Prof. V. A.
Avena
What Need Not Be Proved
ALFELOR v HALASAN
G.R. No. 165987
CALLEJO; March 31, 2006
(glaisa)
NATURE
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari
FACTS
- The children and heirs of the late spouses Telesforo
and Cecilia Alfelor filed a Complaint for Partition.
Among the plaintiffs were Teresita Sorongon and her
two children, Joshua and Maria Katrina, who claimed to
be the surviving spouse of Jose Alfelor, one of the
children of the deceased Alfelor Spouses.
- Josefina H. Halasan filed a Motion for Intervention
alleging that she has legal interest in the matter of
litigation in the above-entitled case for partition
between plaintiffs and defendants; that she is the
surviving spouse and primary compulsory heir of Jose K.
Alfelor, one of the children and compulsory heirs of
Telesforo I. Alfelor whose intestate estate is subject to
herein special proceedings for partition; that herein
intervenor had not received even a single centavo from
the share of her late husband Jose K. Alfelor to the
intestate estate of Telesforo K. Alfelor.
- Josefina attached to said motion her Answer in
Intervention claiming that she was the surviving spouse
of Jose. Thus, the alleged second marriage to Teresita
was void ab initio for having been contracted during the
subsistence of a previous marriage. Josefina further
alleged that Joshua and Maria Katrina were not her
husband’s children. Josefina prayed, among others, for
the appointment of a special administrator to take
charge of the estate. Josefina attached to her pleading
a copy of the marriage contract which indicated that
she and Jose were married.
- Judge set the motion for hearing. Josefina presented
the marriage contract as well as the Reply-in-
Intervention filed by the heirs of the deceased, where
Teresita declared that she knew “of the previous
marriage of the late Jose K. Alfelor with that of the
herein intervenor.” However, Josefina did not appear in
court.
- Teresita testified that Jose told her that he did not
have his marriage to Josefina annulled because he
believed in good faith that he had the right to remarry,
not having seen her for more than seven years. This
opinion was shared by Jose’s sister who was a judge.
Teresita also declared that she met Josefina in 2001,
and that the latter narrated that she had been married
Evidence-A2010 Page |1
three times, was now happily married to an Englishman party cannot subsequently take a position contrary of
and residing in the United States. or inconsistent with what was pleaded.
- Judge denied the motion and dismissed intervenor’s - Intervention shall be allowed when a person has (1) a
complaint, ruling that respondent was not able to prove legal interest in the matter in litigation; (2) or in the
her claim. The trial court pointed out that the success of any of the parties; (3) or an interest against
intervenor failed to appear to testify in court to the parties; (4) or when he is so situated as to be
substantiate her claim. Moreover, no witness was adversely affected by a distribution or disposition of
presented to identify the marriage contract as to the property in the custody of the court or an officer
existence of an original copy of the document or any thereof.
public officer who had custody thereof. Teresita and her - Considering this admission of Teresita, petitioners’
children, Joshua and Maria Katrina, were the legal and mother, the Court rules that respondent Josefina
legitimate heirs of the late Jose K. Alfelor, considering Halasan sufficiently established her right to intervene in
that the latter referred to them as his children in his the partition case. She has shown that she has legal
Statement of Assets and Liabilities, among others. interest in the matter in litigation.
- Josefina filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was Dispositive The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
denied. CA reversed the ruling of the trial court. It held G.R. SP No. 74757 is AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial
that Teresita had already admitted (both verbally and Court, Branch 17, Davao City, is ORDERED to admit
in writing) that Josefina had been married to the respondent Josefina Halasan’s Complaint-in-
deceased, and under Section 4, Rule 129 of the Revised Intervention and forthwith conduct the proper
Rules of Evidence, a judicial admission no longer proceedings with dispatch.
requires proof. Consequently, there was no need to
prove and establish the fact that Josefa was married to
the decedent.
ISSUE
WON the first wife of a decedent, a fact admitted by the
other party who claims to be the second wife, should be
allowed to intervene in an action for partition involving
the share of the deceased “husband” in the estate of
his parents.
HELD
YES.
PSCFC FINANCIAL CORP v CA
- The fact of the matter is that Teresita Alfelor and her (QUIASON, BANCO FILIPINO)
co-heirs, petitioners herein, admitted the existence of G.R. No. 106094
the first marriage in their Reply- in-Intervention filed in BELLOSILLO; Dec 28, 1992
the RTC. Teresita admitted several times that she knew
that her late husband had been previously married to
(kooky)
another.
NATURE
- This admission constitutes a “deliberate, clear and
Petition for annulment of foreclosure proceedings, and
unequivocal” statement; made as it was in the course
damages
of judicial proceedings, such statement qualifies as a
judicial admission. A party who judicially admits a fact
FACTS:
cannot later challenge that fact as judicial admissions
- PSCFC as land developer availed of the Home
are a waiver of proof; production of evidence is
Financing Plan of Banco Filipino and borrowed from the
dispensed with.
latter the amount of P6,630,690 as "developer loan." As
- A judicial admission also removes an admitted fact
security, petitioner constituted a mortgage over several
from the field of controversy. Consequently, an
lots in Pasay City which were not yet sold at that time
admission made in the pleadings cannot be
to third parties. It was agreed that under the Home
controverted by the party making such admission and
Financing Plan, the "developer loan" would mature only
are conclusive as to such party, and all proofs to the
after the lots shall have been subdivided and improved
contrary or inconsistent therewith should be ignored,
and then sold to third persons who would then be
whether objection is interposed by the party or not.
substituted as mortgagors to the extent of the loan
- The allegations, statements or admissions contained
value of the lots and houses bought by them.
in a pleading are conclusive as against the pleader. A
Prof. V. A. Avena
- Sept 25 1987, without the loan having matured as
none of the lots have been conveyed to buyers, the
mortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed and a
certificate of sale was executed in favor of Banco
Filipino.
- Private respondents admitted the loan for which
petitioner had executed a promissory note secured by a
real estate mortgage on the properties. However, they
denied that petitioner had availed itself of Banco
Filipino's Home Financing Plan, averring instead that
under the promissory note and the contract of
mortgage, the subject loan would fall due "1 year from
date" or on 5 January 1986 and that upon default of
petitioner, Banco Filipino could immediately foreclose
the mortgage under Act No. 3135.
- PSCFC served upon Banco Filipino a written request
for admission of the truth of certain matters set forth as
follows:
1. The plaintiff (PSCFC) ... was ... granted by you under
BF Home Financing Plan, on the security of mortgages
constituted on the lands acquired, under the terms of
which the developer loans, despite the contents of the
covering promissory notes and security instruments,
would mature only after the development of the
acquired lands into residential subdivision and the
resale of the ... lots ... to interested third parties who
would then be substituted as mortgagors ...
2. ... in 1984, availing itself of your said Home
Financing Plan, the plaintiff obtained from you a loan ...
of P6,630,690.00 for which it signed in your favor a
promissory note on the security of a mortgage
constituted on ... lots, which were not then yet sold to
any third person ...
3. ... on September 25, 1987, without the said loan
having yet matured for the reason that none of the ...
lots had yet been the subject of sale to third persons
such that substitution of the latter as mortgagors in
your favor could not yet be had, a certificate of sale
was executed by the Notary Public over the ... lands in
your favor.
- PSCFC received Banco Filipino's answer to its request
for admission signed by its counsel, Atty. Philip Sigfrid
A. Fortun. Counsel admitted, inter alia, petitioner's
mortgage loan as well as the fact that Banco Filipino
was engaged in land development loans. However,
respondent denied that petitioner availed itself of the
Home Financing Plan, including the agreement that the
maturity of the debt would depend on the resale of the
mortgaged subdivision lots.
- PSCFC made a second request for admission on
respondent Banco Filipino impliedly objecting to the
first reply having been made by its lawyer, Atty. Fortun,
who was not even an attorney yet when Banco Filipino
inaugurated its financing plan in February 1968 and
therefore did not have personal knowledge of the
Evidence-A2010
financing scheme. The second request called on Banco
Filipino to admit that it did not send a formal notice of
its intention to foreclose the mortgage and that there
was no publication of the notice of foreclosure in a
newspaper of general circulation.
- Banco Filipino objected on the ground of irrelevancy
and denied all the rest.
- PSCFC asked the trial court for a ruling that the
matters sought to be admitted in its second bid for
admission should be considered as impliedly admitted
when the answer was made by a lawyer who was not
qualified to do so as he had no direct and personal
knowledge of the matters sought to be admitted. In
insisting that only a client could make a binding
admission in discovery proceedings, petitioner cites
Koh v. IAC. (PSCFC counsel misquoted the decision; SC
ordered counsel to show cause)
- Trial court did not grant PSCFC’s motion. CA sustained
the trial court.
- Petitioner submits that the answer to the request for
admission under Rule 26 should be made by the party
himself and nobody else, not even his lawyer.
Consequently, failure of respondent Banco Filipino,
upon whom the call for admission was served, to render
the required sworn statement would constitute an
implied admission of the facts sought to be admitted.
Thus, it must be the party itself who must respond to
the request for admission and that a mere reply made
and verified by its counsel alone is insufficient and
contrary to the Rules and the intent behind recourse to
modes of discovery.
ISSUE
WON a request for admission directed to an adverse
party under Sec. 1, Rule 26, of the Rules of Court may
be answered by his counsel
HELD
YES
- When Rule 26 states that a party shall respond to the
request for admission, it should not be restrictively
construed to mean that a party may not engage the
services of counsel to make the response in his behalf.
- Section 21 of Rule 138 states
Sec. 21. Authority of attorney to appear. - An attorney
is presumed to be properly authorized to represent any
cause in which he appears, and no written power of
attorney is required to authorize him to appear in court
for his client ... 3
- Petitioner has not shown that the case at bar falls
under any of the recognized exceptions as found in Art.
1878 of the Civil Code, or in Rule 20 of the Rules of
Court.
- Section 23 of Rule 138 provides that "(a)ttorneys have
authority to bind their clients in any case by any
Page |2
agreement in relation thereto made in writing, and in
taking appeals, and in all matters of ordinary judicial
procedure ..."
Disposition Petition denied
PEOPLE v HERNANDEZ
G.R. No. 108028
FRANCISCO; July 30, 1996
(eva)
FACTS
- Accused-appellant Cristina Hernandez was charged
with the crime of illegal recruitment committed in large
scale in violating of Art. 38 (a) and (b) in relation to
Article 13 (b) and (c) of the New Labor Code.1 Between
Dec.14-Dec.24, 1988, in Manila, she represented
herself to have the capacity to contract, enlist and
transport Filipino workers for employment abroad, and
for a fee, recruited and promised employment/job
placement abroad to: ROGELIO N. LEGASPI, ULDARICO
P. LEGASPI, SONNY P. BERNABE, ARNEL B. MENDOZA,
BENITO L. BERNABE, ARNOLD P. VALENZUELA,
ARMANDO P. PAGULAYAN, GREGORIO P. MENDOZA, JR.,
RONALD T. CORREA, DANILO PALAD and ROBERT P.
VELASQUEZ without first having secured the required
license or authority from the POEA.
- Upon arraignment, Hernandez pleaded not guilty and
trial on the merits ensued. Of the 14 complainants, B.
1
Art. 38. Illegal Recruitment. (a) Any recruitment activities,
including the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34
of this Code, to be undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders
of authority shall be deemed illegal and punishable under
Article 39 of this Code. The Ministry of Labor and Employment
or any law enforcement officers may initiate complaints under
this article.
(b) Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in
large scale shall be considered an offense involving economic
sabotage and shall be penalized in accordance with Article 39
hereof.
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if
carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring
and/or confederating with one another in carrying out any
unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise or scheme, defined
under the first paragraph hereof. Illegal recruitment is deemed
committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as
a group
Prof. V. A. Avena
Bernabe, Velasquez, G. Mendoza and A. Mendoza were
presented as witnesses for the prosecution.
- They testified to the following essential facts:
Their first encounter with the Hernandez was on
Dec.12, 1988 when one Josefa Cinco accompanied
them to the office of the Philippine Thai Association,
Inc. (Philippine-Thai) in Ermita, Manila to meet the
appellant. Introducing herself as the general manager
of Philippine-Thai, Hernandez asserted that her
company recruited workers for placement abroad and
asked private complainants if they wanted to work as
factory workers in Taipei. Enticed by the assurance of
immediate employment and an $800 per month salary,
they applied. Hernandez required them to pay
placement and passport fees in the total amount of
P22,500.00 per applicant, to be paid in three
installments. They were issued receipts by Liza
Mendoza, the last one signed by Mendoza and
Hernandez. Hernandez then assured them that they
would be able to leave for Taipei sometime before the
end of Dec.1988, but contrary to the promise, they
were unable to leave for abroad. They demanded for
the return of their money but to no avail.
- DEFENSE presented as its lone witness, Hernandez,
whose testimony consisted mainly in denying the
charges against her. She claimed that she never met
any of the complainants nor did she ever recruit any of
them. She likewise denied having received money from
anyone and asserted that she did not know any Liza
Mendoza who is the alleged treasure of Phil-Thai. She
maintained that although she had an office in Ermita
Building, the said office belonged to B.C. Island Wood
Products Corp. which was engaged in the logging
business. However, when questioned further, appellant
admitted being the president of Phil-Thai but only in a
nominal capacity, and claimed that as nominee-
president, she did not participate in any of its
transactions. Appellant likewise insisted that Phil-Thai
was engaged solely in the barong tagalog business.
- The court rendered a decision holding that the
defense of "denial" interposed by the accused could not
prevail over the positive and clear testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses which had established the guilt
of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
- Appellant comes to this Court for the reversal of the
judgment of conviction
ISSUES
1. WON Hernandez is guilty of illegal recruitment
committed in a large scale and by a syndicate.
2. WON the trial court erred in taking judicial notice of
the fact that Hernandez had been charged of illegal
recruitment in another criminal case and in considering
the pendency thereof as evidence of the scheme and
strategy adopted by the accused.
Evidence-A2010
3. WON the trial court erred in not giving credence or
weight to the defense of the accused.
HELD
1. YES
The prosecution had in fact presented evidence to
prove the said element of the crime of illegal
recruitment. "EXHIBIT I", a certification issued by the
Chief Licensing Branch of the POEA, attesting to the
fact that neither appellant nor Philippine-Thai is
licensed/authorized to recruit workers for employment
abroad, was offered and admitted in evidence without
the objection of the appellant.
Reasoning
- Defense contends that the prosecution failed to prove
one of the essential elements of the crime of illegal
recruitment- that the offender is a non-licensee or non-
holder of authority to lawfully engage in the
recruitment and placement of workers. This element
was the subject of a stipulation proposed by the
prosecution and admitted by the defense during trial.
Hernandez now assails as erroneous the reliance
placed by the prosecution on the said stipulation of
facts in dispensing with the presentation of evidence to
prove the said element of the crime of illegal
recruitment. Appellant argues that: (1) the stipulation
of facts was not tantamount to an admission by the
appellant of the fact of non-possession of the requisite
authority or license from the POEA, but was merely an
admission that the Chief Licensing Officer of the POEA,
if presented in court, would testify to this fact, and (2)
the stipulation of facts is null and void for being
contrary to law and public policy. This being the case, it
remained incumbent upon the prosecution to present
evidence of such fact.
ON WHAT WAS ADMITTED IN THE STIPULATION
- Although appellant's arguments find no significant
bearing in the face of the existence of "EXHIBIT I", they
nonetheless require deeper scrutiny and a clear
response for future application.
- Appellant correctly distinguishes between an
admission that a particular witness if presented in court
would testify to certain facts, and an admission of the
facts themselves. According to the appellant, what was
stipulated on was "merely that the testimony of the
Chief Licensing Officer of the POEA would be to the
effect that appellant is not licensed nor authorized to
recruit workers."
- The distinction, though cogent, is unfortunately
inapplicable to the case at bar. Conveniently omitted
from the appellant's reply chief is the ensuing
statement made by the court after counsel for the
accused, Atty. Ulep, agreed to the stipulation proposed
by the prosecution:
Atty. Ulep: Agreed, Your Honor.
Page |3
Court: The prosecution and the defense agreed to
stipulate/admit that from the record of the POEA
Licensing and Regulation Office, Dept. of Labor and
Employment, accused Cristina Hernandez/Phil. etc.,
Ass. . . . is neither licensed nor authorized by the office
to recruit workers overseas abroad and that if the duly
authorized representative from the POEA
Administration is to take the witness stand, he will
confirm to this fact as borne by the records.
- It is evident that the prosecution and the defense
counsel stipulated on two things: that from the record
of the POEA, Hernandez is neither licensed nor
authorized by that office to recruit workers for overseas
abroad and that if the duly authorized representative
from the POEA is to take the witness stand, he will
confirm to this fact.
ON THE VALIDITY OF THE STIPULATION
- Appellant further contends that granting that defense
counsel had in fact agreed to the above stipulation of
facts, the same is null and void for being contrary to
the well-established rule that a stipulation of facts is
not allowed in criminal cases.
- The rule prohibiting the stipulation of facts in criminal
cases is grounded on the fundamental right of the
accused to be presumed innocent until proven guilty,
and corollary duty of the prosecution to prove the guilt
of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The rationale
behind the proscription against this class of
agreements between prosecution and defense is that
“It is not supposed to be within the knowledge or
competence of counsel to predict what a proposed
witness shall say under the sanction of his oath and the
test of cross-examination. A conviction for crime should
not rest upon mere conjecture. Nor is it possible for a
trial court to weigh with exact nicety the contradictory
declaration of witnesses not produced so as to be
subjected to its observation and its judgment as to their
credibility.”
- However, in the light of recent changes in our rules,
particularly the pre-trial provisions in Rule 118, the
prohibition against a stipulation of facts in criminal
cases no longer holds true.
- Although not expressly sanctioned under the old rules
of court, a stipulation of facts by the parties in criminal
cases has long been allowed and recognized as
declarations constituting judicial admissions, hence,
binding upon the parties. In People vs. Bocar this Court
stated that: There is nothing unlawful or irregular about
the above procedure. The declarations constitute
judicial admission, which are binding on the parties, by
virtue of which the prosecution dispensed with the
introduction of additional evidence and the defense
waived the right to contest or dispute the veracity of
the statements contained in the exhibits.
Prof. V. A. Avena
- American jurisprudence has established the
acceptability of the practice of stipulating during the
trial of criminal cases, and stated in People vs. Hare
that: This court has held that an accused may by
stipulation waive the necessity of a proof of all or any
part of the case which the people have alleged against
him and that having done so, he cannot complain in
this Court of evidence which he has stipulated into the
record.
COROLLARY ISSUE: SHOULD STIPULATION BE IN
WRITING AND SIGNED (Sec.4 R.118)
- A stipulation of facts entered into by the prosecution
and defense counsel during trial in open court is
automatically reduced into writing and contained in the
official transcript of the proceedings had in court. The
conformity of the accused in the form of his signature
affixed thereto is unnecessary in view of the fact that:
"an attorney who is employed to manage a party's
conduct of a lawsuit has prima facie authority to make
relevant admissions by pleadings, by oral or written
stipulation, which unless allowed to be withdrawn are
conclusive." In fact, "judicial admissions are frequently
those of counsel or of the attorney of record, who is, for
the purpose of the trial, the agent of his client. When
such admissions are made for the purpose of
dispensing with proof of some fact, they bind the client,
whether made during, or even after, the trial."
- Appellant was never prevented from presenting
evidence contrary to the stipulation of facts. If
appellant believed that the testimony of the Chief
Licensing Officer of the POEA would be beneficial to her
case, then it is the defense who should have presented
him. Her continuous failure to do so during trial was a
waiver of her right to present the pertinent evidence to
contradict the stipulation of facts and establish her
defense.
- The stipulation of facts proposed during trial by
prosecution and admitted by defense counsel is
tantamount to a judicial admission by the appellant of
the facts stipulated on. Controlling, therefore, is Section
4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court.
2. NO.
Ratio It is true that as a general rule, courts are not
authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the
records of other cases, even when such cases have
been tried or are pending in the same court, and
notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have
been tried or are actually pending before the same
judge. However, this rule is subject to the exception
that in the absence of objection and as a matter of
convenience to all parties, a court may properly treat
all or any part of the original record of the case filed in
its archives as read into the records of a case pending
before it, when with the knowledge of the opposing
party, reference is made to it, by name and number or
Evidence-A2010
in some other manner by which it is sufficiently
designated. The judicial notice taken by the lower court
of the pendency of another illegal recruitment case
against the appellant falls squarely under the above
exception in view of the fact that it was the appellant
herself who introduced evidence on the matter when
she testified in open court.
Reasoning
- Appellant cites a violation of Section 3 of Rule 129 of
the Rules of Court which provides that before the court
may take judicial notice of any matter, the parties shall
be heard thereon if such matter is decisive of a
material issue in the case. It is claimed that the lower
court never announced its intention to take judicial
notice of the pendency of the other illegal recruitment
case nor did it allow the accused to be heard thereon.
- Even assuming, however, that the lower court
improperly took judicial notice of the pendency of
another illegal recruitment case against the appellant,
the error would not be fatal to the prosecution's cause.
The judgment of conviction was not based on the
existence of another illegal recruitment case filed
against appellant by a different group of complainants,
but on the overwhelming evidence against her in the
instant case.
3. NO.
We do not find any compelling reason to reverse the
findings of the lower court that appellant's bare denials
cannot overthrow the positive testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses against her.
Well established is the rule that denials if
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence are
negative, self-serving evidence which deserve no
weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary
weight over the testimony of credible witnesses who
testify on affirmative matters. That she did not merely
deny, but likewise raised as an affirmative defense her
appointment as mere nominee-president of Philippine-
Thai is a futile attempt at exculpating herself and is of
no consequence whatsoever when weighed against the
positive declarations of witnesses that it was the
appellant who executed the acts of illegal recruitment
as complained of.
Disposition Appellant's conviction of the crime of
illegal recruitment in large scale is hereby AFFIRMED,
and the penalty imposed MODIFIED.
RAMOS v CA (DELOS SANTOS MEDICAL
CENTER)
G.R. No. 124354
KAPUNAN (1999)
(sj)
Page |4
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari
FACTS
- Sometime in 1985, petitioner Erlinda Ramos, after
seeking professional medical help, was advised to
undergo an operation for the removal of a stone in her
gall bladder (cholecystectomy). She was referred to Dr.
Hosaka, a surgeon, who agreed to perform the
operation on her. The operation was scheduled for June
17, 1985 at 9:00 in the morning at private respondent
De Los Santos Medical Center (DLSMC). Since neither
petitioner Erlinda nor her husband, petitioner Rogelio,
knew of any anesthesiologist, Dr. Hosaka
recommended to them the services of Dr. Gutierrez.
- Petitioner Erlinda was admitted to the DLSMC the day
before the scheduled operation. By 7:30 in the morning
of the following day, petitioner Erlinda was already
being prepared for operation. Upon the request of
petitioner Erlinda, her sister-in-law, Herminda Cruz, who
was then Dean of the College of Nursing at the Capitol
Medical Center, was allowed to accompany her inside
the operating room.
- At around 9:30 in the morning, Dr. Hosaka had not yet
arrived so Dr. Gutierrez tried to get in touch with him
by phone. Thereafter, Dr. Gutierrez informed Cruz that
the operation might be delayed due to the late arrival
of Dr. Hosaka. In the meantime, the patient, petitioner
Erlinda said to Cruz, "Mindy, inip na inip na ako, ikuha
mo ako ng ibang Doctor."
- By 10:00 in the morning, when Dr. Hosaka was still
not around, petitioner Rogelio already wanted to pull
out his wife from the operating room. He met Dr.
Garcia, who remarked that he was also tired of waiting
for Dr. Hosaka. Dr. Hosaka finally arrived at the hospital
at around 12:10 in the afternoon, or more than three
(3) hours after the scheduled operation.
- Cruz, who was then still inside the operating room,
heard about Dr. Hosaka’s arrival. While she held the
hand of Erlinda, Cruz saw Dr. Gutierrez trying to
intubate the patient. Cruz heard Dr. Gutierrez utter:
"ang hirap ma-intubate nito, mali yata ang
pagkakapasok. O lumalaki ang tiyan." Cruz noticed a
bluish discoloration of Erlinda?s nailbeds on her left
hand. She (Cruz) then heard Dr. Hosaka instruct
someone to call Dr. Calderon, another anesthesiologist.
When he arrived, Dr. Calderon attempted to intubate
the patient. The nailbeds of the patient remained
bluish, thus, she was placed in a trendelenburg position
a position where the head of the patient is placed in a
position lower than her feet. At this point, Cruz went
out of the operating room to express her concern to
petitioner Rogelio that Erlinda’s operation was not
going well.
Prof. V. A. Avena
- Cruz quickly rushed back to the operating room and
saw that the patient was still in trendelenburg position.
At almost 3:00 in the afternoon, she saw Erlinda being
wheeled to the Intensive Care Unit (ICU). The doctors
explained to petitioner Rogelio that his wife had
bronchospasm. Erlinda stayed in the ICU for a month.
She was released from the hospital only four months
later or on November 15, 1985. Since the ill-fated
operation, Erlinda remained in comatose condition until
she died on August 3, 1999.1
- Petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City a civil case for damages against private
respondents. After due trial, the court a quo rendered
judgment in favor of petitioners. Essentially, the trial
court found that private respondents were negligent in
the performance of their duties to Erlinda. On appeal by
private respondents, the Court of Appeals reversed the
trial court’s decision and directed petitioners to pay
their "unpaid medical bills" to private respondents.
- Petitioners filed with this Court a petition for review on
certiorari.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not private respondents were negligent
in the performance of the operation on Mrs. Ramos.
2. Whether or not the CA erred in taking judicial notice
that nurses do not have intubation in their curriculum
as ground for excluding Dean Cruz’ (Mrs. Ramos’ sister
in law, who was with her during the operation)
testimony.
HELD
1. YES
Ratio Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase which literally
means “the thing or the transaction speaks for itself.”
The phrase “res ipsa loquitur” is a maxim for the rule
that the fact of the occurrence of an injury, taken with
the surrounding circumstances, may permit an
inference or raise a presumption of negligence, or
make out a plaintiff’s prima facie case, and present a
question of fact for defendant to meet with an
explanation.
- The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is simply a
recognition of the postulate that, as a matter of
common knowledge and experience, the very nature of
certain types of occurrences may justify an inference of
negligence on the part of the person who controls the
instrumentality causing the injury in the absence of
some explanation by the defendant who is charged
with negligence. It is grounded in the superior logic of
ordinary human experience and on the basis of such
experience or common knowledge, negligence may be
deduced from the mere occurrence of the accident
itself. Hence, res ipsa loquitur is applied in conjunction
with the doctrine of common knowledge.
Evidence-A2010
- Res ipsa loquitur is not a rule of substantive law and,
as such, does not create or constitute an independent
or separate ground of liability. INSTEAD, IT IS
CONSIDERED AS MERELY EVIDENTIARY OR IN THE
NATURE OF A PROCEDURAL RULE. It is regarded as a
MODE OF PROOF, OR A MERE PROCEDURAL
CONVENIENCE SINCE IT FURNISHES A SUBSTITUTE FOR,
AND RELIEVES A PLAINTIFF OF, THE BURDEN OF
PRODUCING SPECIFIC PROOF OF NEGLIGENCE. In other
words, mere invocation and application of the doctrine
does not dispense with the requirement of proof of
negligence. It is simply a step in the process of such
proof, permitting the plaintiff to present along with the
proof of the accident, enough of the attending
circumstances to invoke the doctrine, creating an
inference or presumption of negligence, and to thereby
place on the defendant the burden of going forward
with the proof. Still, before resort to the doctrine may
be allowed, the following requisites must be
satisfactorily shown:
1. The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not
occur in the absence of someone’s negligence;
2. It is caused by an instrumentality within the
exclusive control of the defendant or defendants; and
3. The possibility of contributing conduct which would
make the plaintiff responsible is eliminated.
Reasoning
- In the above requisites, the fundamental element is
the “control of the instrumentality” which caused the
damage. Such element of control must be shown to be
within the dominion of the defendant. In order to have
the benefit of the rule, a plaintiff, in addition to proving
injury or damage, must show a situation where it is
applicable, and must establish that the essential
elements of the doctrine were present in a particular
incident.
ALTHOUGH GENERALLY, EXPERT MEDICAL TESTIMONY
IS RELIED UPON IN MALPRACTICE SUITS TO PROVE
THAT A PHYSICIAN HAS DONE A NEGLIGENT ACT OR
THAT HE HAS DEVIATED FROM THE STANDARD
MEDICAL PROCEDURE, WHEN THE DOCTRINE OF RES
IPSA LOQUITUR IS AVAILED BY THE PLAINTIFF, THE
NEED FOR EXPERT MEDICAL TESTIMONY IS DISPENSED
WITH BECAUSE THE INJURY ITSELF PROVIDES THE
PROOF OF NEGLIGENCE. The reason is that the general
rule on the necessity of expert testimony applies only
to such matters clearly within the domain of medical
science, and not to matters that are within the common
knowledge of mankind which may be testified to by
anyone familiar with the facts. Ordinarily, only
physicians and surgeons of skill and experience are
competent to testify as to whether a patient has been
treated or operated upon with a reasonable degree of
skill and care. However, testimony as to the
statements and acts of physicians and surgeons,
Page |5
external appearances, and manifest conditions which
are observable by any one may be given by non-expert
witnesses. Hence, in cases where the res ipsa loquitur
is applicable, the court is permitted to find a physician
negligent upon proper proof of injury to the patient,
without the aid of expert testimony, where the court
from its fund of common knowledge can determine the
proper standard of care.
WHERE COMMON KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERIENCE
TEACH THAT A RESULTING INJURY WOULD NOT HAVE
OCCURRED TO THE PATIENT IF DUE CARE HAD BEEN
EXERCISED, AN INFERENCE OF NEGLIGENCE MAY BE
DRAWN GIVING RISE TO AN APPLICATION OF THE
DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR WITHOUT MEDICAL
EVIDENCE, WHICH IS ORDINARILY REQUIRED TO SHOW
NOT ONLY WHAT OCCURRED BUT HOW AND WHY IT
OCCURRED. When the doctrine is appropriate, all that
the patient must do is prove a nexus between the
particular act or omission complained of and the injury
sustained while under the custody and management of
the defendant without need to produce expert medical
testimony to establish the standard of care. Resort to
res ipsa loquitur is allowed because there is no other
way, under usual and ordinary conditions, by which the
patient can obtain redress for injury suffered by him.
EXAMPLES FOR CLASS DISCUSSION
Thus, courts of other jurisdictions have applied the
doctrine in the following situations: leaving of a foreign
object in the body of the patient after an operation,
injuries sustained on a healthy part of the body which
was not under, or in the area, of treatment, removal of
the wrong part of the body when another part was
intended, knocking out a tooth while a patient’s jaw
was under anesthetic for the removal of his tonsils, and
loss of an eye while the patient plaintiff was under the
influence of anesthetic, during or following an operation
for appendicitis, among others.
Nevertheless, despite the fact that the scope of res ipsa
loquitur has been measurably enlarged, it does not
automatically apply to all cases of medical negligence
as to mechanically shift the burden of proof to the
defendant to show that he is not guilty of the ascribed
negligence. Res ipsa loquitur is not a rigid or ordinary
doctrine to be perfunctorily used but a rule to be
cautiously applied, depending upon the circumstances
of each case. It is generally restricted to situations in
malpractice cases where a layman is able to say, as a
matter of common knowledge and observation, that the
consequences of professional care were not as such as
would ordinarily have followed if due care had been
exercised.
A distinction must be made between the failure to
secure results, and the occurrence of something more
unusual and not ordinarily found if the service or
treatment rendered followed the usual procedure of
Prof. V. A. Avena
those skilled in that particular practice. It must be
conceded that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can have
no application in a suit against a physician or surgeon
which involves the merits of a diagnosis or of a
scientific treatment. The physician or surgeon is not
required at his peril to explain why any particular
diagnosis was not correct, or why any particular
scientific treatment did not produce the desired result.
Thus, res ipsa loquitur is not available in a malpractice
suit if the only showing is that the desired result of an
operation or treatment was not accomplished.
The real question, therefore, is whether or not in the
process of the operation any extraordinary incident or
unusual event outside of the routine performance
occurred which is beyond the regular scope of
customary professional activity in such operations,
which, if unexplained would themselves reasonably
speak to the average man as the negligent cause or
causes of the untoward consequence. If there was such
extraneous interventions, the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur may be utilized and the defendant is called
upon to explain the matter, by evidence of exculpation,
if he could.
FACTUAL BASIS FOR THE RATIO
Erlinda submitted herself for cholecystectomy and
expected a routine general surgery to be performed on
her gall bladder. On that fateful day she delivered her
person over to the care, custody and control of private
respondents who exercised complete and exclusive
control over her. At the time of submission, Erlinda was
neurologically sound and, except for a few minor
discomforts, was likewise physically fit in mind and
body. However, during the administration of
anesthesia and prior to the performance of
cholecystectomy she suffered irreparable damage to
her brain. Thus, without undergoing surgery, she went
out of the operating room already decerebrate and
totally incapacitated. Obviously, brain damage, which
Erlinda sustained, is an injury which does not normally
occur in the process of a gall bladder operation. In fact,
this kind of situation does not happen in the absence of
negligence of someone in the administration of
anesthesia and in the use of endotracheal tube.
Normally, a person being put under anesthesia is not
rendered decerebrate as a consequence of
administering such anesthesia if the proper procedure
was followed. Furthermore, the instruments used in
the administration of anesthesia, including the
endotracheal tube, were all under the exclusive control
of private respondents, who are the physicians-in-
charge. Likewise, petitioner Erlinda could not have
been guilty of contributory negligence because she was
under the influence of anesthetics which rendered her
unconscious.
Evidence-A2010 Page |6
Considering that a sound and unaffected member of NRMF; Dean of the Laguna College of Nursing in San
the body (the brain) is injured or destroyed while the Pablo City; and then Dean of the Capitol Medical Center
patient is unconscious and under the immediate and School of Nursing. eviewing witness Cruz' statements,
exclusive control of the physicians, we hold that a we find that the same were delivered in a
practical administration of justice dictates the straightforward manner, with the kind of detail, clarity,
application of res ipsa loquitur. Upon these facts and consistency and spontaneity which would have been
under these circumstances the Court would be able to difficult to fabricate. With her clinical background as a
say, as a matter of common knowledge and nurse, the Court is satisfied that she was able to
observation, if negligence attended the management demonstrate through her testimony what truly
and care of the patient. Moreover, the liability of the transpired on that fateful day.
physicians and the hospital in this case is not
predicated upon an alleged failure to secure the
desired results of an operation nor on an alleged lack of
skill in the diagnosis or treatment as in fact no
operation or treatment was ever performed on Erlinda.
Thus, upon all these initial determination a case is
made out for the application of the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur. PHILIPPINE HELATH-CARE PROVIDERS,
Nonetheless, in holding that res ipsa loquitur is
INC. (MAXICARE) v CARMELA
available to the present case we are not saying that the
doctrine is applicable in any and all cases where injury ESTRADA/CARAHEALTH SERVICES
occurs to a patient while under anesthesia, or to any GR 171051
and all anesthesia cases. Each case must be viewed in NACHURA; :Jan 28 2008
its own light and scrutinized in order to be within the
(da)
res ipsa loquitur coverage.
2. YES
NATURE
Ratio Although witness Cruz is not an anesthesiologist,
Petition for review on certiorari (original action was an
she can very well testify upon matters on which she is
action for breach of contract and damages filed by
capable of observing such as, the statements and acts
respondent Carmela Estrada, sole proprietor of Cara
of the physician and surgeon, external appearances,
Health Services, against Philippine Health-Care
and manifest conditions which are observable by any
Providers, Inc. (Maxicare))
one. This is precisely allowed under the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur where the testimony of expert witnesses is
FACTS
not required. It is the accepted rule that expert
- Maxicare is a corporation engaged in selling health
testimony is not necessary for the proof of negligence
insurance plans .On September 15, 1990, Maxicare
in non-technical matters or those of which an ordinary
engaged the services of Carmela Estrada who was
person may be expected to have knowledge, or where
doing business under the name of CARA HEALTH
the lack of skill or want of care is so obvious as to
[SERVICES] to promote and sell the prepaid group
render expert testimony unnecessary.
practice health care delivery program called MAXICARE
WE TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF THE FACT THAT
Plan with the position of Independent Account
ANESTHESIA PROCEDURES HAVE BECOME SO
Executive. .The letter agreement provided for plaintiff-
COMMON, THAT EVEN AN ORDINARY PERSON CAN TELL
appellee’s [Estrada’s] compensation in the form of
IF IT WAS ADMINISTERED PROPERLY. AS SUCH, IT
commission.
WOULD NOT BE TOO DIFFICULT TO TELL IF THE TUBE
- Estrada submitted proposals and made
WAS PROPERLY INSERTED. This kind of observation, we
representations to the officers of MERALCO regarding
believe, does not require a medical degree to be
the MAXICARE Plan but when MERALCO decided to
acceptable.
subscribe to the MAXICARE Plan, Maxicare directly
At any rate, without doubt, petitioner's witness, an
negotiated with MERALCO regarding the terms and
experienced clinical nurse whose long experience and
conditions of the agreement and left plaintiff-appellee
scholarship led to her appointment as Dean of the
Estrada out of the discussions on the terms and
Capitol Medical Center School of Nursing, was fully
conditions.On November 28, 1991, MERALCO
capable of determining whether or not the intubation
eventually subscribed to the MAXICARE Plan and signed
was a success. She had extensive clinical experience
a Service Agreement directly with Maxicare for medical
starting as a staff nurse in Chicago, Illinois; staff nurse
coverage of its qualified members.
and clinical instructor in a teaching hospital, the FEU-
Prof. V. A. Avena
- The total premium amounts paid by MERALCO to
Maxicare was P20,169,335.00.
- Estrada demanded from Maxicare that it be paid
commissions for the MERALCO account and nine (9)
other accounts. Maxicare denied this because Maxicare
directly negotiated with MERALCO and the other
accounts and that no agent was given the go signal to
intervene in the negotiations for the terms and
conditions and the signing of the service agreement
with MERALCO and the other accounts so that if ever
Maxicare was indebted to Estrada, it was only for
P1,555.00 and P43.l2 as commissions on the accounts
of Overseas Freighters Co. and Mr. Enrique Acosta,
respectively.
- Maxicare and its officers filed their Answer with
Counterclaim alleging that Estrada did not intervene in
the negotiations of the contract with MERALCO which
was directly negotiated by MERALCO with Maxicare;
and Estrada’s alleged other clients/accounts were not
accredited with [Maxicare] as required, since the
agency contract on the MAXICARE health plans were
not renewed.
- Both the trial and appellate courts held that Estrada
was the “efficient procuring cause” in the execution of
the service agreement between Meralco and Maxicare
consistent with our ruling in Manotok Brothers, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals.
- At the SC Maxicare urges the court that both the RTC
and CA failed to take into account the stipulations
contained in the February 19, 1991 letter agreement
authorizing the payment of commissions only upon
satisfaction of twin conditions, i.e., collection and
contemporaneous remittance of premium dues by
Estrada to Maxicare. Allegedly, the lower courts
disregarded Estrada’s admission that the negotiations
with Meralco failed. Thus, the flawed application of the
“efficient procuring cause” doctrine enunciated in
Manotok Brothers, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[9] and the
erroneous conclusion upholding Estrada’s entitlement
to commissions on contracts completed without her
participation.
ISSUE
WON Estrada is entitled to a commission for the
execution of the service agreement between Meralco
and Maxicare.
HELD
YES
- Contrary to Maxicare’s assertion, the trial and the
appellate courts carefully considered the factual
backdrop of the case as borne out by the records. Both
courts were one in the conclusion that Maxicare
successfully landed the Meralco account for the sale of
healthcare plans only by virtue of Estrada’s
Evidence-A2010
involvement and participation in the negotiations. The
assailed Decision aptly states:
There is no dispute as to the role that Estrada played
in selling Maxicare’s health insurance plan to Meralco.
Estrada’s efforts consisted in being the first to offer the
Maxicare plan to Meralco, using her connections with
some of Meralco Executives, inviting said executives to
dinner meetings, making submissions and
representations regarding the health plan, sending
follow-up letters, etc.
- These efforts were recognized by Meralco as shown
by the certification issued by its Manpower Planning
and Research Staff Head Ruben A. Sapitula .
- this Court finds that Estrada’s efforts were
instrumental in introducing the Meralco account to
Maxicare in regard to the latter’s Maxicare health
insurance plans. Estrada was the efficient “intervening
cause” in bringing about the service agreement with
Meralco.
- The jettisoning of the petition is inevitable even upon
a close perusal of the merits of the case.
- Maxicare’s former Chairman Roberto K. Macasaet
testified that Maxicare had been trying to land the
Meralco account for two (2) years prior to Estrada’s
entry in 1990. Even without that admission, we note
that Meralco’s Assistant Vice-President, Donatila San
Juan, in a letter dated January 21, 1992 to then
Maxicare President Pedro R. Sen, categorically
acknowledged Estrada’s efforts relative to the sale of
Maxicare health plans to Meralco, thus:
- Sometime in 1989, Meralco received a proposal from
Philippine Health-Care Providers, Inc. (Maxicare)
through the initiative and efforts of Ms. Carmela
Estrada, who introduced Maxicare to Meralco. Prior to
this time, we did not know that Maxicare is a major
health care provider in the country. We have since
negotiated and signed up with Maxicare to provide a
health maintenance plan for dependents of Meralco
executives, effective December 1, 1991 to November
30, 1992.
- At the very least, Estrada penetrated the Meralco
market, initially closed to Maxicare, and laid the
groundwork for a business relationship. The only reason
Estrada was not able to participate in the collection and
remittance of premium dues to Maxicare was because
she was prevented from doing so by the acts of
Maxicare, its officers, and employees. She was in fact
the “procuring cause”.To be regarded as the “procuring
cause” of a sale as to be entitled to a commission, a
broker’s efforts must have been the foundation on
which the negotiations resulting in a sale began.[18]
Verily, Estrada was instrumental in the sale of the
Maxicare health plans to Meralco. Without her
intervention, no sale could have been consummated.
- On Judicial Admissions
Page |7
Maxicare contends that Estrada herself admitted that
her negotiations with Meralco failed as shown in Annex
“F” of the Complaint.
- We observe that this Annex “F” is, in fact, Maxicare’s
counsel’s letter dated April 10, 1992 addressed to
Estrada. The letter contains a unilateral declaration by
Maxicare that the efforts initiated and negotiations
undertaken by Estrada failed, such that the service
agreement with Meralco was supposedly directly
negotiated by Maxicare. Thus, the latter effectively
declares that Estrada is not the “efficient procuring
cause” of the sale, and as such, is not entitled to
commissions.
- Our holding in Atillo III v. Court of Appeals,ironically
the case cited by Maxicare to bolster its position that
the statement in Annex “F” amounted to an admission,
provides a contrary answer to Maxicare’s ridiculous
contention. We intoned therein that in spite of the
presence of judicial admissions in a party’s pleading,
the trial court is still given leeway to consider other
evidence presented. We ruled, thus:
- As provided for in Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of
Court, the general rule that a judicial admission is
conclusive upon the party making it and does not
require proof admits of two exceptions: 1) when it is
shown that the admission was made through palpable
mistake, and 2) when it is shown that no such
admission was in fact made. The latter exception allows
one to contradict an admission by denying that he
made such an admission.
- For instance, if a party invokes an “admission” by an
adverse party, but cites the admission “out of context,”
then the one making the admission may show that he
made no “such” admission, or that his admission was
taken out of context.
- This may be interpreted as to mean “not in the sense
in which the admission is made to appear.” That is the
reason for the modifier “such.”
- In this case, the letter, although part of Estrada’s
Complaint, is not, ipso facto, an admission of the
statements contained therein, especially since the bone
of contention relates to Estrada’s entitlement to
commissions for the sale of health plans she claims to
have brokered. It is more than obvious from the
entirety of the records that Estrada has unequivocally
and consistently declared that her involvement as
broker is the proximate cause which consummated the
sale between Meralco and Maxicare.
- Moreover, Section 34,[22] Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court requires the purpose for which the evidence is
offered to be specified. Undeniably, the letter was
attached to the Complaint, and offered in evidence, to
demonstrate Maxicare’s bad faith and ill will towards
Estrada.
Prof. V. A. Avena
- Even a cursory reading of the Complaint and all the
pleadings filed thereafter before the RTC, CA, and this
Court, readily show that Estrada does not concede, at
any point, that her negotiations with Meralco failed.
Clearly, Maxicare’s assertion that Estrada herself does
not pretend to be the “efficient procuring cause” in the
execution of the service agreement between Meralco
and Maxicare is baseless and an outright falsehood.
Object Evidence
SISON V PEOPLE
250 SCRA 58
PUNO; November 16, 1995
(maia)
NATURE
Consolidation of 2 cases: petition under rule 45 by
accused, and automatic review of the murder case
since penalty imposed was reclusion perpetua
FACTS
- After the 1986 EDSA Revolution, there was a time
when the Aquino administration was openly challenged
by Marcos loyalists through rallies
- In one particular rally (which was dispersed by the
police for not having a permit to rally) on July 27, 1986
in Luneta, Stephen Salcedo was killed. Apparently, after
the police dispersed the rallyists (using tear gas and
truncheons), some Marcos loyalists chased people
wearing yellow (Coryista) and mauled them
- That’s how Salcedo died. He was mauled by some
Marcos loyalists (8 were accused as principals, 5 were
convicted), hitting and boxing and kicking him all over
his body, even when he was down already. The
attackers even punched him with stones in their hands
and kicked him on the head. He lost consciousness and
when the Luneta’s electrician rushed him to PGH, he
was already dead. The medical report showed that the
cause of death was hemorrhage, intracranial trauma.
(note: there’s a graphic description of the mauling in
the original case, and nakakawa siya, pinagtulungan
talaga. Sabi pa, he even had a chance to sit on the
pavement and wipe the blood from his face, but his
attackers went after him again).
Evidence-A2010
- Some press people were present in the mauling, and a
lot of pictures were taken of the incident (which
reached the front pages of newspapers)
- The prosecution presented as evidence testimonies of
12 witnesses, including 2 eyewitnesses, newspaper
accounts of the incident, and various photographs
during the mauling.
- RTC convicted the 5 attackers as principal, and an
accomplice (a “movie starlet” Annie Ferrer whose
participation in the crime was to shout “gulpihn niyo
ang mga cory hecklers!” immediately before the
incident).
- CA confirmed and increased sentence to reclusion
perpetua (and acquitted the starlet)
- in relation to our topic (object evidence), the relevant
part of the case is the error assigned to the lower court
in admitting the photographs in evidence since they
were not properly identified by the one who took them
ISSUE
WON the photographs of the incident should be
admitted in evidence
HELD
YES
Ratio We rule that the use of these photographs by
some of the accused to show their alleged non-
participation in the crime is an admission of the
exactness and accuracy thereof.
Reasoning
- The rule in this jurisdiction is that photographs, when
presented in evidence, must be identified by the
photographer as to its production and testified as to the
circumstances under which they were produced. The
value of this kind of evidence lies in its being a correct
representation or reproduction of the original, and its
admissibility is determined by its accuracy in portraying
the scene at the time of the crime. The photographer,
however, is not the only witness who can identify the
pictures he has taken. The correctness of the
photograph as a faithful representation of the object
portrayed can be proved prima facie, either by the
testimony of the person who made it or by other
competent witnesses, after which the court can admit it
subject to impeachment as to its accuracy.
Photographs, therefore, can be identified by the
photographer or by any other competent witness who
can testify to its exactness and accuracy.
- That the photographs are faithful representations of
the mauling incident was affirmed when appellants
Richard de los Santos, Nilo Pacadar and Joel Tan
identified themselves therein and gave reasons for
their presence thereat.
- when the prosecution offered the photographs as part
of its evidence, appellants, through counsel Atty.
Page |8
Lazaro, Jr. objected to their admissibility for lack of
proper identification. However, when the accused
presented their evidence, Atty. Winlove (yessss, the
name!) Dumayas, counsel for accused Joselito Tamayo
and Gerry Neri used Exhibits V, V1-V48 to prove that
his clients were not in any of the pictures and therefore
could not have participated in the mauling of the
victim. The photographs were adopted by appellant
Joselito Tamayo and accused Gerry Neri as part of the
defense exhibits. And at this hearing, Atty. Dumayas
represented all the other accused per understanding
with their respective counsels. At subsequent hearings,
the prosecution used the photographs to cross-examine
all the accused who took the witness stand. No
objection was made by counsel for any of the accused,
not until Atty. Lazaro appeared at the 3rd hearing and
interposed a continuing objection to their admissibility.
- An analysis of the photographs vis-a-vis the accused's
testimonies reveal that only 3 of the appellants could
be readily seen in various belligerent poses lunging or
hovering behind or over the victim. Appellant Sison
appears only once and he, although (allegedly) afflicted
with hernia is shown merely running after the victim.
Appellant Joselito Tamayo was not identified in any of
the pictures. The absence of the two appellants in the
photographs does not exculpate them. The
photographs did not capture the entire sequence of the
killing of Salcedo but only segments thereof. While the
pictures did not record Sison and Tamayo hitting
Salcedo, they were unequivocally identified by the
eyewitnesses. Appellants' denials and alibis cannot
overcome their eyeball identification.
Disposition Petition is denied. Decision modified
(increased award of moral damages and indemnity for
death)
PEOPLE v ADOVISO
G.R. No.116196-7
KAPUNAN; June 23, 1999
(owen)
NATURE
Appeal from RTC Camarines Sur Joint Judgment
FACTS
- Pablo Adoviso, a member of the Citizens Armed Forces
Geographical Unit (CAFGU), was found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for Murders of Rufino Agunos and
Emeterio Vasquez. Four unidentified persons who have
been originally charged with him, however, remained at
large. The information states:
That on or about the 18th day of February 1990 at
about 8:00 o’clock in the evening at Sitio Tan-agan,
Barangay Casugad, Municipality of Bula, Province of
Prof. V. A. Avena
Camarines Sur, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
while armed with assorted long firearms, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, with
intent to kill and with treachery and evident
premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously shoot one Rufino Agunos several
times with said firearms hitting the latter on the
different parts of his body which were the direct and
immediate cause of his death, to the damage and
prejudice of the heirs of said Rufino Agunos.
That the crime complained of against the accused is
not service connected. (information wrt the killing of
Emeterio Vasquez, contains the same allegations)
- PROSECUTION VERSION:
The spouses Emeterio and Anastacia Vasquez had
two adjacent houses in Sitio Tan-agan, Barangay
Casugad, Bula, Camarines Sur. One of the houses
was actually a camalig where they stored harvested
rice. The spouses preferred to live there because it
was cooler. The living area of the camalig had walls
of bamboo called salsag. This area was elevated
from the ground. Three steps led down to an awning
(suyab) walled with bamboo slats. These slats were
placed horizontally approximately four to six inches
apart. A portion of the awning was used as a kitchen
but another portion had a papag where the Vasquez’
grandson, Rufino Agunos, son of their daughter
Virginia, would sleep whenever he tended the
irrigation pump. The spouses’ son Bonifacio
occupied the other house eight (8) meters from the
camalig with his own son Elmer.
At around 8:00 in the evening of February 18, 1990,
Emeterio Vazquez was preparing coffee as his wife
was about to retire for the night. Their grandson
Rufino had already gone to sleep in the papag.
Anastacia had just finished spreading the sleeping
mat when she heard three or four gunshots.
Emeterio then uttered that he had been shot. Seeing
Emeterio, Anastacia exclaimed, “Why should you not
be hit when in fact there are guns in front of you.”
Anastacia saw the “protruding edge of the gun” on
the wall near the stairs where Emeterio went down.
A lamp near the stairs where Emeterio drank
coffee illuminated the camalig but Anastacia
failed to recognize the persons who fired their guns
at her husband.
The Vasquez’ son Bonifacio was in the bigger house
when he heard the gunshots. Earlier that evening,
Bonifacio was talking to Rufino regarding the engine
of the irrigation pump. Bonifacio was still talking
when he noticed that Rufino had fallen asleep, the
latter’s back against the bamboo wall. Bonifacio left
Rufino snoring in the papag and went to the other
house. Only a minute had passed after he had gone
Evidence-A2010
up when Bonifacio heard the gunshots. He and his
16-year-old son Elmer immediately went down the
front yard to investigate.
Bonifacio hid himself in the dark portion of the yard,
behind a coconut tree. From a distance of eight (8)
meters, Bonifacio saw Rufino, who was inside the
camalig, being shot by several persons from the
outside. Looking through the bamboo slats of
the camalig wall, Bonifacio recognized one of the
assailants, with a large built and long hair, as
appellant Pablo Adoviso because of the gas lamp
that was lighted inside the camalig. Of Rufino’s
assailants, only appellant was not wearing a mask.
Appellant was holding a long firearm wrapped inside
a sack with its muzzle protruding and directed where
Rufino was sleeping. Appellant then fired hitting
Rufino. At that moment, Bonifacio heard his father
Emeterio shout “Pino,” (referring to his grandson
Rufino) and saw his father go down the stairs
carrying a gas lamp. Appellant fired again, hitting
Emeterio at the stomach.
For his part, Elmer, who rushed towards the camalig
with his father Bonifacio, saw five (5) persons aiming
their firearms at the camalig. Except for appellant,
each of these persons had a cover over their faces.
Three (3) of them were positioned in a ditch near the
camalig while two (2) others were near its door.
Elmer saw these five (5) persons shoot his cousin
Rufino who was lying down on the papag. Although
his back was hit, Rufino was able to crawl under the
papag. Elmer’s grandfather was also hit on the
stomach but he managed to go up the camalig.
When appellant and his companion by the camalig
door saw Elmer, they fired at him then, with the three
others at the ditch, escaped to the banana
plantation. Elmer, on the other hand, fled towards
the coconut plantation.
Upon returning to the camalig, Elmer saw his father
carrying his grandfather Emeterio. He also found
Rufino at the foot of a coconut tree near the river,
lying on his side with his body curled. Rufino told
Elmer that he had been hit and, when Elmer failed to
locate his wound, Rufino took Elmer’s hand and put it
on his back. Elmer then moved Rufino “sidewise.”
Upon returning to the camalig, Elmer carried his
grandfather and bandaged his stomach with diapers.
In the meantime, Bonifacio went to the municipal
building of Bula to fetch the police. Inspector Antonio
Lopez and Senior Police Officer 1 Claro Ballevar
returned to the scene of the crime with him. The
police brought Emeterio and Rufino to the municipal
hall of Bula and then to the Bicol Regional Hospital.
Both Emeterio and Rufino died early the next
morning.
Page |9
- The certification dated March 7, 1990 and signed by
Dr. Janice Nanette Estrada, resident physician of the
Bicol Regional Hospital in Naga City, states that 35-
year-old Rufino Agunos died of four (4) gunshot
wounds: at the inguinal area, the sacral area, the thigh
and the abdomen. The wounds at the inguinal area and
the thigh bore contusion collars. The same physician
certified that Emeterio Vasquez, 88 years of age,
sustained seven (7) gunshot wounds at the
paraumbilical area, lumbar area, hypogastrium,
anterior aspect of the right forearm, anteromedial
aspect of the right forearm, anteromedial aspect left
arm and anterolateral aspect of the left arm. Four (4)
of these gunshot wounds had contusion collars – at the
paraumbilical area, the hypogastrium, the right forearm
and the left arm.
- ACCUSED’S VERSION:
Adoviso interposed alibi and denial as his defense.
He claimed that he was a member of the CAFGU
whose headquarters was located in Barangay
Palsong, Bula, Camarines Sur. At around 7:00 in the
evening of February 18, 1990, he was in Sitio
Burabod, Palsong, about a kilometer away from the
CAFGU headquarters. He, together with Francisco
Bislombre, Benjamin Alina, Jr. and PFC Antero
Esteron, had some drinks in the store of Honoria
Tragante until around 11:00 p.m. Honoria Tragante
and Francisco Bislombre corroborated his alibi.
Antero Esteron likewise testified that from 7:00 until
past 11:00 that night of February 18, 1990, he and
Adoviso had a drinking spree at the Tragante store.
He distinctly remembered that date because it was
the fiesta of Balatan. To support his denial, he
presented Lt. Antonio Lopez, the deputy chief of
police and SPO2 Claro Ballebar of the PNP Bula Police
Station. Lopez identified a police certification
prepared by Pfc. Ramon N. Canabe to the effect
that the shooting incident was perpetrated “by
unidentified armed men.” Lopez said that he
(Lopez) was one of those who brought the victims to
the hospital who were then still conscious. The
victims told him that they did not know who shot
them or why they were shot. The defense also
offered in evidence the testimony of Ernesto A.
Lucena, Polygraph Examiner II of the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in Manila, who
conducted a polygraph test on him. In Polygraph
Report No. 900175, Lucena opined that appellant’s
“polygrams revealed that there were no specific
reactions indicative of deception to pertinent
questions relevant” to the investigation of the
crimes.
- SPO2 Claro Ballebar, however testified that in the
follow-up investigation he conducted several days
after the incident, Bonifacio Vasquez revealed to him
Prof. V. A. Avena
that he (Bonifacio) “vividly saw the incident and
recognized” appellant as one of the perpetrators
of the crime and that the killings had some something
to do with land dispute between Bonifacio’s
parents and the Galicia family.
- REBUTTAL:
Bonifacio Vasquez revealed that when he reported
the incident to the police, he did not identify
appellant as one of the culprits because he was
afraid of appellant who was a member of the CAFGU.
Nevertheless, Bonifacio did mention to the police that
he recognized appellant as one of the perpetrators of
the crime although he told them that he did not
recognize appellant’s four (4) companions. He did
not mention to Lopez and Canabe appellant’s identity
because he was “confused” about what had
happened in their house.
- TRIAL COURT: Joint Judgment finding appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt for two (2) counts of
murder
- APPELLANT CLAIMS:
His bid for exoneration on whether he was properly
identified by the two (2) eyewitnesses as one of the
killers of the victims. He contends that eyewitnesses
Bonifacio and Elmer Vasquez presented an
“incredible” story because it is “highly improbable”
that they could have “distinctly and positively
recognized accused-appellant as one of the
perpetrators of the crimes." According to him,
Bonifacio, who was in the dark portion of the yard
hiding behind a coconut tree, could not have
identified appellant by the light emanating from gas
lamp inside the camalig where Emeterio Vasquez and
Rufino Agunos were staying at the time of the
incident. Neither could Elmer Vasquez, who declared
that he saw his grandfather shot by him, could have
identified him because of the poor lighting coming
from the gas lamp being carried by his
grandfather. He claims that the gas lamp carried
by Elmer's grandfather was “a small can about two
(2) inches tall and the wick is smaller than a
cigarette” and the lamp inside the camalig “was
placed inside a bigger can so that the direction
of the light emanating therefrom was upwards
and not sidewise.”
ISSUES
1. WON visibility, through lamp, is factor in impeaching
witness testimony
2. WON visibility, through bamboo slats, is factor in
impeaching witness testimony
3. WON perpetration of a crime without a mask is
improbable
4. WON failure to identify him as perpetrator
immediately after the crime is a relevant
Evidence-A2010
5. WON motive is relevant in this case
6. WON alibi holds water
7. WON polygraph test is relevant
HELD
1. NO
Ratio Visibility is indeed a vital factor in the
determination of whether or not an eyewitness could
have identified the perpetrator of a crime. However, it
is settled that when conditions of visibility are
favorable, and the witnesses do not appear to be
biased, their assertion as to the identity of the
malefactor should normally be accepted. Illumination
produced by kerosene lamp or a flashlight is sufficient
to allow identification of persons. Wicklamps,
flashlights, even moonlight or starlight may, in proper
situations be considered sufficient illumination, making
the attack on the credibility of witnesses solely on that
ground unmeritorious.
Reasoning
- In this case, not one (1) but two (2) gas lamps
illuminated the place – the one placed inside the
camalig and that held by Emeterio as he descended
from the stairs after the first volley of gunfire.
Appellant’s contention therefore that one particular gas
lamp could not have lighted the place because it was
placed inside a can is puerile. Besides, Elmer was not
describing either of the gas lamps during the incident.
The defense counsel at the trial and appellant’s counsel
misunderstood the testimonies of Elmer and his
grandmother on that matter.
- Through Anastacia’s testimony, it was shown that the
lamp inside the camalig was placed on the floor and a
can was placed over it only after the incident when
Anastacia left with her son and the police to bring the
victims to the hospital.
2. NO
- The bamboo slats of the camalig could not have
effectively obstructed the eyewitnesses' view of
Adoviso, considering that the slats were built four (4)
meters apart. Besides, it is the natural reaction of
relatives of victims to strive to observe the faces and
appearance of the assailants, if not ascertain their
identities, and the manner in which the crime is
committed. A relative will naturally be interested in
identifying the malefactor to secure his conviction to
obtain justice for the death of his relative(s). It must
remembered that Adoviso was not a complete stranger
to the eyewitnesses. Bonifacio had known him for ten
(10) years while Elmer had been acquainted with him
for four (4) years. Elmer recalled that Adoviso used to
join the rabuz at the barracks. Familiarity with his face
and appearance minimized if not erased the possibility
that they could have been mistaken as to his identity.
3. NO
P a g e | 10
- Adoviso’s allegation that it was “improbable” for him
to have committed the crimes without a mask, unlike
the other participants, deserves scant consideration. It
is not contrary to human experience for a person to
commit a crime before the very eyes of people who are
familiar to them. Indeed, some may even take pride in
their identification as the perpetrator of a criminal act.
4. NO
Ratio The failure of a witness to reveal at once the
identity of the accused as one of the perpetrators of the
crime does not affect, much less, impair his credibility
as a witness. The general or common rule is that
witnesses react to a crime in different ways. There is no
standard form of human behavioral response to a
strange, startling and frightful event, and there is no
standard rule by which witnesses to a crime must react.
Reasoning
- The delay in reporting his participation to the police
was however sufficiently explained by Bonifacio.
Bonifacio was afraid of Adoviso since the latter was a
member of the CAFGU and, as such, was provided with
a gun. He was also hesitant in identifying him
immediately lest he got wind of his impending arrest
and posthaste escaped the clutches of the law.
5. NO
- According to Adoviso, Bonifacio suspected that he was
hired by the Galicia family to kill Bonifacio's father who
had earlier won in a land dispute with the Galicias. It is
irrelevant here to talk of motive on the part of Bonifacio
inasmuch as to credible witnesses had positively
identified appellant as one of the participants in the
killing of Emeterio Vasquez and Rufino Agunos.
6. NO
Ratio For an alibi to prosper, moreover, there must be
proof that the defendant was not only somewhere else
when the crime was committed but that he could not
be physically present at the place of the crime or its
immediate vicinity at the time of its commission.
Reasoning
- Adoviso’s alibi thus crumbles in the face of his positive
identification as one of the perpetrators of the crimes.
Appellant did not prove the physical impossibility of his
being in Sitio Tan-agan which is not exactly remote
from Sitio Palsong where he claimed to be when the
incident happened. Both places are within the
Municipality of Bula. Appellant admitted that the
distance between the two sitios could be negotiated in
three hours even without any means of transportation.
On the other hand, his alleged companion in Sitio
Palsong, Antero Esteron, testified that the distance
could be traveled in thirty-five (35) minutes by
“trimobile” or private vehicle.
- Apart from the fact that appellant's alibi was
inherently weak, he was not even sure where he was
Prof. V. A. Avena
and who were his companions at the time the crimes
were committed.
7. NO
Ratio A polygraph is an electromechanical instrument
that simultaneously measures and records certain
physiological changes in the human body that are
believed to be involuntarily caused by an examinee’s
conscious attempt to deceive the questioner. The
theory behind a polygraph or lie detector test is that a
person who lies deliberately will have a rising blood
pressure and a subconscious block in breathing, which
will be recorded on the graph. However, American
courts almost uniformly reject the results of polygraph
tests when offered in evidence for the purpose of
establishing the guilt or innocence of one accused of a
crime, whether the accused or the prosecution seeks its
introduction, for the reason that polygraph has not as
yet attained scientific acceptance as a reliable and
accurate means of ascertaining truth or deception. The
rule is no different in this jurisdiction.
Disposition Joint Judgment of the trial court is hereby
AFFIRMED.
PEOPLE v EMPLEO
226 SCRA 457
REGALADO; Sep 15, 1993
(athe)
FACTS
Elisa Cordova y Urdaneta filed a complaint against
Edmund Empleo y Maquilan charging the latter with the
crime of rape allegedly committed by grabbing her
under a point of a gun, forced her to lie on the ground
and forcibly tore her underwear, kissed and with the
use of superior strength, had carnal knowledge with
her. During the trial, Collen Parreno, corroborated the
testimony of the victim, Elisa, being one of the latter’s
companions on the date and time of the incident.
The TC found Empleo guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of rape. Thus, this appeal.
ISSUES
1. WON the trial court erred in finding him guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape on the
basis of the testimonies of complainant Elisa Cordova
and prosecution witness, Collen Parreño, which are
allegedly replete with contradictions and
inconsistencies on material point (in short, the issue
devolves on the credibility of complainant and witness)
2. WON the trial court erred in not taking into
consideration the results of the medical examination
conducted on private complainant, the report on which
was admitted as Exhibit B
Evidence-A2010
HELD
1. NO.
Ratio When an appealed conviction hinges on the
credibility of witnesses, the assessment of the trial
court is accorded the highest degree of respect. Absent
any proper reason to depart from this fundamental
rule, factual conclusions reached by the lower court,
which had the opportunity to observe and evaluate the
demeanor of the witnesses while on the witness stand,
should not be disturbed.
Reasoning
a. The contradiction between the affidavit and the
testimony of a witness may be explained by the fact
that an affidavit will not always disclose all the facts
and will oftentimes and without design incorrectly
describe, without the deponent detecting it, some of
the occurrences narrated. Being taken ex parte, an
affidavit is almost always incomplete and often
inaccurate, sometimes from partial suggestions, and
sometimes from want of suggestions and inquiries,
without the aid of which the witness may be unable to
recall the connected collateral circumstances necessary
for the correction of the first suggestion of his memory
and for his accurate recollection of all that belongs to
the subject. It has thus been held that affidavits are
generally subordinated in importance to open court
declarations because the former are often executed
when an affiant's mental faculties are not in such a
state as to afford him a fair opportunity of narrating in
full the incident which has transpired. Further, affidavits
are not complete reproductions of what the declarant
has in mind because they are generally prepared by
the administering officer and the affiant simply signs
them after the same have been read to him.
The exception to the rule is where the omission in
the affidavit refers to a very important detail such that
the affiant would not have failed to mention it, and
which omission could affect the affiant's credibility.
Such exceptive circumstance does not obtain in the
present case. The alleged omissions in the affidavit of
complainant are not that vital and substantial as to
affect her credibility. The more important detail which
is really material to the case, and which is categorically
declared and explained both in the affidavit and in
complainant's testimony, is the fact that appellant had
carnal knowledge of complainant without her consent.
b. There is no discrepancy in the statements made by
complainant in her affidavit, where she declared that
she was stripped naked during the assault, and in her
oral testimony, where she said that she was not naked
when appellant did the sexual act. This seeming
inconsistency was later clarified by complainant in her
testimony where she explained that what she really
P a g e | 11
meant by the word "naked" is that she had no
underwear but she had her uniform on.
c. The bare fact alone that complainant did not know
the name of herein appellant, we cannot safely
conclude that the identity of the assailant was not
sufficiently established.
The fact that complainant testified that she was able to
recognize appellant because at that time the moon was
very bright, when in truth and in fact it was a first
quarter moon, does not serve to discredit her entire
testimony. It is perfectly reasonable to believe the
testimony of a witness with respect to some facts and
disbelieve it with respect to other facts. It is not
inconceivable that complainant may have wrongly
perceived the light coming from the lamp post as
having come from the moon.
d. Non-presentation of the torn dress and underwear of
the complainant does not destroy the case for the
prosecution, there being sufficient and convincing
evidence to prove the rape charged beyond reasonable
doubt. Those clothes are not essential, and need not be
presented, as they are not indispensable evidence to
prove rape. The absence thereof does not negate the
truth of a rape complaint and the credibility of a
victim's testimony.
2. NO.
Reasoning
a. An erroneous reckoning or mis-estimation of time is
too trivial and immaterial to discredit the testimony of a
complainant, especially in this case where time is not
an essential element or has no substantial bearing on
the fact of commission of the crime. (Note: med cert
shows the information that she was raped at about
6pm while in her testimony she claimed that the
incident happened at around 8:30pm)Minor
inconsistencies are not sufficient to blur or cast doubt
on straightforward attestations. Far from being badges
of fraud and fabrication, the inconsistencies in the
testimonies of witnesses may on the contrary be
justifiably considered as indicative of the truthfulness
on material points of the facts testified to. These minor
deviations also confirm that the witnesses had not been
rehearsed.
b. The medical findings of the physician who examined
complainant shows that she was positive for alcoholic
breath, but this fact alone does not sufficiently
establish that she was in such a state of intoxication as
would completely deprive her of her sense of
perception and which would pervert her otherwise
coherent and credible testimony.
Consequently, the rule is that the absence of
spermatozoa does not disprove the fact of rape (People
vs Balane, People vs Selfaison, People vs Carandang).
What is essential is that there was genital penetration,
which was unequivocally testified to by complainant.
Prof. V. A. Avena
Disposition The judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED
in toto.
PEOPLE v. ESPINOZA
G.R. No. 104596
PUNO; November 23, 1993
(glaisa)
FACTS
- Prosecution witness Lucresio Croda was in the living
room of his house when he heard cries for help. As he
went down the stairs, he saw the appellants drag the
victim away from the road towards his house. He
positively recognized the victim. He also witnessed the
accused-appellant Rogelio and Victor Espinoza hack the
victim several times with their long bolos while
appellant Magbarit held back the victim who was lying
on his back.
- Prosecution witness Charlito Guevarra testified that
he was watching the coronation ceremonies of the
fiesta queen at the barrio hall when he received
information from his brother, Raul, about a hacking
incident. He immediately went to the place and there
saw Renato Salvar, seriously wounded and lying on his
back. He asked Salvar who was responsible and Salvar
answered: "I was betrayed by Rogelio Espinoza, Victor
Espinoza and Julian Magbaril."
- Simplicio Salvar, Jr. who also proceeded at the
crossing of Anlawagan and Kisawi after being informed
that his brother, Renato Salvar was the victim of an
attack, was able to talk to the latter who was then still
conscious and coherent in speech. The victim identified
the three accused-appellants as his assailants.
- Accused-appellants were charged with and convicted
of Murder by the RTC for hacking to death a certain
Renato Salvar. CA affirmed.
ISSUE
WON the Trial Court and the Court of Appeals erred in
giving credence to the testimony of the lone alleged
eye-witness Lucresio Crudo.
HELD
1. NO
- Eyewitness Lucresio Croda, positively identified
Rogelio Espinoza, Victor Espinoza and Julian Magbaril as
the assailants of Renato Salvar. It is unrebutted that
Lucresio's house is located at least three (3) fathoms
away from the scene of the crime. Moreover, during the
hacking incident, the place was illuminated by the
moon.
- The accused himself, Rogelio Espinoza, admitted on
cross-examination that prosecution witness Lucresio
Evidence-A2010
Croda and Charlito Gualderama, both residents of
Payad, Pangantucan, Bukidnon, are his friends and
could not think of any reason why they testified against
him.
- Lucresio testified in detail how the accused-
appellants, taking advantage of their superior strength,
hacked to death the victim.
- The testimony of a witness, mentioning the minutiae
of an incident that could not easily be concocted, such
as the murder in the case at bar, deserves credence for
it indicates sincerity and truthfulness in the narration of
events.
- The credible testimony of a lone witness can provide a
rational basis for conviction. The fight for truth is not
necessarily won by the party with more numerous
witnesses. It is the quality and not the quantity of
witnesses that counts in assessing their credence.
- We take judicial notice of the fact that people usually
shy away from any involvement in criminal cases due
to its inconvenience, if not the danger it poses to their
lives. The fact, therefore, that it takes them a long time
to decide whether or not to testify should not
necessarily erode their credibility. Inn this case,
Lucresio had just witnessed a gruesome, hacking
incident. There is no standard form of behavior when
on is confronted with a shocking incident. Lucresio's
initial hesitation to report the crime to the authorities
due to the shocking experience should not be counted
against his credibility.
- It cannot also be doubted that the numerous wounds
suffered by the victim were due to hacking by means of
sharp bladed instruments.
Appellant's participation in the merciless killing of
Renato Salvar is further buttressed by the fact that
before the victim died, he disclosed to witnesses
CHARLITO GUALDERAMA AND SIMPLICIO SALVAR, JR.
the name of his assailants. Utterances made
immediately after a startling occurrence and before the
declarant had an opportunity to fabricate a false
statement can be considered as part of the res gestae.
- As between the positive declarations of the
prosecution witnesses and the negative statements of
the appellants, the former deserve more credence and
weight than the latter. In this case, we give full credit to
the factual findings of the trial court considering that it
is in the best position to weigh conflicting declarations
of witnesses as it was able to observe their demeanor
and conduct while giving their testimonies.
Dispositive The decision of the appellate court finding
accused-appellants ROGELIO ESPINOZA, VICTOR
ESPINOZA and JULIAN MAGBARIL guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Murder is hereby AFFIRMED.
Accordingly, they are sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of Renato
P a g e | 12
Salvar an indemnity of fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00).
PEOPLE v AMESTUZO
GR 104383
Jul 12, 2001; KAPUNAN
(athe)
NATURE
Appeal from the decision of the RTC of Kalookan City.
FACTS
At about nine-thirty in the evening of February 22,
1991, a group of eight armed men wearing masks
entered the house of complainant Perlita delos Santos
Lacsamana at Sacred Heart Village, Kalookan City and
robbed the said premises of valuables in the total
amount of P728,000.00. In the course of the robbery,
two members of the gang raped Maria Fe Catanyag and
Estrella Rolago, niece and employee, respectively of
complainant Lacsamana.
- On February 27, 1991, accused-appellant Albino
Bagas, Valeriano Amestuzo, Federico Ampatin, Dioscoro
Viñas and four other accused, whose identities are
unknown and who are still at large up to the present,
were charged with the complex crime of robbery in
band with double rape.
- The trial court rendered judgment convicting all the
accused.
- From the judgment of conviction by the trial court,
only herein accused-appellant Bagas appealed to this
Court. His appeal is based mainly on (1) the alleged
deprivation of his constitutional right to be represented
by counsel during his identification, (2) the trial court’s
error in giving due weight to the open court
identification of him which was based on a suggestive
and irregular out-of-court identification, and (3) the trial
court’s improper rejection of his defense of alibi.
ISSUES
1. WON his constitutional right to be represented by
counsel was violated
2. WON the TC erred in giving due weight to the open
court identification of him which was based on a
suggestive and irregular out-of-court identification
3. WON the TC improperly rejected his defense of alibi
HELD
1. NO.
Ratio The guarantees of Sec. 12 (1), Art. III of the
1987 Constitution, or the so-called Miranda rights, may
be invoked only by a person while he is under custodial
investigation. Custodial investigation starts when the
Prof. V. A. Avena
police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into
an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a
particular suspect taken into custody by the police who
starts the interrogation and propounds questions to the
person to elicit incriminating statements. Police line-up
is not part of the custodial investigation; hence, the
right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution cannot
yet be invoked at this stage.
Reasoning: Bagas could not yet invoke his right to
counsel when he was presented for identification by the
complainants because the same was not yet part of the
investigation process. Moreover, there was no showing
that during his identification by the complainants, the
police investigators sought to elicit any admission or
confession from accused-appellant. In fact, records
show that the police did not at all talk to accused-
appellant when he was presented before the
complainants. The alleged infringement of the
constitutional rights of the accused while under
custodial investigation is relevant and material only to
cases in which an extra-judicial admission or confession
extracted from the accused becomes the basis of his
conviction. In the present case, there is no such
confession or extra-judicial admission.
2. YES.
Ratio There is no law requiring a police line-up as
essential to a proper identification. The fact that he
was brought out of the detention cell alone and was
made to stand before the accused by himself and
unaccompanied by any other suspects or persons does
not detract from the validity of the identification
process. However, we agree that complainants’ out-of-
court identification of accused-appellant was seriously
flawed as to preclude its admissibility. In resolving the
admissibility and reliability of out-of-court
identifications, we have applied the totality of
circumstances test enunciated in the case of People vs.
Teehankee which lists the following factors: xxx (1)
the witness’ opportunity to view the criminal at the
time of the crime; (2) the witness’ degree of attention
at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description
given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty
demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5)
the length of time between the crime and the
identification; and (6) the suggestiveness of the
identification process.
Reasoning
- The out-of-court identification of herein accused-
appellant by complainants in the police station appears
to have been improperly suggestive. Even before
complainants had the opportunity to view accused-
appellant face-to-face when he was brought our of the
detention cell to be presented to them for
identification, the police made an announcement that
he was one of the suspects in the crime and that he
Evidence-A2010
was the one pointed to by accused Ampatin as one of
culprits. The fact that this information came to the
knowledge of the complainants prior to their
identification based on their own recall of the incident
detracts from the spontaneity of their subsequent
identification and therefore, its objectivity.
3. YES
Ratio The defense of alibi or denial assumes
significance or strength when it is amply corroborated
by a credible witness. And to be given weight, accused
must prove not only that he was somewhere else when
the crime was committed but that he was so far away
that it was physically impossible for him to be present
at the crime scene or its immediate vicinity at the time
of its commission. Though inherently weak as a
defense, alibi in the present case has been sufficiently
established by corroborative testimonies of credible
witnesses and by evidence of physical impossibility of
accused-appellant’s presence at the scene of the crime.
Alibi, therefore, should have been properly appreciated
in accused-apellant’s favor.
Reasoning
- Accused-appellant vehemently argues that it was
physically impossible for him to have been present at
the scene of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the
time of its commission. First, the crime was committed
around 9:30 in the evening of February 22, 1991.
Accused-appellant, as well as two other witnesses,
testified that he worked in the factory until 10 p.m. that
night and went to sleep after. Second, there was only
one door in the factory which was the only means of
entrance and exit and this door was kept locked by
witness Ocasla after ten p.m. that night. Ocasla was the
only person who had a key to this door. Third, the
windows on the first floor of the building consisted of
hollow blocks with small holes which do not allow
passage. The second and third floor windows were 14
and 21 feet high, respectively. There was no possible
means of exit through these windows without accused-
appellant getting hurt or injured. Lastly, the crime took
place in Kalookan City around 9:30 p.m. while accused-
appellant’s place of work was in Pasay City. Assuming
for the sake of argument that he was able to leave the
premises after 10 p.m. that night, by the time he
reaches Kalookan, the crime would have already been
completed.
- Another significant evidence which the trial court
failed to consider is the voluntary confession of accused
Federico Ampatin absolving accused-appellant Bagas of
the crime. Ampatin’s testimony was clear and
categorical that he pointed on Bagas because he was
afraid to be hit again by the policeman if he would not
do so. Ampatin did not know Bagas and he did not
even saw his face before pointing on him. Ampatin and
accused-appellant were charged as co-conspirators in
P a g e | 13
the crime of robbery with rape. As a co-accused, it
would have been more consistent with human nature
for Ampatin to implicate accused-appellant if indeed he
was one of the gang. In fact, the Court has recognized
that “as is usual with human nature, a culprit,
confessing a crime is likely to put the blame as far as
possible on others rather than himself. The fact that he
testified to the innocence of a co-accused, an act which
resulted in no advantage or benefit to him and which
might in fact implicate him more, should have been
received by the trial court as an indicum of the truth of
Ampatin’s testimony and the innocence of herein
accused-appellant. Ampatin’s testimony, therefore,
should have been given weight by the trial court.
- More so, the same was substantially corroborated by
another witness, Rodolfo Rosales, accused-appellant’s
co-worker and who was present when accused-
appellant was arrested. Rosales testified that he
noticed that the reaction of Federico Ampatin was
afraid, so, because of fear he was able to point on the
person of Albino Bagas but when asked he does not
know the name of Albino Bagas.
Disposition The decision of the trial court convicting
accused-appellant Albino Bagas of the crime of robbery
with multiple rape is REVERSED and he is ACQUITTED
of the crime charged.
PEOPLE v VALLEJO
382 SCRA 192
PER CURIAM; May 9, 2002
(guilia)
FACTS
The accused-appellant Gerrico Vallejo was convicted by
the RTC of rape with homicide, which was affirmed by
the CA.
The accused was convicted through the ff
circumstancial evidence:
1. The victim, Daisy, went to Aimee Vallejo's
house for tutoring around 1pm
2. At around 2pm, the accused and Daisy went
together to the latter's house to get a book
from which the former could copy Daisy's
school project. After getting the book, they
proceeded to the accused's residence.
3. Daisy then went to her neighbor's house to
watch TV. The accused thereafter arrived and
whispered something to Daisy, and the latter
went with him towards the 'compuerta'
4. At about 4:30pm, Sps Yepes saw accused
coming out of the 'compuerta' with his clothes
wet, although his face and hair were not.
According to witnesses, he looked pale,
Prof. V. A. Avena
uneasy, and balisa. He kept looking around
and did not even greet them as was his
custom to do so.
5. The fishing boat used by the accused as a
bomber was docked by the seashore.
6. A little before 5pm another witness saw the
accused buying cigarettes and noticed that his
clothes were wet, but not her hair and face.
7. At around 5:30, Ma. Nida Diola, mother of the
witness, looked for her daughter and the
accused that Daisy had gone to her
classmate's house. The information proved to
be false.
8. Daisy's body was found tied to an aroma tree
at the part of the river near the 'compuerta'.
9. During the initial investigation, the accused
has scratches on his feet similar to those
caused by the thorns of an aroma tree.
10. The clothes worn by the accused on that day
were bloodstained. The bloodstains on the
accused's clothes and those on Daisy's clothes
were found positive of human blood type 'A'.
11. The accused's blood type is 'O'.
12. The vaginal swabs from Daisy's body
contained her DNA profile as well as that of
the accused.
ISSUES
1. WON the bloodstains found on the accused's
garments were not proven to have been that of the
victim as the victim's blood was not determined and
2. WON the method by which his clothes were
recovered was proper.
3. WON DNA analysis conducted by NBI was also
questioned as the NBI failed to show that all the
samples were not contaminated.
4. WON prosecution's oral and written confessions
were admissible as evidence and WON the extrajudicial
confessions by the accused were admissible
HELD
1. On the bloodstained clothes and means of recovery
Even if there was no direct determination as to what
blood type the victim had, it can reasonably be inferred
that the victim was a blood type 'A' since she sustained
contused abrasions all over her body which would
necessarily produce the bloodstains on her clothing.
2. As to the method by which the accused's clothes
were recovered, there is no showing that accused was
coerced or forced into producing the garments.
3. On the validity of DNA
DNA is an organic substance found in a person's cells
which contains his or her genetic code. When a crime is
committed, material is collected from the scene of a
crime or from the victim's body for the suspect's DNA.
Evidence-A2010
The purpose of DNA is to ascertain whether an
association exists between the evidence sample and
the reference sample. The test may yield three possible
results:
1) The samples are different and therefore must
have originated from different sources
(exclusion). This conclusion is absolute and
requires no further analysis or discussion;
2) It is not possible to be sure, based on the
results of the test, whether the samples have
similar DNA types (inconclusive). This might
occur for a variety of reasons including
degradation, contamination, or failure of some
aspect of the protocol. Various parts of the
analysis might then be repeated with the
same or a different sample, to obtain a more
conclusive result; or
3) The samples are similar, and could have
originated from the same source (inclusion). In
such a case, the samples are found to be
similar, the analyst proceeds to determine the
statistical significance of the Similarity.
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence,
courts should consider, among others things, the
following data: how the samples were collected, how
they were handled, the possibility of contamination of
the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the
samples, whether the proper standards and procedures
were followed in conducting the tests, and the
qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.
The bloodstains taken from the clothing of the victim
and of accused, the smears taken from the victim as
well as the strands of hair and nails taken from her
tested negative for the presence of human DNA. It is
the inadequacy of the specimens submitted for
examination, and not the possibility that the samples
had been contaminated, which accounted for the
negative results of their examination. But the vaginal
swabs taken from the victim yielded positive for the
presence of human DNA. Upon analysis by the experts,
they showed the DNA profile of accused.
4. On the extra-judicial confessions
There are two kinds of involuntary or coerced
confessions treated in Art III of the Constitution: (1)
coerced confessions, the product of third degree
methods such as torture, force, violence, threat, and
intimidation, which are dealt with in par 2 of Section 12,
and (2) uncounselled statements, given without the
benefit of Miranda warnings, which are the subject of
par 1 of the same section.
Accused argues that the oral confessions given to
Mayor Abutan of Rosario, Cavite and to NBI Forensic
Biologist should be deemed inadmissible for being
violative of his constitutional rights as these were made
by one already under custodial investigation to persons
P a g e | 14
in authority without the presence of counsel.
The testimony of Atty. Leyva is not only corroborated
by the testimony of Mayor Renato Abutan, it is also
confirmed by accused where he was apprised of the
consequences of the statements he made as well as
the written confessions he was to execute. Neither can
he question the qualifications of Atty. Lupo Leyva who
acted as his counsel during the investigation. To be an
effective counsel, a lawyer need not challenge all the
questions being propounded to his client. The presence
of a lawyer is not intended to stop an accused from
saying anything which might incriminate him but,
rather, it was adopted in our Constitution to preclude
the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to
admit something false. Indeed, counsel should not
prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling
the truth.
Accused admitted that he was first asked whether he
wanted the services of Atty. Leyva before the latter
acted as his defense counsel. And counsel who is
provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by
the accused where the latter never raised any objection
against the former's appointment during the course of
the investigation but, on the contrary, thereafter
subscribed to the veracity of his statement before the
swearing officer. Contrary to the assertions of accused,
Atty. Leyva was not the municipal attorney of Rosario,
Cavite but only a legal adviser of Mayor Renato Abutan.
The mayor's questions to accused-appellant were not in
the nature of an interrogation, but rather an act of
benevolence by a leader seeking to help one of his
constituents.
For the same reason, the oral confession made by
accused-appellant to NBI Forensic Biologist Pet Byron
Buan is admissible. Accused-appellant would have this
Court exclude this confession on the ground that it was
uncounselled and that Mr. Buan, who initiated the
conversation with accused-appellant, was part of the
NBI. The questions put by Mr. Buan to accused-
appellant were asked out of mere personal curiosity
and clearly not as part of his tasks.
The confession, thus, can be likened to one freely and
voluntarily given to an ordinary individual and is,
therefore, admissible as evidence.
The bare assertions of maltreatment by the police
authorities in extracting confessions from the accused
are not sufficient. The standing rule is that "where the
defendants did not present evidence of compulsion, or
duress nor violence on their person; where they failed
to complain to the officer who administered their oaths;
where they did not institute any criminal or
administrative action against their alleged intimidators
for maltreatment; where there appeared to be no
marks of violence on their bodies; and where they did
not have themselves examined by a reputable
Prof. V. A. Avena Evidence-A2010 P a g e | 15

physician to buttress their claim," all these will be

considered as indicating voluntariness.
Even if accused was truthful and his assailed
confessions are inadmissible, the circumstantial
evidence is sufficient to establish his guilt beyond all
reasonable doubt. The prosecution witnesses presented
a mosaic of circumstances showing accused-appellant's
guilt. Their testimonies rule out the possibility that the
crime was the handiwork of some other evil mind.
These witnesses have not been shown to have been
motivated by ill will against accused.
If the account of accused that he was beaten up is true,
Dr. Antonio Vertido would have found more than mere
abrasions and hematoma on his left finger. Dr. Vertido's
findings are more consistent with the theory that
accused-appellant sustained physical injuries as a
result of the struggle made by the victim during the
commission of the rape in the "compuerta."
No other witness not related to accused-appellant was
ever called to corroborate his claim. The defense
presented only accused's sister, Aimee Vallejo, to
corroborate his story. We have held time and again that
alibi cannot prosper if it is established mainly by the
accused and his relatives, and not by credible persons.
It is well settled that alibi is the weakest of all defenses
as it is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove. For this
reason, this Court looks with caution upon the defense
of alibi, especially when, as in this case, it is
corroborated only by relatives or friends of the
accused.
Disposition decision of the RTC of Cavite City, finding
accused Gerrico Vallejo y Samartino GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape with Homicide is
hereby AFFIRMED.