World Development, Vol. 24, No. 1, pp.

97-l 11,1996
Pergamon Copyright 0 1995 Elsevier Science Ltd
Printed in Great Britain. All rights reserved
0305-750X/96 $15.00 + 0.00
0305-750x(95)00119-0

Deagrarianization and Rural Employment in

sub-Saharan Africa: A Sectoral Perspective

DEBORAH FAHY BRYCESON”

African Studies Centre, Leiden, The Netherlands

Summary. - Sub-Saharan Africa is steadily becoming less rural in character. For decades development
thinking has prescribed industrialization as the virtuous path leading away from economic dependence
on agriculture. But Africa’s industrial record has been plagued with underperformance. An alternative
perspective centered on the process of “deagrarianization” and attendant rural employment generation
may offer more explanatory power and policy direction. This paper outlines key theoretical components
and practical concerns of a deagrarianization approach. The nature and incidence of deagtianization in
sub-Saharan Africa is contrasted with that experienced in developed industrial countries. Conceptual
approaches dealing with rural non-agricultural employment are identified within different social science
disciplines through a thematic review of the literature. The conclusion highlights the need for more
focused study of the deagrarianization process and rural service sector development.

1. INTRODUCTION past 50 years which might generate a supply of labor

Over the past decade, several studies have pointed
to the importance of nonagricultural employment for
rural households in sub-Saharan Africa.’ The signifi-
cance of nonagricultural rural employment (NARE)
relates to its growth as a substantial proportion of total
household labor time and its contribution to household
disposable income. The view that African farmers are
strictly self-sufficient, subsistence-based producers
has long been discarded. Rather the image of peasant
households producing “subsistence” and “cash” crops
has held sway in most of the policy-oriented literature.
“Off-farm” activities have tended to be conceptual-
ized as by-the-way, often seasonal in nature, or pur-
sued by marginal groups such as female heads of
households engaged in beer brewing. On the other
hand, nonagricultural activities hold a center stage
position in development project work, income-gener-
ating projects for women being the prime example. As
cash-earning activities, however, they are usually con-
ceived as supplementary to, rather than in place of,
farming efforts. Now it is beginning to become evi-
dent that NARE are in fact a desirable, if not a neces-
sary, alternative to farming for certain categories of
people in a number of places. It is worth considering
some of the reasons why this may be the case.
Looking at changes in rural communities over the
for NARE, one is immediately aware of the influence
of population growth. The increasing population den-
sity of most rural areas has, in many cases, led to con-
straints on land availability. The economic crisis of
the past decade and a half, and the structural adj@st-
ment programs (SAP) that have followed, have caused
a contraction of urban employment opportunities for
would-be rural emigrants. In some instances retUrn
migration has been observed or is contemplated by
urban residents? Due to investment in primary and
secondary education many of the youth now remain-
ing in the countryside are more educated than their
parents’ generation and often less satisfied with a
strictly agrarian work life.
Similarly, fundamental changes in rural communi-
ties have, it could be argued, influenced demand for
NARE. In the transition from long forest fallow to
shorter bush fallow agricultural systems characteristic
of most rural areas, shifting settlement patterns have
given way to the establishment of permanent villa$es.
Houses, roads, mills, and other village infrastruc!ure
have been built which have generated employmeflt in
construction, operation and maintenance. Because of
*Final revision accepted: June 28, 1995.

97
98 WORLD DEVELOPMENT
the increase in rural population density, there is now
pressure on the availability of natural resources as
well as land. Fuel wood and water supplies, that had
always been “free goods” as far as the community was
concerned, have become scarce and sometimes
assume a cash value with respect to their procurement
and transport. Thus a “renewable” consumer goods
market has arisen in some rural areas. Furthermore,
under structural adjustment programs, government
and parastatal provisioning of rural social services and
productive infrastructure, as well as wholesale and
retail marketing services have been severely curtailed,
often leaving demand suspended until a local market
response is mustered. Rural demand for health, educa-
tion, agricultural marketing services and productive
inputs, basic consumer goods as well as water, energy
and transport infrastructure all provide entry points for
the development of NARE.
Surveys reveal that food purchases still dominate
household budgetary expenditure in most rural areas.3
This is more often a reflection of food insecurity than
an outcome of specialization in nonfood production.
Food purchases represent the development of market
exchange in the realm of basic needs provisioning.
They undoubtedly have an effect on local-level social
attitudes and economic organization, often undermin-
ing more communal-based food/service exchanges.
This creates the conditions for the gradual evolution
of markets in other basic needs and nonagricultural
goods and services.
Since Adam Smith to the present, the expansion of
nonagricultural activities has been primarily seen in
terms of a changing relationship between agriculture
and industry. Most of the development policy debate
of the last 40 years has centered on the “right” rela-
tionship between the two, i.e. whether agriculture or
industry is the lead sector, or alternatively whether it
is possible to engender a balanced development of
them both simultaneously. The overpowering influ-
ence of this debate is demonstrated by the way nona-
gricultural rural employment activities are commonly
referred to as “rural” or “small-scale industries.”
Generally such activities are viewed positively, with
their potential for stimulating industrial and/or agri-
cultural development being vigorously debated in
light of their forward and backward linkages to agri-
culture and urban-based industry.“ Drawing back a
few steps from this perspective, one could ask
whether this economic sectoral development model
has been presumptuously imposed on sub-Saharan
Africa.
It is now widely accepted that the industrial devel-
opment record of sub-Saharan Africa over the past
two decades has been abysmal? Only 0.8% of the
world’s Manufacturing Value Added (MVA) in 1986
came from sub-Saharan Africa, and the continent
accounted for an even smaller proportion of world
manufacturing exports (0.2%). With respect to other
developing countries, the statistics are only margin-
ally greater: 3.8% of MVA and 1.5% of total exports !
The import-substitution industries that were estab-
lished in the 1960s and 1970s only survived with high
rates of protection. Economic crisis in the 1980s led
industries to have to cut back on production and staff,
such that many were operating at a fraction of their
full capacity.’ Even before the economic crisis and
SAP cutbacks, the lack of sufficient productive infra-
structure, engineering skills and the prevalence of a
nonindustrial work culture, had taken their toll on
industrial performance. Maintenance of factory
equipment, informed marketing strategies and prod-
uct distribution were all severely deficient. In retro-
spect, it is questionable whether the new budding
industries of sub-Saharan Africa ever had a chance to
“catch up” and compete successfully with industrial
powers who industrialized a century before.
The industrialization development strategy has
been discredited for exogenous reasons as well. The
environmental critique of the Western industrializa-
tion model has gained momentum over the decade.
Many maintain that Western countries must opt for a
less industrial-output obsessed approach, and that
nations of a semi-industrial or agrarian nature cannot
follow the Western path without dire consequences
for the world’s ecology. In any case, developments in
technology and communications have made old-style
mass factory production an obsolete objective. Now
attention is focused on “flexible specialization” as a
more decentralized, “high-tech” production approach
which many industrial countries are now enthusiasti-
cally pursuing. Thus, the Western industrial model as
applied to Africa is largely in a state of disregard for a
variety of endogenous and exogenous reasons.
Given this revision of development thinking, it is
in order to question the superimposition of an indus-
trial development model in the first place. Much of the
proindustry debate of the 1960s and 1970s assumed
that investment in factories and work force recruit-
ment in itself constituted the achievement of industri-
alization. The need for a material foundation and the
gradual evolution of an industrialization process with
all its social, economic and physical implications were
rarely considered. Thus, the debate is now couched in
terms of “industrial failure.” Too often in the past,
industrialization studies in Africa have attempted to
analyze a projected consequence rather than an actual
ongoing developmental processes. Alternatively, by
adopting a deugrariunizution perspective, the analyti-
cal focus is inverted. Sectoral development can be
studied as a process of unravelling and reformulation
without a determinable industrial outcome.
The purpose of this article is to not to provide
exhaustive empirical data proving the conceptual
validity of deagrarianization. Rather the central con-
cern is to examine trends and tendencies in very broad
continental terms, as well as identify directions of
 DEAGRARIANIZATION
enquiry in the existing literature of a variety of social
science disciplines, which shed light on the deagrari-
anization process.
2. THE CHANGING SECTORAL BALANCE IN
AFRICA
(a) Defining deagrarianization and sectoral
boundaries
Deagrarianization is defined as a process of: (i)
economic activity reorientation (livelihood), (ii) occu-
pational adjustment (work activity), and (iii) spatial
realignment of human settlement (residence) away
from agrarian patterns. Overt and measurable mani-
festations of this process are: a diminishing degree of
rural household food and basic needs self-sufficiency,
a decline in agricultural labor relative to nonagricul-
tural labor in rural households and in total national
labor expenditure, a decrease in agricultural output
per capita in the national economy relative to non-
agricultural output, and a shrinking proportion of the
total population residing in rural areas. These are all
tendencies observable throughout sub-Saharan
Africa.
It is helpful to delineate sectoral categories.
Agriculture, the so-called primary sector, is the easiest
to define. It consists of plant and animal husbandry
activities resulting in the production of raw materials
which are directly consumed or exchanged by its pro-
ducers. In the sub-Saharan African context the bulk of
agricultural activities are pursued by multipurpose
smallholder household units. This involves a large
proportion of nonmarket, self-provisioning activities,
labeled the “subsistence sector,” whose nature and
extent are difficult to measure accurately.
By contrast, the secondary sector, industry refers
to mass production of consumer and producer goods
by “collective workers.” Such workers are occupa-
tionally specialized laborers in factory organizations
which produce on the basis of science and technologi-
cal advances spurred by the competitive forces of the
world market. This sector does not embrace any non-
market economic activities. All production is destined
for market sale or investment.
While different analysts vary their definitions of
the agricultural and industrial sectors, the tertiary sec-
tor, otherwise known as the service sector, is almost
always a residual category consisting of anything that
is not categorized as agricultural or industrial. To
avoid this method of categorization, services are
defined restrictively as value-added production of
goods and activities provisioned by either public or
private economic agents. In the private sector, this
refers to goods and services which meet an individual-
ized (as opposed to industrial mass product) demand
involving customized supply, largely contingent on
AND RURAL EMPLOYMENT 99
specific delivery locations and timing. Public sector
services embrace administration, transport and energy
provisioning for goods and service exchange flows.
Thus, the service sector is generally two-tiered with a
private domain of activities functioning in the infra-
structural context of the public-operated domain.
Above all, the distinguishing feature of the service
sector is not any disassociation from agriculture or
industry per se, but its delivery characteristic, i.e.
ready accessibility of goods and services tailored to
the mobility and time constraints of clients.
(b) Incidence oj’deagrarianization in sub-Saharan
Affica
Deagrarianization, as defined above, is not a
process peculiar to sub-Saharan Africa. Quite the con-
trary, over the course of this century, virtually all
nations have been involved in this process, some hav-
ing reached more advanced stages than others. While
not all aspects of deagrarianization are measurable,
statistics on sectoral allocation of the labor force and
percentages of national population living in rural
areas, and the proportion of GDP arising from agricul-
ture are good indicators of the extent of deagrarianiza-
tion in any country. Table 1 provides some interesoing
insights. Worldwide, the percentage of people living
in rural areas declined from 66% to 55% duaing
1960-90.8 In industrialized countries the comparable
statistics are far lower, i.e. from 39% to 27%. Slub-
Saharan African rural populations have a higher start-
ing point of 85% declining to 69% in 1990.’
Labor force participation statistics are alwiays
fraught with definitional problems related to how igdi-
vidual countries sectors’ are delineated and how labor
force participation is construed. Bearing this in mind,
comparisons from data in Table 1 can be made with
reference to the period between 1965 and 1986-84. In
the world as a whole, agricultural labor shrank fuom
57% to 49% of the total labor force, with industrial
countries registering a decline from 22% to 11% com-
pared with a decrease from 79% to 68% in sub-
Saharan countries. It should be noted that the indus-
trial labor force did not increase in inverse proportion
to the agricultural decline. No clear tendency emerges.
The world’s industrial labor force registers a small
decrease from 19% to 16% of the total. Industrial
countries evince what some economists call “deindus-
trialization”‘” with a proportional decline of industrial
labor from 36% to 27%. Meanwhile the proportion in
sub-Saharan Africa stagnated at 8% between 1965 and
1986-89. Thus sub-Saharan Africa’s industrial labor
force accounts for only between a quarter and one-
third of that found in industrialized countries.
According to the World Bank statistics, in 1465,
the percentage of total GDP derived from agriculture
was lo%, 5% and 40% for the world, industrialized
 Table 1. African deagrarianization statistical indices

Labor % of
National GDP Annual Urban Rural % of labor force force population
population per PGR PGR population %of in agricultural Migration
million capita % % % of Total Agriculture Industry services population labor force rate*

Country 1990 1989 1960-90 196cHa 1960 1990 1965 1986-89 1%5 198&89 I%5 1986-89 1988-90 1965 1986-89 1960-90

Angola 10.0 1225 2.5 5.9 90.0 72.0 79.0 73.8 8.0 9.5 13.0 16.7 41.4 32.7 30.6 3.4
Benin 4.6 1030 3.2 7.4 91.0 62.0 83.0 70.2 5.0 6.6 12.0 23.1 34.5 28.6 24.2 4.2
Botswana 1.3 3180 3.4 13.5 98.0 72.0 89.0 43.2 4.0 4.8 8.0 52.0 34.9 31.1 15.1 10.1
BurkinaFaso 9.0 617 2.4 4.6 95.0 91.0 89.0 86.6 3.0 4.3 7.0 9.1 51.1 45.5 44.3 2.2
Burundi 5.5 611 2.1 5.5 98.0 94.0 94.0 92.9 2.0 1.6 4.0 5.5 55.5 52.2 51.6 3.4
Cameroon 11.8 1699 2.1 6.5 86.0 59.0 86.0 74.0 4.0 45 9.0 215 38.5 33.1 28.5 3.8
Cape Verde 0.4 1717 2.1 4.1 84.0 71.0 na 52.0 na 23.0 na 25.0 33.8 na 17.6 2.0
CAR. 3.0 770 2.3 3.6 77.0 53.0 88.0 83.7 3.0 2.8 9.0 135 48.4 42.6 40.5 1.3
Chad 5.7 582 2.1 7.1 93.0 70.0 92.0 83.2 3.0 4.6 5.0 12.0 37.4 34.4 31.1 5.0
Comoros 0.6 732 3.2 6.8 90.0 72.0 na 83.0 na 6.0 na I 1.o 38.0 na 31.5 3.6
Congo 2.3 2382 2.8 3.6 68.0 60.0 66.0 62.4 11.0 11.9 23.0 25.6 39.8 26.3 24.8 0.8
tote d’rvoire 12.0 1381 3.9 6.5 81.0 60.0 81.0 65.2 5.0 8.3 15.0 265 37.6 30.5 24.5 2.6
Djibouti 0.4 730 5.6 7.3 50.0 19.0 na na na na na na na na na 1.7
EquatorialGuinea 0.4 706 1.1 1.5 75.0 71.0 na 66.0 na 1 I.0 na 23.0 39.2 na 25.9 0.4
Ethiopia 49.2 392 2.4 4.8 94.0 87.0 86.0 79.8 5.0 7.9 9.0 12.3 42.7 36.7 34.1 2.4
Gabon 1.2 4735 3.0 6.3 83.0 54.0 na 75.5 na 10.8 na 13.7 48.2 na 36.4 3.3
Gambia 0.9 886 3.0 5.2 87.0 77.0 na 84.0 na 7.0 na 9.0 36.2 na 30.4 2.2
Ghana 15.0 1005 2.7 3.9 77.0 67.0 61.0 59.3 15.0 11.1 24.0 29.6 38.1 23.2 22.6 1.2
Guinea 5.8 602 2.0 5.3 90.0 74.0 87.0 78.1 6.0 1.3 7.0 20.6 39.1 34.0 305 3.3
Guinea-Bissau 1.o 820 1.9 3.2 86.0 80.0 na 82.0 na 4.0 na 14.0 30.0 na 24.6 1.3
Kenya 24.0 1023 3.6 7.7 93.0 76.0 86.0 81.0 5.0 6.8 9.0 12.1 40.3 34.7 32.6 4.1
Lesotho 1.8 1646 2.4 8.6 97.0 80.0 92.0 23.3 3.0 33.1 6.0 43.6 46.3 42.6 10.8 6.2
Liberia 2.6 937 3.1 6.2 81.0 54.0 79.0 74.2 lo.0 9.4 11.0 16.4 36.2 28.6 26.9 3.1
Madagascar 12.0 690 2.8 5.6 89.0 76.0 85 .O 80.9 4.0 6.0 11.0 132 42.6 36.2 34.5 2.8
Malawi 8.8 620 3.1 6.5 96.0 88.0 92.0 81.8 3.0 3.0 5.0 15.2 42.0 38.6 34.4 3.4
Mali 9.2 576 2.5 4.4 89.0 81.0 90.0 85.5 1.o 2.0 8.0 125 31.8 28.6 27.2 1.9
Mauritania 2.0 1092 2.4 9.8 94.0 53.0 89.0 69.4 3.0 8.9 8.0 21.7 33.4 29.7 23.2 7.4
Mozambique 15.7 1060 2.5 9.5 96.0 73.0 87.0 84.5 6.0 7.4 7.0 8.1 54.6 47.5 46.1 7.0
Namibia 1.8 1500 2.6 4.8 85.0 72.0 na 43.5 na 21.9 na 34.8 29.1 na 12.7 2.2
Niger 7.7 634 3.2 7.4 94.0 81.0 95.0 85 .O 1.o 2.7 4.0 12.3 51.4 48.8 43.7 4.2

Continued on p. 101
 Table 1. Continuedfrom p. IO0

Labor 96 of
National GDP AllllUal Urban Rural % of labor force force population
population per PGR PGR population % of in agricultural Migration
million capita % % % of Total Agriculture Industry Services populatjon labor force rate*

COUIlhy 1990 1989 19~90 196ck90 1960 1990 1965 198a9 1%5 1986-89 1%5 1986-89 1988-90 1%5 1986-89 1960-90

Nigeria 108.5 1160 3.2 6.3 86.0 65 .O 72.0 44.6 10.0 4.2 18.0 51.2 30.3 21.8 13.5 3.1
RWaI& 7.2 680 3.3 7.4 98.0 92.0 94.0 92.8 2.0 3.0 3.0 4.3 49.2 46.2 45.7 4.1
SaoTome 0.1 2.4 na na 67.0 na na na na na na na na na na
Senegal 7.3 1208 2.8 3.5 68.0 62.0 83.0 80.6 6.0 6.2 11.0 13.1 335 27.8 27.0 0.7
Seychelles 0.1 3892 na na na na na na na na na na 44.0 na na na
SierraLeone 4.2 1061 2.1 5.2 87.0 68.0 78.0 69.6 11.o 14.1 11.o 16.4 35.5 21.7 24.1 3.1
Somalia 7.5 861 3.2 5.8 83.0 64.0 81.0 75.6 6.0 8.4 13.0 16.0 29.4 23.8 222 2.6
south Africa 35.3 4852 2.4 3.2 53.0 40.0 32.0 13.6 30.0 24.4 39.0 62.0 36.0 11.5 4.9 0.8
SUdan 25.2 1042 2.8 5.4 90.0 78.0 82.0 63.4 5.0 4.3 14.0 32.3 35.1 28.8 22.3 2.6
Swaziland 0.8 2405 3.0 10.5 96.0 61 .O na 74.0 na 9.0 na 17.0 35.5 na 26.3 7.5
27.3 557 3.4 10.3 95 .o 61 I) 92.0 85.6 3.0 45 6.0 9.9 46.8 43.1 40.1 6.9
Togo 3.5 752 2.9 6.2 90.0 74.0 78.0 64.3 9.0 6.3 13.0 29.4 41.0 32.0 26.4 3.3
Uganda 18.8 499 3.6 6.1 95 .o 90.0 91.0 85.9 3.0 4.4 6.0 9.1 44.6 40.6 38.3 2.5
Zaire 35.6 380 2.8 4.8 78.0 61.0 82.0 71.5 9.0 12.9 9.0 15.6 36.9 30.3 26.4 2.0
Zambia 8.5 761 3.4 7.1 83.0 50.0 79.0 37.9 8.0 7.8 13.0 54.9 315 24.9 11.9 3.1
Zimbabwe 9.7 1469 3.2 5.9 87.0 72.0 79.0 64.7 8.0 5.6 13.0 29.1 40.6 32.1 26.3 2.7

SSA 500.0 475 2.8 5.2 85 .O 69.0 79.0 67.6 8.1 7.7 12.9 24.1 38.6 30.5 26.1 2.4
LDCS 440.0 231 2.5 5.3 92.0 78 .O 83.2 72.4 5.8 7.5 11.0 20.1 38.8 32.3 28.1 2.8
Developing
cOllUtl-kS 4070.0 770 2.3 4.0 78.0 63 .O 72.0 60.9 11.3 12.7 16.1 26.4 43.9 31.6 26.1 0.6
Industrial
countries 1210.0 17017 0.8 1.4 39.0 27 .o 22.2 11.o 36.4 26.9 41.4 62.1 48.8 10.8 5.4 0.6
World 5280.0 3836 1.8 2.9 66.0 55.0 565 48.5 19.0 16.3 24.5 35.2 45.0 25.4 21.8 1.1

Source: UNDP, Human Development Report (1992).

*Urban population growth minus population growth rate.
102 WORLD DEVELOPMENT
countries and sub-Saharan Africa, respectively. 1990
figures were not available for the world or industrial-
ized countries. In sub-Saharan Africa, the percentage
had decreased substantially to 32%. The proportion of
total GDP attributed to industrial production was in
1965: 41% worldwide, 43% in the industrialized
countries and 20% in sub-Saharan Africa. These fig-
ures, however, refer to mining and raw material
extractive industries as well as manufacturing. When
manufacturing labor is isolated the breakdown is: 30%
worldwide, 32% in advanced industrial countries and
7% in sub-Saharan Africa. Comparative 1990 figures
are not available.
The juxtapositioning of statistics in Table 1 clearly
demonstrates that the service sector has gained labor
force participation relative to both the agricultural and
industrial sectors worldwide. In 1965, the service sec-
tor accounted for 25% of world labor, 41% of labor in
industrial countries and 13% of labor in sub-Saharan
Africa. In 1986-89 the respective figures were: 35%,
62% and 25%. It is interesting to note that the “dein-
dustrialization” of the industrial countries and the
“deagrarianization” of sub-Saharan Africa are pro-
ducing similar outcomes with respect to the sectoral
allocation of labor.
Naturally, such aggregate statistics mask huge
variations and different patterns and tendencies are
identifiable within sub-Saharan Africa. At the outset,
it is necessary to point out that there is one country
within this regional cluster which is in fact industrial
in character, namely South Africa. Thus, it is possible
that there are lessons to be derived from an analysis of
the more mature deagrarianization process that has
taken place in that country, relevant to other countries
in sub-Saharan Africa.”
3. HISTORICAL INFLUENCES
This section focuses on the evolution of rum-
urban relationships as a means of demonstrating the
particular nature of the deagrarianization process in
Africa in comparison with Western industrialized
countries.
(a) “Derived urbanization ” of the postindependence
period
Most African countries achieved political indepen-
dence in the 1960s. In the main, the newly installed
African governments inherited economies based on
rural household self-sufficiency and the production of
a few export crops or mineral extraction. The urban
floodgates opened after independence. Table 1 shows
that the average annual urban growth rate of 5.2% was
well above that of developing countries in general.
Many countries’ urban areas were growing at over 7%
per annum, representing an extremely strong pressure
on government for infrastructural investmenti In an
era of widespread optimism regarding the self-destiny
of African nationalist governments, this urban flow,
consisting of young people in the prime economically
active age group between 20 and 40 years, was an out-
come of the rural population’s perception that urban
areas offered superior economic opportunities. But
unlike the Western urbanization wave of the 19th cen-
tury, industrial employment was not available in
abundance. The competitive forces of world capital-
ism precluded the embryonic import-substitution
industry of sub-Saharan Africa from becoming any
more robust than a “glasshouse potted plant.“13
Instead government expansion and the “parastataliza-
tion” of national economies provided jobs for the
influx of increasingly more educated immigrants.
There was a lack of market integration between
urban and rural areas. Domestic terms of trade were
weighted against the rural areasI The capacity uti-
lization of such import substitution industry, which
was established, heavily depended on capital goods
importation. Due to low productivity of food produc-
tion and high domestic transport costs, governments
leaned toward reliance on cheaper staple food supplies
from abroad to feed their rapidly growing urban popu-
lations. Grain surpluses produced in the United States
and the European Community, offered on conces-
sional terms to famine-prone Third World countries,
were too tempting to resist and contributed to the per-
petuation of import dependency even in good harvest
yearsI Often urban food security was achieved at the
cost of foregoing market stimulants to domestic staple
food production. In the short run, there was little
choice. Peasant agricultural supply was risky. Erratic
food harvests and the slower market supply response
of producers who secured their own household food
needs before selling to the market, were a shaky foun-
dation for urban food supply. Urban populations sub-
jected to the uncertainty of basic staple food supplies
resulted in counterproductive effects on the social
division of labor.r6
The urban growth process, which has proceeded in
sub-Saharan Africa without industrial job availability
and without a secure domestic food supply, is best
termed “derived urbanization”. Fueled by the nation-
alization of state power which provided urban jobs
and the internationalization of capital which supplied
essential inputs like urban capital goods infrastructure
and food, such urbanization was premised on a favor-
able economic and political climate. Raw material
exports from agriculture and mining financed the
growth of the urban-based bureaucratic/parastatal sec-
tor. Peasant producers supplied labor and raw materi-
als which, in effect, “built” the urban areas. But the
exchange circuit did not return to the rural areas. A
dual economy prevailed. Peasants had limited reliance
on urban-produced consumer or capital goods. Their
 DEAGRARIANIZATION
agriculture remained largely uncapitalized and unspe-
cialized. Thus, population growth in rural areas had to
be accommodated by intensification of agricultural
labor. This often took the form of the intensification
of female agricultural labor.”
(b) Economic divers$cation and population settle-
ment dispersal under structural adjustment
Derived urbanization.was inherently unstable. The
oil crises of 1973 and 1979 made this all too apparent.
Given the comparatively low population densities of
African producers, the viability of agricultural and
raw material extraction from far flung areas across the
continent, was premised on low oil prices. The rise in
world oil prices rendered domestic food production
for urban areas economically infeasible in many coun-
tries, as well as making African exports less competi-
tive due to increased transport costs.
World optimism regarding African nations’ devel-
opment potential quickly switched to pessimism with
an onslaught of criticism about African government’s
economic policies and more latterly their civil rights
and governance record. I8 Aid conditionality became
the order of the day. During the 198Os, the combined
forces of the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
World Bank and bilateral donor agencies pursuing
“structural adjustment programs,” exerted unavoid-
able pressure on African governments to cutback on
government expenditure.
The government and parastatal retrenchment which
followed caused massive job losses in urban areas.
Real salary levels quickly declined.‘9 The removal of
food subsidies and drastic reductions in commodity
imports caused the prices of consumer goods to climb.
The term “economic crisis” was most applicable to the
urban areas. Virtually all classes of urban residents
experienced drastic rates of decline in their standard of
living. Recent census data from some countries sug-
gest that the 1980s witnessed an easing of rural-urban
migration as many prospective migrants were deterred
and some urban migrants returned to their rural
homes?” The gap in rural-urban terms of trade was
closing in the wrong direction.
In this atmosphere of declining standards of living
and infrastructural uncertainties, both the rural and
urban population converged on a risk minimization
strategy involving individual and household diversifi-
cation of economic activities. There was a strong
precedence for this approach. Rural farmers, uncertain
of climatic growing conditions, had sought to mini-
mize their risks through crop and plot diversification
in traditional agricultural systems. Urban and rural
dwellers alike pursued household livelihood strategies
consisting of subsistence activities, market-oriented
production, and trading?’ In so doing, risks of output
failure were spread over a range of activities.
AND RURAL EMPLOYMENT 103
Furthermore, time and cash invested in lubricating
personal clientage networks was vital for providing a
fallback position in times of distress, as well as facili-
tating the exchange of information regarding opportu-
nities or dangers that existed in the wider productive
environment.22
In addition to the widespread emergence of eco-
nomic diversification, demographic changes were
surfacing. The slowdown in the urban migration rate
did not necessarily infer population immobility
Recent attention has been focused on the growing
incidence and increasing importance of so-called sec-
ondary towns and service centers in several African
countries generally within the range of 20-30,000
people in size.23
It can be argued that the emergence of intermedi-
ary nodes between rural and urban settlement and the
convergence of rural and urban household livelihood
strategies give rise to a higher likelihood of intersect-
ing economic interests. There are several ways fhat
this may occur. Most residents of urban households
are first generation migrants. Their knee-jerk reac-
tions to risk have been to secure access to land for
direct food provisioning. Household budget survey
findings of the 1970s indicated that lower income
urban dwellers were more likely to have a significant
own production component to their diet. Some survey
data from the 1980s reveal that this was changing, at
least, in large cities. Farm land and means of transport
to farm land were increasingly being accumulated in
the hands of the relatively better-off.Z4 One can sur-
mise that low-income urban dwellers, with more diffi-
cult access to agricultural activities, are most likely to
become return migrants. More affluent urban dwellers
might prefer to stay in the city and make investments
in the rural areas, using kin or clientage ties to execute
production. Such absentee farming carried out on the
basis of some form of waged labor, would undoubt-
edly introduce systemic changes in local agriculture,
by creating or deepening the rural labor market. If
rural population growth continued, it is more than
likely that there would be pressure for further labor
intensification in household production. Labor com-
plementaries, as well as conflicts, between rural
household units and urban-based agricultural interests
could arise.
It is possible that the lop-sided flow of labor and
raw materials from rural to urban areas during the era
of derived urbanization is being replaced with a mDre
two-way exchange. Urban migrants who return to the
rural areas tend to be more educated than in situ rural
residents of the same age. Scattered survey evidence
of urban household involvement in rural-based agri-
culture suggests that capital as well might be flowing
to the rural areas in exchange for land.25 What impli-
cations could these developments have for NARE? Is
a foundation for more viable nonagricultural employ-
ment in rural areas being established? Furthermore,
104 WORLD DEVELOPMENT
did the cutbacks in foreign imports of consumer goods
during the 1980s function to create a market for non-
agricultural products from rural areas? In other words,
is there any evidence that reduced foreign competition
lessened the stigma of purchasing so-called inferior
goods?26 Now during the 199Os, market liberalization,
most specifically the lifting of import controls, may
have made this a hypothetical question in many coun-
tries once again.
It is necessary to be cautious about the nature of
NARE growth at this stage in sub-Saharan Africa. The
widespread appearance of NARE does not represent
the development of labor specialization according to
the Western model. Artisanal craft production was
important in the skill formation of Western capitalism.
The economic diversification strategy pursued by
individuals and households in sub-Saharan Africa
appears to be veering away from labor specialization.
Rural technological skill levels might not register a
marked improvement until people begin to restrict
their income-earning activities.
Furthermore, there is one extremely black cloud
looming on the horizon of NARE development. The
impact of the fatal AIDS virus has so far been felt
mainly in urban areas, with the exception of some
rural areas around the lake regions of Rwanda,
Burundi, Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya. It is unfortu-
nately anticipated that over the course of the next
decade deaths among the economically active popula-
tion in many rural areas of sub-Saharan Africa will
increase.” Where the rural incidence of AIDS
becomes particularly pronounced it is already evident
that the supply of local agricultural labor is jeopar-
dized. NARE activities are unlikely to flourish in situ-
ations of such acute labor shortage.
4. OBLIQUE PATHS TO A THEORETICAL
UNDERSTANDING OF DEAGRARIANIZATION
Deagrarianization, as a long-term developmental
process in Africa, has been largely overlooked. Most
of the research relevant to this theme has been on rural
employment from an economic policy perspective. Its
underlying concern has been with increasing the labor
absorption capacity of rural areas in order to prevent
heavy rural migration to urban areas. Until recently,
the anti-urban bias of donor agencies’ contributed to
the lack of research enquiry into the phenomenon of
deagrarianization. Labor that physically removed
itself from village agricultural production was viewed
as a drain, whereas nonagricultural labor within the
village was labeled “income-generating”, a necessary,
but “augmenting,” aspect of household livelihood.
These views tended to give rise to a truncated percep-
tion of nonagricultural activity which largely pre-
cluded exploration of the linkages between agricul-
tural and service sectors and between rural and urban
areas. The long-standing anti-urban bias of donor
agencies and researchers is only now beginning to be
moderated by a more balanced perspective.28
The topic of agrarian transformation has its theo-
retical origins in the work of the classical political
economists such as Adam Smith and David Ricardo
based on the European, notably English, experience.
In the mid-19th century, Marx used the term “primi-
tive accumulation,” to refer to the process whereby
agricultural smallholder peasants were divorced from
their land and formed into a proletariat stripped of
control over the means of production. He argued that
this historical process, necessary for the establishment
of capitalism, creates a “relative surplus population”
vis-d-vis agricultural production. The outcome serves
capitalists in two main ways: labor becomes available
for indushy, i.e. an “industrial reserve army” and the
conditions for lowering wage levels are engendered as
“surplus” workers compete for jobs.
Lewis29 provided a neoclassical 20th century
update to the notion of “surplus labor.” He assumed,
for different reasons than Marx, that surplus labor
existed in densely populated rural settlements of the
developing world. The marginal productivity of labor
was reckoned to be zero or near zero, such that a trans-
fer of labor from agriculture to nonagricultural
employment could take place without any reduction in
agricultural output. Under these assumptions, rural
emigration to urban areas, particularly the industrial
sector, was considered beneficial. As Boserup points
out, later economists tended not to make a distinction
between the value of rural labor in densely, as opposed
to sparsely, populated rural areas. The latter were
more prevalent in sub-Saharan Africa. In African agri-
cultural systems, increasing population was being
accommodated by expanding into new land or
employing more labor-intensive methods of produc-
tion. With marginal productivity of rural labor well
above zero, emigration was ill-advised.“”
In the 1950s and 196Os, labor migration studies
proliferated?’ Originally these focused on the impli-
cations of “stabilizating labor,” i.e. the cessation of
circular migration and the permanent settlement of
laborers and their families in urban areas. By the mid-
196Os, concern had switched from “stabilizing” to
“curtailing” urban labor migration. Researchers rec-
ognized that educational levels of urban migrants
were rising while job availability was declining.32 The
so-called school leaver problem encapsulated the
unbridgeable gap between the material expectations
of the populace and the delivery capability of the
economy. At this time, economic analysts and govem-
ment policy makers were converging on the view that
the emigration of the countryside’s youth was deplet-
ing agriculture of development potential.
“Informal sector” studies abounded in the 197Os,
beginning with the now famous IL0 mission report on
Kenya.33 This period marked a watershed in terms of
 DEAGRARIANIZATION
challenging the colonial notion that urban economic
activities necessarily had to be conducted within the
formal economy to further development objectives.
Later studies would raise severe doubts about the
development potential of the informal sector, arguing
that its activities were marginal and destined to remain
marginal.34 Most informal sector studies were heavily
weighted toward the urban areas and revealed a disad-
vantaged underclass of urban dwellers.35
Each of these successive thematic waves mirrors
changing trends in the relative distribution of labor
between urban and rural areas. As urban labor became
more abundant, the prevailing conceptual framework
was reevaluated. Nonetheless, labor studies focused
primarily on urban areas. The work of the Michigan
State University research team pioneered by
Liedholm has provided a valuable counterbalance.
Since the early 197Os, they have provided insights into
the interaction of agriculture and small-scale rural
enterprises on the basis of firm level surveys in
selected African countries.36
Over the past 15 years, studies of rural industrial-
ization have proliferated. The rural industrialization
perspective derives inspiration from historical work
on the development of European “cottage industries”
and the more recent experience of Chinese rural indus-
trialization. This approach has the advantage of
emphasizing the process of development.37 Saith
defines rural industrialization historically as “a transi-
tion stage between peasant agriculture and modern
industry, and also as the vehicle for affecting both the
necessary primitive accumulation of capital from the
agricultural sector, and its subsequent investment in
industrial activities.“38
The rural industries theme is deeply engrained in
the Asian development literature.39 Its introduction to
Africa is more recent and tends to be argued in terms
of “small-scale industries.“40 Tracing the relationship
between agriculture and industry is central in this
approach.4’ One of the analytical preoccupations of its
adherents is an attempt to discern forward and back-
ward linkages between the two sectors. Economists
and geographers have endeavored to explore this area
despite the methodological difficulties entailed in the
identification and measurement of linkages.42 Overall,
the magnitude of linkages in sub-Saharan Africa is
considered to be smaller than that found in rural
Asia.47
Given widespread disillusionment with industrial
performance in sub-Saharan Africa, a new strategy of
“agricultural demand-led industrialization” (ADLI) is
being advocated.@ ADLI aims at creating an agrarian
middle class and domestic mass market through a uni-
modal agricultural policy which entails land tenure
reform, the promotion of rural small-scale industries
and infrastuctural improvements including transport
and commodity pricing.
While the various threads of the rural industrializa-
AND RURAL EMPLOYMENT 105
tion debate have introduced interesting dimensions to
the study of rural production, it is apparent that apply-
ing the concept of industrialization to sub-Saharan
Africa can have a distorting effect. Often the “indus-
trial activity” label has been applied too liberally to
provide any analytical power. Crafts and trades such
as weaving, pottery, beer brewing, carpentry, auto
mechanics, transport services, etc. have been desig-
nated as “industries.” The skills and organizational
features of these economic activities are rarely in any
way connected with industry as earlier defined in this
paper. Nor can they easily be compared with proto-
industries in 18th and 19th century Europe. Thus,
many of the assumptions regarding the presence or
potential of rural industrialization in sub-Saharan
Africa have been premature. The recent ADLI
approach takes cognizance of this. Adelman points
out that sub-Saharan Africa poses great barriers in
terms of technology, institutions and rural relations
even to the more modest staged aims of ADLI $5
Rural industrialization studies have tended to be
pursued either through broad historical analysis or
detailed surveys of small-scale firms on the other.
Conclusions regarding sectoral linkages have
emanated from the latter. There are, however, difficul-
ties in making generalizations about sectors on the
basis of firm level data. Resort to theories about small
enterprise stages of growth, which borrowing heavily
from the life-cycle approach to business development
in Western industrial societies,& has the attendant
danger of tautological reasoning in data interpretation.
Such an evolutionary perspective leads to normative
assessments about the small size of African businesses
and their low earning capacity!’ But is there a tradeoff
between the proliferation of many small, often one-
person firms, and the increase in firm size with respect
to number of employees and magnitude of earnings
that this literature sometimes implies? This begs the
question of whether the expansion of firm size is
desired or even functional to African entrepreneurs,
leaving aside the issue of economic feasibility.
The history of Western corporate enterprise dating
from the guilds of the Middle Ages onwards has been
one of getting the right balance between trade entry,
scale of operations, and training requirements.
Similarly, traditional African crafts such as black-
smithing, pottery-making and healing had entry con-
trols and apprenticeship arrangements. Most of the
“modem” small enterprises, on the other hand, are of a
free-entry nature with little or no provision for train-
ing. Under the circumstances, it is also not surprising
to find lack of expansion of firm size. The institutional
context which could promote such growth is largely
absent. Furthermore, in some places, village associa-
tional ties based on lineage, age, or gender are at odds
with firm growth. For example, van Donge4’ cites the
difficulties encountered by partnerships of two or
more men among traders from a matrilineal society.
106 WORLD DEVELOPMENT
Even brothers did not have a sufficient degree of trust
to operate a business involving cash transfers and
travel. This serves to illustrate that enquiry into the
nature of nonagrarian enterprises should not stop at
firm level data collection.
Labor market analysis provides a more compre-
hensive perspective. Market performance is evaluated
with respect to participation rates, unemployment and
underemployment, supply and demand, and wage
rates. The data provide good material for sectoral
comparisons. Because rural labor markets are rela-
tively undeveloped in sub-Saharan Africa, there is
very little literature demonstrating this approach.49 It
is significant that research in Sudan, a country where
repeated famine has undermined the economic viabil-
ity of many smallholder peasant households, has gen-
erated some of the most interesting insights into the
functioning of African labor markets. Associational
ties and power relations are vital to an understanding
of labor contract negotiations.50 Such data require-
ments involve the study of other institutions besides
markets, notably household production units.
Rural household studies have been pursued for
decades by anthropologists and more latterly by econ-
omists and agronomists using a farming systems
approach. Welfare economists in particular have
drawn attention to the intrahousehold patterns of
cooperation and conflict over resource allocation and
income distribution.51 Recently, household-level
research has gained even wider appeal with the study
of livelihood strategies. In this context, it is interesting
to note that there is a tendency for rural and urban
boundaries to blur as a result of the emerging patterns
of economic diversification on the part of individual
producers and their households?2 Much more work
has to be done on this to discern such patterns and their
effects on growth and equity.
The household livelihood approach captures the
dynamics of diverse economic activities and income
streams at the microlevel. Production, consumption
and exchange relationships can easily be traced at the
household level. Perhaps most importantly, the
motive force of risk minimization is abundantly
apparent. Households can be distinguished on the
basis of class, income, gender, of its head, or life-cycle
stages. The household level provides a tremendously
rich terrain of enquiry. The main drawback, however,
is that uncontextualized household findings cannot be
directly related to more macrolevel trends and tenden-
cies.
In summary, this schematic review of the literature
suggests that micro and macro data collection must be
combined in an iterative way to gain an understanding
of rural employment patterns and the process of
deagrarianization in sub-Saharan AfricaJ3 Any single
social science discipline is inadequate to the task.
Furthermore, it is likely that rigid adherence to disci-
plinary boundaries and biases in the social sciences
has contributed to the obfuscation of deagrarianiza-
tion in sub-Saharan Africa.
5. RESEARCH TRAJECTORY: DISSECTING
THE SERVICE SECTOR
Citing statistical evidence, this paper has argued
that sub-Saharan Africa is steadily becoming less
agrarian in nature. None of the existing theoretical
approaches offer focused enquiry into the process of
deagrarianization. Weighing up the strengths and
weakness of existing approaches, however, does sug-
gest useful analytical directions. An understanding of
deagrarianization could be pursued at two levels: as a
long-term historical process and as an integral part of
rural households’ short-to-medium term livelihood
strategies. Drawing the findings of these two levels of
analyses together could lead quite naturally to a sec-
toral perspective with attendant policy implications.
Both old and new research themes can be accom-
modated in a deagrarianization approach. The study of
off-farm activities and small-scale industries can be
combined with new interests such as the development
of entrepreneurship and possibilities for flexible spe-
cialization. This would entail the incorporation of
many existing assumptions regarding these fields of
studies but it would also require notable revisions.
The assumption that a shrinking agricultural sector
infers individual or household occupational special-
ization, on the one hand, and economic diversification
within sectors, on the other, has to be avoided.
Deagrarianization in sub-Saharan Africa appears to be
proceeding on the basis of individual activity diversi-
fication with limited intrasectoral diversification.
Occupational specialization is largely missing. A
wide gulf between household livelihood activities and
professional vocation exists. The former represents a
risk minimization strategy whereas the latter takes
stability of livelihood for granted. It is clear that the
growing momentum for economic diversification of
household labor is geared to minimizing risks vis-h-
vis the realization of basic household subsistence
needs and safeguarding the means of livelihood in the
context of African income levels falling.54
The overriding theme in development literature
has been the relationship between agriculture and
industry. The prototype of transitional agricultural
industrial relations is that of Europe, particularly
England. It could be argued that agrarian development
and population densities that are prevalent in sub-
Saharan Africa differ dramatically from those of early
19th century Europe.55 Market relations appear to be
far less generalized.
Industry has been a relative nonstarter in urban
areas of sub-Saharan Africa, easily outcompeted by
advanced industrial producers in the world market.
But rural services are not vulnerable to international
 DEAGRARIANIZATION AND RURAL EMPLOYMENT 107

competition in the same way. A skeletal service sector
already exists. Can or will deagrarianization, in its
present stage, take the form of rural service sector
expansion? Is there a likelihood of intrinsic growth of
agricultural and service sector linkages with concur-
rent consumer market development? Can the current
diversification of household economic activities stim-
ulate forward and backward linkages? If so, will this
raise agricultural productivity and the level of techni-
cal skills in rural areas? As the long-term decline in
Africa’s international terms of trade continues and in
view of the competition African agricultural exports
face from Green Revolution advances in Asia and
biotechnology in Europe and North America, these
questions gain further importance.
To date, very little research on nonagricultural
activities in rural areas has been cast in terms of devel-
opment of a rural service sector.56 Anthropologists,
economists and other social scientists have been col-
lecting data on the phenomenon of nonagricultural
activities in Africa for decades, but these data have
rarely been analyzed in light of its potential for spark-
ing an intrinsic growth process. There are several
aspects that require analytical attention, including: the
emergence of occupational specialization, the pub-
lic/private configuration of the rural service sector, the
organizational evolution of entrepreneurial activities,
spatial aspects of service sector development, social
differentiation among rural service sector agents and
technological levels in rural service sector develop-
ment.
Europe’s transition from an agrarian to an industri-
alized economy has been used as a universal model
and yardstick for the evaluation of economic develop-
ment. African realities need to be judged on their own
terms. In-depth exploration of the interrelationship
between the agricultural and service sectors by social
scientists representing a variety of disciplines is long
overdue.

NOTES

I. E.g., Kenya: Evans and Ngau (1991), Carlsen (1980); 10. Singh (1977) and Blackaby (1987).
Rwanda: von Braun, de Haen and Blanken (1991); Tanzania:
Havnevik (1993); and Zaire: Tshibaka (1992). 11. On the other hand, the extreme racial character of rural
dispossession that has taken place in South Africa may make
2. E.g., Andrae (1992). it a unique case.

3. Kilby and Liedholm (1986) and von Braun, de Haen 12. See Lewis (1978) for an historical illustration of the
and Blanken (1991). effect of this on economic development.

4. E.g., Haze11 and Roe11 (1983) and Ranis (1990). 13. See Boserup (1981) for an insightful comparison of
regional performance in world industrial development.
5. World Bank (1981, 1989), Mkandawire (1988) and
Mytelka (1989). 14. World Bank (1981),pp. 25-26.

6. Rejecting conventional approaches, Riddell’s review 15. Raikes (1988).

(1990,pp. 1 l-12citing WorldBankfigures) of African man-
ufacturing nonetheless provides overwhelming evidence of 16. Bryceson (1990).
poor growth. During 1970-84, per capita MVA from a sam-
ple of 21 countries of sub-Saharan Africa (accounting for 17. Boserup (1989).
85% of MVA for the region) rose by only $1.70 a year, com-
pared with Latin American countries’ rise of $5. 18. Buijtenhuis and Rijnierse (1993).

7. Some countries reported capacity utilization rates 19. Jamal (1993).

below 30%.
20. E.g., Lageman (1989), pp. 525-545.
8. There is no standardized definition of what constitutes
an urban area, so these aggregate percentages should be 21. Bryceson (1993a).
understood as indicators of patterns rather than precise mea-
sures. 22. For a discussion of clientage, see Bryceson (1990), pp.
21 l-224.
9. It should be noted that not all countries define urban
areas according to the UN standard of 20,000 people or more. 23. Bryceson (1984). Southall (1988), Rodinelli (1988)
Thus aggregated continental statistics are problematic, a and Baker and Ove Pedersen (1992).
dilemma faced in compiling almost any economic indicator
for the African continent. On the other hand, growth rates 24. Nigeria: Swindell and Illiya (1994); and Tanzania:
might be considered more reliable because countries tend to Bryceson (1993a).
adhere to one definition of urban areas, allowing change to be
recorded over time. 25. The nature of the capital/labor exchange will vary. In
108 WORLD DEVELOPMENT

some places it is quite benign and takes the form of “land bor- (1987). Gasper (1988), Haan (1989), Carr (1990) and
rowing” by urban-based farmers. In other cases, it amounts Ademisokum-Turton (1990).
to expropriation of land from rural producers. Nigeria:
Swindell and Mamman (1990); and Kenya: Kitching (1980). 41. E.g.,Mellor (1989).

26. A term fust used in Hymer and Resnick (1969). 42. Seidman (1972), Hazel1 and Roe11 (1983). Mureithi
and Sharma (1984). Harriss (1987). Harriss (1990), Ranis
27. Barnettand Blaikie (1992) and World Bank (1993). (1990),Dunham(1991)andHansohm(1990).

28. Jamal and Weeks (1988) and Bryceson (1993b). 43. Haggblade, Hazel1 and Brown (1989).

29. Lewis (1954). 44. Mellor (1986), Elkan (1989), Adelmau (1990) and
Mair (1990).
30. Boserup (19%).
45. Adelman (1990).
31. E.g., Gulliver (1955), Mitchell (1957) and Elkan
(1960). 46. Felsenstein and Schwartz (1993).

32. Todaro (1969) and Sabot (1979). 47. Anderson(l982)andMead(l994).

33. ILO(1972),Hart(l973)andGerry(l974). 48. van Donge (1992).

34. Sethuraman (1981), House (1984). Simon (1984). 49. E.g.,General: Osmani (1990), Smith (1991), Jamal
ILO/JASPA (1985) and Preston-Whyte (1991). (1993); Kenya: Kongstad and Monsted (1980); Sudan: El-
Bagir &al. (1984), Abdelkarim (1986), Kevane (1994); and
35. For an overview of IL0 material see ILO(l991), Zimbabwe:Adams(l991).
Taffere Tesfachew (1992), Ghai (1987) and Meagher with
Yunusa (1991). 50. Kevane (1994).

36. Liedholm (1973), Byerlee et al. (1977), Kilby (1982), 51. Sen (1985), Singh, Squire and Strauss (1986) and
Liedholm and Mead (1987) and Mead (1994). IFPRIWorld Bank (1992).

37. Mendels (1972), Levine (1976) and Medick (1976). 52. Potts and Mutambirwa (1990) and Andrae (1992).

38. Saith (1992),p. 17. 53. Bryceson (forthcoming).

39. Ho (1982), Agarwal (1985). Islam (1987) and 54. de Waal(1989).

Choudhury (1988).
55. Boserup (1981).
40. Chuta and Liedholm (1975) and (1979), Norcliffe,
Freeman and Miles (1984), Chinyoka (1985), Helmsing 56. A notable exception is Wanmali and Zambhiya (1992).

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