Professional Documents
Culture Documents
1
Drs. (Piet) H. Kruizinga MA,
Protestants Theological University of The
Netherlands,
Kampen.
1. Introduction
4
2. Historical Backgrounds.
2.1. 600 Years of Muslim Rule
5
2.2. The Last Nizam
6
2.3. Independence and Partition
8
2.4. The Five Days War
11
2.5. Off the Battlefields
13
3. Hyderabad and Communal Violence.
2
3.1. The Years after
15
3.2. Communal Violence in Hyderabad
18
3.3. Causes and Solutions
21
3.3.1. Political-economical
22
3.3.2. Cultural
26
3.3.3. Psychological
27
3.3.4. Instrumental
28
3.4. Present Interpretations
30
3.5. A cohesive approach
31
4. The Henry Martyn Institute.
4.1. The Beginning
32
4.2. Theologies of Reconciliation and Relationships
34
4.3. The Praxis
37
3
4.3.1. Educational
38
4.3.2. Medical
40
4.3.3. Economics
43
4.3.4. Peace Building
44
4.3.5. Celebrations
45
4.3.6. Development Networking
46
4.3.7. Miscellaneous
47
5. Analyses.
5.1. Theologies
47
5.2. Objectives
51
5.3. SWOT
53
6. Conclusions.
59
Literature
61
4
1. Introduction.
It happened a few months ago. At two different locations in the huge city of
Hyderabad two bombs exploded, one shortly after the other. The results
were terrible. Dozens of men, women and children, enjoying their leisure
time, were killed and far more were seriously injured. The citizens of
Hyderabad were upset: who had done this? What people were behind these
cowardly attacks? Where did they come from? And what were their
motives?
5
What did it mean for the Muslim minority and the Hindu majority in
Hyderabad? And is there any connection between these developments and
the occurrence of Communal Violence many years later? Next I give
attention to the issue of Communal Violence as such and more particularly
in Hyderabad. What Communal Violence took place in Hyderabad after
1948? What were the causes of this violence and what gave rise to it? It is
my conviction that having at least a slight idea of the roots, the causes, the
real motives behind this particular form of violence will help the people of
Hyderabad to overcome the problem of Communal Violence. I hope that
this will strengthen all efforts made by people of goodwill to restore peace,
to work for reconciliation, to create a reliable and - after all - real and just
peace in the city of Hyderabad. This part ends with some present
interpretations of the occurrence of Communal Violence in Hyderabad and
some kinds of similar violence in Western Europe.
The second part is about how the Henry Martyn Institute (HMI) in Hyderabad
deals with the issue of Communal Violence in the Old City. Here I try to
formulate an answer to my central research question:
How can one evaluate the recent activities of the HMI to prevent and reduce
Communal Violence in the Old City of Hyderabad?
First I give a short history and describe HMI’s theological motives and
reflections. Have there been any developments in HMI’s paradigm over
time? If so, what did it mean for HMI’s activities? How has HMI responded to
the increasing Communal Violence in Hyderabad in the last decade of the
last century? Then about the praxis. What concrete activities has HMI
undertaken in the last seven years in the Old City to prevent and to reduce
Communal Violence? Were they effective and to what extent were their
preset goals reached? And how can we evaluate these in a SWOT-analysis,
in terms of Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats? In the
concluding chapter I make some critical remarks about HMI’s underlying
theologies and give some suggestions.
2. Historical Backgrounds.
At the beginning of the 16th Century, the Sultanate divided into five smaller
kingdoms because the provincial governors one by one declared
independence. So the First Dynasty of Hyderabad State, the Qutub Shahi of
Golconda, was founded in 1512. The founder, a Turkish man from Persia,
assumed the title Sultan Quli Qutub Shah. Under his successor, Ibrahim, the
neighboring Hindu Kingdom was defeated. The city of Hyderabad was
founded in 1589 by Muhammad Khan near to the fortress of Golconda. The
Charminar, the centre of the Old City of Hyderabad and its symbol, was built
in 1591. At the beginning of the 17th Century, Hyderabad became a vassal
state of the Moghuls, the Muslim Imperial Rulers of the Northern Part of
India. But there was some disobedience and the Moghul’s Army took the
fortress of Golconda in 1689. An Army General, Quamruddin, came into
power. In 1712 the Moghul gave him the title of Nizam-ul-Mulk Fateh Jung
(Nizam by short) and the governorship of the Deccan. The Second Dynasty
of Hyderabad State commenced. In 1800 the second Nizam and his State
became a subordinated ally of the British. In the middle of the 19 th Century
the Moghul’s Empire was removed by the British and the Nizam of the then
Hyderabad State became independent. The Nizams stayed in power until
1948. In that year Hyderabad State became a part of the Union of India.
This short introduction shows that in the 20th Century the Hyderabad State
was more or less a relic of the old Moghul Empire. It is necessary to
understand this to be able to comprehend the events around 1948 and the
years afterward. A strong element of medievalism pervaded the culture of
Hyderabad because of the origin of the ruling class and the social hierarchy
in the State. The principle of nobility, the jagirdari, which dominated the
thinking of the State’s rulers and subjects, was brought to the Deccan from
Central Asia. The tribal background of the Moghuls was in Central Asia and
they brought their tradition of administration with them. Of course, the
Central Asian institutions underwent many changes in the course of the
centuries but its backbone remained the same. In the Deccan many of the
customs of the Moghuls were adopted by the Nizams. As a consequence,
the administration of the Hyderabad State was built on the jagirdari-system.
The core of that system is that a nobleman, a member of the same tribe as
the Ruler, gets a grant as an reward for certain services and becomes a
jagirdar. This grant consists of a part of the revenues from a piece of land
with one or more villages. In exchange for that the jagirdar is absolutely
obedient to the Ruler, providing him with troops if necessary. Since the
7
Nizam maintained a Regular Army, however, the jagirdars military services
ended. The jagirdari-administration did not affect the primary relationship
between the tenant-cultivator and the owner of the land. The jagirdars thus
constituted an intermediary between the Nizam’s government on the one
hand and the owner on the other. The jagirdar took the revenues of “his”
land by taxes, goods, and labor. This jagirdari system was hereditary in the
Deccan and became an important factor that provided continuity to the
Nizam’s rule.1 The jagirs were scattered all over the Hyderabad State. In
1948 the jagirdars occupied 40% of the total territory (41.000 square
kilometers), 37% of the villages (6536), and about one-third of the
population (four million). This system, a pyramid with a base of millions of
poor peasants, above them the landlords, and in the upper part the
jagirdars with the Nizam at the top, functioned from the beginning of the
eighteenth century until the middle of the twentieth century. An
administrative reform at the end of the 19th Century extended the power of
the Nizam through centralization at the cost of the Reddy’s, the Hindu-
landlords. So these old Moghul traditions continued nearly unchanged in
the lotus-eating atmosphere that survived in the Hyderabad State into the
middle of the twentieth century. There was no change or innovation of any
kind.2
This was the situation in Hyderabad State when the Seventh and Last Nizam
came to power at the beginning of the twentieth century.
The seventh and final Nizam, Mir Osman Ali Khan, was born in 1886. He
was the sovereign of Hyderabad State from 1911 until 1948. In his time
Hyderabad was India’s largest state and a separate entity. It had little
contact with India’s other Princely states or with British India as a whole.
The Nizam still coined his own money, had his own postal system and
stamps, built and equipped his own factories, and had his own railway
network. He also had his own Army and the total number of his Regular and
Irregular Forces was about 30.000 men. This Army was trained and
commanded by British as well as Hyderabad officers.
1
See: Hiroshi Fukazawa, The Medieval Deccan, Peasants, Social Systems and States, New
Delhi 1989, pp. 49 – 70. See also: V.K. Bawa, The Last Nizam, the life and times of Mir
Osman Ali Khan, New Delhi, 1992, pp. 10 – 14.
2
V. K. Bawa, c.w., p. 15.
8
The seventh Nizam was considered to be the richest man in the world
during his lifetime. As a Muslim he was tolerant to other creeds. There was
more Hindu-participation in his administration than in previous
administrations and thanks to his mild regime many low-caste people and
untouchables from other parts of India immigrated to Hyderabad. 3 It was
ahead of many other Princely States in terms of education, legal justice, and
employment. Hyderabad State was an important area for the growth of Urdu
literature in the entire subcontinent. But the State was still run on feudal
lines, despite the presence of the British, or, possibly, because of them.
After all, it is easier to control a feudal state then a modern state. In this
way, the British could hold onto their real power while leaving the symbols
of power in the hands of the traditional rulers.
Like some of his predecessors, the 7th Nizam was a builder and constructed
some buildings which are still impressive, such as the Osmania Hospital and
the Osmania University. The Osmania University introduced the teaching of
Urdu with English as a second language. In September 1908 a flooded Musi-
river destroyed a quarter of the Old city, killing more than 15.000 people.4
Thus two more dams were built to stop the river Musi from future flooding.
The 7th Nizam was highly honored by the British. In 1917 he received the
“Knight Grand Cross of the British Empire”. Without any doubt it had to do
with the financial aid he gave to the British during World War I. Also during
World War II he gave a lot of financial aid to the British. 6 Therefore he was
rewarded and given the “Royal Victorian Chain” in 1946.7 But in the most
crucial period from December 1947 to September 1948 the British left him
alone. The last Nizam was honored by the British as their “Most Faithful
3
According Narendra Luther, Hyderabad, a biography, New Delhi, 2006, the total non-
Muslim (Hindu, Christian, and Parsee) representation in the senior levels was less than
15%. Also there were no non-Muslims in high posts in the Army and the Police.
4
I. Austin, City of Legends, The Story of Hyderabad, New Delhi, 1992, p. 164. It is
remarkable that Luther dedicates only half a sentence to this event that influenced the
whole life of the population of the Old City for a long time. See: N. Luther, c.w., p. 200.
Neither of the writers mentions the plague of 1911.
5
See: Census 1941.
6
Thanks to his personal aid, several naval vessels were in service and two Royal Air Force
squadrons were financed. From his own pocket he funded the entire needs of two
regiments and a Hurricane squadron during the Battle of Britain in the autumn of 1940.
See: Ian Austin, c.w., p. 175. Confirmed by S.E. El-Edroos, the Commander of the
Hyderabad Army till Sept. 1948, in his book: Hyderabad of “the seven loaves”, Hyderabad,
1994, p. 77.
7
This close relationship to the British did not please everybody. Narayan Apte, a Hindu
zealot, who masterminded the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi in 1948, was in 1947 in
Hyderabad to organize guerillas in an attempt on the Nizam’s life. No one was interested,
or else nobody had the courage, so he left and turned his attention to removing Gandhi.
9
Ally” but it turned out that the British were not faithful to him at all. Winston
Churchill and his Conservative Party, the princes’ best friends, lost the 1945
elections and the new Labor government under Prime Minister Clement
Attlee was less interested in the problems of the Union of India after its
independence. It was that position that decided the fate of the Hyderabad
State in the years of Independence and Partition; years so crucial in India’s
history.
Meanwhile pressure from India on the Hyderabad State and its inhabitants
grew. Experienced troops from the Northern part of India were moved to the
borders of the State. They started to control all traffic of goods and people
and soon it turned into a real blockade. Their reason for doing so was to
stop the smuggling of arms into the State by the Razakars. The blockade
was quite effective and the tension continued to rise. 19
The Razakars were not the only problem facing the Indian government. In
the early forties the Communists started to work with the poor peasants of
the Telengana District, the Telugu-speaking eastern part of the Hyderabad
State.20 They had in the feudally-ruled region a great deal of support. More
and more villages refused to obey the orders of the jagirdar (mostly Muslims
under the protection and the rule of the Nizam), to supply forced labor, or to
pay taxes and rent. The Communists claimed in the latter forties to have
“liberated” more than 2000 villages. These villages were ruled by “People
Independent Committees”, a kind of soviets, elected by the villagers
themselves. Peasant tribunals liquidated many “old” officials of the ruling
Regime. These developments frightened the Delhi Government. They were
aware that a solid communist base of power could be set up for operations
against their own regime – as Manchuria was in China before. 21 The situation
became complicated. The Nizam ascribed the loss of territory to India’s
blockade and the refusal to supply him with arms. The communists’
successes vindicated the necessity of the Razakars. The Nizam’s
Government, the Indian Government, and the Communists each accused
the other two of working together at some points. All of these accusations
contained some truth.22
18
“… it is mentioned … that the Hyderabad Army … was in league with the Razakars and
was helping them with arms and ammunition … This was absolutely incorrect”. See: S.E.
El-Edroos, c.w., p. 116.
19
“There were restrictions not only on essential items like salt and petrol, but we were also
running short of whisky”. See: S.E. El-Edroos, c.w., p. 108.
20
The movement was inspired by the uprisings of rural peasants against their (often
Muslim) landlords in 1921 in the Malabar District. See: K.N. Panakar, Against Lord and
State, Religion and Peasant Uprisings in Malabar 1836 – 1921, New Delhi, 1989.
21
During the Second Congress of the Communist Party of India in Calcutta in
February/March 1948, the Telengana-uprising was cited as an example of a successful
“armed insurrection of the people against the Government” which revolution could be
brought to the whole of India. See: L.B. Bechenou, c.w., pp. 203 – 204. El-Edroos, c.w., p.
159, agrees with his former enemies as he writes: “Had the Communist experiment in
Telengana district succeeded, … the Communists could have easily spread out and
established a Communist State in the South and … could have expanded all over India”.
22
The Telengana-uprising had two phases. The first was from 1946 to the Police Action of
1948 and the second was from early 1949 until the first general-elections in 1952. During
the second phase the armed resistance was crushed by the Indian Army and 4000
revolutionaries were killed. It was inevitable: they lacked modern weapons, they ran out of
ammunition, and nobody came to their assistance. See: N. Luther, c.w., pp. 317 – 318. See
also: Suba Chandran and Mallika Joseph, The Naxalite Movement, in: Monique Mekenkamp
12
In the course of the year 1948, the tension between the Governments of
Hyderabad State and the Union of India continued to rise. There were a lot
of border-incidents. The borders between the Hyderabad State and the
Union were not straight lines and each had many enclaves in the other’s
territory. Then the public learned that the Nizam had given a loan of 20
crore Rs, a huge amount of money in that time, to the government of
Pakistan.23 That loan was given at a crucial moment. The tensions between
India and Pakistan were at their peak. The Indian Government was furious:
next to the external enemy, Pakistan, there was an internal enemy, the
Nizam and his State. Then, on May 4th, 1948, the Nizam lifted the ban on
the Communist Party with the understanding that the Communist Party was
to instruct its liberated villages to resist Indian troops should they come.
By mid July all flights of Deccan Airways to Hyderabad were halted. Soon
after that, the long distant express trains were diverted and telephone
contact was cut off.24
Lord Mountbatten, who was the Governor General of India until 15 th August,
1948, did what he could to avoid a military action against Hyderabad. But
at the beginning of August 1948 there was no solution in sight and fear of a
military invasion increased. So on August 21, 1948, the Hyderabad State
submitted to the United Nations a request that the dispute between itself
and India should be brought to the attention of the Security Council as a
threat to peace. But it was too late. The Nizam and his followers had
gambled and they lost.
c.s., Searching for Peace in Central and South Asia, An Overview of Conflict Prevention and
Peacebuilding Activities, London, 2003, pp. 384 – 385. In 1951 a delegation of the
Telengana Communists traveled to Moscow and spoke to Stalin and other leaders of the
USSR. But the USSR did not want to assist them and the mission failed. So they decided to
cease their armed struggle and they entered into “normal” politics. After 1980, however,
the armed struggle began again. See: P. Sundacayya, Telengana People Struggle and its
Lessons, Calcutta, 1972.
23
In those times 20 crore Rs would have been the equivalent of sixty million USD.
24
V.K. Bawa, c.w., p. 270.
25
For those who are not familiar with the Polo-game: two teams of mounted horsemen try
to get e small ball in the other’s goal, using a long wooden mallet.
26
Indian Defense Department-sources: about 35.000 Indian soldiers were involved. About
the strength of the Hyderabad Armed Forces: Nehru reported on Sept. 9th to his Ministers:
Regulars 22.000; Irregular and under training 12.000; Police 38.000 and 15.000 Home
guards. Hyderabad Army Commander El-Edroos (c.w., p. 190) counts 17.000 Regulars and
13
“Police Operation” had started. The assault was not unexpected. There were
intelligence-sources that predicted an attack in the course of September.
The Hyderabad government knew that there were strong concentrations of
troops and heavy weapons along the borders. Despite all that they were not
prepared and taken by surprise.27 So it transpired that a bridge, crucial for
the defense, was not blown up, because the person responsible for the
detonation was sleeping miles away from his post. The attack came from all
possible sides, so the defenders had to shift their attention constantly. And
their defense was poor. They used old maps and had the same code-system
for several years. Some days before the attack, he British ordered their
officers back, so a lot of troops were now commanded by young and
inexperienced officers. 28 There was a lack of weaponry. 29 The Hyderabad
troops were armed with handguns and there was only a small number of
twenty-five pounders, a type of field gun. The Indian Air Force was
constantly bombing the airfields of the State and other strategic targets.
There was hardly any anti-aircraft artillery. So the Indians crushed the
defense lines within a few days. When their armored vanguard was only
some kilometers away from Hyderabad with a free way before them, it was
time to act. The Nizam sent a radio-message to New Delhi and offered a
11.000 Irregulars. These figures do not completely correspond with other sources, but in
general the total of the (Regular and Irregular) Armed Forces of the Hyderabad State is
estimated at something between 30 – 50.000. Luther, c.w., p. 273, comes to the total
number of 31.660 Regulars and 10.000 Irregulars.
27
An anti-aircraft gun, brought by Sidney Cotton (see footnote 29), was still wrapped in its
packing case. See: V.K. Bawa, c.w., p. 283.
28
According to the Prime-Minister of the Nizam-government some senior officers, such as
the Army Commander, were incompetent. Years after the fall he still blamed only the
military for the defeat. See: Mir Laiq Ali, The Five Day War, published in: Omar Khalid
(edit.), Hyderabad: after the fall, Wichita (Kansas), 1988, pp. 27 – 64. And an eyewitness, a
Muslim and ex-government official Fareed Mirza states: “The Hyderabad Army as a whole
did not fight against the Indian Army. It seems that the Chief of the Hyderabad Army was
putting up a show … to fool the Razakars leaders and the … cabinet”. See: Fareed Mirza,
c.w.
29
There is the remarkable story of an Australian adventurer, Sidney Cotton, a former RAF-
pilot, who “coincidently” arrived at Hyderabad Airport end of March 1948. Due to the
blockade there was a lack of essential things. So he agreed with the Nazim government to
set up an airlift from Karachi in Pakistan to Hyderabad. In a short time he organized a
number (Austin: 12} of aircraft, mostly Lancaster-bombers from WW II and started from
the airfield of Bidar. From April to the early hours of 16th September this air bridge was
used. The airlift provided in small arms, medical supplies but also liquors and Swiss
chocolate for the Nizam’s household. Of course the Indian Air force tried to stop the airlift,
but Cotton’s planes used to fly during the night and bad weather conditions. And the Indian
fighter pilots could not or did not want to fly during those times. See: Austin, c.w. This
story of Cotton is confirmed by the Unions Ministry for External Affairs, as stated in a note
of the 6th July 1948. In that note from intelligence-sources Cotton’s gunrunning is
described. And from Hyderabad’s side: “Sidney Cotton … was responsible for bringing
about twenty thousands of .303 service rifles with ammunition”. See: S.E. El-Edroos, c.w.,
p. 142.
According to the Indian Intelligence the number of Cotton’s aircraft was only five or six. But
El-Edroos, c.w., p. 147, speaks about only one aircraft. And John Zubrzycki is the most
specific. He counts five Lancaster ex-bombers and eight 3-man crews. See: John Zubrzycki,
c.w., p. 191. See for more details: Omar Khalidi, Memoirs of Sidney Cotton, Wichita, 1994
and: Sidney Cotton, Aviator Extraordinary: The Sidney Cotton Story as Told to Ralph
Barker, London, 1969.
14
cease-fire, replacement of his government and the disbandment of the
Razakars. Pandit Nehru accepted all but not the change in government. He
insisted that an Indian Military Governor should take power. There was no
choice any more. And so on 18th September the Army Commander of
Hyderabad State, Major-General El Edroos drove out of the city to meet
India’s Major-General Chaudhuri to offer him the unconditional surrender of
all Hyderabad’s Armed Forces.
What about the United Nations? On 16th September 1948, a few days after
the invasion, the Security Council of the United Nations met in Paris to
discuss Hyderabad’s complaint. The India’s representation argued that
Hyderabad State was not competent to bring the case before the Council,
because it was not an independent country and they argued for an
adjournment of five days. The issue was postponed to the next meeting of
the Council. But it never came to a final decision. The matter was discussed
several times by the Security Council with Pakistan and India as opponents,
but as time went on, the case was put aside.
From the beginning of the fighting, the Razakars were very active. Shortly
after the invasion there was a call from Radio Deccan to all Razakars to
move to the front and to fight. Quasim Razvi was often in the Army
Operations Room. There was close cooperation between the Army, the
political leadership and the Razakars, at least during the hostilities. 30 After
the surrender on Sept. 17th Razvi broadcast by radio to his followers to stop
the violence and to preserve peace.31 On the morning of Sept. 18th
“thousands and thousands of Hindus … were roaming the streets of the city
in a very jubilant mood. … The Muslims were very much depressed and
grieved”.32
The war, or Police Action, lasted only five days, but there were a lot of
casualties. Different sources give different numbers. Austin mentions a
number of about 800 Hyderabad’s soldiers killed. Others speak about
several hundreds. Bawa counts a number of 900. 33 O. Khalidi reports, citing
a former Razakar, several hundred killed and many thousands injured.34 The
most detailed figures are those from the Indian Defense Department. Indian
soldiers: killed 10, wounded 97; Hyderabad Regular Forces: killed 807,
30
The Prime Minister of the Nizam’s Government reported on the 16th September 1948: “I
ordered sending out all the available Razakars and civilian volunteers to the eastern front
with detailed instructions for laying out mines and digging up trenches across the roads…”
On another moment that day in the Army Operations Room: “Quasim Razvi was busy
organizing his Razakar batches and had called in … to make arrangements for their
transport and other requirements. He was kept informed of the military situation fully”.
31
As stated by V.K. Bawa, c.w.
32
See: Fareed Mirza, c.w., p. 47.
33
V.K. Bawa, c.w., pp. 282 – 283.
34
O. Khalidi, c.w., p. 15.
15
Prisoners of War 1647; Razakars: killed 1373, Prisoners of War 1911.
According to this data, there were considerable losses on the defenders
side.35
I could not find any written eyewitness record of the events shortly after the
Police Action. The main document is a report written by two Congressmen, a
Hindu and a Muslim, Pandit Sundarlal and Kazi Muhammad Abdul Ghaffar.
The two undertook in November and December 1948 a fact-finding mission
and went from village to village and district to district, listening to the
stories of the survivors. Their report is an account of numerous lists of those
who have been killed, raped or driven to death. After their return to New
Delhi, they presented the report to the Central Government. The Union
Home Minister was not amused. He contested the value of the report and
called it one-sided and made “not in accordance with good statesmanship
and administrative ability”. So he argued against the status of this report
but also he criticized the contents. 37 But Nehru was shocked. He knew both
the Congressmen to be reliable and he announced further inquires about
35
It has to be taken in consideration that in general a winner underestimates his own
losses and overestimates the losses of his counterpart, the loser. But I could not find a
more specific overview than this one.
36
F. Mirza, c.w., p. 63 – 70.
37
See Frontline, India’s National Magazine, Volume 18, Issue 05, March 03 – 16, 2001.
Herein is Home Minister Patel quoted in his letter to Abdul Ghaffar dated January 4th, 1949:
“I noticed that in your report you mentioned that you were asked by the Government of
India to proceed to Hyderabad State on a goodwill mission. At least I am not aware of any
such mission having been entrusted to you by the Government of India. … There could
have been no question of Government of India sending any goodwill mission to Hyderabad
State. … I notice that your report is … about what happened during and after the Police
Action … There is nothing in it about the extent and consequences of Razakar atrocities”.
16
the massacres.38 Such an inquiry was never made or at least, no results are
known. The report of Sundarlal and Ghaffar disappeared in the archives. 39
Who were responsible for the killings? The “liberated” villagers? The Police
or the Indian Army? The Police of Hyderabad State was dominated by
Muslims. And in general the Indian Army did not take part in the atrocities.
There are some reports about the active participation of soldiers and lower
ranked army personnel, but mostly they were reported to be exceptions. 40
But what was the estimated number of deaths during that dark period?
Some authors suggest that the Sundarlal – Ghaffar report mentions a
number of 200.000. Others estimate 50.000. Some give higher or lower
numbers. We do not know, but it was surely a considerable number. 41 So
much that the Government of India refused to accept what was reported by
reliable observers. Times were difficult for the young state of India. There
was a war going on in Jammu and Kashmir. How should Pakistan react to the
figures; if known and published? How would the Muslim community,
scattered throughout India, react? What could be the position of the Muslim
countries towards India? Besides that, if the records should become known
in public, it would harm the non-violent image of Gandhi’s India, preached
so convincingly overseas.
What about the fate of the last Muslim Ruler of the Hyderabad State after
that short period of violence and sudden change? After lifting India’s Military
Rule in Hyderabad State, the 7th and last Nizam got in 1950 a new role as
38
In a note to Home Minister Patel of November 14th, Nehru wrote: “They are both reliable
observers. … The impression I have gathered is … that in a very large number of outbreaks
… resulting in the massacre of possibly some thousands of Muslims by Hindus. … This
information is contrary to what I had believed....”. Quote from Frontline, see note 37.
39
In the quoted edition of Frontline the author of that article, A.G. Noorani, writes, that he
obtained a copy of that report from the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library in New Delhi.
But he gives no further details. Why not? May be because what is written in the last
sentences: “The Sundarlal Report is of more than historical importance; it is of current
relevance, for the massacres, coupled with the national indifference to them, have left
scars in the minds of the Muslims in the State, Hyderabad City in particular. And some
Muslim communal parties have not been slow to exploit these scars”.
40
Bawa is in this point the most explicit as he writes: “There were probably Hindu and Sikh
soldiers who had a desire to take revenge for the massacres … of West Punjab … I do not
however accept Khalidi’s figure of about 200.000 Muslims as having been killed”. See: V.K.
Bawa, c.w., p. 393. On the pages 288 and 289 of the c.w. Bawa already wrote: “In the
circumstances there has been some disorder, in which Hindus had retaliated, evidently
taken revenge for their sufferings under the Razakars. The situation had settled down by
Oct. 15th when looted property was recovered and returned”.
Luther about Khalidi’s figure: “… seems to be a gross exaggeration.” See: Luther, c.w., p.
300. John Zubrzycki, c.w., p. 197: “…independent reports put the number of Muslims killed
at anywhere between 20.000 and 200.000. Many died in the settling of old scores at the
hands of Hindus, but the Indian Army was also accused of committing atrocities … and
looking the other way while civilian reprisals took place.” See also: Zubaida Yazdani, The
Seventh Nizam: The Fallen Empire, Cambridge, 1985, p. 277.
41
According to the figures of the Election Commission of the Republic of India, the
percentage of Muslims in Hyderabad during the 1950 elections was 11.8 %. It is known that
this figure in 1948 was about 15%. What happened to the disappeared 3, 2 %, comparing
to about half a million people? 200.000 Emigrated to Pakistan and elsewhere, so some
hundreds of thousands are still missing? See: Omar Khalidi, c.w., p. 133.
17
the Governor of Hyderabad. This function was nothing more than a
figurehead. In 1956 the State of Hyderabad was broken up along linguistic
lines. The Telugu-speaking people formed the new State of Andra Pradesh.
Among them the Urdu-speaking Muslims now became a smaller minority
than ever before. Nehru offered the Nizam the post of Governor of the new
State, but he refused. He died in 1967.
Back to the former Hyderabad State and its inhabitants. What did the
radical change in government mean for the citizens, particularly the
Muslims? What were to them the consequences of the military takeover?
42
See: Rashiduddin Khan, Major aspects of Muslim Problem in Hyderabad, in: Omar Khalidi,
c.w., pp. 150 – 158.
43
The demobilization of the Razakars caused severe problems. A lot of them were taken
into prison and India refused to consider them as Prisoners Of War who have certain rights
according to International Conventions. So the International Committee of the Red Cross
had considerable problems to try to protect them from treatment as “ordinary” criminals.
44
Especially the youth and the intellectuals, who could afford it, immigrated to Pakistan. In
the years 1948/49 their total number was app. 200.000. See also: Luther, c.w., p. 301.
45
At the beginning of the twentieth century the socio-economic position of the population
of the Old City was already worsened by the devastating floods of the Musi in 1908, the
plague in 1911 and the shift of the seat of the Nizam to King Kothi on the left bank of the
river.
18
unemployed group. But there was more. Their pride was broken; they felt
humiliated. They lived on an island surrounded by a hostile sea.
About ten years after the fall of the Princely State of Hyderabad, the Indian
Institute of Economics did three surveys. The first one among the rickshaw-
drivers; the second one among the street-beggars and the third one among
the hut-dwellers in Hyderabad. It was found that the proportion of Muslims
to non-Muslims among owner-drivers was 1:9 and among drivers 1:2. The
average income of the Muslim drivers was almost half of that from the
others. The illiteracy-rate under the Muslims seemed to be more than a third
higher than among non-Muslims.46 And finally 30% of the Muslim rickshaw-
drivers had formerly been employees in the Nizam’s estate. The figures
about the street-beggars gave the same image. Among the approximately
5000 beggars, the Muslims contributed 48%, even more than the scheduled
castes. And concerning the dwellers: 53% of them belonged to the
scheduled castes; 25 % from Hindu-low caste and a considerable 21% from
among the Muslims.
A more specific survey was done in Bidar. This town, as Hyderabad, had also
been for far more than 500 years under Muslim rule. Twenty years after the
military operation, 45% of the population of this city were Muslim, but only
19% of them owned land. For Hindus were these figures 83:43. In Bidar
almost 90% of the rickshaw-drivers were Muslims. So, two decades after the
events of 1948, the Muslim population in Bidar was still suffering from the
former feudal economy and carried the burden of the sins of their
forefathers.
In the former Hyderabad State Urdu was the official language and for
decades the medium for education, writers, poets and scientists. But in only
a lifetime this language was relegated to a far lower position. In 1941 56%
of Greater Hyderabad (Hyderabad, Secunderabad and the adjoining areas)
regarded Urdu as their mother-tongue. Twenty years later, in 1961, this
number was reduced to 36%. In the erstwhile Nizam estate the total of
those who considered Urdu as their mother-tongue was, also according to
the census of 1941, 13%. As a consequence of the Police Action, the
massacres and the migration of many Urdu-speaking people, this total
46
In September 2007 the Report of the National Literacy Mission, Status of Adult Literacy
in India, based on the census of 2001, was made public. It showed that the literacy-rate
under Muslims in India as a whole was about 10 % lower, than among non-Muslims in the
age group from 15 – 35 years. (59% vs. 65%). In general the education level of Muslims
was 20 – 40% lower than that of Hindus. Census 2001, published in the Deccan Chronicle,
Oct. 23th 2007, p. 7.
47
See: Ratna Naider, Old Cities, New Predictments, a Study of Hyderabad, New
Delhi/London, 1990, pp. 109 – 116.
19
decreased to nearly half: 7% in 1951. It is significant that Urdu is not “the”
language of the Muslims in India, yet a large number of them considers Urdu
as their mother-tongue.48 The Constitution of India recognizes Urdu as one
of the fourteen national languages, but all the languages have at least one
state of their own. Urdu is the only living language with no (Indian) state of
its own. 49 The weakening of the position of the Urdu-language has more
consequences. Urdu is a language, developed during the Moghul Empire,
which has its basis in Sanskrit en Hindi with Arabic, Persian and Turkic
influences. The script is a modification of the Perso-Arabic, which is a
derivative from the Arabic alphabet, so the language is in that aspect akin
to Arabic. The non-use of Urdu leads to ignorance of the script, resulting in
difficulty in reading the Quran.
In the period from 1948 – 1957 the Muslims had no political collective
representation at a higher level. There were Muslim-representatives from
the former Hyderabad State, but they belonged to other, secular parties,
such as the Congress Party and The Communist Party of India. In 1957 the
Majlis-i-Ittihad al-Muslimin Party was activated again. The Majlis contested
the first elections to the Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad in 1960. They
gained 18 out of 30 obtainable seats.50 This result led the Government of
the State to merge the seats of the Corporation of Secunderabad with those
of Hyderabad, which had the effect of reducing the strength of the Majlis in
the larger Council.51 In 1961 the Majlis transformed themselves into a party
at National level. According to their election-manifesto of October 1961 they
were in favor of : “Securing the Urdu language; proportional representation
of Muslims and high post for Muslims in Defense and Police”. The Majlis
were petitioning the Central Government in 1967 for a purely Muslim State
on India’s Eastern Coast. In 1986 they did very well in the elections for the
Greater Hyderabad Corporation and gained 38 seats out of 100.52 In the
period 1984 – 2004 the Party obtained one seat in the Lok Sabha, the Indian
Lower House.53
48
About half of the Muslims have Urdu as their mother tongue.
49
The official language of Jammu and Kashmir is Urdu, but this language is hardly spoken
in the Indian part of this region. The common language there is Kashmiri.
50
The total number of representatives of the Hyderabad Corporation was 64.
51
From 18 out of 30 counselors, to 18 out of 64.
52
P.R. Rajgopol, Community Violence in India, New Delhi, 1987.
53
That compares with over half a million voters.
20
opportunities.54 Around that time Hyderabad City had got all the elements
and marks of a classic ghetto. According to the 1981 Census, the population
existed of 63% Muslims and 34% Hindus. This majority of the Muslims in the
Old City worked, shopped and had schools for their children there, so one
could speak of a socially segregated group. A group, living in a densely
populated environment, narrowly spaced and with a poor level of civic
institutions and infrastructure.55 The erstwhile proud Capital of the
Hyderabad State was ramshackle. Drainage, sewerage and roads were laid
down during Nizam’s Rule. And despite some efforts to improve the
situation, sixty years later there were still too often water shortages,
malfunctioning of drains and frequent traffic bottle-necks, due to increase of
the population on one hand and the stagnation of development on the
other.56
How about the situation of the Muslims in India as a whole? In March 2005 a
High Level Committee under the leadership of Justice Rajendra Sachar was
appointed by the Prime Minister of India to study the Social, Economic and
Educational Status of Muslims in India. The Committee submitted its findings
in December 2006. The results shocked the nation.
- Only 3,4% of the Muslim population has completed graduation whereas the
corresponding figure for “Other Backward Castes, Scheduled Castes and
Tribes” - Hindus is 15,3%.
- Only 59,1% of the Muslim community is literate. The literacy level for
“Scheduled Castes and Tribes” is 65,1 %.
- Muslims have a Head Count Ratio, an incidence for poverty, of 31% against
35% of the “Scheduled Castes-Tribes”.
- Out of the total 543 Lok Sabha members, only 33 are Muslim. 57
54
N.N., The Historic Growth of Hyderabad, University of Hyderabad, 1990 (?), p. 146.
Anonymous dissertation registered as 954.84 HMI 1293 G in the library of the HMI in
Hyderabad. The number and intensity of the processions have increased. It leads to a
procession-race between the two communities.
55
N.N., c.w.
56
N.N., c.w., p. 161.
57
For the full text of the Report see: http//signal.nationalinterest.in/archives/Admin/35,
November 2007.
21
The Report has highlighted the fact that India has failed to ensure
participation in the governance for the largest minority group and is
therefore co-responsible for the negative consequences of it.58
Back to the Old City of Hyderabad. Has any Communal Violence occurred
since 1948? And if so, what triggered it; what was the toll in lives and
possessions? In the next chapter I give an overview from 1948 until the
autumn of 2007.
Throughout the 1950’s and 1960’s anti-Muslim riots were localized and
minor episodes of violence’s occurred. But in the seventies and the nineties
the number of violent riots and its victims increased.
In Sept. 1978 riots broke out after a group started throwing stones at a
Ganesh-procession consisting of about 2000 people.59 In November heavy
riots paralyzed the Old City for fifty days. A Hindu temple in Charminar, in
the heart of the Old City, was desecrated on Friday, 25th Nov. The temple
was named after the Hindu-woman, who gave Hyderabad its first name,
Bhagyavathi. The riots started because the Majlis Party called for a protest
against the takeover of the Ka'aba in Mecca by Muslim sectarians. Hindu
shops were looted and set on fire.60 Kakar gives a different explanation.
According to him the riots were triggered by the rape of a Muslim woman
and the killing of her husband in a police station. In the beginning the rioting
58
But not the Indian State alone is responsible for the situation. The still existing three-
caste system (upper layer Ashrafs; middle layer Ajlafs and on the bottom the Arzals)
among Muslims hinders a steady economic development of a large part of their
community. See also A.A. Engineer in: Monique Mekenkamp, c.w., p. 338. And some blame
also the Muslim clergy and the Muslim politicians. “The Muslim politicians are too ready to
raise emotional identity-related issues not keen on socio-economic issues of the
community. The … Ulema focus on identity-related issues and not on socio-economic
issues.” See: V. Edwin, Ethics of dialogue in relationship with Muslims in India, in: Salaam,
Quarterly to Promote Understanding of the Islamic Studies Association, Vol. 28, No. 3, New
Delhi, July 2007, p. 131.
59
B. Rajeshwari, Communal Riots in India, A Chronology (1947 – 2003), IPCS Research
Papers, New Delhi, March 2004.
60
S.K. Ghosh, Communal riots in India, meet the challenge united, New Delhi, 1987, p. 119
and R.N.P. Singh, Riots and Wrongs, Islam and religious riots, New Delhi, 2004, p. 257.
22
was against the police but soon the two communities stood against each
other. The incident, responsible for that, was the beating up of a Muslim boy
by some Hindus. The riots were centered around the vegetable market. This
market had been dominated by Hindu-traders since the forced integration of
Hyderabad into the Indian Union and the Muslims wanted to regain control.61
In July 1981 communal riots took place. They were carried out by music
played in front of a mosque during a procession. There were already
growing tensions because of the municipal elections in that month. Although
elections were postponed, the unrest was very serious. More than forty
people were killed and more than 300 injured during the rioting.63 The
communal riots of 1983 began on September 9th. That was at the beginning
of the Ganesh-festival from 10 – 14 September. That festival did not exist in
the city of Hyderabad until 1979 when the then governing Prime Minister of
Andra Pradesh Chenna Reddy, a Hindu-nationalist, introduced it as a part of
his Telugu Revival Movement. So the festival became an occasion for anti-
Muslim speeches and behavior. And very often the Ganesh-festival triggered
communal unrest in the city. In 1983 there was already a lot of tension in
the city, because of a quarrel about the use of a mosque on the premises of
a factory. On that day, 2 September, a Hindu-temple in Charminar was
desecrated. So, after the Friday-prayers a crowd of 15.000 Muslims started
a confrontation with Hindus. The following day the Ganesh festivities started
and coincidently also an India – Pakistan cricket test match. Till Sept 23th
the mutual killings, mostly by stabbing, went on. During this time a curfew
was proclaimed.64
In 1984 the trouble started on July 22th when a procession of Kali, a Hindu
Goddess, was stoned while passing a Muslim area. Retaliation followed. The
next day a large procession of Kali-worshippers was attacked, shops were
looted and vehicles set on fire. Police came in and opened fire. A curfew was
proclaimed and put the City on hold. During the Ganesh-festival, later that
year, the riots started again. The procession was attacked, shops looted,
people stabbed etc. Again a curfew was proclaimed. The Army moved into
the City on 9 September.65
61
S. Kakar, The Colours of Violence, New Delhi, 1995, p. 60.
62
R.N.P. Singh, c w., p. 259. Singh too reports about this incident in the framework of his
description of the 1983-riots. From the year of that “Rameeza Bi” incident, 1978, almost
every year communal clashes kept rocking the city. See: R.N.P. Singh, c.w., pp. 264 – 205.
See also: Kakar, c.w., p. 160. About the role of the wrestling-clubs in the Hyderabad-riots
from Hindu as well as from Muslim side, see: S. Kakar, c.w., Chapter 3 “The Warriors”, pp.
66 – 111. Wrestling in the Indian, and more specific in the erstwhile princely states as
Hyderabad, tradition is not just a sport, but a whole way of life with changing political
coordinates. Citing Joseph Alter on p. 105: “Wrestling as a meeting of muscles and morals.”
63
R.N.P. Singh, c.w., 261-2. Singh reports here an important role of criminals in boosting
the fighting.
64
S. K. Ghosh, c.w., pp. 120 – 122. See also: R.N.P. Singh, pp. 264 – 265.
65
S.K. Ghosh, c.w., p. 123 and R.N.P. Singh, c.w., p. 270. The role of the religious festivals
as triggering the clashes brought Ghosh to the following suggestion: “… a ban of all festive
23
In 1985 there were communal clashes in March during the Assembly
elections.66
The entire year 1986 witnessed small communal skirmishes, but no major
violence.67
In June 1989 a pamphlet with an image of Ganesh trampling over Mecca and
Medina, was spread in the city. One temple and four mosques were
attacked. On June 5th and 6th clashes broke out. Eight people were killed and
over a hundred wounded.
On 5th July 2003 there was a dispute over the payment of a cup of tea and
communal riots broke out. One person was killed and a lot of vehicles were
set on fire. At the beginning of November some people tried to stop a truck
loaded with cattle. A large mob rioted and a number of vehicles were set on
fire.77 Clashes between Sikhs and Muslims broke out after a rumor that a
Muslim boy damaged a Sikh-gurdwara (sacred place) on Dec. 5th 2003.
Retaliation followed and one person was killed and several wounded. On
Dec. 6th the Muslims were celebrating the demolition of the Babri Mosque on
that day in 1992. Wide-scale riots broke out. Police came in and opened fire
on protesters. At least five people were killed and many more wounded.
There was looting of shops and arson.78
In 2006, on Feb. 11th and 24th, there were some small riots in Charminar and
other places.80
On May 18th 2007 there was a bomb blast near the Mecca Mosque in the Old
City. About six people were killed. Riots broke out and police tried to restore
peace. Additionally between two and seven people were killed by the
police.81 Immediately after the blast Bangladeshi Muslim extremists were
held responsible for the blast. Some arrests were made and some
confessions were made.82
74
The PM was dismissed indeed. The structure of the violence and the more specific role of
BJP and Congress, are also acknowledged by A. D’Souza, Director of the HMI and an active
observer of the 1990-riots in an interview on October 25, 2007 with the writer. But still
there is the question of the cause of the sudden first large outbreak of violence in the
evening of Dec. 8th, when within two hours about 40 Hindus were slaughtered. That was
not in the interests of the Majlis. Planned provocation by BJP and/or Congress?
75
J. Alam, c.w., p. 80.
76
Times of India, July 17th 2002.
77
Times of India, June 6th 2003.
78
A.A. Engineer, Annual Report of Communal Violence 2003,
www.countercurrents.org/comm-engineer, October 2007.
79
Times of India, April 17th 2005.
80
A.A. Engineer, Annual Report on Communal Violence 2006.
81
Most sources recount two persons, killed by the police. Officials of the Majlis numbered
seven.
82
The Andra Pradesh State Minorities Commission accused the Police for illegally detaining
and torture of the suspects of the bomb blasts. See: Deccan Chronicle, Oct. 20th 2007.
25
On August 25th 2007, two bombs exploded nearly simultaneously, one in a
crowded park and the other in a cinema. More than forty people were killed
and more than fifty injured. Despite the tension, there were no communal
riots after the bomb blasts. Some Bangladeshi citizens, Muslim-
fundamentalists, were arrested by the Police. They confessed. No
Communal Violence occurred. The hope that there was a more lasting peace
grew on all sides. Maybe a repetition of history could be avoided.
What were the causes of all this Communal Violence during these years?
Are there explanations? If so, which? And which can be seen as possible
solutions? In the next section I try to answer that question.
In the first place the (large) group of those, who see economical factors as
the most important cause (and solution) for communal violence. In their
view only a far-reaching improvement of the economic circumstances of the
groups involved i.e. the Muslim minorities, could lead to a reliable base to
prevent future riots. Some of this group consider politics, the politicians and
their leaders as the main cause. They think that earlier and current party
politics, often fed by personal interests, need the violence to gain more
26
power and the solution is to change these politics and their representatives
to make economic improvement possible. Others see the development of
the economy as more or less separate from politics. They interpret the
economic as the major factor causing Communal Violence and they see the
solution of the problem in that field. For those reasons I take these two
opinions together in the economic-political approach. The second, also large
group consists of people who think that particular cultural elements are the
pushing factors behind this form of violence. Sometimes promoted by
fundamentalist politicians and their parties. These politics and politicians I
take also in the cultural approach. In this connection religion has to be seen
as a (large) part of the culture. The third group consists of psychologists,
who hold the prevailing personal and group’s mentality responsible for the
communal riots. The last group is of those who are more instrumental. For
them the questions into the causes are not the most important, but the way
how to deal with Communal Violence.
Subsequently I shall highlight these four groups or approaches one after the
other. In doing so we can distinguish these approaches from each other but
in general they are often closely linked and mixed with each other, as we
shall see.
3.3.1. Economic-political.
The most well-known present scholar in this field is A.A. Engineer, the
founder and long- time Director of the Institute of Islam Studies in Mumbai.
He says that Communalism is a very complex phenomenon. It cannot be
located only in the present social and economic context. It has its historical
antecedents both medieval as well as modern.83 You have to look to the
motives of the medieval rulers rather than at their behavior. Not all, maybe
not even the majority, of those opposing Muslim rule, were freedom
fighters. A lot of them wanted only to gain (more) power. And not all, maybe
not the majority of the Muslim rulers destroyed Hindu-temples. In their wars
they also destroyed the enemy’s mosques. The motives of the Muslims
plundering India in the High Middle ages were not (only) religious, fighting
the Hindus and their idolatry, but (also) the possession of gold and other
prosperous goods.84Not all Hindus were tolerant and not all Muslims
fanatical. Neither the Hindu-period nor the time of Muslim supremacy was
India’s Golden Age. Throughout the ages rulers of different faiths have
fought with each other in different coalitions, depending on the existing or
desired balance of power. Nowadays communalism is a product of the
British period. The British followed the “Divide and Rule Policy” and thus
created rifts between the Hindus and the Muslims. The British colonial policy
replaced feudal policy and economy. The feudal policy was wielded by the
83
A.A. Engineer, Communalism in India, a historical and empirical study, New Delhi, 1996,
p. iv.
84
A.A. Engineer, c.w., pp. 5 – 7.
27
sword; the democratic power through competitive ballot boxes. Feudal
economy was not-competitive, unlike the capitalist’s market economy. The
British introduced highly controlled doses of democratization which created
a sense of competition between the two communities. And a struggle
between the old interests and the new ones was born. The shape of this
struggle was decided by the prevalent political, social and economic
structures. “In Europe, the industrial revolution triggered off class struggle
as the people shared the same religion and the language too”.85 But in India,
with all its varieties of religion and language,86 the changes could not
assume the form of class struggle, instead they became communal.
Partition in 1947 could not solve this problem and so the riots went on even
after Independence with extremists on both sides gaining power. Now, after
Independence, the British “Divide and Rule” policy is no longer an adequate
explanation for the present riots.
There is the role of the police, paramilitary forces and the Army. Too often
they are anti-Muslim and act so during the riots. The effect is that the riots
85
A.A. Engineer, c.w., p. 47.
86
Note, that Engineer does not mention culture as an aspect.
87
A.A. Engineer, c.w., pp. x – xxi.
88
A.A. Engineer, Religious Conflict, A Brief Survey of the Hindu – Muslim Problem in:
Monique Mekenkamp, c.w., p. 336. For a review of the role of the political Hindu-
fundamentalists see: Monique Mekenkamp, c.w., pp. 340 – 343.
89
A.A. Engineer, c.w., p. 25.
90
A.A. Engineer, c.w., p. 25. It has to be noticed here, that Engineer shows a limited view of
religion. Religion has not only an essential transcendental aspect, but also an immanent
one. Engineer’s view on religion and his strict division of “religious” and “worldly” matters
is crucial for his work. It is in fact the basis of his historical-materialistic approach.
91
A.A. Engineer, c.w., p. 46.
92
A.A. Engineer, c.w., pp. 108 – 109.
93
A.A. Engineer, c.w., pp. 118 – 120.
28
become worse instead of being stopped by the police and military action.94
Politics has a lot of influence in preventing and stopping communal riots.
Sometimes governments could have stopped riots, but they did not.
Sometimes governments paved the way for communal violence, sowing
discord among the people in the hope of gaining more support, to get more
votes.95
P.R. Rajgopal, a scholar of the Centre for Political Research in New Delhi,
sees material circumstances as the principal cause for the existing
communal violence in India. To him it is a lack of work, lack of decent
housing and other civic amenities that causes the anger leading to riots. 100
So, in principle he belongs to this category. But he sees a lot of secondary
factors making the riots possible. And his main discourse is to meet these
secondary causes. In this way he is an instrumentalist. These factors have a
94
A.A. Engineer, c.w., p. 142. See also: Vibhuti Narain Raj, Communal Conflicts: Perception
of Police Neutrality during Hind-Muslim Riots in India, New Delhi, 1998. This book is based
on interviews with Muslims and Hindus involved in riots. In general Hindus tend to see the
Police as their friends, while Muslims look upon them as their enemies. According to Narain
Raj is such a perception rooted in the actual behavior of the Police. And what about the
decisiveness of the judicial authorities? On October 24th2007 a Judge in Kanpur sentenced
fifteen persons (Muslims?) to life imprisonment. They were accused of burning nine
persons -an entire family- alive during the communal riots after the demolition of the Babri
Mosque in December 1992. The judgment was fifteen years later. The Hindu, Oct. 25th
2007.
95
A.A. Engineer, c.w., p. 375. In this aspect the Left Parties seem to be more effective
preventing communal violence. In the often left or centre-left ruled States of West Bengal,
Kerala and Tamil Nadu there were no serious communal clashes in recent decades. See
also: Paul. R. Brass, The production of Hindu – Muslim violence in contemporary India, New
Delhi, 2003, p. 374. This book is mainly a case-study on the Aligarh-riots in 1990-91.
96
A.Kumar, Communal Riots in India, Social and Economic Aspects, New Delhi, 1991, p. viii.
97
A. Kumar, c.w., p 6.
98
A. Kumar, c.w. pp. 130 -132.
99
A. Kumar, c.w., p. 90. However, he does not give convincing arguments. It is thinkable
that the historical and the instrumental approaches complete each other instead of being
contradictory. In general is Kumar’s work more an ideological discourse and less an
empirical study. In that aspect Engineer’s work offers more.
100
P.R. Rajgopal, c.w., p. 22.
29
political and a cultural nature. The two meet each other in the recent revival
of political Hindutva and Islamism. 101 But also foreign influence is important.
Rajgopal states that a lot of money flows in from the Gulf States and that
many Pakistan and Bangladesh illegals are a constant threat to public
security.102 A major political factor is the behavior of political parties and
their leaders. According to Rajgopal, the political practice of recent decades
in Kerala is a bad one. The ruling political parties are in line with the
different religious groups. Due to the specific composition of the population
of Kerala (58% Hindus, 21% Muslims and also 21% Christians) 103 the State
has to be ruled by a coalition of different political parties. That has been for
a relatively long period and during that time there were hardly any
communal riots. So, the politics of Kerala seems very fruitful and could be
copied by other States. But that is only how it appears from outside; the
reality is, quite different. In fact the (religious) political parties in Kerala
maintain a kind of “Divide and Rule” policy in which certain departments are
the terrain of certain religions. As long as they can maintain this balance of
power, there is no space for communal violence on a wider scale. But as
soon as this balance is disrupted by for instance the upcoming Hindu-
nationalists, peace has gone. Kerala’s solution is therefore not
sustainable.104 Other secondary causes are the continuing call from Muslims
for the introduction of Muslim personal Law (Shariah) 105; the lower
educational profile of Muslims106; the Muslim share in state-employment107
and Muslims and elections.108 Rajgopal has no trust in the work of
Commissions of Inquiry. These Commissions are usually installed after the
riots. Their judgments, conclusions and recommendations depend on what
material is presented to them and that material is often manipulated, wrong
or, at least, suspicious. As in any fighting truth is the first victim. And in the
few cases where there were firm and clear conclusions and
recommendations, they were ignored in the post-riot confusion.
3.3.2. Cultural.
101
P.R. Rajgopal, c.w., pp. 24 – 30.
102
P.R. Rajgopal, c.w., pp. 31 – 34.
103
Census 1981.
104
R.P. Rajgopal, c.w., pp. 36 – 46. Rajgopal does in this aspect not agree with Paul R.
Brass, c.w., p. 374.
105
R.P. Rajgopal, c.w., pp. 53 – 58.
106
R.P. Rajgopal, c.w., pp. 58 – 63. The figures of the level of higher education in New Delhi
show a negative score with regard to the Hindus of about 50%.
107
R.P. Rajgopal, c.w., pp. 63 – 69. An underrepresentation of sometimes more than 50%. It
seems that Andra Pradesh is an exception. According to the Deccan Chronicle of Oct.10th
2007, the percentage of Muslims in State-employment was 9, 26 against the percentage of
population 9, 2. This figures are from the Census 2001. The figures were given as a part of
the then running debate about the need of some kind of legal affirmative action for
Muslims.
108
R.P. Rajgopal, c.w., pp. 69 – 74. Rajgopal’s opinion is that Muslims have to align with
different political parties with a view to be able a role of pressure group within the party.
30
An outspoken representative of this group is R.N.P. Singh, a former senior
Intelligence-officer for the Government of India.109 According to him, the
problem is a Muslim problem. The main reason behind the communal
problems in India is the dilemma confronting the major sections of Muslims
to choose between the secular democratic way and the hard line tenets of
Islam, which declare that “Allah is the only God, Mohammed is the only
leader, Quran is the only constitution and jihad is the only path”.110 Indians
have been living a miserable life since the day in 711 AD when Muhammed-
bin-Quasim invaded Sindh (India). Aurangzeb was the worst and he is
considered by the Muslim community as the purest practitioner of Islam. 111
Communal violence started already in 1713 in Ahmedabad. Pakistan and
other Arab countries are now engineering the communal riots on a large
scale. With the help of foreign money mosques are built or restored,
converts paid and fundamentalist organizations supported.112 In ninety
percent of the cases, it was the religious reason that ignited the communal
conflicts. All the other oft mentioned reasons as: weak Law and Order,
Partisan (anti-Muslim) attitude of the police, class struggle, political and
economic factors, assertation of communal Identity, and the British “Divide
and Rule”-policy are one-sided. They are not realistic, because in the first
place the Muslims are responsible for the problems. 113 Because of their
behavior riots follow mostly the same process. Starting with an initial clash
it comes to a situation of insecurity. That causes immigration and ghetto-
isation. A result is alienation between the different groups and
fundamentalism grows. Then there is provocation, revenge and the next riot
is there. It is a vicious circle which can only be broken by the Muslims.114
3.3.3. Psychological.
Sudhar Kakar is a psychologist and the most prominent representative of
this group. He tries to understand why the riots of 1990 in Hyderabad
occurred. Looking at the Muslim community in the Old City of Hyderabad he
describes: “Deprived of economic opportunities with the dismantling of the
feudal structure and deprived by its elite … the Walled City as an area
languishes in multiple deprivation”. 119 And this deprivation is not only
material but also psychological and cultural. The sudden fall of Muslim
power and superiority in 1948 caused a mourning of the kind that is called
“The Andalus Syndrome”. This refers to the end of the great Muslim
civilization on the Iberia-peninsula after almost a thousand years at the end
of the 16th Century. Kakar examines both individuals and groups involved in
the riots. He researches their reasons, morality and memories in an attempt
to register all the human motives which led to their behavior before, during
and after the riots. He has to do so, because if you only look to the
individuals as “instigators” of communal violence, the fact that there are
“instigees” too is neglected.120 In communities, especially in the cities,
where a minority lives amidst a majority, the different groups are
considered by Muslims as well as Hindus as groups with a specific cultural
identity. This identity becomes more conscious if there is more threat to its
integrity. Regarding the involved groups, there is the “in-group” and the
rival one, that is the “out-group” The reasons why Muslims are the hated
“out-group” by the Hindus have not only to do with the sheer size of the
Muslim minority, but also with certain social-psychological axioms on
scapegoating and displacement of aggression. A source of an “out-group”
being a target for aggression is the frustration for its own right. An “out-
group” with the most disparaging images of the “in-group” will be the most
hated. Also the “out-group” which is seen as the most ethnocentric, will be
the most hated. 121 In Kakar’s view, communalism is in the first place a state
of mind. It is the individual’s assertion of being a part of a religious
117
J. Narayan, c.w., pp. 187-8.
118
J. Narayan, c.w., p. 191. Here he is quoting A.A. Engineer, c.w., edition 1989, p.31.
119
S. Kakar, c.w., p. 12.
120
S. Kakar, c.w., p. 193.
121
S. Kakar, c.w., p. 192 - 193.
32
community, preceded by a full awareness of belonging to such a
community. This “we-are” must inevitably lead to intolerance to all those
outside the boundaries of the group. Then the psychological ground for
violence has been prepared. For the outbreak of violence, the communal
identity has to swamp personal identity in a large number of people,
reviving feelings of love and identification with one’s own group members
and hatred towards the “out-group”. Amplified by rumors, religious
demagogues and threats by the rival community, only the slightest of
sparks is needed for a violent explosion.122
For the future, Kakar sees more than one scenario for the likely evolution of
Muslim-Hindu relationships.123 The Hindu-nationalist believe that the only
way of avoiding future large-scale violence is a change in the Muslim view of
the community’s role, traditions and institutions, so that the Muslim can
adapt to the Hindu majority “national” culture.124
3.3.4. Instrumental.
122
S. Kakar, c.w., p. 246.
123
S. Kakar, c.w., pp. 252 – 253.
124
In my summary I have placed this approach under the category of the Culturists,
because they are culture-centered.
125
This group I placed under the economic-political approach.
33
According to the instrumentalists, the question of the causes of communal
unrest is not the first one which needs to be answered, but the question
how to deal with it. A modern representative of this group is Paul R. Brass, a
former Professor of Political Science at the University of Washington. Brass
is clear in his position: “The primary focus of this book is on how communal
riots happen, rather than on why they happen”. 126 So, for Brass the
question “what causes riots?” is not the appropriate one. To him it has been
proven that it is difficult to answer that question and it is more practical and
functional to question “What, how, and where?” The historical analysis of
Hindu – Muslim conflicts, its causes and preconditions, are highly
contentious in character. The historians of India do not even agree on
whether or not this violence existed before the nineteenth century. For an
instrumentalist such as Brass is, that does not matter, because the
consolidation and politicization of the differences between Muslims and
Hindus are a modern phenomenon.127 Analyzing the Aligarh-riots of 1990-91,
he sees an important role for police and other armed forces, the press and
the local and regional governments. Because they all failed was one of the
major reasons that the riots became aggravated. 128 A major player at the
eve of and during these riots was also the inter-competition of some political
parties before and during election time.
126
Paul R. Brass, The production of Hindu-Muslim Violence in Contemporary India, New
Delhi, 2003, p. 16.
127
Paul R. Brass, c.w., p.25.
128
Paul R. Brass, c.w. pp. 345 – 351: the press’ role during the riots was, in general,
spreading rumors and so exacerbating tension between the two communities.
129
S.K. Ghosh, c.w., p. xi.
130
S.K. Ghosh, c.w., p. 24.
131
S.K. Ghosh, c.w., pp. 31 – 32.
34
various communities. Better living conditions should be provided for the
Muslims.132
But first back to the Old City of Hyderabad. How can we interpret the
present situation? What lessons can be learned?
The Nizam’s game was over and the Muslim minority fell from heaven to
hell. In the autumn of 1948 the days of reckoning came. Thousands and
thousands of rural Muslims were killed or driven to death. The survivors
tried to seek refuge in the cities under the custody of the Indian troops.
In the years after the Fall of Hyderabad State the former government was
totally dismantled and the Muslims were particularly the victims of that.
They lost their jobs, their positions, their incomes and they lost their pride.
And the spiral went downward: lower income, less housing, less education,
fewer jobs, lower income and so on. And so the general position of the
former ruling class worsened from year to year. And also as a result of the
upcoming Hindu-fundamentalism there was no real and effective political
power to stop that process.
We must also consider the situation on the eve of the first large-scale
communal riots in Hyderabad in the late seventies: economically poor,
educationally low, politically isolated, culturally depressed and marginalized.
In a psychological respect they were humiliated, frustrated and feeling
victimized. This was a very fertile soil for raising unrest and violence. The
usual existing systems of checks and balances did not work. The Police and
(Para) military Forces were seen to be partisan and behaved often in that
way. The political management of City and State was incompetent and/or
unwilling to deal with the problems. The polarization caused by the rise of
Hindu-fundamentalism held the authorities in a stalemate. Every
(affirmative) action in favor of the suffering Muslim-minority could lead to
the loss of their political basis among the Hindu-majority. All these aspects;
historical, economical, sociological, cultural, political and psychological, led
to a greater or lesser extent to the violence, starting in the late-seventies
36
and continuing up to today. But there is hope. The level of violence has
declined in the past decade. The Majlis are losing power and a lot of
community-based programs were started in the Old City, especially after the
cruel riots of 1990. In all these projects the fight began against poverty and
unemployment, segregation and ghettoizing, isolation and hopelessness. In
the last part of this essay I highlight the role of the Henry Martyn Institute,
International Centre for Research, Interfaith Relations and Reconciliation in
this field of Community Projects.
133
See: S. Kakar, c.w., p. 195.
37
some kinds of communal unrest in several European countries. A good
example is the riots in the autumn of 2005 in a large number of French
suburbs. Thousands of mostly North-African youths, mostly Muslims,
rebelled, rampaged for several months destroying cars and public facilities,
fighting with the riot-police. The authorities reacted in a confused way: how
could it happen; what were the causes? And already very soon there was a
general feeling that in particular the material circumstances of these young
people, their unemployment, their bad housing conditions and their poverty,
caused the riots. And so new policies were set up. Mostly they provide plans
to improve the material circumstances in the suburbs. But that is only a
(major) part of the problem and thus a part solution. As we saw in the
Hyderabad-case that there are also major historical, cultural and
psychological causes of Communal Violence. They have to be taken into
consideration to ensure a fruitful approach. It is my conviction that only a
coordinated, comprehensive and coherence approach can contribute to a
really sustainable solution. Because it is an illusion to think that the
improvement of the residential areas alone can prevent prospective
communal violence. A mistake, often made by leftist politicians with their
historic-material paradigm. A human being needs more than bread to live.
He also needs dignity, recognition, justice and safety. Only a combined
approach has the full scale of possibilities. In Hyderabad but also in the
West-European context.
What did the occurrence of Communal Violence in the Old City of Hyderabad
mean for the Henry Martyn Institute there? What is the history of that
Institute and how did it react to the violent events? Were there any changes
in the underlying theological thoughts? These and other questions I deal
with in the next chapter.
38
in Persian and Arabic. He died on Oct. 16th 1812, only thirty-one years of
age.134
The NCCI indicated three basic functions for the new school:
- Staff study and research of Islam with special reference to the Indian
context;
- Teaching and training of those who would be sent for Christian work
among Muslims.
In the seventies of the last century the word “dialogue” became more and
more important. It was the second turning point in the history of the HMI,
because it represented a shift: from confrontation to conservation. It
recognizes the worth and integrity of other people who find their identity
and values in cultural terms and patterns that differ from our own. 136 This
developed to a change in the official purpose of the HMI. For the coming two
decades the task of the HMI was to assist the Church and other Institutions
to realize and fulfill their evangelistic obligation to Muslims by fostering an
adequate and sympathetic understanding of Islam. So, the final purpose was
still within the framework of the Christian missionary activities among the
Muslims of India.137 But a turning point was due. The opportunity of the 50 th
134
Clinton Bennett, In Dialogue With Truth: a Critical Biography of Henry Martyn, in: The
Bulletin of Henry Martyn Institute of Islamic Studies, volume 16, nos. 1 and 2, Hyderabad,
January – June 1997, pp. 46 – 85.
135
David T. Lindell, The Henry Martyn Institute of Islamic Studies, in: The Bulletin of
Christian Institutes of Islamic Studies, volume III, no. 1- 4, Hyderabad, Jan. – Dec. 1980, pp.
133 – 141.
136
D.T. Lindell, c.w., p. 140. Note that the word “religion” is not (yet) mentioned.
137
Diana D’Souza, in: Evangelism, Dialogue, Reconciliation: The Transformative Journey of
the Henry Martyn Institute, Hyderabad, 1998, pp. 18 - 19.
39
Anniversary of the HMI was used by its Board to install a Committee to deal
with the future of the HMI. One of the main suggestions of this Committee
was to introduce the notion of “reconciliation” in the work of the HMI. The
background of this advice was the riots between Muslims and Hindus in the
Old City of Hyderabad in the previous period. How could you live and work in
such an environment as a Christian Institute without getting involved in
those communal clashes and its consequences? But such an engagement
was not credible if the duty to missionary still remained. The Board of the
HMI adopted the recommendations but the implementing of it took a lot of
time.138 A further landmark in the development of HMI was set during a
three-day seminar on Communal Harmony, organized by HMI, in 1986 in
Orissa. At the end of the meeting a plan of action was adopted. One of the
recommendations was: “A centre for promotion of interreligious
cooperation, communal harmony and national integration should be set up
in the twin-cities”.139 But –again- the time was not yet ripe. A new approach
was made at the end of the eighties. A new Director was appointed and the
issue of a new strategy was raised again. On the occasion of the Three
Annual Consultation and Planning Meetings of HMI in November 1990 a new
draft for a change in strategy was discussed and adopted.140 This meant for
the work of the HMI a change of paradigm. No longer was mission the
(indirect) task of HMI, but the work on reconciliation.141 The new Constitution
defined the main objectives as:
• To function as an expression of the Church’s ministry of reconciliation
and to focus on the relationship between Christians and people of
other faiths.
• To help the churches to fulfill their unique roles as peacemaking
communities in the midst of religious and communal
misunderstanding and suspicion, to engage in sharing the good news
of Jesus Christ and to work together in the wider context of India and
the world.
• To move with patience and integrity towards a deeper and more
138
Although the Board agreed with the Committee’s proposals for a change in HMI’s policy,
the Management could not come to concrete steps because of internal disputes. This was
confirmed by the present director Andreas D’Souza during an interview in October 2007.
Diana D’Souza, c.w., p. 24, wrote that “the matter was forgotten” from October 1982 till
October 1986, when the Board decided to take these concrete steps.
139
The Bulletin of Christian Institute of Islamic Studies, volume IV, no. 3, Hyderabad, July –
Sept. 1986, p. 132.
140
During November 1990 there was a lot of unrest in the city. Communal clashes came up
and people were killed. During those days the Staff of HMI was already active in the
process of peacekeeping. Together with other religious leaders the HMI-director formed an
“Aman Shanti Forum” whose main purpose was to work for peace. Peace marches etc.
were organized. Despite of all these efforts the cruel riots of December 6th and later
occurred. During and after the riots the HMI was active in the distribution of food and other
necessities in the curfewed Old City and the care for the wounded in the hospitals. The
change of the strategy of HMI came at a crucial moment in the recent history of the city of
Hyderabad. As said by Director D’Souza during an interview on Oct 25th 2007 with the
writer, the November 1990 – decision was prophetic.
141
An overview of HMI’s developments, especially from the beginning to the early nineties,
is given by Diana D’Souza, c.w.
40
faithful understanding among people of all faiths in ways which will
remove traditional barriers and open up opportunities to live and
work together in the wider context of India and the world.
• To encourage among all people a deeper understanding of Islam and other
religions through dialogue and study and to find ways in which they can work
together in addressing common concerns.
There was also a change in the name from the former Henry Martyn
Institute of Islamic Studies to Henry Martyn Institute: International
Center for Research, Interfaith Relations and Reconciliation.
142
Genesis 33, 4 – 14.
143
Genesis 45, 1 – 15. See: Israel Selvanayagam, Galed versus Peniel: True Reconciliation
in the Esau – Jacob/Israel Story, in: Kirsteen Kim (ed.), Reconciling Mission, The Ministry of
Healing and Reconciliation in the Church Worldwide, New Delhi, 2005, pp. 1 - 23.
41
HMI’s travel from dialogue to reconciliation was not so astonishing, because
these two terms are often closely associated, not least because so often in
history the followers of different religions have caused offence or even
engaged in conflict with one another. The difference is that, while dialogue
does not necessary take place in a context of offence or conflict, it may be a
path leading to reconciliation. While reconciliation is seen as both a goal and
a process, dialogue is an important part of that process. Dialogue can be
described as a means of resolving differences but this is not always the aim
and certainly not often the outcome in interreligious dialogue. Dialogue, like
reconciliation, is both a spirituality and a strategy where communication
takes place but the outcomes are open ended. The outcome of interreligious
dialogue that is hoped for is that people of different faiths can live alongside
one another, certainly without violence and in an atmosphere of mutual
respect and cooperation. This goes a long way towards reconciliation as a
process, not as a goal.”144
Some more about HMI’s shift in paradigm at the beginning of the nineties.
The basis for such a change was a decisive step in the development of HMI’s
theological background. During the years before there was the rise of what
is called with an umbrella-notion: the Contextual Theologies. The
fundamental difference of the Contextual Theologies as against the more
traditional forms is the starting point. In the Contextual Theologies this
starting point is the context and the move is from that Context to the Text
(of the Scriptures) and then back. That specific context can be the
environment in which one is living, but also one’s personal body or state of
mind. In the course of the seventies and the eighties of last century, a rich
variety of Contextual Theologies was developed all over the world. The most
well-known are the so-called. Liberation Theologies in Latin America and
Feminist Theology, originally dating from the USA. All these developments
did not pass HMI unnoticed. And the question arose whether HMI could
maintain a kind of Theology whose central focus was not on the actual
situation in India at that time. The answer was “no”. The immediate task
had changed. No longer was the need to convert India’s Muslims in the
forefront, but the needs and sorrows of the people among whom one was
living: the riot-torn Old City of Hyderabad, the ongoing uprisings in the
Northeastern States with their non-Arian tribes, the state of war in Jammu
and Kashmir and the atrocities in Gujarat. In 1991 HMI’s Director wrote:
“There is a need for a new beginning. The efforts to search for a common
ground, to … understanding and respect cannot stop. Our strategy however
must change. Our dialogue efforts must not be occasions of intellectualizing
our differences and similarities … We must turn our attention and energies
144
See: Preparatory Paper 4 for the Conference on World Mission and Evangelism, Athens,
2005. And: Robert J. Schreiter, The Ministry of Reconciliation: Spirituality and Strategies,
New York, 1998. See also: Pervaiz Sultan, Healing the Blind: Vision and Reconciliation in a
Multi-faith World, in Kirsteen Kim, c.w., 2005 and: Gregory Baum and Harold Wells (eds),
The Reconciliation of Peoples, Challenge to the Churches, New York, 1997.
42
to the much harder taste of building bridges of understanding at a very
basic level: in the homes of the grieving families of the victims … in the
hospitals … in the streets… It is there that our Ministry of Reconciliation, a
dialogue that goes beyond words, must begin”.145
145
Andreas D’Souza, The Bulletin of Henry Martyn Institute of Islamic Studies, Hyderabad,
volume 10, number 1, Jan. – Mar. 1991, p. 5.
146
Andreas D’Souza, Theology of Relationship, in: Forum Infocus, Number 14, Toronto,
2002/2003.
43
is absolutely true. God is omnipotent. God has and continues to send chosen
people to guide humanity whenever and wherever necessary.” 147 As an
illustration of the ability to transcend the boundaries the following story is
often told.
Reflecting on the above episode, Song says that there are two types of
theologies -“a transpositional type and a nontranspositional type”. Hui Tzu
represents the latter while Chuang Tzu stands for the former: he was able to
transpose himself into the fish and intuitively know that the fish are happy.
“This kind of theology,” writes Song, “crosses the boundaries of cultures,
religions, and histories in order to have deeper contacts with the strange
and mysterious ways and thoughts of God in creation.”149
147
Andreas D’Souza, The Journal of the Henry Martyn Institute, Volume 24, Hyderabad, July
– December 2005.
148
The episode is taken from A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, translated and
compiled by Wing Tsit Chan, Princeton, 1969, pp. 209 - 210 cited in: C.S. Song, The
Compassionate God, New York, 1982, p. xi.
149
C.S. Song, c.w., p. xii.
44
The aims of HMI’s Community Development Projects are:
4. To document the HMI’s peace building efforts and clearly articulate its
practical models for strengthening Hindu and Muslim ties.150
The activities in this framework in the six years from 2000 to 2007 can be
divided into five different groups.151 A number of them are in the
educational sector. Others in economic, medical, peace building and
miscellaneous areas.152
Among these activities, those designed to improve the skills of the centre’s
own staff are not counted in the following summaries.
4.3.1. Educational.
Primary school.
There is at the Centre in Sultan Shani since 1969 a model school that offers
qualitative education to students. This school is among the very few schools
in Hyderabad that offer education to students from both the Hindu and the
Muslim community. After completing the third standard the students join
local schools to continue their studies. Throughout the past six years around
eighty to a hundred students a year have attended this school. The school is
located on the second floor of the Centre and has four teachers, three
Hindus and one Muslim.153 The children are from Muslim as well as Hindu
(and Dalit) community backgrounds.
150
HMI’s Result-Oriented Final Report to the Church of Sweden, 2001 – 2006.
151
Sources: the Annual Reports of the HMI in the period 2002 – 2007 and interviews with
the involved staff-members of the HMI in October-December 2007.
152
The following summary of HMI’s praxis activities is derived from Interaction, a bi-annual
newsletter of HMI, in the period 2001 – 2006 and the annual reports to the Church of
Sweden in those seven years.
153
Situation November 2007.
45
Peace building games (bi-monthly) and workshops that foster friendships
develop leadership and improve communication skills have been a feature
of the Sultan Shani School and they are also being conducted in the two
other local schools, which are offering education exclusively to Hindu and
Muslim students only.154 In those two schools the interaction and confidence
of the students have increased noticeably. Their teachers were able to carry
forward the message of interfaith dialogue and they have a new perspective
on teaching students apart from the regular methods of teaching and
lectures. Parents’ meetings were organized regularly at the school, mostly
once in two months. Those meetings served as a platform for dialogue
among the parents, particularly women, of the different faith backgrounds
to discuss issues of common concern. In this term the issues on which the
meetings focused were the education of their children as well as personal
cleanliness and water-borne diseases like malaria and jaundice, as the
incidence of those two health problems was very high.155
Tailoring c.a.
Also since 1996 there is in Sultan Shani Centre a tailoring class for girls. The
goal is to provide the students with enough skills to make them
economically independent. The courses, mostly long-term for eight month,
were in the period 1969 – 2006 attended by 50 – 70 students every year.
The students were from different religions and castes. There were two
teachers. Besides the tailoring courses, mostly during the summer vacation
(April – June), there were for this group also embroidery lessons and courses
in fabric painting, Mehndi-painting, pot-painting, flower-making and
sometimes a course in knitting and hairstyling. Some of these were also
attended by women from the surrounding community. In 2001 a similar
program started in the Shankernagar Centre. From then on about 40 - 50
girls and young women attended these courses every year. One teacher
was appointed there. Due to the existing demand a similar tailoring class
also started in the Aman Shanti Centre in the quarter of Chandrayangutta in
2005 and a teacher was appointed there. From ten to 30 girls and young
women have attended this course every year since then.
The students hold monthly meetings to discuss issues of concern and new
programs at the Centers, such as dowry problems, the purdah-system, plans
for celebrations and ongoing developments in Hyderabad. Peace games to
154
From April 2004. See: Final Report to the Church of Sweden, 11th August 2005, p. 4.
155
Interaction, a newsletter of the Henry Martyn Institute, International Centre for
Research, Interfaith Relations and Reconciliation, Volume 28, No. 1, January – June 2005, p.
9.
46
develop interaction and communication among the students were organized
during these meetings.
Literacy.
From the start of the Aman Shanti Centre in Sultan Shani a range of literacy
courses were organized. Classes in Hindi, Urdu and sometimes English were
held in order to encourage the students to learn different languages and
scripts so that better understanding could take place among the students
hailing from different religious backgrounds. The literacy courses were
proving to be one way to build interfaith relations. The classes were
organized and taught by teachers from cooperating NGO’s, which also
provided the study materials. From 2002 these classes in Urdu and Hindi
were also held in the Aman Shanti Centre in Shankernagar and from 2003
also in the Centre at Chandrayangutta. The total number of students varied
from to 100 - 180, children, young men and women per annum. After
completing the course and passing the exam, the students received a
certificate which was recognized by Government.
In the second half of 2003 fifteen young men from Sultan Shani as well as
from Shankernagar joined a government training body for youth for a one
year refrigerator and air-conditioning course. In 2004 a second batch was
organized for 25 young men. At the end of that year a similar six-month
course started at the Sultan Shani Centre with seventeen young men. In
2006 26 young men completed their studies and received a certificate.
Since then many of them have been employed as mechanics.
Typewriting.
In 2004 and 2005 a course in typing was also held at the Sultan Shani
Centre, which was attended by several dozens of students. Both activities
were co-organized by a cooperating local semi-governmental organization.
In 2006 twenty-five students attended regular typing classes.
Various.
Every year there was an outing for the students and teachers from the
school as well as the tailoring class.
47
In 2002 an income generation group started in the Shankernagar Centre. In
2004 they formed new batches of 30 each and learned how to make
candles, artificial flowers and fabric painting. At the Shankernagar Centre
two different income-generation programs were conducted in 2005. A one-
day program in making flower vases and a three-month embroidery course.
In the second half of 2005 eight students of HMI’s Post Graduate Course in
Conflict Resolution attended a one-month training course in interfaith
dialogue through community development. In 2006 40 girls underwent
training in Mehndi156 application. This group also sewed bags for the HMI-
summer course. Also in that year a course in Electric Motor Winding started
in Sultan Shani with 16 young men as students. And a course for Spoken
English started for 15 young men.
4.3.2. Medical.
Health Centre.
In Sultan Shani one room is specially equipped for a health post. The post is
staffed by a doctor and a nurse. Till 2007 every year about 2000 patients
visited this clinic and got advice, treatment and medicine or were referred
to a medical specialist, hospital etc. All these were free of charge. The
services of the center were not restricted to curative measures only, but
also extended to educate the community in such areas as avoiding health
hazards and learning about diseases by identifying symptoms in their early
stages. In 2004 a health clinic also started at Shankernagar. The number of
visitors from the beginning was about 100 a month.
Health Camps.
In the first half of 2002 a two-days pediatric camp for the community was
held in cooperation with a local hospital. More than 500 children received
medical attention. In the second half of 2002 a Cancer Awareness and
General Health camp was organized, attended by 157 patients. The patients
who needed immediate minor treatment received it and the facilities of the
Cancer Institute were made available to patients who needed prolonged
treatment.
In 2003 another pediatric camp was organized. Again more than 500
children from the community and local schools took part.
In close cooperation with different partners, three health camps were hold in
the course of 2004. An eye camp for 57 patients; a pediatric camp for over
300 children of the community and a general health camp for 70 women.
156
Henna painting.
48
In the spring of 2005 there was an outbreak of jaundice in the Old City. A
week-long health camp was organized at Sultan Shani Centre in
collaboration with the local Urban Health Post (UHP). More than 350 patients
were screened and chlorine tablets distributed. A leprosy and HIV/AIDS
health camp was organized in collaboration with the Hyderabad Leprosy
Eradiction Project from which 214 people benefitted. Three pulse polio
camps were held in that year at both the Sultan Shani and Chandrayangutta
Centre. Fifteen young women from Sultan Shani and twelve from
Chandrayangutta volunteered for the camps and received certificates from
the Urban Health Post for their voluntary services. An eye camp was
conducted and 58 patients availed themselves of the services. Every month
an immunization program for school children and the local community was
held in collaboration with the UHP.
Health Talks.
Every two month a health talk was held for the students of the primary
school and their parents about current health issues by a member of the
medical staff.
The same happened at the monthly meeting of the tailoring c.a. students at
Sultan Shani as well as at Chandrayangutta.
In 2004 these health talks at Sultan Shani were held separately for tailoring
students and community women. In each of these sessions around 35 – 40
women participated.
Health check-ups for the school students were held at least once a (school)
year.
Due to cases of jaundice and sunstroke a talk was held in collaboration with
the local Urban Health Post halfway through 2005. In the Centre of
Shankernagar a health talk on TB and HIV was held. And 40 girls from that
Centre attended the program on gender sensitization.
In 2006 there was an outbreak of the viral fever Chickunguniya in the Old
City. Regular talks were given through the clinic and free medicines were
distributed to everyone in the community. Home visits were made by all the
staff members to create awareness about the symptoms of the fever and
also to encourage the people to keep their surroundings clean and
mosquito-free.
49
In that year there were also awareness lectures conducted by Lepra India on
Denque, Malaria, Alcoholism, Tuberculosis, HIV and Chikunguniya for the
community in Shankernagar and a Family Planning orientation to young
women was given in the Chandryangutta Centre. Also a pulse polio
immunization day was conducted by eight tailoring students who made
visits in the community by going from door to door.
HIV-AIDS.
50
AIDS Day was observed on 1st December 2005 with 45 young men
participating. This program started with an awareness session, followed by a
skit (sketch) and a slogan writing competition.
Miscellaneous.
Every year there was a general health check-up for the students of the
primary school.
In 2004 a visit to the Public Health Museum was held for eighteen young
women from the community.
In that year Pulse Polio Immunization was given to women and children on
National Pulse Polio days and afterwards every Tuesday at Sultan Shani
Centre.
A doctor and a nurse from the local Urban Health Post in the neighborhood
organized general and antenatal/postnatal health checkups once a month in
the Centre.
4.3.3. Economic.
Income generation.
51
In 2001 at the Centre of Sultan Shani a group of about 20 women started
manufacturing household products like detergent soaps, washing powder,
cleaning powder and white phenyl. They were trained by a teacher from the
government training department. The women started as a group but later
they found that manufacturing independently was more lucrative.
Four members from the Shankernagar group made use of credit for house
repairs, medical purposes and the education of children.
52
had a different theme: prejudice reduction, understanding the dynamics of
conflict and the importance of communication and listening for effective
conflict resolution.
53
In 2005 there were several meetings in view of the Ganesh festival and prior
to the Babri Masjid anniversary on the 6th of December. Young men, local
leaders and police officials of the Sultan Shani area attended the meetings.
Discussions were held on the circumstances that lead to communal riots,
the various dynamics involved in them and recommended steps to be taken
to prevent violence.
4.3.5. Celebrations.
In 2002 a combined national and interfaith festival was held on 26 th January
in celebration of Republic Day, New Year’s Day, Sankranti, Christmas and Id-
ul-Fitr. Members from all the religious communities took part in the
celebration while students from the school and the tailoring unit performed
skits and sang national songs. Other celebrations for the community were
held on the 15th August (Independence Day), 2nd October (Gandhi’s Birthday)
and 14th November (Children’s Day). These celebrations strengthened the
bonds of the community members and provided them with an opportunity
to interact positively.
In 2003 the inter-religious festival on 26th January was held again. Also
Independence Day and Gandhi’s Birthday were celebrated.
In 2004 once again January 26th, New Year and Republic Day were jointly
celebrated as an inter-religious festival. Other occasions for interfaith
festivals were Independence Day, Gandhi’s birthday, Children’s day and the
eighth anniversary of the Center at Sultan Shani. The (tailoring) students
and community members toke an active part in these.
54
At the Shankarnagar Centre in 2004 two national festivals were held and an
interreligious celebration in which Diwali, Christmas and Ramadan were
commemorated. On that occasion Hindus explained about Muslim festivals
and vice versa.
Also in 2005 there was an interreligious festival and annual day at the
Shankernagar Centre.
55
and tension in and around Hyderabad and to explore processes for
implementing monitoring and early warning systems.
4.3.7. Miscellaneous.
In the framework of an initiative for young men a reading room in the Sultan
Shani Center was equipped in 2002. Daily newspapers in English, Urdu and
Telugu and some other literature such as employment related magazines
and sport magazines can be read there, giving participants an opportunity
to meet each other during the evenings. About 25 young men availed
themselves of this facility in the following years .
5. Analyses.
5.1. Theologies.
56
As we have seen, the underlying theology of HMI underwent in the course of
the twentieth century various changes in paradigm. HMI started as a school
serving the missionary activities under de Muslims in British India. That was
the raison d’etre of HMI and so it functioned in de colonial era till 1947 and
years after. The theological starting point was that Christianity as such was
the most desired religion and that is would be better for the Muslims if they
converted to Christianity. In terms of models of theology, this was typical of
the exclusivist view: Christendom as the only source for Truth and Salvation.
This view is as old as Christianity itself. Since the beginning of the Church it
was believed that those who were not baptized were after life damned to
hell. This opinion, extra exclesiam nulla salus, was the ruling in the Roman
Catholic Church till the 2nd Vatican Council in the sixties of the twentieth
century. From that moment it changed and it was recognized that also other
religions could have Truth. But not only in the Roman Catholic Church, but
also in the vast majority of the Protestant churches the conviction reigned
till the 20th century that Christianity was the only True religion. Then this
view changed and the view emerged that not only one’s own religion has
the full Truth but also other world religions shared the same Truth in varying
images and messages and in every religion there was something of that
present. This view is called inclusivism. From that moment on it was
possible to have a genuine dialogue between Christians and believers of
other religions. The need to convert them was not present any more. But in
the latter half of the century a third view developed: every religion has its
Truth, its own system of dogmas and they exist next to each other and
independent from each other and this was called pluralism or particularism.
This paradigm shift from exlusivism, sometimes via inclusivism, to
particularism is called a “Copernican Revolution” in Christian Theology of
religions.157 In the exclusivist’s view the Christian religion is Church- or
Christ centered. The particularist sees God as the Ultimate Reality and is
God-centric.
Back to the HMI and its theology. From the beginning to the end of the
nineties the exclusivist view was leading. The ultimate goal of HMI was the
conversion of Indian Muslims to Christianity. In the seventies there was
more space for nuances and an opening towards dialogue was made. But
this was not a dialogue in the true sense of the word, based on the principal
of equality of the parties involved, but a kind of interaction with believers of
a different religion serving one’s own more or less explicit goal to convert
them. And the Copernican Revolution came at the end of 1990. The
watershed was the awful riots in that period in the Old City of Hyderabad,
the following period of reflection and the personal experiences in the
starving City and in the crowded hospitals. And so HMI moved from an
exclusive view to a particular view, from Church-centered to God-centered.
But this view is not an isolated one, as having a Theology among other
Theologies, independently from and nothing to do with each other. On the
157
Nicolaus Copernicus, 1473 – 1543, a Polish astronomer, proposed that the planets
orbited around the sun and not the sun around the Earth. This led to an overthrow of the
established geocentric cosmology.
57
contrary: HMI’s particularism is strongly connected to and engaged with
other religious views. The fundamental basis for this engagement was
already marked by the adoption of the notion of “reconciliation” as a central
issue and further developed in the formulating of a “Theology of
Relationship” around the turn of the century. HMI realized this shift in
strategy in concrete actions and attitudes in the early nineties. And as a
consequence of that at the beginning of the twenty-first century, while new
buildings were put into use, a second name was added: Aman Shanti
Milayam.158 What happened since then in HMI’s program in the Old City of
Hyderabad?
Also, Jacob has to be reconciled to his own wrongdoings. In this way, the
struggle he has with an unknown nightly visitor, who tries to prevent his
passing into the Holy Land (Genesis 32, 23 - 33) , can be interpreted as a
necessary preliminary to his confrontation with his brother: reconciliation
cannot happen without sincere repentance and turning around.
Then the second story about reconciliation. Once again between brothers,
between Joseph and his relatives. The threatening years of famine enforce
Jacob and his family to leave their homeland and to come to Egypt. Because
there is plenty of food. Without this reconciliation there would be no future
to Jacob and his offspring. The Big Story would stop there and then.
Then the two citations from the New Testament. In the Gospel of Matthew
Jesus is inviting his audience to reconciliation. Why? As the only opportunity
to keep out of the prison. Reconciliation as a method of self-defense; an
instrument to prevent further damage. In the letter to the Romans, Paul is
speaking about reconciliation too. But not in the sense of necessary or
desired reconciliation between people who are hostile to each other, but
between men and God. Another relevant chapter is 2Cor. 5, 19, where Paul
ties up the reconciliation between God and humans with his own conflict
with the people of Corinth. In the light of Gods reconciliation we are called
to reconcile ourselves with others.
5.2. Objectives.
First the question as to the effectiveness of the described activities.
Effectiveness seen as the rate of achieving previously formulated
objectives.
Indeed, that is the case. The Projects in the field of Education, Healthcare
and Income-generation do fit into the socio-economic segment of the table
produced. This group of activities also had the largest financial, material and
personnel input and had also by far the largest output of concrete results. 160
Without any doubt they contributed in a positive way to the improvement of
the socio-economic position of a number of citizens of the Old City. The
activities in the field of Peace building, Celebrations en Networking fit in the
Cultural segment. And in almost all activities psychological factors played a
major role. The participants came from the Muslim- as well as from the
Hindu-community and the shared activities contribute to the fight against
prejudices against each other and the promotion of mutual understanding.
There were no specific projects directed to the decrease of political
distinctions. There are also no results concerning the attempts to bring
together the leaders of one or both religious communities. Several times an
attempt to achieve that purpose was made, but these did not succeed.161
In HMI’s evaluation of the CDP a stocktaking of its experiences in the period
2001 – 2006 was made.162 The first point mentioned is: “To build peace in
the community it is necessary to address first and foremost the basic socio-
economic needs of the people which are of high importance to the
community like primary education, health, skill development. Once these
basic needs are met then the community members will be in a position to
deal with the issue of Peace Building in their communities.” 163 A clear
description of the thoughts behind giving priority to the social economic
aspects. This evaluation enumerates in total eleven experiences of the
Communal Development Programs. Only the first one has a social economic
nature; the rest is mainly cultural and a single one is psychological. The
emphasis on the role of women in their community is striking. This has been
motivated by two reasons. By pointing out the subordinate position of
woman, especially in the centre of the Old City, as in HMI’s Evaluation: “It
has been seen that to build confidence and ownership among women is a
slow process and needs lots of efforts from the social workers to encourage
women to come to the forefront due to deep rooted religious and cultural
traditions. This is more in the Sultan Shahi centre as the community is very
rigid and the people live in divided communities based on Hindu and Muslim
religions.”164 On the other hand it is elsewhere declared: “Women’s
programmes particularly are given priority as they do not have any say in
160
According to the HMI’s Financial Reports concerning that period as I read them in
Hyderabad in November 2007.
161
According to information, obtained from a member of HMI’s Staff in October 2007.
162
HMI Evaluation CDP 2001-2006, Hyderabad, 2007.
163
A variant of “Zuerst das Fressen, dann die Moral“ (first the Stuff, then the Morality).
164
HMI Evaluation, c.w., Challenges.
62
their family and it is observed that they are the crucial members in the
peace building processes.”165 In my opinion here is an apparent
contradiction. No influence and despite that crucial? In the available reports
only once is a concrete result of these directed to women policy mentioned:
“When women’s voices are heard we see a drastic change in the community
right from taking the initiatives in cleaning the garbage in their locality to
bringing government facilities to the community and to undertaking peace
initiatives in the community at a larger level.”166
Further the question if the CDP-activities meet the more general objectives
as they are formulated by the HMI in an implicit or explicit way. At first the
implicit objectives. These can be derived from the underlying and sustaining
theology and its development. This Werdegang of the HMI from a exclusivist
Christian Institution for Mission among the Muslims to a particularistic
Theology of Relationship, I have described in Chapters 4.1 and 5.1: “Such a
Theology is working, doing through direct involvement in and commitment
to building relationships where they do not exist, healing relationships
where they are broken and deepening relationships where they are weak.
This is the motive for HMI’s activities in Hyderabad and elsewhere; those
activities are feeding that Theology.” Also the CDP-activities have to fit in
the general objectives to enter, to maintain and -if necessary- restore
relationships between particularly the Muslims and the Hindus in the Old
City. But what do these “relationships” mean in this context? In the
Theology of Relationship as further specified in Andreas D’Souza’s
formulations there is no limitation of this notion, so we have to understand it
in an extended way. It concerns relationships in an interpersonal sense,
between persons and individuals. In the case of the Old City especially
between individual Muslims on the one hand and individual Hindus on the
other. These relations are at a personal and micro level. But there are also
relations at a group level. What are the relations between the Muslim-
community towards the Hindu-community? Communities and groups are
more than just the sum of individuals. These relations are at the communal,
medium level. Finally you can speak of relationships at a structural level. In
that case the societal relations as a whole are considered. These relations
have a social, economic and cultural level.
Are these relations at a general level equal to each other? All three kinds of
relationship are present in the CDP-projects; some more often and intensive
than others. The objectives of the educational activities are to create equal
societal opportunities to Hindus as well as Muslims. That is important
especially to the Muslim-community because their level of their education is
in general much worse than the Hindus one. And as a result of the mixed
classes the interpersonal human relations between the students and their
parents are fostered. That is the same with the income generation activities.
The combined festivities, the common deliberations to prevent Communal
165
Result Orientated Final Report 2001 – 2006 to the Church of Sweden, p.7, Hyderabad,
2007.
166
HMI Evaluation, c.w., Experiences from the Project.
63
Violence and the working together in a culture of peace, they all contribute
to an improvement of human relations at a basic level. It is not so easy to
categorize the medical activities in this way. Of course, they can contribute
to an improvement of the general health situation in the Old City. Some
recent fever- and jaundice epidemics have shown that this situation has to
be improved. But local Government already provides a small-scale system
of personal health-care. Despite that the CDP activities in the field of the
health care meet a still existing need, considering the large number of
clients and patients. Moreover they lower the threshold to take part in the
other CDP-activities. For medical care is basic and primary. The rendering of
this kind of care can lower present mistrust and suspicion. But seen more
generally they do not fit so easily into the implicit objections formulated.
Then the general, explicitly formulated objectives. Here we have a problem.
Because the formulation of objectives of this kind in policy papers of the HMI
is a recent activity, dating only from 2006. 167 Because of this, these types of
objectives concerning the period surveyed 2001 – 2007 are not available. A
closer analysis in this aspect is therefore not possible.168 As a result of this
lack an analysis of the quantitative aspects of preset formulated general
objectives is also not possible.
Finally the previously formulated specific objectives. We can find them in
the application to the Church of Sweden for (co-)sponsoring of the CDP-
projects in the period 2001 – 2007. In the annual reports to this major
sponsor mention is made to what extent the qualitative and quantitative
objectives have been met. The first objective of the projects is formulated
as: “To work intentionally and creatively in riot prone areas to build
supportive and sustaining relationships between communities leading
towards a climate of trust and cessation of communal violence in the
localities through community development and empowerment.” Surveying
the totality of the CDP-projects we can conclude that these mainly fit within
this objective. But I make three remarks here. The target groups reached
with the activities can be described as women, children and patients.
Especially with the elder youth and the adult men only a relatively small
number people have been reached. From several descriptions of the
Communal Riots in Hyderabad it is known that specially young men were
167
See HMI’s Strategic Plan 2006 – 2009.
168
Concerning the explicit and general objectives which were formulated afterwards, see
HMI’s Evaluation: “HMI aims to develop peace through community development projects.
The main focus is on developing supportive sustaining relationship between the
communities leading towards a climate of trust.” And the Result-Oriented Final Report
mentions: “The main need for the project is to develop sustainable peace through local
participation and community support. For this reason community members and HMI jointly
identified developmental programmes for children, young women, men and the elderly as
ways to reach out to the community for peace building processes through needs analysis
survey. Since 1996 the local community and HMI were able to meet the immediate goals of
creating spaces for dialogue among people from different faith communities, opportunities
for social and economic empowerment of women in particular, different programmes for
personal development so that the community members of different faiths come forward
and take the lead to become agents of change and peace makers in the community.”
64
involved. 169 The second remark relates to the actual places of the activities.
Only Sultan Shahi can be considered as a riot prone area. Finally it is
therefore not possible to determine if these CDP-projects contributed to the
desired cessation of Communal Violence in the localities.170
The second objective of the projects reads as: “To facilitate the formation of
community based ownership (CBO) of community development programmes
by promoting grassroot leadership”. The various descriptions of the projects
and the Result-Oriented Final Report to the Church of Sweden show, that as
much as possible local staff was involved and thus a lot of development of
leadership at grassroots level was done. Almost exclusively only women
were involved. It is not clear whether this new local leadership has led to
more activities in the communities outside the framework of the HMI’s CDP.
There is no sign of a handover to the local communities of one or more of
these activities. The fact that there was no success in developing sufficient
income-generation activities, could have played a role in this. Then the third
project-objective: “To deepen the understanding of and commitment of
HMI’s goal and models of reconciliation among the staff”.
5.3. SWOT.
In the third part of this chapter I analyze the Communal Development
Program activities of the HMI using the SWOT-analysis.171 This analysis is a
subjective assessment of data which is organized by the SWOT format into a
169
S. Kakar, c.w.
170
This aspect is repeating mentioned in the annual reports of this “Aman Shanti
Initiatives for Communal Harmony” to the Church of Sweden.
171
SWOT Analysis is a strategic planning tool used to evaluate the Strength, Weaknesses,
Opportunities and Threats involved in a project or business venture. It involves specifying
the objective of the business venture or project and identifying the internal and external
factors that are favorable and unfavorable to achieving the objective. The technique is
credited to Albert Humphrey, who led a research project at Stanford University, USA, in the
1960s and 1970s.
65
logical order that helps understanding, presentation, discussion and
decision-making. The four dimensions Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities
and Threats are a useful extension of a basic two heading list of pro and
contra’s. The SWOT analysis template is normally presented as a grid,
comprising the four sections:
INTERNAL
Origin
Strengths Weaknesses
facts/
Things that are good now, Things that are bad now,
factors of
maintain them, build on them remedy, change or stop
the
and use as leverage them.
organizatio
n
EXTERNAL
Origin
Opportunities Threats
facts/
Things that are good for the Things that are bad for the
factors of
future, prioritize them, capture future, put in plans to
the
them, build on them and manage them or counter
environme
optimize them
nt in which
it operates
Strengths.
I limit myself here to only five strengths. This enhances the clarity and
legibility of this paper. This limitation applies also to the other indicators of
the SWOT-analysis. The following Strengths can be discerned:
1. Almost from their start the projects have run at maximum capacity. All
available means such as (class)rooms, equipment and teachers are fully
used in all Centers. Thus the offer provides for a large need.
2. All projects are clear and transparent. They are very concrete with
preset formulated goals. That is why it is easy to present and evaluate
them.
1. The activities hardly address the male part of the communities. The
adult males are however the dominating group and they are particularly
involved in Communal Violence. Thus an image is created that peaceful
coexistence is mainly a women’s business. At the same time it is very
difficult for women in the conservative Muslim community of the Old City
to hold a function in the public sphere. Also in the Hindu community the
position of woman is often second-rate.
2. HMI did not succeed in making the activities self-supporting. There was
the ambition to hand over some activities after some time to the
communities, but it has not happened yet. The local communities don’t
have the possibilities to finance them or are not willing to do so yet.
67
3. The projects are small-scale and only a very small part of the population
of the Old City can be reached. The HMI can possibly deploy its staff and
other means in a more efficient and effective way to meet its mission.
4. There is no clearness about the broad social basis of the activities. There
are hardly any relations between the projects and the political and
religious structures in the Old City. That questions the foundation of the
CDP-projects in the long term.
1. The influence of Communal Violence on the daily life in the Old City is
decreasing and the trend is downwards. There is less violence, damage
and victims than some years ago. The bloody bomb attacks of 2007 did
not lead to new outbursts of violence between Muslims and Hindus in
the Old City. Political radicalization has not become stronger in recent
years. All these developments promote a climate wherein HMI’s mission
and activities can prosper better.
2. A second menace occurs when HMI and its programs are seen as
more or less covert missionary activities. In India resistance against the
sometimes aggressive missionary activities of several Christian
churches has been growing in the past few years. Anti-conversion
lawmaking is in progress or is already in place. If Hindu-radicalism does
not decrease, then the pressure on the Muslim-minorities continues with
all its cultural and psychological consequences. In the relatively isolated
Muslim community of the Old City of Hyderabad this can easily lead to
resistance against those communal activities, which are not undertaken
172
HMI’s Evaluation, c.w., p 2.
69
by their own government or religious community. Then mistrust will
reign and the CDP will lose its social basis.
Thus far the analysis. Let me repeat the relative value of the SWOT-analysis.
It is a subjective judgment and its value is therefore limited. Despite that it
can be useful. As far as the Strengths are concerned , to build on them and
to use them as a leverage; with regard to the Weaknesses, to remedy,
change or stop them; regarding the Opportunities, to prioritize, capture,
build on them and optimize them and as for the Threats to manage or
counter them.
6. Conclusions.
In this concluding Chapter I want to consider the question of what I have
learned during the writing of this paper. Reading, thinking and writing I have
become more and more convinced of the importance of knowing (more)
about the history and background of communal problems. If you don’t know
about the origins of the situations, there is also no real knowledge about the
solutions to the problems. This is because the history, recent or longer ago,
is part of the collective memory of all concerned. An approach which is only
pragmatic is superficial and gives only an apparent solution. Therefore I
am arguing strongly in favor of a solid historical analysis of every communal
problem before trying to deal with it. I am aware that this is very often
against the ruling policies, which are adopted in The Netherlands, but also in
the rest of Western Europe, which are mainly directed to concrete short
term actions.
A second insight which is also important is that with that historical analysis
not only the social economic circumstances but also the cultural and
psychological factors should be considered. Sometimes they reinforce and
70
sometimes they oppose each other. But their relative positions are always
decisive to the situation which are ultimately caused. This is also against
the present trend in Western Europe which takes into consideration almost
exclusively the social economic issues and only these factors in the search
for solutions. What sometimes happens is that the cultural and/or
psychological elements are discredited as being of minor, subordinate or
secondary importance.
The third insight which is connected to this is that only solutions resulting in
a comprehensive way from the social economic as well as from the cultural
and psychological factors are sustainable and that only these kinds of
solutions have real possibilities to solve the real problems. Sometimes this
notion is acknowledged in the Western European context. But despite that
very often measures belonging only in the materialistic field are taken.
These are often enforced by convenience and the haste to implement these
kinds of policy.
How can one evaluate the recent activities of the HMI to prevent and reduce
Communal Violence in the Old City of Hyderabad?
My very last thought is with the people of the HMI. They gave me some of
their spirit, passion and personal commitment. And they provided me all the
data for this paper; no request of mine was too much to them. Thank you
all.
72
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