1.Lat. Amer.Stud.r,I,
I-30
PrintedinGreat Britain
BritishPolicyandSpanishAmerica,
I783-I808
byJOHNLYNCH'TheliberationofSouthAmerica',wroteCastlereaghinI807,'mustbeaccomplished throughthewishes and exertionsoftheinhabitants;butthechangecanonlybeoperated...undertheprotectionandwith thesupportof anauxiliaryBritish force'.1Theargument,familiarinpoliticaldebate,wasrare inofficialpolicy.Britain,it istrue,hadlongregardedSpanishAmericaasa sourceofstrengthforherrivals and apotentialmarket for her manu-factures.After thePeaceof1783interest becamemoreintense asBritishobservers,impressedbythevulnerabilityofempires,claimedtoseesignsofrapiddeclinein theempireofSpain.IntelligencereportsonSpanishAmerica accumulatedingovernmentdepartments;plansforBritish attacksflowedfrom official andprivatesources;andasection ofmerchantopinionincreased itsagitationformilitaryinterventioninthearea.Yet,apartfromtheconquestof Trinidad inx797and theattemptedconquestoftheRio delaPlatain
1806-7,
BritishpolicytowardsSpanishAmericawas diffidentinitsapproachandvaguein its intent. Therewere, indeed,compellingreasonswhy SpanishAmericashould remainonthemarginof Britishpolicy.Britain'sexisting Europeanandimperialinterestsnecessarilydominatedherpolicyandabsorbedher resources.Until1806,moreover,existingchannelsof tradeinEuropeand the restofthe worldwere sufficient to takethebulkofBritishindustrialproduction.Andmilitaryresourceswereusuallyinsuffi-cient to releasetroopseitherfromEuropeorthe West Indies formajoroperationsin anewtheatreofwar.2BritishpolicytowardsSpanishAmerica,therefore,wasessentiallynegative:it waseasier forstatesmentosee whattheyshouldprevent-principallythe extensionofFrenchpowerandideologyin the NewWorld-thantodeterminewhattheyshouldpromote.Should
1Charles W.Vane,MarquessofLondonderry(ed.), Correspondence,Despatches,and OtherPapersofViscountCastlereagh,SecondMarquessofLondonderry(hereinaftercitedasCastlereaghPapers)
(I2
vols., London,I848-53),
vII,
385.
2
It wasforthisreason that considerationwasgiventosending expeditionsacross thePacificfromIndia,anoperationwhich wouldinvolvegreat problemsoftiming, logisticsandfinance.
L.A.S.-I
I
2
JohnLynchBritainespouseapolicyofconquest,ofemancipation,ora combination ofboth? Whatevertheoption,therewereanumber offormidable deterrents.ThelossoftheNorthAmerican coloniesdidnot initself inhibit Britishimperialactivityintheyearsafter1783;dominionandcolonizationwerestill at theserviceof commerce ifcircumstancesrequired.3But even thoseobservers who continuedtobelieveinthevalueofempiredoubted whetheritshouldincludeacquisitionsfromtheempireofSpain.TheEarl ofSelkirk,forexample,whosecolonizingactivitiesin North America haveovershadowedhisdistinguishedadvocacyof apolicyofemancipationinSpanishAmerica,arguedin1806that'itmaybefairlydoubted whetherthe revenue thatwould arise fromtheseSpanishAmericanprovinceswouldbe sufficientindemnificationforthe burdenswhichthepossessionwouldinvolve'.4Andhethoughtthat aBritish colonial administration wouldbeincapableofgoverningSpanishAmericans.Theseargumentsheregardedas decisiveagainst any policyofpermanent conquestinSpanishAmerica;bypromotingitsindependence,on the otherhand,Britain wouldgainthecommercialbenefitsofempirewithoutitspolitical obligations.This isnottosaythatBritishthinkingwas conditionedbyadoctrinaire aversiontodominion inSpanishAmerica;thereal criterionwaswhetherlocalconditions madeit feasible.Apolicyofconquestpre-supposedthatthecreoles would welcome achangeofimperial government.Butanyillusions aboutthis wereshatteredinthe Rio dela Plata in1806-7.Duringthe BritishoccupationofMonte-videoLieutenant-ColonelRichard Bourke sounded creoleopinionand foundthatitwas'entirelyturned towardsIndependence,and theestablishment ofaRepublicorFederalGovernmentsimilarto thatofNorthAmerica. ThatthesubmittingtoanEnglishmasterwould be thegreatest possiblebartothisproject...I have never heard awordofanEnglishPartyof whichsomuchwassaidin Londonabout thetime ofoursailing;nor do I believethat such apartyever existed.'5Anotherofficerwasevenmorepessimistic:'You havenot a friendamongthe inhabitantsofSouthAmerica.Thepeoplehereare notthatsoft,effeminateracetheyare inOldSpain,on thecontrarytheyare ferociousandwantdiscipline onlytomake them formid-able.'
6
In theeventtheyhaddiscipline enoughtoejectthe British invaders.
3SeeVincentT.Harlow,TheFoundingoftheSecond BritishEmpire,1763-93(2vols.,London,1952-64),and the commentariesofRichardPares,EnglishHistoricalReview,
LXVIII
(I953),282-5,andRonaldHyam,'BritishImperialExpansioninthelateEighteenthCentury,The HistoricalJournal,x(I967),I13-24.4ThomasDouglas,fifthEarlofSelkirk,'Observations on theproposedexpeditionagainstSpanishAmerica'(7Junei806),BritishMuseum,Add.37884,ff.16-17.5BourketoWindham,9Feb.1807,B.M.,Add.37886,ff.38-9v.6ColonelBrowne to GeneralWalpole,25April
I807,
B.M.,Add.37886,ff.253-5v.
BritishPolicyandSpanishAmerica,1783-18083
The alternativetoconquestwasemancipation,but thisraisedfurtherproblems.No Britishgovernmentwouldpromotearevolution forindepen-dence ifitwaslikelytounleash a social revolution. Aversiontosocialchangeinhibited BritishpolicytowardsSpanishAmericathroughoutthisperiod, especiallyafter1789when thespectreof theFrenchRevolutionwithitslevellingdoctrines,and theexampleofclassandracialconflict inthecolonyofSaintDomingue,hauntedBritishstatesmen formanyyearstocome.These fearswerelaterexpressedbythe Duke ofWellington,whohad beenpreparedto execute apolicyofemancipationthat wasan affronttoall his conservativeinstincts: 'Ialwayshad a horror ofrevolutionisinganycountryforapoliticalobject.Ialwayssaid,iftheyrise ofthemselves,wellandgood,but do not stir themup;it isa fearfulresponsibility.'
7
Viewsofthiskind conditioned Britishpolicyin theRio de laPlata in
I806-7,
whenmilitarycommanders wereinstructed thattheobjectoftheoperationwasnot revolutionbut achangeofimperial government,thattheymustavoidarousing'aspiritofinsurrectionandrevolt',and thattheymust donothingtoimpair'therightsandprivileges,or evenestablishedusages,ofanyclassof inhabitants.Thedangerofsocialrevolution,ofcourse,couldbeused tojustifyasomewhat differentargument.Grantedthat thespiritofrevolutionalreadyexistedinSpanishAmerica,should notBritainintervene to directandcon-trolit? Thiswas the viewofHenryDundas,whoquestionedwhetherBritain wasin apositiontopreventthespreadof a'revolutionizingsystem'inSpanishAmerica;Britain shouldact,withapolicyofindependence,inorderto avoid thedangerthat wouldarise'ifthisempireis to bepermittedto revolutionizeitselfwithoutguidanceorcontrol'.Thiswas also the stand-pointoftheEarlofSelkirk ini806.Recognizingthatthe fear ofspreading'Jacobinprinciples'hadbeen a deterrenttoBritishaction inthepreviouswar withSpain,hearguedthatrevolutionaryupheavalwas now lesslikelyto comefrom theimperialistpolicyofNapoleonthanfromtheactivities ofFranciscodeMiranda,whowas then atlargeintheCaribbean.TheVenezuelanrevolutionary,hethought,'maybeunabletorepressthe dissen-tionsamongthedifferentclasses andordersofthecolonists-to reconcile thecontendingfactions of theWhites,theIndians,theNegroes,Mulattoes,etc....thehorrors ofSt.Domingomaybeactedoveragainin theCaraccas.0
7PhilipHenry,fifthEarl ofStanhope,NotesofConversationswith theDukeofWellington
I83I-1851
(3rded.,London,1889), p.69.8InstructionsoWhitelocke,5March1807,B.M.,Add.37886,f.I48.9'Memorandum fortheconsideration oftheCabinet',3Oct.1799,CastlereaghPapers,viI,284-5.
10
Selkirk, 'Observations', B.M.,Add.37884,ff.
20-2.
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John Lynch - British Policy and Spanish America, 1783-1808
Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 1, No. 1 (May, 1969), pp. 1-30
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