The plaintiffs object to all three requests on grounds of both temporal and geographicoverbreadth, arguing that:1. Although the defendants seek information from January 1, 2008, forward,legislation targeting same-sex marriage was not signed into law until May 6, 2009, and thepeople’s veto referendum overturning that law occurred on November 2, 2009.
Plaintiffs’Initial Brief at 2.2. The questions are not limited to NOM’s activities with respect to the people’sveto referendum or even with respect to its expenditures in Maine generally, but rather seek information regarding its activities nationwide, which the plaintiffs contend have no bearing onthe instant case.
.The objection is
in part, to the extent that the defendants will be permittedto inquire only as to information from January 1, 2009, forward, and otherwise
NOM has alleged, in relevant part, that Maine’s Ballot Question Committee (“BQC”) lawscannot be constitutionally applied to it because it “does not have as its major purpose thepromotion or defeat of any Maine referendum or ballot question[,]” First Amended VerifiedComplaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (“Complaint”) (Docket No. 32) ¶ 25, and thatMaine’s campaign finance/political action committee (“PAC”) laws cannot be constitutionallyapplied to it because it does not “have the major purpose of nominating or electing, a candidateor candidates, for state or local office in Maine[,]”
. ¶ 126 (citations omitted).The defendants are entitled to test the foundations of these assertions, and NOM’sfinancial information is relevant to that test.
See, e.g., Shays v. Federal Election Comm’n
, 511F. Supp.2d 19, 29-31 (D.D.C. 2007). In turn, in assessing major purpose, the defendantsrationally seek to compare the extent of NOM’s activities in Maine against its activities3