Intention [sic] Infliction of Emotional Distress and Defendant’s Civil Rico violation.”Joint App. 188. The District Court granted DiMeo leave to file an additional brief bynoon on May 14, 2006, but a few minutes before noon on the due date, DiMeo rested onthe briefs already submitted. Thus, DiMeo did not file a memorandum of law in supportof his motion to amend or submit a proposed amended complaint. On May 26, 2006, theDistrict Court dismissed the complaint with prejudice and denied DiMeo’s motion for leave to amend the complaint.
, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 533. On appeal, DiMeochallenges only the trial court’s dismissal of the defamation claim (Count I) and itsrefusal to grant leave to amend.II.We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s order granting a Rule12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.
Weston v. Pennsylvania
, 251 F.3d 420, 425 (3d Cir. 2001);
. R. C
. P. 12(b)(6). Accepting the allegations of the complaint as true anddrawing all reasonable factual inferences in favor of the plaintiff, “[w]e will affirm adismissal only if it appears certain that a plaintiff will be unable to support his claim.”
, 251 F.3d at 425. We agree with the District Court that DiMeo’s defamationclaim is barred by 47 U.S.C. § 230. Section 230 provides, in relevant part, that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.” 47 U.S.C.§ 230(c)(1) (emphases added). “No cause of action may be brought and no liability may