Court and is discretionary in nature, that granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, asexpressly provided for in the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it was given anexpanded definition to include the power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of anygovernment branch or instrumentality. There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitutionand the Philippine Constitution with respect to the power of the House of Representatives over impeachment proceedings. While the U.S. Constitution bestows sole power of impeachment to the Houseof Representatives without limitation, our Constitution, though vesting in the House of Representativesthe exclusive power to initiate impeachment cases, provides for several limitations to the exercise of such power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These limitations include themanner of filing, required vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the impeachment of one and the sameofficial. The people expressed their will when they instituted the above-mentioned safeguards in theConstitution. This shows that the Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to thesole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or "judicially discoverablestandards" for determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the power of judicialreview. There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the power of judicial reviewover congressional action. Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exerciseof judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily,the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat another."Both are integral components of the calibrated system of independence and interdependence that insuresthat no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.
Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS
GR 122156, 3 February 1997
The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of thePhilippine Government under Proclamation 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel (MHC). In a close biddingheld on 18 September 1995 only two bidders participated: Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipinocorporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and RenongBerhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Pending the declaration of RenongBerhard as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the necessary contracts, the ManilaPrince Hotel matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad in a letter to GSISdated 28 September 1995. Manila Prince Hotel sent a manager’s check to the GSIS in a subsequent letter, but which GSIS refused to accept. On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that GSIS has disregardedthe tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by GSIS andconsummated with Renong Berhad, Manila Prince Hotel came to the Court on prohibition andmandamus.
Whether the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII Section 10, are self-executing.
Whether the 51% share is part of the national patrimony.