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THE PRESIDENT OF VERIFICATION COMMISSION Antoni MACIEREWICZ
ABSTRACT OF THE REPORT
On the actions of soldiers and employees of theformer Military Intelligence Services (WSI) performing military intelligence andcounter-intelligence activity and other actions going beyond the issues of theState defense and safety of the Polish Army.
Introduction
The Report comprises information about the activity of soldiers and employees of special services (and the persons co-operating with them) concerning: •disclosure or use of the information making by the State secret or; • omission tonotify the prosecution agencies of criminal acts; • obstruction and disconcertingpenal proceedings; • use of violence and illegal threats; • exerting illegal affect ondecisions made by the public authorities; • keeping secret cooperation withentrepreneurs and persons acting in (public) media; • falsifying information inorder to exercise or extend penal proceedings against specific persons; • takingfinancial or personal benefits from the above mentioned actions; • and any other actions going beyond the matters of State defense and safety of the Polish Army.The Report also discloses the information about the persons occupying leadingstate positions who did not undertake any actions aiming at discontinuation of theactivities of the military special services going beyond the prevailing regulationsof the law. Military Intelligence Services (the WSI) and their legal predecessors –the entities executing the military intelligence and counter-intelligence tasks,constituted and were integral part of the Polish Army. As part of the Polish Army,the military special services could act exclusively within the scope of Statedefense and safety. The strictly determined obligations of Military IntelligenceServices (the WSI) included only the tasks relating to identification andcounteracting the threats being detrimental to State defense and breach of theState secret relating to defense. In connection with liquidation of the MilitaryInformation Services – the WSI [the process begin on the summer of 2006 bythree Acts of Parliament, issued on the 9th of June], the Verification Commissionwas appointed. The Commission was collecting and analyzing materialsoriginating from the hearings of the soldiers of the WSI and third persons, fromthe archive files, being at the disposal of the WSI (Military Information Services).
Then after WSI was disbanded on the date of the 30th of September 2006, fileswere at the disposal of new services: SKW (Military Counter-intelligenceService), SWW (Military Intelligence Service), IPN (Institute of NationalRemembrance), CAW (Central Military Archives). The transformations performedin the Army after 1989 left intact the basic structures and the old cadre of thespecial forces and subordinated them to the management of the officersoriginating from the 2nd Directorate of the Staff General. The files of former military services or files produced by individual WSI units on an on-going basis,were systematically destroyed and hidden. In turn, the process of establishing of a new system aimed at hiding material information before the vetting-relatedlegislation coming into force was initiated. For instance, an attempt at destroyingthe personal data by deleting them with the use of a marker in the register of agents from ‘Wybrze
ż
e Gda
ń
skie’ [Three-Cities: Gda
ń
sk-Sopot-Gdynia Region]from the 70’ies and 80’ies was proved. The Report contains 24 documentaryannexes, in which the problems referred to above are discussed in more detailcomparing to the Report itself.
The WSI - origins
In the 1980s two structures composed the military services of the People'sRepublic of Poland. These were: the 2nd Directorate of the General Staff of thePolish People's Army and the Military Internal Services (WSW) established fromthe former Military Information, acting simultaneously as C.I. as well as militarypolice but in reality being merely a kind of military political police. In the autumnof 1991, the structure was named the Military Intelligence Services. In 2006 theParliament’s Act dissolved the WSI and established two separated services: theMilitary Counter Intelligence Service - MCIS and the Military Intelligence Service -MIS (SKW and SWW [in Polish: S
ł
u
ż
ba Kontrwywiadu Wojskowego and S
ł
u
ż
baWywiadu Wojskowego]). Organizational changes made in the end of eightiesand in the beginning of nineties did not have a crucial impact. [Military] Service(s)have played a function of political apparatus continuously: amongst almost 10thousand collaborators of the military services acting inside the country as wellas abroad in the year 1990, at least 2500 (roughly 25%) consisted of peoplebeing very well-placed in central administrative and economic institutions of thecountry. This problem is illustrated below presenting a list encompassing of as
many as 2457 WSI (WSW) collaborators being placed in as WSI 'assets' in civilinstitutions of the [so-called] People's Republic of Poland [before 1989]. Inter aliathey were placed in: • National Level Administration: 204 (including 108 in theMinistry of Foreign Affairs alone). • Political and social organizations: 24 •Academies and Universities: 207 university teachers, 342 students, 38 membersof the Polish Academy of Sciences, 41 employees of Research Institutes. •Schools: 25 in high-school, technical, professional and elementary schools. •Journalists in TV, Radio and Press: 67 • Artistic and cultural institutions,publishers and printing offices: 21 • Hospitals and medical institutions: 34 • Banksand insurance companies: 18 • ‘International Commerce ‘Centrala’s’ - foreigntrade companies and chambers: 471 • Military Production Companies: 19 • Fuel& Energy Companies: 32 • Transportation companies: 272 • Maritime sector companies [besides the mentioned above transportation ones]: 101 • Other business branches: 407 • R&D centers for industry, project bureaus, etc.: 49 •Cooperatives including dwelling-cooperatives: 38Single collaborators were placed also in inter alia: arrests, labor offices, ‘TreasuryPrinting-house’, taxi-cab companies, ‘Institute of Meteorology’, sport clubs, ‘FolkRiding Team’ (‘Ludowy Zespó
ł
Je
ź
dziecki’), ‘State Mint’, and many other institutions. WSI established also a network of companies on the territory of theneutral countries (from Scandinavia to Mediterranean countries), working legallyas regular commercial establishments. Several sources of military intelligencewere identified: • smuggling and illegal trade of computer parts; • foreign banktransaction from the funds of the state-owned ‘Foreign Trade Central’; •repurchase of Polish debt through ‘Foreign Debt Administration Fund’ (FOZZ); •taking over inheritances of former Polish citizens deceased abroad; • arms tradewith (especially Arab) terrorists; • establishing common ventures (called even inPolish: 'joint venture') with Polish companies through secret collaborators. • theForeign Intelligence of the WSI tried also very hard to start with its own TVcompany. Original reason for such activities was to make easy to place secretcollaborators on the West.Russian penetration: the threats for internal and external safety of the State TheSoviet special services (KGB and GRU) fully controlled (also, if not especially
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