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Criminal Procedure a2010 page 1 Prof.Rowena Daroy Morales
ABBARIAO v BELTRAN
468 SCRA 421PANGANIBAN; August 31, 2005
NATURE
Administrative matter in the Supreme Court
FACTS
- This stemmed from an administrative case filed byAbbariao against Judge Beltran. Beltran was chargedwith gross ignorance of the law and knowinglyrendering unjust judgment.- Abarriao was the former branch manager of Country Banker’s Assurance Corporation. In October1992, Joseph Abraham procured 2 insurance policiesfrom him and issued a post-dated check to serve aspasyment. But the cheque was subsequentlydishonored.- Informations were filed before before Judge Beltranfor estafa and violation of BP 22.
Petitioners’ Claim
- Petitioner claims that Beltran’s ruling that there wasno valid insurance contract with Abraham waserroneous and that he had no jurisdiction over thecase in the first place.
Respondents’ Comments
- Beltran claims that there was no valid insurancecontract between Abbariao and Abraham becausethe insurance policy form of Abraham wasdisapproved.- He also claims he has jurisdiction over the casebecause the accused was arraigned in his court andthe prosecutor failed to withdraw the case.
ISSUE
1. WON the judge is guilty of rendering unjust judgment2. WON Beltran’s ruling showed gross ignorance of the law in terms of assuming jurisdiction over thecase
HELD
1. NO, the judge must be absolved from this charge.
Ratio
 
 The acts of judges pertaining to their judicialfunctions are not subject to disciplinary power,unless such acts are commited with fraud,dishonesty, corruption or bad faith. In the absence of proof to the contrary, an erroneous decision or orderis presumed to have been issued in good faith.2. YES. Beltran had no authority to rule over thecase.
Ratio
A court can only take cognizance of a casethat falls within its jurisdiction.
 Reasoning
- April 15, 1994 is the date of effectivity of RA 7691.RA 7691 expanded the jurisdiction of the first-levelcourts by providing that first-level courts shall have jurisdiction over criminal cases in which the offenseis punishable with imprisonment not exceeding 6years, regardless of the amount of the fine.- January 30, 1995 was the date the information wasfiled. The case had to do with the violation of BP 22which is penalized by an imprisonment of not lessthan 30 days but not more than one year. Thuswhen the information was filed, RA 7691 was alreadyin effect.- During the tenure of the former presiding judge, theissue of jurisdiction over the case was alreadypending resolution. He also displayed indecisivenessby relying on the public prosecutor’s assurance thathis court had acquired jurisdiction.- Aside from this instance, there were two otheroccasions when Beltran was charged and foundguilty of gross ignorance of the law (in
De Austria v.Beltran
and
 Andres v. Beltran
).
DISPOSITION
 
 Judge Beltran was found guilty of gross ignorance of the law for which he is finedP20,000 as recommended by the OCA and is warnedthat a repetition of the same act would merit agraver penalty.
RIBAYA v JUDGE BINAMIRA-PARCIA
AM No. MTJ-04-1547CORNEJO; April 15, 2005
NATURE
Administrative case against Judge Aurora Binamira-Parcia of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC),Ligao City, Albay relative to Criminal Case No. 8617(People v. Sps. Ribaya)
FACTS
- Asst Provincial Prosecutor Pedro Vega, in hispersonal capacity, filed before the MTCC, Ligao City acriminal complaint for estafa against the Spes Ribayaon November 29, 2001. The spouses, after receivingP12,000 from Vega, allegedly misappropriated theamount to the latter’s prejudice. The preliminaryinvestigation was then conducted by respondent judge.- Complainant, the daughter of the accused spouses,observed several irregularities in the conduct of thepreliminary investigation and the issuance of thewarrant of arrest. The spouses then filed a motion toquash and sought the nullification of “subsequentorders”.
They alleged that the MTCC had no jurisdiction and authority to conduct a preliminary investigation of a complaint filed by an offended party directly with the court.The authority to conduct a preliminary investigation was vested solely on the Office of the City Prosecutor.
- While waiting for the resolution of their motion toquash, the spouses did not post bail. On April 10,2002 Corazon Ribaya was apprehended by arrestingofficers in the public market by virtue of a warrant of arrest issued by respondent judge.- The complainant filed this administrative caseagainst Judge Parcia. The motions basicallyquestioned respondent’s authority to conduct apreliminary investigation.- In her answer, respondent judge claimed thatcomplainant was not a party in Criminal Case No.8617.
Respondent explained that sheconducted the preliminary investigation of thecriminal complaint against the spousesbecause the Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of theOffice of the City Prosecutor was too busy todo so.
- To support her claim, respondent attached theaffidavit of OIC City Prosecutor Vasquez of the thennewly-created Ligao City. Vasquez stated that theCity Prosecutor’s Office was still undergoingreorganization when the subject criminal complaintwas filed. It had neither enough manpower nor officespace in the Hall of Justice. Positions had not yetbeen filled. His workload as Asst ProvincialProsecutor and OIC City Prosecutor was so heavythat time constraints did not permit him to conductpreliminary investigations. Thus, it was therespondent judge who conducted the preliminaryinvestigation.- the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) foundthat respondent erred when she conducted thepreliminary investigation of the subject criminalcomplaint even after the Municipality of Ligao, Albayhad been converted into a city. The OCArecommended that: (1) the complaint be re-docketedas a regular administrative matter; and (2) therespondent be reprimanded, directed to concentrateher time and effort on performing her judicial tasksand warned that a repetition of the same or similaroffense would be dealt with more severely.- A motion for reconsideration was filed byrespondent on October 1, 2003.
This time,respondent claimed that what she conducted 
 
Criminal Procedure a2010 page 2 Prof.Rowena Daroy Morales
on November 29, 2001 was a preliminary examination to determine probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest against thespouses. Respondent also claimed that thecriminal complaint was governed by Sec. 9,Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the rule governing cases that did not require preliminary investigation.
Since theamount involved in the estafa case was P12,000, nopreliminary investigation was required.
ISSUES
1. WON respondent judge had the authority toconduct preliminary investigation2. WON respondent judge is guilty of misconduct inoffice3. WON preliminary investigation was not requiredfor the estafa case4. WON warrant of arrest was valid
HELD
1. NO- Although judges of inferior courts are authorized toconduct preliminary investigation of all crimes withintheir jurisdiction, the task is essentially an executivefunction. As far back as Collector of Customs v.Villaluz, we already held that:[w]hile we sustain the power of the x x x courts toconduct preliminary examination, pursuant to OurConstitutional power of administrative supervisionover all courts
 , as a matter of policy, we enjoin x x x judge[s] x x x to concentrate on hearingand deciding before their courts. x x x  [Judges] should not encumber themselveswith the preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints, whichthey should refer to the municipal judge or  provincial or city fiscal, who in turn canutilize the assistance of the state prosecutor to conduct such preliminary examination and investigation.
- City judges then were clearly authorized to conductpreliminary investigation and examination.
But even then, we also held that the provisions of Rule 112 granting city judges the authority toconduct preliminary investigation did not apply to judges of cities the charters of whichauthorized the city fiscal only to conduct  preliminary investigation of criminal complaints.
- This ruling was, in fact, integrated into the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Under Sec. 1, Rule110, criminal actions in chartered cities areinstituted by filing the complaint only with theCity Prosecuto
r. The rule implies that the task of conducting preliminary investigation in these cities isnow lodged with the Office of the City Prosecutor.
Consequently, inferior court judges of citieswhose charters authorize only the fiscal toconduct preliminary investigation are nolonger allowed to perform this function.
- The Municipality of Ligao was converted into acity by RA 9008 which took effect on Feb 21, 2001. This law, also known as the charter of the City of Ligao, provides in Sec. 50 that:(a) There shall be established in the city aprosecution service to be headed by a cityprosecutor and such number of assistant prosecutorsas may be necessary, who shall be organizationallypart of the DOJ…(b) The City Prosecutor shall handle the criminalprosecution in the MTC in the city as well as in theRTC for criminal cases originating in the territory of the city, and shall render to or for the city suchservices as are required by law, ordinance orregulation of the DOJ…- Clearly, respondent judge had no more authority toconduct a preliminary investigation of the subjectcriminal complaint. The officer authorized to conductpreliminary investigations in the then newly-createdCity of Ligao was its City Prosecutor. At that time,the duty devolved upon OIC City Prosecutor Vasquez,despite the administrative difficulties he wasencountering.2. YES- We noticed the contradiction between her answerand her motion for reconsideration as to what sheactually conducted on November 29, 2001. In heranswer, she justified her authority to conduct apreliminary investigation. In her motion forreconsideration of the OCA’s resolution, however,she declared that she conducted a preliminaryexamination to justify the issuance of a warrant of arrest-There appear just too many intriguing uncertaintiessurrounding the filing of the estafa case. Wetherefore direct our attention to respondent judge’sfailure to erase our doubts over how she administers justice in her jurisdiction.- Respondent judge must be reminded that sheshould do honor to her position not only by rendering just, correct and impartial decisions but doing so in amanner free from any suspicion as to their fairnessand impartiality, and as to her integrity. A spotlessdispensation of justice requires not only that thedecision rendered be intrinsically fair but that the judge rendering it must at all times maintain theappearance of fairness and impartiality.- Considering all this, respondent judge committedsimple misconduct in office. Misconduct in office hasa well-defined meaning. It refers to misconduct thataffects the judge’s performance of her duties and not just her character as a private individual. Toconstitute an administrative offense, misconductshould relate to or be connected with theperformance of the official functions and duties of apublic officer.3. YES- Respondent correctly observed that it was notneeded in the estafa case. The maximum penalty forthe crime allegedly committed there (6 months and 1day to 4 years and 2 months) did not meet theminimum penalty (at least 4 years, 2 months and 1day) required to make a preliminary investigationpart of the spouses’ right to due process.4. YES- As long as the constitutional mandate was compliedwith, that is, the warrant of arrest was issued upon afinding of probable cause personally by the judgeafter an examination under oath or affirmation of thecomplainant and the witnesses he may produce, thewarrant of arrest was valid.- Respondent judge examined the complainant PedroVega on the day the complaint was filed and she wassatisfied that probable cause existed. The warrant of arrest she issued against the spouses Ribaya was,therefore, justified and no violation of theirconstitutional rights occurred.
DISPOSITION
Respondent Judge Aurora Binamira-Parcia is herebyfound guilty of simple misconduct and a fine of P11,000 is imposed on her. She is hereby directed todevote her time and effort exclusively to dischargingher judicial functions. She is furthermore warnedthat a repetition of the same or similar act will merita more severe penalty.
TUMANG v BAUTISTA
136 SCRA 682ABAD-SANTOS; May 31 1985
NATURE
Petition to review and annul orders of RTC Laguna
FACTS
- Emilio Javier filed a
sakdal
against Enrique Tumangand his daughter Georgia Tumang.- The
sakdal
was written in Tagalog and wasunaccompanied by an English translation.
 
Criminal Procedure a2010 page 3 Prof.Rowena Daroy Morales
- The Tumangs prayed that Javier be ordered to file acopy of the complaint as translated in English, and acopy of the criminal complaint and Decision of acquittal in the unjust vexation case mentioned in Javier’s complaint.- TC ruled on Oct. 21 1982 that the complaint writtenin Pilipino, which is an official language, is proper andis admitted. TC also ruled that it is not absolutelynecessary that copies of the complaint and criminalcase be attached as annexes. Javier should have,however, at least stated the docket number as wellas name of the court and branch number.- The Tumangs failed to answer the
sakdal
and weredeclared in default. They sought to reconsider, notonly the order of default but also the order admittingthe complaint in Pilipino.- TC set aside its order of default that refused toreconsider its order of October 21, 1982.- The Tumangs filed a motion to dismiss, allegingthat the complaint did not state a cause of action andthat the venue was improperly laid. TC denied themotion on both grounds.
ISSUE
WON the
sakdal
should have been in English and not Tagalog
HELD
 YES- In the ponente’s lecture, “Writing Decisions”, hesaid in part:“What language should the judge use? Theconstitution says that until otherwise providedby law, English and Pilipino shall be the officiallanguages! (Art. XV, Sec. 3, Par 3.) If we are tobe guided by this provision then either English of Pilipino can be used. But in fact English is almostexclusively used and with good reason. ForPilipino is still a gestating language. Theconstitution says so. It directs that “theBatasang Pambansa shall take steps towards thedevelopment and formal adoption of a commonnational language to be known as Pilipino.”- However, petitioner cannot now raise this questionbefore the Supreme Court, As they have tacitlysubmitted to the TC’s ruling that the
sakdal
did nothave to be translated in English; they analyzed the
sakdal
in arguing that it stated no cause of action.Such analysis demonstrated that they understood itscontents.
DISPOSITION
Denied for lack of merit.
POTOT v PEOPLE
383 SCRA 449SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ; June 26, 2002
NATURE
Review on certiorari on a decision of RTC of Catarman, Northern Samar
FACTS
- Dec.12,1999: Potot was charged with homicidebefore the RTC for assaulting and stabbing a certainRodolfo Dapulag with a knife, thereby causing hisdeath.- Feb.1, 2000: Upon arraignment, Potot pleadedguilty and invoked the mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty and voluntary surrender. He was laterconvicted of homicide w/ the above stated mitigatingcircumstances.- Feb.3, 2000: Potot filed a manifestation with motioninforming the TC that he is not appealing from theDecision and praying that a commitment order beissued so he could immediately serve his sentence.- Feb.11, 2000: Private complainant Rosalie Dapulag(wife of the victim), with the conformity of the publicprosecutor, filed a motion for reconsideration/retrialpraying that the decision be set aside and that thecase be heard again because of certain irregularitiescommitted before and during the trial. She allegedthat there were 2 other men involved in thecommission of the crime and that the eyewitnessdeliberately withheld the information uponsolicitation by a certain Mayor Dapulag and upon theeyewitnesses’ own belief that such inclusion wouldcomplicate the case and make it more difficult.- Petitioner opposed this motion, asserting that thedecision can no longer be modified or set asidebecause it became final when he formally waived hisright to appeal.- May 3, 2000: The trial court granted RosalieDapulag’s motion, set aside its previous Decision aswell as ordered that the records of the case beremanded to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutorfor re-evaluation of the evidence and filing of thecorresponding charge.- Petitioner filed a MFR, contending that the trialcourt has no jurisdiction to issue the Feb.1 order asthe Decision had become final, and that the saidorder would place him in double jeopardy.- May 26, 2000: The trial court denied the MFR forthe reason that the State is not bound by the error ornegligence of its prosecuting officers, hence, jeopardy does not attach.- Petitioner now assails the May 3
rd
and May 26orders with the Sol.Gen. agreeing that the challengedorders should be set aside and that the Feb. 1Decision should be reinstated. 
ISSUES
1. WON the trial court, upon motion by a privatecomplainant, can set aside a previous judgment of conviction and remand the records of a case to theOffice of the Provincial Prosecutor for re-evaluation of the evidence and the filing of the correspondingcharge2. WON the manifestation by the accused that he isnot appealing from the trial court’s Decision renderthe judgment final3. WON the trial court err in granting privatecomplainant’s motion for reconsideration/retrial4. WON the assailed orders violate petitioner’sconstitutional right against double jeopardy
HELD
1. NO
Ratio
Only the accused may ask for a modification orsetting aside of a judgment of conviction which hemust do before the said judgment becomes final orbefore he perfects his appeal.
 Reasoning-
Sec. 7 Rule 120 of the Revised Rules on CriminalProcedure, as amended, provides:Sec. 7. Modification of judgment - A judgment of 
conviction
may,
upon motion of the accused 
, be
 modified or set aside before it becomes final 
or
 
before appeal is perfected. Except where thedeath penalty is imposed,
a judgment becomesfinal
after the lapse of the period for perfectingan appeal, or when the sentence has beenpartially or totally satisfied or served, or
whenthe accused has waived in writing his right toappeal
, or has applied for probation.- It is thus clear that only the accused may ask for amodification or setting aside of a judgment of conviction. And this he must do before the said judgment becomes final or before he perfects hisappeal. Such judgment becomes final in any of thefollowing ways: (a) when no appeal is seasonablyfiled by the accused, except in case of automaticreview of the decision imposing the capital penalty;(b) when he has partially or totally served hissentence; (c) when he expressly waives his right toappeal the judgment, except when the death penaltyis imposed; or (d) when he applies for probation.When a judgment becomes final, the trial court whichrendered the judgment of conviction loses jurisdiction to alter, modify, or revoke it.2. YES
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