Hispanic AmnericanHistorical Review63(1), 1983, 3-35Copyright
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1983 by Duke University Press
Bolivar and the Caudillos
JOHN LYNCH*
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I
NDEPENDENCE
imposed many roles uponSimonBolivar.
Hewasamilitary planner and afieldcommander,apo-litical philosopher and a maker of constitutions, a liberatorofpeoplesandafounder
ofrepublics.Hehadtodealnotonly
withroyalist enemies butwithforeign friends and anarchic followers.Healsohad to control the caudillos, to tame the guerrillas andtheirleaderswithinthe revolutionary ranks. The wars of independencein northernSouth Americaincorporatedtwoprocesses,the constitutionalismof Bo-livar and the caudillismofthe regions, and theywerefoughtwithtwoarms, regularforcesand localguerrillas.These movementswerepartallies, partrivals.Tocompeteand ruleinsuch circumstancesasoldierhad to be a politician. Bolivar sought power as well as freedom; he wantedtorule as well astoliberate.' But powerdidnot come easilyto him.Hebeganwithobvious assets.Hisfamily, education, and status madehima natural leaderinthe society ofthe time. Hewas one of therichestmeninVenezuela,the owner offourhaciendas,twohousesinCaracas,anotherinLaGuaira,and themasterof numerousslaves.Hisprivateproperty gavehim a firmpower base, until,ofcourse,itwas confiscated.Hislossesearlyin the revolutionamountedto80,000 pesos,thelargestsingleconfiscation madebytheroyalists.Bolivar'stotalwealthprobablyamounted to at least200,000 pesos, thoughatthe end of his lifehehadlittle more thantheunrealized assetsofthe Aroacoppermines.2Intheprimitivewarfareof thellanos andamongthemassofthe
*The author is Director of the Institute of Latin American Studies andProfessor ofLatinAmericanHistoryinthe University of London.1. Gerhard Masur, Simon Bolivar (Albuquerque, 1948), p.184.2. Vicente Lecuna, Catdlogo de errores y caluinnias en la historia de Bolivar, 3 vols.(New York, 1956-58), I, 157-159; Stephen K. Stoan, Pablo Morillo and Venezuela, 1815-1820 (Columbus, 1974), p. 163; Paul Verna, Las minas del Libertador (Caracas, 1977), pp.179-181.
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HAHRIFEBRUARYIJOHNLYNCH
insurgents, these advantagescounted for little.Bolivar belonged toanotherworld,another culture. Theincongruity of hisposition is illustrated inastory toldby the Englishobserver Richard Vowell.In 1817, after thelossofCalabozo, the patriot officerManuel Cedefioreached SanFernandoindisgrace, to be met bymutinous llaneros.JoseAntonioP'aez,caudilloof the westernllanos,"whoknew how tomakehimself feared and re-spectedbythesoldiers," ended the tumult witha few words and per-sonallyrescuedCedenio.Toshow whowasincommand, he hadtheringleadersarrested, thoughthey included officers fromhis personal fol-lowing. Thus the movementwas stifled owing to the"irresistible ascend-ancy"ofP'aezover thellaneros. Bolivarmeanwhilehad shut himselfinhis housewithhisaides andsecretaries, and whennight fell, he em-barkeddiscreetlyona boatforAngostura,consciousperhaps that withouthis owntroops he waspowerless among thellaneros, who onlyobeyedtheirpersonalchief.
3
One ofBolivar'sgreatestachievements was to overcomehisinnatedisadvantages,toimprovehisqualifications forleadership, and to gainforhimself thepowernecessarytofulfill his task.To dothis,he hadtodominate a seriesoflesserrivalsforleadership. Hewasnotan absolute
enemyof thecaudillos;ina sensehe tookthem forgrantedas inevitableandevenuseful.Individuallyaregionalcaudillo wasprobablyno morethan aminorirritant.Collectively theywereamajorhazard to the causeandthecareer of theLiberator.2Thecaudillo was aregionalchieftain, derivinghis powerfrom controloflocalresources, especiallyofhaciendas,whichgavehimaccess to menandsupplies.Classical caudillism tookthe form ofarmedpatron-clientbands,heldtogether by personaltiesofdominance and submission andbya common desire toobtain wealthbyforceof arms.Thecaudillo'sdomainmight growfrom localtonationaldimensions.Here, too,su-premepowerwaspersonal,
notinstitutional;competitionfor;offices andresourceswas violent and the achievements wererarely permanent.Thecaudillo isrecognizedinprofilebyhistoriansand socialscientists, thoughsomeof hisfeatures remain obscure.4 The structuralinterpretationisusefulbutstaticand lackstherealismofchronologyandprosopography;nor doesit allow sufficientlyfor distinct stages ofdevelopment,when
3. Richard Vowell,Cainpaiasy cruceros (Caracas, 1973), pp.65-66.4.Eric R. Wolf and Edward C. Hansen, "Caudillo Politics: A Structural Analysis,"ComlparativeStudcliesn Society and History, 9 (1966-67), 168-179.
BOLIVARANDTHE CAUDILLOS
5caudillism existedinembryo, theninincipient or partial form, beforeculminatinginthe major figures of caudillo history.The colony was not propitious for caudillism. The Spanish empire wasgoverned by an anonymous bureaucracy, andwhilepersonalism mayhave been important in patronage, it had little place in government orpolicy-making,both ofwhichwerehighly institutionalized.On themar-gin of colonial society, however, caudillo prototypes made their appear-ance.InVenezuela land concentrationinthe llanos resultedinthe for-mation of vast hatos ("ranches")owned by powerful proprietors who cameto assert private property rights. The hunting activity of the llaneros,hitherto regarded ascommonusage, was now defined as rustling andcondemnedas delinquency.In self-defensemanyllanerosgrouped
them-selves into bands underchieftains,tolivebyviolenceand plunder;thefrontiers ofrurallifecame underthe control ofbandits, and some areas
wereina permanent stateofrebellion.Whiletheywereanaffront to
colonial law and order, however, bandit leadersdid notoperate beyondtheirlocality,nor didthey pose a political threat.The caudillo was essentially a productof thewars of independence,when the colonial state was disrupted, institutions were destroyed, andsocial groups competedto fill the
vacuum.5
Therewasnowa progressionfrom llanero, to vagrant, to bandit, to guerrilla fighter, as local proprietorsornew leaders soughttorecruit followers. While such bands might enlistunder one political cause or another, the underlying factorswerestillrural conditions and personal leadership. The countryside was soon im-poverished by destruction, and people were ruined by war taxes andplunder.As theeconomy reached breaking point,so men were forced
into bandsforsubsistence under a chieftainwhocould lead themtobooty. Thus, banditrywas aproductofrural distress and a causeofit,and,intheearly yearsofthewar, delinquency was strongerthanide-ology.It is not uncommon to observeinthese vast territoriesgroupsofbanditswho,withoutany politicalmotivationandwithdesireofpillagetheironly incentive,cometogetherand followthefirstcaudillo who offers thembootytaken fromanyonewithproperty.This ishowBoves and other bandits ofthesamekind have beenable torecruithordesofthesepeople,who liveby vagrancy,rob-bery,and assassination.
5. Robert L. Gilmore, Cauclillisrnand Militarism inVenezuela,1810-1910(Athens,Ohio, 1964),pp. 47, 69-70, 107.6."Reflexionessobre el estado actualde los Ilanos,"Dec. 6, 1813,cited in GermanCarrera Dainas,Boves,aspectos socio-econ6micosde su accionhistorica (Caracas,1968),p.158.
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John Lynch - Bolivar and the Caudillos
The Hispanic American Historical Review, Vol. 63, No. 1 (Feb., 1983), pp. 3-35
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