Military-Strategic Information Section

Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces

June 10th , 2010

Operation Sea
Breeze
Summary and
Background
May 31st – June 5th
 Military-Strategic Information Section
Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
Table of Contents

1 Strategic 2 Flotilla 3 Flotilla

Context Background Participants
State of Armed Conflict General The IHH

The Naval Blockade Blockade Enforcement IHH and Turkey

Humanitarian Status:
Diplomatic Efforts Other Terrorist Links
Gaza
Hamas & Humanitarian
Participating Boats
Aid

4 Interception 5 The Aftermath

Intercepting the Boats Materials Onboard

Interception to
IDF Investigation
Repatriation

The Rachel Corrie

Unclassified || Slide 2
 Military-Strategic Information Section
Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
The Broader Context
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Unilateral PA Elections Hamas Coup State of Calm Operation Cast Increased

Disengagement Lead deterrence
Shalit
Kidnapped

Rockets and Terrorist Activity in 2010 (As of June 7th ) Military Buildup
Mortars
Light
34 Arms
Attacks
5 IEDs
Jan.-Jun. 2010
56 Rockets
33 Mortar Shells Anti-Tank
7 Fire 1 Grenade

Refusal of
• Cessation of hostile terrorist activity against Israel
International
• Recognition of agreements between Israel and the PA
Community
• Recognition of the State of Israel’s right to exist
Conditions:
Unclassified || Slide 3
 Military-Strategic Information Section
Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
The Naval Blockade on Gaza
Israel enforces certain restrictions aimed at
ensuring its security, by preventing Hamas
military buildup. This is subject to ongoing scrutiny by
the Supreme Court.
Under International Law, naval blockades is a
legitimate mean in armed conflicts. Its use requires
the fulfillment of a number of conditions:

Declaration The date the blockade begins, the duration and location must be notified
to every affected country. [Israel began the blockade on 03/01/09]

Effectivene A State that declares a naval blockade must enforce it in practice

ss
Impartiality Blockades must be applied impartially to vessels of all States

The goal of the blockade must not be to punish the population or refuse
Purpose
supplies vital for its survival.

Proportionalit The damage to the population must not exceed the military advantage.
y
Neutral A naval blockade must not bar access to the ports and coasts of neutral
Access States

Unclassified || Slide 4
 Military-Strategic Information Section

Humanitarian Status in GazaStrategic Division // Israel Defense Forces

In coordination with the PA and NGOs, Weekly Transfers (30/5-

supplies and goods are transferred on a daily 5/6)
Trucks: 484
basis to the Gaza Strip, extending beyond Tons: 12,413
the requirements of international law.
Medical Evacs: 373
Israel continues to assist in ensuring that
Fuel: 1.08 million
basic water and infrastructure requirements in
liters
Gaza exist, allowing equipment transfers
when necessary.
Transfers in 2009
Trucks: 30,920

Tons: 738,576

Medical Evacs: 10,544

NGO Personnel:
21,200

Pictures of a Gaza Market

((2009 Unclassified || Slide 5
 Military-Strategic Information Section
Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
Hamas and Humanitarian Aid
Hamas seeks to create an illusion of a humanitarian crisis within the
Gaza Strip. This relies largely on preventing the entry or distribution of aid
and exploitation of the aid for its own purposes, achieving political and military
gains at the expense of Gaza residents.
Recent Examples

While the Hamas charges Gaza residents for

electricity, it has refused to transfer the money to
the PA for fuel, leading to a Hamas instigated
reduction in transfer.
Using Molotov cocktails, radical elements in Gaza
set fire to a UNRWA camp (23/5,10), apparently due
to the non-religious agenda of the camp. Pictures of the Burnt UNRWA
Children’s Camp
In mid-May 2010, the Hamas razed dozens of
homes within the Gaza Strip, beating civilians who
refused to leave them.

In early June 2010, Hamas forces raided and shut

down numerous NGO charities in the Gaza Strip. UN
officials expressed concern.
Unclassified || Slide 6
 Military-Strategic Information Section
Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
Flotilla Background

On April 28th , a number of organizations, led by the Turkish-based IHH,

announced that they intended to sail a flotilla to the Gaza Strip
coast to breach the naval blockade imposed in January, 2009.

The flotilla aimed to reach Gaza with

approximately 10 ships, departing from south
of Cyprus on May 24th .

This was the 3rd flotilla since the blockade was

imposed. Two flotillas attempting to
breach the blockade since have been
stopped. Humanitarian supplies aboard
transferred to Gaza by the land crossings.
The option of transferring supplies via the land crossings was conveyed,
even suggesting that the organizers oversee the transfer. This
was declined by the organizers, who declared that the purpose of the
flotilla was to breach the blockade. Israel unequivocally conveyed
that ships would not be permitted to breach the blockade.
Unclassified || Slide 7
 Military-Strategic Information Section
Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
Enforcing Naval Blockades

Attempted Breaching of the Blockade

The entry of a vessel into a blockaded area without permission

constitutes a breach of a naval blockade. According to International
Law, if there are reasonable grounds to believe that a vessel has
breached the blockade, it may be captured. If the vessel refuses to
stop, use of force is permissible.
Moreover, a vessel may be captured when attempting to breach a
naval blockade if there are reasonable grounds to believe that the
vessel intends to breach it, even before the vessel reaches the
blockaded area. In such a case, the capture must take place outside
of territorial waters of neutral states.
Attempted breach of blockade occurs from

“ the time a vessel or aircraft leaves a port or

airfield with the intention of evading the
blockade…
The Commander’s Handbook on
the Law of Naval Operations, US
Navy
”
Unclassified || Slide 8
 Military-Strategic Information Section
Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
Diplomatic Efforts to Avoid the Use of Force

Prior to the operation, a multi-pronged diplomatic effort was made in to

prevent the flotilla from attempting to breach the naval blockade:
MFA and Others Israeli Defense Forces

Messages conveyed to relevant Meeting between Navy Planning and

countries. Organization Department and relevant
Meetings on working levels and higher foreign attachés
in relevant countries
Personal meeting between Navy
Message conveyed to flotilla Commander in Chief and relevant
organizers attachés
Written messages conveyed to all Letter from Navy CoC sent to relevant
foreign delegates in Israel naval CoCs.

Reiteration of blockade
Messages
prior to Offer to transfer humanitarian supplies through Ashdod
Warning that necessary measures would be taken if course
interception
unchanged
and boarding Warning that ship would be boarded barring change

Unclassified || Slide 9
 Military-Strategic Information Section

Naval Warnings Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces

Insert Video
Naval Warnings Prior to Interception
 Military-Strategic Information Section
Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
Participating Boats

Name Mavi Gazze Challenger Sfendonh

Marmara 1
Max. knots 15 knots 13 20 knots knots 15
Speed
Comoros Turkey Unknown
Flag Togo
(Hoisted US
flag)
Passengers 561 18 17 48

Name Defne Y Sofia Rachel

Corrie
Max. knots 13 knots 12.5 knots 12.5
Speed
Flag Kiribati Greece Cambodia

Passengers 21 30 19
Unclassified || Slide 11
 Military-Strategic Information Section
Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
IHH

The IHH (Insani Yardim Vakfi) is a radical Islamic organization

established in 1992, formally registered in Istanbul (1995) and led by
Bulent Yildrim. While its activities include legitimate humanitarian
activity, it also includes the support of radical Islamic terrorist
organizations:
Hamas Global Jihad al-Qaeda

The IHH openly supports IHH has links with the GJ in the In 2006, a Danish
the Hamas, as a member Middle East, as well as Syria, Iraq, research group showed
of the Union of Good Afghanistan and Chechnya. A CIA IHH involvement in
(UoG), which supports report (1996) exposed the IHH’s recruitment, the
Hamas institutes in the PA. connection with extremist groups.
purchase of weapons and
UoG was defined a It also provided aid to a terrorist
the planning of attacks
terrorist entity by the US planning an attack in the US
for al-Qaeda.
government in 2008. (2000)
IHH provided 40 core activists, three boats, including the Mavi Marmara, as
well as aid to the Hamas regime in preparing to receive the flotilla. Bulent
Yildrim also admitted to having children and elderly on board as a deliberate
human shields (30 May)
Unclassified || Slide 12
 Military-Strategic Information Section
Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
The IHH and Turkey
Core group of 40 IHH activists on Mavi
Turkey and the IHH
Marmara
Boarded without security inspection in Elements in the Turkish
Istanbul government continue to defend
Hierarchy based on regional coordinators. and praise the IHH, despite the
Wore security badges during journey and organization’s terrorist
carried radio communication devices affiliations and the blatant,
organized attack on Israeli
Top deck restricted to IHH access alone
soldiers.
Turkey refused to nine separate
Conducted instructional briefing regarding Israeli requests to provide security
resistance during the boarding process. oversight over the ships’ loading,
unlike other countries which
The Mavi Marmara contained passengers
provided oversight.
alone, no humanitarian aid.
The Mavi Marmara was acquired
Gas
masks from a Turkish company (IDO),
and created in 1987 by the Istanbul
Turkish
Interviews with passengers aboard
municipality.
military
vests used reveal that the Turkish
by IHH government aided the flotilla prior
activists
to its departure.
Unclassified || Slide 13
 Military-Strategic Information Section
Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
Other Terrorist Links

While internal investigations continue, it is becoming more and more

evident that individuals affiliated with terrorist groups were aboard the
boat:
Armed A large number of passengers involved in the extreme violence were
Groups found without any identification papers and with large thousands of
Euros in envelopes, indicating that they may be mercenaries, or people
wanted for unlawful activity, therefore hiding their identity.
Passenge
rs Specific passengers with known terror involvement:
Fatimah Mahdami – Iranian-born US resident caught smuggling into the
Gaza Strip and an active member of Viva Palestine

Ken O’Keefe –Irish citizen; operative in the Hamas organization; has

attempted to enter Gaza to form a commando unit
Hassan Iynasi – Turkish citizen; supported the Islamic Jihad financially

Hussein Urosh – Turkish citizen who sought to smuggle Al-Qaeda

operatives into the Gaza Strip
Ahmed Umimon – French citizen of Moroccan origin; Hamas operative

Unclassified || Slide 14
 Military-Strategic Information Section
Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
Interception of the Ships

On 31 May, at 0428, after numerous warnings were given to ships

approaching the Gaza Strip, clarifying that entrance to the blockaded
area would not be allowed, the six ships were boarded.

Mavi Marmara 561 Boarding Preparation

Challenger 17
Soldiers boarding the boats were instructed
Passengers

personally by the Chief of the Navy to use

SFENDONH 48
the minimal amount of force necessary,
Gazze 18 as befits operations involving civilians. They
were equipped with paintball guns,
Sofia 30
beanbag ammunition, tasers and stun
Defne Y 21 grenades, as well as pistols to be used
when facing a clear and immediate threat
Despite some resistance from passengers on five boats (excluding
to life.
the Mavi Marmara), no injuries or casualties were sustained. The
boats were brought to Ashdod port without extraordinary incidents.
Unclassified || Slide 15
 Military-Strategic Information Section

Violence Onboard Ship Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces

Insert Video
Violence Before Boarding
 Military-Strategic Information Section
Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
Violence on the ‘Mavi Marmara’
Soldiers upon the Mavi Marmara encountered organized, life-
threatening violence. Troops limited fire to aggressors alone, after non-
lethal force failed to prove effective. All casualties resulted from attacks
immediately threatening the life of Israeli soldiers.

Calls on the boat directed non-IHH members

(including 16 parliament members & 34 journalists)
below deck prior to the IDF boarding. Weapons were
prepared and IHH members split into squads for the
violent confrontation.
IHH Violence Upon Boarding

Soldiers were fired upon, thrown off the top deck,

abducted, stabbed and attacked with metal rods,
slingshots, and other weapons. Soldiers were
forced to respond with force in self-defense.
7 IDF 9 IHH
Wounded casualties
(2 critical) 34 wounded
Unclassified || Slide 17
 Military-Strategic Information Section

Violence Onboard Ship Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces

Insert Video
Violence Against Soldiers - Overhead

Insert Video
Violence Against Soldiers - Side View
 “
We will definitely
resist and we will
not allow the
Israelis to enter
here… if Israel
wants to board
the ship, it will
Bulent Yildrim, Head of the IHH meet strong
May 30th , 2010
resistance.
 “
There were guys
who they threw off
the top deck, and
who were stripped
of their gear. They
jumped into the sea
Testimony of one of the as a last resort …
Navy commandos on
the ‘Mavi Marmara’
 Military-Strategic Information Section

IHH Preparation for BoardingStrategic Division // Israel Defense Forces

Metal rods 100

Knives 200
Kevlar boards 11
Military vests 150
Electric saws 7
Large tools 100
Gas Masks 200
Axes 20

Unclassified || Slide 21
 “ Every person who
came down the ropes,
was grabbed by three
or four people and
violently assaulted.
We were lynched.
They had metal rods,
knives, slingshots,
Testimony of one of the and glass bottles. At
Navy commandos on
the ‘Mavi Marmara’ some point, live fire
was shot at two of our
 Military-Strategic Information Section

Violence Onboard Ship Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces

Insert Video
Soldier Describes Violence
 Military-Strategic Information Section
Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
Interception until Repatriation
Injured passengers were evacuated by June 1st
helicopter to five hospitals in Israel
Two Egyptians returned to Egypt
Belinson
Approximately 120 transferred to
Hadassah Ein Karem
Jordan as final destination and as
Tel Hashomer transfernd point
June 2
Rambam
Four Lebanese residents returned
Barzilay
via Rosh HaNikra crossing

Procedure Once in Port June 3rd

With the exception of 7 injured

In Ashdod Port, passengers were given
passengers and 3 others, all
medical examinations and screened for
passengers returned to Turkey via
security purposes. Passengers who agreed
3 airplanes and 3 ambulance
to sign deportation notices were brought to
airplanes
Ben Gurion Airport for immediate June 6th
repatriation. Those who refused were
detained until deportation procedures were One returned on flight to Turkey
completed. Unclassified || Slide 24
 Military-Strategic Information Section
Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
The ‘Linda’ (Rachel Corrie)

Interception || July 5th

The Rachel Corrie arrived in the region on July 5th

and, after ignoring calls to avert its course, was
boarded by IDF forces. The boarding was done
calmly and peacefully. All 19 passengers were
brought to Ashdod port, where they underwent
medical examinations and security screening.

Repatriation || July 6th

On July 6th , 8 of the passengers were transferred

to Jordan via Allenby crossing. The remaining
passengers were transferred to Turkey by
airplane.
The perceptible difference between the behavior of the activists
upon the ‘Linda’, as well as the other five ships, when compared
to the hostile aggression from the passengers of the Mavi
Marmara, reflect upon the nature of the “peace activists” aboard
each of the ships.
Unclassified || Slide 25
 Military-Strategic Information Section
Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
Materials Aboard the Ships

Materials Aboard the Ships

After passengers disembarked, the supplies were unloaded

and transferred to some 80 trucks, sent to pass through
the land crossings at Kerem Shalom. The supplies included
medical equipment (including expired medicine),
clothing and children’s toys. Material requiring
refrigeration are in IDF storage units.
However, large portions of the aid were rendered useless by poor packaging upon
the boat. In addition, much of the materials did not match the standard definition of
humanitarian aid. Camouflage fabric intended to be transferred was found on
board. Much of the clothing is old and not wearable and medical equipment
was not transferred in a sterile manner.
Transferring the Materials

Hamas has refused to accept the materials,

threatening those who do try to transfer them. The
materials remain at Kerem Shalom crossing.
The routine, daily shipments of supplies continue – in the
past week, 484 trucks (including two with concrete) were
transferred.

Unclassified || Slide 26
 Military-Strategic Information Section
Strategic Division // Israel Defense Forces
IDF Investigation
Field investigations within the navy are currently taking place.

In addition, the Chief of the General Staff has appointed a

professional inquiry team, led by Maj. Gen. (res.) Giora Eiland to
examine the flotilla operation and establish lessons. The team is
to present the findings no later than July 4th . Consisting of
professionals who are experts in the field, the investigative team was
not part of the chain of command, allowing impartial investigation.

Model of IDF Investigations

Criminal
Inciden

Command Criminal
misconduct MAG Supreme
investigati investigati
t

oversigh Court
on on
t oversight

Credible allegation or non-operational

incident
Unclassified || Slide 27