3Subsequently, at an unemployment hearing, Kannensohn named another reason for Lewter’sdischarge. Prior to the exchange discussed above, Kannensohn had received a forwarded email fromanother Fayette District Judge, Maria Ransdell. In that email to Judge Ransdell, Lewter expressedher displeasure at the way Judge Ransdell handled the sentencing of a particular case,
, andat the way Judge Ransdell overruled her objections to bond reductions. Lewter then requestedpermission to speak with the jurors in the
case. Judge Ransdell considered the email aprohibited
communication as the content of the email involved pending cases. Initially,Kannensohn decided to only reprimand Lewter for the email. However, after learning about thecourtroom exchange with Judge Horne, Kannensohn discharged her.On May 6, 2004, Lewter filed the instant action in the District Court seeking reinstatementor front and back pay, punitive damagesand attorneys fees as she claims she was discharged inretaliation for exercising her First Amendment right to freedom of speech. On July 12, 2004,Kannensohn filed a motion for summary judgment, seeking a dismissal of Lewter’s claims basedon qualified immunity and failure to establish a constitutional violation. Lewter then filed a motionto hold Defendant’s motion for summary judgment in abeyance until discovery was complete. Thedistrict court granted Kannensohn’s motion for summary judgment and denied Lewter’s motion forabeyance.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review the grant or denial of summary judgment de novo.
Rodgers v. Banks
, 344 F.3d587, 595 (6
Cir. 2003). Summary judgment is proper if the moving party shows there is “is nogenuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matterof law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).