In the decades to come, the most lethalthreats to the United States’ safety andsecurity—a city poisoned or reduced torubble by a terrorist attack—are likely to emanate from states that cannot ade-quately govern themselves or secure theirown territory. Dealing with such frac-tured or failing states is, in many ways,the main security challenge of our time.For the Defense Department and theentireU.S. government, it is also a com-plex institutional challenge. The UnitedStates is unlikelyto repeat a missiononthe scale of those in Afghanistan or Iraqanytime soon—that is, forced regimechange followed by nationbuilding underfire. But as the Pentagon’sQuadrennialDefense Reviewrecentlyconcluded, theUnited States is stilllikelyto face scenariosrequiring a familiar tool kit of capabilities,albeit on a smaller scale. In these situations,the eªectiveness and credibility of theUnited States will only be as good asthe eªectiveness, credibility, and sustain-ability of its local partners. This strategic reality demands that theU.S. government get better at what is called“building partner capacity”: helping othercountries defend themselves or, if necessary,fight alongside U.S. forces by providingthem with equipment, training, or otherforms of security assistance. This is some-thing that the United States has been doingin various ways for nearly three-quarters of acentury. It dates back to the period beforethe United States entered World War II, when Winston Churchill famously said,“Giveus the tools, and we will finish the job.” Through the Lend-Lease program,the United States sent some $31 billion worth of supplies (in 1940s dollars) tothe United Kingdomover the course of the war.U.S. aid to the Soviet Unionduringthose years exceeded $11billion, includinghundreds of thousands of trucks and thou-sands of tanks, aircraft, and artillerypieces.Building up the militaryand security forces of key allies and local partners wasalso a major component ofU.S. strategy in the Cold War, first in Western Europe,then in Greece, South Korea, and else- where. One of the major tenets ofPresidentRichard Nixon’s national security strategy,the Nixon Doctrine, was to use military and economic assistance to help U.S.partners and allies resist Soviet-sponsored
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Helping Others Defend Themselves
The Future of U.S. Security Assistance
Robert M. Gates
Robert M
.
Gates
is U.S. Secretary of Defense.
foreign affairs
.
May/June 2010
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Helping Others Defend Themselves
insurgencies without using U.S. troopsin the kind of military interventions thathad proved so costly and controversial inKorea and Vietnam.
ADVISORY DUTY
The global security environment haschanged radically since then, and today it is more complex, more unpredictable,and, even without a superpower adversary,in many ways more dangerous. The U.S.military, although resilient in spirit andmagnificent in performance, is understress and strain fighting two wars andconfronting diªuse challenges aroundthe globe. More broadly, there continuesto be a struggle for legitimacy, loyalty, andpower across the Islamic world betweenmodernizing, moderate forces and the violent, extremist organizations epitomizedby al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other suchgroups. In these situations, building thegovernance and security capacity of othercountries must be a critical element of U.S. national securitystrategy.For the most part, however,theUnited States’ instruments of nationalpower—militaryand civilian—weresetup in a diªerent erafor a verydiªerentset of threats. The U.S. militarywasdesigned to defeat other armies, navies,and air forces, not to advise, train, andequip them. Likewise, the United States’civilian instruments of power were de-signed primarily to manage relationshipsbetween states, rather than to help buildstates from within. The recent history ofU.S. dealings withAfghanistan and Pakistan exemplifies thechallenges the United States faces. Inthe decade before 9/11, the United Statesessentially abandoned Afghanistan to itsfate. At the same time, Washington cutoª military-to-military exchange andtraining programs with Pakistan, for well-intentioned but ultimately shortsighted—and strategically damaging—reasons.In the weeks and months followingthe 9/11 attacks, the U.S. governmentfaced a number of delays in getting crucialeªorts oª the ground—from reimbursingthe Pakistanis for their support (such astheir provision of overflight rights to U.S.military aircraft) to putting in place aformal Afghan military. The security assistance system, which was designedfor the more predictable requirements of the Cold War, proved unequal to the task. The U.S. government had to quickly assemble from scratch various urgently needed resources and programs. Andeven after establishing funding streamsand authorities, the military services didnot prioritize eªorts to train the Afghanand, later,the Iraqi security forces, sincesuchassignments were not consideredcareer enhancing for ambitious youngo⁄cers. Instead, the militaryrelied heavily oncontractors and reservists for these tasks.Morerecently,the advisorymissions inboth the Afghan and the Iraqi campaignshavereceived the attentiontheydeserve—in leadership,resources, and personnel. Within the military,advising and mentor-ing indigenous security forces is movingfrom the periphery of institutional priorities, where it was considered the province of the Special Forces, to being a key missionfor the armed forces as a whole. The U.S.Army has established specialized Advisory and Assistance Brigades—now the mainforces in Iraq—and is adjusting its promo-tion and assignment procedures to accountfor the importance of this mission; theU.S. Air Force is fielding a fleet of lightfighter jets and transport aircraft optimized
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foreign affairs
.
Volume
89
No.3
Robert M. Gates
to train and assist local partners, and itrecently opened a school to train U.S.airmen to advise other nations’ air forces;and the U.S. Navy is working with Africancountries to improve their ability to com-bat smuggling, piracy, and other threatsto maritime security.One institutional challenge we face atthe Pentagon is that the various functionsfor building partner capacity are scatteredacross diªerent parts of the military. Anexception is the air force, where most of these functions—from foreign military sales to military training exchanges—aregrouped under one civilian executive (theequivalent of a three-star general) to bet-ter coordinate them with larger goals andnational strategy. This more integratedand consolidated approach makes bettersense for the Pentagon and for the govern-ment as a whole. The United States has made greatstrides in building up the operationalcapacity of its partners by training andequipping troops and mentoring them inthe field. But therehas not been enoughattentionpaid to building the institutionalcapacity(suchas defense ministries) orthe human capital (including leadershipskills and attitudes) needed to sustainsecurityover the long term. The United States now recognizes thatthe security sectors of at-risk countries arereally systems of systems tying togetherthe military, the police, the justice system,and other governance and oversight mech-anisms. As such, building a partner’s over-all governance and security capacity is ashared responsibility across multipleagencies and departments of the U.S.national security apparatus—and onethat requires flexible, responsive toolsthat provide incentives for cooperation.Operations against extremist groups in thePhilippines and, more recently, Yemen haveshown how well-integrated training andassistance eªorts can achieve real success.But for all the improvements of recent years, the United States’ interagency toolkit is still a hodgepodge of jury-riggedarrangements constrained by a dated andcomplex patchwork of authorities, persis-tent shortfalls in resources, and unwieldy processes. The National Security Act thatcreated most of the current interagency structure was passed in 1947, the last majorlegislation structuring how Washingtondispenses foreign assistance was signedby President John F. Kennedy, and thelaw governing U.S. exports of military equipment was passed in 1976. All the while, other countries that do not suªerfrom such encumbrances have been morequickly funding projects, selling weapons,and building relationships.
BRIDGING THE POTOMAC
In 2005, to address the country’smostpressing needs, the Defense Departmentobtained authorities that enable the mili-taryto respond to unforeseen threats andopportunities by providing training andequipment to other countries with urgentsecurityneeds. These newtools came withan important innovation: their use requiresthe concurrence of both the secretary of defense and the secretary of state in whatis called a “dual key” decision-makingprocess. In recent years, the secretaries haveused these authorities to assist the Lebanesearmy, the Pakistani special forces, and thenavies and maritime security forces of Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines. Those authorities and programs—andthe role of the Defense Department inforeign assistance writ large—have stirred
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Helping Others Defend Themselves: The Future of U.S. Security Assistance
In the decades to come, the most lethal threats to the United States’ safety and security—a city poisoned or reduced to
rubble by a terrorist attack—are likely
to emanate from states that cannot adequately
govern themselves… (More)
rubble by a terrorist attack—are likely
to emanate from states that cannot adequately
govern themselves… (More)
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