3Cite as: 560 U. S. ____ (2010)Syllabusdinate to the State’s right to fill. Pp. 25–27.(c) The decision below is consistent with these principles. Cf.
South Carolina Coastal Council
, 505 U. S. 1003, 1028–1029. It didnot abolish the Members’ right to future accretions, but merely heldthat the right was not implicated by the beach-restoration project be-cause of the doctrine of avulsion. Relying on dicta in the Florida Su-preme Court’s
decision, petitioner contends that the Statetook the Members’ littoral right to have the boundary always be themean high-water line. But petitioner’s interpretation of that dictumcontradicts the clear law governing avulsion. One cannot say theFlorida Supreme Court contravened established property law by re- jecting it. Pp. 27–29.J
, joined by T
, concluded in Parts II and III that if a court declaresthat what was once an established right of private property no longerexists, it has taken that property in violation of the Takings Clause.Pp. 7–24.(a) Though the classic taking is a transfer of property by eminentdomain, the Clause applies to other state actions that achieve thesame thing, including those that recharacterize as public propertywhat was previously private property, see
Webb’s Fabulous Pharma-cies, Inc.
, 449 U. S. 155, 163–165. The Clause is not ad-dressed to the action of a specific branch or branches. It is concernedsimply with the act, not with the governmental actor. This Court’sprecedents provide no support for the proposition that takings ef-fected by the judicial branch are entitled to special treatment, and infact suggest the contrary. See
PruneYard Shopping Center
447 U. S. 74,
Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies
Pp. 7–20.(b) For a judicial taking, respondents would add to the normal tak-ings inquiry the requirement that the court’s decision have no “fairand substantial basis.” This test is not obviously appropriate, but itis no different in this context from the requirement that the propertyowner prove an established property right. Respondents’ additionalarguments—that federal courts lack the knowledge of state law re-quired to decide whether a state judicial decision purporting to clarifyproperty rights has instead taken them; that common-law judgingshould not be deprived of needed flexibility; and that applying theTakings Clause to judicial decisions would force lower federal courtsto review final state-court judgments, in violation of the
Fidelity Trust Co.
, 263 U. S. 413,415–416,
District of Columbia Court of Appeals
, 460 U. S.462, 476—are unpersuasive. And petitioner’s proposed “unpredict-ability test”—that a judicial taking consists of a decision that “consti-tutes a sudden change in state law, unpredictable in terms of rele-