Publishing Co. v. Tornillo
, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) [p. XXX], the Supreme Court upheld the FCC’s(since-repealed) requirement that radio and television broadcasters provide criticized persons anopportunity to respond to attacks.
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal CommunicationsCommission
, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) [p. XXX]. Broadcast media were different, the Courtconcluded, because the scarcity of available broadcast frequencies prevented each potentialspeaker from having access to the airwaves. Accordingly, broadcasters could constitutionally beconsidered to hold their licenses in the public interest, and obligated to permit other members of the public access to their stations when necessary to give the public a balanced presentation of issues.Government is usually prohibited from imposing civil or criminal penalties for politicalspeech, and may not interfere with the speech of candidates for public office.
See Brown v. Hartlage
, 456 U.S. 45 (1982) [p. XXX]. Where a state’s electoral process incorporates a role for petitions (often as a prerequisite to ballot-access for third parties or initiatives), the circulation of such petitions involves “core political speech.”
See Meyer v. Grant
, 486 U.S. 414, 420-22 (1986)[p. XXX]. Even judicial candidates possess a First Amendment right to announce their views incampaigns, though states may be able to restrict judicial campaign speech more than they canrestrict speech in other types of campaigns.
See Republican Party of Minnesota v. White
, 536U.S. 765, 783 (2002) [p. XXX]. Political speakers are also protected from being forced todisclose their identities when speaking.
See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission
, 514 U.S.334 (1995). As we will see in Chapter 9, however, the Court has upheld campaign-finance lawsthat require donors to disclosure their identities.
See McConnell v. Federal Election Commission
,540 U.S. 93,
189-202 (2003) [p. XXX];
Buckley v. Valeo
, 424 U.S. 1, 74-82 (1976) [p. XXX](
).When government acts not as a regulator but as an employer, it may sometimes conditionemployment on the employee’s agreement not to engage in political speech—provided that theemployee’s speech would adversely affect job performance. Where an individual’s job performance is unaffected by the speech, government may not discipline an employee for speechthat opposes the government’s viewpoint.
See Pickering v. Board of Education
, 391 U.S. 563(1968) [p. XXX]. In a series of cases upholding limitations on government employees’ politicalactivity, however, the Court has indicated that the government may impose limits on employees’First Amendment freedoms where public confidence in government demands that workers not beseen as having their jobs depend on their support for the party or politicians in power.
See Broadrick v. Oklahoma
, 413 U.S. 601 (1973);
Civil Service Commission v. National Associationof Letter Carriers
, 413 U.S. 548 (1973) [p. XXX];
United Public Workers v. Mitchell
, 330 U.S.75 (1947) [p. XXX].The dangers of a partisan government workforce are so acute that the Court has not onlyauthorized limits on employees’ speech, but has also held that the First Amendment itself requires government to refrain from making certain employment decisions on a patronage basis.Patronage persists to some degree, of course, but the Court has stated that party loyalty may bethe basis for personnel decisions relating only to those positions for which “party affiliation is anappropriate requirement for the effective performance of the public office involved.”
Branti v. Finkel
, 445 U.S. 507, 518-20 (1980).One particular type of political speech—campaign finance—is the subject of its ownChapter. As you read the materials in this one, however, you should consider how the principlesdeveloped here should apply in evaluating the constitutionality of restrictions on raising or spending money in campaigns.3