Hizballah

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Cover photo: Children dressed as Hizballah mujahideen (holy warriors) tram-

pling U.S. and Israeli flags at an Al-Quds Day demonstration in Beirut, Lebanon.
TERRORISM BRIEFING
Hizballah
The “Party of God”
Yehudit Barsky
THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

Yehudit Barsky is the director of the Division on Middle East and
International Terrorism of the American Jewish Committee and an
associate scholar of the Foreign Policy Research Institute. She holds
an M.A. in International Relations and Near Eastern Studies from
New York University and is the author of a forthcoming book on
Hamas, “Jihad Is the Way”—The Terror of Hamas, as well as numer-
ous monographs. Ms. Barsky’s publications for the American Jew-
ish Committee include The Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine,
Hamas—the Islamic Resistance Movement of Palestine, Usama Bin
Ladin and Al-Qaìda, and The Brooklyn Bridge Shooting: An Inde-
pendent Review and Analysis.
Copyright © 2003 The American Jewish Committee

All rights reserved.
Publication date: May 2003
ISBN 0-87495-123-2
Contents
Foreword v
Hizballah—the “Party of God” 1
The Ayatollah Khomeini as the Supreme Jurisconsult 2
Origins: “There Is Only One Party, the Party of Allah!” 4
The Symbol of the Movement 5
Front Organizations 6
“A Muslim Youth in Lebanon Smiled at Death” 6
Ideology 9
The Obligation to War and Jihad 12
Hizballah’s Terror Activities 14
Hizballah’s Role in the Israel Embassy
and AMIA Bombings 16
Funding 20
Iran, Hizballah, and International Terrorism 21
Hizballah and the Islamic Jihad Movement
in Palestine 23
Hizballah and Hamas 25
Hizballah, Syria, and Lebanon 26
Hizballah and Al-Qaìda 26
Hizballah and the Palestinian Authority 28
iii
iv Contents
Hizballah’s U.S. Activities 29

“Islamic Revolution Is the Only Solution” 31
Fund-Raising in the United States 37
Conclusion 39
Notes 39
Foreword
A
s the war on terrorism advances, it has become increasingly
evident how widespread, complex, and dangerous is the
network among fanatical Islamic radical groups. The pres-
ent study focuses on Hizballah, the Lebanon-based, Iran-backed
Shiì radical organization, with a twenty-year history of attacks on
Western and Jewish targets, which seeks to export Khomeini-style
revolution throughout the world.
Hizballah’s worldview sees an apocalyptic confrontation
between Islam and the West, in which every earthly terror attack is
a small blow in the “Divine struggle against Satan.” Its spiritual
mentor, Shaykh Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, has defended sui-
cide bombings as the unconventional weapons of “oppressed Mus-
lims.”
In this struggle, Hizballah’s trail of blood is very long. In the
early 1980s it was responsible for the truck bombing of the U.S.
Marine barracks that killed 241 Marines, the suicide attacks on the
American embassy in Beirut, and the hijacking of TWA flight 847
that resulted in the murder of a U.S. Navy diver. More recently, the
roles of Iran and Hizballah have been revealed in the early 1990s
attacks on the Israeli embassy and the AMIA Jewish community
center building in Buenos Aires, and in the 1996 Khobar Towers
bombing in Saudi Arabia.
Hizballah’s network is truly worldwide. Its cells are reported to
function in at least twenty states, including the United States,
Britain, Germany, France, and Pakistan. The present report docu-
ments its ties to the Irish Sinn Fein and its involvement in violence
emanating from the lawless South American Tri-Border area, shared
by Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay. It also reveals Hizballah’s coop-
v
vi Hizballah: The “Party of God”
eration with Al-Qaìda, having helped dozens of Bin Laden opera-

tives flee from Afghanistan to Iran.
On the Arab-Israeli front, by virtue of Iran’s close ties to Syria
and Syria’s control of Lebanon, Hizballah has served as Syria’s proxy
in destabilizing the southern Lebanese border with Israel. Since
1985, it has launched over 4,000 Katyusha attacks against the
northern Israeli town of Kiryat Shemona alone. Throughout the
1990s Hizballah served as the vehicle for dispensing Iranian funds
to Palestinian terrorist organizations, including Hamas, the Islamic
Jihad Movement in Palestine, and the Popular Front for the Libera-
tion of Palestine. More recently, Hizballah was implicated in the
shipment of fifty tons of illegal Iranian-manufactured arms to the
Palestinian Authority, intercepted by the Israeli Navy’s capture of
the Karine A off Israeli waters.
This study traces the trail of Hizballah to our own home front,
where a number of Hizballah cells are said to function in the Unit-
ed States, raising millions of dollars through front organizations
and criminal activity, including copyright violations, cigarette tax
fraud, and counterfeit operations. The message of Hizballah is more
openly disseminated through the Muslim Student Association-Per-
sian Speaking Group and through the pulpits of some American
mosques. Programs of Hizballah’s Al-Manar television station have
aired on Detroit’s Channel 23, and Hizballah calendars have been
distributed through the Islamic Center of America in Detroit.
Understanding the complex relationships between Islamic radi-
cal groups and terror-sponsoring nations requires the depth of
knowledge and intelligence-gathering capacity that has been the
hallmark of the American Jewish Committee’s Division on Middle
East and International Terrorism. Established in 1999, DMEIT
focuses on interpreting and disseminating “open-source intelli-
gence.” DMEIT’s director, Yehudit Barsky, applying her proficiency
in the Arabic language and extensive knowledge of the Islamic
world, evaluates, digests, and explains vast amounts of data to pro-
duce an in-depth, informative study such as this portrait of Hizbal-
lah.
Foreword vii
This report is the fourth in a series of terrorism briefings she has

prepared, the previous ones having focused on Al-Qaìda, Hamas,
and the Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine. (The reports are all
available at www.ajc.org.) Like its predecessors, it brings invaluable
insights into the ideology and workings of international terrorist
groups that pose an existential threat to the United States, Israel,
and the West.
David A. Harris
Executive Director
The American Jewish Committee
May 2003
Hizballah–The “Party of God”
Killing is our habit. Our dignity, which is martyrdom, comes from
God.1
Banner displayed outside the office of Hizballah’s representative to
the Lebanese Parliament, Muhammad Ra’ad, in Nabatiyah,
Lebanon, April 2002
It is our pride that the Great Satan [the United States] and the
head of despotism, corruption, and arrogance in modern times con-
siders us as an enemy that should be listed on the terrorism list. I
say to every member of Hizballah: Be happy and proud that your
party has been placed on the list of terrorist organizations as the
U.S. views it.2
Hizballah leader Shaykh Hassan Nasrallah, November 4, 2001
We are headed for dealing with evil at the roots and the roots are
America.3
Imam Khomeini, the leader, has repeatedly stressed that America is
the reason for all our catastrophes and the source of all malice. By
fighting it, we are only exercising our legitimate right to defend our
Islam and the dignity of our nation.4
We see in Israel the vanguard of the United States in our Islamic
world. It is the hated enemy that must be fought until the hated
ones get what they deserve.5
Hizballah’s Manifesto: “Open Letter from Hizballah to the Down-
trodden in Lebanon and the World,” February 1985.
Let the entire world hear me. Our hostility to the Great Satan is
absolute….
I conclude my speech with the slogan that will continue to rever-
berate on all occasions so that nobody will think that we have
weakened. Regardless of how the world has changed after Septem-
1
2 Hizballah: The “Party of God”
ber 11, “Death to America” will remain our reverberating and

powerful slogan: Death to America.6
Hizballah leader Hassan Nasrallah, at a Beirut rally in support of the
Palestinian intifada, September 2002
Martyrdom operations—suicide bombings—should be exported
outside Palestine. I encourage Palestinians to take suicide bombings
worldwide. Don’t be shy about it.7
Sermon by Hizballah leader Shaykh Hassan Nasrallah broadcast on
Al-Manar Television, December 2002
On Al-Quds Day, I reaffirm to you that Israel will be eliminated
one day, God willing.8
Hizballah’s Shaykh Hassan Nasrallah at an Al-Quds Day rally, 1999
Hizballah, or the “Party of God,” is a Lebanon-based Shiì Islamic
radical terror organization with a twenty-year history of attacks
against Westerners, Israel, and Jews. The movement’s “spiritual
mentor” is Shaykh Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, and its secretary
general is Shaykh Hassan Nasrallah. Over the past decade, Hizbal-
lah has expanded its terror attacks against Israelis and Jews from the
Middle East throughout the world. Hizballah ultimately seeks to
eradicate Western influence and promotes the cause of a Khomeini-
style Islamic revolution throughout the Middle East, and, ultimate-
ly, the world.
The United States has officially designated Hizballah as a for-
eign terrorist organization (FTO) by the State Department’s Office
of Counterterrorism9 since 1997. On November 2, 2001, President
Bush updated Executive Order 13224 of September 23, 2001,10 to
include the freezing of the assets of organizations and individuals
linked to Hizballah in the United States.11
The Ayatollah Khomeini as the Supreme Jurisconsult

The Ayatollah Khomeini’s Islamic revolution of 1979 established
an Islamic state based upon Shiì traditions that he radically reinter-
preted in order to legitimize a concept known in Persian as velayat-
e-faqih and in Arabic as wali al-faqih—the rule of the supreme
The Ayatollah Khomeini as the Supreme Jurisconsult 3
jurisconsult. The concept that he delineated provided for an Islam-

ic state to be ruled by a rahbar, a quasi-infallible leader who would
rule absolutely over all Shiìs as a marjaì taqlid, supreme guide.12
Upon his accession to power in 1979, the Ayatollah Khomeini
claimed authority as the supreme guide of Shià all over the world,
including the Shià of Lebanon. Hizballah designated Khomeini as
its supreme Jurisconsult13 as a demonstration that the movement
revered his ideologies as well as acknowledged his leadership as
Divinely inspired.
Hizballah leader Shaykh Hassan Nasrallah explained:
We must obey the wali al-faqih; disagreement with him is not
permitted. The guardianship of the faqih is like the guardianship
of the Prophet Muhammad and of the infallible imam. Just as the
guardianship of the Prophet Muhammad and the infallible imam
is obligatory, so too is the guardianship of the faqih ... his wisdom
derives from God and the family of the prophet, and he
approaches the Divine.... When the wali al-faqih orders someone
to obey and that person disobeys, that is insubordination against
the imam. When the wali al-faqih orders someone to be obeyed,
such obedience is obligatory.14
Commensurate with his goal of exporting the Islamic Revolu-
tion, in a 1981 sermon Ayatollah Khomeini called upon Muslims
throughout the world to take up arms and to galvanize themselves
in a revolt against the United States and other “enemies of Islam.”
He memorialized this demand in a political observance that he
called the “Day of Al-Quds” or Jerusalem Day, which is annually
observed on the third Friday of the Muslim holy month of
Ramadan. Khomeini ordained the observance of Al-Quds Day as
an event that would “behoove the world’s Muslims to rid them-
selves of the shackles of bondage to the Great Satan [i.e., the United
States] and superpowers.”15
In his address on the first observance of Al-Quds Day, Khomei-
ni called for a revolution of Muslims throughout the world:
O, you Muslims of the world! You oppressed masses! Rise up and

take your destiny into your hands. How long do you intend to sit
quietly while your fate is determined in Washington or Moscow?
Until when should Quds [Jerusalem] be trampled under the
boots of the residue of the United States, the usurper Israel? How
long should Quds, Palestine, Lebanon and the oppressed Mus-
lims be under the domination of criminals while you remain
onlookers, while some of your treacherous rulers aid them? How
long should almost one billion Muslims and 100 million Arabs,
with vast lands and endless resources, continue to suffer plunder-
ing by the East and the West and oppressions and inhumane
massacres by them and their residue?
Khomeini concluded his remarks with a call for his followers to
take up arms: “Why don’t you stand against the enemies of Islam
and use firearms and military might and a God-inspired power?”16
Origins: “There Is Only One Party, the Party of Allah!”

Hizballah is the Islamic radical revolutionary movement in
Lebanon that was inspired and encouraged by the Ayatollah
Khomeini subsequent to Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution. Its pur-
pose is to export the Islamic Revolution throughout the world. The
movement was named for the last words of the Iranian cleric Aya-
tollah Mahmud Ghaffari, who died under torture in Qom, Iran, in
1973. Ghaffari, who became a hero of the Islamic Revolution, was
quoted as saying: “There is only one party, the Party of Allah!”17
Following the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the cleric’s son, Hadi Ghaf-
fari, known as the “machine gun mullah,”18 served as a minister in
the Khomeini government. He was charged with the responsibility
of cooperating with Hizballah in Lebanon.19
Mahmud Ghaffari’s reference to the Arabic phrase Hizb (Party)
Allah (of God) was taken from two verses in the Qur’an. The first
verse states:
And whoever takes Allah and His Apostle and those who believe
for a guardian, then surely, the Party of Allah, they are they that
The Symbol of the Movement 5
shall be triumphant.20 [Emphasis added.]

The second verse refers to the reward that is promised to those
who are faithful on the Day of Judgment:
You shall not find a people who believe in Allah and the Latter
Day [Day of Judgment] befriending those who act in opposition
to Allah and His Apostle, even though they were their own
fathers, or their sons, or their brothers, or their kinsfolk; these are
they into whose hearts He has impressed faith, and whom He has
given strength and with an inspiration from Him; and He will
cause them to enter gardens beneath which rivers flow, abiding
therein; Allah is well-pleased with them, and they are well-
pleased with Him; these are Allah’s Party: now surely the Party of
Allah are the successful ones.21 [Emphasis added.]
The Symbol of the Movement

Hizballah’s symbol consists of the name of the movement out of
which emerges a globe with an upraised arm grasping an AK-47
rifle. The arm grasping the rifle signifies the martyrdom of Imam
Husayn and links it to the militancy of the movement today. The
globe represents Hizballah’s desire to see its brand of Islam ultimate-
ly prevail throughout the world. Below the figure of the globe is the
organization’s official name in Arabic: Hizb Allah–Al-thawra Al-
Islamiya fi Lubnan (Hizballah, the Islamic Revolution in Lebanon).
The letter “A” of “Allah” above is linked to the upraised arm grasp-
ing the AK-47, which signifies the ideological legitimization of the
movement’s militancy as being Divinely sanctioned. A Qur’an rests
atop the letter “b” of the word “Hizb” (party) which is fashioned in
the shape of a traditional lectern for the Muslim scriptures, which
also signifies that the movement’s stances are legitimized and based
upon the Qur’an. Emblazoned above the symbol of the movement
is the Qur’anic verse, “Fa-inna Hizb Allah hum al-ghalibun,” “Lo,
the Party of God, they are the victorious ones.”
Front Organizations
Since its founding, Hizballah has never directly assumed responsi-
bility for its terrorist attacks. Through the uses of various aliases,
small factions of the group have claimed responsibility for acts of
violence ranging from kidnapping to suicide car bomb attacks.
Included among the aliases that have been employed by the group
are: Islamic Jihad, Islamic Jihad Organization; Revolutionary Jus-
tice Organization, Organization of the Oppressed on Earth, the
Mujahideen (Holy Warriors) for Freedom, the Cells of the Armed
Struggle, and Ansar Allah, the “Partisans of God,” Revolutionary
Justice Organization, Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine,
Organization of Right against Wrong, and the “Followers of the
Prophet Muhammad.”22
“A Muslim Youth in Lebanon Smiled at Death”

The Lebanese branch of Hizballah was founded in 198223 and was
led by local Shiì Islamic radical leaders including Shaykh Ragheb
Harb,24 Shaykh Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, Shaykh Ibrahim
Amin, Shaykh Abbas Al-Musawi, and Shaykh Subhi Al- Tufayli, as
well as Shaykh Husayn Al-Musawi, the leader of the Islamic Amal
Movement.25 Hizballah was created under the patronage of the
then Iranian ambassador to Syria, ‘Ali Akbar Mohtashemi-Pur,26
“A Muslim Youth in Lebanon Smiled at Death” 7
who is known as “Hizballah’s midwife.”27 As the result of Iran’s

close ties to Syria, and Syria’s continued influence over the Lebanese
government, Hizballah was, and still is, provided freedom of move-
ment in Lebanon.
Two years after Iran’s Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini
established the “Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in the
World,” led by Ayatollah Hussein Montazeri, who was entrusted
with the role of creating a movement to establish radical Islamic
states throughout the world based on the revolutionary template of
Iran.28 With the cooperation of Syria, Iran established the Shaykh
Abdallah Barracks of the Pasdaran, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary
Guard, in the Baqa’a Valley to extend its influence over the Shiì
population of Lebanon. During the early 1980s, the Pasdaran com-
mitted as many as 2,000 of its Revolutionary Guards at its head-
quarters at Baalbek in southern Lebanon to assist in forming and
training Hizballah.29
In Baalbek, Hizballah leader Shaykh Abbas Al-Musawi served
as the local patron of the Pasdaran. Al-Musawi provided hospitality
to the Revolutionary Guards at his Imam Al-Mahdi Seminary and,
in return, the Pasdaran provided him and his followers with mili-
tary training. Al-Musawi described his experience at the Islamic
Revolutionary Guards’ first military training course as a personal
spiritual epiphany:
When I joined the Guards and sat with the brethren in the first
course they gave in the Baqa’a Valley, I felt I derived immense
benefit. I felt I had truly penetrated genuine Islam.30
Al-Musawi described the impact of the Islamic Revolutionary
Guard training on his disciples as being the impetus for them to
carry out suicide bombings:
[The Pasdaran] made the Muslim youths love martyrdom. And
so we were not surprised at all when, shortly after the arrival of
the Guards, a Muslim youth in Lebanon smiled at death while
carrying with him 1,200 kilograms of explosives.31
In the early 1980s, Hizballah gained worldwide notoriety for its

spectacular car-bombing attacks against Western installations in
Lebanon. The most notable of the attacks was the October 23,
1983, suicide truck bombing of the U.S. Marine Barracks in Beirut,
in which 241 Marines were killed and 38 wounded. At the time,
Hizballah leader Shaykh Husayn Al-Musawi praised the bombing
by declaring, “I salute this good act and bow to the spirits of the
martyrs.”32
The movement’s spiritual mentor, Shaykh Muhammad Husayn
Fadlallah, denied being directly involved in the Marine barracks
bombing; nevertheless, he asserted that “the Muslims believe that
you struggle by transforming yourself into a living bomb like you
struggle with a gun in your hand. There is no difference between
dying with a gun in your hand or exploding yourself.”33
Hizballah ideologues evade a confrontation with the Islamic
theological prohibition against suicide by referring to suicide
bombings as ‘amaliyat istishadiya—literally, “self-martyrdom opera-
tions,” thereby creating theological legitimacy for such acts and
actively encouraging that they be carried out. This abuse of the con-
cept of martyrdom to permit suicide bombings is a prominent fea-
ture of Hizballah and the ideology of other Islamic radical
movements that engage in terrorism.
Shaykh Fadlallah justified his movement’s suicide bombings
during the early 1980s against American targets by explaining that
if the actions of a “self-martyr” were intended to “have a political
impact on an enemy whom it is impossible to fight by conventional
means, then his sacrifice can be part of a jihad. Such an undertaking
differs little from that of a soldier who fights and knows that in the
end he will be killed. The two situations lead to death; except that
one fits in with the conventional procedures of war and the other
does not.”34
Fadlallah further legitimized such actions by asserting that sui-
cide bombings are the “oppressed Muslims’” nonconventional
weapons that are employed in answer to the highly advanced
Ideology 9
weapons used by the United States and the West:

The oppressed nations do not have the technology and destruc-
tive weapons America and Europe have. They must fight with
special means of their own... [We] recognize the right of nations
to use every unconventional method to fight these aggressor
nations, and do not regard what oppressed Muslims of the world
do with primitive and nonconventional means to confront
aggressor powers as terrorism. We view this as religiously lawful
warfare against the world’s imperialist and domineering pow-
ers.35
Shaykh Fadlallah is also considered to be responsible for other
terrorist activities carried out by Hizballah, including the kidnap-
pings and murders of Western hostages in Lebanon throughout the
1980s. Despite having publicly condemned Hizballah’s kidnap-
pings of the hostages, Fadlallah is believed to have inspired the kid-
nappers and known precise operational details of those terror
incidents.36
Ideology
We face a plan by the United States and the Zionists to control the
region, to redraw the political map of the region!
…We should realize the extent of the dangerous and Satanic goals
these people have.37
Hizballah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah, on the occasion of
Al-Quds (Jerusalem) Day, November 29, 2002
In the Qur’an’s historic vision Allah’s support and the revolutionary
struggle of the people must come together, so that Satanic rulers are
brought down and put to death. The people that is not prepared to
kill and die in order to create a just society cannot expect any sup-
port from Allah. The Almighty has promised us that the day will
come when the whole of mankind will live united under the ban-
ner of Islam, when the sign of the Crescent, the symbol of Muham-
mad, will be supreme everywhere…
But that day must be hastened through our jihad, through our
readiness to offer our lives and to shed the unclean blood of those
who do not see the light brought from the heavens by Muhammad
in his mir’aj [divinely-inspired vision]. It is Allah who puts the
gun in our hand. But we cannot expect him to pull the trigger as
well simply because we are faint-hearted.38
Muhammad Taqi Partovi Sabzevari, “The Future of the Islamic
Movement,” Qom, Iran, 1986
Hizballah’s ideology is delineated in an official forty-eight-page
manifesto that was published in February 1985 entitled, “Open
Letter from Hizballah to the Downtrodden in Lebanon and the
World.”39 In the manifesto, Hizballah echoed the anti-U.S. ideolo-
gy of the Ayatollah Khomeini by declaring, “We are headed for
dealing with evil at the roots—and the roots are America.”40
Demonstrating its fealty to continuing the Islamic Revolution of
Iran, Hizballah designated the Ayatollah Khomeini as the Shiì
Faqih, or Supreme Religious Guide, and described the Islamic Rev-
olution as the “vanguard” that “laid the foundation of a pan-Islam-
ic state under the wise guidance of the fully qualified Faqih,
Ayatollah Ruhallah Khomeini.”41 In the text of its manifesto,
Hizballah openly pledged its obedience to Khomeini:
We are sons of the Nation of Hizballah, whose vanguard God
made victorious in Iran, and who reestablished the nucleus of a
central Islamic state in the world. We abide by the orders of the
sole and wise and just command represented by the Supreme
Jurisconsult who meets the necessary qualifications, and who is
presently incarnate in the Imam and Guide, the great Ayatollah
Ruhallah Al-Musawi Al-Khomeini, may his authority be perpet-
uated, enabler of the revolution of the Muslims and harbinger of
their glorious Renaissance.42
As a symbol of Hizballah’s continuing fealty to the Islamic revo-
lution, followers of the movement display the Iranian flag, and pho-
tographs of the Ayatollah Khomeini and Iran’s current Supreme
Guide, Ali Khameneì.
Ideology 11
Many Hizballah fighters are deeply attached to Iran sentimental-

ly. Some even have taken to speaking Arabic with a Persian
accent. There are many intermarriages, and having an Iranian
wife or husband is regarded as a status symbol. Huge portraits of
the late Khomeini, and the new Iranian Supreme Guide ‘Ali
Khameneì adorn many Hizballah mosques, businesses, and
homes. The thoughts of Khomeini are taught at Hizballah
schools and indoctrination classes. Each year thousands of
Hizballah activists [go] on a visit to the tomb of Khomeini near
Tehran.43
Hizballah legitimizes its terror activities and suicide bombings
by relying on a radicalized interpretation of a core episode in Shiì
Muslim history. In 680 C.E., Imam Husayn, the grandson of the
Prophet Muhammad, contested the right of the Caliph Yazid to the
leadership of the Muslim empire, which was then based in Damas-
cus. Initially, Husayn took refuge in Mecca, but was subsequently
encouraged by his supporters to go to Kufa, Iraq, where they
informed him that he would find additional support.
Husayn sent his cousin Muslim Ibn ‘Aqil in advance of his own
journey there, but the local governor who was loyal to the caliph
captured Ibn ‘Aqil and executed him. Husayn nevertheless proceed-
ed to Kufa with eighteen members of his family and sixty other sup-
porters. On his way into Iraq, Husayn was joined by reinforcements
of 600 men. Upon his arrival in Karbala, Iraq, his forces were
attacked and surrounded by troops loyal to Yazid. Deprived of
water by enemy forces, Husayn’s supporters fought against Yazid’s
troops for eight days, and ultimately, Husayn himself rode his horse
into battle and was killed.44 In contrast to the historical account of
the episode, followers of Hizballah and the ideology of Ayatollah
Khomeini paint Husayn as being a willing martyr and interpret this
episode of their history as being the template for the Hizballah sui-
cide bombers of today.45
Hizballah’s worldview is fueled by the perception that the Mus-
lim world is experiencing a period of deep crisis and, as a result,
members of the organization are encouraged to strike at the forces
of evil in the world in order to accelerate a final apocalyptic con-

frontation between Muslims, who are characterized as the force of
God in the world, and the West, which is characterized as the force
of evil. From Hizballah’s perspective, each of its terror attacks
against the West is counted as an earthly action that assists the
Divine struggle against the Satanic forces of the world, personified
by the West. As the Iranian political analyst Amir Taheri notes:
The Party of Allah’s ideology is simplicity itself, and it is therefore
immediately accessible to the audience it favors above all: the
illiterate poor in the towns and cities. This ideology, despite its
Islamic pretensions, is in fact Manichean and is based on the
division of all phenomena into good and evil. Mankind is also
divided between the Partisans of Allah and those who support
shaytan or Satan; the war between the two must continue until
the complete victory of the Partisans of Allah. Every aspect of
Satan’s presence must be removed, by violence if necessary, so
that Divine society can become a reality.46
The Obligation to War and Jihad

Hizballah anticipates that the final cumulative effect of its war
against the West will bring about the establishment of a radical
transnational Islamic state that, in time, will encompass the entire
world. Ayatollah Khomeini delineated his vision of a radical Islam-
ic state achieving such a goal in a tract that he wrote in 1942 enti-
tled Kashf Al-Asrar (“Keys to the Secrets”). Khomeini explained:
There are two kinds of war in Islam: one is called jihad [holy
war], which means the conquest of [other] countries in accor-
dance with certain conditions. The other [type] is war to preserve
the independence of the [Muslim] country and the repulsion of
foreigners. Jihad, or holy war, which is for the conquest of [other]
countries and kingdoms, becomes incumbent after the formation
of the Islamic state in the presence of the Imam or in accordance
with his command. Then Islam makes it incumbent upon all
adult males, provided they are not disabled and incapacitated, to
The Obligation to War and Jihad 13
prepare themselves for the conquest of [other] countries so that

the writ of Islam is obeyed in every country in the world.47
In an effort to explain the benefits of his vision of the eventual
domination of radical Islam throughout the world, Khomeini
asserted:
But world public opinion should know that Islamic conquest is
not the same as conquests made by other rulers of the world. The
latter want to conquer the world for their own personal profit,
whereas Islam’s conquest is aimed at serving the interests of the
inhabitants of the globe as a whole. [Non-Islamic] conquerors
want to rule the world so that they can spread through it every
injustice and sexual indecency, whereas Islam wants to conquer
the world in order to promote spiritual values, and to prepare
mankind for justice and Divine rule. [Non-Islamic] conquerors
sacrifice the lives and possessions of the people to their own
leisure and pleasure. But Islam does not allow its leaders and gen-
erals to enjoy themselves or to have a moment’s leisure; in this
way the lives and property of people can be protected and the
bases of injustice destroyed in the world.48
Khomeini further justified the conquest of the entire world
through jihad, or holy war, by explaining that the countries that
will be conquered and ruled by radical Islam will be “marked for
everlasting salvation”:
Islam’s Holy War is a struggle against idolatry, sexual deviation,
plunder, repression, and cruelty. The war waged by [non-Islamic]
conquerors, however, aims at promoting lust and animal pleas-
ures. They care not if all countries are wiped out and many fami-
lies left homeless. But those who study Islamic Holy War [jihad]
will understand why Islam wants to conquer the whole world. All
the countries conquered by Islam or to be conquered in the
future will be marked for everlasting salvation. For they shall live
under Light Celestial Law.49
Hizballah’s Terror Activities

Prior to the official establishment of the Hizballah movement in
1982, a considerable number of young Shià in Lebanon were
recruited and trained, during the 1970s, by the personal security
force of PLO leader Yasir Arafat known as Fatah’s Force 17. Force
17 leader Mahmud Natur, also known as Abu Tayib, initiated
efforts to recruit Lebanese Shià operatives for Force 17. The young
men were trained in operations tactics, firearms, and explosives by
experts from Fatah.50 As of 2001, Faisal Abu Sharkh commanded
3,500 Force 17 operatives throughout the Palestinian Authority-
controlled areas. Force 17 maintains its ties to Hizballah and is
presently considered responsible for operating Hizballah cells in
Gaza.51
With the establishment of Hizballah, many Shiì recruits of the
Fatah movement joined Hizballah. Ìmad Mughniyah, Hizballah’s
most prominent terror operative, was originally a Shiì recruit to
Force 17 during the 1970s who went on to join Hizballah. Upon
joining Hizballah, Mughniyah created that organization’s “Special
Security Apparatus,” considered responsible for a string of attacks
against Western targets in Lebanon, including the suicide car
bombings against American and French peacekeeping forces and
the kidnappings of Western citizens in Lebanon during the 1980s.
Mughniyah is currently believed to be headquartered in Tehran,
Iran,52 and has been operating under the protection of the Iranian
Ministry of Intelligence and Security and the Pasdaran, Iran’s Islam-
ic Revolutionary Guard Corps.53 His Special Security Apparatus is
now known as Hizballah’s Foreign Operations Department.54
Drawing its inspiration from the late Ayatollah Khomeini’s
government policy of “exporting the Islamic revolution” around the
world, Hizballah has sought to eradicate Western influence from
the Middle East through acts of violence, with the ultimate goal of
establishing a radical Islamist regime in Lebanon. As a complement
to these local efforts, Hizballah, in concert with its patron, Iran, has
also operated on a much wider scale by carrying out terrorist attacks
Hizballah’s Terror Activities 15
against those whom it views as its enemies—namely, Israel and

Jews, the United States, and other Western countries. In this larger
sphere, too, the ultimate goal is to create a radical international
pan-Islamic movement. In the words of Sheikh Ibrahim al-Amin,
one of the group’s leaders: “We want to see Islam prevail through-
out the world.”55
Hizballah is considered responsible for the suicide bombings of
the U.S. Embassy in Beirut in April 1983 and of the U.S. Embassy
Annex in Beirut in September 1984.56 Three Hizballah terrorists
are on the FBI’s list of the twenty-two “Most Wanted Terrorists”:
Ìmad Mughniyah, Hasan Izz al-Din, and ‘Ali ‘Atwa.57 Ìmad
Mughniyah, the leader of Hizballah’s Special Security Apparatus,58
together with Izz al-Din59 and ‘Atwa,60 were indicted in the United
States for planning and participating in the hijacking of TWA flight
84761 that led to the murder of U.S. Navy diver Robert Dean Steth-
em on June 15, 1985.62 Through the FBI web site, the State
Department’s “Rewards for Justice” program is offering up to $25
million for information leading to the arrest and/or conviction of
each of the terrorists who carried out the hijacking.63 Mughniyah is
also considered responsible for the suicide bombing in October
1983 of the U.S. Marine Barracks in Beirut that left 241 Marines
dead,64 and he has been implicated in the 1996 Khobar Towers
bombing in Saudi Arabia in which nineteen U.S. servicemen were
killed.65
During the 1980s, Hizballah’s terror activities included attacks
and kidnappings in Lebanon that targeted Westerners, specifically
American, French, and German citizens, as well as Lebanese Jews.
In January of 1992, the depth of Iran’s control over Hizballah’s
activities was revealed when a U.S. government official announced
that the Iranian government had paid Hizballah nearly $1 million
for the release of each Western hostage. It was further revealed that
during the period that the Western hostages were being held cap-
tive, Iran directly paid Hizballah for the “confinement and the
upkeep” of the hostages’ prison quarters. When asked whether
Hizballah or Iran had controlled the ultimate fate of the hostages,

the official responded, “Tehran called the shots.”66
Hizballah’s Role in the Israel Embassy and AMIA Bombings

In the 1990s, Hizballah further expanded its terror activities on the
international level. On March 17, 1992, a Hizballah terrorist oper-
ative detonated a Ford Fairlane packed with 220 pounds of plastic
explosives at the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires, Argentina.67 The
bomb caused a massive explosion that leveled half the building and
left other nearby buildings severely damaged. Thirty-two civilians
were killed, and 252 people were injured.68
In a statement issued from Beirut, Lebanon, the Islamic Jihad,
one of the front organizations of Hizballah, took responsibility for
the bombing on March 18, 1992. Islamic Jihad identified the sui-
cide bomber as “Abu Yasir,” who was described as an Argentinean
convert to Islam. Islamic Jihad vowed to continue its activities,
declaring, “It is an open war until the elimination of Israel and until
the death of the last Jew on earth.”69 Islamic Jihad went on to pro-
claim:
Our open battle with the criminal Zionist enemy requires our
permanent presence in the arenas of jihad and confrontation and
our readiness to sacrifice our lives and blood for God. We call on
all Muslims to join the jihad, united under the slogan of liberat-
ing Jerusalem and eliminating Israel, so defeating our usurping
enemy and expelling him in humiliation from beloved Palestine
[sic]. We send greetings of admiration to the mujahideen of the
Islamic intifada in Palestine in the month of intifada and
Jerusalem Day and to the heroes of Islamic Jihad, the heroes of
axes, daggers, and knives. We call on them to escalate their jihad
operations against the Jews.
O noble martyr, congratulations on your blessed martyrdom
and on your seat with a sovereign omnipotent [sic]. We will
remain loyal to your chaste blood and that of dear Islam’s mar-
tyrs. We will continue on the path of holy jihad, the difficult
thorny path, that of red martyrdom. We will sacrifice our lives
Hizballah’s Role in the Israel Embassy and AMIA Bombings 17
against the usurping Jews because no one can reproach us in our

work for God until the banner, there is no God but God, is hoist-
ed worldwide. Our open battle with the criminal Zionist enemy
requires our continuous presence in the battlegrounds of holy
war and confrontation.70
The investigation by the Argentinean authorities and Israel into
the bombing of the Israeli embassy indicated that the attack was
carried out by the Iranian intelligence services together with
Hizballah. Hizballah’s Foreign Operations Department headed by
Ìmad Mughniyah is considered responsible for having played a
central role in the execution of the bombing.71
Two years later, on July 18, 1994, a second attack was carried
out in Buenos Aires. A suicide bomber drove a delivery van and
parked in front of the AMIA Jewish community center building.
Three hundred fifty pounds of explosives detonated at the entrance
of the building, causing an immense explosion that completely lev-
eled the structure that housed the two largest Jewish communal
institutions in Argentina, the AMIA (Argentine-Jewish Mutual
Association) and the DAIA (Delegation of Argentine-Jewish Asso-
ciations). The blast caused severe damage to buildings nearby, and
cars parked on the street near the building were completely demol-
ished. The day after the attack, an organization that identified itself
as the “Islamic Command”72 telephoned a radio station in Buenos
Aires and took responsibility for the bombing. Forty-eight hours
later, an offshoot organization of Hizballah in Lebanon, Ansar
Allah,73 claimed responsibility for the attack.
Recent reports have indicated that Iranian leaders put into
action their decision to implement a strike against the Jewish com-
munity center in August 1993. Those who participated in a meet-
ing to plan the attack included Iran’s Supreme Islamic Guide,
Ayatollah ‘Ali Khameneì, who chaired the meeting; Khameneì’s
intelligence and security adviser, Muhammad Hijazi; then Iranian
president ‘Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani; Iran’s intelligence minis-
ter, Ali Fallahian, and Iran’s minister of foreign affairs at the time,
‘Ali Akbar Velayati.74
Iran’s Supreme Guide, Ayatollah Khameneì, legitimized the

attack by issuing a fatwa directing that it be carried out via the Iran-
ian intelligence ministry headed by Àli Fallahian. In turn, Fallahi-
an gave instructions that Ìmad Mughniyah, the head of Hizballah’s
Foreign Operations Department, was to be tasked with executing
the attack, with the full cooperation of the Iranian intelligence serv-
ices. Hizballah recruited the suicide bomber, Ibrahim Hussein
Baro, who arrived in Argentina several days before the bombing.
Shortly before carrying out the attack, Baro contacted his family in
Lebanon and informed them that he was going to be reunited with
his brother, who had been killed while carrying out a car bombing
attack on Israeli soldiers in Lebanon in 1989.75
Over the past several years, a clearer picture of Iran’s and
Hizballah’s involvement in both bombings has emerged as the result
of the defection to Germany of Abdolghassem Mesbahi, a former
official of Iran’s intelligence agency. In his testimony to the Argen-
tinean court, Mesbahi stated: “The decision for the 1994 attack was
taken in [Ayatollah Àli] Khameneì’s office in1992, at a meeting
presided over by [then Iranian president Ali Akbar Hashemi] Raf-
sanjani,” which was attended by other senior officials.
Mesbahi continued, “The committee that took the decision for
the bombing in 1992 was composed of the [Supreme] Guide or
Leader, the president of the republic,” and also included a former
minister of foreign affairs, the intelligence chief, and leaders of
Islamic religious groups and militias.76 In another part of his testi-
mony, Mesbahi also informed the Argentinean investigators that
the 1994 attack was financed via a $200 million bank account in
Switzerland controlled by Àli Khameneì and a son of the Ayatol-
lah Khomeini.77
The Iranian foreign ministry is believed to have provided diplo-
matic cover for the attack. Prior to being appointed cultural attaché
of Iran to Argentina in 1994, Muhsin Rabbani, an Iranian native,
served as the imam, or spiritual leader, of the Shiì community of
the Southern Cone countries of South America and had lived in
Hizballah’s Role in the Israel Embassy and AMIA Bombings 19
Buenos Aires since 1982. Following the bombing of the Israeli

embassy in 1992, Rabbani left for Iran and returned to Argentina
six months later as the cultural affairs officer of the Iranian embassy
in Buenos Aires, using a brand new diplomatic passport.78 Among
other activities, Rabbani is believed to have been directly involved
in making the preparations to procure the van that was used in the
1994 AMIA bombing. In 1993, Rabbani allegedly made inquiries
in Buenos Aires into renting a commercial van. He specifically
requested a Renault Traffic, the same type of van that was used in
the attack.79 Rabbani is presently viewed by the Argentineans as
having acted as the head of “Iranian intelligence in Buenos Aires.”80
Most recently, Judge Juan José Galeano, the Argentinean magis-
trate who has been investigating the bombing of both the Israeli
embassy and the AMIA Jewish community center, announced that
an alleged Hizballah terrorist operative from Colombia, Samuel
Salman El-Reda, is under investigation for acting as the leader of
the local South American Hizballah terror cells responsible for the
two bombings. According to recent testimony provided to the
Argentinean court, El-Reda was married to an Argentinean woman
and had close ties to Muhsin Rabbani.81
El-Reda, suspected of responsibility for both the 1992 Israeli
embassy bombing as well as the 1994 AMIA bombing, is also
believed to be the link between the Iranians and the local South
American cells of Hizballah. He is thought to have played the role
of coordinating the activities of the local Hizballah “sleeper” cells in
Foz do Iguacu, Brazil, where he had allegedly made contact with
members of Hizballah. Foz do Iguacu is located on the Brazilian
side of the Tri-Border area shared by Argentina, Brazil, and
Paraguay, which has become known for its concentration of Hizbal-
lah and other terrorist operatives.82
According to testimony presented during the investigation,
from Brazil El-Reda “would have coordinated the so-called ‘sleeper
cells’ that took part in the operation.” El-Reda would also have
“given the order for the attack on the AMIA building, which was
carried out by a suicide bomber.” As further evidence demonstrat-

ing the link between the bombing and the local cells of Hizballah,
Argentinean investigators presented telephone records that they had
seized that showed conversations between the accused men and sus-
pected Hizballah members who live in the Tri-Border area.83
Following an eight-year investigation into the AMIA bombing,
Judge Galeano reportedly concluded: “The evidence obtained con-
firms the role Iran and the Lebanese Hizballah played in the bomb-
ing.” The judge further specified that the former Iranian cultural
attaché to Argentina, Muhsin Rabbani, was charged with providing
“logistic assistance to Hizballah elements that entered Argentina
illegally by way of the border area Argentina shares with Brazil and
Paraguay to carry out the bombing using local manpower.”84
In a largely symbolic move, the Argentinean Ministry of Justice
issued indictments against five of the suspected perpetrators of the
attack. The Argentinean government also requested Interpol’s assis-
tance in seeking their arrests. The five included: Hizballah’s Shaykh
Hassan Nasrallah, who was indicted in October 2002;85 Iranian
intelligence minister Àli Fallahian; Àli Akbar Parvaresh, a former
education minister and former speaker of the Iranian parliament;
the former spokesman of the Iranian embassy in Buenos Aires, Àli
Balesh Àbadi; and Iran’s former cultural attaché to Argentina,
Muhsin Rabbani. The latter four were indicted in March of 2003.86
Funding
Commensurate with the late Ayatollah Khomeini’s philosophy,
Hizballah has declared the United States to be the “Great Satan”
and regards Israel as an agent of the United States in the region. As
a reflection of Iran’s policy of exporting the “Islamic Revolution,”
Iran finances Hizballah with an annual budget that is disbursed by
the office of Iran’s Supreme Islamic Guide, Ayatollah ‘Ali
Khameneì.87
According to its own official budget, during the mid-1990s
Iran was reported to have devoted $500 million to supporting radi-
Iran, Hizballah, and International Terrorism 21
cal Islamic organizations that were sympathetic to its cause

throughout the world. It was also reported to have established a
network of terrorist cells that are “located in at least twenty states,
including the U.S., Britain, Germany, France, Spain, Switzerland,
Italy, Greece, Turkey and Pakistan.”88 In 1994, Hizballah was
reported to receive at least $250 million of that amount.89
More recently, Iran is reported to have organized Hizballah cells
in Azerbaijani territory bordering on Iran. A council of fifteen
influential Azerbaijani religious figures is said to organize the activi-
ties of the cells, whose responsibilities include forming “an army of
God” to operate in Azerbaijan. One of the council members has
also arranged for young Azerbaijanis to study at Iranian theological
seminaries. In 2001, the Azerbaijani National Security Ministry
arrested a group of individuals suspected of having contact with
Hizballah in Calilabad.90
Hizballah also receives funds from Iranian religious, economic,
and government institutions. Charitable organizations that provide
funds to Hizballah include Al-Shaheed, the Martyrs Foundation;
Imdad Al-Imam, the Imam Khomeini Relief Committee; and Al-
Mostaza’fin, the Foundation for the Oppressed. Each of these
organizations provides “vast amounts of financial aid” to the fami-
lies of Hizballah operatives, as well as to members of the movement
who are injured or handicapped.91
Iran, Hizballah, and International Terrorism

In an effort to gain allies in its war against the West, during the
early 1980s the Iranian government and Hizballah made an effort
to provide financial assistance to Sinn Fein, the political section of
the Irish Republican Army. At the time, Hadi Ghaffari, the presi-
dent of Hizballah 92 and the Iranian minister tasked with cooperat-
ing with the Hizballah movement in Lebanon,93 began to travel to
Belfast, Ireland, in order to initiate contacts between his govern-
ment and the Irish Republican Army. On one occasion, Ghaffari
hosted members of Sinn Fein at a luncheon but, adhering to his
movement’s ideology, refused to pay for their drinks.94 To demon-

strate his support for the IRA, Ghaffari told a 1980 rally in Tehran,
“We are ready to blow up British factories and ships. Now is the
time for the death of [British Prime Minister Margaret] Thatch-
er.”95
In 1981, on a subsequent trip to Ireland, Ghaffari attended the
funeral of the IRA operative Kieran Doherty, who had died after
participating in a hunger strike in prison. As a further expression of
its support for the IRA, the Iranian government officially renamed
the street outside of the former British embassy in Tehran Bobby
Sands Avenue after another member of the IRA who died in prison
after participating in hunger strike.96
In June 1982, IRA leaders secretly flew to Tehran to attend the
Conference of World Movements, an international conference of
leading figures of international terrorist organizations, including
Hizballah, the Abu Nidal organization, the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine–General Command, the Japanese Red
Army, and ETA, the Basque separatist organization. At Fayruzi
Palace in Tehran, the commander of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary
Guard, Muhsin Reza’i, met the leaders of the organizations. The
agenda of the conference was a plan by Iran to fund and arm a new
“terrorist international” in exchange for the organizations’ making a
commitment to launch attacks against Western targets in Europe to
make them pay a price for supporting U.S. policies in the Middle
East. In return, the Iranians sent an official delegation to Sinn Fein’s
annual conference in Dublin.97
Hizballah has also maintained relationships with Palestinian
radical left-wing organizations with which it has found common
cause. In the early 1990s, Iran used Hizballah as a conduit to trans-
fer funds estimated to total $10 million per year to Ahmad Jibril’s
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine–General Command.98
Since the signing of the Israel-PLO Declaration of Principles in
1993, Hizballah forged agreements with the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine99 and the Democratic Front for Palestine,
led by Naif Hawatmah, to actively oppose any peace agreements
Hizballah and the Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine 23
between Israel and the Palestinians.100

Hizballah has also benefited from its relationship with other
Palestinian radical terrorist organizations. The Abu Nidal organiza-
tion, led by the late Sabri Al-Banna, reportedly trained Hizballah
operatives during the mid-1990s. In 1994, the Abu Nidal organiza-
tion operated a school for terrorists in Lebanon known as the
“Academy of Terrorist Sciences.” The school was located in the
Hizballah-dominated Burj Al-Barajneh neighborhood of Beirut.
The courses were given by Ghaleb Hussein Jamal, an Abu Nidal
operative who offered prospective students the opportunity to
attend regular classes as well as private tutoring sessions on the exe-
cution of terrorist attacks and “applied explosive sciences” for a fee
of $50 per hour of instruction.101
Hizballah and the Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine

Throughout the 1990s, Hizballah extended Iran’s largesse to assist
dissident Palestinian factions. As a mainstay of its foreign policy,
Iran assists other Palestinian Islamist terror organizations, including
Hamas (the Islamic Resistance Movement in Palestine) and the
Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine (IJMP), a Palestinian terrorist
organization which shares Hizballah’s pro-Khomeini views. Hizbal-
lah’s contacts with Islamist terrorist organizations are facilitated by
Iran, which uses Hizballah as an instrument to coordinate activities
and provide support for such organizations.
In 1988, Hizballah, in cooperation with the Iranian embassy in
Syria, helped IJMP leaders Ahmad Fat’hi Al-Shiqaqi and Shaykh
Àbd Al-Àziz Al-Àwda to establish the headquarters of the IJMP
in Beirut, Lebanon.102 The headquarters of the IJMP is presently
located in Damascus, Syria,103 and since its inception in 1980,104
the movement has received training and funding from Iran via
Hizballah.105 Iran has continued to fund Islamic Jihad and encour-
age its suicide attacks. In 1997, the IJMP was reported to have
arrived at an agreement with Iran under which it began to receive
“bonus” payments for each successful suicide bombing attack
against Israel.106
In May 2002, IJMP leader Ramadan ‘Abdallah Shallah met

with Ayatollah ‘Ali Khameneì and requested that the IJMP’s budg-
et be separated from the funds provided to Hizballah by Iran.
Khameneì reportedly promised that the IJMP’s budget of over
$200 million would be separated from that of Hizballah and
increased by 70 percent for the purpose of “continuing its martyr-
dom operations.”107
Via Hizballah, Iran continues to support and coordinate the
activities of Islamist terror organizations. As a show of support for
Palestinian Islamist terror movements, Iran hosted the Internation-
al Conference on Imam Khomeini and Support for Palestine on
June 2, 2002.108 Representatives of the Iranian government were
prominent participants in the conference, including the speaker of
the Iranian Majlis, or parliament, Mehdi Karrubi,109 and the
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Àli Khameneì, who called upon Mus-
lims throughout the world to “mobilize all material and spiritual
resources to boost the morale of the Palestinian people in their holy
jihad against the occupiers.”110 The participants also called for a
boycott of American goods.111
During the conference, Ramadan Àbdallah Shallah, the secre-
tary-general of the Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine, was
reported by official Iranian television to have stated “that America
had declared war on Islam and the freedom-loving people of the
world.” Shallah continued, “Contrary to popular perceptions,
America is trying to annihilate the ideal, as well as the land, of
Palestine.” He stressed that “martyrdom operations would continue
in Palestine,” adding, “We have the right to sacrifice our own lives
and America does not have the right [to] oppose this.”112
Referring to President Bush’s January 2002 State of the Union
address that singled out Iran as a member of an “axis of evil” for its
support for terrorism, Shallah declared, “If America is the one to
divide the world into the ‘camp of the good’ and the ‘camp of the
evil,’ and if it puts the Palestinian people and all of its jihad fighters
on the evil side, claiming that the martyrs are evil, then we say:
Hizballah and Hamas 25
‘Allah make us all evil, [make us all] anger America and blow up in
the heart of this cursed Zionist entity.’”113
Other attendees at the conference were Na’im Qasim, the
deputy secretary-general of Hizballah; the secretary-general of the
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, General Command,
Ahmad Jibril; and Hilarion Capucci, who was described as the
“Archbishop of Quds–Jerusalem-in exile.”114
The delegates called for the continuation of the “armed strug-
gle” against Israel and the rejection of peace talks. The Iranian
organizer of the conference, Àli Akbar Mohtashemi-Pur, declared,
“Israel is a cancerous tumor in the heart of the Muslim world which
should be removed,”115 and lauded the attacks carried out by Pales-
tinian suicide bombers. The speaker of the Iranian Majlis, Mehdi
Karrubi, called upon Muslim nations throughout the world to
engage in an oil embargo against allies of Israel.116
Hizballah and Hamas

Through Iran’s patronage, Hizballah coordinates its activities with
Hamas, which maintains its own “embassy” in Tehran. As evidence
of the increasing ties between the three parties, in December 1992
Iran and Hizballah signed an official agreement of cooperation with
Hamas. The most recent indicator of this cooperation was a Jordan-
ian government report that was presented to U.S. Secretary of State
Colin Powell in February 2002 that provided evidence of an Iranian
effort to open a new front to carry out terror attacks against Israel
from Jordanian territory. According to the report, Iran was directly
involved in seventeen attempts to launch rocket and artillery attacks
against Israeli territory. The attacks were to be carried out by terror-
ists from Hamas and the Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine who
had received training in Iran at camps run by Hizballah.117
Hizballah, Syria, and Lebanon

By virtue of Iran’s close ties to Syria and Syria’s continuing control
over Lebanon, Hizballah is the only armed militia that has contin-
ued to operate in Lebanon since the end of that country’s civil war
in 1991.118 Having been given free rein to carry out attacks against
Israel, Hizballah serves Syria’s interests by acting as its proxy and
destabilizing the Lebanese border with Israel. Hizballah has been
waging its war of attrition in southern Lebanon since Israel’s earlier
withdrawal from Lebanon in 1985. Indicative of the level of threat
that Hizballah continues to pose to the civilian population of Israel,
from 1985 to 2000, the organization carried out 4,000 Katyusha
rocket attacks against the Israeli town of Kiryat Shemona.119
Despite Israel’s complete withdrawal from Lebanon carried out
under UN auspices in May 2000, Hizballah has vowed to continue
its war against Israel.
Iran has continued to arm Hizballah by sending deliveries of
weapons via Syria. In 2002, Hizballah was reported to have received
10,000 Katyusha rockets from Iran that are capable of hitting tar-
gets within Israel.120 A recent cause for concern has been the
increase in Iranian arms shipments that Hizballah received in early
2003.121
In 2002, an Islamic Revolutionary Guards source explained
that Iran’s “Quds Forces will continue to train Islamic Jihad’s fight-
ers in Iran while Brigadier-General Ali Reza Tamyaz, one of the
Quds Forces commanders, and his technical team will remain
responsible for preparing and training Hizballah’s fighters on the
use of sophisticated weapons, including Ra’d missiles, Shaheen
launchers, and the surface-to-surface missiles that Hizballah
received recently.”122
Hizballah and Al-Qaìda

The relationship between Hizballah and Al-Qaìda parallels that of
Iran and Egyptian Islamic Jihad, one of the umbrella organizations
that is presently part of Al-Qaìda. According to Hamid Reza Zak-
eri, an Iranian defector who describes himself as a former official in
the Pasdaran, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Ministry
of Intelligence and Security, and the Supreme Guide’s office, the
Hizballah and Al-Qaìda 27
Guards had a relationship with Egyptian Islamic Jihad going back

to the 1980s. Zakeri also asserted that Hizballah’s Ìmad Mugh-
niyah has maintained contacts with Ayman Al-Zawahiri, a leader of
Egyptian Islamic Jihad who is now the second in command of Al-
Qaìda. 123
In the early 1990s, Ìmad Mughniyah, the chief of Hizballah’s
Foreign Operations Department, was reported to have been in con-
tact and cooperated with Ùsama bin Ladin’s Al-Qaìda organiza-
tion. ‘Ali Muhammad, one of the members of Al-Qaìda who was
captured and convicted of bombing the U.S. embassies in Kenya
and Tanzania, admitted his membership in the Al-Qaìda organiza-
tion and described its activities and contacts in testimony presented
in New York in October of 2000. Muhammad testified:
I was aware of certain contacts between Al-Qaìda and Al-Jihad
organization, on one side, and Iran and Hizballah on the other
side. I arranged security for meeting in the Sudan between
Mughniyah, Hizballah’s chief, and bin Ladin. Hizballah provided
explosives training for Al-Qaìda and Al-Jihad.124
Prior to September 11, 2001, Mughniyah was reported to have
received a request for assistance from Al-Zawahiri, which he relayed
to the Guard Corps. However, the Guards Corps declined the
request. Nevertheless, Mughniyah was instrumental in having
“organized the escape of dozens of Al-Qaìda elements to Iran”125
who had left Afghanistan.126
More recently, the leaders of Hizballah, Al-Qaìda, Hamas, and
other terrorist organizations convened for the first time in Lebanon
in March 2002. The organizations reportedly discussed future plans
for joint operations against American, British, and other targets.127
Hizballah and the Palestinian Authority

Over the past two years, Iran and Hizballah have again demonstrat-
ed their intent and capability to assist Yasir Arafat’s Fatah organiza-
tion, which presently comprises the ruling infrastructure of the
Palestinian Authority (PA). In January of 2001, Israeli security
forces captured two sealed barrels filled with arms on a beach near
Ashqelon. An inspection of the barrels revealed that they had been
transported from Hizballah in Lebanon and were en route to Gaza.
Palestinian Islamic Jihad terror operatives were supposed to retrieve
them for use within Palestinian Authority-controlled territory.128
The most significant interception and seizure of Iranian arms
purchased by the Palestinian Authority with the assistance of
Hizballah occurred on January 3, 2002, when the Israeli Navy
intercepted and seized the 4000-ton Karine A,129 a Palestinian
freighter that was traveling 300 miles off Israeli coastal waters. The
ship was transporting fifty tons of Iranian manufactured weapons,
including modern missiles equipped with Tandem-Charge war-
heads capable of piercing heavy armor, and 122 mm Katyusha rock-
ets with a range of twelve miles.130 Other weapons in the shipment
included Strela anti-aircraft missiles, mortar tubes and bombs, land
mines, Russian-manufactured wire-guided Sagger missiles,131
ammunition, anti-tank missiles, rocket-propelled grenade launch-
ers, and explosives132 en route to the Palestinian Authority.
The Palestinian Authority effort to procure the weapons from
the Iranians was initiated in Russia in September 2000. At that
time, the PA’s Major General Fu’ad Shubaki, known as Yasir Arafat’s
“finance minister,” led a high-ranking Palestinian delegation to
Moscow to make contact with the Iranians. The Palestinians were
introduced to Iranian officials via contacts from Hizballah. Shortly
after the September 11, 2001, terror attacks, Shubaki traveled to
Lebanon to finalize the Palestinian Authority’s $15 million arms
deal with the Iranians. To facilitate the transport of the weapons,
the Karine A was purchased from an agent in Bulgaria and departed
from Yemen in early December 2001. On December 11, the ship
arrived at the Iranian island of Qeys, where it was met by a Hizbal-
lah representative and Iranian intelligence officers. Eighty-three
waterproof containers were loaded onto the ship. The containers
were designed to remain submerged just below the surface of the
water with a buoy that would designate each container’s location.
Hizballah’s U.S. Activities 29
The containers were to have been transported to the Sinai coast of

Egypt and then transferred to small fishing boats that would unload
them into the sea just off the coast of Gaza, where Palestinian
Authority vessels would retrieve them at night.133
Hizballah’s U.S. Activities

The formation of Hizballah is not only linked to Iran, but is also
linked to the phenomenon of Islamic radicals who, throughout the
past four decades, have found refuge and ample opportunities in
Western countries to spread their extremist ideology to local Mus-
lim populations. Islamic radicals have learned that they can take
advantage of the freedoms that are afforded to them in Western
countries to indoctrinate, organize, and recruit members. In the
case of the 1979 Islamic Revolution, a number of activist followers
of the Ayatollah Khomeini in Europe and United States went on to
become prominent figures in Iran’s Islamic revolutionary govern-
ment after the fall of the shah.
Prior to Iran’s Islamic Revolution, the United States and Iran
were engaged in a political and cultural relationship that included a
student exchange program. This provided an opportunity for a
large number of Iranian students to study in the United States.
Among them were followers of the Ayatollah Khomeini, who later
went on to become militant members of the Iranian student organ-
ization in Tehran that seized the U.S. embassy in 1978 and held the
American diplomats hostage. Other followers of the movement
became the leaders of the Shiì Amal movement in Lebanon.134
One Iranian student who was attracted to Khomeini’s Islamic
radicalism as well as to Marxism was Mustafa Chamran Savehi, who
studied at the University of California at Berkeley and San Jose.
Chamran also became a member of Khomeini’s inner circle during
the years that Khomeini was exiled in France.135 In 1964, Chamran
left his family in California and went to Egypt, where he studied
guerrilla warfare. Upon his return to California in 1965, Chamran
created an organization with the Persian name Tashayu Sorkh (“Red
Shiìsm”) for the purpose of training “soldiers for our future strug-
gle.”136 The initial core group of five included Chamran, his broth-
er Mahdi, and an Afghan student named Hussein Forqani. The
focus of their activities consisted of organizing target practice ses-
sions at a parking lot in San Jose.137
In 1968, Chamran established the Muslim Students’ Associa-
tion of America (MSA), which recruited a number of militant stu-
dents to the cause of radical Islam. Five years after its founding, the
Muslim Students’ Association had 700 members in the United
States and had spread to the United Kingdom and France as well.
The leader of the U.S. branch was Ibrahim Yazdi, who, eleven years
later, would become Iran’s foreign minister under the Ayatollah
Khomeini.138 Members of the organization were encouraged to
abandon their studies in order to travel to Lebanon to learn terror-
ism tactics. In 1975 the MSA was described as “dispatching scores
of volunteers to Lebanon.”139
Chamran left the United States for Lebanon in 1971, where he
headed a technical school for Shiì recruits who were also trained by
him in terrorism tactics. The Democratic Front for the Liberation
of Palestine, a Marxist faction of Yasir Arafat’s Palestine Liberation
Organization led by Na’if Hawatimah, provided “technical sup-
port” for his terrorism training course.140 During his time in
Lebanon, Chamran also trained with members of the Lebanon’s
Shiì Amal militia, then led by Imam Musa Sadr.141
In 1979, Chamran went on to become the commander of Iran’s
Revolutionary Guards and its minister of defense.142 Chamran’s ini-
tial task was to establish SAVAMA,143 a new secret police to replace
that of the shah, for which he relied principally on his contacts with
the Palestine Liberation Organization. The PLO sent a special unit
trained in intelligence methods by the Soviet Union to Iran to assist
the Khomeini regime in weeding out “counterrevolutionaries.”144
Under Chamran’s leadership, the Islamic Revolutionary Guards
established a terrorist training camp in Manzariyah Park, Tehran, in
1981 named “Volunteers for Martyrdom.” Recruits for the camp
were sought among Muslim students throughout the world.145

Following the 1979-80 American hostage crisis in Iran, a lull in
recruitment activity for Hizballah occurred. However, the revivifi-
cation of indoctrination activities among Hizballah supporters in
the United States was initiated on American college campuses in
the mid-1980s. The recruitment of American students for the
movement focused on Muslim students and African American
Muslim students. From 1984 to 1987, followers of Hizballah reini-
tiated their activities in the United States. The Iranian representa-
tive for Hizballah in the United States was Ayatollah Muhammad
Nasiri, who was instructed in terrorism tactics by the Palestine Lib-
eration Organization in a training camp in the southern Lebanese
city of Tyre. Nasiri visited the United States and Canada five times
between 1984 and 1986 for periods varying between six and nine
weeks. The declared purpose of his visits was to address religious
gatherings organized by African American Muslims and Muslim
students at various campuses and at Muslim Students’ Associations.
His message, however, focused on promoting the political cause of
the Islamic Revolution as being the solution to poverty and racial
discrimination.146
“Islamic Revolution Is the Only Solution”

The Muslim Students’ Association that espouses a pro-Khomeini
position is currently known as the Muslim Students’ Association-
Persian Speaking Group (MSA-PSG). Throughout the late 1980s
and the early 1990s, the group coordinated demonstrations across
the United States to commemorate the Ayatollah Khomeini’s
“Worldwide Day of Al-Quds.” As was done in the Middle East, the
demonstrations would take place on the last Friday of the Muslim
month of Ramadan each year. The Worldwide Day of Al-Quds
became the largest public manifestation of pro-Khomeini activity in
the United States.
A leaflet from the 1992 Day of Al-Quds demonstrations in the
United States contained a statement that overtly expressed support
for the “global Islamic revolution” and included slogans such as:
“Long Live Palestine. Down with Zionism. Long Live Islamic Rev-
olution.”147 Al-Quds Day demonstrations took place in Washing-
ton, D.C., Los Angeles, and Detroit. In Canada, the demon-
strations were held in Montreal and Toronto. The sponsor of the
event, the MSA-PSG, located in Albany, California, declared in a
leaflet that the observance was instituted by the Ayatollah Khomei-
ni for the purpose of supporting the Palestinians and opposing
Zionism:
In order to establish a unified front against Zionism, Imam
Khomeini has declared the last Friday of the holy month of
Ramadan the day of Quds, a day in which everyone is invited to
proclaim international support for the Palestinian people. Join us
in demonstrations held throughout the world.148
Additional organizations that cosponsored the demonstrations
in 1992 included the Jafaria Islamic Society, the Islamic Institute of
Southern California, and “the Lebanese Muslim community.”149
The 1993 demonstration cosponsors included the Council for
Muslim Unity, the Islamic Student Association-Persian Speaking
Group, United Muslim Women Association [sic] Muslim Group,
Detroit branch, Tawheed Association, Islamic International Devel-
opment Association, United Michigan Muslim Association, Azari
Students Association, and the Islamic Cultural Society (ISFS) [sic].
The 1993 resolutions of the Demonstrations of the Worldwide
Day of Al-Quds declared their support for the Ayatollah Khomei-
ni’s Islamic Revolution:
Brothers and sisters of Islam,
We are gathering here to be involved in the Palestinian struggle.
1. We consider the Zionist regime an illegitimate entity and its
establishment in the heart of the Islamic lands a premeditated
conspiracy by a global Zionism and the arrogant powers and ene-
mies of Islam against [the] Muslim nation.
2. We call on the decent Jews to come out of their fatal embrace of
anti-Semitic Zionism [sic]…
10. We reiterate that Zionism is racism.150

The resolutions of the 1993 Demonstrations of the Worldwide
Day of Quds concluded with a statement that supported acts of
violence that were legitimized as “military initiatives” against “Zion-
ist usurpers,” i.e., Israel: “We endorse and support the Islamic mili-
tary and political initiatives against the Zionist usurpers.”151
In an extremely graphic depiction of the group’s endorsement
of “Islamic military initiatives,” the flyer was illustrated with a pic-
ture of the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem superimposed over a map
of “Palestine” covered with barbed wire and prison bars in the shape
of a six-pointed Star of David, symbolic of Israel. The corners of the
star were depicted as having been broken and dripping with
blood.152
Like many other Islamic radical organizations, the Muslim Stu-
dents’ Association-Persian Speaking Group began to use the Inter-
net to organize its followers in the 1990s. Flyers for the
demonstrations that were held throughout North America were
posted on the organization’s web site.153
The 1998 Worldwide Day of Quds was observed in Washing-
ton, D.C.; Dearborn, Michigan; Seattle, Washington; and Toronto
and Montreal, Canada. The national flyer for the day quoted the
Ayatollah Khomeini: “To liberate Quds (Jerusalem) Muslims must
depend on the power of Islam. The day of Quds is a day when all
Muslims must concentrate on Islam. The Muslims must keep the
day of Quds alive.”154 Slogans that were chanted during the demon-
stration included: “Islamic Revolution—Is the Only Solution,”
“Neither East nor West—Islam Is the Best,” “Quds Is a Muslim
Land–Its Return We Demand,” “Zionism Is Racism,” and an
expression of loyalty to Iran’s Supreme Islamic Guide, Àli
Khameneì: “Our Leader Khameneì–Long Live Khameneì.”155
The first three resolutions of the 1998 Worldwide Day of Quds
declared:
Because of this Israeli-American translocation and its military
affront to the Muslims and Christians of the world regarding the
status of Al-Quds (Jerusalem) and the physical, political, and

legal bulldozing attitude coming from all Zionist administra-
tions, we the Muslims on the International Day of Al-Quds
declare the following:
1. The Israeli-American official affront has become too transparent

to be ignored any longer by the Muslims of the world.
2. If and when the U.S. moves its embassy to Al-Quds (Jerusalem),
it shall be considered an act of way [sic] [i.e., war] by the Mus-
lims the world over.
3. All Arab and nominal Muslim governments that reach a working
relationship with the Israeli-Zionist occupiers of the Holy Land
shall be de facto accomplices of the bloody Israeli interest.156
Organizations that cosponsored the local events included the
“Washington, D.C. Quds Committee,” which provided as contact
information telephone numbers for Bahram Nahidian, a longtime
pro-Khomeini activist, and the Manassas Mosque in Virginia.157 In
Michigan, the organizers were listed as the “Michigan Quds Com-
mittee,” and in Seattle two mosques, the Islamic Center of Portland
and the Islamic Center of Seattle, were the sponsors of the event.158
Recruitment and fund-raising activities on behalf of Hizballah
in the United States became more apparent during the late 1980s
and early 1990s. Support has been centered among the Lebanese
Shiì community in Dearborn, Michigan. Sympathy for Hizballah
and Khomeini’s Islamic Revolution has also been manifest among a
minority of the Muslim American population in the area. During
the mid-1990s, unsigned leaflets in English were distributed along
Warren Avenue in Dearborn reflecting the Hizballah line by prais-
ing the late Ayatollah Khomeini and condemning U.S. support for
the “racist Zionists.”159 Additionally, a local organization named the
“Cultural Development Society” was reported by local Arab Ameri-
can residents to be operating on behalf of Hizballah.160
Support for Hizballah’s cause has also been manifest from the
pulpit of some mosques in the United States. In Dearborn, the late
Imam Muhammad Jawad Chirri of the Islamic Center of America,
known as a supporter of the Ayatollah Khomeini,161 authored a

book entitled The Shiìtes under Attack. The book describes the
twentieth century as “a time distinguished from previous centuries
by its Zionist character.” Chirri elaborated on this statement by
painting a broad picture of a worldwide conspiracy against the
Muslim world:
During this century, the Zionist dream was realized through the
creation of Israel.... Israel was planted in the heart of the Islamic
world. The East and West gave their support for this location.
This unanimous support was not due to their love of the Jews,
but rather it was motivated by their prejudice against Islam and
Muslims. East and West were determined to destroy the future of
Islam.162
Chirri praised what he termed “the Lebanese Shiìtes” of Hizballah
as Israel’s “[n]ew enemy that was small in number but big in
courage, having no arms except love of martyrdom in the way of
God,” and credits them with having achieved “the first true victory
against Israel… [and] proving that it is possible for any Arab people
to defeat the Zionists if they believe in God.”163 The present imam
of the Islamic Center of America is Imam Hassan Al-Qazwini, who
has defended fund-raising efforts on behalf of Hizballah’s social wel-
fare institutions by asserting, “Our community feels obligated to
help these orphans. They belong to the same land and soil.”164
Additionally, programs from Hizballah’s Al-Manar television
produced in Beirut, Lebanon, have been rebroadcast for American
audiences on a local Detroit station, Channel 23. A 1993 program
praised Hizballah’s terrorist activities in Lebanon. Hizballah gun-
men were shown firing automatic rifles and shelling what was then
the Israeli security zone between Israel and Lebanon. The Hizballah
announcer’s voice-over declared of the gunmen, “They are Allah’s
sword and the nation’s hope.”165
Calendars from Hizballah’s Islamic Resistance have been dis-
tributed at the Islamic Center of America in Detroit. The calendars
were bound with a cover done in classical Arabic calligraphy which
reads Al-Muqawama Al-Islamiya (“The Islamic Resistance”). The

calendar explains that the donations raised in support of the Islam-
ic Resistance will be used to “aid the Islamic Resistance to confront
and prevail over the oppressors, to liberate the land, and to secure
precious freedom for the future, and for the Society of Resistance to
overcome the challenges that it faces.”166 Donors to the Islamic
Resistance calendar are assured that their support for the movement
shows a “strike of confidence for the struggling [Islamic] clergy and
the marching of the movement in the Lebanese sphere and
throughout the world as well. Peace and Allah’s mercy and blessings
be upon you.”167
CIA Director George Tenet recently testified that Hizballah has
been carrying out surveillance activities on targets in the United
States.168 He also testified: “They have a worldwide presence. And
we see them actively casing and surveilling American facilities.”169
Hizballah cells reportedly operating in the United States are said to
number twelve. The cells are made up of a hard core of militants
who have received “military training” in Hizballah terrorist camps,
as well as supporters who number in the hundreds. They are con-
sidered to be responsible for raising millions of dollars for the
organization derived from criminal acts, including copyright viola-
tions, cigarette tax violations, and counterfeit violations.170
According to a senior FBI official, several Hizballah cells have
been under surveillance due to concerns that they will “shift from
their traditional crimes to conducting terrorist operations” as the
result of the U.S.–led war in Iraq. The official indicated that some
Hizballah operatives had left the States for Lebanon to receive ter-
rorist training: “We know that some have gone to Lebanon and
come back. A person that would attend a camp that we’d know
about, we’re investigating them pretty heavily.”171
Fund-Raising in the United States

In January 2003, as part of a two-year investigation called Opera-
tion Mountain Express, the Drug Enforcement Administration
Fund-Raising in the United States 37
confirmed the existence of groups of Middle Eastern men in Chica-

go and Detroit who had organized a methamphetamine drug oper-
ation that was sending money back to Hizballah. Arrests were made
in Detroit, Cleveland, Chicago, Phoenix, and several California
cities. The men, who had ties to Jordan, Lebanon, Yemen, and
other Middle Eastern countries, were indicted on drug charges for
smuggling large quantities of the drug pseudoephedrine from
Canada into the Midwest.172
The ring was purchasing the pseudoephedrine, a legal drug
used in cold and allergy medications, and reselling it to Mexican-
based drug operations in the Western United States which used the
pseudoephedrine to produce methamphetamine, a drug known on
the streets as “crystal meth,” “ice,” or “poor man’s cocaine.” Part of
the proceeds of the sales of pseudoephedrine was diverted to
Hizballah, while other profits were sent to bank accounts in
Lebanon and Yemen. As a result of the investigation, criminal
charges were filed against 136 people. DEA officials seized nearly
thirty-six tons of pseudoephedrine, 179 pounds of methampheta-
mine, $4.5 million in cash, eight real estate properties, and 160 cars
used by the drug gangs.173
Over the past eight years, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and
Firearms has investigated a Hizballah cell led by Mohamed Ham-
moud operating as a multimillion-dollar tobacco smuggling ring in
Charlotte, North Carolina. The cell bought truckloads of cigarettes
in North Carolina, where each carton was taxed at $.50, and resold
them in Michigan, where each was taxed at $7.50 per carton, and
kept the difference. During the time that they operated their ring,
they purchased $8 million worth of cigarettes and made a profit of
between $1.5 and $2 million.174 The cell used the profits of its cig-
arette smuggling operation to procure the following equipment for
Hizballah: night-vision devices, surveying equipment, global posi-
tioning systems, mine and metal detection devices, video equip-
ment, advanced aircraft analysis and design software, computer
equipment, stun guns, hand-held radios and receivers, cellular
phones, nitrogen cutters (used for cutting metal under water), min-
ing, drilling and blasting equipment, military-style compasses,
binoculars, naval equipment radar, dog repellers, laser-range find-
ers, and camera equipment.175
Evidence seized at the Charlotte, North Carolina, residence of
Hammoud by law enforcement officials that linked the ring to
Hizballah included a videotape depicting a Hizballah “martyr
squad” taking an oath to attack the United States and Israel: “We
will answer the call, and we will take an oath to detonate ourselves,
to shake the grounds under our enemies, America and Israel.” Then
a group responds, “We will answer to your call, Hizballah. We will
answer to your call, Hizballah.”176 Other evidence seized from
Hammoud’s residence was a series of receipts from Hizballah in
Lebanon for money sent by members of the cell in North Caroli-
na.177
In March 2003, Hammoud and five other members of the cell
were convicted and sentenced for their involvement in the ring.
Hammoud received a 155-year sentence for racketeering and pro-
viding “material support” for Hizballah. In December 2002, a sim-
ilar case was opened for investigation when a Middle Eastern man
from Los Angeles carrying $279,000 in cash was arrested in
Asheville, North Carolina. He was driving a tractor-trailer and was
apparently on his way to purchase cigarettes at a tobacco wholesaler.
Similar cases are reportedly being investigated in Louisville, Ken-
tucky, and potential leads point to New York, Chicago, and
Boston.178
Two additional cells are being investigated in Detroit and Los
Angeles. In February 2003, eleven other suspects reportedly con-
nected to the North Carolina ring were indicted in Detroit. Two of
them allegedly sent money to Hizballah.179
Conclusion
Under Iranian direction, assistance, and guidance, over the past
decade Hizballah has increasingly shifted toward attacking Jewish
Conclusion 39
and Israeli targets in parts of the world seemingly far removed from
the Middle East. The 1992 Israeli embassy bombing and the 1994
car bombing of the Argentinean Jewish community center carried
out in Buenos Aires demonstrate Hizballah’s enhanced capabilities
to carry out terror attacks as an instrument of the Iranian govern-
ment. Hizballah’s cooperation with and assistance to Al-Qaìda is
an indication of the future challenges that will be faced by Western
countries targeted by both organizations.
Hizballah’s attacks of the 1990s and Al-Qaìda’s attacks against
the United States in 2001 indicate that the threat of terror assaults
of such magnitude is no longer confined to the Middle East. As the
result of Hizballah’s international expansion, its fund-raising activi-
ties, and recruitment of operatives throughout the United States,
Europe, South America, and West Africa, Hizballah has demon-
strated long-term capabilities to carry out attacks worldwide, and
the only deterrent will be increased international cooperation to
counter Iran’s offensive in the name of Hizballah.
Notes
1. “Hizballah Acknowledges Teaching Guerrilla Warfare to Palestini-
ans,” Knight Ridder/Tribune News Service, April 21, 2002.
2. “Hizballah Proud to Be on Terror List,” NewsMax.com, November
4, 2001.
3. “Out of Captivity; The Party of God: A Powerful and Growing
Pro-Iranian Force in Lebanon,” New York Times, July 1, 1985.
4. Fouad Ajami, “Inside the Mind of a Movement,” Newsweek,
August 14, 1989.
5. “An Open Letter: The Hizballah Program,” translation of “Nass Al-
risala Al-maftuha allati Wajahaha Hizballah ila Mustadh’afin fi Lubnan wa
Al-‘alam,” Al-Safir (Lebanese daily), February 16, 1985; International
Institute for the Study of Counterterrorism, http://www.ict.org.il/Arti-
cles/Hiz_letter.htm.
6. “Hizballah Leader Nasrallah Supports Intifadha, Vows ‘Death to
America,’” Al-Manar Television, (Hizballah), Beirut, in Arabic 1450
GMT, September 27, 2002; in BBC Monitoring Middle East–Political,
September 27, 2002.

7. “Hizballah Calls for Global Attacks,” Washington Times, December
4, 2002.
8. “Millions of Muslims Demonstrate against Israel, U.S.,” Associated
Press, January 15, 1999.
9. “Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” U.S. Department of State
Office of Counterterrorism, October 23, 2002.
10. “What You Need to Know About U.S. Sanctions,” U.S. Treasury
Department Office of Foreign Assets Control, http://www.ustreas.gov/
offices/enforcement/ofac/sanctions/terrorism.html, September 23, 2001.
11. “Comprehensive List of Terrorists and Groups Identified under
Executive Order 13224,” U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordi-
nator for Counterterrorism, October 23, 2002.
12. Daniel Brumberg, “Khomeini’s Legacy: Islamic Rule and Islamic
Social Justice,” in Spokesman for the Despised: Fundamentalist Leaders of the
Middle East, R. Scott Appleby, ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1997), p. 17.
13. Martin Kramer, Hizballah’s Vision of the West, Washington Insti-
tute for Near East Policy, Paper No. 16, 1989, p. 10.
14. Ibid., p. 11.
15. “Imam Khomeini’s Message on the Occasion of the Day of Quds,
1981,” Extreme Islam: Anti-American Propaganda of Muslim Fundamental-
ism, Adam Parfrey, ed. (Los Angeles: Feral House, 2001), p.198.
16. Ibid, pp.198-9.
17. Amir Taheri, Holy Terror: Inside the World of Islamic Terrorism
(Bethesda, Maryland: Adler& Adler, 1987), pp. 86-7.
18. “Iranians Have Nurtured Sinn Fein Links since 1980s,” Times
(UK), April 29, 1994.
19. “Pragmatists and Radicals Start Post-Khomeini Power Struggle,”
Financial Post (Canada), July 25, 1988.
20. The Qur’an, Surah 5; Al-Ma’ida; verse 56 (Elmhurst, New York:
Tahrike Tarsile Qur’an Inc., Publishers and Distributors of the Holy
Qur’an, sixth edition, 1990), p. 104.
21. The Qur’an, Surah 58; Al-Majadala; verse 22, p. 550.
22. “What You Need to Know about U.S. Sanctions.”
23. Martin Kramer, “The Oracle of Hizballah,” in Spokesmen for the
Despised, R. Scott Appleby, ed., p. 83.
Notes 41
24. Taheri, Holy Terror, p. 131.

25. “Hostages Linked to Lebanese Clan,” New York Times, January
31, 1985.
26. Amir Taheri, “Signs of Schism in Lebanese Hizballah,” Arab
News, December 19, 1994.
27. “Iran Reportedly Agrees to Increase Islamic Jihad’s Budget,” Al-
Sharq Al-Awsat, June 8, 2002, in Global News Wire—Asia Africa Intelli-
gence Wire, BBC Monitoring /BBC Monitoring International Reports, June
14, 2002.
28. “In the Name of God: Iran’s ‘Shiìte International,’” Defense and
Foreign Affairs, August 1985.
29. Kenneth Katzman, The Warriors of Islam: Iran’s Revolutionary
Guard (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), p. 71.
30. Martin Kramer, “Musawi’s Game,” New Republic, March 23,
1992.
31. Ibid.
32. “Aftermath in Bloody Beirut: Vows to Stay, as the Search for the
Missing Goes On,” Time, November 7, 1983.
33. Interview with Shaykh Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, Middle
East Insight, June-July 1985.
34. Kramer, “The Oracle of Hizballah,” p. 111.
35. Ibid., p. 111.
36. “Israel’s 10 Most Wanted Terrorists,” Jerusalem Report, October
20, 1994.
37. “Hizballah Becomes Potent Anti-U.S. Force,” New York Times,
December 24, 2002.
39. Kramer, Hizballah’s Vision of the West, p. 11.
40. “Out of Captivity,” July 1, 1985.
41. “Shadowy Terror Group Has Strong Ties to Iran,” New York
Times, August 2, 1989.
42. Kramer, Hizballah’s Vision of the West, p. 11.
43. Taheri, “Signs of Schism in Lebanese Hizballah.”
44. Cyril Glasse, “Husayn,” in Concise Encyclopedia of Islam (San
Francisco: Harper and Row Publishers Inc., 1989), pp. 162-3.
45. Ajami, “Inside the Mind of a Movement.”
47. Ibid., p. 241.

48. Ibid., p. 242.
49. Ibid., p. 242.
50. Wall Street Journal, August 16, 1989.
51. “Arafat’s Elite Force 17, Accused by Israel of Instigating ‘Terror,’”
Agence France Presse, March 29, 2001.
52. “Former Intelligence Officer Alleges Iranian and Hizballah Links
with Al-Qa’ida,” News Wire-Asia Africa Intelligence Wire, March 2, 2003.
53. “U.S. Traces Iran’s Ties to Terror through a Lebanese,” New York
Times, January 17, 2002.
54. “Israel’s 10 Most Wanted Terrorists.”
55. “Shiìte Radicals: Rising Wrath Jars the Mideast,” New York
Times, March 22, 1987.
56. “Hizballah (Party of God),” Patterns of Global Terrorism, U.S.
Department of State, May 2002, http://library.nps.navy.mil/home/tgp/
hizbalah.htm.
57. “Most Wanted Terrorists,” Federal Bureau of Investigation,
http://www.fbi.gov/mostwant/terrorists/fugitives.htm.
58. Ibid.
59. “Most Wanted Terrorists: Hasan Iz Al-Din,” http://www.fbi.gov/
mostwant/terrorists/terizzaldin.htm.
60. “Most Wanted Terrorists: ‘Ali ‘Atwa,” http://www.fbi.gov/most-
want/ terrorists/teratwa.htm.
61. “Most Wanted Terrorists: Ìmad Fayez Mughniyah,” http://www.
fbi.gov/mostwant/terrorists/termugniyah.htm. The charges against Mug-
hniyah include: “conspiracy to commit aircraft piracy, to commit hostage
taking, to commit air piracy resulting in murder, to interfere with a flight
crew, to place a destructive device aboard an aircraft, to have explosive
devices about the person on an aircraft, and to assault passengers and
crew; air piracy resulting in murder; air piracy; hostage taking; interfer-
ence with flight crew; and placing explosives aboard aircraft; placing
destructive device aboard aircraft; assault aboard aircraft with intent to
hijack with a dangerous weapon and resulting in serious bodily injury;
aiding and abetting.”
62. “Robert Dean Stethem,” Arlington National Cemetery,
http://www.arlingtoncemetery.com/rdstethe.htm.
63. “Most Wanted Terrorists,” http://www.fbi.gov/mostwant/
terrorists/ fugitives.htm.
Notes 43
64. “U.S. Renews Bid to Catch Beirut Bombing Suspect,” CNN.com,

October 10, 2001.
65. “Terror Alliance Has U.S. Worried; Hizballah, Al Qa’ida Seen
Joining Forces,” Washington Post, June 30, 2002.
66. “U.S. Says Iran Paid Captors $1 Million for Each Release,” New
York Times, January 20, 1992.
67. “14 to 20 Are Dead in Embassy Blast,” New York Times, March
19, 1992.
68. “Death Toll in Israeli Embassy Bombing Rises to 32,” New York
Times, March 21, 1992.
69. “Statement Claims Argentina Bombing by Islamic Jihad,“ United
Press International, March 24, 1992.
70. “Pro-Hizballah Radio Reports Islamic Jihad Statement on Israeli
Embassy Bombing,” Voice of the Oppressed (Hizballah radio), 1630
GMT; March 19, 1992; BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, March 19,
1992.
71. “How Iran Planned the Buenos Aires Blast,” Ha’aretz (Israeli
daily), March 18, 2003.
72. “26 Die and 127 Hurt in Blast at Argentine Jewish Center,” New
York Times, July 21, 1994.
73. “Multicontinental Investigators Target Global Bombers of Jews,”
Washington Post, July 31, 1994.
74. “How Iran Planned the Buenos Aires Blast.”
75. Ibid.
76. “Argentine Judge Indicts Four Iranian Officials in 1994 Bombing
of Jewish Center, “New York Times, March 10, 2003.
77. Ibid.
78. “Iranian Charge D’affaires Questioned on Links with Hizballah,”
Noticias Argentinas news agency, Buenos Aires, in Spanish 19:48 GMT;
July 24, 1994; in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, July 27, 1994.
79. “How Iran Planned the Buenos Aires Blast.”
80. “Argentina–Terrorism: Colombian Under Investigation for
Argentine Terrorist Bombings,” Global News Wire, March 24, 2003.
81. “Argentina – Terrorism.”
82. Ibid.
83. “Iran, Argentina Trade Charges on ’94 Attack,” Washington Post,
March 11, 2003.
84. “Argentina Asks Interpol to Arrest Hizballah Leader,” Telam

News Agency, Buenos Aires, in Spanish 13:07 GMT; October 1, 2002; in
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, October 2, 2002.
85. Ibid.
86. “Iran, Argentina Trade Charges on ‘94 Attack.”
87. “Iran Reportedly Agrees to Increase Islamic Jihad’s Budget.”
88. Amir Taheri, “The Aid Iran Gives Islamic Organizations and Var-
ious Groups in Other Countries Is No Secret,” Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (Lon-
don), Arabic-language daily, July 30, 1994; translated in “Arab News
Digest,” Jerusalem Post, August 10, 1994.
89. Ibid.
90. Farhad Mammadov, “Hizballah Has Cells in Azerbaijan,” Azadliq
(Azerbaijan), March 14, 2002; http://www.eurasianet.org/resource/azer-
baijan/ hypermail/20203/0046.shtml.
93. “Pragmatists and Radicals Start Post-Khomeini Power Struggle.”
94. “Revealed,” Sunday Times (UK), May 1, 1994.
95. Ibid.
96. “Iranians Have Nurtured Sinn Fein Links since 1980s.”
97. “Revealed.”
98. “Tehran Stepping Up Funding of Terrorists,” Chicago Tribune,
October 15, 1993.
99. “UPI Spotlight: Hizballah, PFLP Join to Foil PLO-Israeli Peace
Accord,” United Press International, November 1, 1993.
100. “DFLP and Hizballah Agree to Work Together against Gaza-
Jericho Deal,” Radio Monte Carlo - Middle East, Paris, in Arabic 1200
GMT; October 31, 1993; in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Novem-
ber 2, 1993.
101. Foreign Report, March 17, 1994.
102. Ehud Ya’ari, “A Holy War of Words,” Jerusalem Report, January
10, 1991.
103. Roni Shaked, “The Orders to Murder Arrive by Fax from Dam-
ascus,” Yediot Aharonot, November 18, 1994.
104. Anat Kurz, Maskit Burgin, and David Tal, eds., Terror Islami
v’Yisrael: Hizballah, Jihad Islami Palistini, Hamas (Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center
for Strategic Studies, and Papyrus Publishing, 1993), p. 130.
Notes 45
105. “Palestinian Group Small but Deadly,” Associated Press, June 5,

2002.
106. Ze’ev Schiff, “The Islamic Jihad Receives Additional Payment
from Iran for Each Attack,” Ha’aretz, July 31, 1997.
108. “IRNA Reports Khameneì’s Message to Conference on Support
for Palestine,” Iranian Republic News Agency (IRNA), Tehran, in Eng-
lish, 9:15 GMT, June 2, 2002, in BBC Worldwide Monitoring, June 2,
2002.
109. “Iran: Majlis Speaker, Palestinian Leaders Address Conference
on Palestine,” Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Network 1, Tehran,
in Persian, 14:30 GMT, June 2, 2002; in BBC Worldwide Monitoring,
June 2, 2002.
110. “IRNA Reports Khameneì’s Message.”
111. “Iran: Pro-Palestinian Conference Ends, Calls for Embargo on
U.S. Goods,” Iranian Republic News Agency (IRNA), in English, 1833
GMT, June 3, 2002, in FBIS-NES, June 3, 2002.
112. “Iran: Majlis Speaker, Palestinian Leaders.”
113. “Iran Increases Funding and Training for Suicide Bombings,”
Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, Saudi-owned Arabic newspaper based in London, June
8, 2002; translated in Middle East Media and Research Institute
(MEMRI) Special Dispatch—Iran/Jihad and Terrorism, June 11, 2002, No.
387.
114. “Iran: Majlis Speaker, Palestinian Leaders.”
115. “Iran: Pro-Palestinian Conference Ends.”
116. “Iran Meeting Offers Support to Palestinians,” Financial Times,
June 3, 2002.
117. “Jordan Told USA about Iranian Plan to Stage Attacks on
Israel—Paper,” Al-Sharq al-Awsat, February 5, 2002, in BBC Monitoring,
Middle East–Political, February 5, 2002.
118. “Lebanese Army Arrests Hizballah Members,” Associated Press,
April 1, 1994.
119. Gal Luft, “The Karine-A Affair: A Strategic Watershed in the
Middle East?, Peacewatch #361, Washington Institute for Near East Poli-
cy, January 30, 2002.
120. “Iran-Palestinian Weapons Link Likely,” BBC News, February 5,
2002; http://www.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/1803148.stm.
121. “U.S. Warns Terrorist Groups against Retaliatory Attacks,”

Chicago Tribune, March 20, 2003.
123. “Iran: Former Intelligence Officer Alleges Iranian and Hizballah
Links with Al-Qaìda,” Global News Wire-Asia Africa Intelligence Wire,
March 2, 2003.
124. United States of America v. Ali Muhammad, United States Dis-
trict Court Southern District of New York, S (7) about 98 Cr. 1023
(LBS), New York, N.Y, October 20, 2000, p. 28.
125. “Iran: Former Intelligence Officer Alleges Links with Al-
Qaìda.”
126. “Terror Alliance Has U.S. Worried.”
127. “Suicide Bombers Will Strike in America: FBI,” Sydney Morning
Herald, May 22, 2002; http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2002/05/21/
1021882056818.html.
128. Gal Luft, “The Seizure of Gaza-Bound Arms: Military Implica-
tions,” Peacewatch #359, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Janu-
ary 8, 2002.
129. “Israeli Commandos Capture Arms Ship Bound for Palestini-
ans,” Telegraph (UK), January 5, 2002; http://www.telegraph.co.uk.
130. Luft, “The Seizure of Gaza-Bound Arms.”
131. “Israeli Commandos Capture Arms Ship.”
132. “Israelis Present ‘Proof ’ of Arafat’s Role in Arms Plot,” Telegraph
(UK), January 13, 2002; http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?x
ml=news/ 20002/01/13/wisr13.xml
133. Ibid.
135. “After the Crisis, How Will Carter Deal with Iran?” Associated
Press, November 19, 1979.
137. Ibid., p. 78. Taheri quotes from Yadnameh Shahid Chamran, “In
Memoriam–Chamran the Martyr” (Persian) (Tehran: third edition,
1984), p. 89.
138. Ibid., p. 78.
139. Ibid., p. 78-9.
140. Ibid., p. 78.
141. “Amal’s Relationship with Iran,” Info-Prod Research (Middle
Notes 47
East) Ltd., November 16, 1999.

142. “Iranian Ambassador on Western ‘Conspiracy’ to Disrupt Arab-
Iranian Relations,” Kuwait News Agency, 07:30 GMT, October 3, 1979,
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, October 4, 1979.
143. “Khomeini Reported to Have Own SAVAK-Style Agency,”
Washington Post, June 7, 1980.
144. “Terror: A Soviet Export,” New York Times, November 2, 1980.
145. Taheri, Holy Terror, pp. 100-101.
146. Ibid.
147. “Resolutions of the Worldwide Day of Quds Demonstration,”
March 27, 1992.
148. Ibid.
149. Ibid.
150. “Worldwide Day of Al-Quds” flyer, May 5, 1989.
151. Ibid.
152. Ibid.
153. “Worldwide Day of Quds” flyers, January 23, 1998; at MSA-
PSG Quds Day Website, http://www.msapsg.org/quds.
154. “Download Quds flyers,” MSA-PSG website; http://www.msa
psg.org/ flyers.html , PDF document “qudsall-1.pdf.”
155. Ibid., PDF document, “slogan98.pdf.”
156. Ibid., PDF document, “qudsres.pdf.”
157. Ibid., PDF document “qudsdc-1.pdf.”
158. Ibid., PDF document “qudswa-2.pdf.”
159. “Islamic Radicals,” Associated Press, May 5, 1993.
160. Ibid.
161. “Cleric Was the Catalyst in Islamic Community,” Detroit Free
Press, November 11, 1994.
162. Boston Jewish Times, March 22, 1990.
163. Ibid.
164. “Local Arabs Fear Fed Scrutiny,” Detroit News, July 25, 2000.
165. “Islamic Radicals.”
166. Taqweem Al-Muqawama Al-Islamiya, 1413/14, 1993.
167. Ibid.
168. “Progress Since 9 /11: the Effectiveness of U.S. Anti-Terrorist
Financing Efforts,” Hearing of the Oversight and Investigations Subcom-
mittee of the House Financial Services Committee, chaired by Represen-
tative Sue W. Kelly (R-NY); Federal News Service, March 11, 2003.
169. “Chairman Holds Hearing on Worldwide Threats to the Intelli-
gence Community,” Senate Select Intelligence Committee, FDCH Politi-
cal Transcripts, February 11, 2003.
170. “How a Hizballah Cell Made Millions in Sleepy Charlotte,
NC,” U.S. News and World Report, March 10, 2003.
171. “U.S. Warns Terrorist Groups against Retaliatory Attacks”
Chicago Tribune, March 20, 2003.
172. “Drug Money for Hizballah,” CBSNews.com, September 2,
2002.
173. Ibid.
174. “Terrorism Financing,” Panel One of a Hearing of the Senate
Judiciary Committee, Federal News Service, November 20, 2002.
175. Ibid.
176. Ibid.
177. Ibid.
178. “How a Hizballah Cell Made Millions.”
179. Ibid.

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Hizballah

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The American Jewish Committee protects the rights and free-

doms of Jews the world over; combats bigotry and anti-Semi-

Cover photo: Children dressed as Hizballah mujahideen (holy warriors) tram-

THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

Copyright © 2003 The American Jewish Committee

Hizballah’s U.S. Activities 29

eration with Al-Qa`ida, having helped dozens of Bin Laden opera-

This report is the fourth in a series of terrorism briefings she has

ber 11, “Death to America” will remain our reverberating and

The Ayatollah Khomeini as the Supreme Jurisconsult

jurisconsult. The concept that he delineated provided for an Islam-

O, you Muslims of the world! You oppressed masses! Rise up and

Origins: “There Is Only One Party, the Party of Allah!”

shall be triumphant.20 [Emphasis added.]

The Symbol of the Movement

“A Muslim Youth in Lebanon Smiled at Death”

who is known as “Hizballah’s midwife.”27 As the result of Iran’s

In the early 1980s, Hizballah gained worldwide notoriety for its

weapons used by the United States and the West:

Many Hizballah fighters are deeply attached to Iran sentimental-

of evil in the world in order to accelerate a final apocalyptic con-

The Obligation to War and Jihad

prepare themselves for the conquest of [other] countries so that

Hizballah’s Terror Activities

against those whom it views as its enemies—namely, Israel and

Hizballah or Iran had controlled the ultimate fate of the hostages,

Hizballah’s Role in the Israel Embassy and AMIA Bombings

against the usurping Jews because no one can reproach us in our

Iran’s Supreme Guide, Ayatollah Khamene`i, legitimized the

Buenos Aires since 1982. Following the bombing of the Israeli

carried out by a suicide bomber.” As further evidence demonstrat-

cal Islamic organizations that were sympathetic to its cause

Iran, Hizballah, and International Terrorism

movement’s ideology, refused to pay for their drinks.94 To demon-

between Israel and the Palestinians.100

Hizballah and the Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine

In May 2002, IJMP leader Ramadan ‘Abdallah Shallah met

Hizballah and Hamas

Hizballah, Syria, and Lebanon

Hizballah and Al-Qa`ida

Guards had a relationship with Egyptian Islamic Jihad going back

Hizballah and the Palestinian Authority

The containers were to have been transported to the Sinai coast of

Hizballah’s U.S. Activities

were sought among Muslim students throughout the world.145

“Islamic Revolution Is the Only Solution”

10. We reiterate that Zionism is racism.150

status of Al-Quds (Jerusalem) and the physical, political, and

1. The Israeli-American official affront has become too transparent

known as a supporter of the Ayatollah Khomeini,161 authored a

reads Al-Muqawama Al-Islamiya (“The Islamic Resistance”). The

Fund-Raising in the United States

confirmed the existence of groups of Middle Eastern men in Chica-

September 27, 2002.

24. Taheri, Holy Terror, p. 131.

47. Ibid., p. 241.

64. “U.S. Renews Bid to Catch Beirut Bombing Suspect,” CNN.com,

84. “Argentina Asks Interpol to Arrest Hizballah Leader,” Telam

105. “Palestinian Group Small but Deadly,” Associated Press, June 5,

121. “U.S. Warns Terrorist Groups against Retaliatory Attacks,”

East) Ltd., November 16, 1999.

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