Alex Taylor Dissertation 0709944

According to Popper’s
Falsificationism, is Evolutionary
Biology a Science?

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Popper on Darwinism

Popper’s formulation of what defines Scientific method can be

essentially formulated into three major tenets:

• Any Scientific theory must be fundamentally empirically

testable. That is, there must be an observable and repeatable

datum which would prove that the theory as stated was

wrong.

• Scientists – rather than searching for data which would prove

or support their theory – should be trying to disprove the

theories of others in their field.

• The more unsuccessful attempts there have been to falsify a

theory, the stronger the theory should be held. Propositions

that have testable consequences but have not been tested

should be considered scientific, however we should have no

reason to consider them true.

There are, of course, far more criteria available that determine how

testable a theory is, and what types of claims are stronger – which

will be looked at later in this paper – however for the moment the

question we will be addressing is whether evolutionary theory meets

the first of these tenets.

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Popper himself discussed this, though admittedly not in a

great deal of detail, originally arguing that natural selection was

tautological. The idea is that evolution states that the organism

fittest for surviving is most likely to survive, however we only know

what organism is fittest for surviving based on how many of them

survive. Natural selection, the fundamental mechanism of Evolution,

simply states that what survives survives. As such – Popper stated:

“Darwinism is not a testable scientific theory, but a

metaphysical research program”1

This, of course, is not intended to be any deprecation of

Darwinism; simply a statement defining it. Metaphysical

programmes can still find true statements (in many ways Popper

considered Philosophy itself such a programme), it is just that these

statements differ in kind to those that Scientific projects produce.

No matter what our conclusions are on Evolutionary Theory, it would

be almost impossible to deny that it has gleaned objectively true

facts about the world.

Popper himself admits this, saying that

“…the theory is invaluable. I do not see how, without it, our

knowledge could have grown as it has done since Darwin. In trying

to explain experiments with bacteria which become adapted to, say,

penicillin, it is quite clear that we are greatly helped by the theory of

natural selection. Although it is metaphysical, it sheds much light

upon very concrete and very practical researches.”2

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If, then, at the end of this paper we are to conclude that

Darwinism is not a Scientific Theory; I would hope it should be clear

that this is in no way any detriment to its usefulness or truth. As well

as this, the conclusions we reach here should not be taken to apply

to Biology as a whole. To clarify: this essay seeks to determine the

semantic status of Darwinism and some associated theories.

Other philosophers of science at the time, however,

considered this claim a fallacious one. Michael Ruse went as far to

say that Popper only made and supported such statements as he

was “abysmally ignorant of the current status of Biological thought”

and that his “criticisms of Biology are without thought and

suggestions for its improvement are without need”3

Ruse, focussing in the fields of both Biology and Philosophy,

was in a highly informed position to comment on the significance of

Biological theory; and indeed it seems that Popper, at least partially,

took his points to heart. Seemingly as an example of his own theory;

Popper admitted to the falsity of his statement in a lecture

delivered, rather appropriately, in Darwin College, Cambridge.

In a later paper, Popper went on to state the criteria under

which he considered Natural selection to be falsifiable, and why he

considered it tautological in the first place, which seems to be

largely influenced by discourse he had with contemporary

Biologists. He went on to point out that, although far harder to test

than other sciences, there are still tests that qualify Evolutionary

theory. This is done in ‘Natural Selection and its Scientific Status’, in

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a section that is so helpful to the understanding of Popper and his

position that I feel it deserves to be quoted in its entirety.

“Darwin's own most important contribution to the theory of

evolution, his theory of natural selection, is difficult to test. There

are some tests, even some experimental tests; and in some cases,

such as the famous phenomenon known as 'industrial melanism', we

can observe natural selection happening under our very eyes, as it

were. Nevertheless, really severe tests of the theory of natural

selection are hard to come by, much more so than tests of

otherwise comparable theories in physics or chemistry. The fact that

the theory of natural selection is difficult to test has led some

people, anti-Darwinists and even some great Darwinists, to claim

that it is a tautology A tautology like 'All tables are tables' is not, of

course, testable; nor has it any explanatory power. It is therefore

most surprising to hear that some of the greatest contemporary

Darwinists themselves formulate the theory in such a way that it

amounts to the tautology that those organisms that leave most

offspring leave most offspring. C. H. Waddington says somewhere

(and he defends this view in other places) that 'Natural selection …

turns out ... to be a tautology'. However, he attributes at the same

place to the theory an 'enormous power. ... of explanation'. Since

the explanatory power of a tautology is obviously zero, something

must be wrong here. Yet similar passages can be found in the works

of such great Darwinists as Ronald Fisher, J. B. S. Haldane, and

George Gaylord Simpson; and others. I mention this problem

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because I too belong among the culprits. Influenced by what these

authorities say, I have in the past described the theory as 'almost

tautological', and I have tried to explain how the theory of natural

selection could be untestable (as is a tautology) and yet of great

scientific interest. My solution was that the doctrine of natural

selection is a most successful metaphysical research programme. It

raises detailed problems in many fields, and it tells us what we

would expect of an acceptable solution of these problems. I still

believe that natural selection works in this way as a research

programme. Nevertheless, I have changed my mind about the

testability and the logical status of the theory of natural selection;

and I am glad to have an opportunity to make a recantation.”3

We can see, then, Poppers view that Darwinism does indeed

conform to his Falsificationist view of Science. In order to fully

understand what this means, however, we must first ensure that we

fully define all the terms in discussion.

The Nature of Falsificationism

Falsificationism was originally intended as a response to the

Problem of Induction, as introduced by Hume, and a way to allow

Scientific inquiry to be both Empirical and Deductive. Hume

introduced the idea of the problem of induction in the ‘Enquiry

Concerning Human Understanding’, where it was formulated like so:

“If we be, therefore, engaged by arguments to put trust in

past experience, and make it the standard of our future judgment,

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these arguments must be probable only, or such as regard matter of

fact and real existence according to the division above mentioned…

We have said that all arguments concerning existence are founded

on the relation of cause and effect; that our knowledge of that

relation is derived entirely from experience; and that all our

experimental conclusions proceed upon the supposition that the

future will be conformable to the past. To endeavour, therefore, the

proof of this last supposition by probable arguments, or arguments

regarding existence, must be evidently going in a circle, and taking

that for granted, which is the very point in question”4

Hume’s central point is that the only reason we trust inductive

reasoning is because it has worked in the past – since there is no

deductive reason for believing that past events should be

predicative. However, this in itself is an inductive argument; we are

expecting the fact that induction has proved accurate in the past to

count as cause for it to be accurate in the future. It would seem,

then, that the argument for induction is a circular one.

There are three main solutions to this problem. We can either

deny that circular reasoning in this case is unjustified, which would

be a hard claim to make if we wished to deny any others; we can

give an objective deductive reason for why induction should be

trusted to work; or we can accept the conclusion of this argument

and, at least philosophically, not base arguments on inductive

principles.

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Falsificationism, then, is Popper’s attempt at the last solution

to this problem. If a law is proposed, and then an exception to the

law is found, deductive logic proves that the law is invalid. Since

there will be a technically (if not practically) finite number of

formulations of falsifiable laws, we will eventually be able to

eliminate all but the true laws through deduction.

Though actually intended as a clever way to allow science to

beat this problem, Falsificationism has proved in practice a very

effective demarcation between science and pseudoscience –

perhaps due to simply psychological reasons. Sciences attempting

to find universal truths tend to make highly falsifiable statements,

simply because it makes it very easy to prove wrong. In the quest

for truth, it is highly valuable if your opinions can be proved invalid.

This distinction tends to come from the way theories and facts are

marred in different fields of science and pseudoscience. In Scientific

enquiry, for example Newtonian Physics, the information is gathered

before opinions and laws are made. Having the facts first, and then

attempting to work out a theory means that the theory is likely to

explain more than the facts acquired so far, in the same way that

identifying a pattern in figures with the figures first ( 1, 1, 2, 3, 5, 8,

13, 21) will allow you to predict further numbers in the sequence.

Having a theory before the facts are gathered, such as in creationist

pseudoscience, means that your theory will be a descriptive one.

The theory can be changed to fit the facts, but still will not have a

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predicative element. In such a way, Falsificationism is a very useful

tool for examining the motivation behind a theory.

The Status of Falsificationism as a Criterion

An important clarification we have to make is how we are to view

the Falsificationist theory, whether it should be simply as a

necessary condition for something to be considered scientific or

whether it is also a sufficient condition as well. In the first iteration,

it means that not all falsifiable statements are necessarily scientific,

though all non falsifiable propositions are non scientific. Some

philosophers think that this is the best interpretation of the theory,

including Feleppa:

“Popper should not be too quickly interpreted as offering a

sufficient condition for demarcating science. …[another passage]

indicates that it is only to be taken as a necessary condition”5

(emphasis is his)

The passage Feleppa is referring to is from Conjectures and

Refutations, where Popper states that: “A system is to be

considered scientific only if it makes assertions which may clash

with observations, and a system is, in fact, tested by attempts to

refute it”6

Feleppa’s claim relies mainly on the wording of this

statement. The fact that Popper states that a system is scientific

‘only if’ it is falsifiable, rather than ‘if and only if’ it is falsifiable

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shows the nature of the logic Popper intended. Logically defined the

statement should be:

¬f¬s

(Where f stands for the fact the system is falsifiable and s stands

for the system being scientific).

Popper himself contradicted this, though, by making it explicit

that condition is a sufficient one by using the phrase ‘if and only if’,

logically represented as .

“A sentence (or a theory) is empirical-scientific if and only if it

is falsifiable”

The first ‘if’ here means that the condition is a sufficient one, if a

statement is falsifiable, then it is scientific. Given this was one of the

last representations of the theory, we can assume that this was the

meaning Popper intended.

Darwinism and Natural Selection

The specific formulation of the theory of natural selection we are

using – and the ways in which it can be tested – is possibly the most

integral part of our argument, and where the most problems in the

philosophy of biology are generated. Because our purpose is not to

improve a biological understanding of the notion, I will endeavour to

keep the tenets of the theory as simple as possible, but at the same

time keeping them accurate and explanatory. We will be using the

latest modern synthesis theory, first introduced in 1942 by Julian

Huxley4 (who, I am delighted to be informed, is the Grandson of

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Thomas Huxley); which essentially attempts to consolidate the

concepts of Natural Selection and Mendelian Genetics.

To simplify, I will highlight the major claims that I will be

focussing on here. This is, of course, neither a comprehensive nor a

categorical list of claims; however it should illustrate both the most

and least falsifiable elements of the theory.

• All currently living organisms are descended from one

common ancestor.

• The diversification and progression of organisms is due to the

selective pressures of nature. Any gene that improves the

likelihood for survival of a species, and therefore the gene’s

own survival, will be more likely to appear in the majority of

the population

• Different branches of evolution will result in nested sets of

characteristics. The more closely related two different species

are, the more genetic information they will share.

These three claims, as you may have noticed, I have sorted in order

from least to most falsifiable. The first claim – being somewhat of a

general one, and not providing any great deal of information about

the time or nature of that ancestor makes it very hard to test;

whereas the last gives a set of easily observable characteristics we

can test.

What characteristics are we to look for, then? There are three

strong sets of Characteristics which Evolution plans for, which we

can test.

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Scientific Progression

A sample datum which would falsify certainly the current

formulation of evolutionary theory may well lie in the case of fossil

reversal.

Evolution predicts the slow formulation of complex anatomical

apparatus from more simple organisms in earlier times. As our

example, we will be looking at the wing of birds of flight, seen here:

Currently, there are two main theories as to the evolution of the

wing (and flight in general); arboreal and cursorial. The arboreal

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theory states that powered flight emerged in primarily tree-dwelling

species. For a while, this was the most widely held belief, simply

because it seems a far smaller series of steps to go from leaping

mammals (of the kind of lemurs and chipmunks), to gliding

mammals (flying squirrel), to the powered flight we see today. This

theory predicts that the first transitional forms which display

characteristics of birds will also have characteristics related to

jumping and climbing, simply so that they can get into the trees in

the first place, in order to jump out of them.

The cursorial theory is referred to as the ‘ground up’ theory;

stating that the first flying organisms evolved from fast-running

long-jumping organisms. Feathers will have developed primarily as a

gliding mechanism, allowing longer and longer jumps until

eventually the ability for powered flight let them carry on without

needing to touch the ground. This theory predicts that the first

forms to display characteristics of birds will also have strong

powerful legs allowing them to reach the speeds needed for takeoff.

Two contradictory evolutionary theories have been posed,

then, and one has certainly been falsified. If we concentrate on one

characteristic of modern birds that would be considered essential,

feathers, and look at the first fossils that display this characteristic a

clear pattern emerges. Some of the fossils we have found with

filaments that are strongly suggestive of feathers are:

Sinosauropteryx, Caudipteryx, Therezinosaurs, Protarcheopteryx,

Microraptor, Rahonavis, Archeopteryx and Alvarezsaurus, in

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chronological order. We can analyse some of the oldest of these in

order to determine the evolutionary path through which feathers

reached the state they are in now.

The oldest of that list, and indeed the oldest specimen ever

recorded with feathers (though it is likely they were used as

insulation rather than propulsion) is Sinosauropteryx.

10

We can see, from this illustration, that the arms of Sinosauropteryx

are much smaller than its legs. This would, effectively, falsify the

arboreal conjecture. Were it to live, for the most part, in trees, then

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these arms would need to be larger, and allow for more stability.

The cursorial theory, however, remains unfalsified – and so we can

continue to test it, by looking at two later fossils, Caudipteryx and

Therezinosaurus.

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The sheer scale of the second fossil Therezinosaurus, being

around 9 metres across, makes it somewhat clear that this animal

did not habitually live in trees. This provides further falsification to

the Arboreal theory. For posterity’s sake, it should be mentioned

that the proposition that Therezinosaurus was feathered is a

relatively controversial one, without the quantity of fossil evidence

showing filaments that other specimens such as Archaeopteryx

display. However, other Therezinosauridae do display clear feathers,

such as the closely related Beipiaosaurus, as we can see here

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13

The feathers we can clearly see here, coupled with the bird-like

pelvis and feet of other Therezinosauridae, strongly support the

claim that Therezinosaurus was a precursor to modern birds – and

the proposition certainly has not been falsified to this date.

The arboreal theory, then, can be said to have been falsified in

a very strong sense. Creatures the size of Therezinosaurus and

Bepiaosaurus are simply too large to have lived in trees, so cannot

have begun by gliding. The cursorial theory, however, still remains

unfalsified. Though we can say that Therezinosaurus itself was

certainly incapable of flight – although if it was it would be the most

terrifying creature on the face of the planet – it displays

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characteristics we would associate with a creature dwelling in a

primarily flat environment. Any Jungle or Forest would severely

restrict its movement.

This, then, is exactly the type of scientific progression that

Popper describes. Two contradictory theories are proposed, and one

is falsified by the evidence. However, despite the weight of evidence

collected, the cursorial theory of the origin of flight remains

unfalsified. This shows that – at least in this field – the progression

of evolutionary biology is scientific

Endogenous Retroviruses

However, because fossils were known about and studied before the

theory of evolution was considered; Popper might argue that the

theory of evolution was an explanatory one rather than a predictive

one. The theory cannot tell us how flight will develop in future, but

can only explain what happened in the past. As well as this, the

various theories on the origin of flight are not central to evolutionary

theory. All that their falsifiable status can explain is the progress of

evolutionary biology in certain fields.

To test the central theory, that all organisms descended from

a common ancestor, we can look at new form of evidence that was

discovered a long while after the theory was developed: genetic

data in the form of DNA. There is a lot of confusion in the

relationship between phenotype and genotype, phenotype being the

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actual physical characteristic of an organism, and genotype being

the genetic code that we associate with it. It is often

misrepresented, occasionally even by biologists, as the genotype

causing the phenotype. This is not only a simplification, as human

characteristics are affected greatly by environmental situations also

– but it is also an assumption. All we know is that the phenotype

cannot occur without the genotype also.

However, since we can say with certainty that every

phenotypical characteristic in humans (I will generally be referring

to human characteristics and genetics given that they have been

the most comprehensibly mapped) always occurs along with a

genotype. This occurs in both the variable and generally invariable

characteristics, genes determine our eye colour, and simply the fact

we have eyes. Since genetic data is the way in which we pass on

characteristics such as the possession of eyes, we expect creatures

that we have characteristics in common with to show similar

genotypes. The way this relates to evolution is through the fact that

we generally share the most characteristics with organisms we are

most closely related to. As well as this, since we all organisms

developed from a single common ancestor, we should share a

certain amount of DNA with organisms that we greatly differ from

indeed.

Can we then come up with a falsifiable criterion by using

genetic evidence then? I would argue so. If we can both prove that

we inherit genes from our parents, which of course we have done,

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and also prove that we share no genes with even our closest

ancestors, then the original theory of evolution as Darwin formed it

will have been falsified.

Of course, our genetic similarity to apes has been widely

documented, surpassing even the most optimistic estimates. The

genetic difference between humans and various primates is seen

here:

“We selected 53 autosomal intergenic nonrepetitive DNA

segments from the human genome and sequenced them in a

human, a chimpanzee, a gorilla, and an orangutan. The average

sequence divergence was only 1.24% ± 0.07% for the human-

chimpanzee pair, 1.62% ± 0.08% for the human-gorilla pair, and

1.63% ± 0.08% for the chimpanzee-gorilla pair. These estimates,

which were confirmed by additional data from GenBank, are

substantially lower than previous ones, which included repetitive

sequences and might have been based on less-accurate sequence

data. The average sequence divergences between orangutans and

humans, chimpanzees, and gorillas were 3.08% ± 0.11%, 3.12% ±

0.11%, and 3.09% ± 0.11%, respectively, which also are

substantially lower than previous estimates.”14

These data mean that we share anywhere between 98.55% --

98.69% of our DNA with our closest living ancestor, the chimpanzee.

The theory of evolution remains unfalsified.

If this establishes that evolution is falsifiable, does falsifiability

correctly demarcate between this and the pseudoscientific theory of

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creationism? Many creationists consider exactly the same test to be

one of their theory, arguing that if something designed all species

he would use the same kinds of building blocks to make similar

species – analogous to a painter using the same types of paint in the

same ways for similar landscapes. As this website put it:

“Similarity (“homology”) is not an absolute indication of

common ancestry (Evolution) but certainly points to a common

designer (creation). Think about a Porsche and Volkswagen “beetle”

car. They both have air-cooled, flat, horizontally-opposed, 4-cylinder

engines in the rear, independent suspension, two doors, boot (trunk)

in the front, and many other similarities ('homologies'). Why do

these two very different cars have so many similarities? Because

they had the same designer! Whether similarity is morphological

(appearance), or biochemical, is of no consequence to the lack of

logic in this argument for evolution. If humans were entirely

different from all other living things, or indeed if every living thing

was entirely different, would this reveal the Creator to us? No! We

would logically think that there must be many creators rather than

one. The unity of the creation is testimony to the One True God who

made it all”15

Though this claim was only made after the results had been

found, it must be admitted that it does seem to hold a certain kind

of logical consistency. What would be required to help falsify the

theory that this was evidence of common designer rather than

common ancestor would be a type of genetic information that is

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unrelated to phenotypical characteristics. Since it would be

completely useless to include in different species, there would be no

reason for it to be in organisms at all. If it was included, there would

be no reason for it to be shared between families of organisms –

imagine finding a cucumber in a Volkswagen, there would be no

reason you would expect to also find one in a Porsche, as it is

entirely incidental to the car.

Fortunately for the sake of Popperian Darwinists, we find

exactly that tool in Endogenous Retroviruses. Retroviruses are a

specific type of virus, categorised by their ability to transcribe RNA

into DNA, which – very basically – results in the creation of new

genetic information in the genome of the cell. This new DNA is

formed in the signature of the retrovirus that caused it. Most

retroviruses infect the somatic cells of an organism, however very

few target germline cells. In rare circumstances, the germline cell

infected will be fertilized and create a new organism, which will

contain the extraneous DNA from the retrovirus.

This is, as you would imagine, an impossibly exceptional

occurrence. However, given the vast extent of biological time we

have to work with, there is quite a lot of data to analyse.

“HERVs, representing about 3% of all TE related sequences,

are currently believed to occupy up to 1% of the human genome.”16

This means that there are around thirty thousand individual

instantiations of Retroviral DNA in the human genome altogether,

which does make a sufficient ground for testing.

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If we remind ourselves of the consequences of evolutionary

theory, we can restate our predictions for the distribution of these

viruses. The more closely related species will have branched off

from each other fairly recently, and so will share the majority of the

imprints of these viruses – the more distantly related will show less.

It would falsify evolutionary theory if either of two things occurred,

either:

• Species showed no commonly shared retroviral DNA

whatsoever, showing that they could not have descended

from each other in the last few million years.

• Retroviral DNA was shared across species that were thought

to have diverged very long ago, if a species of fish shared all

of its ERV DNA with a species of Fungus, for example.

Both of these are strongly falsifiable claims, for the thirty

thousand ERVs we share – if they were distributed through

chance, would be almost impossible to occur in exactly the same

places throughout other species genome purely through chance

also.

Of course examining the genome of all species would be a

long process, and it has only really just started in non-hominids.

We can, however, look at the data presently obtained on this

topic and see how it compares. The following diagram shows the

only differences between ERVs in humans and apes, as in, out of

the thirty thousand cases, the ones listed here are the ones that

are seen in the species on the top branch and not seen in the

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other species.

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This shows that, out of all of our ERV DNA, only three instantiations

of it are unique to humans. In unique human evolution, only these

three ERVs have inserted themselves into our DNA. The scale at the

top represents how long ago these insertions and branches are

thought to have happened, in millions of years. The shared ERVs fit

in almost exactly with the branching that biologists had previously

thought.

We can see, then, that evolutionary theory remains staunchly

unfalsified, though several falsifiable criteria were given. These

criteria would have been incredibly unlikely to occur without some

guidance, so they are very strongly falsifiable. Since, however, we

have so far only looked at the Genome of various hominids in any

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great detail – there is still plenty of evidence that would falsify

evolution which could conceivably be found. Any one species found

to have radically different genetic ERVs than any of its relatives

would mean that it could not have descended from other similar

species – which would disprove evolution.

Nested Hierachies

An outcome of the idea that all organisms are descended from each

other, and different species are formed by branching off existing

species, is that characteristics will develop in groups. A

mathematical consequence of any Hierarchical progression is that it

will be representable in terms of nested sets of characteristics.

Every organism will be a member of several sets of increasing size,

and each of these sets will have their own unique characteristics.

For example: you, reader, are a Hominid, you are also a Eutherian, a

Mammal, a Vertebrate and a Eukaryote. Each of these categories

are defined by several features which evolved separately from other

. In contrast, a Chrysanthemum is an Asteraceae, a Tracheophyte, a

Plant, and a Eukaryote.

All hominids have opposable thumbs, a trait unique to

primates. Eutherian mammals feed and insulate their young in

placentas before they are born, and all mammals feed their young

through mammary glands. Vertebrae are supported by a backbone

or spinal column, and Eukaryotes have complex cellular structures,

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including a cell nucleus. Asteraceae have inflorescent flowers

(several smaller flowers inside a larger one), Tracheophytae have a

vascular system which allows transport of nutrients through the

plant, Plants photosynthesise carbon dioxide to make oxygen and,

of course, Chrysanthemums too share a cell nucleus.

This may seem like an arbitrary list of characteristics, but the

point is to show that each new feature of the organism puts it in a

set within a set. The eventual list of different types of organism

rapidly becomes almost unimaginable. Evolutionary theory predicts

that because of this branching out, no characteristics will be shared

across sets. As they evolved independently of another, specific

characteristics will not be seen in organisms not closely related. In

terms of Falsificationism, it would disprove the theory of evolution if

any sufficiently complex feature of an organism was found in an

organism not part of the same higher sets as this organism. If a

mammal was found today which had a xylem or phloem, that datum

would comprehensively disprove evolution.

However, there is part of evolutionary theory that makes

testing this postulate more difficult than it would at first appear.

Many features seem to have evolved covergently. The ability to fly,

for example, was developed in insects, birds and bats all separately

and distinctly as a solution to similar problems. However, despite

the face they all share wings, the structure of the wing itself and the

muscles powering it vary greatly. As well as this, bats have the

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ability of echolocation; which was also developed in Whales, again

with the apparatus used differing between cases.

The violation found in the nested hierarchy, then, needs to be

not only functionally equivalent to a characteristic found in another

set of organisms, but structurally (and possibly genetically) identical

to another system. Has there been any example of this in Biological

study? There certainly have been claims, not least of which

pertaining to the Platypus.

If the Archaeopteryx was the most remarkable vindication of

Evolutionary theory, the Platypus will be its biggest challenge.

Though a mammal, it lays eggs, and has a bill almost identical to

that of a duck. As well as this, it actually shares some genetic

similarity in the way it reproduces to birds, as seen here:

“The platypus X1 chromosome has 11 genes that are found on

all mammalian X chromosomes. The X5 carries a gene called

DMRT1, which is also found on the Z chromosome in birds. But

although many people believe that DMRT1 will turn out to be the

key sex-determining gene in birds, Grützner cautions that there is

no evidence that it plays a similar role in the platypus. The way in

which chromosomes determine sex in mammals and birds was

thought to have evolved independently after the two classes

diverged 300 million years ago.” 18

This is not impossible to explain in evolutionary terms, but

does – for now – involve a rather ad hoc move. Given that mammals

and birds both evolved from fish, which reproduced sexually, there

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is a chance that the DMRT1 gene was present in a common

ancestor, and most mammals simply lost use for it. However, given

their incredibly odd chromosomal make up (XXXXXXXXXX for female

and XYXYXYXYXY for male) the DMRT1 gene continued to be useful

for Platypi. This proposition, though, is unscientific in Popper’s

sense. Without any real idea of what common ancestor birds and

mammals might have had, and even less idea if a fossil would ever

be found, and perhaps no way of testing it even if it was found – this

is an unfalsifiable claim.

Argument From Increasing Complexity

Another claim directly derivable from the theory of evolution is that

biological complexity should form a strictly linear progression. This

is only accepted, however, if we also introduce the idea of

abiogenisis; the statement that life originated from earth from non-

organic substances. There are several theories as to how this may

have come to be – but if we for now dismiss the idea that we were

created by either a lucky or benevolent alien, it is clear that it must

have found some way to happen.

Because the first organisms must have been incredibly simple

to happen as a result of chemical processes – likely no more than a

string of RNA – they will have had to take the long, 800 million years

route to evolve to the amount of complexity we see today. As such,

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certainly in the very early Precambrian to Cambrian periods, we

would expect to see the following:

1. Very few fossils, as in order for fossils to form, a hard calcite

structure (such as in skeletons or shells) must be apparent. It

is thought that the ability to metabolise limestone in order to

provide the calcium required did not evolve until the early

Cambrian period – so before that there should be almost no

fossils.

2. All fossils found should be impressions of soft tissue, see

references 19 and 20.

3. The complexity of all fossils should be limited at best. After

only a hundred million years of evolution, the progress of

organisms is expected to be restricted to invertebrate sea

creatures. Segmented worms and Jellyfish will be about the

most complex these organisms will get.

What could we think of that might falsify these claims? Well, clearly

any sufficiently complex Precambrian organism would certainly

throw the theory wildly. Any basic vertebrate, showing a spine and

system of internal organs, would mean that life would have to

originated and evolved for at least a hundred million years or so

before previously thought. A more complex specimen, showing bone

development similar to mammals or another primarily land-dwelling

genus would disprove the theory entirely.

Can we then say that scientists are attempting to falsify the

theory by this method? In looking at a set of Ediacaran Fauna from

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Adelaide, the fossil Tribrachidium was discovered, which was

tentatively termed an echinoderm. Admittedly this is not quite the

same as finding a monkey in a set of Cryogenian rocks, but the

development of such an organism means that certain types of

marine animal were present in the world earlier than it would have

seemed before. Other, simpler Ediacaran fauna can be seen here:

19, 20

This is the type of fossil, if any, to be expected in the Pre-Cambrian

period. The first represents a front segment of a worm-like organism

which is radially symmetrical, the second showing a type of soft

coral which is bilaterally symmetrical. This is opposed to

Tribrachidium:

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21

Which shows an (almost unique) trilateral symmetry, and a set of

loose filaments which allowed the specimen to inflate or deflate

whilst retaining its structure. Whilst it may not seem like much, this

shows quite a lot of complexity for such an early organism. As well

as this, Tribrachidium is almost impossible to fit into the fossil

record of the Cambrian explosion. The fossils above, representing

worms and coral, have well established evolutionary pathways;

however Tribrachidium (along with many other Ediacaran fossils)

does not really fit into the established order of evolution.

Here we come across – I think – Popper’s main justification for

calling Evolutionary theory non-scientific. In what would seem like

an ad-hoc move, the loss of connection between Tribrachidium is

explained away due to the lack of corroboratory fossils. As of the

moment, there is no explanation as to what Tribrachidium evolved

from, and what species evolved from it. This is partially because of

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the lack of much of a fossil record from the Pre-Cambrian period.

Due to the nature of organisms from that time, as well as how few of

them there probably was, biologists may just have to admit

ignorance in this area. We don’t know how Tribrachidium fits into

the evolutionary picture, and we may never know. It does, in fact,

falsify various conjectures about the Cambrian explosion and Pre-

Cambrian life; but also makes it very hard to come up with new

ones.

Because of this, it is incredibly hard – if not impossible to

come up with any genuinely falsifiable conjecture about Ediacaran

fossils. Although the complexity of some of these organisms means

that life may have originated slightly earlier than previously

thought, most Biologists would claim that it does not falsify

evolutionary theory as a whole. All that can be said of these fossils

is we cannot, at the moment, account for them.

Demarcation within Science

The lack of falsifiability here may justify Popper’s argument, to a

certain extent. Generally, in physics or chemistry, if an anomalous

data point exists that seems to go against what is predicted by the

theory, an explanation is offered almost immediately afterwards.

When Newton’s theory of gravity was found to not explain the

orbital path of Neptune correctly, the idea that there was another

planetoid behind it was put forwards – and subsequently proved.

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After observations of the expansion of the universe were found to

contradict the amount of matter that was thought to be in it, dark

matter was proposed, and is currently being searched for.

The fact that the evidence for a lot of Biological propositions

depends on the formation of fossils and rocks does mean that

Biologists cannot be as clear cut when explaining what to test for,

making evolutionary theory not falsifiable in the same way as other

scientific theories. Finding fossil evidence that could falsify evolution

depends in a large way upon luck. If – even after Popper’s

declaration that he considered Natural Selection to be testable, and

not a tautology – we wanted to argue that evolutionary theory was

non-scientific, this would probably be the most convincing claim. In

a lot of ways, Biological tests are simply of a different kind.

The demarcation between the physical sciences and biological

ones lies in this distinction. Physical sciences will tend to propose

theories with strongly falsifiable individual claims, and also have an

explanation of how to test these claims straight away. Biological

theories tend to come up with lists of things that could falsify the

theory, if found. This is a necessary difference, as it depends on the

types of truths both subjects aim to discover. The truths of the

physical sciences are universal ones pertaining to laws, so will be

observed in any object. Many physical laws could, theoretically, be

tested simply using objects from your desk; though probably more

easily observed in either larger or smaller examples. Because

biological truths relate directly and solely to life, living organisms

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are the only thing that could conceivably test them. Natural

selection does not apply to Gluons.

What are we to make of this demarcation then? I would argue,

nothing. Provided Biologists list sufficient falsifiable criteria to test,

which would be statistically surprising without the theory, we can

say that Biology is still falsifiable. As such, any fossil reversal, lack of

genetic similarity or violation of the nested set of characteristics:

which together provide an incredible list of data points to falsify the

theory, would disprove evolution.

These two types of falsification need to be distinguished from

each other. The first type of falsification, the one which Popper

seems to consider for the majority of his work, I will be calling

Experimental Falsification. This type of falsification involves setting

up a scenario in which you can predict an outcome, and deliberately

organising that situation. For example, the conjecture that fire is an

oxidation reaction can be tested by keeping petrol in an oxygen-free

environment, and then heating the petrol to around 250 degrees

Celsius. If the Petrol ignites, the theory has been falsified; if it does

not, it has not.

The second type of falsifiability, which Popper does not fully

account for, is Observational Falsification. Though all science is

based on observation, I think that this term more helpfully

distinguishes the type of observation that is required: simply

proposing a theory, and then looking for examples of things that

would falsify it. It should be stated that most of astrophysics

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operates in this way, including the previous example of the

discovery of Pluto. The main way we test our theories of pulsars and

black holes is by seeing if they, and the objects around them,

behave as the theory predicts. Despite how difficult they may be to

observe, however, there is no shortage of astronomical objects in

the same way there may be of specific biological taxa. It is certain

there will be species we will never discover, and it is immensely

probable that this will turn out to be the majority of all species.

However, none of the examples discovered so far have in any way

disproved evolution.

Though this distinction has been observed before, I intend to

apply this to the way we expect these types of science to be

falsified. As the data differ greatly, so should – I will argue – the

expected Falsifiability of such Data.

Science as a Verb

Much of the confusion in whether the evolutionary theory is a

scientific one is caused by a fundamental problem with the way we

consider science. It seems we can easily identify scientific

endeavour, and not just by the proliferation of lab coats. Scientists

do tend to constantly propose new theories, announce conflicting

data, announce data which conflict with the conflicting data and so

on. As well as this, not all scientists constantly attempt to falsify

their theories, yet we still think of them as such. Often the best

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science occurs when there are two sides to a debate, some trying to

disprove a theory, others trying to defend it. Lakatos was the first to

state that Popper missed this basic notion of human nature:

“Is, then, Popper’s falsifiability criterion the solution to the

problem of demarcating science from pseudoscience? No. For

Popper’s criterion ignores the remarkable tenacity of scientific

theories. Scientists have thick skins. They do not abandon a theory

(merely) because facts contradict it. They normally either invent

some rescue hypothesis to explain what they then call a mere

anomaly and if they cannot explain the anomaly, they ignore it, and

direct their attention to other problems. Note that scientists talk

about anomalies, recalcitrant instances, and not refutations.”22

As well as this basic contradiction with how science is actually

done, Lakatos also claims that there is a logical contradiction

inherent in Popper’s falsificationism, stating that any observation is

always just that – an observation. Assigning a truth value to an

observation is impossible.

“The truth value of the ‘observational’ propositions cannot be

indubitably decided: no factual proposition can ever be proved from

an experiment. Propositions can only be derived from other

propositions, they cannot be derived from facts: one cannot prove

statements from experiences”23

Without wishing to venture too far into epistemological claims,

this statement is of course a correct one. Sensory data can only tell

us about the sensory world, to claim otherwise we would need to

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assume several things about the nature of reality. This is, however,

an unhelpful point. Despite its claim for universal truths, science can

of course only deliver observational ones; since it is an empirical

endeavour. Science requires the active assumption that the sensory

world is accessible to everyone in the same manner, otherwise it

simply cannot progress.

Regardless, Lakatos’ characterisation of scientific

development is accurate. Science does not divide itself into

‘theorists’ and ‘experimenters’, it simply argues over what the best

theory could be. Because of this, and because we can generally

recognise science thanks to its constant reevaluation and progress

towards comprehensive theories; it may be better to characterise

science as a method, rather than a type. Rather than deciding

whether statements and theories are scientific, it is the way in

which they are tested which must be analysed. Both Evolutionary

theory, and Creationist theory are equally scientific, it is how much

they progress which will determine their value.

How should we judge this progression then? In truth, Popper

has taken us the majority of the way there with his ‘dogmatic’

Falsificationism. An endeavour is scientific if and only if it constantly

proposes new theories that can be challenged. The consequences of

studying a branch of science should be that you are predicting

potential observations, and then looking for them. If an observation

falsifies a corollary of the theory, then the theory is modified if it can

be. Sometimes, so much contradictory evidence will be accumulated

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that the theory simply cannot be changed to accept it, and the

theory will be dropped. Thus, to find evidence that does not fit your

theory does not mean that you necessarily have to drop it.

“Methodological ‘falsification’ is very different from Dogmatic

falsification. If a theory is falsified, it is proven false; if it is ‘falsified’,

it may still be true”24

Finding evidence that clashes with your theory is an everyday

part of science, according to Lakatos. If you are not constantly re-

evaluating your theory then you cannot be said to be a scientist. It

is this act towards truths, rather than statements of it, which is the

defining characteristic of science.

It is worthwhile to note that in this characterisation of

Falsificationism, when (or if) we reach the end of science – where we

know all universal truths to the extent that we can predict the entire

universe without error – science will cease to exist. The statements

it has produced will, of course, but given that we are now

characterising science as an act if there is nothing to refine then

there is no science to be done.

Again, however, though Lakatos does help our understanding

of scientific progress, his dismissal of Popperian dogmatic

Falsificationism is unwarranted. Certain sciences do operate how

Popper describes. The ‘plum pudding’ model of atomic structure,

for example, was disproved by just one major experiment. The

Geiger-Marsden experiment on the reflection of alpha-particles

showed that alpha-particles – known to be high in mass and power –

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mostly penetrated straight through gold foil. However, some were

diffracted slightly to one side or another, and in rare cases some

reflected directly backwards.25 This could not have happened if the

structure of the Gold foil was uniform, otherwise all the particles

should behave the same. In one experiment, the ‘plum pudding’

model proposed by J. J. Thomson was disproved.

After the Photoelectric effect was discovered it was used to

test the wave theory of light. Whether electrons were given off or

not was found to depend on the frequency of the light used, rather

than the intensity, thus disproving the wave theory. There are

thousands of examples were a theory was proposed, given a

testable criterion, and disproved using one experiment; sometimes

all within one week. At the time of writing, the entire standard

model of Particle Physics is being tested at the large Hadron

collider; if no Higgs Boson is found, the theory is disproved. All of

these scientific postulates conform almost ideally to Dogmatic

Falsificationism.

Different theories for Different Sciences

Is there not a way to consolidate the theories of both Lakatos and

Popper into a workable model? I believe there is, and the solution

lies in the previous demarcation between types of scientific

falsifiability. As Popper was more familiar with the physical sciences,

it is my belief that he tailored his theory towards experimental

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falsifiability. When you are able to be in complete control of the

variables which you intend to measure, this strong or Dogmatic

sense of Falsifiability is entirely justified. A repeatable experiment

which shows that a universal law proposed does not hold in a given

circumstance has disproved that law, or at least the current version

of it. As such, experimental scientists should take every care to

make sure that any law they propose has a performable trial

associated with it.

When it comes to Observational science, however, scientists

simply are not in a position where this type of claim can come to

hand. Working with a partial fossil record and unmappable

genomes, central theories cannot always be falsifiable. As we have

seen, both the explanations for the Platypus and Tribrachidium are

not falsifiable ones currently, and may never be so. However, they

were created as a corollary of a central theory that is producing

falsifiable claims. Any examples of Fossil reversal, a massive

violation of the nested set of characteristics or a complete lack of

shared ERVs with related animals would mean that some fairly

major tenets of Evolutionary theory would have to be completely

rethought, and even eventually overthrown. Evolutionary biology is

Falsifiable in the Methodological sense

Both categories are falsifiable, and both categories are

science; in the same sense that whilst paintings and pottery may be

judged on different merits they are still both types of art. There is

nothing remarkable in the claim that different methods of research

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should be analysed differently. The problems Lakatos found with

Popper’s theory were valid, but perhaps ironically, Lakatos assumed

these problems falsified the entirety of the theory.

If my claim is correct, observational sciences other than

evolutionary biology will be better viewed as methodologically

falsifiable rather than experimentally. This will mean that some

central theories may not be falsifiable in themselves, but corollaries

to theories that produce other falsifiable claims. To test this, let us

analyse astrophysics.

Currently, it is thought that around 74% of the energy in the

universe is unobservable, and may be fundamentally so. Even the

most optimistic claims state that:

“The case for detection of dark energy is serious but not yet

as convincing; we await more checks that may come out of work in

progress. Planned observations might be capable of detecting

evolution of the dark energy density; a positive result would be a

considerable stimulus to attempts to understand the microphysics of

dark energy.”26

The current expansion rate of the universe entails this dark

energy, along with dark matter; as it opposed what we would

otherwise expect simply through gravitational forces. However, this

is again an ad hoc move. When data conflicts with the a part of the

theory, an untestable addition is added. This is certainly not

falsifiable in the Dogmatic sense. However, Relativity as a whole has

produced models for black holes, and can predict the rotation of

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galaxies according to gravity. These other corollaries are falsifiable,

and are constantly being adapted along with the theory itself. This

would make Astrophysics methodologically testable.

Conclusion

We can see, then, that ultimately Evolutionary Biology is not

Falsifiable in the Popperian sense, even though Popper himself

might have claimed otherwise. In the claim itself, however, he did

mention that

“…really severe tests of the theory of natural selection are

hard to come by, much more so than tests of otherwise comparable

theories in physics or chemistry. The fact that the theory of natural

selection is difficult to test has led some people, anti-Darwinists and

even some great Darwinists, to claim that it is a tautology”27

Of course, Popper is right. Tests of evolutionary theory are

less severe, and in some cases prove unhelpful. This is not any fault

of the scientists proposing the theories, or the theories themselves;

it is simply a consequence of the fact that there are several types of

truth in the world, and several ways that data on these truths can

be obtained. When you can control the situation in which a certain

event will occur, then you will have an experimental science, when

you cannot then the best you can hope for is an observational one.

Without the ability (and for the moment disregarding the moral

concerns) to create organisms ourselves – and certainly without the

time to observe their reproductive behaviour over hundreds of

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millions of years; Biology simply cannot be falsifiable in the sense

Popper would like.

This does mean that natural selection does differ from other

sciences, and Popper did not properly allow for it as a category in

his construal of scientific method. Popper’s explanatory model,

however, should be kept, as like the best science it can be altered to

explain the data it cannot account for. All we need is a

methodological mode of Falsificationism where it is the act of

science in which science is defined, and observational science is

included fully in our delineation.

If it were to be argued that this further complicates the

demarcation of science, I would have to agree. However, I submit

that the further demarcation is a necessary one. Furthermore, our

innate sense of science involves the idea that people are prepared

to be proven wrong, this is the main thing to keep in mind when

observing scientific endeavour.

I am also willing to admit that my further categorisation of

Science may not be comprehensive. Though I cannot currently

conceive of any, there may be subjects which I wish to account for

as science which the Experimental/Observational criterion does not.

This being so, I am sure that the way to include these subjects

would be a further expansion of falsifiability to include a third

category.

We can say, then, that despite Popper not fully accounting for

natural selection in the theory of Falsficationism, the theory still

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stands. All that is required is caveat that specifies another,

methodological way we can consider something to be falsifiable.

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References

1. Popper, Karl Unended Quest, Routledge 2002 (First Published

1976)

2. Ibid

3. Ruse, Michael Karl Popper’s Philosophy of Biology, taken from

‘Philosophy of Science’ vol.44, University of Chicago press

1977.

4. Popper, Karl Natural Selection and its Scientific Status 1977.

Taken from ‘Popper Selections’ edited by David Miller

(Princeton University Press 1985).

5. Hume, David Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding,

Dover 2004 (First Published

6. Popper, Karl Conjectures and Refutations,

7. Feleppa, Robert, Kuhn, Popper, and the Normative Problem of

Demarcation taken from Philosophy of Science and the Occult,

State University of New York 1990

8. Huxley, Julian Evolution: A Modern Synthesis, (Allen and

Unwin, 1942)

9. http://www.akcreative.com/pcw/wing.gif

10. http://people.eku.edu/ritchisong/feather_evolution.htm

11. http://dinobase.gly.bris.ac.uk/frontend/dinobase_pageViewSpe

cies.php?id=809

12. http://www.gondwanastudios.com/dd/dd51.jpg

13. (from the blog of Paleontologist Adam Yates,

http://web.wits.ac.za/Academic/Science/GeoSciences/Staff/yat

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es.htm )

http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_5jvcMWhYJGc/SWxUnZ2YMMI/AAAA

AAAAARg/f_cENlKb-Hg/s400/Beipaiosaurus.jpg

14. Feng-Chi Chen and Wen-Hsiung Li, Genomic Divergences

between Humans and Other Hominoids and the Effective

Population Size of the Common Ancestor of Humans and

Chimpanzees, taken from ‘American Journal of Human

Genetics’ volume 68, p444-456, (February 2001)

15. http://www.christiananswers.net/q-aig/aig-c018.html (not a

scholarly article, though only because no creation science

journals that claimed justification of creationism on genetic

grounds I could find would release a copy of their work, even

after emailed)

16. Eugene D. Sverdlov, Retroviruses and Primate Evolution,

taken from ‘Bioessays’ volume 22, p161-171, (2002, John

Wiley and Sons

17. Yuri B. Lebedev, Oksana S. Belonovitch, Natalia V. Zybrova,

Paul P. Khil, Sergey G. Kurdyukov, Tatyana V. Vinogradova,

Gerhard Hunsmann and Eugene D. Sverdlov, Differences in

HERV-K LTR insertions in orthologous loci of humans and great

apes, taken from ‘Gene’, Volume 247, Issues 1-2, Pages 265-

277, (18 April 2000)

18. http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn6568

19. http://home.entouch.net/dmd/burgess22.gif

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20. http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_dvbHH5KkRSU/SujZyQuU6jI/AAAAAA

AAD1A/gA06nAEAwqg/s400/ediacaran_fossil.jpg

21. http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_sQUMEIlMJX0/SQ_kOralWAI/AAAAAA

AAAFg/7wSU_zHhgPU/s320/Ediacaran+Tribrach1.jpg

22. Lakatos, Imre, Science and pseudoscience, taken from

‘Conceptions of Inquiry: A Reader’ p114–121 (London:

Methuen. 1981).

23. Lakatos, Imre, Falsificationism and the Methodology of

Scientific Research Programmes, taken from ‘Proceedings of

the International Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science’

volume 4 p91-197, (London, 1965)

24. Lakatos, Imre, Ibid

25. H. Geiger and E. Marsden, On a Diffuse Reflection of the alpha

Particles, (University of Manchester Press, 1909)

26. P.J.E. Peebles and Bharat Rhata, arXiv:astro-ph/0207347v2

27. Popper, Karl Natural Selection and its Scientific Status 1977.

Taken from ‘Popper Selections’ edited by David Miller

(Princeton University Press 1985).

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