2d 1212, 23 Conn. App. 287, certification denied 584 A.2d 471, 217 Conn,
803)
52
The RICO Law corresponding to the Collection of Unlawful Debt says:
unlawful debt in which the defendant has participated as a principal within the meaning
an unlawful debt, 18 USCA § 1962(b) [see § 7], and the conduct of or participation in an
interstate enterprise.”
The "Racketeering activity" plaintiff is complaining about includes a multitude of state and
federal offenses, concentrating on a palpable and pervasive pattern of fraud to achieve extortion.
That is furthered by the conspirators’ separate acts in their participation in a criminal enterprise
dedicated to overpower plaintiff’s ability to affirm his rights in equity to his property. This was
achieved by defendant’s scheme propped up by indictable conduct of fraud and deceit, bribed
witnesses, coercion, harassment to force plaintiff off his property by the order of the city
marshal.
Consequently, due to defendant causing the plaintiff to live in a hotel while defendants rented the
premises in his property as if they were full owners of the properties In spite of the fact that
defendants totally disregarded that plaintiff possessed 50% ownership of the LCC’s. The very
LCC’s that defendants exploited to fraudulently obtain title to impose their rights and powers of
USCS § 1962(c), and to use one's position in enterprise to line one's pocket through
States v Ambrose (1984, CA7 Ill) 740 F2d 505, cert den (1985) 472 US 1017, 87 L Ed 2d
614, 105 S Ct 3479 ) ; (United States v Desimone (1992, CA7) 1992 US App LEXIS
These activities are traditionally conducted between private parties whereby funds are obtained
from the victim with his consent produced by the use of force, fear, or threats.
Whereby, the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Nardello, 393 U.S. 286 (1969) says:
legitimate businesses, and obtain control of labor unions. See President's Commission on
Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: Organized Crime 3-
5 (1967).Prosecutions under the Travel Act for extortionate offenses involving only
private individuals have been consistently maintained. (United States v. Hughes, 389 F.2d
535 (C.A.2d Cir.1968); McIntosh v. United States, 385 F.2d 274 (C.A. 8th Cir.1967);
Marshall v. United States, 355 F.2d 999 (C.A. 9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 815
(1966).
54
Moreover, the professional representation performed by plaintiff’s past lawyers indicates
collusion as the apparent result of under the table bribery. Since all of plaintiff’s lawyers
vigorously acted in furtherance of defendant’s agenda by their constant and continuous acts in
support of defendants goals. This is through ruthless and shameless misconduct to extort plaintiff
through bullying and mental dominance to impose their will and block plaintiff from achieving
his objectives. Not to mention, plaintiff’s lawyers acted maliciously and with evil intent to
intimidate him and inflict devastating harm and the suffering that flows out from such
mistreatment. This consorted activity of abusive mistreatment and cruel abuse vigorously
to act in support of the business and legal interests of defendants. Bribery according to RICO is
the voluntary giving of property for receipt of an illicit benefit. In fact it is directly due to the
lawyers perversion of plaintiff’s trust by affirming the defendants’ ability to achieve their
criminal intentions for the last 5 and a half years. Since, plaintiff relied on his lawyers to support
and articulate his business and legal interests. Yet, they intentional interfered and substituted
Yet, the facts and circumstances, supports the conclusion that plaintiff’s lawyers intentionally
allowed the other defendants get away with their scheme to defraud. Insomuch as the fact history
indicates bribery of plaintiff’s lawyers must have occurred deeded to motivate them to
intentionally neglect to perform the duty they owed. As anyone educated in law would know that
the signed contract was an outrageously unconscionable agreement and defendants could not
55
enforce it in any court of law. Especially, after the two year term to buy the property had expired
in May 2006. In effect, all of the terms of the contract were now moot, due to defendant’s
noncompliance to buy or sell the property as in accordance to the essential intention of the
contract.
This is where plaintiff’s lawyer, Aldamis told him that even though the contract had expired after
its two year time restriction to buy the property it was still a gray area. This is where he
fraudulently claimed that due to the existence of the LCCs, the expired agreement was not
applicable to be resolved by legal. Thus, plaintiff’s lawyers duped him to believe he signed away
his way of life to Pecunies and Watson whom he trusted by tricking him to sign away his farm to
them. Evil doers who wanted to cause paramount emotional injury from their cruel treatment that
------remedy outside of a monetary settlement. Rather than informing plaintiff that the bad faith
by the opposition by not fulfilling the purchase of the property in the two year period made the
that he agreed to enter in good faith and the other party breech their primary promise to purchase
the property.
-commercial bribery statute applicable to giving of money to attorney with intent of influencing
his conduct with relation to his client's affairs over defendant's objection that he was "public
servant" and did not fall within ambit of commercial bribery statute.”(New York: People v.
Tuttle, 45 A.D.2d 750, 356 N.Y.S.2d 652 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974)
56
This afore stated victimization of plaintiff manifested as malicious assaults against his well being
over 5½ years. Thereby, defendant's wrongful misconduct constituted a criminal conspiracy and
a profoundly extensive pattern of racketeering activity. Whereas Supreme Court efforts define
this pervasive pattern of criminal misconduct - as "a series of related predicates," as entailing
"continuity plus relationship"; and this matter is a continuous onslaught of criminal acts
dedicated to inflict devastating harm to plaintiff s already frail and traumatized psyche. There a
myriad amount of wrongful acts overwhelming the two isolated criminal predicate act
-Joint trials are favored in cases that are asserted under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO), 18 USCS § 1961 et seq., because RICO counts are often intended to
allow joinder of separate incidents and defendants into single trial; even if all defendants are not
charged with all predicate acts, joinder is proper to prove existence of enterprise and by
establishing requisite relationship.” (United States v Megale (2005, DC Conn) 363 F Supp 2d
359).
An additional predicate offense particular to this case, is with defendants' engaging in similar
activity related to "collection of an unlawful debt," as proscribed in § 1962(a) - (c). This crime
was consummated by the defendants’ conspiracy as in the deed records indicate in the
Greenwich County Clerk. On November 10th , 2004 and the embezzlement of $380,000 under
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In effect, the primary misconduct of the defendants was to fraudulently acquire with malicious
intent to steal the equity in plaintiff’s property, by seizing control through trickery and fraudulent
deceptions. This is where the defendants tricked plaintiff to sign title over to them and duped him
On the basis of Plaintiff signing for Pecunies and Watson to be managers of his property, they
demanded $6,700.00 monthly revenue of its rents that they collected for 5 years. This was under
the false misrepresentation to plaintiff that the $6,700 would be exclusively applied to pay off the
mortgage and other maintenance applications. Although, defendants initially agreed with
Plaintiff to allow him to collect the other $3,700 in rents, in March 2009 they without right or
authority, demanded by written notice from plaintiffs tenants that the $3,700 was to be paid to
The result of defendants’ unlawful demand that rents are paid to them is that Plaintiff from his
primary source of income, the rent from his property. Further, the defendants have imposed
exclusive control to sell plaintiff’s property is that has been listed since last May of 2009. This
control over plaintiff’s property has been accomplished through the participation of the other
defendants in a conspiracy to control his property through continuous acts of fraud, coercion and
harassment.
Consequently, the accumulated result of defendant's actions to deprive plaintiff of his rights to
his property is that they interfered with his ability to sell his property at the height of the market
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in 2006. This deprived him of well over a million dollars in addition to the many hundreds of
thousands of revenue they illegally pocketed as a result of imposing their control. This is where
the overt acts of each of the defendants facilitated the current success of the criminal enterprise
that would not have happened without their collective participation, as the law says:
“In RICO an "enterprise" refers to virtually any grouping, business or otherwise, (broadly
defining "enterprise" to include any "group of persons associated together for a common
purpose in a course of conduct" (United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 [1981]). In
corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals
“There is sufficient evidence that could readily support defendant's indictment for Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) conspiracy . . . that is in violation of 18 USCS
§ 1962(d) Even though there was no direct evidence that defendant entered into agreement to
violate RICO, the tier of facts could infer from evidence that defendant entered into agreement
with fellow members of Outlaw Motorcycle Club to violate RICO by operating drug ring.”
(United States v Lawson (2008, CA6 Ohio) 535 F3d 434, 2008 FED App 273P.
Plaintiff relied on his lawyers to support his legal position and his business interests. Yet, the fact
history supports the conclusion that their professional conduct was clearly dedicated to support
the defendants’ legal agenda. Thus, as a causation of this situation, plaintiff was isolated from
knowing his true legal position. Consequently, plaintiff was only able to find out about that the
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defendants had filed a transfer of title in mid October of 2009 when a friend researched the deed.
The title transfer occurred after defendants tricked petitioner to sign two quit-claims.
Moreover, plaintiff’s own council duped him to believe he had no legal option after signing onto
Watson. Hence, according to the "injury discovery" rule, a civil RICO cause of action accrues
upon a plaintiffs discovery that he or she has been injured.” (Klehr, 117 S. Ct. at 1989). This rule
has been applied in the first (Rodriguez v, Banco Central, 917 F,2d 664,665-66 (Is Cir. 1990));
Second (Bankers Trust Co. v Rhoades, 859 F.2d 1096, 1102 (2d Cir. 1988).
At the time of November 3rd 2004, Philips tricked plaintiff to sign on to the second quit-claim on
the fraudulent pretext it was paperwork for a $20,000.00 loan. Thereafter, Philips signed onto
this instrument in his official capacity as Stephan G. Philips, Commissioner of the Superior
Court, Fairfield County, Connecticut (exh,). This quit claim accompanied other instruments filed
with the County Clerk, misrepresented to plaintiff to be for refinancing of an approximately one
million mortgage on his two properties. This is where the two properties had a combined
mortgages believed to be somewhere around 8½% and the two mortgage notes placed a
Yet, the new mortgaged defendants filed with the county clerk along with the second quit-claim
transformed the mortgage on the two properties to be 11½% and imposed $2,000,000.00 lean. It
is comical that years later when plaintiff was told by a real estate friend that there was a two
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million dollar lean on his property, and had subsequently asked Phillips about it, he said: “it was
This can be verified as a material fact by his health-aid Joanne Gramacy. Since she was present
and a witness to the material fact that plaintiff was tricked by sham loans to unknowingly sign
away title to his properties. This is for four acres in Greenwich, surrounded by mansions that are
Consequently, a forensic appraisal of November 2004 is expected to verify that plaintiff could
have netted $3,000,000.000 on the open market for what he signed over for $40,000.00 in
exchange. This is where Johanna’s presence is verifiable on the April 21st signing onto the quit-
Yet, Ms Gramacy was deceived on the November 3rd signing of the quit claim. Since she was
present to be a witness to what she was always against plaintiff singing anything whatsoever
with Pecunies, Watson and Philips. . . that it was a meeting for plaintiff’s personal loan and
refinancing, and certainly not for plaintiff to transfer away ownership of his property without
him receiving anything in return. This signing occurred in the Mercedes Benz office in
Greenwich with ‘QUIT CLAIM DEED’ written in bold type, and signed “in the presence of:”
and witness to defendants John L Cox (account for Mercedes Benz of Greenwich and Lauren
reasonable to consider the possibility that QUIT CLAIM was added after plaintiff signed the
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In addition, Phillips identified himself on a document that was a proposed instrument of an
accounting that he had received $103,000 under the color of being the Trustee of the LCC’s
(exh.). Yet, in actuality Philips was a trustee de son tort, since Del is lawfully 50% owner of the
two LCC’s that Philips is the trustee and the LCC never had one meeting. Thus Del along with
the other principals was required to appoint any new member and the assigning Philips as a
F. DAMAGES
“An action for tortious interference with a prospective business relation protects the right
'to pursue one's business, calling, or occupation free from undue influence or
molestation.” (Printing Mart v Morristown, 563 A.2d at 36 (quoting Louis Kamm, Inc. v.
Flink, 175 A. 62, 66 (N.J.1934)..(Lightning Lube v Witco Corp. (1993, CA318 USCS §
1962 NJ) 4 F3d 1153, RICO Bus Disp Guide (CCH) P 8379, 38 Fed Rules Evid Serv
902, 26 FR Serv 3d 1468, subsequent app (1994, CA3 NJ) 39 F3d 1170 and (criticized in
Schudel v GE (1997, CA9 Wash) 120 F3d.
prepared the instruments for their gain to be legitimately constructed upon defendant’s liability.
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However, through the wisdom of the legislators, our laws protect us from acts of ‘constructive
fraud’ achieved under ‘false pretenses.’ Not to mention, the principal of the doctrine of ‘unclean
hands’ states that those with ‘dirty hands’ are not entitled to relief in equity. Moreover, the
doctrine means one who has defrauded his adversary in the subject matter of the action would
not be herd to assert his right in equity. Under this doctrine, the court of equity may deny relief
to a party whose conduct has been inequitable, unfair, and deceitful. As this doctrine is
applicable when the reprehensible conduct complained of pertains to the controversy at issue.
Whereas, Phillips’ bungling adventurous representation of defendants, Pecunies and Watson has
lead them into being in a deep abyss of verifiable liability. This is where Philips as their lawyer
signed on to all their instruments as a witness corresponding to the fraudulent title transference,
million dollar open ended loan, and mortgage. As the conveyance of title was strictly based on
the prior owner (plaintiff) having received a $40,000 mortgage on his property. . .that is issued
While, plaintiff first learned that conveyance of the title to his property had occurred five years
after the fact with not knowing he has signed quit claims that were misrepresented as the
paperwork for his $40,000 loan. Rather, the court and his lawyers have been going by his
contract (exh. A) and the establishment of the shared ownership in the charter of the LLCs that
legally empowered defendants with a claim to title of 50% ownership. However, although the
terms of the contract were misrepresented not to include things that were included (such as
where plaintiff would only get $100, 000.00 a year until he was 103 years old); still as one side
as the terms are it does state plaintiff was authorizing for refinancing (to get a better rate) and a
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$40,000.00 pay-out with the refinancing he approved. In addition that the collection of the rents
were to be directed to paying off the properties debts, perhaps two hundred thousand dollars of
the rental revenue is reported towards going towards legal fees to act in bad faith of the terms of
the agreement. Such as with defendants evicting plaintiff from his farm produce store and now
from his home to force him to agree for them to sell his properties as if it was their own.
Therefore as defendant has entered the ‘agreement’ as evidence to their claim of legal right
within the dynamics of the agreed bargain between parties, they are barred by judicial estoppel to
deviate or contradict its terms. Exactly what is occurring at this time where defendant are
estopped from now being able to prove that they have legal ownership on the basis that the RKD
Venture and RKD Venture Two, states on each charter that plaintiff assigns 25% to both
Pecunies and Watson in each LLC that identifies (albeit by a past typo) 1753 Kings St on each
LLC.
However, for the court to go by the signatures on the LLC’s that were established for a sale that
never occurred, as verifying to the veracity of defendants claim of 100% is substantiated, they
are ruling outside the courts own established jurisdiction. Since the defendants had entered into
evidence the agreement as proving the conveyance of tile to be 50-50 as a material fact to the
satisfaction of the court. Thus, the inherent principals of jurisprudence prevents them from now
changing their claim that in 2004 when the alleged conveyance occurred it was not to be 50-50,
but that they obtained100% ownership of defendants home. Albeit not by giving plaintiff any
money whatsoever, but by the enforceable power of plaintiff’s signature on the agreement. Even
though petitioner pleads, the agreement was obtained through false pretenses and trickery and
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that its term had lapsed over three years ago when defendants breeched its core condition. This
was that they agreed to buy the property by the end of 2006 for 3 million, or if the property was
sold to an outsider it would be for $4 million and they would receive $500,000 under the term of
the contract. Yet when plaintiff had two buyers wanting to pay 4 million they wanted more
Yet, for the last three years the Norwalk Court recognizes the agreement as an enforceable claim
to tile for defendants. This is on the basis it says that the property is to have 50-50 ownership and
that plaintiff agrees defendants are to manage his property. Consequently, the court has long
participated with affirming defendants agenda that plaintiff should cooperate with their interest
As now with Judge Grogins’ outrageously inappropriate order of execution of eviction from
plaintiffs home to make him homeless and destitute, upon plaintiff’s default because he is too ill
to travel for another 6 weeks. This is where the agreement is acknowledged by the rulings of
Judge Hickey, Grogins, and Moore of the Norwalk Court as constituting defendant’s claim of
The lending institution neglected their implied professional duty of responsibility to do due
diligence to insure that the tile transfer was the intention of the prior owner. Not to mention, the
one million open-end-loan assigned to Pecunies and Watson. Thereafter, they drew down the
entire $900,000.00 upon their whim, plus additional exorbitant interest and penalties being
leveraged on plaintiff’s property. Although one would think that upon review of the mortgage’s
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structure the lending bank (M&T) before approving the mortgage/loan would have been
motivated to consult with plaintiff, if not but for their own business interests.
produced some signed papers of another person to qualify them to receive a pre-approved million
dollar cash payout. This money was offered by the placing a two million dollar lean on the basis
of signed papers with the name of the owner of property to give the cash to the applicant. How
could such deficiency of demonstrated authorization from the owner not be viewed as having the
“business relationship” is analogous to where the “borrower” could have turned out to have been
a home-aid. Yet, after paying out the trusting senior the $40,000.00, has since left the country
with the $900,000 that they got through leveraging it on the seniors property. Albeit such a deed
trust was by a third party who offered to do a senior’s paperwork to get them a $40,000 payout
and a better rate of mortgage from refinancing their property. As exactly what occurred where
defendant obtained plaintiff’s signatures under the false pretense. Specifically, the bargain in the
‘agreement’ was it was for getting a better rate on the mortgage and a “40, 000.00 loan” which
Consequently, such a scenario would place the lending institution in a precarious position to
enforce the additional million dollar debt on the unsuspecting senior who only received
$40,000.00 of the million dollar pay out. On the other hand, Pecunies and Watson are not
66
someone who are without assets and earning twenty thousand a year. Rather, they have fiduciary
credibility and financial substance that they may have benefited from to plaintiff’s detriment.
Accordingly, when an actor wants to impose a $900,000 debt (the open end loan) on another
person for their own benefit by manner of imposing a lean or liability on another, a written
authorization is required from the party bearing the accountability. Since, no such authorization
exists the lender is stuck with going after Pecunies and Watson for the two million that they
borrowed to pay off about 1.1 million of the properties debts. Insomuch as, the over two million
dollar lean on defendants property most likely will prove to be unenforceable under the fraud
statutes. Although with plaintiff will benefit from the unencumbering of his property due to
defendants being liable for the over two million debt they won’t benefit when the compensatory
While it seems that Phillips, who specializes in the practice of Tax Law, felt that his approval of
the instruments, legally served the business interests of his clients, Pecunies and Watson.
However, the law will prove their signing on to these irregular instruments would have a
profoundly detrimental effect of severely injuring their financial interests. Not to mention, the
legal instruments Philips produced and instruments of tile he attested as a witness or notarized
are all unenforceable in a court of law. Consequently, the fact that Pecunies and Watson each
signed on to the mortgages for one million dollars as the ‘borrower’ means that they are stuck
with the debt and plaintiff has no bank debt on his property. Since, the two million dollar lean on
the properties was obtained without proper authorization and Pecunies and Watson received one
million each as being the “borrowers,” while they committed bank fraud by each signing to:.
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“THE CONDITION OF THIS DEED IS SUCH, that whereas the Mortgagor is justly
indebted to the Mortgagee in the sum of Two Million and 00/100 Dollars
($2,000,000.00) the Mortgagor hereby represents, warrants and covenants with the
Mortgagee that the Mortgagor is the sole owner of the Premises; is lawfully seized and
possessed of the same in fee simple; that the same are free from all encumbrances, except
as provided on Exhibit B; that the Mortgagor has good right, full power and lawful
authority to give, grant, bargain, sell, and convey the same in the manner as aforesaid.”
The manner of second malpractice injury is that on face, petitioners’ claim of right to title exists
only as a ‘Color of Title.’ Since petitioners’ claim of ownership to the disputed properties,
corresponds to receiving the transfer of title properties in an egregiously irregular regular. Such
as where the filed documents are defective in content and appear to be the product of
“constructive fraud.’ Since the mortgage filed has major defects with the admission of signing
onto the liability for the one million mortgages for each property. Insomuch, as the mortgage
substituted petitioner having purchased the property. Instead, the consideration for the
This is just one of numerous elements of material facts exhibited in the documents of record that
constitutes an irregular chain of title to justify petitioner’s claim has no standing in fact and law.
However, fortunately for Philips, the doctrine of ‘unclean hands,’ shields him from being sued
by Pecunies and Watson for malpractice. On the other hand, Philips shares full culpability in
criminal and tort court for all the injury that his clients inflicted upon defendant, under the law of
conspiracy.
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Title 52, ch. 923a Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act § 52-552e (4) Elements of, fraudulent intent:
“Party seeking to set aside conveyance as fraudulent bears burden of proving either that
conveyance was made without substantial CON sideration and rendered transferor
unable meet his obligations, or that conveyance was made with fraudulent intent in
which grantee participated; only one of two alternatives need be satisfied.” (Tyers v.
Coma (1990) 570 A.2d 186, 214 Conn. 8).
However, the immediate liability is to the ‘title insurer’ after the properties reverts back to
defendant as always having been the legitimate owner. Since the insurer guarantees against any
loss, due to any defects in title and when property is illegitimately sold or is mortgaged. In
addition they cover conveyances altered before recording, persons of unsound mind, falsification
of records, forged deeds, or releases obtained by fraud, duress, or coercion in securing essential
signatures
The facts and circumstances of plaintiff’s grievance meets the elements of a section 1983
claim under the ‘due process clause’ to establish his entitlement for relief. Since " . . .Every
person . . .," including, state judges may be sued for conduct performed in their official capacity
for declaratory or injunctive relief. Accordingly, the Judges, Hickley, Grogins, and Moore of the
Norwalk Housing Court “ . . . who under the color of [state law] . . . ” “have exercised power
69
possessed by virtue of state law; and made possible only because they are clothed with the
authority of state law;" and such actions constitute abuses of the position given to them by the
state.
The complained decisions of these Judges were to such a degree of being unfair, arbitrary
and capricious so as to shock the conscious of society. Thereby, causing “ . . . the deprivation of
rights . . . ” for plaintiff’s to be heard in a court of equity to protect his rights to the possession
of the property he owns; and, ". . . subjects or causes to be subjected . . ." his rights to his
property; and these judges " . . . shall be liable . . . in an action at law, . . . or other proper
proceeding for redress . . . ;" such as with petitioners application for declaratory and injunctive
relief.
Whereas the rulings over the last month by Judge Moore and Grogins against plaintiff
were to deny him the time that he required to appear at the trial was totally unreasonable.
Insomuch with considering the tremendous weight of the extraordinary facts and circumstances
brought to these judges’ attention in papers by plaintiff’s pleadings to readily justify the
continuance until April 3rd was justified. In addition to having shown in movant papers to Judge
Moore that the ruling of granting “U& O’ was a product of “fraud upon the court” by the
opposition; and subsequently must be vacated, since it was obtained by their making a false
declaration of his clients having 100% ownership. Yet, Judge Moore denied the movant for
vacating the Use & O,” without any commentary of explanation, and turning a blind eye to rule
Even though defendant was collaterally estopped, by having prior entered into the record
the ‘agreement’ that states their 50% claim of ownership. Moreover, although the corresponding
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motion of defendant to Judge Moore (based on her ruling of the “U&O” ) was served on the
opposition and filed on the 29th of January her ruling was made 4 & ½ weeks later on the 23 rd of
February. Albeit was restricted to just a decision on the denial of the application for the
continuance (exh. ).
Moreover, the time the decision of denial was received by plaintiff in Florida on the 26 th
of February, one day after the trial. This deprived plaintiff of the ability to decide to put his
health in serious jeopardy to avoid the execution of a default judgment that has occurred.
However, even the option of appearing on the 25th would not have been possible because plaintiff
did not have the funds required to pay for any mode of transportation. Essentially, it is a material
fact that plaintiff is completely broke, heavily in debt, and all his credit cards are maxed out.
Since, the last rental revenue from plaintiff’s tenant from renting his garage and the masonry
business using his land was recently maliciously blocked by defendants conduct of interference
with his business expectations This makes it not possible that plaintiff could have obtained the
funds need to get to Connecticut to have appeared if he wanted to before being driven to
Whereby, although the trial was set for 2:00 AM, Judge Grogins declared a default
judgment entered a 2:12 PM when a trial brief and Affidavit in support by plaintiff was filed at
2:27 PM. Consequently, at this time plaintiff is moving to vacate the default judgment for cause,
and seeking for his constitutional rights to be affirmed in accordance to the ‘due process clause”
of the 14th Amendment. As this grants plaintiff with procedural due process rights requiring that
certain steps, such as a hearing, be followed before a person's life, liberty, or property can be
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Accordingly, plaintiff’s side has not been fully heard and the pleadings of defense and
counterclaim stated in his filed papers have been ignored by Judge Groggins and Moore.
Judge Grogins’ policy was to make it a requirement plaintiff pays the petitioning party to
an eviction action $3,350 in order to have the trial adjourned six weeks when I am physically
In effect, as I reported
Even though plaintiff documented the certainty of his ability to prevail. As this was in
extraordinary great detail showing in facts, circumstances and law in detailed and comprehensive
moving papers to Judge Grogins on the 25 and 26 of January (exh ) and Judge Moore on the 29 th
of January. This is where plaintiff informed the judges that the party seeking to evict him
other injunctive relief; specifically for the title to the two disputed properties is to be recognized
as a constructive trust. As this court shall enforce ownership rights; starting reinstatement of the
title of ownership to be reverted back to the name of plaintiff. Consequently, plaintiff seeks
recovery of all inflicted damages of a compensatory nature; an award for the amount imposed to
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right; damages as a result of malicious interference with reasonable business expectancies; and
the afore stated damages in totality are to be granted treble damages. As is provided under
provision 18 USC 1964 (c), attorney's fees, and whatever other relief the court may deem to be
“Claim for relief under treble damage provision of 18 USCS § 1964 may properly be
based upon allegation of conspiracy between defendant corporation and its agents or
employees to violate 18 USCS § 1962. (Callan v State Chemical Mfg. Co. (1984, ED Pa)
Philips unduly influenced plaintiff and through deception has power of attorney, trustee of the
LCC
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