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Francisco, Manila Prince, Morato, Bayan, Gonzales

Francisco, Manila Prince, Morato, Bayan, Gonzales

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Published by Katrina Montes

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Categories:Types, Business/Law
Published by: Katrina Montes on Jun 21, 2010
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12/08/2012

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Francisco vs. House of Representatives
(GR 160261, 10 November 2003)En Banc, Carpio Morales (J): 1 concurs, 3 wrote separate concurring opinions to which 4 concur, 2 wroteconcurring and dissenting separate opinions to which 2 concur.
Facts:
On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approvedthe Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Porceedings, superceding the previous House Impeachment Rulesapproved by the 11th Congress. On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution,which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the JudiciaryDevelopment Fund (JDF). On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachmentcomplaint (first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven AssociateJustices of the Supreme Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust andother high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by House Representatives, and was referred to the HouseCommittee on Justice on 5 August 2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.The House Committee on Justice ruled on 13 October 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was"sufficient in form," but voted to dismiss the same on 22 October 2003 for being insufficient in substance.Four months and three weeks since the filing of the first complaint or on 23 October 2003, a day after theHouse Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint was filed with theSecretary General of the House by House Representatives against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.,founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution.The second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment"signed by at least 1/3 of all the Members of the House of Representatives. Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed with the Supreme Court against the House of Representatives, et.al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint isunconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that "[n]oimpeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year."
 Issue:
Whether the power of judicial review extends to those arising from impeachment proceedings.
 Held:
The Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the government inSection 1, Article VIII of our present 1987 Constitution. The "moderating power" to "determine the proper allocation of powers" of the different branches of government and "to direct the course of government along constitutional channels" is inherent in all courts as a necessary consequence of the judicial power itself, which is "the power of the court to settle actual controversies involving rights whichare legally demandable and enforceable." As indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, judicialreview is indeed an integral component of the delicate system of checks and balances which, together with the corollary principle of separation of powers, forms the bedrock of our republican form of government and insures that its vast powers are utilized only for the benefit of the people for which itserves. The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains notthrough express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the governmenthas exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But itdoes not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that theConstitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitutionhas provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of thevarious departments of the government. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the finalarbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, andhence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court and that of the U.S.Supreme Court is that while the power of judicial review is only impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme
 
Court and is discretionary in nature, that granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, asexpressly provided for in the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it was given anexpanded definition to include the power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of anygovernment branch or instrumentality. There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitutionand the Philippine Constitution with respect to the power of the House of Representatives over impeachment proceedings. While the U.S. Constitution bestows sole power of impeachment to the Houseof Representatives without limitation, our Constitution, though vesting in the House of Representativesthe exclusive power to initiate impeachment cases, provides for several limitations to the exercise of such power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These limitations include themanner of filing, required vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the impeachment of one and the sameofficial. The people expressed their will when they instituted the above-mentioned safeguards in theConstitution. This shows that the Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to thesole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or "judicially discoverablestandards" for determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the power of judicialreview. There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the power of judicial reviewover congressional action. Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exerciseof judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily,the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat another."Both are integral components of the calibrated system of independence and interdependence that insuresthat no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.
 
 
Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS
GR 122156, 3 February 1997
Facts:
The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of thePhilippine Government under Proclamation 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel (MHC). In a close biddingheld on 18 September 1995 only two bidders participated: Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipinocorporation, which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and RenongBerhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Pending the declaration of RenongBerhard as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the necessary contracts, the ManilaPrince Hotel matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad in a letter to GSISdated 28 September 1995. Manila Prince Hotel sent a manager’s check to the GSIS in a subsequent letter, but which GSIS refused to accept. On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that GSIS has disregardedthe tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by GSIS andconsummated with Renong Berhad, Manila Prince Hotel came to the Court on prohibition andmandamus.
Issue(s):
Whether the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII Section 10, are self-executing.
Whether the 51% share is part of the national patrimony.
 
Held:
A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Article II of the 1987Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomesoperative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed arefixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of itsterms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action. In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the exercise of  powers directly granted by the constitution, further the operation of such a provision, prescribe a practiceto be used for its enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the protection of the rights secured or thedetermination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the right. The mere fact thatlegislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-executingconstitutional provision does not render such a provision ineffective in the absence of such legislation.The omission from a constitution of any express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability isnot necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a self-executing provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject, but anylegislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and makeit more available. Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily mean that the subjectconstitutional provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable. As against constitutions of the past, modernconstitutions have been generally drafted upon a different principle and have often become in effectextensive codes of laws intended to operate directly upon the people in a manner similar to that of statutory enactments, and the function of constitutional conventions has evolved into one more like that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce aconstitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislaturewould have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. In fine,Section 10, second paragraph, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command whichis complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for itsenforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation.In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. When the Constitution speaksof national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitutioncould have very well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos. Italso refers to Filipino’s intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. In the present case, Manila Hotel has become a landmark, a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively an Americanhotel when it first opened in 1912, a concourse for the elite, it has since then become the venue of varioussignificant events which have shaped Philippine history. In the granting of economic rights, privileges,and concessions, especially on matters involving national patrimony, when a choice has to be made between a “qualified foreigner” and a “qualified Filipino,” the latter shall be chosen over the former.The Supreme Court directed the GSIS, the Manila Hotel Corporation, the Committee on Privatization andthe Office of the Government Corporate Counsel to cease and desist from selling 51% of the Share of theMHC to Renong Berhad, and to accept the matching bid of Manila Prince Hotel at P44 per shere andthereafter execute the necessary agreements and document to effect the sale, to issue the necessaryclearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be necessary for the purpose.

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