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Global Economics

October 2007

India:
Everything to Play for
With the right reforms, India could
grow at 10% for a decade
John Llewellyn, Robert Subbaraman, Alastair Newton and Sonal Varma
Lehman Brothers | India: Everything to play for

FOREWORD

Lehman Brothers has had a long association with India – both through its own presence
in the country, and through the many Indian nationals who work for us, including the
2000 staff we have in our knowledge center in Powai. But, as India’s impressive
economic expansion gained momentum, the question naturally arose whether our
presence in India was of sufficient scale, or whether we should raise it by a quantum
leap.
Such a decision is never to be taken lightly; and certainly we did not. First and foremost,
we had to decide whether India’s recent growth upsurge was likely to prove temporary,
as some commentators at the time were suggesting, or whether it had a chance of
becoming self-sustaining.
Accordingly, we embarked on a detailed and lengthy evaluation of the prospects for
India’s economy, Indian financial markets, and Indian governance. We were encouraged
by what we found. India’s rapid growth of the past several years, we concluded, bears all
the hallmarks of the sort of economic take-off that, in earlier decades, had taken place
elsewhere in Asia, and stunned a world that until then had thought that single-digit
growth was the most that any economy could achieve.
In short, we concluded that India’s growth could not, and should not, be dismissed as a
flash in the pan. But our research also led us to conclude that a continuation of recent fast
growth is not automatically guaranteed: just as this growth is the result of important
structural policy reform, so will future growth be shaped, in respect both of its rate and
its quality.
In this respect, India is no different from, and cannot escape the challenges faced by,
other successful economies, whether developed or developing: in a world of rapid
technological change, changing tastes, global competition, climate change, and myriad
other challenges, economies need continually to adapt. And the structure of countries’
governance has to lead this, if economies are to realise their full potential.
India has learned a great deal from its structural policy reforms of the past decade; and
we suspect strongly – though it is not guaranteed – that these lessons will be carried
forward, and built upon, in the coming years. And it is on that basis that we judge that
India’s economy has the potential to grow at 10% or so annually over the coming
decade. Consistent with being one of the world’s fastest growing economies, India is
likely to attract substantial foreign investment, and its local capital markets have
enormous growth potential.
Hence it is fitting that we are releasing this report, which contains a good part of our
thinking as we approach the first anniversary of the opening of our new office in
Mumbai, Ceejay House. In this short period of time, we have already created a full scale
investment banking, securities trading and private equity business, a clear vote of
confidence in the economic and social future of India – a future in which we at Lehman
Brothers fully intend to play a large and growing part.

Tarun Jotwani
Chairman and CEO of Lehman Brothers, India

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PLEASE SEE ANALYST CERTIFICATIONS AND IMPORTANT DISCLOSURES ON PAGE 171 OF THIS REPORT
Lehman Brothers | India: Everything to play for

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This study owes to many people.


It all started with the head of global research at Lehman Brothers, Ravi Mattu, saying “I
think that something pretty interesting is going on in India. But why don’t you go there
and look for yourself. Talk to people, make up your own mind, and write what you
conclude.” So we did: one could not ask for a fairer mandate, nor a more interesting one.
That was getting on for two years ago. In the intervening period, many people have
helped. Senior members of the Government of India, of the Reserve Bank of India, and
of the regulatory authorities all made themselves readily available and spoke with
impressive openness. The Confederation of Indian Industry arranged for us to meet a
host of representatives of different industries and other experts, who likewise invariably
spoke with candour.
Sir Michael Arthur, the then British High Commissioner and himself no mean scholar of
India, together with his staff, generously arranged for us to talk usefully with a wider
cross section of Indian society than we could ever have managed by ourselves; and UK
Trade and Investment set up instructive meetings for us not only in Delhi and Mumbai
but indeed throughout India.
We are also indebted to many Indian economists for their frank discussions and debates,
including Priya Basu (World Bank), Subir Gokarn (CRISIL), Pulin Nayak (Delhi School
of Economics), Ila Patnaik and Ajay Shah (National Institute for Public Finance and
Policy), Ajit Ranade (Aditya Birla Group) and Shubhada Rao (Yes Bank). Dr Vikram
Akula, CEO of SKS Microfinance, was kind enough to talk us through the world of
microfinance. And we are grateful for illuminating discussions with Peter Wonacott
(Asian Wall Street Journal), and Jo Johnson and Amy Yee (Financial Times).
The global world being what it is, we also received advice, encouragement, and
information from outside India’s borders, particularly from The Indian High
Commission in London, and staff at Chatham House and the International Institute for
Strategic Studies. And we had two particularly useful discussions with Richard Herd of
the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
Sanjeev Kaushik and Chimon Fernandes of the Lehman Brothers’ Mumbai office
arranged many meetings with interesting organisations, and helped with an array of
logistical issues. Julia Giese did a significant amount of the early research work before
she left the Lehman Brothers London office to start on her DPhil at Oxford.
Authors of particular parts are in general acknowledged in their respective sections: but
specific mention should be made of Camille Chaix for her contribution on climate
change, and Evdokia Karra and Melissa Kidd for their contributions on carbon trading
and the clean development mechanism.
Lehman Brothers’ Global Chief Economist, Paul Sheard, encouraged us throughout and,
near the end, read the study through in its near entirety. And Valerie Monchi and her
team looked after the full range of technical issues, from editing to layout to production.
We have sought to document everything that we say in the report, to the greatest extent
possible; and we have endeavoured to make judgements explicit, so that the reader can
decide. But, as always, there are the inevitable errors. The responsibility here rests with
us, and us alone.
The cut off date for information in this report is 5 October 2007.Ŷ

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Lehman Brothers | India: Everything to play for

CONTENTS

FOREWORD 1

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 2

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 5

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 6

CHAPTER 2: INDIA RISING 8


We judge that India’s growth acceleration is not a flash in the pan. We see evidence of
important structural shifts, suggestive of a dynamic growth process.

CHAPTER 3: ACCOUNTING FOR INDIA’S GROWTH 21


“Growth accounting” studies are akin to taking a snapshot through the rear-view mirror
when what is really needed is a movie taken through the windscreen.

CHAPTER 4: INDIA’S RECENT GROWTH ACCELERATION –


THE CRUCIAL ROLE OF REFORMS 32
An in-depth consideration of India’s policies, reforms and political challenges:
Developing the financial sector 32
Macro management 42
Foreign trade and investment 48
Economies of scale and competition 56
Growth and governance: the political challenge 70

CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION AND MARKET IMPLICATIONS 88


With the right reforms, India could grow sustainably by about 10% over the next decade.

THE OUTLOOK FOR THE INDIAN STOCK MARKET 91


Given the prospects for a sustained high rate of economic growth, the Indian stock
market should perform very well over the medium to long term.

EQUITY ANALYSIS OF INDIVIDUAL SECTORS 104


We consider the implications of our findings for a range of key sectors.

AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE INDIAN DEBT MARKET 130


Few global debt portfolios regularly employ Indian debt. This will soon change.

MEASURING THE LONG-TERM TREND AND VALUE OF THE INR 140


India’s moving into a new era of solid economic growth should support a long-term
appreciation trend of the Indian rupee.

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Lehman Brothers | India: Everything to play for

BOXES AND APPENDICES

Box 1: Economic take-off – definitions and drivers 14


Box 2: Manufacturing: India’s new powerhouse 18
Box 3: Dynamics within India’s top 50 companies 19
Box 4: Summary chronology of India’s reforms 23
Box 5: Adjusting the labour force data for “quality” 25
Box 6: Economies of scale: A case study of the Tata group 29
Box 7: Microfinance – “A Serious Business, Not Charity” 34
Box 8: Recommendations on fuller capital account convertibility 37
Box 9: Recommendations on developing the corporate bond market 38
Box 10: Estimating the impact of financial development on economic growth 41
Box 11: Estimating India’s public debt dynamics 46
Box 12: Lehman Brothers’ Damocles model of external sector vulnerability 47
Box 13: India goes global 49
Box 14: Sizing up India’s SEZs 51
Box 15: Estimating the impact on GDP growth from rising economic openness 55
Box 16: Financing India’s infrastructure deficit 58
Box 17: Climate change and India 60
Box 18: India and the clean development mechanism 62
Box 19: The state of India’s states 69
Box 20: The structure of central government 71
Box 21: Economic growth and the law 72
Box 22: The centre and the states 73
Box 23: The Uttar Pradesh election – its national implications 75
Box 24: A legacy of anti-materialism 77
Box 25: “A healthy India… for a wealthy India” 78
Box 26: The economy and international relations 87
Appendix 1: Common abbreviations 144
Appendix 2: Issues with India’s macroeconomic data 147
Appendix 3: The returns to education 149
Appendix 4: Physical economies of scale 151
Appendix 5: Problems with the theory of the production function 153
Appendix 6: Limitations of the “growth accounting” method 155
Appendix 7: Growth accounting results for the Indian economy 157
Appendix 8: Status of India’s bilateral and multilateral trade policies 159
Appendix 9: India’s foreign direct investment policy 160
Appendix 10: Key statistics: India 161
Appendix 11: Chronology of events in India 162
Appendix 12: Map of India 165
References 166

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Lehman Brothers | India: Everything to play for

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• Impressive though its economic transition has been, we judge that India could grow
sustainably even faster than at present, and faster than most other studies have
suggested, i.e. at 10% or so per annum over the coming decade. This judgement is
contingent on India continuing to actively pursue structural economic reforms.
• Naturally, a sharp global economic downturn is a risk to India’s near-term economic
growth. While India is one of the least vulnerable economies, it is not immune.
Conversely, a period of demand running ahead of supply cannot be ruled out, raising
risks of short-term overheating.
• But more important than the ups and downs of the economic cycle are the structural
changes behind India’s growth acceleration, contributing to capital deepening and
rising productivity. They include the development of the financial system, trade and
capital account liberalisation, and more prudent macro management.
• Conventional static “growth accounting” analysis gauges the contributions of labour,
capital and multi-factor productivity to GDP growth. We believe that this approach
fails to take adequate account of dynamic interactions in an economy, especially a
developing one which has reached “take-off”. That is the basic reason why our
estimate of India’s potential rate of growth is higher than that of other studies.
• We find clear evidence that India’s rapid economic development, high growth and
reforms have started to interact positively with each other – the economy appears to
be taking on many of the characteristics exhibited by other large Asian economies
during the early stages of economic take-off.
• While business continues to prove impressively adept at working round systemic
and structural challenges, sustaining higher growth in the medium term will require
continuing structural reform. For example, we estimate that further financial sector
reforms could add 1 to 1½ percentage points to India’s long-term GDP growth.
• Even larger economic gains could flow from removing constraints such as weak
(soft and hard) infrastructure, bureaucracy, and labour market rigidities. Breaking
down these barriers is key to enabling business to achieve increasing returns to scale
by capitalising on its global comparative advantages in labour-intensive
manufactured and agricultural exports. We estimate that India’s trade-to-GDP ratio
could double over the coming decade, also adding 1½ points to GDP growth.
• However, pushing through structural reform will remain a political challenge in the
face of headwinds from vested interest and coalition politics. That said, there should
be a new window for reform after the next general election due in 2009.
• Given the powerful trends of demography and urbanisation, India needs “a faster
and a more inclusive” growth strategy to correct its inter- and intra-regional
imbalances and avoid social unrest. The social and economic costs of not pursuing
inclusive growth are potentially enormous.
• Inclusive growth can be facilitated by further easing the shackles on business, by
making education and health available to all of society and by developing the rural
sector, which employs nearly 60% of the total workforce. Labour market reforms to
spur the necessary job creation over the next decade will be a key challenge.
• India’s growing economic clout is encouraging a more proactive regional policy and
greater engagement on the global stage, for example in trade liberalisation and the
climate change debate, which also stand to boost economic growth.
• In short, given that there is still much growth potential to be unlocked, India has
“everything to play for”.Ŷ
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

John Llewellyn With attention focused principally on China, for the first half of this decade India’s
44-20-710-22272 progressive upturn in economic growth went largely unremarked. This was especially so
jllewell@lehman.com following China’s accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in December 2001,
with all its attendant potential implications for the global economy.
Rob Subbaraman Recently, however, India has been attracting the attention its economic performance
85-2-2252-6249 merits. In turn, this growth performance has raised questions about the future. Opinion
rsuba@lehman.com has been spread over a wide spectrum.

Alastair Newton
At one end are commentators who argue that India’s recent growth performance will
prove unsustainable, that “overheating” threatens its sustainability. And, certainly, India
44-20-710-23940
has never grown so rapidly as it has in the past few years.
anewton@lehman.com
At the other end of the spectrum, we ourselves consider that history – or at least India’s
Sonal Varma history – need not prove to be a perfect guide. Our judgement, based on a dynamic
91-22-4037-4087 analysis of the growth process and examination of the performance of other Asian
sonal.varma@lehman.com “miracle” economies, is that India could grow even faster over the coming decade than it
has to date – at 10% or so over the coming decade. But that would depend upon India’s
continuing to make progress with structural economic reforms.
As is only to be expected with a culture and economy as richly diverse as India’s,
coming to a firm and convincing forecast of the economy’s growth prospects for the next
decade or so is far from straightforward. That is why, in preparing this report, we have
undertaken an in-depth, holistic examination of the drivers behind the surge in India’s
rate of GDP growth over the past two decades or so – particularly since the start of the
21st century – as well as the factors which will determine whether that can be sustained
or even improved upon. In particular:
• We have used the growth accounting framework and statistical techniques which
extract the trend component from growth. However, while these methods are useful
to quantify what has happened to an economy, they do not explain why it happened.
So, on their own, they are not very useful at forecasting the future.
• We have therefore coupled growth accounting with an examination of the policies
and reforms which have driven India’s growth acceleration hitherto, before
assessing whether the current momentum is likely to be maintained if not increased.
Our starting point has been the premise that the question of how fast the Indian economy
may be able to grow sustainably over a multi-year period can be addressed only on the
basis of presumptions about influences which may prove important in the future.
Some inferences may be obtained from influences judged to have been important in
India’s past or in growth accelerations in other countries. However, even if these have
been identified correctly – and perhaps even quantified – the rate at which they will carry
forward will depend on many factors, especially structural reforms, which will, in turn,
be influenced by India’s politics.
It is therefore useful to approach the matter from two directions: by considering the
factors which have enabled India’s economic growth to accelerate; and by examining
how this evidence compares and contrasts with influences which have been important in
other economies, particularly in Asia.
The first question is important because, in the words of Professor Bakul Dholakia in his
Presidential address in 2001 to the Gujarat Economic Association:
“In a developing country like India where rapid economic growth has become a
national goal, analysis of the sources of growth assumes special significance not
only because it helps to find out what has and what has not been important in
the growth which has already occurred, but also because of the obvious

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Lehman Brothers | India: Everything to play for

implications it has for the macroeconomic strategy and policies that affect the
future growth – its rate as well as pattern.” 1
The second question is equally significant because, in considering the extent to which
India’s future growth may be different – faster – than in the past, it is useful to draw
inferences from the performance of a number of other highly successful economies in the
region. In 1993, the World Bank explained the so-called “East Asian Miracle” as
follows:
“The high performing Asian economies (HPAEs)…differ from other
developing economies in three factors that economists have traditionally
associated with economic growth. High rates of investment, exceeding 20% of
GDP on average between 1960-1990, including in particular unusually high
rates of private investment, combined with high and rising endowments of
human capital due to universal primary and secondary education, tell a large
part of the story. These factors account for roughly two-thirds of the growth in
the HPAEs. The remainder is attributable to improved productivity. Such high
levels of productivity are quite unusual…This superior productivity
performance comes from the combination of unusual success at allocating
capital to high-yielding investments and at catching up technologically to the
industrial countries”. 2
The World Bank also observed that this Asian economic performance did not happen by
chance: were economic growth randomly distributed, there would have been only about a
one in ten thousand chance that East Asia’s success would have been so regionally
concentrated. Fundamentally sound development policies and sound macro management
in East Asia were, in the judgement of the Bank, major factors in achieving rapid growth.
But the World Bank also noted that there was, nevertheless, significant government
intervention which, judging from experiences in other parts of the world, did not always
reconcile easily with promoting growth.
This was a prophetic warning. Four years later there came the Asian crisis, caused in part
by governments not having allowed markets to develop as completely and as efficiently
as they might have. Ten years on and, following major structural reforms, the East Asian
economies are booming again. Thus, history – both India’s own and that of its Asian
peers – provides cogent lessons in how fast India could grow over the coming decade.
But lessons from history are useful only up to a point. It is just as important to assess the
potential – both economic and political – for further structural reforms which are
essential to sustain and improve upon India’s recent impressive growth performance.
The next chapter of this report examines India’s recent economic growth acceleration and
presents evidence of structural changes, led by the business sector, which are similar to
the experiences of other large Asian economies during the early stages of economic take-
off. The third chapter discusses the growth accounting framework, which is a key tool in
accounting for why an economy grew as it did. However, growth accounting has
limitations when forecasting the future – in particular, it fails to take adequate account of
dynamic interactions in an economy, especially a developing one which has reached
“take-off”. To forecast the future, growth accounting as applied to India needs to be
coupled with an in-depth consideration of the country’s policies, reforms and political
challenges, which are the focus of the fourth chapter. The fifth chapter pulls together the
various strands of the preceding three and concludes that, with the right reforms, India
could grow sustainably by about 10% over the next decade. Finally, we look at the
implications of our projections for India’s economic growth for equity, fixed income and
foreign exchange strategy as well as the prospects for stocks in specific sectors.

1
Dhokalia, B. (2001). Since 2002, Professor Dholakia has been Director of the Indian Institute of Management,
Ahmedabad.
2
The World Bank (1993), “The East Asian Miracle”, World Bank Policy Research Report, Oxford University Press,
p.8.
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Lehman Brothers | India: Everything to play for

CHAPTER 2: INDIA RISING

India’s growth has accelerated progressively since the 1960s. From the “Hindu rate of
growth” of 3.5% up to 1980, growth accelerated to 6.0% following the reforms of the
1980s and early 1990s. 3 Over the past four years, the growth performance has been even
more impressive, averaging 8.5% per year; and, over the past fiscal year it was 9.4%, the
fastest rate in 18 years (Figure 1). Faster growth has resulted in India becoming the
world’s 12th largest economy in 2006, with GDP of some US$900bn at current exchange
rates; or the third largest (after the US and China) in purchasing power parity terms.
This progressive acceleration of India’s growth, and particularly its performance over the
past few years, could be a flash in the pan. But we doubt it. Our judgement is that India’s
low-cost economy is now reaping the rewards of market liberalisation, and that Indian
companies are seizing the opportunities presented by new technologies and a more open
economy. Significantly, a middle class is fast emerging, which is spurring demand as
consumption and investment interact in a benign and dynamic way.
India is increasingly exhibiting many of the characteristics which were evident in the
early “take-off” phases of other large Asian economies. For example, over the past four
years not only has the growth of India’s GDP accelerated, but so too has the growth of
GDP per capita; and it appears to be taking on a trajectory similar to that of China and
South Korea during their early growth accelerations. If this is indeed so, it suggests a
huge, and as yet untapped, potential for India (Figure 2).
This chapter examines the nature of – and inferences which can be drawn from – the
most recent phase of India’s growth acceleration. But first it is important to make clear
the distinction between cyclical ups and downs in the economy, and structural medium-
to-long-term trends, for it is the latter that this report is about.

India’s exposure to a global economic downturn


The current global economic outlook is highly uncertain. Our baseline view is that a
modest US-led global slowdown is in train, with the risks tilted to the downside.
Macroeconometric model simulations show that India is among the least exposed
economies in Asia. The IMF estimates that a one percentage point (pp) fall in US GDP
growth would reduce India’s growth by 0.1-0.2pp (IMF, 2007a), while the Asian
Development Bank (2007) estimates that it would reduce Asia ex-Japan’s aggregate
growth by 0.8pp.
Figure 1. India’s real GDP growth Figure 2. Real GDP per capita during takeoffs

% y-o-y China,
Ko rea,
12 1100 1978-2006
1965-2006

9 900
Index t=100

6
700

3
500
0
300
India,
-3
1991-2006
100
-6 t t+5 t+10 t+15 t+20 t+25 t+30 t+35 t+40 t+45
FY52 FY63 FY74 FY85 FY96 FY07
No. of years from takeoff

Source: CEIC and Lehman Brothers. Source: World Bank, CEIC and Lehman Brothers.

3
Ever since the reforms initiated in 1980s, India has not reported a single year of negative GDP growth.
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However, models may not capture all the channels, nor take into account all the feedback
and multiplier effects. We judge that India would be much more affected by US GDP
growth weakening from 1% to 0% than from 2% to 1%. India is exposed through four
main channels:
1. Exports: India’s economy has rapidly become more open, with its exports having
risen sharply to 23% of GDP from 11% a decade ago, although this is still less than half
the ratio for Asia ex-Japan. The US is the destination for 15% of India’s goods exports
and about 70% of India’s service exports. A sharp downturn in India’s exports would
likely have spillover effects on its domestic economy, as firms reduce capex and jobs.
2. Financial intermediation: India’s credit risk remains low: the credit-to-GDP ratio is
only about 45% and the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), India’s central bank, has been
proactive in tightening provisioning standards and increasing risk weights. Still, India’s
financial institutions are not immune to the rise in global risk aversion. Investors are
demanding a higher premium for holding risk, and Indian firms have recently been
sourcing a larger share of their funds through overseas borrowing, equity and
commercial paper to offset the domestic bank credit slowdown. But, with most of these
routes now either more expensive or less readily available (the government tightened
rules on external commercial borrowings, or ECBs, on 7 August 2007), firms are likely
to depend heavily on domestic funding via bank credit. There is a risk that Indian banks
tighten their lending standards at a time when firms need to increase their borrowing.
3. Capital flows: India has received robust net capital inflows, particularly non-FDI.
During FY04-FY07, of India’s total net capital inflows, a cumulative US$94bn (or 83%),
were non-FDI, especially ECBs and portfolio equity flows (Figure 3). At first glance,
India appears vulnerable to short-term capital flight were global risk aversion to rise.
However, the RBI has built up an enormous buffer of FX reserves: US$236bn-worth. To
assess India’s external vulnerability, we conducted stress tests under two scenarios: (1)
exports of goods and services decline by 20%; and, (2) exports fall by 20% and non-FDI
net capital inflows fall by 50%. Even under scenario (2), the number of months covered
by India’s FX reserves declines only from 13.6 to 10 – still more than adequate – while
the ratio of short-term debt to FX reserves remains low, at under 10% (Figure 4).
4. Wealth effect: Sharp portfolio outflows can exacerbate equity corrections resulting in
negative effects on confidence, household wealth and business balance sheets. However,
in India macroeconomic linkages with asset prices are still embryonic. A recent study by
the IMF (2007c) found that direct holdings of shares account for only 2% of Indian
household wealth, and that a 10% increase in the stock market index is associated with
an increase in consumption of only 0.1%.

Figure 3. Net capital inflows and FX reserves Figure 4. Stress test of India’s FX reserves

US$bn FDI, lhs US$bn Months %


Import cover of FX reserve, lhs
45 225
Non-FDI, lhs 16 Short-term debt/ FX reserve, rhs 8

FX reserves, rhs
14 7
30 150
11 6

15 75 9 5

6 4
B aseline Expo rts fall by 20% Expo rts fall by 20% +
0 0 no n-FDI capital
FY01 FY03 FY05 FY07 inflo ws fall by 50%

Source: Bloomberg, RBI and Lehman Brothers. Source: CEIC, RBI and Lehman Brothers.

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Lehman Brothers | India: Everything to play for

As long as US GDP grows by about 1.5% or more in 2008 – our baseline view – the
impact on Indian GDP growth should be relatively mild. However, if US GDP growth
falls to below 1%, causing a severe global economic downturn, the impact is unlikely to
be linear, as weakening economic growth, asset prices and confidence feed off each
other within and across countries.

Structural shift versus cyclical challenge


Provided the global economy avoids a severe downturn, we expect India’s GDP to grow
by 8.8% in FY08, before picking up to 9.2% in FY09. Often an economy’s growth can
accelerate for a few years but then run into capacity constraints which trigger
overheating and provoke a policy tightening, returning growth to a slower path. That this
might be the case in India has been a concern frequently voiced, both domestically and
more widely, notably early in 2007 when inflation was rising. And policymakers –
rightly in our view – remain alert to this risk.
However, international experience shows that, under certain circumstances, economies
can experience growth accelerations which are more structural than cyclical. And, while
inflation may accelerate in the process, economies in this situation may nevertheless
manage to remain sustainably on the higher growth path without overheating seriously.
For this to happen, the growth acceleration must be capacity-enhancing, whether because
factor inputs grow faster – i.e. more labour and/or capital is employed – or because the
existing inputs are used more efficiently (i.e. higher productivity). We judge that such a
structural acceleration in growth is happening in India today, lifting the economy’s
potential output growth rate.
Interpreting the cyclical situation. This is not to deny that India’s transition to a higher
growth trajectory is signalling some mild cyclical elements. Rakesh Mohan 4, Deputy
Governor of the RBI, notes that “it is important to disentangle the structural and cyclical
components underlying the growth process. It is necessary to note that a cyclical
upswing is also underway in India since FY04 after a prolonged trough which began in
1996.” But it is far from clear that the economy is overheating: additions to productive
capacity usually result, albeit with a lag, in downward pressure on prices so that, at first,
it is difficult to distinguish symptoms of overheating from those of rapid – and,
significantly, more sustainable – economic development. Consider the three symptoms
often presented as signs that India’s economy may be overheating:
• Inflation. Wholesale price inflation (WPI) rose to 5.4% in FY07 from 4.4% during
the previous year. However, this is a mild impulse given that the economy has
accelerated to over 9% growth. Importantly, there is no evidence of a change in
India’s growth-inflation trade-off: in economists’ parlance, India remains on its
short-run Phillips curve (Figure 5). 5 Food prices were an important driver of the
higher inflation rate, reflecting India’s structurally weak agricultural sector and
robust global demand; but another reason has been the boom in investment. This
investment surge first affects demand – witness the sharp rise in the prices of metals
and cement. But, with a lag, it also enhances supply, thereby easing price pressures. 6
To an extent, inflation also manifested itself through rising housing prices.
Residential prices in cities such as Bangalore and Delhi more than doubled in the
four years to 2005. The RBI responded by raising interest rates and increasing the
risk weighting and provisioning requirements on banks for housing loans, which has
helped to temper the housing bubble and ease inflation below the central bank’s
target of 5.0%. According to media reports, transactions have dropped to almost half
of their previous levels, and a 5-10% drop in real estate prices is visible in suburbs
4
Mohan (2007).
5
The periods 1991-99 and 2000-07 also witnessed a significant downward shift and a flattening of the Phillips
curve. Not only has there been a structural fall in inflation for every level of growth, probably part of the global
“wage moderation” process, but every increase in growth now apparently requires a smaller trade-off in terms of
higher prices – i.e. there has been a flattening of the Phillips curve.
6
China and Japan experienced comparable higher inflation during their growth transitions; but inflation later
stabilised as induced investment – and strong productivity – added to capacity.
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Lehman Brothers | India: Everything to play for

such as Kharghar in Navi Mumbai, Greater Noida near Delhi, and Bangalore’s
Hosur Road. 7
• Credit. The combination of robust economic growth, financial liberalisation and a
rising middle class has led to credit growth of more than 30% over the past two
years, twice as fast as nominal GDP. Clearly, such a pace is not sustainable in the
medium run. But it started from a low base: private non-food credit comprised only
45.6% of GDP in March 2007, a low share by international standards (Figure 6).
Moreover, as a result of monetary policy tightening, credit growth has recently
started to ease – to 23.4% y-o-y by the mid of September 2007.
• Current account deficit. India’s current account registered a modest deficit of 1.0%
of GDP in June 2007 on a 4-quarter rolling basis, which may well widen. But there
is nothing intrinsically wrong with a developing economy running small current
account deficits and it is not necessarily a sign of overheating. In theory, the
“natural” direction for foreign capital to flow is from developed economies to
developing ones. The developed economies would be net savers with current
account surpluses, allowing them to benefit from higher returns and increased
diversification of their investments; the emerging economies would be net
borrowers and, with (small) current account deficits, would have sufficient funds to
make investments to develop and grow.
We are therefore not particularly troubled by India’s recent inflation performance and
consider neither that, nor the pace of credit growth, nor the balance of payments situation
indicative of serious overheating.
Evidence of structural acceleration. On the other side of the issue, there is growing
evidence that India’s growth acceleration is more structural than cyclical, with an
investment boom and high productivity enhancing the economy’s capacity. Gross
domestic investment as a share of GDP has increased from 28.0% in FY04 to around
35% in FY07, while gross domestic savings have risen from 29.7% to around 34%
(Figure 7).

Figure 5. Inflation and growth trade-off in India Figure 6. Private credit/GDP vs GDP per capita 2006

FY91-FY99
200 United Kingdo m
Private loans outstanding, % GDP

14 FY00-FY07

12 Taiwan
FY91 150 Ho ng Ko ng Canada
WPI inflation, %

10 China
M alaysia
Ko rea Germany
100
8 Thailand France
Japan
Singapo re
6
50 India B razil United States
FY07 Turkey
4 Indo nesia
0
2
0 10000 20000 30000 40000
2 4 6 8 10
GDP grow th, % Nominal GDP per capita, US$

Source: World Bank and Lehman Brothers. Source: IMF, CEIC and Lehman Brothers.

7
“Real estate prices see a sharp decline”, Hindustan Times, 18 May 2007.
October 2007 11
Lehman Brothers | India: Everything to play for

Robust government revenue meanwhile is providing room for much needed public
infrastructure spending; and bigger structural changes still have been occurring in the
corporate sector. Gross corporate savings have jumped from 4.7% of GDP in FY04 to
8.1% in FY06, while the average debt-equity ratio for the Bombay Stock Exchange
(BSE) 500 companies (excluding banks) declined from 120% in the first half of the
1990s to 54% over FY04-FY07. Ample sources of funds and healthy balance sheets are
underpinning a boom in corporate investment, which surged from 6.7% of GDP in FY04
to 12.2% in FY06.
Corporate profits have grown by over 20% y-o-y in recent years despite accelerating
wage growth, higher raw material costs and a tightening of monetary policy (Figure 8).
All this is consistent with productivity picking up, spurred by the diffusion of new
technologies and rising competition – within India and, increasingly, overseas. One
indicator of capital productivity is the incremental capital output ratio (ICOR) which
measures the ratio of the investment rate (investment/GDP) to the GDP growth rate. The
lower the ICOR, the bigger the growth “bang” for the investment “buck”. India’s ICOR
has come down to under 4.0 in FY07, from more than 4.5 in early 2000 (Figure 9).
A recently documented example of how the diffusion of new technologies can boost
productivity is the impact of mobile phone technology on the Kerala fishing industry. 8 It
was found that the private-sector roll-out of mobile phone technology drove significant
improvements in market efficiency leading the author of the study to conclude that
“Information makes markets work, and markets improve welfare”.
The nub of the issue is that, before they had access to mobile phone technology,
fishermen would simply land their catch at the nearest port, which tended to create gluts
(and, thereby, low sale prices) on some parts of the coast, and shortages on others.
However, by adopting mobile phones the fishermen were to garner up-to-the-minute
information on the market along the coast and to bring their catch ashore where demand
– and therefore prices – was most favourable.
While this lesson is not necessarily easily transferable to agriculture in India’s interior, it
hints at the sort of welfare improvements which the spread of mobile phone technology
can help to underpin, if other barriers to economic development, including transportation
of goods, can be eased.
India is starting to look like other economies in take-off. Reinforcing our judgement
that India’s most recent growth acceleration since FY03 is not a flash in the pan are four

Figure 7. India’s domestic saving and investment Figure 8. Private corporate financial performance

% GDP % y-o-y
40 Gross domestic investment
45 Sales Gross Profits
Gross domestic saving
35
35

30
25
25
15
20
5
15

10 -5
FY62 FY71 FY80 FY89 FY98 FY07 FY92 FY95 FY98 FY01 FY04 FY07

Source: CEIC and Lehman Brothers. Source: RBI and Lehman Brothers.

8
“The Digital Provide: Information (technology), market performance and welfare in South Indian fisheries sector”
by Robert Jensen, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2007, vol. 122, issue 3, pages 879-924.
October 2007 12
Lehman Brothers | India: Everything to play for

major signs that India’s economy is taking on key characteristics experienced by other
large developing economies, such as China and Korea, during the early stages of their
take-off (see Box 1: Economic take-off – definitions and drivers).
First, the spurt in India’s GDP per capita, to about US$800, is resulting in a rapidly
growing middle class. According to one recent study, India’s middle class – defined as
those with incomes between US$4,400 and US$22,000 – has increased to 13m
households or about 50m people. 9 As a result, India is experiencing surging demand for
consumer durable goods such as cellular mobile phones, ownership of which has
increased exponentially to 148m in August 2007 from 49m two years earlier. Annual
domestic sales of microwave ovens grew by a hefty 29% in FY07. And, according to TV
Veopar Journal, an Indian home-appliances publication, usage of high-end “frost-free”
refrigerators is growing faster than that of traditional “direct cool” ones – a good
example of growing income and aspiration levels.
Second, as India’s finance minister, P Chidambaram remarked in parliament, “There is
an investment boom in the country. It appears that India is catching up with the high
investment rates of East Asia and China.” India’s investment-to-GDP ratio, estimated at
around 35% in FY07, is now in the 30-40% range which was regarded by many analysts
as intrinsic to the Asian miracle (see Figures 11 to 16).
Third, there is the dramatic opening up of India’s economy, as occurred in China and
Korea. The ratio of trade (exports plus imports) to GDP surged to 49% in FY07 from
31% just three years earlier. The number of visitor arrivals to India has doubled in the
past five years, to 4.7m in FY07. And foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows more than
doubled to US$19.4bn in FY07 from US$7.7bn in FY06.
Fourth, Indian companies’ sourcing of finance, from both local and international capital
markets, has begun to take off. From less than US$6.5bn financed through the capital
markets just five years ago, India Inc. raised about US$30.7bn in FY07, according to
statistics from the Reserve Bank of India.
Encouraging though these developments are in their own right, they tell only part of the
story. Compared with the take-off experiences of China and Korea, India appears to be at
a relatively early stage which suggests that there remains substantial – perhaps enormous
– potential to be tapped. A powerful indicator of this is the still low degree of
urbanisation: 70% of the Indian population still lives in the countryside, which is a
comparatively high figure given India’s level of GDP per capita (Figure 10).

Figure 9. India’s incremental capital output ratio Figure 10. Take-off in urbanisation rate

%
Ratio ICOR (4-yr moving average)
90
Ko rea,
1965-2005
5 75

60
4
45 China,
1978-2005

3 30
India,
1991-2005
15
t t+5 t+10 t+15 t+20 t+25 t+30 t+35 t+40 t+45
2
FY86 FY93 FY00 FY07 No. of years from takeoff

Source: CEIC and Lehman Brothers. Source: World Bank and Lehman Brothers.

9
McKinsey and Co. (2007), The Bird of Gold: The Rise of India’s Consumer Market, McKinsey Global Institute.
October 2007 13
Lehman Brothers | India: Everything to play for

Box 1: Economic take-off – definitions and drivers


Over the past four years India has met most of the criteria used in studies to define and describe economic take-offs.
The definition
Economic “take-off” is a nebulous term. W.W. Rostow (1960) was the first to use it in the context of economic growth
analysis. Rostow conjectured that economies evolve in stages and that “…take-off is the interval when the old blocks and
resistances to steady growth are finally overcome. The forces making for economic progress, which yielded limited bursts
and enclaves of modern activity, expand and come to dominate the society. Growth becomes its normal condition.”
Recent studies have used more specific, and progressively more complicated, definitions of “take-off”. Easterly (2005)
defined take-off as real per capita GDP growth increasing from the -0.5% to 0.5% range to “permanent” stability above
1.5%. Aizenman and Spiegel (2007) define take-off as transition from stagnation to robust growth, where stagnations are
defined as five-year periods with average real per capita GDP growth below 1% and robust growth is defined as a period of
real per capita GDP growth exceeding 3%. The Aizenman and Spiegel definition is particularly stringent, requiring real per
capita GDP growth to exceed 3% for five consecutive years and to occur within ten years of the stagnation period.
On the other hand, Hausmann et al (2004) define growth acceleration as an increase in real per capita income growth of
2.0% or more, sustained for at least eight years. Pritchett (2000) defined an accelerator, which is similar to a take-off, as the
case where real per capita income growth was below 1.5% prior to a structural break and then above 1.5% after the break.
The drivers
In a study of 146 country experiences, Aizenman and Spiegel conclude that it is policy which does much to determine
whether or not countries move from low-growth episodes to take-off. Other factors are important too, however, notably
increased trade and capital account openness and higher average education levels. Changes in political regime, or the end of
a war, may also be important predictors of acceleration episodes. Countries with a higher share of services – compared with
commodities – in their total output are more likely to sustain a take-off because they are, in general, less susceptible to
commodity price shocks.
Hausmann et al’s study of growth acceleration for 110 countries between 1957 and 1992 shows that such accelerations are
quite frequent. They find accelerations to be correlated with increases in investment and trade, political regime change,
economic reforms and real exchange rate depreciations. Interestingly, they also conclude that most accelerations are highly
unpredictable.
India’s experience
With real growth in GDP per capita averaging 6.9% since FY03; with the trade-to-GDP ratio doubling over the past seven
years to 50%; and with services comprising 55% of GDP, we conclude that India is exhibiting growing evidence of being in
the early stages of economic take-off. Ŷ

October 2007 14
Lehman Brothers | India: Everything to play for

INVESTMENT-TO-GDP RATIOS ACROSS COUNTRIES AROUND TAKE-OFFS

Figure 11. India Figure 12. China

% of GDP % of GDP
35 45

40
30 Take-off
35
25 Avg since take-off
30 = 37.3%

20 Avg since take off = 25


25.5%
20 Take-off
15
15
10 10
1964 1970 1976 1982 1988 1994 2000 2006
1964 1970 1976 1982 1988 1994 2000 2006

Source: World Bank, CEIC and Lehman Brothers. Source: World Bank, CEIC and Lehman Brothers.

Figure 13. South Korea Figure 14. Taiwan

% of GDP % of GDP
45 30
Take-off
40
25
35

30 20

Avg since take-off


25
= 30.2% 15
Avg since take off =
20 19.6%
Take-off
10
15

10 5
1964 1970 1976 1982 1988 1994 2000 2006 19329 21885 1966 1973 1980 1987 1994 2001

Source: World Bank, CEIC and Lehman Brothers. Source: World Bank, CEIC and Lehman Brothers.

Figure 15. Japan Figure 16. Hong Kong

% of GDP % of GDP
40 40
Avg since take-off
35 = 26.1%
35 Avg since take-off
= 31.1% 30

30
25

20
25

Take-off 15 Take-off
20
21520 1964 1970 1976 1982 1988 1994 2000 2006 10
1964 1970 1976 1982 1988 1994 2000 2006

Source: World Bank, CEIC and Lehman Brothers. Source: World Bank, CEIC and Lehman Brothers.

October 2007 15
Lehman Brothers | India: Everything to play for

Business is carrying the baton


None of this is to suggest that business does not face significant challenges in its role as
the primary engine of take-off (see Chapter 4: Economies of scale and competition).
Perhaps the most impressive aspect of India’s recent economic performance has been the
ability of the private sector to work around the structural and systemic challenges it
faces. 10 Business’s responses to these challenges range from “hard” infrastructure, for
example installing private electricity generation capacity, to “soft”, for example training
programmes for employees, whether in-house or working with higher education
establishments.
While such a response clearly involves costs, both to business and the overall efficiency
of the economy, the private sector has tended to see such steps as an opportunity to form
partnerships and work successfully within the existing system. Common types of
partnership include:
• private-public partnerships for infrastructure projects (see Box 16: Financing India’s
infrastructure deficit);
• private companies partnering with universities to work around the skilled labour
constraint;
• private companies partnering with each other to build efficient supply chains; and,
• private companies partnering with foreign investors.
Underpinning this is what the socio-economic commentator and former senior diplomat,
Pavan K Varma, describes as the Indian “instinct for jugaad” i.e.
“…[a] creative improvisation, a tool to somehow find a solution, ingenuity, a
refusal to accept defeat, initiative, quick thinking, cunning, resolve, and all of
the above”. 11
Putting this in a business context, Mr Varma elaborates:
“…as Silicon Valley has shown, given the right environment [Indians] can be
remarkably inventive. They have the ability to bridge two opposing worlds by
just being themselves, part tradition, part modern. Most importantly, they have
a burning desire to succeed, to partake of the good life. The aspiration to
upward mobility makes them exceptionally focused and hard-working. Instinct
and conditioning have taught them how to get around a problem…
Circumstances have taught him (sic) how to take the failure of the system in his
(sic) stride and find a solution anyhow”. 12
Given this “instinct for jugaad”, there appears to be a serious possibility of business
being able to continue to carry the baton of economic growth through to 2012 at least,
i.e. the final year of India’s latest Five-Year Plan. A relatively low-key but important
series of policy decisions which the government has been taking to open up new areas of
business to large private enterprise is also set to help.
The Indian Government Planning Commission has just released a consultation paper
projecting that investment of about US$492bn will be needed by FY12 to upgrade the
country’s infrastructure 13, and expects about 30% to be financed by the private sector – a
share which is looking increasingly feasible. K.V. Kamath, CEO of ICICI Bank, India’s
biggest private lender, projected in April 2007 that Indian private companies will invest
US$500bn over the coming three years, with about US$300bn of this earmarked for
infrastructure and infrastructure-related projects.

10
An oft-cited example of India’s entrepreneurial zeal is Mumbai’s Dabbawalas, an association of 5,000 lunch
deliverymen who make lunch box deliveries to the city’s workers with almost faultless efficiency despite the
infrastructure problems.
11
Being Indian by Pavan K Varma (Arrow Books, 2004), page 67.
12
Ibid, page 132.
13
‘Projections of Investment in Infrastructure during the Eleventh Plan’ a consultation paper by the Planning
Commission of the Government of India, 24 Sep. 2007.
October 2007 16
Lehman Brothers | India: Everything to play for

Areas where private enterprise is already having a major impact include:


• Civil aviation. This led initially to a boom in budget airlines and is now stimulating
the privatisation of airports and significant investment in air transport infrastructure.
• Oil and Gas. The sector is deepening and broadening, with major exploration and
exploitation of new gas fields and related development of infrastructure. This is seen
by many commentators as an object lesson for the still-closed mining sector, as well
as providing a powerful argument in favour of the government implementing the
stalled 2003 electricity law.
• Telecom. India is currently making more than 5.5m new mobile phone connections
per month, most notably in rural areas where telecom has previously been largely
absent. Perhaps the most significant immediate benefit is to give farmers better
access to market information.
• Banking. A consumer credit culture is taking hold and India’s large private banks,
such as ICICI, are in the vanguard with initiatives such as micro credit and micro
insurance.
• Retail. Until recently there was almost no organised retailing in India, but the partial
opening up of the retail sector at the end of 2006 has already stimulated a surge in
setting up medium-sized grocery stores (albeit in the face of political resistance in
some parts of the country). The Indian conglomerate Reliance alone is planning to
invest INR250bn (US$6.3bn) in 5,000 shops, including hypermarkets, aiming at
annual sales of US$25bn by 2010 (although a recent political backlash in some parts
of the country may lead to the company to reduce this target).
• Real Estate Development. From the outset real estate development has been driven
by the private sector and it has recently received a major boost from private equity
and an influx of foreign funds taking stakes in Indian companies. This has allowed
developers of commercial, residential, hotel and hospital projects in particular to
scale them up to a size at which it is financially viable to install basic utilities.
• Containerised Rail Transport. In January 2007, the government signed public-
private partnership agreements with 14 companies, which stands to break the state
monopoly in cargo business and is expected to increase the Indian Railways’
container traffic to 100m tonnes (mt) by 2012 from 21 mt presently.
In addition to these sectors, the private sector has also made inroads into both domestic
and export markets in such diverse sectors as pharmaceuticals, automobiles, metals,
cement, textiles and hotels (see Box 2: Manufacturing: India’s new powerhouse). The
dynamism of the corporate sector is also evident in the number of new companies in
India’s 50-largest list, compared with 15 years ago (see Box 3: Dynamics within India’s
top 50 companies).
While specific measures are providing significant private enterprise opportunities within
individual sectors, even more important should be their cumulative impact. As T.N.
Ninan wrote at the time of the rail containerisation announcement:
“…the development of these businesses will bring about system-wide efficiency
improvements, and also create export possibilities – agri-exports could finally
take off as people work out cold chains and efficient supply links”. 14

14 “Growth Drivers” by T.N. Ninan (Financial Times website, 9 January 2007).


October 2007 17
Lehman Brothers | India: Everything to play for

Box 2: Manufacturing: India’s new powerhouse


Growth has been driven by aggressive inroads made in the export and domestic market by different sectors.
The information technology (IT) and IT-enabled services sector has long been the standard bearer of India’s international
fame. Low costs, the availability of skilled and English-speaking labour and fast turnaround times have worked to India’s
advantage, leading to the popular perception that its growth has been services-led. However, in the past three years there
have also been significant developments in manufacturing where growth has averaged 9.9% and, at 12.3% in FY07, is now
even faster than that of the services sector (at 11.0%) (Figure 17).
The manufacturing success story extends to many sectors, particularly capital-intensive ones, including pharmaceuticals,
automobiles, metals, cement, telecoms and textiles (Figure 18). The drivers at the macro level are usually similar: firms have
focused on increasing their sales, productivity and profits through more efficient use of technology, capital and labour. They
have passed lower costs onto consumers in order to gain market share. Firms have funded organic and inorganic growth
through strong retained earnings, thereby avoiding excessive leverage.
At the micro level, however, sector strategies have differed. The auto, pharmaceutical and textile sectors, for example, have
concentrated primarily on capturing export markets for growth. For auto companies, India has emerged as the global hub for
small car manufacturing through increasing indigenisation, process improvement, economies of scale and lower costs: the
industry has registered robust 21% y-o-y growth in sales volume over the past three years. In the pharmaceuticals sector,
where output volumes have grown at 21% y-o-y, exports have been the main market; low costs and aggressive inorganic
growth have helped firms in formulation and bulk drug manufacturing, as well as increasing their presence in R&D such as
drug discovery and clinical trial services. Textile firms meanwhile have posted a 17% y-o-y growth in sales and 26% in net
profit, following the removal of the quota regime, which has enabled them to capture a greater share of export markets,
notably in the United States and Europe.
Other sectors, such as cement, iron and steel and telecom, have depended largely on the domestic market to expand. For
example, the growth in cement and iron and steel has primarily been buoyed by rising demand from indigenous
infrastructure, housing and industrial construction. Even in services such as transport and communication, the ability to
reduce costs and prices has been the key to the volume-led growth most notable in the telecom and aviation sectors. Banking
has gained from the rapid growth in retail and corporate credit. Ŷ

Figure 17. Growth in the manufacturing & service sectors Figure 18. Sector growth rates

% y-o-y Manufactuing Services Net sales growth Net profit growth


FY02- FY05- FY02- FY05-
% y-o-y FY04 FY07 FY04 FY07
12
Auto & auto parts 20.3 21.4 55.9 17.3
10 Banking & services 4.9 21.9 37.5 21.6
Cement 16.7 32.9 58.9 119.4
8
Engineering 10.7 33.4 31.3 59.0
6 Hotels 15.6 29.6 27.4 78.7
IT 21.9 36.3 13.7 41.7
4
Infrastructure 41.6 47.2 99.0 136.0
2 Oil & gas 12.8 23.8 39.6 13.7
Pharmaceuticals 18.0 21.1 28.5 34.0
0
Steel & non-ferrous 33.6 22.7 * 23.9
Jun-01 Jun-02 Jun-03 Jun-04 Jun-05 Jun-06 Jun-07
Telecom -12.7 52.7 -35.7 95.4
Textiles & machinery 8.1 17.2 * 26.4
Transportation 12.3 20.5 43.8 -9.2
Utility & Power 5.5 15.2 16.5 8.1

Grand Total 12.6 24.1 41.7 26.4


Note: Results represent a sample of 1825 companies.
*Either numerator or denominator is negative.

Source: CEIC and Lehman Brothers. Source: Capitaline and Lehman Brothers.

October 2007 18
Lehman Brothers | India: Everything to play for

Box 3: Dynamics within India’s top 50 companies


Changing growth dynamics have altered the entire landscape of Indian firms over past 15 years.
The Indian economy has gone through a dynamic change over the past 15 years with robust growth, rising per capita income,
increased consumer demand and changing consumer preferences. Not surprisingly, a similar change has swept through some
of the largest Indian companies which have led this growth acceleration. Figure 19 shows the top 50 Indian listed companies
by market capitalisation in 1992 and more recently in 2007. The key observations are:
• A number of new companies make it to the top 50 list, with only 14 companies from the earlier period still present. Top
companies such as Reliance, Tata Motors, State Bank, ITC, Hindalco and Hindustan Lever have consistently maintained
their top market cap position. Market capitalisation of the 14 companies which still make it to the top 50 list has
increased enormously with Reliance, the largest company, currently at a market capitalisation of US$80.3bn.
• In 1992, the equity market was dominated by manufacturing industries, with only six service-sector firms in the top 50.
The subsequent rapid growth in the services sector has resulted in an increase in the total number of services firms to 18.
Sectors which dominated in 1992 included fertilisers, chemicals, engineering, textiles, shipping and automotive
companies. The boom in services has led to the dominance of IT, telecoms and financial services in 2007.
• Commodity sectors, both energy and metals, have also joined the top 50 list in 2007 with companies such as Oil and
Natural Gas Corporation, Indian Oil and Steel Authority of India among the top 50.
• As of end-September, about 26 companies have a market cap of more than 1% of GDP in 2007 compared with only
three in 1992. This reflects the greater economies of scale achieved by Indian firms. Given that Indian firms will likely
continue to seek further scale globally, we expect this trend to become more pronounced.Ŷ
Figure 19. India’s top 50 companies by market capitalisation
Rank Company US$bn Rank Company US$bn Rank Company US$bn Rank Company US$bn

As on March 31, 1992 As on September 28, 2007


State Bank of Reliance 10.4
1 India 7.32 26 Bombay Dyeing 0.54 1 Industries 80.32 26 Suzlon Energy 6
2 Tata Steel 4.41 27 Essar Gujarat 0.54 2 ONGC 51.43 27 Reliance Capital 9.77
3 ITC 2.92 28 Great Eastern Shipping 0.53 3 Bharti Airtel 44.83 28 Hind.Zinc 8.62
Reliance
4 Industries 2.13 29 Tata Timkem 0.49 4 NTPC 40.04 29 Idea Cellular 8.28
5 Hindustan Lever 2.03 30 Nestle India 0.48 5 DLF Ltd 32.65 30 Grasim Industries 8.09
6 Tata Motors 1.69 31 Castrol (India) 0.47 6 Reliance Comm. 30.06 31 Cairn India 8.08
Associated
7 Cement Co. 1.57 32 Century Enka 0.47 7 ICICI Bank 29.67 32 GAIL (India) 8.04
8 Century Textiles 1.28 33 Indian Aluminium Co. 0.46 8 Infosys Tech. 27.19 33 Kotak Mah. Bank 7.56
9 Grasim Industries 1.17 34 Motor Industries Co. 0.46 9 TCS 25.96 34 Tata Motors 7.53
State Bank of
10 Tata tea 1.12 35 Britannia Industries 0.44 10 India 25.77 35 Satyam Computer 7.44
11 Tata Chemicals 0.95 36 Apollo Tyres 0.42 11 BHEL 24.98 36 Maruti Suzuki 7.25
12 Larsen & Toubro 0.94 37 Madura Coats 0.42 12 SAIL 21.47 37 GMR Infra. 7.23
Gujarat State
13 Fertilizers 0.92 38 Gujarat Ambuja Cement 0.37 13 Larsen & Toubro 20.23 38 Reliance Energy 6.91
Colgate
14 Palmolive 0.88 39 Indian Rayon 0.37 14 ITC 17.92 39 ABB 6.88
Master Shares Natl. Mineral Devt.
15 (UTI) 0.86 40 National Organic Chem. 0.36 15 Corp. 17.42 40 Axis Bank 6.84
16 Cochin Refineries 0.84 41 Raymond Woollen Mills 0.36 16 Reliance Petro 17.34 41 Bajaj Auto 6.45
17 ICICI 0.79 42 Birla Jute Industries 0.36 17 HDFC 17.20 42 Jaiprakash Assoc 6.02
Chemicals &
18 Plastics India 0.68 43 Oswal Agro Mills 0.36 18 Wipro 16.84 43 Power Fin. Corp. 5.80
Mineral & Metal
19 Hindalco 0.67 44 Ingersoll Rand India 0.35 19 Trading 16.53 44 Siemens 5.72
20 Bajaj Auto 0.66 45 Mazda Industries 0.35 20 Indian Oil 14.08 45 ACC 5.62
Brooke Bond
21 India 0.66 46 Seimens 0.33 21 Sterlite Inds. 13.31 46 Ambuja Cem. 5.49
Indo Gulf Fert. &
22 Chem. Co. 0.58 47 Ashok Leyland 0.33 22 Tata Steel 13.00 47 Hindalco 5.30
Gujarat Narmada HCL
23 Fert. Co. 0.57 48 VST Industries 0.33 23 HDFC Bank 12.77 48 Technologies 5.00
Jaiprakesh
24 Industries 0.57 49 ITC Bhadrachalam 0.32 24 Unitech 12.53 49 Natl. Aluminium 4.88
Shipping Credit
25 Co. 0.56 50 SKF Bearing (India) 0.3 25 Hindustan Lever 12.16 50 Sun Pharma. 4.83

Source: BSE, DataStream and Lehman Brothers.

October 2007 19
Lehman Brothers | India: Everything to play for

One sector in which opportunities abound is agriculture. Currently, an estimated 30% of


food products rots en route to market. Hence, when put alongside the government’s push
towards raising the growth rate in the farm sector, the private sector’s potential impact
on the agricultural supply chain – “from farm to fork” – could be one of the most
significant developments of the decade, not only for the economy as a whole but also for
its direct impact on poverty alleviation (see Chapter 4: Foreign trade and investment). To
quote Dr Raghuram Rajan, former Director of Research at the IMF:
“Because poor infrastructure increases costs … low-margin labour-intensive
industries may continue to be uncompetitive in India unless infrastructure
improves. Similarly, value-added agricultural production will also remain a pipe
dream. Improved infrastructure will allow greater access to markets and, thus,
to jobs, and is an essential ingredient for job growth.” 15

Bottom line
Based on the evidence above, we judge that India’s growth acceleration is not a flash in
the pan. Rather, we conclude that important structural shifts underpin India’s growth
acceleration, suggestive of a dynamic growth process which has a reasonable chance of
proving sustainable.
However, in any judgment of medium-term prospects it would be unwise to rely on an
interpretation of just these most recent few years. To explore this issue further, it is
necessary to consider the growth process in greater historical depth and detail. This is
undertaken in the next chapter.

15 See “From Paternalistic To Enabling” by Dr Raghuram G Rajan (Finance & Development, Sept 2006, Vol 43, No
3). Dr Rajan is currently the Eric J Gleacher Distinguished Service Professor of Finance at the University of
Chicago Graduate School of Business.
October 2007 20
Lehman Brothers | India: Everything to play for

CHAPTER 3: ACCOUNTING FOR INDIA’S GROWTH

Introduction
In the previous chapter we interpreted the evidence of the past several years as at least
suggestive of India’s economy having entered a potentially self-sustaining, or take-off,
process. If that diagnosis is correct, the conditions for take-off will not have built up
overnight: they will have been consolidating for a number of years. Hence, an
understanding of the progressive, longer-term rise in India’s trend growth since the
1980s should illuminate the extent to which, or the conditions under which, India’s most
recent growth may prove sustainable.
Long-term growth performance has traditionally been analysed through the so-called
“growth accounting” framework – a method which seeks to relate, or “account for”,
economic growth in terms of the growth of factor inputs, both capital and labour.
“Growth accounting” studies first became fashionable in the 1970s and 1980s. But
problems with the data available for the most advanced economies, let alone for
emerging ones, were considerable; and theoretical problems, ranging from measurement
to the fundamental assumption that output can be represented by an input-constrained
production function, have caused this approach to be seen as difficult.
Moreover, quantifying ex post the contributions which inputs have made to output, even
if that can be done reasonably satisfactorily, tells only part of the story: while growth
accounting quantifies what has happened on the input side of the story, it does not
explain why inputs grew as they did and were able to produce the output that they did.
In other words, “growth accounting” is akin to taking a snapshot through the rear-view
mirror when what is really needed is a movie taken through the windscreen.
What particularly needs to be understood are the dynamic processes whereby, when
matters are going well, growth begets growth in a dynamic interaction between rising
investment and consumption expenditures, and between public and private investment.
Examples of how the dynamic process can come into play include:
• when GDP per capita reaches a threshold, boosting demand for durable goods such
as cars, as witnessed in China;
• when the economy opens up to foreign trade and investment, thereby promoting
economies of scale in production and boosting productivity; and
• when improvement in economic fundamentals instils greater investor confidence,
boosting investments still further.
As Kaldor, for example, emphasised repeatedly, growth in an economy is the product of:
“…an interplay of static and dynamic factors [in] causing returns to increase
with an increase in the scale of industrial activities.”
“This … is the basic reason for the [positive] empirical relationship between
the growth of productivity and the growth of production which has recently
come to be known as the ‘Verdoorn Law’.” 16
It is instructive that the fast-growing Asian economies have exhibited the full interplay
of these (dynamic) sources of growth revealing a strong relationship, across countries,
between the rate of growth of output per worker and the rate of growth of output. In this
context, India’s labour productivity growth – of 3.8% per year on average over the 1980-
2005 period – while impressive by India’s own historical standards, represents only an
average performance by Asian comparison: and India’s labour productivity has evolved
broadly as a cross-country Verdoorn-type relationship would suggest (Figure 20).

16
Kaldor, N. (1966).
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Lehman Brothers | India: Everything to play for

However, most serious is the failure of “growth accounting” to capture the role of
economic reforms and prudent policies in assisting (or hindering) the growth of inputs.
This problem is particularly acute in the case of India where the policy reforms initiated
in the mid-1980s, and taken further after the balance of payments crisis in 1991, have
been fundamental to India’s accelerated growth performance. (A chronology of the
broadly “pro-business” 1980 reforms and the broadly “pro-market” reforms of the 1990s
is presented in Box 4.) 17
Accordingly, after first examining the (limited) information which can be conveyed by
the basic macroeconomic data for output, employment and capital formation in
conventional “growth accounting” analysis, this chapter proceeds to examine the role of
economic reforms, particularly since the 1980s, and how they have fostered a dynamic
interaction between rising consumption and rising (private) investment.

The growth of output


Calculations undertaken on a “peak-to-peak basis”, so as to minimise distortions caused
by short periods of unusually rapid (or slow) within-cycle growth, show that India’s
GDP growth has accelerated continually, from 3.9% per year on average over the period
FY65 to FY71 to 6.8% over the period FY00 to FY07 (Figure 21). Similarly, time-
varying estimates of trend growth calculated using a Hodrick-Prescott filter show GDP
growth as having accelerated from 3.4% to 7.1% over the same period. Most recently,
over the four years from FY04 to FY07, GDP growth has averaged 8.6% per year,
India’s fastest-ever growth over a four-year period. Over the past two years, GDP growth
averaged even higher at 9.2%.
Notwithstanding this accelerating growth performance, however, India’s growth has not
been particularly spectacular in cross-country comparison. In large part, this reflects how
slowly India was growing before the acceleration began. This suggests not only that
India still has some way to go to catch up with other economies, but also that it is still in
only the early stages of growth acceleration. In order to catch up, India’s growth rate
would have to increase above that of other Asian economies. We judge that this is
achievable in the next stages of growth acceleration as India’s growth increases and the
other economies mature.

Figure 20. The “Verdoorn” relationship in Asia: average Figure 21. Historical review of India’s average annual real
growth in GDP and labour productivity over 1980-2005 GDP growth rate

9 Peak-to- Hodrick
China Period Interval peak Prescott
Labour productivity growth, %

7 1 FY51-FY57 4.0 4.1


2 FY57-FY65 4.4 3.7
5 Ko rea 3 FY65-FY71 3.9 3.4
Thailand
Vietnam
India
Singapo re
4 FY71-FY79 3.8 3.5
Ho ng Ko ng
3 M alaysia 5 FY79-FY91 4.9 4.8
A ustralia Indo nesia
6 FY91-FY00 5.8 6.0
1
7 FY00-FY07 6.8 7.1
Whole
-1 P hilippines period FY51-FY07 4.7 4.8
Recent
2 4 6 8 10 period FY04-FY07 8.6 7.4
GDP grow th, %

Source: World Bank and Lehman Brothers. Source: CEIC and Lehman Brothers.

17
Such a characterisation has been suggested by, for example, Rodrik and Subramanian (2004).

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Lehman Brothers | India: Everything to play for

Box 4: Summary chronology of India’s reforms


Despite the common belief that India’s reforms were initiated after the balance of payments crisis of 1991, the initial phase
of reforms can be traced back to the 1980s. Panagariya (2004) judges that, while the 1980 reforms were substantial, they
were half hearted, whereas the reforms initiated after 1990 were both systemic and deep.
Reforms during the 1980s: The real thrust to the reforms of the 1980s picked up in 1985 in the following key areas:
• Import de-licensing. (1) Imports of capital goods and intermediate inputs were liberalised by expanding the list of
items under the open general license (OGL). (2) The share of canalised imports (monopoly rights of the government
for the import of certain items) was reduced significantly, thereby providing more room for other imports.
• Export incentives. (3) Replenishment (REP) licenses were extended to exporters in 1985 to relax export
constraints, and to provide a source of imports for goods sold in the domestic market. (4) Interest rates on export
credit were reduced. (5) Foreign exchange for exporters was liberalised. (6) Profits from exports were made tax
deductible.
• Industrial controls relaxed. (7) 25 industries were de-licensed in 1985. (8) The asset limit for firms which came
under the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act (MRTPA) was raised from INR200m to INR1bn in 1986,
thereby enhancing product market competition. (9) Broad banding permitted firms in some industries to switch
production between similar product lines. (10) A modified value-added (MODVAT) tax was introduced to replace
multi-point excise duties. (11) Incentives that encouraged small-scale industries (SSI) to remain small, such as
excise tax concessions, were gradually removed.
• Administered prices de-controlled. (12) Price and distribution controls on cement and aluminium were abolished.
• Exchange rate. (13) Rupee depreciation corrected the overvaluation of the currency, aiding external liberalisation.
Reforms since the 1990s: The government changed its approach to quantitative restrictions in the 1990s, from having a
“positive list” to a “negative list”. Key areas during this period were:
• Deregulation of industry: (1) With the New Industrial Policy 1991, the need for industrial licences was trimmed to
only five industries. (2) Public sector monopoly was restricted to just eight sectors and the remainder were opened
to the private sector. (3) A policy of automatic approval for FDI up to 51% was initiated for 34 industries.
• External sector liberalisation: (4) Import licensing on intermediate and capital goods was removed in July 1991,
except for consumer goods which were exempted in 2001. (5) The rupee was devalued by 22% in 1991. (6) Peak
import tariffs were lowered from 355% in 1991 to 10% in the FY08 budget. (7) The rupee was made convertible on
the current account in 1994. (8) Capital account convertibility was introduced gradually, based on the
recommendations of the Tarapore Committee, with greater liberalisation for companies and financial institutions.
• Liberalisation of trade in services: (9) The Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority (IRDA) bill was
passed in 1999 and the insurance sector was opened up to the private sector, with 26% foreign investment allowed.
(10) Private banks were allowed and 74% FDI was permitted under an automatic route in private banks; foreign
banks were permitted to open several branches each year. (11) 100% FDI under automatic approval in infrastructure
was allowed for construction and maintenance of roads, airports, highways, ports etc. (12) The Electricity Act 2003
was passed, to de-license generation and freely permit captive generation.
• Financial liberalisation: (13) Income recognition and asset classification under Basel norms were introduced in
1992. Banks are currently required to comply with the Basel II norms by 31 March 2009. (14) The National Stock
Exchange was established in 1994, and lending rates of commercial banks were deregulated. (15) Foreign
Institutional Investors (FIIs) were permitted to invest in government securities. (16) Fixed rate repos in government
securities were introduced for liquidity management along with the Liquidity Adjustment Facility, Interest Rate
Swaps (IRS), and Forward Rate Agreements (FRAs) as over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives. (17) Stock Index
Futures were introduced in FY01 and the Clearing Corporation of India established to provide an integrated clearing
and settlement system. (18) The statutory liquidity ratio (SLR) was cut from a peak of 38.5% to 25% in 1998, and
interest rates on government securities were made more market-determined.
• Fiscal consolidation: (19) The RBI and the government agreed in 1997 to end automatic monetisation of fiscal
deficits. (20) Under the Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Act (FRBM) Act 2003, the government is
required to reduce the fiscal deficit by 0.3% of GDP, and the revenue deficit by 0.5%, every year, to eliminate the
revenue deficit by FY09, and to bring the fiscal deficit down to 3% by FY09. Ŷ
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Lehman Brothers | India: Everything to play for

The growth of employment


Employment in India is measured only very imperfectly: the most serious problems are
summarised in Appendix 2. One important study by Bosworth, Collins, and Virmani
(2006) summarises the situation thus:
“… reliable estimates of the total workforce are limited to the years covered by
six quinquennial household surveys that were conducted over the period of
FY73 to FY00. Annual estimates for the aggregate economy can only be
obtained by interpolations of the results from those surveys” 18.
This seriously limits the usefulness for present purposes of India’s employment data. Our
best judgement is that total employment in India grew at 2.1% per year on average over
the period FY73 to FY06. It grew slightly faster than this (2.3%) between FY73 and
FY85, and slightly slower (2.0%) in the second sub-period, between FY85 and FY06.
This largely reflects the stagnating employment growth in agriculture and the slack pace
of employment growth in the manufacturing sector. 19
We estimate that, encouragingly, total employment over the most recent period for which
data are available grew faster, reflecting rising employment in services and, to a lesser
extent, in manufacturing. For example, total non-agriculture employment grew 4.7%
annually between FY00 and FY05, compared with an average rate of 2.8% during the
preceding six years.

The growth of output per worker


Taking the employment estimates together with estimates for GDP growth suggests that
output per worker in India accelerated progressively, from 3.3% per year on average
between FY81 and FY92 to 4.2% between FY92 and FY06. We estimate that over the
most recent period, FY03 to FY06, labour productivity grew by 5.4% (Figure 22).
Meanwhile, the quality of India’s organised labour has increased modestly, thanks to
improved schooling and increasing returns to higher education. Adjusting the data to
produce a “quality-adjusted” labour force (Figure 23), we estimate that “quality
adjusted” labour input grew around 0.2pp faster each year than the unadjusted labour
force growth of 2.1% (See Box 5: Adjusting the labour force data for quality).

Figure 22. Output per worker in India Figure 23. India’s workforce – adjusted for quality

Output m
per 520 Workforce Quality-adjusted w orkforce
Period Output Labour worker
Annual percentage rate of
change
Whole period FY81 - FY06 5.9 2.0 3.8 420
Sub period I FY81 - FY92 5.2 1.8 3.3
Sub period II FY92 - FY06 6.4 2.1 4.2
Recent period FY03 - FY06 8.3 2.7 5.4
320

220
FY74 FY82 FY90 FY98 FY06

Source: CEIC, NSSO and Lehman Brothers. Source: CEIC, NSSO, World Bank and Lehman Brothers.

18
Bosworth, B., Collins, S.M. and Virmani, A. (2006), pp 13-14. They also go on to note that “A recent evaluation of
the potential usefulness of the smaller NSO surveys, which were undertaken in other years, is provided by
Sundaram, K. and Tendulkar, S.D. (2005). They concluded that the WPRs [worker-population ratios] are not
sufficiently comparable with those of the quinquennial surveys. Bhalla and Das (2006) [no reference cited by
Bosworth et al.] reach a contrary conclusion.”
19
Our figures are close to, though not in all cases identical to, those calculated by Bosworth, Collins, and Virmani
(2006)
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Box 5: Adjusting the labour force data for “quality”


The quality-adjusted labour force grew 0.2% faster than the unadjusted labour force did.
It has been recognised at least since Adam Smith in the 18th century that two principal factors – the division of labour and
education – do much to produce higher productivity and, thereby, earnings. 20 Smith argued that labour productivity is
augmented by specialisation, including through the division of production into many different processes, as exemplified by
his famous example of pin-making. The same phenomenon, writ large, can be seen in the specialisation of tasks in modern
production processes where each individual worker concentrates on, and becomes highly efficient in, a strictly limited set of
tasks which are performed repeatedly.
Regarding the productivity-increasing effects of education, a stream of post-1960s research analysing expenditure on
education as investment across a wide range of countries and educational institutions has found rates of return similar to
those from investment in physical assets. 21
To the extent to which an individual’s earnings in turn equate broadly to that individual’s productivity – a possibly heroic
assumption but an unavoidable one as few data are available on personal productivity – it may be reasonable to infer the
extent to which expenditure on education may have raised the productivity of the labour force 22.
For India, Kingdom (1998) estimates the private return to a year’s schooling to be around 10.6%. A similar study by level of
education by Duraisamy (2002) has found the private returns per year of schooling in India in FY94 for the primary, middle,
secondary, higher secondary and college levels of education to be 7.9%, 7.4%, 17.3%, 9.3% and 11.7% respectively (Figure
24). Interestingly, the returns to an additional year of women’s education are apparently appreciably higher than those of
men’s at the middle, secondary and higher secondary levels.
Private rates of return to education at the secondary and tertiary levels are markedly higher in India than in most other
countries at a similar development stage. This may reflect the fact that, although the standard of the best of India’s education
is high relative to the best in other countries, the average level of education is low by comparison. For example, the adult
literacy rate in India is just 61%, compared with 91% in China. Worse still, India’s female literacy rate is just 54.2%.
Similarly, India’s “average years of schooling” statistic is among the lowest in the group of countries shown in Figure 25. As
in other countries, payoffs to higher education in India appear to be rising over time relative to the payoffs to lower levels of
schooling, although the overall returns to college education do not appear to be as high as to lower secondary school
education. (See Appendix 3 for details.)
On the basis of the data for average years of schooling and returns to education, we have adjusted India’s employment data
for estimated improvements in the “quality” of labour. These calculations suggest the “quality-adjusted” labour force grew
about 0.2pp faster on average than the (2.1%) growth in the workforce over the period 1972-2004. 23 Ŷ

Figure 24. Private rate of return to an extra year of Figure 25. Cross-country comparison of education
education in India profile
Adult Youth
literacy literacy Average
School life rate (% of rate (% years of
Higher expectancy people aged 15- schooling
% Primary Middle Secondary secondary College (years) 15+) 24) ( over 15 yrs)
Duraisamy
(2002) 7.9 7.4 17.3 9.3 11.7 Year 2004 2004 2004 2000
Tilak (1987) 7.8 8.5 negative 2.4 6.8 Philippines 12 93 95 8
Pandit (1976) 17.3 18.8 5.0 5.2 9.2 Thailand 13 93 98 7
Goel (1975) 10.4 10.1 6.0 - 6.4 China 11 91 99 6
Blaug et al
(1969) 18.7 16.1 11.9 - 10.4 India 10 61 76 5
Nallagounden
Indonesia 12 90 99 5
(1967) 23.0 13.0 10.0 - 8.1

Source: See references at the back of the report. Source: World Bank and Lehman Brothers.

20
Smith made these points in the first three chapters of The Wealth of Nations,
21
The analysis of human capital was set on its modern course principally by Becker, G. (1964), and developed
extensively by Mincer, J. (1974) and Kendrick, J.W. (1976).
22
This line of empirical analysis was pioneered by Schultz, T. (1961) and Denison, E.F. (1962).
23
Our calculation of the quality-adjusted labour force is based on the assumption of a 10% internal rate of return on
education with average years of schooling taken from Barro and Lee (2000).Our results are a little lower than
those obtained by Bosworth, Collins, and Virmani, (2006) – this is deduced from Bosworth et al.’s Table 3, which
puts the contribution from quality at around ¼% per year. This figure had in turn been obtained by multiplying the
quality adjustment by labour’s share of GDP, which is around 0.6, and hence implies an “education adjustment”
of (0.25/0.6 = 0.4).
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The growth of the capital stock


India’s data on the resources devoted to capital formation are poor and subject to large
revisions. According to Bosworth et al (2006):
“The FY94 benchmark revisions increased total investment of all industries by
a relatively modest 9 percent. Somewhat surprisingly, the changes associated
with the shift to the FY00 base are much more substantial, despite the passage
of just 5 years since the prior benchmark. Total industry fixed investment in
FY00 has been increased by 33 percent, with revisions for agriculture, industry
and services of 57, 17, and 46 percent respectively.”
Taking the basic data at face value, gross investment has grown by an average of 6.9%
per year since 1960 and at 8.9% per year since 1990. However, these investment figures
are likely to under-represent the growth of the resulting productive capacity of the capital
stock, probably considerably so. Perhaps the single most important reason for this is a
failure to capture the phenomenon of economies of scale, whereby a given increase in all
inputs taken together produces a proportionately greater rise in productive capacity.
From a qualitative perspective, economies of scale are particularly important in countries
which are growing fast from a low base (by global standards). Opening up the economy
allows firms to benefit from their comparative cost advantage and increase plant size.
Furthermore, greater access to technology reduces the cost of capital, enhancing the
productivity of investment – and, thereby, profits – encouraging capital accumulation.
Thus, a dynamic interaction develops between rising capital and labour productivity as
higher capital productivity boosts the efficiency with which labour works with capital.

The results of growth-accounting studies on India


The “growth accounting” method fails to capture these vital dynamic features of “take-
off”: the typical finding is that much of the growth of output cannot be meaningfully
accounted for by the weighted growth of inputs as measured. In the original application
of this method, by Solow (1957) in his “Technical Change and the Aggregate Production
Function”, growth of the factors of production, labour and capital, accounted for just
12½% of US growth: the remainder of US output growth, some 87%, was attributed,
rather emptily, to “technical change” – also dubbed “the ‘residual”, or “total factor
productivity”.
So it is with India. If the “growth accounting” method is taken at face value then, by our
calculations, labour and capital, as measured, contributed just 23.7% and 27.1%,
respectively, to total growth over the FY81 to FY06 period – i.e. the increase in factor
inputs as measured accounted for only half of the growth in India’s output (see Appendix
7 for details). Put the other way round, our calculations using this method suggest that
the “residual” factor, or the growth of so-called “total factor productivity” (TFP)
accounted for 2.9 percentage points per year, out of growth averaging 5.9%. These
results are similar to those of other growth-accounting studies, which have found that
TFP contributed a minimum of 34% (Bosworth et al) and a maximum of 48% (Dholakia)
to total output growth (Figure 26). 24

24
Bosworth, Collins, and Virmani (2006) find, for the period 1980-2004, that total factor contributed 2.0% points to
the average GDP growth of 5.8%, a 34% share (2.0/5.8 = 0.34%).
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Figure 26. Sources of economic growth


Contribution to growth, Proportionate contribution
% points to growth, %
Output
Period growth Labour Capital TFP Labour Capital TFP
Lehman Brothers
Whole period FY81 - FY06 5.9 1.4 1.6 2.9 23.5 26.6 49.9
Sub period I FY81 - FY92 5.2 1.3 1.3 2.6 24.4 25.8 49.8
Sub period II FY92 - FY06 6.4 1.5 1.7 3.2 22.9 27.1 50.0
Recent period FY03 - FY06 8.3 1.9 2.2 4.2 23.1 26.7 50.3
Other studies
Dholakia (2001) FY86-FY01 6.0 1.8 1.3 2.9 29.7 21.7 47.9
Acharya et al (2003) FY92-FY00 6.5 3.9 2.6 60.0 40.0
Bosworth & Collins (2003) 1980-1999 5.7 2.2 1.2 2.1 37.9 20.6 35.8
Virmani (2004) FY81-FY04 5.8 - - 2.4 - - 41.4
Bosworth et al (2006) FY81-FY05 5.8 1.9 1.4 2.0 32.8 24.1 34.5
Bosworth & Collins (2007) 1978-2004 5.4 2.0 1.3 1.6 37.0 24.1 29.6

Source: Lehman Brothers.

The limited usefulness of growth accounting


Despite the advantage of producing numbers which purport to apportion growth among
main contributory factors, the growth accounting method is fraught with limitations. First,
as discussed above, a large part of acceleration in output, over time and across countries, is
attributed to essentially unexplained TFP. While this may highlight the quantitative
importance of TFP, as defined, it does not explain what drives it. This is crucial when
assessing growth in developing countries and, in India’s case, in judging whether – or
under what conditions – its recent rapid growth will be sustainable in the long term.
A second set of limitations relates to the assumption commonly made about the way inputs
combine, i.e. about the production function (see Appendix 5). While the empirical evidence
is overwhelming that economies of scale are widespread and large (see Appendix 4),
growth accounting – largely for reasons of analytic convenience – typically assumes that
economies are characterised by constant returns to scale. 25 (See Appendix 6 for more on
this.)
Economies of scale

Economies of scale refer to the cost savings which a firm can achieve when rising
production volume reduces its average unit cost, i.e. doubling inputs more than doubles
output as factor inputs are used more efficiently. Economies of scope, on the other hand,
refers to the cost savings which a firm can achieve by widening its product range such
that its existing infrastructure or distribution network can be shared among products,
reducing average unit costs.
Perhaps the most intuitive form of economies of scale is the physical size of production.
The basis of many physical economies of scale lies in the laws of geometry and of
physics. A geometrical example, which applies to many items of capital equipment,
involves the so-called “power rule”: where a piece of equipment is volumetric, e.g., a
sphere, and the relationship between the area (A) of material used to construct it and the
volume (V) which it encloses is expressed as:
A = fV 2/3
To the extent that cost is (approximately) proportional to the area of material used, cost
varies as volume to the 2/3 power: a 10% increase in capacity requires only a 6.5%
increase in expenditure on the material used in its construction. A similar phenomenon,
25
In their exhaustive survey of theories of economic growth, Hahn, F.H. and Matthews, R.C.O. (1964) observed
that “…the reason for the neglect is no doubt the difficulty of fitting increasing returns into the prevailing
framework of perfect competition and marginal productivity factor pricing.”
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Lehman Brothers | India: Everything to play for

albeit with different parameters, applies to many other volumetric shapes, such as tubes
and cylinders. Economies of scale are also to be found in some areas of agriculture, such
as fencing: the cost is a linear function of the length of the fence, whereas the area
enclosed increases with the square of the length of the fence.
The geometric origins of physical economies of scale are frequently modified
significantly by the laws of physics. For example, a container cannot be scaled up
without limit: the laws of physics governing the structural strength of a hollow body,
such as a sphere, imply that, if scaled up too far, it would collapse under its own weight
unless its walls were thickened, which would raise the cost of its construction. Hence,
economies of scale in this case would ultimately be limited to less than implied by the
2/3 “power rule”, although in many cases the volume would nevertheless increase less
than in proportion with the amount, and hence cost, of the material used in its
construction.
Geometric economies of scale are to be found in a wide range of capital items important
to India’s economy – ranging from blast furnaces to engines to ships – and they stand to
be quantitatively important not only in the manufacturing sector, but also in a much
wider range of economic activities, from food processing to transport to brewing.
However, there are many other ways of achieving economies of scale, including
purchasing (bulk buying of materials through long-term contracts); managerial (increasing
the specialisation of managers); financial (access to greater financing at lower cost) and
marketing (spreading the cost of advertising over a wider range of output).
In the 19th century United States, for example, the combination of the newly developed
railway and the telegraph increased substantially the size of the market available to many
industries, for which access had hitherto been circumscribed by technological limits,
making it difficult to exploit small local markets efficiently. Thus, industries as diverse
as cigarettes, light machinery, electrical equipment, metal manufacturing, oil refining,
rubber, glass, aluminium and steel all grew fast in the latter half of the century, giving
rise to considerable economies of scale in the process. 26
An example in India is Tata Steel, a fully integrated steel firm with strong backward and
forward linkages. With the acquisition of NatSteel, Millennium Steel and – most recently –
Corus, it has catapulted itself to the world’s fifth largest producer from a rank of 56 before
these deals. In addition to increased physical returns to scale, Tata Steel also benefits from
bigger economic returns to scale arising from greater access to low-cost raw material, a
larger customer base, global distribution networks and a full array of end-to-end steel
products. (See Box 6: Economies of scale: a case study of the Tata group).
Accordingly, while constant-price perpetual-inventory capital stock series of the sort
widely compiled by statisticians (in India as in most other economies) may measure
reasonably accurately the (constant price) value of resources devoted to capital
formation, they cannot be taken as even reasonably indicative of the rate of growth of the
capacity afforded by that capital stock. 27

26
Based on Chandler, A.D. (1990), as cited by Lipsey, R.G. (2000).
27
In addition, there are serious theoretical reasons why such a measure of the capital stock cannot be used in a
production function – and hence “growth accounting” – analysis.
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Lehman Brothers | India: Everything to play for

Box 6: Economies of scale: A case study of the Tata group


Global inroads via strategic tie-ups and the creation of upstream and downstream linkages are key to scale and scope
economies.

Economies of scale refer to the cost savings which a firm can achieve when rising volume of production reduces its average
unit cost. Economies of scope, on the other hand, refers to the cost savings which a firm can achieve by widening its product
range in such a way that its existing infrastructure or distribution network can be shared among products, reducing average
unit costs. Achieving economies of scale is one of the key drivers of consolidation. In India, a powerful example of a group
which has taken advantage of economies of scale and scope is the Tata group and, within it, Tata Motors and Tata Steel.
Tata Motors was founded in 1945. Today, it is India’s largest fully integrated automaker, with revenues of US$5.5bn in
FY06. The company operates in commercial (CV), utility (UV) and passenger vehicle segments. Tata Steel was established
in 1907. Today, it is the largest private-sector steel player in India, making long and flat products. Both companies have
achieved economies of scale through a combination of consolidation, strategic tie-ups and cost reduction techniques.
Increasing domestic volumes
Volume is critical to scale economies. Tata Motors has garnered volume through reduced manufacturing costs. The company
has pitched itself at the low-cost, spacious and fuel efficient car market. This has helped it to establish itself in both the
personal and commercial car segment. The firm has tied up with Andhra Bank to leverage its wider branch networks and to
finance sales in the rural and semi-urban markets. Tata Steel, on the other hand, has increased volumes by expanding
greenfield capacity in the mine-rich states of Chattisgarh, Jharkhand and Orissa.
Making global inroads through strategic tie-ups
Tata Motors has followed the joint venture and acquisition route to increase its scale globally. It tied up with Rover Plc of
the UK to help it market Indica. Tata Motors also has a strategic tie-up with Fiat in a joint venture, which gives it greater
access to export markets because it can utilise the South American Fiat plants to manufacture and sell cars. The company has
also managed to negotiate for superior quality components at competitive prices, even for the export markets, giving it scale
economies. Furthermore, Tata Motors has used its strategic tie-ups to complement business and build supply chain. For
instance, its joint venture with Cummins USA supplies Tata with Cummins engines, while the joint venture with HV Axles
and HV Transmissions manufactures axles and gearboxes for its medium and heavy commercial vehicles.
Tata Steel initially focused on the domestic market but then exported its brands to Nepal, Sri Lanka and the Middle East
before following the acquisition route. The firm acquired Millennium Steel (Thailand) in 2005; and the acquisition of
NatSteel Singapore gave it access to NatSteel’s assets in seven countries, as well as low-cost inputs. With the acquisition of
Corus, the company has become a one-stop steel shop with large economies of scale. Tata Steel has access to Corus’s
customers and distribution network across geographies, reducing marketing costs and giving it large economies of scope.
Bringing economies into play through upstream and downstream linkages
Tata Motors uses a common platform for manufacturing its car brands Indica and Indigo. This helps the firm to shift between
product lines, thereby increasing scale economies and efficiency. It has also created a large dealer network of around 140
outlets. The company has high levels of indigenisation, at 95%; and in-house has developed engines, gearboxes, body panels,
castings and forgings, which helps it to save on import duties.
According to World Steel Dynamics, Tata Steel is the least-cost producer of steel globally – as it has both upstream and
downstream linkages. The company has integrated operations right from iron ore mines (upstream linkage) to finished high-
value-added steel products (downstream linkage), which it distributes from its 115 distribution centres, giving it large
economies of scope. Its upstream and downstream integration plans include the development of a deep-sea port in Orissa.Ŷ

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Lehman Brothers | India: Everything to play for

Virtuous dynamics
Probably the most critical of all the limitations of the static growth accounting
framework is that it fails to capture key dynamic interactions that evolve during an
economy’s growth acceleration. This is particularly the case for India.
One virtuous spiral has involved a synchronous rise in supply and demand. This is very
different from the situation in the mid-1990s, when firms made large investments to
boost capacity, anticipating a post-liberalisation driven domestic demand which failed to
materialise. Domestic demand did not accelerate significantly and export growth
remained lacklustre, leaving firms saddled with excess capacity.
By contrast, during the recent acceleration, Indian demand growth – both domestic
consumption and exports – has risen in line with that of supply. Demand has accelerated
because personal annual income is reaching the critical threshold of around US$1,000
(or US$4,000 in purchasing power parity terms) at which demand for consumer durables
and services – such as mobile phone – takes off (Figure 27). Supply, meanwhile, has
been accelerating as a result of the opening of the economy. The rise in demand pushes
capacity to its maximum and, crucially, imbues firms with the confidence to increase
investment (Figure 28). Rising investment, in turn, raises the incomes of workers who
can then buy the additional goods which the economy has the capacity to produce.
A second virtuous spiral relates to fiscal policy. Buoyant activity in India is boosting the
government’s coffers and lowering the general government fiscal deficit to a decade low
(see Chapter 4: Macro management). This has two effects: first, it helps channel a greater
share of government revenues into infrastructure spending, thereby boosting the
productivity of private investments; and, second, it reduces the crowding-out of private
investment that can come when higher deficits push up interest rates. Both factors have
augmented the virtuous cycle of private investment growing with government expenditure.
A third dynamic interaction involves India’s high growth, capital account liberalisation
and relatively sound economic fundamentals, including high foreign exchange reserves,
low external debt, small current account deficit and healthy financial and corporate
sectors. This combination is attracting substantial capital inflows into the country,
helping to finance investment and buoy asset markets. This is boosting consumption
through wealth effects, and investment, giving rise to a virtuous spiral of growth leading
to capital inflow and in turn to more growth.
These virtuous dynamics are playing a fundamental role in India’s take-off. And given
that India’s GDP per capita has risen to about US$1,000, that nearly 60% of its
workforce is still in the countryside and that half of its population is under 25 years old,
huge potential remains to be unlocked.

Figure 27. Rising mobile phone subscribers Figure 28. Capacity utilisation rate across sectors

Millions, 12m rolling sum Overall


2000-2004
160 Auto ancillaries
2005-2006
Cars
Cement
120
Crude oil
Food & beverage
80
Pharma
Shipping
40 Steel
Textiles

0 40 60 80 100 120
Mar-97 Mar-99 Mar-01 Mar-03 Mar-05 Mar-07 %

Source: CEIC and Lehman Brothers. Source: CRIS INFAC, NCAER and Lehman Brothers.

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Lehman Brothers | India: Everything to play for

Bottom line
Whether or not this “unlocking” occurs, however, will depend on further supply-side
reform, a consideration of the contribution of which forms the subject of the next
chapter. We also look at the unfinished reforms in the critical areas of financial sector
development, macro management, foreign trade and investment liberalisation, hard and
soft infrastructure building, and market competition. Success in implementing reforms
requires that politics do not get in the way. Accordingly, the chapter also considers the
political challenge which implementation of these policies may imply.

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Lehman Brothers | India: Everything to play for

CHAPTER 4: INDIA’S RECENT GROWTH ACCELERATION – THE CRUCIAL ROLE OF REFORMS

Introduction
This chapter discusses India’s policies, reforms and politics, highlighting the key areas
which India must focus on to stay on its new, higher growth trajectory with the potential
to raise it further.
We focus on five main areas:
• Developing the financial sector
• Macro management
• Foreign trade and investment
• Economies of scale and competition
• Growth and governance – the political challenge

DEVELOPING THE FINANCIAL SECTOR


On our estimates, development of the financial sector could add 1.0-1.5 percentage
points to long-term GDP growth.
A solid and well-functioning financial sector is a powerful engine of economic growth,
channelling savings to the most productive investments. A positive relationship between
financial development and growth has long been recognised in the economic literature
(Schumpeter, 1912). However, while early empirical work established that financial
development and economic growth occurred in tandem, there was no strong evidence of
a causal relationship (Robinson, 1952).
But in recent decades a consensus has been emerging from more sophisticated empirical
studies at the cross-country, industry and firm levels that financial development is an
important contributor to economic growth (Levine and Zervos, 1998; Rajan and
Zingales, 1998; Levine, 1999; Khan and Senhadji, 2000; Tsuru, 2000; Bassanini,
Scarpetta and Hemmings, 2001; and Favara, 2003). Such studies demonstrate that
financial development can spur economic growth through various channels including by:
• Increasing the efficiency whereby savings are mobilised – through increased
consumer access to finance – and allocated to the most productive investments,
thereby increasing the productivity of capital;

Figure 29. The size of the financial sector in 2006 Figure 30. Equity market capitalisation in 2006
India Asia ex-Japan
4,000
US$bn % GDP US$bn % GDP UK
Equity mkt. capitalisation, US$bn

Equity market France

capitalisation 802 88 5,976 118


3,000

Private loans
outstanding 417 46 5,687 113 2,000 HK Canada
Germany
Domestic bonds
outstanding 326 36 3,307 66 China
1,000 Italy
- Public 305 34 1,983 39 Taiwan India
Brazil
S. Korea
- Private 21 2 1,324 26
Turkey
0
Total financial
0 1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000
assets 1,545 170 14,970 297 Nominal GDP, US$bn

Source: Bank for International Settlements, IMF, World Bank, ADB, World Source: World Bank, World Federation of Exchanges members, CEIC, and
Federation of Exchanges members, CEIC, and Lehman Brothers. Lehman Brothers.
October 2007 32
Lehman Brothers | India: Everything to play for

• Reducing the cost of raising debt and equity capital;


• Encouraging new business start-ups and innovation, and helping consumers to
smooth their consumption over their lifetime;
• Facilitating the trading, hedging, diversifying and pooling of financial risk, thereby
reducing uncertainty;
• Reducing the risk of financial crises, especially important in the presence of large
and potentially volatile capital flows; and
• Enhancing the efficiency of monetary policy by increasing the number of channels
– and the speed – whereby changes in interest rates affect the economy.
The gaps
India has made substantial reforms to its financial sector since 1991 – including
deregulating interest rates, liberalising capital inflows and strengthening the regulatory
bodies – and the economy is reaping the benefits. We estimate that the total size of
India’s financial sector increased from US$0.3tr in 1994 to US$1.6tr in 2006 (Figure 29).
The biggest success by far has been its equity market, which in fact is one of the oldest
in the world – the Bombay Stock exchange was founded in 1875. India’s equity market
capitalisation was 88% of GDP in 2006, which is high relative to other countries at a
similar stage of economic development (Figure 30). India’s main stock exchanges boast
world-class electronic trading and settlement systems, with trades settled in just two
working days. India’s National Stock Exchange is now the world’s third largest, after
NASDAQ and NYSE, in terms of the number of transactions per year.
Nevertheless, strip out India’s vibrant equity market and large government bond market
and the financial sector looks much smaller. Large gaps remain, most notably perhaps
the virtual absence of a corporate bond market.
Further broadening and deepening of the financial sector offers enormous potential for
India to develop into a main financial hub in Asia. After all, India already has many of
the preconditions: domestic savings are rising; the pension and insurance systems have
yet to be developed; the capital account is now largely convertible; it is at the cutting
edge of software technology and English is widely spoken in the major cities.
To build on this platform, we see the following three core reforms as top priorities:
Government crowding out banks. The banks have to finance the government’s large
budget deficits, which have thereby been “crowding out” the availability of funds
lendable to the private sector. Banks are currently obliged to maintain a minimum
Statutory Liquidity Ratio (SLR) of 25%, i.e., 25% of total bank deposits must be
invested in government debt and other approved securities. Until recently, banks have
held government securities well in excess of the SLR requirement, helping to explain
why private loans outstanding comprise about 45% of GDP, which is a very low ratio by
international standards (Figure 31).
Substantial segments of India’s economy, notably SMEs and rural households, remain
largely excluded from access to formal finance (see Box 7: Microfinance – a serious
business, not charity). 28 Moreover, banks tend to have short-term liabilities – with the
result that buying long-term government bonds exposes them to interest rate risk when,
in most other countries, banks typically specialise in credit risk.

28
To compensate for the lack of finance in rural areas there have been some innovative microfinance approaches.
However, the reach of microfinance institutions has been modest and is an unlikely substitute for an efficient
formal financial sector (see Box 7: Microfinance – “A Serious Business, Not Charity”).
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Box 7: Microfinance – “A Serious Business, Not Charity”


Microfinance in India is attracting the interest of major financial institutions but has yet to diversify beyond simple loans.
Microfinance is the practice of providing financial services, such as microcredit, microsavings or microinsurance to poor
people. In the current decade India’s microfinance industry has taken off, comparable to the economy’s overall growth story,
to the point where – according to Dr Vikram Akula, CEO of Hyderabad-based SKS Microfinance and winner of several
awards for his work in this field – the total market for microfinance in India now stands at around US$2bn.
Dr Akula underlines that the rapid expansion of the microfinance sector is a reflection of the fact that: “People are dying for
an opportunity; they don’t want hand-outs – they don’t mind paying interest; they just want to get on with running
businesses”. Above all, he believes, they are “hungry” for – and, if they have the means, are willing to pay for – two services
in particular: private education for their children and healthcare.
According to Amy Yee in one of a series of articles on microfinance published in The Financial Times last year, SKS alone
has disbursed more than US$92m since its launch in 1998 and has a 98% on-time repayment rate from a total client base
which is now around 700,000, based in nearly half of India’s states (see “Farmers’ Small Loans Cultivate Knowledge”, The
Financial Times, 10 November 2006). Around 70% of India’s population still lacks a bank account and returns on equity
(ROE) in the microfinance industry are around 23% (despite interest rates which significantly undercut those charged by
traditional money lenders). It is hardly surprising therefore that, to quote from Ms Yee’s 15 November 2006 article (from
which this box borrows its title): “Large banks are increasingly viewing microfinance as serious business rather than
altruistic works and are providing loan capital to groups such as SKS. And now venture capital firms are taking equity stakes
in microfinance groups to take them to the next level.”
In a third article Ms Yee notes the two “core models” of microfinance to be found in India. In the “self-help group (SHG)”
model which has grown almost tenfold in the past five years and which now applies to over 31m families, “…groups of
about a dozen women in a village pool their savings. After several months of managing and disbursing their money, they are
eligible for a bank loan of up to four times that amount.” In the second model, “…banks loan money through multi-finance
institutions, usually non-governmental organisations with a track record for rural development work.” Ms Yee adds that
there are now about 800 such institutions with an estimated loan portfolio of US$347m.
Despite the boost of the past decade or so, scope for further growth of the sector is huge. Reflecting the concentration of
micro-financiers in the south of the country – in particular Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Tamil Nadu – independent
experts estimate that microfinance services are still only available to around 20% of India’s 75m households living around
the poverty line. Furthermore, many loans still amount to “subsistence credit” (the average loan size is just US$90), rather
than bigger “enterprise credit” to help lenders start income-generating businesses capable of lifting them out of poverty. The
World Bank (see Basu and Srivastava, 2005) suggests that for the SHG bank linkage to be scaled-up further requires
“promotion of high quality SHGs that are sustainable, clear targeting of clients and ensuring that banks linked to SHGs price
loans at cost-covering levels.”
Although the industry appears to have worked well to date, growth of the sector also begs questions over regulation (for
which there is currently no responsible agency). A report commissioned last year by the Swiss Agency for Development and
Cooperation (SDC), the international NGO CARE and the Ford Foundation called for greater transparency, more training for
local partners and diversification of services (e.g., into pensions and insurance). It remains to be seen whether this will take
the form of an industry-generated code of conduct or whether the government will bring in formal regulation.
One way or the other microfinance in India looks set to continue to grow and, increasingly, to attract business-based
investment from major financial institutions. Nevertheless, although the author of last year’s report, development consultant
Dr Prabhu Ghate, pronounced himself “reasonably confident that [microfinance] will… make a dent on financial inclusion in
the next 10 years”, the extent to which it can provide the diverse range of services which Indians will increasingly seek as
they emerge from poverty remains to be seen. Ŷ

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Lehman Brothers | India: Everything to play for

In recent years, loan growth has been strong as banks have drawn down their excess
holdings of government securities to the point where they are now close to the minimum
SLR requirement. To promote bank lending the SLR should, in our judgement, be
gradually phased out or at least reduced substantially, which will be easier if the
government continues to make good progress in reducing its budget deficit.
Underdeveloped corporate bond market. By international standards ņ and also in relation
to its stage of financial development ņ India’s private bond market is immature, with
debt outstanding equal to just 2-3% of GDP (Figure 32). A diverse domestic pool of
institutional investors has yet to emerge, and there are tight controls on portfolio
allocation. Public offerings are costly, time consuming, and involve many disclosure
requirements. There is virtually no market for corporate bonds below investment grade.
To sustain India’s nascent boom in business investment, a deep and liquid corporate
bond market is urgently needed to fill the gap left by the declining role of development
financial institutions, long the traditional source of long-term finance for Indian
companies. Banks are reluctant to fill this vacuum, however, because of the asset-
liability mismatch which it creates on their balance sheets, it being the case that Indian
companies issue debt securities of much longer maturities than the average bank deposit:
instead Indian banks are turning their attention to retail lending.
Without a developed corporate bond market India’s financial sector risks becoming
unbalanced, given that equity and debt markets play different roles. India’s corporate
sector needs a healthy debt-equity mix. Firms issue debt more readily when investors
demand a relatively safe instrument with a strong commitment to pay out. A firm issues
equity when investors have an appetite for risk, expect high growth and want a share in
the expected growth potential. The corporate bond market can provide a stable source of
finance when investors perceive risk to be high and the equity markets are volatile.
Without a well developed bond market, companies have to roll over short-term debt and
increase their borrowings overseas, exposing themselves both to refinancing and to
exchange rate risks.
Dominance of public sector banks. The public sector still dominates India’s banking
industry, accounting for 75% of the assets. Yet, there is strong international evidence that
such dominance retards financial development and growth (Hauner, 2006; and Barth,
Caprio and Levine, 2000).
Public sector banks tend to be less motivated by profit maximisation than are their
private counterparts, being prone to political influence and moral hazard problems. The
margin between lending and deposit rates for India’s state-owned banks is 6.3%,
compared with an average of 3.1% in Korea, Malaysia, Singapore and the United States

Figure 31. Private loans outstanding in 2006 Figure 32. Private domestic bonds outstanding in 2006
4,400 1,200
Private bonds outstanding, US$bn

UK
Private loans outstanding, US$bn

France
Italy Germany

3,300 Germany 900


China

2,200 600
Canada France S. Korea
Italy UK
Australia China
Canada
1,100 Australia 300
S. Korea
Taiwan Brazil
Taiwan
India
Turkey Turkey India
0 0
0 1,100 2,200 3,300 4,400 0 1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000
Nominal GDP, US$bn Nominal GDP, US$bn

Source: IMF, World Bank, CEIC, and Lehman Brothers. Source: Bank for International Settlements, World Bank, ADB, CEIC, and
Lehman Brothers.

October 2007 35
Lehman Brothers | India: Everything to play for

(Farrell and others, 2006). Only ten of the 27 publicly owned banks were fully
computerised by March 2006. The average age of employees in Indian public sector
banks is 45 years plus compared to about 25 for the overall population (Mohan, 2007).
Capital is what Indian banks need to meet the stricter Basel II norms in FY09. In this
context, reducing the government’s stake to less than 51% in public sector banks will go
a long way to reducing the capital deficiency and preparing for the competitive pressures
likely to build from the entry of foreign banks in 2009.

The way forward


There is a broad agreement in India on what needs to be done to develop the financial
sector further. The government-appointed Patil Committee has submitted clear
recommendations on how to develop the corporate bond market, while the central bank-
appointed Tarapore Committee has unveiled an equally clear road map for fuller capital
account convertibility (see Boxes 8 and 9). The proposals aim at enhancing liquidity in
the corporate bond market and encouraging greater two-way movement of capital,
respectively. Implementation, however, is complicated because many of the reforms are
interdependent and therefore require careful sequencing. For example:
• For banks to focus less on financing public debt and more on their lending to the
private sector, the government must maintain a prudent fiscal policy;
• To increase competition and strengthen the banking sector, a large number of
public sector banks need to be privatised; To develop the corporate bond market,
priority must attach to attracting institutional investors which requires developing
the insurance and pension systems, promoting mutual funds and further relaxing
restrictions on foreign institutional investors; and
• To liberalise the capital account further, the economy needs an efficient financial
sector, strong regulatory and supervisory bodies, fiscal discipline, sound monetary
policy and a not-too-large current account deficit.

Huge potential
If India’s financial sector is developed further, the momentum could become self-
sustaining. International experience has been that, once financial sectors take off, they
tend to grow much faster than nominal GDP. This is partly because, as financial sectors
develop, they tend to attract greater investment, which spurs economies of scale and
product innovation to manage risk. This leads to new markets, such as derivative
products, commodity market exchanges, credit default swaps and debt securitisation, all
of which help attract even greater investment.
We see little reason why the success of India’s equity market cannot be replicated in its
corporate bond market. India already has many of the necessary preconditions for
developing a corporate bond market including: large private companies; experienced
credit rating agencies; market-determined interest rates; a benchmark government yield
curve; and a sound regulatory framework. Moreover, the macro preconditions seem ripe
for a “big bang” in India’s financial sector development, if the recommendations made
by the Patil and Tarapore committees are implemented. India’s capital account has
already been significantly liberalised – more so than many other countries at a similar
stage of economic development; and, with robust economic growth, India is attracting
substantial foreign investment, judging from its foreign exchange reserves, which have
more than quadrupled since 2001 to US$236bn in mid September 2007. Domestically,
fiscal consolidation is making headway – the general government deficit-to-GDP ratio is
at its lowest in a decade – which is increasing government savings.

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Lehman Brothers | India: Everything to play for

Box 8: Recommendations on capital account convertibility


The second Tarapore Committee (TC) was formed in March 2006 (the first presented its recommendations in May 1997) to
explore fuller capital account convertibility. Its recommendations were unveiled in July 2006 in the form of a roadmap over
a five-year period, up until FY11. A summary follows:
Current status: The 2006 TC described the situation as follows: “…for foreign corporates and foreign institutions, there is a
reasonable amount of convertibility; for non-resident Indians (NRIs) there is approximately an equal amount of
convertibility, but one accompanied by severe procedural and regulatory impediments. For non-resident individuals, other
than NRIs, there is near-zero convertibility…as regards residents, the capital restrictions are clearly more stringent than for
non-residents. Furthermore resident corporates face a relatively more liberal regime than resident individuals. Until recently,
resident individuals faced a virtual ban on capital outflow, but small relaxation has been undertaken in the recent period.”
Preconditions and sequencing: The TC-recommended preconditions for capital account liberalisation include: a central
fiscal deficit of 3% of GDP or less (currently 3.5%); inflation within 3-5% (currently 3.4%); a current account deficit no
higher than 3% of GDP (currently -1.1%); a net non-performing asset ratio of 5% or less (currently 1.1%); FX reserves
sufficient to cover six months of imports (currently 13 months); avoiding a prolonged overvalued exchange rate, by having a
monitoring band of +/-5% around the neutral (not defined) real effective exchange rate; strengthening the banks and legal
system; having well developed capital markets; and avoiding high levels of debt, especially of short-term maturity.
Recommendations
Residents (companies): The current limit of US$22bn for external commercial borrowings (ECB) should be gradually
raised (ECBs of over seven year maturity should have no ceiling from FY08-FY09); (note: subsequent to this
recommendation, the Finance Ministry on 7 August 2007, restricted that ECB of over US$20m will be permitted only for
foreign currency expenditure, while ECBs under US$20m can be used for rupee expenditure, but only after the RBI’s
approval.) The limit per corporate for automatic approval (currently US$500m per year or US$750m, if average maturity is
more than ten years) should be raised to US$1bn in FY10-FY11. If ECB is denominated in rupees (and payable in foreign
currency) it should be excluded from the limits. Limits for investment abroad should be raised from the existing 300% of net
worth to 400% in FY10-FY11 (note: the RBI raised this limit to 400% of net worth on 25 September 2007, well ahead of
schedule).
Residents (financial institutions): The current limit for bank borrowing from overseas banks is 50% of unimpaired Tier 1
capital, or US$10m, but should be raised to 75% in FY08-FY09 and 100% in FY10-FY11. For mutual funds, the current
overall limit for overseas investments is US$4bn, with individual ceilings decided by SEBI (usually 10% of net asset value,
or US$50m). The limit should be raised to US$5bn in FY10-FY11, and individual limits should be removed. (note: the limit
for mutual funds was raised to US$5bn in September 2007 and the individual limit set by the SEBI was raised to US$300m).
Residents (individuals): The current limit of US$100,000 per person per year for overseas financial transfers should be
raised to US$200,000 in FY10-FY11. (note: limit was raised to US$200,000 on 25 September 2007, ahead of schedule.)
Non-residents (companies): FDI is permitted in most sectors but with limits in some such as finance, broadcasting,
infrastructure and retail trade (for details, see Appendix 9). Regulations and procedures for FDI should be streamlined and
liberalised. New participatory notes should be banned and existing P-notes should be phased out. Companies should be
allowed to invest in the Indian equity market through mutual funds and portfolio management schemes. Raising funds in
India by issuing rupee-denominated bonds should be broadened to corporates and financial institutions, subject to an overall
ceiling which can gradually be raised.
Non-residents (financial institutions): Portfolio investment is permitted to entities registered as foreign institutional
investors (FIIs), subject to a ceiling of 10% for each FII. For investment in debt instruments, FIIs are currently subject to a
ceiling of US$3.2bn for government debt; this should be changed to a limit of 6% of total gross issuance per year in FY07,
8% in FY08-FY09 and 10% in FY10-FY11. FIIs are currently subject to a ceiling of US$1.5bn for corporate debt; this
should be changed to a limit of 15% of fresh issuance per year in FY08-FY09 and 25% in FY10-FY11.
Non-residents (individuals): NRIs are currently permitted rupee and foreign currency special bank deposit facilities with
tax benefits. Non-residents other than Indians should also have access to these deposit facilities but with no tax advantages.
Currently, NRIs can invest in individual companies on the stock market up to 5% of the paid-up value of the company or the
value of the convertible debenture, with an aggregate ceiling for NRI investments of 10%. Non-residents other than Indians
should also be allowed to invest in the stock market through mutual funds and portfolio management schemes, with the
funds channelled through bank accounts in India.Ŷ

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Lehman Brothers | India: Everything to play for

Box 9: Recommendations on developing the corporate bond market


In July 2005, the government set up a high level committee, under the chairmanship of Dr R.H. Patil, to make
recommendations on how to develop the corporate bond market. The committee submitted its key recommendations to the
government in December 2005:
Enhancing the investor base
• Restrictions should be relaxed on the scope of investments in rated corporate bonds by banks, foreign institutional
investors, pension, provident and gratuity funds and insurance companies.
• The investment ceiling on foreign institutional investors should be raised.
• Retail investors should be encouraged to participate in the market through stock exchanges and mutual funds.
Enhancing the issuer base
• Stamp duty on partly secured and unsecured debentures should be made uniform across all states and should be linked
to the tenure of the securities, with an overall cap (note: subsequent to this recommendation the state finance secretaries
have agreed to a common stamp duty, currently proposed at 0.25%).
• The tax-deduction-at-source rules for corporate bonds should be similar to those applicable to government securities.
• The time and cost of public issuance and the disclosure and listing requirements for private placements should be
reduced and simplified.
• Banks should be allowed to issue bonds of maturities of over five years for asset-liability management purposes ņ and
not only for the infrastructure sector as at present.
• The government could underwrite some of the tranches to enhance the credit rating, particularly for infrastructure bonds.
Creating a more efficient primary market
• For listed companies, disclosure requirements should be substantially abridged so that incremental disclosures are
needed only when they approach the market for a fresh issue, either to the public or through private placement.
• For unlisted companies issuing bonds to institutional investors, the disclosure requirements should be stringent,
including credit ratings.
• The Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) should encourage the growth and development of professional
trustee companies.
• Debenture trustees should ensure that information on credit rating downgrades is made available to all investors. A
press release should be made public whenever there is a default by a corporate.
• SEBI should issue guidelines providing wide dissemination of information to help create an efficient market. A
centralised database needs to be created for all bonds issued by companies. All information, including compliance
reports, should be made public and put on the websites of the companies, debenture trustees and stock exchanges.
• It should be made mandatory for the issuer to have the privately placed bonds listed within seven days of the date of
allotment, similar to the norms applicable to public issues.
Creating a more efficient secondary market
• Efficient market-making needs to be encouraged, for example by allowing repos in corporate bonds.
• A trading reporting system needs to be developed to capture all information related to trading corporate bonds as
accurately and as close to execution as possible; and to facilitate clearing and settlement and price discovery (note:
subsequent to this recommendation, corporate debt transactions have started to be reported on the stock exchanges)
• Banks and other institutions should be given the freedom to set up inter-dealer electronic broking platforms to facilitate
over-the-counter deals.
• Steps should be taken to introduce the revised and approved exchange-traded interest rate derivative products, which
have long been pending (note: currently, the interest rate derivatives market is confined to the over-the-counter market,
with only a handful of participants).
• The minimum market lot criteria of INR1m (about US$25,000) for trading in corporate bonds at the stock exchanges
should be reduced to INR100,000 (about US$2,500) to enable better access for smaller investors.Ŷ
October 2007 38
Lehman Brothers | India: Everything to play for

The area which remains largely untapped – and hence offers the most potential, in our
view – is private savings. Economic theory on the “demographic dividend” associated
with the transition from high to low fertility and mortality rates highlights the large pool
of potentially employable labour of working age and the potential for high saving rates
by these workers, particularly as they move into their most productive years and as the
need to support their young dependents lessens (Bloom and Canning, 2004).
Empirically, there is strong evidence of a demographic dividend effect on savings. In
Japan, Korea and China the decline in dependency ratios – the sum of people aged 0-14
and over 65 divided by those aged 15-64 – has correlated strongly with a rise in the
(gross) saving-to-GDP ratio (Figure 33).
A similar relationship obtains in India; and, with half its population still under 25 (and
40% under the age of 18), India’s dependency ratio is projected to fall from 60 now to 48
by 2025. This could potentially lift India’s gross domestic saving ratio from an estimated
34% in FY07 to over 40% by 2025, provided the young workforce is well trained and
healthy (Figure 34).
Developing India’s pension and insurance systems will be key to mobilising household
savings. And here, too, there is enormous potential, given that 80% of India’s 1.1bn
population has no insurance coverage and that 88% of the workforce does not contribute
to pension schemes.

Lehman Brothers’ projections


Combining India’s private loans outstanding, equity market capitalisation and domestic
bonds outstanding, we estimate that the total size of the financial sector has grown from
US$0.3tr (83% of GDP) in 1994 to US$1.6tr (170% of GDP) in 2006. While that is
undoubtedly impressive, by international standards India’s financial sector remains
under-developed relative to the size of its economy (Figure 35).
If India sustained its recent pace of economic growth, as we believe it could, the
economy would approximately double in size by 2012 to about US$2tr. In turn –
assuming (conservatively, in our view), a constant ratio of financial sector to GDP –
India’s financial sector could grow to US$3.4tr.
Moreover, we regard this as a lower-bound, conservative estimate. If India presses ahead
with financial reforms – such as privatising the banks, developing the corporate bond
market and further liberalising the capital account – its financial asset-to-GDP ratio

Figure 33. Domestic savings against falling dependency Figure 34. India’s domestic savings and dependency
ratios in China, Korea and Japan during 1960-2006 ratio

45 y = -0.4157x + 55.525 % GDP %


R2 = 0.658 45 45
Gross savings (% of GDP)

40 Gross domestic saving, lhs


40 50
35 Dependency ratio*, (inverted) rhs
35 55
30
30 60
25
25 65
20 20 70
15 15 75
China Japan Korea
10 10 80
35 45 55 65 75 85 95 105 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
Dependency ratio (population aged under 15 and * The dependency ratio is calculated as the population aged under 15 and
over 64 as a % share of the remaning population) ov er 64 as a % share of the remaining population

Source: US Census Bureau, World Bank, CEIC, and Lehman Brothers. Source: United Nations, World Bank, CEIC, and Lehman Brothers.

October 2007 39
Lehman Brothers | India: Everything to play for

should be able to rise to at least the “line of best fit” in Figure 35: and that would put the
size of India’s financial sector by 2012 at 343% of GDP, or US$6.9tr in today’s prices. 29
It is no easy task to estimate the economic benefits which flow from India’s rapidly
growing financial sector. The banking and insurance sectors have certainly been growing
faster than the overall economy; but this is a very narrow measure of the financial sector
and it gauges only the direct effects (Figure 36). An alternative approach is to estimate
empirically the relationship between GDP growth and financial development. We have
undertaken this using panel data for the period 1995-2006 for the twenty countries
depicted in Figure 34 (see Box 10: Estimating the impact of financial development on
economic growth).
Our results, while encouraging, should be treated cautiously. After all, GDP growth is
the most endogenous of economic variables and there is also likely some reverse
causality from GDP growth to financial sector development. That said, the coefficient on
the financial asset-to-GDP variable is positively signed and statistically significant under
the three different methods, with values ranging from 0.0058 to 0.0086. These results
suggest, broadly, that each one-percentage-point (pp) increase in the financial asset-to-
GDP stands to boosts long-run GDP growth by 0.006-0.009pp.
For India, this implies that, if it can raise its financial asset-to-GDP ratio by 173
percentage points (343-170) to the line of best fit, it could raise its long-run GDP growth
by 1.0-1.5pp.
However, we believe India has enormous potential to lift its financial asset-to-GDP ratio
above the line of best fit and get an even bigger GDP growth bang out of the financial
development buck. To achieve this, Mumbai needs to be developed into one of the
world’s financial hubs. This will require India taking further steps to leverage its
considerable comparative advantages, including: the scope to attract considerable talent
from and/or deepen interaction with its diaspora in financial institutions worldwide;
English-language skills; and “hard” infrastructure development and the ability to draw
on India’s world-class ICT-industry on which the finance industry depends heavily to
disseminate information speedily.Ŷ

Figure 35. The size of financial sectors in 2006 Figure 36. India’s GDP: total and financial sector output

10,000 FY90 = 100


UK 450
Size of financial sector, US$bn

Banking and insurance


8,000 France sector output
400
Germany
350 Real GDP
6,000
China
Canada Italy
300
4,000
S. Korea 250
HK
2,000 Brazil 200
Turkey
India
0 150
0 600 1,200 1,800 2,400 3,000
100
Nominal GDP, US$bn
FY91 FY94 FY97 FY00 FY03 FY06

Source: Bank for International Settlements, IMF, World Bank, ADB, World Source: CEIC and Lehman Brothers.
Federation of Exchanges members, CEIC, and Lehman Brothers.

29
Note: for this calculation we included the data points for Japan and the US, which are not included in Figure 35,
simply because the size of their financial sectors, at US$20.1tr and US$49.5tr, are off the chart.
October 2007 40
Lehman Brothers | India: Everything to play for

Box 10: Estimating the impact of financial development on economic growth


A substantial body of empirical work has tested the relationship between financial development and economic growth (a
good survey of the literature is provided in Khan and Senhadji, 2000). The studies are generally based on regression analysis
for a large cross-section of countries.
The basic equation we have investigated has the following form:
Yi = α + β FDi + δXi + ei
Where:
Yi is the rate of real GDP growth of country I;
FD is an indicator of financial depth;
X is a set of control variables;
e is the error term.
We ran a simple regression of real GDP growth against total financial assets (measured as the sum of loans outstanding,
government and corporate bonds and equity market capitalisation) as a share of GDP, using panel data for the 20 countries
highlighted in Figure 34. The regression was estimated for 1995-2006 (making for 240 annual observations). We expanded
on this in three ways. First, we added GDP per capita as an explanatory variable to “control” for the different stages of
economic development of each country. Second, we added dummy variables for each country to isolate country-specific
shocks (e.g. political instability). Third, we added individual year dummies to isolate year-specific developments (e.g. the 11
September 2001 terrorist attack). In all three methods, the coefficient on the financial asset-to-GDP variable is “correctly”
signed (i.e. positive), with a t-value which is statistically significant at the 5% probability level. The ordinary least squares
regressions were run using White-consistent standard errors and covariance to correct for heteroskedasticity, a common
problem associated with panel data.
Our results in Figure 37 are consistent with most of the empirical evidence, which finds a strong and statistically significant
relationship between financial development and economic growth. That said, it can be argued that the relationship reflects
reverse causality – i.e. that faster economic growth leads to financial development. While this argument carries some weight,
the large body of empirical evidence – including some studies which have taken a more microeconomic approach (e.g.,
Rajan and Zingales, 1996) – cannot be dismissed on the basis of this premise alone. Indeed, it would amount to assuming not
only that growth affects financial development, which is realistic, but also that financial development has no effect on
growth, which is counterintuitive. Ŷ

Figure 37. Estimating the relationship between the ratio of financial assets to GDP and GDP growth
Regression 1 Regression 2: Regression 3:
country dummies country and year dummies
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
Constant 4.34 8.6 5.69 9.8 6.77 8.0
Financial assets/GDP 0.0058 3.2 0.0086 2.5 0.0075 2.4
GDP per capita -0.0002 -6.0 0.00002 0.4 -0.0001 -2.7
R-squared 0.12 0.31 0.55
SE of regression 3.29 3.02 2.52
Durbin-Watson statistic 1.53 1.50 2.25

Source: Lehman Brothers.

October 2007 41
Lehman Brothers | India: Everything to play for

MACRO MANAGEMENT
Macro-economic policies have improved; but a new challenge is the management of
huge capital inflows.
Prudent macro policies and sound institutions are key ingredients to sustaining strong
economic growth. The literature has tended to focus on the following relationships:
Lax monetary policy leads to high inflation, which is negative for growth. It can
increase distortions created by non-indexed features of the tax system (Feldstein, 1996);
and it is typically correlated with higher variability in inflation, which generates
uncertainty, thereby hindering investment (Ball and Cecchetti, 1990). A study of OECD
countries estimated that a reduction by 1 percentage point (pp) in the standard deviation
in inflation could lead to an increase in long-run output per capita by 2pp, ceteris paribus
(Bassanini and Scarpetta, 2001). High inflation also creates so-called “menu costs”
whereby sellers have to spend more time and resources revising their prices; and it can
reduce the credibility of monetary policy, raising long-run inflation expectations.
Lax fiscal policy crowds out private investment. The traditional argument is that large
budget deficits and high public debt crowd out private investment, either by causing
long-term interest rates to rise or by obliging banks to finance the high government
spending at the expense of lending to private companies. Worsening fiscal finances can
also raise the risk premium perceived by foreign investors and can lead to sovereign
credit rating downgrades. Some argue that large governments are also negative for
growth, as government departments tend to be less driven by competition and the profit
motive and so can be less efficient in allocating resources (Folster and Henrekson, 1998).
Macroeconomic stabilisation. If firms expect economic crises to be frequent, they will
hesitate to invest in order to expand capacity for fear of being saddled with unused
capacity for frequent, significant periods. Similarly, households may tend to increase
their precautionary saving rather than spend. Prudent macro policies and a sound
regulatory and institutional framework can help minimise boom-bust cycles.
India’s macro policies
From a long-run perspective, India’s macro policy performance has improved. Inflation
bursts have been tamed, and inflation expectations have ebbed, obviating the need for
monetary policy to tighten to the point of inducing recession and thereby damaging
growth. There have been no GDP declines – which have been big in the past – since the
late 1970s. Since the 1991 balance of payments crisis, GDP growth has risen and become
more stable. Inflation, meanwhile, has been steadily brought down from above 10%
(Figure 38). Moreover, the volatility of growth and inflation has fallen (Figure 39).

Figure 38. India’s long-run GDP growth and inflation Figure 39. The volatility of India’s growth and inflation

% y-o-y Standard deviation Rolling five-year standard deviation


20 10 of annual grow th in the:
GDP grow th
15
8 GDP deflator
10

5 6

0
4
-5 Real GDP
GDP deflator 2
-10
Wholesale price index
-15 0
FY55 FY68 FY81 FY94 FY07 FY63 FY74 FY85 FY96 FY07

Source: CEIC and Lehman Brothers. Source: CEIC and Lehman Brothers.
October 2007 42
Lehman Brothers | India: Everything to play for

More recently, wholesale price inflation rose from 3.9% y-o-y in April 2006 to a peak of
6.6% in March 2007; but it has since abated to 3.2% in mid-September thanks to a
judicious monetary policy response from the RBI. The RBI raised the repurchase rate by
a total of 175bp to 7.75% and also hiked the cash reserve ratio from 5.0% to 7.0% to
help absorb excess liquidity.
The RBI deserves credit for successfully taming inflation without choking growth, for
two reasons. First, it was unclear how much of the higher economic growth was cyclical
rather than structural (although with hindsight it seems to have been predominantly the
latter). Second, a significant part of the rise in inflation was due to surging food prices, a
consequence of many years of weak agricultural output. Monetary policy is not well
equipped to deal with inflation fuelled in this way, but such supply shocks, if long
lasting, can raise consumers’ inflation expectations (especially given that food makes up
a hefty 27% of the consumption basket in India) thereby affecting wages and prices more
generally.
Recognising this fact, the RBI coordinated its monetary policy with the government. The
government – mindful of the impact of rising food prices on India’s poor and, in
particular, the related political significance of the price of the ubiquitous and emblematic
onion – introduced several measures to tackle food shortages. These included such
measures as reducing import duties on a range of items and banning exports of wheat
and pulses. 30 The RBI is on track to meet its goal of containing inflation around 5.0% in
FY08 and, in the medium term, aims to condition policy and perceptions for inflation in
the range of 4.0-4.5%.
Historically, India has had a poor track record on fiscal policy. Since FY81 the
consolidated (centre and state governments) budget deficit has averaged 8.0% of GDP,
widening to as high at 9.9% in FY02. But more recently it has steadily improved,
narrowing to an estimated 6.1% in FY07. India’s fiscal consolidation over the past four
years has been the most significant in the past quarter of a century (Figure 40).
In FY04, the Indian government enacted the Fiscal Responsibility and Budget
Management (FRBM) Act, which created a medium-term fiscal planning framework for
central government. The Act stipulates that the central government’s revenue deficit
should be reduced by 0.5% of GDP each year to eliminate it by FY09; and that its budget
deficit should be reduced by 0.3% of GDP every year to no more than 3% of GDP by
FY09. The central government’s budget deficit narrowed to 3.5% of GDP in FY07,
suggesting that the 3% goal for FY09 is within reach – at least in principle considering
that the March 2009 target date coincides with the end of the current electoral cycle and
the pressures that can bring to bear on even the most fiscally responsible administration.
In addition, in April 2008 the Sixth Pay Commission will submit its recommended
increase for the base salary of government workers (the Fifth Pay Commission
recommended substantial pay increases to government workers, which were
implemented in 1997, and was one of the key reasons for the increasing budget deficit).
That said, various fundamental federal tax reforms have been implemented, including:
the rationalisation of excise duties; a move towards a median central value-added tax
(VAT) rate; and the creation of a tax information network to prevent tax evasion.
Consolidation has also been advanced at the state level. High-cost state debt has been
reduced under the Debt Waiver and Relief Facility, coupled with the precondition that
states enact their own FRBM. State finances have received a significant boost from the
revenue buoyancy of the new state-level value-added tax. From 20 states which initially
30
The Indian government’s banning of wheat exports was in part a reaction to domestic inflation as well as to shifts
in the global wheat market triggered by the sudden upsurge in production of corn-based biofuels in the US and
Europe in particular as a policy-driven response to global warming. As for the price of onions, as Amelia
Gentleman wrote in the International Herald Tribune of 15 February 2007, “the onion plays an explosive role in
Indian politics…. The most vital ingredient in Indian cooking, the basic element with which all dishes begin and,
normally, the cheapest vegetable available, the pink onion is an essential item in the shopping basket of families
of all classes.” Ms Gentleman goes on to quote C.P. Chandrashekhar, professor of economics at Jawaharlal
Nehru University in New Delhi, as follows: “The routine nature of consumption of onions means that a price rise
quickly transmits onto the consumer’s consciousness. It symbolises an overall feeling of inflation…. Once the
vocal urban middle classes are affected, it becomes an issue politicians cannot ignore”.
October 2007 43
Lehman Brothers | India: Everything to play for

adopted VAT in April 2005, today a further ten (including union territories) have
followed suit, encouraged by the ability of the tax to generate funds to meet development
needs. VAT has ceased to be a political issue and its economics have played an
important role in improving the centre-state financial relation.
While there could be some fiscal slippage in the near term because of the political cycle,
it is important to recognise that India’s public debt dynamics have changed substantially
in its favour since economic take-off, with the GDP growth-interest rate differential
swinging sharply into positive territory. India’s public debt declined from 82.4% of GDP
in FY05 to 75.3% in FY07 and, on the assumption that the positive growth-interest rate
differential and prudent fiscal policy both continue, the debt ratio could decline to about
60% or less by 2011-12 (see Box 11: Estimating India’s public debt dynamics).
Continued medium-term progress on fiscal consolidation stands to have many positive
effects on the economy. It should reduce the crowding out effect of private-sector
investment, and it tends to put downward pressure on long-term interest rates, lowering
the government’s debt servicing costs and liberating fiscal space for more resources to
flow towards productive expenditure. Lower government borrowing could also be
expected to reduce the need to maintain such a high statutory liquidity ratio (SLR),
thereby increasing the availability of funds lendable to the private sector. Indeed, this
seems to be happening: total public infrastructure, both physical and “soft”, rose from a
low of 3.9% of GDP in FY05 to 5.0% of GDP in FY07.

India’s economic fundamentals


Avoiding boom-bust cycles in developing economies is not easy. It requires not only
prudent macro policies, but also a sound institutional and regulatory environment;
healthy corporate and financial sectors; a sufficiently flexible exchange rate to avoid
large external imbalances; and a deregulated and open marketplace to foster competition-
induced efficiency gains.
Inspection of key vulnerability indicators suggests that India’s economic fundamentals
have strengthened. On top of low inflation and improving fiscal finances, India’s
corporate sector has a light debt burden and its banking sector has a low net NPL ratio of
1.1% of net advances in FY07. Admittedly, India’s current account has swung into
deficit but, at close to 1.1% of GDP in FY07, it remains small; and there has been a
major improvement in other external vulnerability indicators (see Box 12: Lehman’s
Damocles model of external sector vulnerability). For example, with FX reserves soaring
to some US$236bn (Figure 41), India’s ratio of FX reserves to short-term external debt

Figure 40. India’s consolidated fiscal deficit Figure 41. India’s foreign exchange reserves

% GDP US$bn
0 250
-1
-2 200
-3
-4 150
-5
-6 100
-7
-8 50
-9
-10 0
FY81 FY86 FY91 FY96 FY01 FY06 Sep-89 Sep-92 Sep-95 Sep-98 Sep-01 Sep-04 Sep-07

Source: Government of India, RBI and Lehman Brothers. Source: CEIC and Lehman Brothers.

October 2007 44
Lehman Brothers | India: Everything to play for

has risen from less than one in FY91 to about 16 in FY07. Against this background it is
not surprising that Moody’s raised its sovereign credit rating for India to investment
grade in May 2006, while S&P lifted its rating to one notch above investment grade in
January 2007.
Improving economic fundamentals and credit rating upgrades have further bolstered
investor confidence in India’s economy. However, they have also brought a new
challenge to Indian policymakers: managing strong, persistent net capital inflows.
Strong capital inflows can be a mixed blessing: they facilitate economic growth and
development; but they can also complicate the implementation of monetary policy. Like
most other Asian countries, India faces the “impossible trinity”. This holds that, at any
given time, a country can have a combination of only two of three conditions: a fixed
exchange rate, an open capital account and an independent monetary policy. With the
rupee still a managed float and the capital account de facto open, the RBI’s strategy of
raising interest rates to tackle liquidity risks attracting even stronger capital inflows. This
poses a policy dilemma for the RBI because letting the rupee appreciate risks crimping
export competitiveness, while resisting rupee appreciation can compromise the
autonomy of monetary policy and raise the risk of excess liquidity fuelling asset price
bubbles.
Needless to say, India also faces other external risks which are outside its control such as
a global growth slowdown, an oil price overshoot and geopolitical factors.

October 2007 45
Lehman Brothers | India: Everything to play for

Box 11: Estimating India’s public debt dynamics


India now has very favourable debt dynamics, creating a good opportunity to bring down its public debt-to-GDP ratio.
The change in the public debt-to-GDP ratio from one year to the next is given by the following identity:
Dt Dt − 1 Pt Dt − 1
− = + ( Rt − Gt )
Yt Yt − 1 Yt Yt − 1
where:
D is gross public debt of the general government (central plus state governments);
Y is nominal GDP;
P is the general government’s primary balance, i.e., the fiscal balance excluding debt servicing costs;
R is the interest rate on public debt, calculated by dividing the government’s interest payments by the debt stock in t-1;
G is the nominal GDP growth rate.
From the identity, the increase in the public debt-to-GDP ratio can be broken down into two parts: (1) the primary balance,
which measures the fiscal balance excluding interest costs on the existing stock of debt; and (2) a debt-dynamic part, which
is a function of the difference between the interest rate on the debt and nominal GDP growth. If the primary balance is zero,
the public debt-to-GDP ratio will rise (fall) if the interest rate is higher (lower) than the GDP growth rate.
India’s public debt dynamics have changed importantly in its favour since economic take-off, with the GDP growth-interest
rate differential swinging sharply into positive territory (Figure 42). India’s public debt-to-GDP ratio has declined from
82.4% in FY05 to 75.3% in FY07, largely because of the favourable public debt dynamics as the government is still running
a primary budget deficit, albeit smaller than in the past. Moreover, as the name implies, debt dynamics tend to have self-
fulfilling effects. For example, a lower public debt-to-GDP ratio reduces the government’s cost of servicing debt, making it
easier to reduce a primary deficit. Further, it can also lower the perceived risk premium which investors demand on holding
debt and thereby lead to sovereign credit rating upgrades. Both help further support GDP growth and lower interest rates.
How long India’s favourable debt dynamics last will depend on progress on economic reforms (to sustain high growth) and
prudent policies, especially monetary policy (to keep inflation in check).
On the assumption that the existing GDP growth-interest rate differential remains constant, we have projected India’s public
debt through to FY12 under three different scenarios for the primary budget balance. The first makes the rather optimistic
assumption given the election cycle that the primary budget balance (-0.4% of GDP in FY07) averages zero over the
projection period, which would be the first time it has not been in deficit in over two decades. The second assumes that the
primary deficit is 1.6% of GDP, the average over the past five years. The third assumes, pessimistically, that the primary
deficit widens sharply to 5% of GDP, the highest since FY91. Our projections suggest that, under the first two scenarios
India’s public debt-to-GDP ratio in FY12 would decline to 55% and 62% respectively. Even under the pessimistic third
scenario, the debt ratio would remain stable at 77% because of the favourable public debt dynamics (Figure 43).Ŷ

Figure 42. India’s nominal GDP growth and interest rate Figure 43. Projections of India’s public debt-to-GDP ratio

% % GDP Scenario 1: primary balance equals zero


16 90 Scenario 2: primary deficit of 1.6% of GDP
Interest rate paid on public debt Scenario 3: primary deficit of 4.0% of GDP

14 Nominal GDP grow th


Projections
80

12
70
10

60
8

6 50
FY99 FY01 FY03 FY05 FY07 FY98 FY00 FY02 FY04 FY06 FY08 FY10 FY12

Source: RBI, CEIC, and Lehman Brothers. Source: RBI, CEIC, and Lehman Brothers.

October 2007 46
Lehman Brothers | India: Everything to play for

Box 12: Lehman Brothers’ Damocles model of external sector vulnerability


High level of FX reserves, low external debt and large capital inflows mean that India has low vulnerability to a crisis.
Damocles is Lehman Brothers’ proprietary early-warning system for assessing the risks of external financial crises in
emerging market economies. It uses ten indicators which are widely recognised as possible predictors of external financial
crises (see: Damocles: Room for optimism, 24 August 2007). These include: foreign reserves/imports; foreign reserves/short-
term external debt; broad money/foreign reserves; external debt as % of GDP; short-term external debt as % of exports;
current account as % of GDP; domestic private credit as % of GDP; the real short-term market interest rate; the stock market
index; and the real trade-weighted exchange rate. Each indicator is allocated a signalling threshold and we use the noise-to-
signal ratio method to weight each indicator to arrive at a composite index. A reading above 100 implies a 50-50 chance of
an external financial crisis erupting over the next 12 months, whereas a reading above 65 implies a one-in-three chance.
India’s low Damocles score of 9 as of June 2007 reflects low external vulnerability because of a surge in FX reserves to a
record high of US$236bn, little external debt and large capital inflows that are easily financing the country’s small current
account deficit (Figure 44). By contrast, our Damocles model indicates that Iceland and Romania have a one-in-three chance
of experiencing financial difficulties (Figure 45). However, financial crises have a nasty habit of morphing into new forms;
so Damocles should be supplemented with other information, including political risk. We judge that managing liquidity,
while avoiding a too-rapid appreciation of the rupee in the face of very strong capital inflows, are key policy challenges for
India. Ŷ

Figure 44. Vulnerability indicators of India’s economy

Indicators “Safe” threshold FY91 FY05 FY06 FY07


Foreign reserves/imports Above 6 1.2 14.9 12.2 12.3
External debt as % of GDP Below 50% 28.7 18.0 15.8 16.6
Foreign reserves / short term external debt Above 1 0.3 24.2 16.7 16.0
Current account as % of GDP Above -3% -3.1 -0.4 -1.1 -1.1
Consolidated fiscal balance, % GDP Above -3% -9.4 -7.5 -7.5 -6.1
Consolidated public debt, % GDP Below 50% 64.9 82.6 79.5 78.6
Private credit as % of GDP Below 100% 30.2 33.9 41.1 46.3
WPI inflation, % y-o-y Below 5% 10.3 6.5 4.4 5.4
Non-performing loan ratio, % Below 5% n.a. 4.9 3.3 n.a.

Source: CEIC, RBI and Lehman Brothers. The “safe” thresholds are our own subjective estimates.

Figure 45. Individual Damocles scores for June 2007


Scores
1-in-2 chance of an external
100
89 financial crisis

75 1-in-3 chance of an external


67 financial crisis

50
35 35
26 24
25 17 16 16 16 15
9 9 9 9 9 7 7
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0
al s

a
Tu a

R d
i li i a
g

a
li c

do d

C hi le
Ta a
un a

Ar ore

ru
el
a

Th i a
R nd

ng o
ey

ry

Po l

a
M n
a

bi
i

n
on

si

si

n
re

az

ic

in
an

Ph Ind

a
s
ch fric

ra
ub

Pe
in

ga

la

la
rk

om
hi
a

ne
ay

iw
us

ex

ap
So Ko

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C
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Br
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Is
om

ai

C
ep
ze h A

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Ic

ol
g
h

M
on
R

In
ut

ut

Si
H
So

Source: Lehman Brothers.

October 2007 47
Lehman Brothers | India: Everything to play for

FOREIGN TRADE AND INVESTMENT


India has doubled its trade-to-GDP ratio over the past seven years to almost 50%. We
judge that it could double again in the next decade if the business climate improves,
which could add 1.5 percentage points to GDP growth.

Theory
The economic literature, barring some exceptions, suggests that increased openness to
trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) has a positive and pronounced impact on a
country’s economic growth, especially in developing economies. 31 Furthermore, recent
studies have found that the link between economic openness and growth has become
stronger over time, and that economic openness helps stimulate labour shifts out of
agriculture, thereby boosting productivity growth. 32 In particular, a recent study of
countries that have experienced economic take-off found that de jure trade openness
policies play a prominent role in determining whether or not a take-off occurs. 33
The economic gains can accrue through several channels:
• Trade increases the efficiency with which resources are deployed across countries
through exploitation of comparative advantages.
• Access to foreign markets allows the exploitation of economies of scale as firms are
able to expand production, distribution and marketing.
• Imports provide access to resource endowments not readily available domestically.
• FDI diffuses new skills, technologies and international best practice.
• Foreign competition enhances efficiency and productivity.

Practice - Trade and FDI liberalisation in India


India has a good story to tell on trade and inward investment liberalisation, which are
among its most advanced areas of economic reform. Trade liberalisation in India began
in the early 1980s and gained momentum following the 1991 balance of payments crisis.
Most of the licensing restrictions on imports of raw materials, intermediate and capital
goods have now been eliminated. The peak import tariff rate on non-agricultural goods
has fallen from 300% in FY92 to 10% in FY08 and the government has pledged to
reduce the tariff to ASEAN levels (currently around 8.5%) by 2009. Also, while the
Doha round of global trade negotiations (in which India is a major player) has stalled,
India has pressed ahead with a plethora of regional and bilateral free trade negotiations.
For details see Box 26: The economy and international relations, and Appendix 8: Status
of India’s bilateral and multilateral trade policies. 34
Similarly, India’s regulatory regime for foreign direct investment (FDI) has been
substantially liberalised since 1991 and today is no longer particularly restrictive by
international standards. In 1991, FDI policy was amended to allow automatic approval of
up to 51% ownership in 34 sectors. That list was expanded to 111 sectors in 1997.
Today, 100% FDI is permitted in most sectors; but some are still capped – notably, air
transport, finance and telecommunications – while FDI is not permitted at all in a small
number of sectors: retail trading bar single-brand products, betting and gambling, nuclear
power and agriculture (see Appendix 9: India’s Foreign Direct Investment Policy).

32
Notable papers supporting this view include Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), Sachs and Wanrer (1995), Frankel
and Romer (1999), and Bassanini, Scarpetta and Hemmings (2001). A contrary view can be found in Rodriquez
and Rodrick (2000).
32
See, for example, Vamvakidis (2002), Williamson and Clemens (2002) and IMF (2006).
33
See Aizenman and Spiegel (2007). Using probit estimation, the authors find that a one standard deviation
increase in de jure trade openness is associated with a 55% increase in the probability of take-off.
34
The Indian government has stressed that, for the Doha round of trade talks to make progress, a key issue is the
reduction of farm support in developed countries which, India argues, would aid its vulnerable and under-
developed agricultural sector.
October 2007 48
Lehman Brothers | India: Everything to play for

No longer a closed economy


As a result of trade and inward investment liberalisation, measures of Indian economic
openness are taking off. India’s total trade (exports plus imports) as a share of GDP has
doubled over the past seven years to almost 50% in FY07, while FDI inflows have more
than doubled from US$7.7bn in FY06 to a record US$19.4bn in FY07. Furthermore,
judging by the global integration experiences of other Asian economies, India’s take-off
is still in its early stages (Figures 46 and 47).

Box 13: India goes global


Access to foreign markets and technology, easy funding and fewer restrictions have propelled outward FDI from India.
A rising ambition to be globally competitive has unleashed a boom in overseas acquisitions by Indian companies, which is
unusual for an economy still at an early stage of development. Outward FDI from India has grown strongly, from US$2.5bn
in 2005 to almost US$10bn in 2006.
The boom. The initial boom in outward FDI started with software companies, which took the acquisition route both to
enlarge and diversify their customer base and to move up the value chain. Now, a similar rise is being seen in manufacturing.
Access to production facilities, technology, foreign markets and international brand names were key factors behind Tata
Motors’ acquisition of Daewoo Motors (see Box 6: Economies of scale and scope: a case study of the Tata group).
Pharmaceutical firms such as Ranbaxy are investing abroad to access technology and knowledge by setting up their own
R&D facilities in countries such as China and the United States. Access to natural resources is spurring overseas acquisitions
in sectors such as steel, oil and gas, and aluminium: for example, Hindalco acquired two copper mines in Australia in 2003
and recently purchased Novelis for US$6bn, making it a low-cost aluminium producer with a global footprint. Oil and
Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) has invested in Sudan and Russia to secure supplies of gas; and, last year, Tata Steel took
over Corus for US$13.6bn. Meanwhile, Tata Power’s acquisition of PT Kaltim Prima Coal and PT Arutmin Indonesia in
2007 for US$1.1bn has given it the access to the largest exporting therma coal mines in the world. Much of India’s outward
investment is in the US and Europe (for market access and technology), followed by Russia (natural resources), Mauritius
and the British Virgin Islands (for tax advantages).
The drivers. As highlighted by the IMF in its February 2007 Article IV consultation on India, relative to companies in most
other developing economies, Indian corporates have found it easier to “go global” because their business models are very
similar to western ones in terms of both framework and governance, and they have managers who have been trained overseas
and/or who speak English. Surging capital inflows have given the Indian government greater confidence in easing
restrictions on outward FDI. From an earlier cap of US$100m, Indian companies are now allowed to invest up to 400% of
their net worth. In 2006, the RBI also allowed proprietary or unregistered partnership firms to set up joint ventures or wholly
owned subsidiaries abroad. Furthermore, India has signed a number of bilateral investment treaties and double taxation
agreements which have facilitated investment in partner countries.Ŷ

Figure 46. The take-off in trade (exports plus imports) for Figure 47. Foreign direct investment in India and China
some low-income Asian countries

% GDP Vietnam, Thailand, US$bn


1991-2005 1980-2006
150 80
China,
70
125 1978-2006
60
100 China, 50
1978-2006
75 40
India,
1991-2006 30
50
20
India,
25 10 1991-2006

0 0
t=0 t=5 t=10 t=15 t=20 t=25 t=0 t=5 t=10 t=15 t=20 t=25

Source: World Bank, CEIC and Lehman Brothers. Source: CEIC and Lehman Brothers.

October 2007 49
Lehman Brothers | India: Everything to play for

India has many comparative advantages in international trade and FDI, including: a large
domestic market; a potentially massive pool of relatively low-cost, young, English-
speaking labour; impressive information-communication technology capabilities; strong
enforcement of intellectual property rights; and a vibrant equity market. Already, India is
a world-class exporter of information and communication technology services – such as
software development, call centres and business process outsourcing – and has made
inroads into some capital-intensive industries, notably auto parts and petrochemicals
(Figure 48).
With strengthening FDI inflows, India has the potential to become a critical part of
Asia’s elaborate production network (Figure 49). More unusual for an economy still in
the early stages of development, there has also been a surge in outward investment by
Indian corporates to gain access to foreign technologies and markets (see Box 13: India
goes global).
The favourable environment is not just for FDI, but also for other forms of investment.
According to Dealogic, private equity (PE) investment in India rose to US$3.8bn in the
first eight months of 2007 compared with a total of US$2.6bn in 2006 and US$2.2bn in
2005. The strength and liquidity of India’s stock market helps as it facilitates an eventual
stake sale. Today, most large US-based firms like The Carlyle Group, The Blackstone
Group and General Atlantic have done PE deals in India. Venture capital investment has
also been large in the technology and real estate sector. For instance, Microsoft launched
a US$1.7bn commitment to R&D and venture-capital investments, while Cisco launched
a US$100m commitment.
Given that India’s economy is still in the early stages of economic take-off and that its
capital account has already been liberalised substantially, we judge that capital inflows
will remain strong, and most likely intensify. India’s net FDI inflows, which nearly
doubled to US$7.8bn in 2006, could surge to US$50bn in 10 years. India’s other net
capital inflows, including portfolio and external commercial borrowings totalled
US$30bn in 2006, and our projection is that they could swell to US$170bn in ten years’
time. So despite a small current account deficit, we expect India’s large capital account
surplus to place significant pressure on the rupee to appreciate. We expect the RBI to
manage the pace of currency appreciation through FX intervention, causing India’s FX
reserves – which totalled US$236bn in mid-September 2007 – to quadruple to about
US$900bn by 2017.

Untapped comparative advantages


While India has had success in exporting software services, business process outsourcing
and some capital-intensive manufacturing, it has failed to capitalise fully on its global
comparative advantages in labour-intensive sectors of manufacturing, agribusiness and
tourism. Tapping these areas could transform India into a global manufacturing hub and
tourist destination and help employ the tens of millions of young people who will enter
the workforce in the coming decade. In an effort to seize this opportunity, the current
government has accelerated the programme of setting up special economic zones (see
Box 14: Sizing up India’s SEZs).

October 2007 50
Lehman Brothers | India: Everything to play for

Box 14: Sizing up India’s SEZs


While not a first-best solution, the success of SEZs could be a catalyst for removing the barriers to business nationwide.
A largely unknown fact is that Asia’s first special economic zone (SEZ) was set up in India in 1965. However, the expansion
of SEZs was very slow; only eight existed by 2004. This pedestrian development led the current government to introduce a
new, more favourable SEZ policy which was inscribed into law in February 2006.
India’s new SEZ policy offers several incentives to zone developers and potential business occupiers alike, notably:
• 100% income tax exemption on export income for SEZ units for the first five years, 50% exemption for the following
five years and for the five years thereafter a 50% exemption on re-invested profits.
• Duty-free imports/domestic procurement of goods for development, operation and maintenance of SEZ units.
• Exemption from the minimum alternate tax, the central sales tax and the service tax.
• Single window clearance for central and state-level approvals for development in the SEZ.
• In some states, partial relaxation of labour laws.

As of 19 September 2007, formal approvals – given to those projects that have already secured land – had been granted to
386 SEZs, while a further 176 had been approved in principle as meeting the criteria but had still to secure land. The final
stage in the process is notification, which is when physical development can begin on site. As of August 2007, 149 SEZs had
been notified.
The benefits. Proponents of SEZs argue that they will promote exports and foreign direct investment, encourage private
infrastructure development, draw surplus labour off the land into more productive employment, boost research and
development, help develop new niche industries, and create clusters where economies of scale provide positive externalities.
The costs and risks. There has been considerable opposition to the developments of SEZs in India for three main reasons.
First, most of the projects on SEZs are Indian business initiatives which, it is argued, would probably have occurred anyway,
with the unwanted consequence that their designation as “SEZs” – and the associated very generous tax breaks – constitutes
an unnecessary loss of revenue for the government. Second, most of the formally approved SEZs are small – the average
land size is 1.3sq km – suggesting that the projected economic benefits from clustering and infrastructure development may
prove optimistic. And third, in part because India is a democracy, acquiring land for SEZs has been challenging, primarily
because of concern – including among India’s political classes – that poor rural households could be displaced without fair
compensation for their loss of livelihood and property rights. This has been coupled with worries that, rather than productive
investments of the type that the government is hoping to stimulate, SEZs could fuel real estate speculation where land is
acquired cheaply, fitted with basic infrastructure and sold on to build hotels and shopping centres.
For these reasons, and particularly the concern over “land grabbing”, INC President Sonia Gandhi has publicly spoken out
against the use of agricultural land for SEZs in order to prevent the large-scale uprooting of farmers. They also underpinned
a wave of social protests which turned violent in January 2007 in West Bengal. As a result, new approvals were frozen in
January 2007, giving time for the government to review its policy. As a result of this review, the government unveiled a raft
of new criteria for setting up SEZs before lifting its self-imposed freeze on new approvals in April 2007. The new rules limit
the maximum size of the SEZs to 50sq km, designate that at least 50% of the land acquired for SEZs be used for
manufacturing, require developers to give a job to at least one member of every family displaced by an SEZ, and forbid state
governments from using their powers of eminent domain to acquire land compulsorily for private developers.
It remains an open debate in India whether the economic and social benefits of SEZs outweigh the costs. There are positive
stories: Nokia and Flextronics electronics hardware SEZ in Sriperumbudur are already employing 3,800 and 2,069 workers,
the majority of which are woman. Apache SEZ being set up in Andhra Pradesh plans to employ 20,000 workers. The first
private sector IT-ITeS SEZ at Coimbatore is likely to create 30,000 jobs in three years, while Brandix Apparels, a Sri Lankan
FDI project, is setting up an SEZ to provide employment to 60,000 over the same period. Overall, the government’s
projection is that the SEZs formally approved thus far will, once operational, provide investment of INR3tr (US$75bn) and
will create 4m new jobs.
While not a substitute for economy-wide reform, we are optimistic that the development of SEZs could build pockets of
excellence in infrastructure and industry – perhaps especially in Indian states which remain relatively underdeveloped
economically at present – to help India capitalise on its global comparative advantages in labour-intensive industries. In this
way, the success of SEZs could be a catalyst for breaking down the barriers to business nationwide.Ŷ
October 2007 51
Lehman Brothers | India: Everything to play for

Consider three examples where India appears to have large comparative advantages
which have yet to be utilised fully.
First, textiles. India is resource rich in cotton and its textile industry spans the entire
supply chain; yet its clothing and textile exports comprise only 5% of the world total,
compared with 59% for China. This is largely because in India the sector is dominated
by small-scale producers who use obsolete technologies, and who are handicapped
relative to competitors in other countries by infrastructure and regulatory hurdles (see
also Box 24: A legacy of anti-materialism). As a result, China enjoys an estimated 13%
cost advantage over India in shipping garments to the United States (Ananthakrishnan,
2005). Modernisation and associated up-scaling of the industry, coupled with
improvements to the support infrastructure has the potential both to help India become a
global manufacturing hub and create jobs for less skilled workers who are at present
excluded from the formal sector. Also, starting to work in India’s favour are the rising
costs in China’s textile industry because of appreciation of the renminbi and the
reduction in value-added tax rebates on textile exports.
Second, food. India is the world’s largest producer of milk and the second largest
producer of food, yet its food and live animal exports make up just 1.6% of the world
total. Underpinning this is the fragmented nature of the agricultural sector, with over
100m small farms, coupled with widespread dependence on outdated technologies, both
in production and in the rural-to-retail supply chain which is subject to streams of red
tape and ad hoc fees, and which lacks the requisite infrastructure to handle the transport
and storage of perishables. The infrastructure is so deficient that, of India’s total output
of fruit and vegetables, only 2% are processed and some 30% rot before reaching market.
Downstream, India’s retail sector, long protected against foreign ownership, is
dominated by over 12m “mom and pop” outlets with an average size of less than 50
square meters. This has further impeded the development of an efficient agribusiness.
Only 3% of India’s total retail sales is based in “organised retail” and less than 10% of
the total food market is branded.
Recognising that almost half of India’s land mass is arable (versus 13% worldwide), that
it has over 7,517km of coastline and that it is home to 17% of the world’s population, it
is clear that India’s food industry offers enormous potential. Last year, the partial
opening up of the retail sector led to India’s Reliance Industries announcing a goal “to
bring the world to Indian farmers”, with plans to build a nationwide retail network of
1,000 hypermarkets and 2,000 supermarkets within four years, plus a distribution system
to ensure an “integrated farm-to-fork supply chain”. Some foreign retailers, including
Wal-Mart of the US, have entered the Indian market but for cash-and-carry, or
wholesale, services only; they are still prohibited from operating front-end stores.
Indeed, FDI in India’s retail sector is not allowed except for single-brand products.

Figure 48. India’s major exports Figure 49. India’s major export destinations
FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY07 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY07
US$bn US$bn US$bn US$bn US$bn US$bn % total US$bn US$bn US$bn US$bn US$bn US$bn % total
Primary products 7.2 8.7 9.9 13.6 16.4 19.5 15.5 EU 10.1 11.8 14.4 18.1 23.1 25.8 20.4
- Agriculture products 5.9 6.7 7.5 8.5 10.2 12.5 9.9 - France 0.9 1.1 1.3 1.7 2.1 2.1 1.7
- Ores & minerals 1.3 2.0 2.4 5.1 6.2 7.0 5.6 - Germany 1.8 2.1 2.5 2.8 3.6 4.0 3.2
Manufactured goods 33.4 40.2 48.5 60.7 71.8 82.8 65.6 - Italy 1.2 1.4 1.7 2.3 2.5 3.7 2.9
- UK 2.2 2.5 3.0 3.7 5.1 5.5 4.4
- Leather & leather goods 1.9 1.8 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.9 2.3
Africa 1.7 1.8 2.3 3.0 3.5 5.6 4.4
- Chemicals & allied products 4.1 7.5 9.4 12.4 14.5 16.7 13.2
US 8.5 10.9 11.5 13.8 17.4 18.9 14.9
- Iron and steel 0.9 1.9 2.5 3.9 3.5 5.2 4.1
Canada 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.2 0.9
- Manufacture of metals 1.6 1.8 2.4 3.4 4.2 5.0 4.0
Latin America 1.0 1.3 1.1 2.2 3.0 4.3 3.4
- Machinery & instruments 1.7 2.0 2.8 3.7 4.8 6.5 5.1 West Asia & North Africa 5.8 7.5 10.2 14.2 16.7 23.0 18.2
- Transport equipment 1.0 1.3 2.0 2.8 4.6 4.9 3.9 - UAE 2.5 3.3 5.1 7.3 8.6 12.0 9.5
- Electronic goods 1.2 1.3 1.7 1.8 2.2 2.7 2.2 East Asia 9.8 13.1 15.9 22.5 27.6 33.4 26.4
- Other engineering goods 0.5 0.7 1.0 1.6 2.3 4.7 3.7 - China 1.0 2.0 3.0 5.6 6.8 8.3 6.6
- Textile & textile products 10.2 11.6 12.8 13.6 16.0 17.0 13.5 - Japan 1.5 1.9 1.7 2.1 2.5 2.8 2.2
- Gems & jewellery 7.3 9.0 10.6 13.8 15.5 15.6 12.3 South Asia 2.1 2.8 4.3 4.6 5.5 6.5 5.1
- Others 1.0 1.4 1.2 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 - Bangladesh 1.0 1.2 1.7 1.6 1.7 1.6 1.3
Petroleum products 2.1 2.6 3.6 7.0 11.5 18.6 14.7 Other 4.3 2.8 3.3 4.3 5.2 7.7 6.1
Others 1.2 1.2 1.9 2.3 3.0 5.4 4.3 Total goods exports 43.8 52.7 63.8 83.5 103.1 126.3 100.0
Total goods exports 43.8 52.7 63.8 83.5 103.1 126.3 100.0

Source: CEIC. Ministry of Commerce and Lehman Brothers. Source: CEIC, Ministry of Commerce and Lehman Brothers.
October 2007 52
Lehman Brothers | India: Everything to play for

CRISIL Research (2007), the Indian affiliate of Standard and Poor’s, estimates that
liberalising organised food retailing could boost India’s GDP growth by 1.5 percentage
points.
The modernisation of the retail sector may pose some threat to the livelihoods of small
shopkeepers, and it has triggered a political backlash in some states, such as Uttar
Pradesh, where Reliance Retail was forced in August 2007 to shut ten of its new fresh
supermarket stores and lay off 1,000 staff. However, modernising the retail sector has the
potential to be a major catalyst for reform of the agricultural sector and, therefore, more
inclusive growth nationwide. This could be a significant stepping-stone towards India
becoming a food factory for Asia, a region which accounts for more than half of the
world’s population – and one where incomes are rising rapidly, leading to increased
caloric intake and expanding dietary preferences. Organised retail can help set up supply
chains, give better prices to farmers for their produce and facilitate development of the
agro-processing industries, while the presence of foreign retailers is likely to help
generate the much-needed export-market linkage for Indian suppliers.
Third, tourism. Business travel and foreign tourist interest in India is growing strongly,
but from a low base. As a share of GDP, the size of India’s tourist and travel industry is
estimated at only 2%, the second lowest among a selection of Asian countries and well
below the world average of 3.6% (Figure 50). And yet, India has 27 properties on the
World Heritage List, the second highest in Asia after China (34); and, with so many
great tourist attractions, the World Travel and Tourism Council has identified India as
one of the world’s foremost tourist growth centres in the coming decade. Furthermore,
the potential of this rich history and cultural heritage can only be enhanced by the
availability of low-cost labour to help take advantage of new niches such as medical and
adventure tourism and by the benefit to India’s broad reputation in leisure and
entertainment which the success of Bollywood has brought.
All that being said, to substantially increase the number of visitors to India, tourism
infrastructure needs to be upgraded including international airport facilities, intra-India
transport to tourist destinations and tourist hotels consistent with international standards
and competitive in cost terms. For example, a hotel room in Bangalore now costs about
US$299 a night, as much as anywhere in the world.
As these three examples illustrate, having substantially liberalised its trade and FDI
regimes, India has yet to capitalise fully on its global comparative advantages in labour-
intensive exports, and therefore has yet to reap the economies of scale from exporting
textiles, agribusiness and tourism to the rest of the world.
The so-called Three-sector Hypothesis developed by Clark and Fourastié in the 1930s

Figure 50. Size of travel and tourism industries 2006 Figure 51. The share of industrial output in GDP at
various stages of economic development, 1965-2004

% GDP Share of industrial output in GDP (%)


6.7
7 55
Russia
6 China
50 South Africa
5 4.4 45
4.1 Korea
3.7 3.7 3.8 Japan
4
3.1 40
2.7
3 2.4 2.4 2.5
2.0 35
2 1.5
Canada
30
1 Mexico United States
25 Brazil Oceania
es
a

nd
tan

i na

nka
ia

m
re

s ia
HK

n
rea

esi

pa
Ind

tna
po

pin

ail a
l ay
Ch
k is

La

Thailand
Ko

W. Europe
Ja
on

ga
Vi e

i li p

20
Th
Pa

Ma
Ind

Sri
Si n

Ph

India
15
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
Real GDP per capita (thousands of PPP-adjusted U.S. dollars)

Source: World Travel and Tourism Council and Lehman Brothers. Source: IMF’s World Economic Outlook, Sept 2006 and Lehman Brothers.
October 2007 53
Lehman Brothers | India: Everything to play for

shows that economic development typically follows a pattern where production first
shifts from primary to secondary industries and then, as economies mature, to tertiary
industries. The resource shift out of low-productivity agriculture to higher-productivity
manufacturing and services should boost the overall productivity of the economy. From
this vantage point, India’s experience is quite unusual for a developing economy: its
services sector has been developing faster than its manufacturing sector such that tertiary
output makes up 55% of GDP versus 27% for secondary and 18% for primary. India’s
manufacturing share is low for such a large, low-cost economy in an era of rapid
globalisation, and it is particularly low in comparison to its Asian peers (Figure 51).
India’s low share of labour-intensive manufacturing output and failure to scale up its
labour-intensive industries are largely because of the constraints to business, including
weak infrastructure, bureaucracy and labour market rigidities. Breaking down these
barriers would pave the way for many more Indian companies to grow into world
leaders. For example, Hsieh and Klenow (2007) find that improving resource
misallocation across plants within an industry could give productivity gains of 40-50% in
India’s manufacturing sector.
The window is more open than ever for India to seize this opportunity, and the economic
payoff should be substantial. Based on panel data across 35 countries, we have found a
statistically significant positive relationship between GDP growth and the trade-to-GDP
ratio. Moreover, the impact of the trade-to-GDP ratio becomes more powerful for a sub-
set of countries with fast developing economies, with the rule of thumb that a 10
percentage point rise in trade/GDP can lift GDP growth by 0.3 percentage points (Box
15: Estimating the impact on GDP growth from rising economic openness).
India’s trade-to-GDP ratio doubled over the past seven years to almost 50%.
Furthermore, we judge that it has the potential to double again in the next decade if the
business climate continues to improve in ways we discuss in the next section.
India has much to gain in attracting FDI and lifting its trade-to-GDP ratio to 100%. Our
empirical results suggest that this could raise the country’s GDP growth rate by 1.5
percentage points. 35 This may seem ambitious; but we see no reason why India’s trade-
to-GDP ratio cannot follow the trajectory of China’s which surged from 48% in 2002 to
73% in 2006, especially considering the following three factors: (1) this is an era of rapid
globalisation; (2) over half the world’s population is in Asia and personal incomes are
rising rapidly; and (3) with intensifying competition in Asia, multinationals will be
seeking new lower-cost processing and assembly centres to outsource production – a key
element which has helped sustain the region’s export-led development growth model,
famously described as the “flying geese” pattern. 36

35
This figure is obtained as follows: we estimated the rule of thumb that a 10 percentage point rise in the
trade/GDP ratio can lift GDP growth by 0.3 percentage points (see Box 15: Estimating the impact on GDP growth
from rising economic openness). Therefore, if India’s trade/GDP ratio doubles over the next decade, from 50% to
100%, it can raise India’s GDP growth rate by 1.5 percentage points [(100-50)x0.03].
36
The ‘flying geese’ pattern initially applied to Japan in the 1930s. In the late 1960s, 1970s and early 1980s,
companies in Japan (the “head goose”) would outsource the assembly of motor vehicles and consumer
electronics to the newly industrialised economies (NIEs) of Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore (“flying
geese”). In the late 1980s and 1990s, faced with rising business costs, companies in Japan and the NIEs, started
outsourcing the more labour-intensive divisions of production to the lower-cost South-east Asian countries,
notably Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines. The latest development this decade is China
becoming the key outsourcing centre. Expectations are that Vietnam and India are future possible candidates.
October 2007 54
Lehman Brothers | India: Everything to play for

Box 15: Estimating the impact on GDP growth from rising economic openness
For developing economies, we estimate that a 10pp rise in the trade-to-GDP ratio can lift GDP growth by 0.3% points.
To explore the relationship between increased foreign trade and economic growth we estimated the following equation:
Yi = α + βOpennessi + δGDPpercapi + ei
where:
Yi is the rate of real GDP growth of country i;
Openness is measured as exports plus imports of goods and services as a share of GDP;
GDPpercap is nominal GDP per capita in US$ to control for the different stages of economic development of each country;
e is the error term.
The average value for each of the three variables was calculated over 1970-2006 for 35 countries. The countries were fairly
evenly split between developing and developed economies and included: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Chile,
Czech Republic, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, New
Zealand, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey,
UK, US, Vietnam and Venezuela. The equation was estimated using OLS regression; and White-consistent standard errors
were used to correct for heteroskedasticity, a common problem with panel data.
The results are shown in Figure 52. In the first regression, the coefficient on Trade/GDP has the “correct” positive sign and is
statistically significant at the 1% probability level, but its size (0.0145) is small – a 10 percentage point (pp) rise in the trade-
to-GDP ratio lifts GDP growth by 0.15pp. Theory suggests that greater economic openness should have a larger impact on
GDP growth for countries that are in the early stages of economic development because they can exploit economies of scale
and the competitive advantage of cheaper labour. To test this, we deleted data for countries whose GDP per capita for any
given year was above the average GDP per capita of our sample. A scatter plot of GDP growth versus trade/GDP for our
streamlined sample of developing economies is shown in Figure 53. In the second regression, the coefficient on trade/GDP
remains statistically significant at the 1% probability level and has doubled in size, consistent with our priors. The results
suggest that, for developing economies, a 10pp rise in trade/GDP can lift GDP growth by a non-trivial 0.3pp. Moreover, this
is likely an underestimate since we have not considered the positive effects from FDI or the indirect effects of increased
foreign competition enhancing efficiency and productivity.Ŷ
Figure 52. Estimating the relationship between the ratio of trade to GDP and GDP growth
Regression 1 Regression 2
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
Constant 3.63 6.0 4.87 5.4
Trade/GDP 0.0145 5.5 0.0295 4.8
GDP per capita -0.0001 -2.2 -0.0009 -4.1
R-squared 0.23 0.50
SE of regression 1.97 2.24
Durbin-Watson statistic 1.07 1.54
Source: Lehman Brothers.

Figure 53. Average GDP growth and trade/GDP ratios over 1970-2006 for a sample of developing economies
Real GDP grow th
15 Singapo re
12
China Taiwan
9 Ko rea Vietnam
HK
6 India Thailand M alaysia
Chile
Hungary
3 SA
A rgentina Ro mania Czech republic
0
Russia
-3
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
Trade/GDP

Source: World Bank, IMF, CEIC and Lehman Brothers.

October 2007 55
Lehman Brothers | India: Everything to play for

ECONOMIES OF SCALE AND COMPETITION


Deficient infrastructure, bureaucracy, and labour market constraints all contribute
significantly to the large economic disparities across and within India’s states, and
militate against the government’s drive to more inclusive growth.
India’s recent economic growth acceleration has been spearheaded by private companies.
The cumulative effects from market-opening reforms are raising competition, diffusing
new management know-how and technologies, and generally unleashing entrepreneurial
zeal. First, it was India’s software and business process outsourcing companies which
quickly seized the opportunities presented by globalisation and the dotcom boom; now,
large, globally competitive Indian manufacturing companies are starting to emerge.
However, India’s business environment is still well below international best practice,
with deficient infrastructure, burdensome bureaucracy and a rigid labour market among
the major constraints (Figure 54). Despite some recent success stories, many Indian
companies fail to grow and are, therefore, failing to realise economies of scale because
of the above constraints. Indian manufacturers often set up a number of small enterprises
(in garments, sports goods and toys, for example) rather than having one large, efficient
enterprise.
The average size of Indian manufacturing companies is substantially below that in other
countries. Kochhar et al (2006) estimate that the average value-added production is only
US$300,000 per Indian firm, less than one tenth the average of a sample of other (mostly
developing) economies. Indian businesses are having to “make do” by coming up with
their own innovative solutions, such as installing their own power generators, turning to
contract labour and creating their own job training programmes. For example, Infosys
Technologies is investing US$300m in its own training centre in the southern city of
Mysore.
Such remedies are clearly not sustainable indefinitely. There is, therefore, much at stake
as to whether the government can successfully further ease the shackles on business.
Failing to do so will make it difficult to sustain the recent growth acceleration, whereas
doing so would offer enormous potential for Indian business to become more
competitive and to capitalise on its global comparative advantages, thereby reaping the
productivity gains from economies of scale.
Indian companies and foreign companies alike seem optimistic. A survey of the world’s
largest firms shows that India has risen to become the second most attractive destination
for foreign direct investment, reflecting a long-term commitment consistent with an
increasingly favourable business climate (Figure 55).

Figure 54. Main constraints on doing business in India* Figure 55. FDI confidence index, top 15 countries*

Inadequate supply of inf rastructure 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
1 US US China China China China
Inef f icient government bureaucracy
2 UK China US US US India
Restrictive labour regulations
3 China Brazil UK Mexico India US
Corruption
4 Brazil UK Germany Poland UK UK
Tax regulations
5 Poland Mexico France Germany Germany Poland
Tax rates
6 Germany Germany Italy India France Russia
Policy instability
7 Mexico India Spain UK Australia Brazil
A ccess to f inancing 8 Italy Italy Canada Russia Hong Kong Australia
Poor w ork ethic in national labour 9 Spain Spain Mexico Brazil Italy Germany
Foreign currency regulations 10 Australia France Australia Spain Japan HK
Inadequately educated w orkf orce 11 India Poland Poland Gfrance Russia Hungary
Inf lation 12 France Canada Japan Italy Poland Czech Rep.
Crime and thef t 13 Canada Singapore Brazil Czech Rep. Spain Turkey
Government instability/coups 14 Thailand Thailand Czech Rep. Canada Czech Rep. France
15 Korea Australia India Japan Malaysia Japan
0 5 10 15 20 25 30

* From a list of 14 factors, respondents were asked to select the five most * CEOs of the world's 1,000 largest firms are surveyed on the most attractive
problematic for doing business in India and to rank them from 1 to 5. The figure destinations for future FDI. The lower the score, the more attractive the
show the responses weighted according to their rankings, where the higher the destination.
figure the more problematic the factor.

Source: World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report, FY07. Source: A.T. Kearney. http://www.atkearney.com/main.taf?p=5,3,1,89

October 2007 56
Lehman Brothers | India: Everything to play for

However, many of the potential fruits of economies of scale remain to be exploited, and
this generally requires a growing market which permits output to be produced on a larger
and larger scale (for more details, see section on ‘The limited usefulness of growth
accounting’ in chapter 3).
Today, globalisation and the information-technology revolution are providing a fertile
ground for businesses in developing countries to exploit economies of scale by utilising
their comparative advantage of lower costs and, in the case of India, abundant labour.
Also in India’s favour is a potentially massive domestic market.
Just as important as sound physical infrastructure and a flexible labour market, however,
are policies which foster competition so as to ensure that resources are allocated
efficiently. The Deputy Governor of the RBI, Rakesh Mohan, draws a clear link between
this favourable development and policy:
“…micro structural reforms undertaken over the years have enabled continuing
productivity gains, particularly in the manufacturing sector, with enhanced
access of Indian business to technology, increased competition, greater attention
to research and development and other productivity enhancing activities.
Widening and deepening of the financial sector, along with improved regulation
and supervision, has also contributed to improvement in productivity.” 37
In the following sections we highlight the main constraints to doing business in India
which, if resolved, would help foster economies of scale and competition – two essential
elements for sustaining high economic growth.

Creaking infrastructure
According to surveys, low quality and inadequate physical infrastructure are currently
the major constraints on doing business in India. In its Annual Policy Statement for the
Year FY08, the RBI warned that “infrastructure bottlenecks are emerging as the single
most important constraint on the Indian economy”. The government will shortly unveil
its 11th Five-Year Economic Plan, spanning FY07 to FY12, and it has estimated about
US$492bn needs to be spent over that period on improving the roads, railways, ports,
power and water systems (Figure 56). 38 This is an enormous policy initiative which
would raise infrastructure spending from its current 5% of GDP to 9% in FY12.
While fiscal policy is improving, the government will need to rely heavily on public-
private partnerships to finance infrastructure development (see Box 16: Financing
India’s infrastructure deficit). Encouragingly, the pace of infrastructure development has
recently picked up in some areas, notably roads, but as detailed below, India’s power
supply and railways remain a major constraint.
Power. Power capacity addition fell a disappointing 53% short of the target of the 9th
Economic Plan (FY97-FY02) and 55% short in the 10th Plan (FY03-FY07). As a result,
over the four years to FY05 real GDP has grown 16% more than power generation.
Power outages cost Indian firms an estimated 8% in lost output per year, four times
higher than in China (Purfield, 2006b). Indeed, outages are so common that large
companies increasingly rely on their own electricity generators and captive power plants.
This is a particularly common trend among many IT firms such as Infosys, Wipro and
Geometric Software as it saves on the cost of frequent power cuts. On the domestic front,
only 44% of rural households have access to electricity, which results in significant
reliance on traditional energy sources, i.e. wood and animal dung, which are estimated to
be the root cause of around 1m premature deaths each year as a result of smoke
inhalation.

37
See (Mohan, 2007)
38
In May 2007, the Deepak Parekh Committee Report on infrastructure had estimated that US$475bn is required
for infrastructure during the 11th (FY08-FY12) Economic Plan . Subsequently, The Planning Commission of the
Indian Government published a consultation paper on ‘Projections of Investment in Infrastructure during the
Eleventh Plan’ on 24 September 2007, which raised this estimate to US$492bn.
October 2007 57
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Box 16: Financing India’s infrastructure deficit


The success of Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) is crucial for the development of India’s infrastructure.
The Indian government estimates that investment of around US$492bn will be needed by FY12 to upgrade the country's
creaking roads, ports and airports. To meet this target the government expects the private sector to contribute a share of
about 30% by actively pursuing more innovative solutions including PPPs, a special purpose vehicle, and provision of
viability gap funding.
PPPs involve long-term detailed contracts between the government and private firms, spelling out the rights and obligations
of both parties. They offer significant advantages in terms of attracting private capital, accessing specialised expertise,
sharing risk and lowering the cost of the provision of services to users. However, for private investors there can be
significant uncertainty about whether the rewards of investing in infrastructure projects, which can span decades, will
compensate them for the risk of partnering with state governments which frequently face election-related pressures during a
period when (unrelated) anti-incumbency voting is becoming increasingly common.
In order to reassure potential private sector partners, the government is creating a standardised framework for PPPs, with a
matrix of risk allocation obligations and returns. The Model Concession Agreement (MCAs) for PPPs in national highway
projects is already in operation; and similar MCAs are being designed for other infrastructure projects. Also, to help
streamline the appraisal process, a Public-Private Partnership Appraisal Committee (PPPAC) has been set up to review PPP
proposals in a time-bound manner. As of 6 August 2007, 37 PPP proposals had been received from different central
ministries for clearance by PPPAC, of which 28 had been approved.
Further to encourage PPPs, the government has set up a provision of viability gap funding, which normally takes the form of
a capital grant at the stage of the project construction not exceeding 20% of the total project cost. However, in order to be
eligible, the PPP must be implemented by an entity with at least 51% private equity. Additionally, in January 2006 the
government set up a special purpose vehicle called the India Infrastructure Finance Company Limited (IIFCL) to help meet
the long-term financing requirements of potential investors. The IIFCL is funded through long-term debt-raising from the
open market and can provide financial assistance through direct lending to eligible projects, or through refinance to banks for
loans with a period of five years or more. The government has also accepted the Deepak Parekh Committee’s
recommendation to use US$5bn of the RBI’s FX reserves for India’s infrastructure development. The proposal is to set up a
monoline credit insurance company abroad, which will issue long-term foreign currency bonds, in which the RBI will be the
sole investor, using its FX reserves. These funds will be invested in highly rated collateral securities, which will be used to
provide a credit guarantee to Indian companies borrowing abroad to finance infrastructure-related capital imports.
As a result of the government’s initiatives, a growing number of foreign and domestic private investors are raising private
equity to invest in infrastructure development companies and projects in India. For example, 3i, a private equity firm based
in the UK, has announced plans to raise US$5bn to invest in infrastructure and has highlighted India as an area of focus.
Citigroup and private equity group Blackstone recently agreed to float a fund worth US$5bn with India's Infrastructure
Development Finance Company (IDFC) and IIFCL. GE plans to create an infrastructure fund of US$300-500m, doubling
that amount over time. The State Bank of India (SBI) Mutual Fund, a joint venture between SBI and Société Générale of
France which manages around US$5bn, opened a dedicated infrastructure fund for subscription in May 2007. In September
2007, ICICI Bank announced plans to set up a US$2bn infrastructure fund.Ŷ
The Ministry of Power has launched an initiative for the development of coal-based
Ultra-Mega Power Projects, each with a capacity of MW4,000 or more. Coal, which is
abundant domestically, will remain the dominant source of energy, notwithstanding
increasing exploitation of offshore natural gas and (controversial) proposals to build gas
pipelines from both Iran and Myanmar. There is also increasing recognition of the need
for India to exploit more of its potential in renewables, especially hydro-electricity, as
well as considerable emphasis on nuclear energy, especially in the field of fast breeder
reactors, even though ministers concede that this is unlikely to supply more than 3% of
India’s electricity requirements. The efficient use of energy has become all the more
urgent given the emerging challenge of climate change and adopting the clean
development mechanism (see Box 17: Climate change and India and Box 18: India and
the clean development mechanism).
However, the greatest weakness lies not in generation but on the distribution side, which
is the domain of the state governments. Nearly half of the power generated in India is
“lost” due to poor maintenance and operations, rampant electricity theft and corruption.
October 2007 58
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The Accelerated Power Development and Reform Programme, initiated in 2001, was
expected to reduce aggregate technical and commercial losses of state power utilities to
15% by 2007: in fact, the average losses (including uncollected bills) for all states taken
together remain around 40%.
The Government Planning Commission estimates that additional power generation
capacity of MW70,000 is needed over the 11th plan (FY08-FY12), and that India needs
US$150bn worth of investment in electricity over the next five years to meet this target.
Transportation. Poor roads, railways and ports result in long delays and higher
transportation costs for Indian business – it takes 24 days for Indian exports to reach the
United States, compared with only 15 days from China and 12 from Hong Kong
(Winters and Mehta, 2003).
(i) Railways. Of the three transport modes, the biggest concern is railways. India has the
world’s second largest network under a single management, but its railways are saturated
with freight and passenger traffic and urgently need more capacity. The total number of
rail route kilometres has barely increased since FY01, while the average speed of an
Indian container-carrying train is a mere 25kph. A new dedicated 1,469km freight line is
under construction from Jawaharlal Nehru Port, near Mumbai, to Dadri, near Delhi.
However, many more projects are needed to resolve the bottlenecks, as the government
has recognised through the launch in January 2007 of public-private partnerships (PPPs)
with 14 companies, aiming to increase containerised rail transport from around 21m
tonnes per year currently to over 100mt by 2012. The Government Planning Commission
estimates that over the 11th Plan, 10,300km of new railway lines are needed, and that
India needs US$62bn worth of investment in railways over the next five years.
(ii) Roads. India has an extensive road network of 3.3m km, the second largest in the
world, which carries 70% of the country’s freight and 85% of the passenger traffic. The
government is making progress in implementing the National Highways Development
Project, the largest highway project ever undertaken by the country. The Golden
Quadrilateral phase is almost complete. This connects the four major cities of Delhi,
Mumbai, Chennai and Kolkata, and totals 5,846km of highway where average speeds on
the better stretches are close to 100kph. Work is now under way on developing highways
for the North-South (from Srinagar to Kanyakumari) and East-West (Silchar to
Porbandar) corridors, upgrading existing highways with additional lanes, and improving
port connectivity (Figure 57). The government has formulated a model concession
agreement to facilitate the speedy award of contracts and has also announced several
incentives, such as tax exemptions and duty free import of road building equipment, to
encourage private sector participation.

Figure 56. Projections of infrastructure investment Figure 57. The National Highway Development Project

Anticipated Projected Number of kilometers,


investment investment status as at August 31, 2007
Growth
Sectors in 10th Plan in 11th Plan Balance
(FY02-FY07) (FY07-FY12) awaiting
Total Being contract
US$bn % y-o-y length Completed implemented award
Electricity 70.5 150.4 113 Golden
5,846 5601 245 -
Roads & bridges 31.7 76.1 140 Quadrilateral
Telecom 22.5 65.1 190 NS & EW
7,300 1418 4903 821+
Corridors
Railways 20.3 62.2 207
Irrigation 32.1 53.1 65 Upgrading and
10,500 126 2014 8360
extra lanes
Water & sanitation 15.6 48.6 212
Ports 1.3 18.0 1266 Port connectivity 380 159 215 6
Airports 2.1 8.5 295
Other 962 322 620 20
Storage 2.3 5.5 137
Gas 2.1 5.0 135 Total 24988 7626 7997 9207
Total 201 492 146
Note: Projections are in rupees at FY07 prices and converted into US$ at
INR/US$ of 41.0

Source: Government Planning Commission and Lehman Brothers. Source: National Highway Authority of India and Lehman Brothers.

October 2007 59
Lehman Brothers | India: Everything to play for

Box 17: Climate change and India


Increasingly aware that India stands to be one of the countries most affected by climate change, its authorities are starting
to shift their stance.

Climate change in India


According to the recent report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 39, warming of the climate system
is “unequivocal”, and global average surface air warming will likely be between 1.8ºC and 4.0ºC by the end of the 21st
century. Such warming will have climatological consequences: the IPCC judges it very likely (i.e. with a greater than 90%
probability) that hot extremes, heat waves, and heavy precipitation events will become more frequent 40.
The impact on India may be especially significant, because its large population depends particularly heavily on climate-
sensitive sectors, notably agriculture and forestry, for its livelihood. Furthermore, the Indian economy and its societal
infrastructures are rather finely tuned to the remarkable stability of the monsoon 41. Any small change in monsoon rainfall
could therefore have a large impact on the economy. It is impossible, given the present state of knowledge, to predict exactly
what these impacts will be, not least because global temperatures are set to enter uncharted territory. However, climate
models are getting ever better, and the judgement of climatologists is that they now give good general indications. Principal
implications include the following.
Temperature increases

India’s increase in temperature is, in the judgement of the IPCC 42, likely (i.e. with a more than 66% probability) to be greater
than the global mean increase. A study by the United Kingdom Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
(DEFRA) 43 projects temperature increases in India of as much as 3 to 4ºC towards the end of the century under two different
socio-economic scenarios (see Figure 58). One of these gives priority to economic growth (A2 scenario), and the other of
prioritises environmental issues (B2 scenario). As a result of these temperature increases, heat waves stand to be of longer
duration.
Rainfalls and water resources

It is considered very likely (i.e. with a greater than 90% probability) that the frequency of intense precipitation events will
increase in India (see Figure 58). The Godavari basin, in particular, is projected to experience higher precipitation than the
regions of Krishna and Ganga. Most major river basins across the country are likely to become considerably dryer, which
would lead to constant water shortages. In other regions, a marked rise in precipitation intensity, and variability in extremes,
are expected to have impacts on a range of sectors, including agriculture, water resource management, and urban planning.
Moreover, melt-water from the Himalayan glaciers and snowfields currently supplies up to 85% of the dry season flow of the
great rivers of the Northern Indian plain. This could be reduced to about 30% of its current contribution over the next fifty
years, and have major implications for water management and irrigated crop production 44.
Sea level rise

One quarter of the Indian population lives on, and depends upon, the coast for its livelihood. Climate change effects on the
level of the sea can impact low-lying areas in two ways: directly through the increase in average sea level; and through
increased frequency and intensity of coastal surges and storms. Coastal zones are densely populated (455 inhabitants per
km2, which is about 1.5 times the national average). According to an Indian government report to the United Nations
Framework Convention for Climate Change 45, a 1 meter sea level rise would force around 7.1 million people to displace. Sea
level rise would also imply land losses, increased flooding in low-lying areas, and damage to coastal infrastructure.
Human health

The DEFRA report suggests that there will be an increase in temperature-related illnesses, vector-borne diseases, health
impacts related to extreme weather events, and health effects due to food insecurity. According to the Indian government’s
report, malaria will move to higher latitudes and altitudes, with 10% more area offering climatic opportunities for the malaria
vector to breed throughout the year during the 2080s, compared with 2000.
39
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2007), Summary for Policy Makers.
40
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2007), Technical Summary.
41
Over the past 100 years, the standard deviation of the seasonal mean monsoon rains has been close to +/- 10%
for all India. See Challinor, A. et al. (2006).
42
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2007), Regional Climate Projections.
43
DEFRA (2004).
44
Stern, N. et al. (2006), ch. 5.
45
Government of India (2004).
October 2007 60
Lehman Brothers | India: Everything to play for

Should India take part in climate change policies?


A natural, and frequently posed, question is whether or not India should participate in climate change policies. This question
is particularly debated on the international scene of climate change policy negotiations. For the moment, India has no
binding commitment to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions, because of its developing-country status. However, India is
already the world’s 5th biggest emitter of greenhouse gases. 46
For their part, India – and other developing countries – argue that they should not take part in climate change policies, on
several grounds:
• First, because they have not contributed to past carbon emissions as much as developed countries have.
• Second, because they stand to be more affected by climate change. India, in particular, seems to be one of the most
affected regions by a global mean temperature increase (see Figure 59).
• Third, because they cannot pay for adapting to climate change and abating future emissions.
• And last, because developed countries grew rich through a fossil-fuel – and carbon emitting – economic model of
growth, and that it would be inequitable to prevent today’s developing countries from following a similar path.
Indeed, this equity issue has been raised formally, in the Article 3 of the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, which stipulates that “…the Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future
generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and
respective capacities. Accordingly, the developed country Parties should take the lead in combating climate change and the
adverse effect thereof.”
On the other hand, developed countries argue that India should also take part in climate change policies, as it is ranking now
among global top emitters, and because its part in global emissions will increase.
Our judgement is that, ethical considerations aside, India’s authorities would be well advised to send a clear signal to the
Indian people that India wishes to join in the growing world movement to curb greenhouse gas emissions, if only because
this movement stands to offer great commercial opportunities to companies that produce the goods and services that stand to
be in high demand.
And indeed, well aware that India stands to be heavily affected by climate change, India’s authorities have taken the first
steps towards developing a national plan to tackle the effects of climate change. This new national plan, which is set to be
announced this month, will almost certainly not include any commitment to cut carbon emissions, but more emphasis is
likely to be placed on: energy efficiency; a greater use of renewables; improving air quality; and subsidising clean
technologies and forestation. Ŷ

Figure 58. Mean annual cycles of all-India rainfall and Figure 59. Estimated costs of 2.5ºC and 6ºC global
temperature, baseline and simulated warming

T e m pe ra t ure R a inf a lls % of GDP 2.5 deg w arming 6 deg w arming


( ºC ) ( m m / da y)
16
40 12

36 10 12

32 8 8
28 6
4
24 4
0
20 2

16 0 -4
HY OPEC
Eastern Europe
EU
US

Other HY

Global^
Japan

Russia
India

Global#
Middle Y

Low income
Lower-middle Y
Africa
China

12 -2
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec
Baseline (1961-1990) A2 scenario (2071-2100)
B2 scenario (2071-2100)

*HY = High Income; Y = Income


# (output weights) and ^ (pop weights)

Source: DEFRA (2004). Source: Nordhaus, W.D., Boyer, J. (1999).

46
Energy Information Administration (2004), International Energy Annual 2004.
October 2007 61
Lehman Brothers | India: Everything to play for

Box 18: India and the clean development mechanism


Shifts in policy can help India gain significant rewards from deeper participation in global carbon markets.
The clean development mechanism (CDM), which came into force with the Kyoto Protocol in 2005, is a tool to help
developed countries which have ratified Kyoto (known as “Annex 1” countries) achieve their emissions-reduction targets.
The CDM allows Annex 1 countries to invest in emissions-reducing projects in developing countries, such as India. They
can then use these reductions (certified emissions reductions or CERs) to meet their own emissions targets, e.g. as part of the
European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS). The CDM is subject to strict regulatory guidelines and is set to play
a major role in the rapidly growing carbon markets. Through it, India and other developing countries can and already do play
a prominent role in tackling climate change.
CDM credits can be used for compliance in the EU ETS from 2008. So far, India has attracted the largest number of projects
of any participant and is second only to China in terms of credit volumes. India has great potential to reduce emissions
thanks to continuing industrialisation and infrastructure development. Such development creates an opportunity to choose
cleaner technologies to meet this demand which would not be possible without CDM finance (which includes funds to
upgrade existing qualifying infrastructure). The sheer scope for development in Indian rural areas in particular and the size of
the national market are a spur to technological innovation in these areas.
To date, India has tended to attract smaller-scale projects which generate smaller amounts of credits. Thus, there is
significant potential to “bundle” smaller-scale projects with the benefit that the larger the project the less of a hurdle to
development are transaction costs and consultancy fees. However, projects must continue to satisfy important CDM criteria,
i.e. emissions must be additional, permanent, measurable and verifiable to ensure the credibility and marketability of
emissions reduction credits.
Public and private sector decision-makers in India appreciated early on that the CDM was a significant opportunity for
encouraging technology transfer from developed countries. Directed appropriately, CDM projects can also provide funding
for sustainable development goals. Realising these benefits requires an appropriate regulatory and policy framework and a
willingness to cooperate with the developed countries – key elements which we hope to see strengthened in the ongoing
review of Indian climate change policy being conducted by Prime Minister Singh in the run-up to the December 2007 Bali
climate change summit.
In addition to more familiar investment risks, the CDM can also bring its own uncertainties: Will the technology work? How
many credits will be produced? What will the demand be in five years time? China has helped to decrease such risks by the
following means:
• All projects must have an Annex 1 donor who endorses the project and ensures that credits reach a credit registry in the
developed world; and,
• The Chinese government has high involvement on the sellers’ side, enforcing the Chinese project developer’s
contractual commitments.
These measures increase buyer confidence in what will be long-term investments to gain future emissions reductions.
Together, they have contributed to China attracting the highest volume of potential CDM credits (CERs) so far.
Without such guarantees, investors will look mainly to already-issued Indian CERs, for which the seller assumes all the risks.
The volume of CERs issued so far is small and the transaction costs involved in purchasing them are likely to put off any
significant investor interest. By introducing a more rigorous policy structure for the CDM, India would therefore stand to
reap significant rewards for project developers, companies and local communities, as well as take a strong lead in addressing
climate change internationally. Ŷ

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Lehman Brothers | India: Everything to play for

At the state level, on 5 September 2007 Uttar Pradesh chief minister Mayawati
announced an ambitious programme to build an eight-lane 1,000km expressway linking
Noida (near New Delhi) and Ballia at the underdeveloped eastern edge of Uttar Pradesh.
Running along the left bank of the Ganges, the proposed highway is being compared by
its proponents to the Grand Trunk Road built along the right bank by Sher Shah Suri 500
years ago, which is often described as India’s first highway. The aim is to start the
project in January 2008 and complete it within three to five years, and for it to be built
entirely by the private sector with the state acting as facilitator in land acquisition.
While there has therefore been some progress recently, major challenges remain
including improving the quality of existing roads. For instance, the World Bank
estimates that 82% of the homes in Chhattisgarh are not connected by road. Fewer than
half of the roads are paved; so, with motor vehicle ownership now taking off, investing
in road infrastructure remains a top priority. This is highlighted by the statistic that India
has just 1% of the world’s vehicles but 10% of global road fatalities.
Further progress on developing roads and highways will depend on how rapidly a range
of constraints can be resolved. For new roads, the same sort of concerns apply as those
already highlighted over land acquisition for SEZs: that poor rural households could be
displaced without fair compensation for their loss of livelihood and property rights; that
there could be a large-scale uprooting of farmers; and that land acquired at least
purportedly for new roads could be diverted for other, speculative, uses. For existing
highways, in many parts of rural India, in particular, maintenance is severely deficient –
arguably in part because of India’s rigid labour laws. Edward Luce cites the example of
Uttar Pradesh, India’s most populous state, where the highways department employs one
worker for every two kilometres of road, “among the highest ratios in the world”. 47 Luce
continues: “…many of them do not bother to turn up for work because they cannot be
sacked; and any attempt to offer voluntary redundancy to public sector workers prompts
an outcry about abuse of workers rights…. But even if the road gangs did regularly
report for duty, the [state] government…would still be unable to equip them with enough
tools and material for the job…because it spends most of its road budget on salaries. The
employees of Uttar Pradesh’s highways department are paid more than three times the
market’s going rate.” 48
(iii) Aviation. India’s civil aviation sector is one of the fastest growing in the world.
Domestic air passenger traffic increased by 39% in FY07, while total passenger traffic
(including that of international routes) rose by 31%. K.V. Kamath, CEO of ICICI Bank,
India’s largest private lender, summed up the predicament of India’s airports thus:
“You have the peculiar problem where the infrastructure on the ground is not
fully in place, but the infrastructure in the air is there in terms of flights.”
The Centre for Asia-Pacific Aviation, a consultancy, predicts that domestic traffic will
grow 25-30% per year until 2010, and international traffic by 15%, increasing the overall
size of the market to more than 100m passengers annually.
Capacity constraints at the major airports in Delhi and Mumbai are already causing
restrictions to be imposed on the number of flights which domestic airlines can operate
during peak hours. In response, in co-operation with the private sector, the government is
planning to invest US$9bn by 2010. It has awarded contracts to two private sector
consortia to redevelop Delhi and Mumbai airports during that period. The airports of
Chennai, Kolkata, Bangalore and Hyderabad have been earmarked to be modernised
along similar lines, as have 35 non-metropolitan airports. A major fleet acquisition is
also under way: Indian carriers currently have a total fleet size of just 310 aircraft, but
have a further 480 on order for delivery by 2012. Furthermore, several new private sector
airlines have been granted licenses.

47
See The Future of India by Bimal Jalan (2005), pp107-8.
48
See In Spite of the Gods: The Strange Rise of Modern India by Edward Luce (2006) pp88-9.
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Lehman Brothers | India: Everything to play for

(iv) Ports. India has 12 major and 185 minor ports along its 7,517 km of coastline. They
are heavily congested, with an average turnaround time of 3.5 days, compared with 10
hours for Hong Kong. The government plans to add 76 berths at India’s major ports over
the coming five years, mainly through public-private partnerships. The Government
Planning Commission reckons that developing India’s ports will require additional
investment of US$18bn over the next five years.
As noted above, poor connectivity to ports is a major problem, especially in a country
where only 38% of the population lives within 100km of the coast or sea-navigable
waterways. In an attempt to mitigate this situation, the government plans to build three
new ports as part of a large industrial zone which would span five states (Uttar Pradesh,
Haryana, Rajasthan, Gujarat and Maharashtra) along the Delhi-Mumbai Industrial
Corridor. Over the 11th Plan the Government Planning Commission projects that India
will need additional capacity of MT 485m in major ports, and MT 345m in minor ports.
Telecommunications. The telecom sector has been India’s biggest success story in
infrastructure reform, thanks largely to government deregulation. The success of soaring
demand can be judged from that fact that Nokia built a huge factory near Chennai in just
five months in 2006. Telecom tariffs, which were among the highest in the world less
than four years ago, have now dipped to among the lowest. The total number of phone
subscribers has increased from 55m in March 2003 to 241m in August 2007 – a tele-
density of 21.2% – with the Government Planning Commission projecting 600m by
FY12 (of which 90% are likely to be wireless connections). The bulk of the growth
needs to come from the rural areas, where tele-density remains low. The Telecom
Regulatory Authority of India estimates that India will require about 330,000 mobile
phone towers by 2010, more than three times the current count of 100,000.

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Reels of red tape


There has been some progress made with deregulation at the centre. But “license raj” and
a more pervasive “inspector raj” still survive, especially in many of the states.
Companies in India spend significant amounts of time and money dealing with permits,
clearances and inspections, which encourages entrepreneurs to pay “rents” to the
inspectors for speedier processing. To capture this point, the Economist vividly depicts
the journey of a lorry from Kolkata to Mumbai: 49 it only arrives in Mumbai in the
morning of the eighth day, having achieved an average speed of 11km/h and spending 32
hours waiting at toll-booths and checkpoints between states as well as within states.
Not surprisingly, in the World Bank’s 2007 survey of 178 countries on the “ease of
doing business”, India ranked 120, slightly better than a ranking of 132 in the 2006
survey, but still leaving it in the bottom quartile (Figure 60). India fares relatively well in
protecting investors and in the ease of getting credit, and there has been a significant
improvement in the ease of trading across borders. However, in nearly all other
indicators India ranks in the bottom half. For ease of comparison, of the 178 countries
surveyed by the World Bank we have extracted the results for the world’s large
developing economies and set them out in Figure 61.
According to the World Bank survey, India is one of the worst in the world when it
comes to enforcing contracts, ranking 177th with only Timor-Leste having a worse
record. Even though the rule of law is well established in India, the country experiences
a huge backlog in cases. Currently, 28-29m legal cases are pending in India’s courts; and
enforcing contracts takes an average 1,420 days to complete, with 46 different steps –
scarcely any improvement from four years ago.
India also fares poorly dealing with licences, with its world ranking of 134 making it the
fifth worst of the major developing economies. To build a warehouse in the city of
Mumbai takes over 200 days and involves 20 different procedures. Furthermore, it takes
an estimated 40 days for a business in Mumbai to apply for a permanent power
connection; and about 60 days for water and sewage.
For all that, the World Bank survey reveals that it is easier to start a business in India
than it is to close one. As regards setting up, India is now close to the median ranking,
the time taken having dropped from 89 days in 2003 to 33 in 2007. On the other hand,
closing a business in India takes an average of ten years, ranking the country as the 137th
worst in the world, with only the Philippines of the other major developing economies,
having a poorer record. Moreover – and likely not unrelated – the recovery rate for
closing a business is just 12 cents in the dollar.

Figure 60. Ease of doing business in India* Figure 61. Business ease in India vs elsewhere in 2007*

Enforcing contracts Dealing with licenses Starting a business Closing a business


2007 rank 2006 rank Change in rank Hungary 12 Thailand 12 Thailand 36 Mexico 23
Doing business 120 132 12 Russia 19 Mexico 21 Turkey 43 Thailand 44
Starting a business 111 93 -18 China 20 South Africa 45 Russia 50 Hungary 53
Thailand 26 Philippines 77 South Africa 53 Malaysia 54
Dealing with licenses 134 133 -1 Turkey 34 Hungary 87 Hungary 67 China 57
Employing workers 85 83 -2 Argentina 47 Indonesia 99 Malaysia 74 Argentina 65
Registering property 112 108 -4 Malaysia 63 Malaysia 105 Mexico 75 South Africa 68
Poland 68 Brazil 107 India 111 Russia 80
Getting credit 36 62 26 Mexico 83 Turkey 128 Argentina 114 Poland 88
Protecting investors 33 32 -1 South Africa 85 India 134 Brazil 122 Turkey 112
Paying taxes 165 158 -7 Brazil 106 Poland 156 Poland 129 Brazil 131
Philippines 113 Argentina 165 China 135 Indonesia 136
Trading across borders 79 142 63 Indonesia 141 China 175 Philippines 144 India 137
Enforcing contracts 177 177 0 India 177 Russia 177 Indonesia 168 Philippines 147
Closing a business 137 135 -2
* Of 178 countries surveyed by the World Bank, we extracted the key
* The ranking is of 178 countries surveyed by the World Bank, where the developing economies. The lower the ranking, the easier it is to do
lower the ranking the easier it is to do business in the respective country. business in the respective country.

Source: World Bank's Ease of Doing Business database and Lehman Brothers. Source: World Bank's Ease of Doing Business database and Lehman Brothers.

49
See Economist (2006).
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The adverse impact of such regulations on small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)
is particularly burdensome, given that they are less well equipped to deal with the
complex requirements. This is a major concern, not only because SMEs are the breeding
ground for technology innovations, but also because it constrains their ability to grow
and achieve economies of scale.

Taxing taxes
The World Bank’s “ease of doing business” survey also shows the administrative burden
India’s tax system places on business. A medium-size company in Mumbai must make a
total of 60 different payments in taxes, duties and charges per year, the paperwork taking
an average of 271 hours to process.
The taxes include: corporate income tax; social securities payments; fuel tax; value-
added (state) tax; employees’ state insurance contribution; property tax; dividend tax;
Maharashtra sales tax; interest tax; insurance contract tax; vehicle tax; and stamp duty.
Recently there have been reforms – including broadening the corporate income tax base,
introducing a state-level value-added tax and eliminating the tax on inter-state trade
central sales tax (CST). But India’s competitiveness remains compromised by the
complexities and distortions in its tax system.
The corporate tax rate (including surcharges) is relatively high at 33.7%. Adding in all
the other taxes and charges, the overall burden on the average Indian company amounts
to 71% of profits, at least in principle (Figure 62). In practice, this explains why India’s
taxation system is littered with exemptions, tax holidays, poorly targeted subsidies and
widespread tax evasion.
The tax system also introduces distortions which discourage businesses from growing.
For example, excise taxes are fully exempt up to a certain level of sales, but become
fully payable (including on the exempt amount) once sales exceed the exemption limit. 50
This represents yet another constraint on firms achieving economies of scale.
The Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Act road map recommends: lowering
the personal and corporate tax rates; eliminating most exemptions; and introducing a
national goods and services tax, together with accelerating tax administration reform.
Cutting the corporate tax rate and shifting the burden of indirect taxation from
manufacturing to consumption would enhance India’s attractiveness as an investment
destination, as well as its export competitiveness.

Laggard labour reforms


India’s labour laws protect a minority of workers in the organised sector at the expense
of the majority, a paradoxical situation for a poor country with surplus unskilled labour
specialising in skill- and capital-intensive sectors. However, the impact of these laws has
recently diminished, as enforcement has slackened in some states.
In the Indian constitution, there are 45 Central Acts and 16 associated rules which deal
directly with labour. Arguably, the law which has the greatest impact on business is
Chapter 5B of the 1947 Industrial Disputes Act which bars manufacturing companies
with more than 100 employees from firing workers without receiving permission from
the state government. It is this law which underpins India’s very high score of 70 on the
World Bank’s “difficulty of firing” index (which assumes full compliance with the
relevant laws), the highest among large developing economies (Figure 63).
This lack of flexibility can hurt business. Employers whose business is seasonal, for
example textiles, are reluctant to add extra staff during peak seasons because they cannot
be laid off during lulls. This is one of the primary reasons for lack of scale economies in
the textiles sector among others.

50
See Government of India’s Planning Commission (2006), p.77.
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However, the clause requiring an employer to seek state permission before dismissing
workers also says that if the state does not revert within 60 days permission is assumed
to have been granted. In practice, this is often the case. Furthermore, “voluntary
retirement” or “voluntary exit” agreements are becoming more common between
employers and employees – a prime example of the ability of the private sector to work
around the structural and systemic challenges it faces.
Another provision of the labour laws discourages factories from having shifts longer than
eight hours (otherwise compulsory overtime rates must be paid) even if it is in the
interest of workers to work longer hours for fewer days, because of long commutes, for
example. Many firms are now moving towards contract labour to get around this issue
(although this is permitted only in “non-core” areas).
Even though there is not full enforcement, and companies can often find loopholes, the
labour laws are part of the reason for the polarisation of India’s labour market. The
organised, or formal, sector in India comprises businesses which are required to register
officially as companies, either because they have electricity and employ more than ten
workers or because they employ more than 20 workers. A telling statistic is that India’s
formal sector comprised 27m workers in FY05 amounting to just 7% of the total
workforce. Furthermore, that share is declining. The reason: companies with ten or more
workers must be registered under the Factories Act and, accordingly, must file tax
returns and other official documentation, as well as being subject to official inspections
related to the labour laws.
Additional perverse impacts of the labour laws include discouraging companies from
growing their workforces to achieve the enhanced efficiencies associated with economies
of scale and encouraging capital-intensive manufacturing, despite India’s abundant cheap
labour. As Jean-Philippe Cotis, the Chief Economist of OECD warns, “In India, the
existing combination of greater competition and unchanged labour regulation is probably
not sustainable. Indeed, it is putting pressure on many large employers to expand output
through capital investment and reduce employment wherever possible, pushing jobs into
the less productive informal sector.” Furthermore, for large companies with over 100
workers strict employment protection can limit their ability to innovate, for example by
restructuring or making strategic changes to their business model.

Figure 62. Details of doing business in India in 2007 Figure 63. Job markets in India vs elsewhere in 2007*
Difficulty of firing Rigidity of employment Firing costs
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 index index weeks of wages
Enforcing contracts Brazil 0 Malaysia 10 Poland 13
Procedures (number) 46 46 46 46 46 Thailand 0 Thailand 18 Russia 17
Time (days) 1440 1420 1420 1420 1420 Hungary 10 China 24 South Africa 24
Dealing with licenses Argentina 20 Hungary 30 Hungary 35
Procedures (number) 20 20 20 Malaysia 30 India 30 Brazil 37
Time (days) 224 224 224 Philippines 30 Philippines 35 Mexico 52
Starting a business South Africa 30 Poland 37 Thailand 54
Procedures (number) 11 11 11 11 13 Turkey 30 Argentina 41 India 56
Time (days) 89 89 71 35 33 China 40 South Africa 42 Malaysia 75
Closing a business Poland 40 Turkey 42 China 91
Time (years) 10 10 10 10 10 Russia 40 Indonesia 44 Philippines 91
Paying taxes Indonesia 60 Russia 44 Turkey 95
Payment (number) 59 59 60 India 70 Brazil 46 Indonesia 108
Time (hours) 264 264 271 Mexico 70 Mexico 48 Argentina 139
Total tax rate (% profit) 72 72 71
* Of 178 countries surveyed by the World Bank, we extracted the key
developing economies. The lower the ranking, the easier it is to do business in
the respective country.

Source: World Bank's Ease of Doing Business database and Lehman Brothers. Source: World Bank's Ease of Doing Business database and Lehman Brothers.

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The evidence
There is powerful international evidence that economic reforms and policies which foster
competition and economies of scale can significantly boost productivity, employment
opportunities and potential economic growth (OECD, 2002; Gwartney and Lawson,
1997; Djankov and others, 2006). Across India, thanks to the high degree of autonomy
enjoyed by individual states, there has been wide variation in economic reforms which
allows analysts to explore, on a sub-national scale, whether policies which promote
economies of scale and competition make an economic difference. Several empirical
studies, including our own, suggest that they do (Box 19: The state of India’s states).

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Box 19: The state of India’s states


Empirical studies show that economic reform matters in explaining the growing economic disparities across states.
Although India as a whole has improved its performance considerably over the past two decades, disparity across the states
is large and growing. The five poorest states, with 40% of the population, produce only one-quarter of total output. By
contrast, the richest five states, with only about a quarter of India’s population, produce over 40% of total output (Figure 64).
Given that India’s poorest states are also among the most populous, one major concern – not least for the authorities in India
– is that unless these states begin to share in the benefits of growth, an increasing proportion of the population will be left in
poverty and be subject to rising income inequality, leading to social, political, and economic difficulties (see “Populism
versus progress” in the next section). These concerns gain yet greater traction when it is recognised that about 60% of the
forecast 620m increase in the Indian population between now and 2051 is expected to occur in four of its poorer states, i.e.
Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan (Visaria and Visaria, 2003).
Examination of the varying economic reforms and policies across India’s states, which have significant autonomy in this
respect, suggests that they can make an important difference to economic performance:
• States with more rigid labour laws experienced slower growth of output, employment and productivity in the formal
manufacturing sector, as well as increases in urban poverty – Besley (2004).
• States which have amended land laws to encourage redistribution of land to labourers and the amalgamation of farms
into viable units experienced higher investment, productivity and output growth – Banerjee and Iyer (2005).
• States with weaker institutions and poorer infrastructure experienced lower GDP growth, particularly in electricity- and
infrastructure-intensive sectors – Kochhar and others (2006).
• States with better infrastructure apparently grow faster: in particular, rising transmission and distributional losses in the
electricity sector adversely affect a state’s growth performance – Purfield (2006a).
To add to this list, for the period FY00 to FY05 we examined the relationship between state economic performance
(measured as the growth in net state real domestic product per capita) and the size of government (measured as the share of
state government spending in state GDP). A scatter plot of these two variables shows a strong negative relationship (Figure
65), consistent with the view that excessive bureaucracy and state-owned enterprises are detrimental to growth. The “line of
best fit” to this scatter has an R-squared of 0.41%; and the coefficient on the size of government variable is -0.1, statistically
significant at the 1% probability level. Taking these results at face value suggests that a 10pp reduction in the share of state
government spending in state GDP – for example, through reduced bureaucracy or privatisation – could boost the annual
growth in net state real domestic product per capita by fully 1pp. The incentive to reform is likely to intensify among India’s
states as competition increases, labour migrates and capital is mobilised to the better performing states. Ŷ

Figure 64. State nominal net domestic product per capita Figure 65. Growth in state net domestic product per
and population size as at FY05 capita vs size of state governments, FY00 to FY05

Haryana 50
Average government spending/GDP

Maharashtra
Gujarat Uttar P radesh B ihar
45 P unjab
Punjab Rajasthan
A ssam Orissa
over FY00 to FY05

Kerala
40
Andhra M adhya Kerala
Karnataka P radesh Gujarat
Tamil Nadu
35
West
West Bengal Tamil Nadu B engal
Assam 30 Karnataka
State population, m Haryana
Rajasthan
25 A ndhra
Madhya M aharashtra P radesh
Orissa Net state domestic product
Uttar per capita, US$ 20
Bihar 1 2 3 4 5 6
Average grow th in real GDP per capita
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700
over FY00 to FY05

Source: RBI, CEIC and Lehman Brothers. Source: CEIC and Lehman Brothers.

October 2007 69
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GROWTH AND GOVERNANCE: THE POLITICAL CHALLENGE


“…The government needs to do all it can to encourage private enterprise. Indians
are born entrepreneurs. They will respond to an environment which is conducive
to this talent. Public policy needs to close the perennial debate on equity versus
growth. State intervention in favour of the poor is needed in India, but realism
requires us to distinguish between the desirable and the feasible... The only
economic model that can work in India is a percolation of benefits consequent to
an increase in the size of the pie. Since the poor are far too many, the pie needs to
grow faster... A growth rate of 8 per cent or more is feasible provided the process
of economic reform is sustained and business is left to entrepreneurs.” Pavan K
Varma (2004) 51
In the preceding pages, we have set out the economics underpinning our view that not
only is 9% sustainable but also that India’s potential growth could be boosted further to
10% or so given the “right” policy measures. But the implementation of those policy
measures should not be taken for granted; rather it is inextricably intertwined with
India’s politics. Alongside the economics, we therefore need to consider the political
challenges which India’s policymakers face, be it at the national (Box 20: The structure
of central government), state (Box 22: The centre and the states) or city level. 52

The difficulties with democracy


The maintenance of democracy since independence is frequently cited as one of India’s
greatest achievements of recent years – and rightly so. 53 However, as the distinguished
Indian political scientist Professor Sudipta Kaviraj observed more than a decade ago:
“…democratic government functioned smoothly in the early years after 1947
precisely because it was not taking place in a democratic society: as democratic
society has slowly emerged, with the spread of a real sense of political equality,
it has made the functioning of democratic government more difficult”. 54
The consequence of this is that successive Indian governments are finding themselves
confronted with a challenge which is all too familiar to democracies worldwide:
significant structural reforms inevitably involve “losers”, at least in the short term, as
well as “winners”. Reform, in the face of popular resistance and vested interest, is hard.
For India, this difficulty is compounded by the additional challenge of coalition
government – especially when that coalition is drawn from a wide range of the political
spectrum.

51
Being Indian by Pavan K Varma (Arrow Books, 2006) pages 190-1.
52
In practice, Delhi is currently the only city in India which enjoys governance independent of that of the city’s host
state. See also Box 20.
53
The one period when Indian democracy seemed genuinely threatened was from 1975 to 1977 after the then
prime minister Indira Gandhi was found guilty of electoral fraud; she was ordered by the high court of Allahabad
to be removed from her parliamentary seat and banned from running for elected office for six years. Public
demonstrations supporting her removal caused Mrs Gandhi to advise the then president – a longtime political ally
– to declare a state of emergency. Mrs Gandhi then used the extraordinary powers she assumed to rule largely
by presidential decree and without recourse to parliament.
Emergency rule lasted 19 months during which India made significant economic progress, thanks mainly to the
banning of strike action and the repression of unions. Agricultural and industrial productivity increased; the
administration was streamlined; tax evasion was reduced although corruption remained endemic. These
economic gains may have contributed to Mrs Gandhi’s decision to call an election in 1977 when, in a surprise
result, she was heavily defeated effectively ending the INC’s dominance of India’s central government – see also
footnote 56 .
54
Dilemmas Of Democratic Development In India by Professor Sudipta Kaviraj p119 (1996).
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Box 20: The structure of central government


India’s robust constitutional federal democracy revolves primarily around its elected parliament.
The Republic of India is a constitutional federal democracy made up of 29 states (including the city of Delhi) and six
federally governed union territories.
The role of head of state is filled by a president, currently Pratibha Patil, who is elected indirectly for a five-year term by
members of the central and state assemblies, historically by consensus among the main parties. Mrs Patil, India’s first
woman president, was sworn in on 25 July 2007 despite being opposed by the main opposition Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).
The executive is headed by a prime minister, currently Dr Manmohan Singh of the Indian National Congress (INC), who
presides over a Council of Ministers chosen from elected members of parliament.
Parliament is bicameral.
The upper house – the Rajya Sabha – has 245 members, 233 of whom are elected by weighted votes of the elected members
of parliament and the legislative assemblies of states and union territories, with 12 appointed by the president. Elected
members sit for a six-year term with one-third retiring every two years.
The lower house – the Lok Sabha – comprises 545 members, 543 of whom are elected from single-seat constituencies under
a first-past-the-post system, with (a relic from the past) two representatives of Anglo-Indians appointed by the president. 79
seats are reserved for the scheduled castes and 40 for the scheduled tribes. The maximum term is five years (with the next
general election due no later than May 2009).
Representation in parliament remains frozen on the basis of the 1971 census. Already contentious, if the recommendation of
the National Population Council to extend the freeze until 2026 is confirmed this could become a source of major tension
between the north, where population growth is significantly higher, and the south of the country.
Given the size of the electorate – currently around 670m (i.e. over twice the size of the electorate for the European
Parliament, which is the second largest globally) – general elections (and, indeed, large state elections, such as in Uttar
Pradesh in May 2007 are conducted in a number of phases, usually over a period of about one month (see Box 23: The Uttar
Pradesh election and its national implications).
The current – 14th – Lok Sabha was elected between 20 April and 10 May 2004. In a surprise outcome, the INC emerged as
the largest single party with 145 seats (26.53% of the vote), thereby winning from the incumbent BJP – with 138 seats and
22.16% of the vote – the right to form the next government. However, the INC was only able to do so under the banner of
the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) with the support of 11 other parties which won seats in the house, and, even then,
only as a minority government controlling a total of 217 seats and supported “from outside” by the Left Front (which won 60
seats). The BJP and its allies won a total of 185 seats.
See also Box 22 below for an explanation of the relationship between central government and the state authorities, which
also exhibits some important differences between principle and practice. Ŷ
One of the practical implications of this, which will almost certainly affect India’s ability
to grow, can be extrapolated from one of the targets proposed by India’s Planning
Commission in its approach paper to the 11th Five-Year Plan published early in 2007. To
support a GDP growth target of 9% per annum over FY08-FY12, the Commission
proposes that infrastructure expenditure should rise to 9% of GDP per annum from just
5.0% now. It notes: “Our roads, railways, ports, airports, communication and above all
power supply are not comparable to those prevalent in our competitor countries. This gap
must be filled in the next 5-10 years if our enterprises are to compete effectively. Indian
[companies] no longer expect protection. But they do expect a level playing field.”
The government is hoping that around 30% of the US$492bn estimated investment this
would require will come from the private sector. But despite recent impressive profits, it
is not yet clear whether business can raise the sort of sums involved given India’s still
fledgling corporate debt market. And, whether or not the corporate debt market can
develop hinges to a large extent on pension reform, which is effectively blocked in
parliament by the communists on whom the current INC-led minority government
depends for its survival.

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Box 21: Economic growth and the law


The Supreme Court is pressing for the practice of law in India to match the country’s impressive legal framework.
One of India’s many strengths is its impressive legal framework. But the legal system as a whole has left itself open to
criticism over the years. For example, in 2004 the Indian social commentator and former diplomat Pavan K Varma wrote
that India had: “…one of the world’s largest corpuses of high-minded laws, and one of the poorest records of
implementation”. And in a paper published the following year Dr Pranab Bardhan commented: “To this day [the rule of law]
is a rather alien concept in much of Indian political culture… The law as actually enforced is often not above elected
politicians”.
However, more recent criticism arguably offers a more encouraging perspective. In December 2006, a number of
parliamentarians did the legal system something of a service by highlighting, through public criticism, the courts’ increasing
propensity to “overstep” their “proper” constitutional role through the passing of executive orders. And in September 2007,
commenting on a land dispute which had been stuck in the Indian legal system since 1957, a Supreme Court panel
comprising Justices A.K. Mathur and Markandey Katju said: “People in India are simply disgusted with this state of affairs
and are fast losing faith in the judiciary because of the inordinate delay in the disposal of cases”.
Such comments – in particular, the pointed warning of the Supreme Court panel – underscore the fact that at least some of
India’s judges are prepared not only to speak out in their efforts to get India’s courts up to speed with the demands of a
modernising economy, but also to use the law to make politicians and bureaucrats do their job where otherwise the executive
has failed to deliver. Combined with a number of recent high-profile cases – perhaps most notably the conviction for murder
in November 2006 of the then cabinet minister Shibu Soren, now serving a life sentence – there is a growing sense that
India’s higher courts at least are a force for good.
In a December 2006 FT.com article on this phenomenon, the distinguished editor and publisher T.N. Ninan cited a number
of examples of where the courts could intervene to the public good, including the following: “An infrastructure project in
Mumbai needs clearance from no fewer than 13 state government departments, many of them presided over by ministers
from rural constituencies who do not understand the urgency of having a properly functioning metropolis. How then can
despairing Mumbai-ites find solutions to their many problems? Delhi didn’t, till the courts stepped in. Do they now have to
do the same thing in Mumbai?”
As in most developing economies, compounding the overloading of the legal system is the problem of corruption in some
parts of it. According to a 2005 survey by the Centre for Media Studies (an independent not-for-profit development research
and facilitation organisation) about US$580m changes hands in bribes related to legal cases in every 12-month period.
In addition to the efforts of the Supreme Court, the current government has tried to improve the situation. A potentially
important legislative reform is the Right to Information Act 2005 (RTI). This is the first national law to come into force
addressing disclosure of government information since 1923 and a significant step towards enshrining in law a 1975
Supreme Court ruling that “the people… have a right to know every public act, everything that is done in a public way, by
their public functionaries” (note: the highly criticised 2002 Freedom of Information Act never came into effective force).
Despite extensive parliamentary amendment to the original draft of the bill, the RTI is far-reaching in its impact, as is
underlined by the filing of over 40,000 applications under it in its first year of existence – and, arguably, highlighted further
by parliamentary attempts to amend the law in 2006 which were abandoned in the face of a public outcry. In addition to the
help it offers to ordinary citizens, there is already evidence that its existence alone is acting as a stay on corruption on
contracts for major public works.
There is, nevertheless, a major economic cost associated with the slowness with which the wheels of justice can turn in India
(hardly a new problem in India – it stretches back to the pre-colonial period and British rule did little if anything to alleviate
the situation). Some innovative measures – especially the prioritisation of so-called “public interest litigations” (PILs) and,
more recently, the promotion of mediation for civil suits – help to expedite some cases. But the backlog still amounted to
about 26m in 2006 when an estimated US$75bn (roughly 10% of Indian GDP) was tied up in legal disputes – an issue which
the then US Treasury Secretary John Snow (speaking in 2005), among others, has cited as a potential barrier to investment
including in critical sectors such as infrastructure. Ŷ

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This is, unfortunately, not an isolated example. After INC’s surprise victory in the 2004
general election, the Left Front (which is dominated by the communists) decided not to
join the INC-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) but to support it from “the outside”.
Although the Front has subsequently been accommodating on some issues, notably
foreign investment, it has continued to oppose many reforms put forward by the
government, especially those relating to deregulation of the labour market and
privatisations. In 2005, it boycotted coordination meetings with the UPA for four months
until the government abandoned a reform package. And, if anything, it has become even
more assertive since the communists secured landslide victories in state elections in West
Bengal and Kerala in the first half of 2006. For the duration of this parliament it is now
likely to block any reform that requires new legislation (this highlights the contrast
between the communists at the national level, who enjoy leverage without responsibility,
and those at the state level whose administrations are pushing through reform). Indeed, at
the time of going to print the communists were continuing to threaten to withdraw their
support for the government were it to press ahead with ratification of a benchmark
agreement with the United States on civil nuclear technology, a dispute which some
experts judge may even precipitate an early general election (see Box 26: The economy
and international relations).
There is nothing particularly remarkable about this. The general pattern in democracies
worldwide is that governments find it easier to push through reforms – and other
potentially controversial legislation – earlier in their term of office; thus reform tends to
tail off towards the latter part of the election cycle. At this stage in the cycle, we would
expect any reform-minded democratically elected government to be concentrating on
measures that can be brought in without potentially contentious legislation having to be
passed in parliament.

Box 22: The centre and the states


The trend of recent years had been for power to shift from Delhi to the states – but not to the city authorities.
The Indian constitution defines the division of most powers between the centre and the states, with the centre having
precedence over residual issues.
In principle, central government can exercise considerable power over the state authorities through its significantly greater
ability to raise revenue, in particular through taxing income, production and international trade. Furthermore, the states
cannot borrow without central government permission.
However, the period since 1977 has seen the emergence of numerous caste- and regionally-based parties which grew out of
the opposition movement to then prime minister Indira Gandhi’s state of emergency (see footnote 56). As these parties have
become increasingly successful in state and national elections, central government has become increasingly reliant on
regional allies and has found it harder to resist state demands to manage their own finances.
Furthermore, as central government’s control of industry, finance and foreign trade has gradually been relaxed over the past
decade in particular, competitive pressures have grown among the states which have sought to attract and retain business
investment. The most successful states in this regard have tended to be those in the south and west of the country.
With the notable exception of Delhi, which enjoys significant governmental autonomy, any loosening of the reins by central
government has tended to devolve power to the state authorities rather than the major cities. As a Financial Times leader
published on 9 October 2006 argued: “Central government should bolster [conditions which favour ‘commercial enterprise’]
by decentralising more decision-making and by giving more power to the larger cities to run their affairs. As the source of
most of India’s wealth generation, their prosperity holds the key to its future development.” Ŷ

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A window in 2009?
Optimistically, we look for a new window for economic reform after the next general
election, which must be held no later than May 2009.
However, the days when the INC could reasonably expect to command a majority in
parliament – as was the case more or less continuously from 1950 to 1990 – appear to be
gone forever. The main opposition Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) from 1997 to 2002
became the first party other than the INC to head a democratically elected Indian
government for a full five-year term. Neither it nor the INC looks likely to be able to
secure much more than 25% of the total vote in future general elections. 55 Thus,
whichever of India’s two main parties emerges as the larger after the next election, it will
be obliged to cut – probably complex – deals with myriad smaller parties in order to be
able to form a stable government.
Increasingly, there appears to be a propensity of Indians to vote on a caste and/or vested
interest basis. There is also an emergence at the national and, more especially, at the state
level of politics a predilection for anti-incumbency “revolving door” politics where no
party holds power for more than one term before it is ejected by the electorate (see, for
example, Box 23: The Uttar Pradesh election – its national implications). Neither is
conducive to rapid reform.
Realistically, therefore, we expect the pace of reform to continue to be measured at the
national level irrespective of the outcome of the next general election. We acknowledge
though that at the sub-national level some parts of the country will continue to move
forward more quickly than others – sometimes, as communist-governed West Bengal is
demonstrating, irrespective of the political hue of the administration.

55
For three decades after independence, Indian general elections were dominated by the INC party which also
won most state elections in the 1950s and 1960s. This pattern changed in the aftermath of the 1975-77 state of
emergency, when INC prime minister Indira Gandhi was roundly defeated by the Janata Party as her party lost
all but 200 seats relative to the previous (1971) election. One of the underlying causes of Mrs Gandhi’s original
decision to call a state of emergency had been accusations of authoritarianism, including erosion of state powers
under the constitution.
Janata itself was a somewhat disparate coalition which fractured during its three years in office and disintegrated
completely after the 1980 general election when INC was returned to power. The modern BJP is one of the
parties which emerged from the wreckage of Janata.
To a significant extent, history repeated itself in 1989 when Congress – now under the leadership of Rajiv
Gandhi – was narrowly defeated by the Janata Dal coalition, another successor to Janata which enjoyed the
outside support of the BJP while it was in office. Congress managed to win back power in 1991. But the
increasingly fissiparous nature of Indian politics since 1977 had by this time created a new – and still prevailing -
paradigm whereby, since 1992, none of the three truly national parties in India (i.e. the BJP, the Communist
Party of India (Marxist) and the INC) has been able to command a parliamentary majority and India has been
ruled by successive coalition governments.

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Box 23: The Uttar Pradesh election – its national implications


A surprise2007 state election result in Uttar Pradesh may be a pointer for future national voting patterns.
Despite its surprise result, the May 2007 state election in Uttar Pradesh (UP), India’s most populous state (with an estimated
175m people, UP would qualify as the world’s sixth most populous country) and often viewed as a microcosm of India as a
whole, should offer some useful pointers for both the next general election and Indian national politics more generally.
The surprise was the winning of an outright majority (206 out of 403 seats) by the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), making the
new administration in UP the first since 1991 that has not needed a coalition. Underpinning this success was the decision by
BSP – a left-leaning party with strong roots in UP and which has chiefly represented Dalits – to form tactical alliances with
both Muslims and upper-caste Hindus (including fielding almost 90 Brahmin candidates), a move which could prove to be a
boost for UP.
Not surprising were (a) the ejection from government of the incumbent Samajwadi Party-led coalition, further confirming the
established pattern of “revolving door” politics (it is worth noting that BSP leader Mayawati has herself been chief minister
in UP on three previous occasions so it remains to be seen whether she has indeed definitively broken this mould); and (b)
BSP’s defeat of the two biggest national parties, i.e. the BJP and INC.
The BJP had won both Punjab and Uttaranchal in February; but the party secured its lowest return in UP since 1991 with just
50 seats. The INC saw its seats reduced to 21 despite a high-profile campaign, albeit with limited objectives. Although
neither went into the UP election with great expectations, both will be well aware that the UP result does not look positive
for their prospects in the next general election. However, it remains to be seen whether BSP, which certainly has political
aspirations beyond UP and which is a member of the ruling UPA, can translate this into national success. Indeed, if this
pattern were to be repeated elsewhere in India with largely state-based parties winning outright majorities, it could serve
further to entrench coalition politics at the centre as different parties dominating different states are obliged to accommodate
one another in Delhi.Ŷ

The quest for inclusive growth


Speaking on the BBC World Service in February 2007, India’s finance minister,
Palaniappan Chidambaram, estimated that it would take until 2040 to wipe out the
“abject poverty” which, he acknowledged, currently “afflicts about 25% of India’s
population”. 56
Mr Chidambaram, citing his “most challenging” task as ensuring “that the economy
grows at no less than 8% a year”, underlined the relationship between growth and
poverty alleviation as follows:
“Growth gives incomes to people who are employed, throws up jobs for those
who are not employed. Therefore growth is imperative. But growth obviously is
not sufficient in a country… where a significant proportion lives in poverty: the
growth must be inclusive growth. So the task of the government… is to ensure
not only growth but that this growth is inclusive growth.”
To that end, India’s 11th five-year plan (2007 to 2012) – still to be finalised – has the
declared objective of “faster and more inclusive growth”. 57 This challenge broadly
manifests itself at two levels, i.e. among states where a clear divide has opened up
between the north and west of the country and the more reformist and consequently
wealthy south and east; and, within individual states, among different sections of the
population, in particular rural versus urban.
The realisation of that objective – and, through it, the alleviation of “abject poverty” by
2040 – may seem relatively straightforward. It would certainly be so if India were able
56
For the full text of the interview see http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/6330691.stm.
57
The magnitude of the poverty alleviation task still facing India should not cause us to lose sight of significant
achievements in this respect since independence and especially since the economic reform programme of 1991.
As Pavan K Varma notes in his book Being Indian (Arrow Books, 2004 – page 180): “More people in India have
been rescued from absolute poverty in the past fifty years than the entire population of Europe. The job could
have been done better: over 200m people are still very poor. Significantly, however, poverty levels fell most
dramatically – by 10 per cent – in the decade since the economy was liberalised in the 1990s, further proof that
in India only an expansion of the economic pie, and not state-sponsored policies seeking to redistribute growth,
ultimately benefit the poor.”
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lift itself from what T.N. Ninan, has described as the “one per cent society”, i.e. a society
which improves socio-economically by around 1% per year, into a 2% society (as China
has). 58
The FY08 budget, unveiled on 28 February this year, is arguably consistent with both the
principles noted above, i.e. the systemic and cyclical challenges which the Indian
government faces in pursuing structural reform and the need nevertheless to aid the
economy’s longer-term prospects with poverty alleviation very much to the fore. It
concentrated on social spending, especially education and healthcare, and on rural
infrastructure, consistent with Mr Chidambaram’s quest for “faster and more inclusive
growth”. 59
As such:
• The budget raised the total expenditure on education by 34.2% to INR324bn
(US$7.3bn);
• Similarly, health spending rose by 21.9% to INR153bn (US$3.5bn); and,
• The government set a target of raising annual growth in the farm sector from an
average of 2.3% in FY02-06 to 4% by FY12 (i.e. the end of the new five-year plan)
by increasing significantly the budgets for a number of flagship rural development
programmes, as well as credit to the sector.
If these measures are implemented properly – and especially when put alongside the
proposed increase in infrastructure expenditure encapsulated in the 11th five-year plan –
they almost certainly have the potential to lift India’s growth prospects. While additional
education and health spending may bring only longer-term benefits (see Box 25: A
healthy India… for a wealthy India), the focus on agriculture is critical if the
government’s medium-term target of raising growth to 10% p.a. by FY12 is to be met.
But even more important, if sustained, may be the shift in political philosophy implied
by Mr Chidambaram’s budget. This was consistent with a key aim for India summed up
in a 2006 paper by the then economic counsellor and research department director at the
IMF, Dr Raghuram G. Rajan, as follows: “…a focus on creating an enabling
environment that provides access for all to education, health care, finance, and, yes, a
minimum safety net – indeed, a focus on spreading opportunity rather than mandating
outcomes – will be a better way to achieve both growth and social justice”. 60

58
The former South Asia Bureau Chief of The Financial Times, Edward Luce, in his book In Spite Of The Gods:
The Strange Rise Of Modern India (Little Brown, 2006 – page 336) elaborated as follows: “Whichever indicator
you choose, whether it is economic or social, India is improving at a rate of roughly 1 per cent a year. For
example, India’s poverty rate is declining at about 1 per cent a year: in 1991 it was 35 per cent; by 2000 it was
26%. It has probably continued to decline at roughly the same rate since then. Or take India’s literacy rate: in
1991 it was 52%; by 2001 it was 65%. Or life expectancy: in 1991 the average Indian would live until around the
age of fifty-eight; by 2001 that had risen to sixty-five years. Roughly the same congruence emerges from its
international rankings. India’s human development index, which is compiled by the United Nations Development
Programme, went for 0.254 in 1970 to 0.602 in 2005, which translates into an annual improvement of about 1 per
cent.”
[Note: in fact the March 2007 Indian National Sample Survey puts the poverty level in 2004/5 at 21.8% of the
population, i.e. more or less consistent with the one per cent “rule”, and the number of people living below the
poverty line in 2004/5 at 238.5m – 170.3m in rural areas (where poverty fell more quickly during the survey
period) and 68.2m in the cities.]
59
The corollary of this focus on social spending is that measures such as labour and product market reforms,
privatisation and the removal of caps on foreign direct investment in banking and insurance were notable for their
absence from the budget – no surprise given the political realities with which the government has to grapple. The
2008 budget and, if it falls before the next election, that for 2009 will likely be even more heavily overshadowed
by electoral considerations.
60
See “From Paternalistic To Enabling” by Dr Raghuram G Rajan (Finance & Development, Sept 2006, Vol 43, No 3).
See also “India – Inclusive Growth and Service Delivery: Building on India’s Success”, Development Policy Review
Report No 34580-IN (World Bank, 29 May 2006).
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Box 24: A legacy of anti-materialism


Gandhian philosophy remains an important factor in economic policy.
In his 2006 book In Spite Of The Gods: The Strange Rise Of Modern India, Edward Luce, former bureau chief of The
Financial Times in South Asia, highlights the continued influence of the anti-materialistic philosophy of Mohandas K
Gandhi (1869-1948), the spiritual and strategic leader of India’s drive to independence, on political and policy thinking.
Mahatma Gandhi believed that the village should be the main building block of Indian society in perpetuity, sparking a
debate that continues to this day.
Mr Luce illustrates how Gandhianism continues to impact on India’s economy through the following example:
“[W]ithout an appreciation of Gandhi’s impact on economic thinking, it is hard to explain why India has so badly disabled
the ability of its textile sector to grow to a size more fitting with its potential. As any student of development knows, textile
production has played a critical role in the industrialisation of most societies, from Britain in the eighteenth century to China
in the twenty-first. Gandhi’s legacy can be seen in India’s continued tariff bias against synthetic fabrics in favour of cotton
(when the bulk of export demand is for the former), and in regulations that provide disincentives for textile companies to
grow beyond ‘cottage industry’ size, which penalises commercial success and protects failure.”
Since 1991 especially, many of the economic policies which were rooted in the Gandhi philosophy have been altered. But
many persist, albeit sustained not so much on Gandhian grounds as in vested interest. Nevertheless, as Bhimrao Ambedkar
(1891-1956), the chief architect of India’s constitution and himself a Dalit and fierce critic of the Mahatma’s promotion of
village life, remarked: “The love of the intellectual Indian for the village community is of course infinite, if not pathetic…
What is the village but a sink of localism, a den of ignorance, narrow mindedness and communalism”.
By “communalism”, Dr Ambedkar meant an allegiance to one’s own ethnic group which, as noted in the main text, bedevils
policy-making in India as it impacts increasingly on voting patterns. Ŷ

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Box 25: “A healthy India… for a wealthy India”


Reaping the “demographic dividend” depends as much on the health of the labour force as on better education.
Writing on the “rediff.com” news site on 25 August 2003, the chief executive of ITC Limited’s agri-business and one of
India’s leading rural development experts, S. Sivakumar, concluded an article on the Indian healthcare system as follows: “A
healthy India is certainly a precondition for a wealthy India”. Yet, with the notable exception of the high-profile issues of
HIV/AIDS and TB, it is arguable that the issue of healthcare in India has received insufficient attention in analyses of the
country’s prospects.
Arguably underpinning many of the country’s health challenges is malnutrition. As Indian officials conceded earlier this
year, India is lagging relative to the UN Millenium Development Goal (MDG) target at the half-way stage in the 15-year
programme launched in 2000. According to the FY06 National Family Health Survey, 46% of children aged three or less are
malnourished and underweight – a high percentage, compared to 30% for Sub-Saharan Africa – and almost 80% are anemic,
a figure which is matched by anemia among pregnant women. Even putting to one side infant mortality (and the WHO
estimates that over half of deaths among the under-fives are malnutrition-related) this is a critical issue; for, as Nobel Prize-
winning economist Robert Fogel has argued: “It may well be that a very large increase in expenditures on ante-natal care and
pediatric care in infancy and early childhood is the most effective way to improve health over the entire life cycle, by
delaying the onset of chronic diseases, alleviating their severity if they occur, and increasing longevity".
Overall, according to the Economist Intelligence Unit, India spent just US$41 per head on healthcare in 2006, less than one-
fifth of the average for Asia and Australasia; and India has just 0.6 physicians per 1,000 population, i.e. just over one-third of
the average for Asia/Australasia and more or less the same ratio as prevailed 20 years ago.
Writing on “rediff.com” on 23 July 2007 about a recent trip to India, Dr Baltej S. Maini, president of the Fallon Clinic
Foundation based in Massachusetts, noted “…the frenzy with which hospitals are being built, ostensibly to meet the
demands of an expanding middle class population that can now afford the best of healthcare. Not a day goes by that a new
healthcare venture is not announced, either in partnership with a foreign company or by an all Indian business house.” So,
there is clear evidence of progress on some fronts. But Dr Maini goes on to underline the need for a “…coherent and
sustainable plan that addresses the healthcare needs of the masses…” and suggests ten reforms consistent with that aim:
• Develop and implement national standards for examination and proper remuneration for healthcare professionals.
• Develop and implement national accreditation of – and performance incentives for – hospitals; those which do not
comply would not get paid by insurance companies.
• Obtain proposals from private insurance and the government on ways to provide medical coverage to the population at
large and execute the strategy.
• Utilise and apply medical information systems which encourage the use of evidence-based medicine, guidelines and
protocols as well as electronic prescribing in in-patient and out-patient settings, including the setting up of electronic
health records.
• Perverse incentives between specialists, hospitals, imaging and diagnostic centres on the one hand and referring
physicians on the other need to be removed and a level of clarity needs to be introduced.
• Develop multi-specialty group practices with incentives aligned with those of hospitals and payers.
• Encourage business schools to develop executive training programmes in healthcare.
• Update the curriculum in schools which train healthcare professionals.
• Develop public/private partnerships which design newer ways to deliver healthcare.
• Appoint a government commission which makes recommendations for the healthcare system and monitors its
performance. Ŷ

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Populism versus progress?


At the same time, it is reasonable to conclude that the boost to the farming sector was, in
part, political. Two-thirds of the labour force in farming translates more or less into two-
thirds of the electorate – a weight of voting which no government in India can ignore and
expect future electoral success. As the distinguished economics professor, Dr Pranab
Bardhan, wrote in a 1998 paper: “Democracy has a way of putting ideas in the heads of
the lower classes and the proliferating demands for spoils threaten to catch up with the
operators of the machine.” 61
A subsequent article by Professor Pranab highlights the almost inevitable need for any
budget to be bedded in real politik: “By and large India is less of a legislative and
deliberative democracy, more one of popular mobilisation. This usually means short-run
populist measures or patronage distribution are at a political premium, not long-gestation
attempts at structural transformation of the constraints in the lives of most people.” 62
The overall thrust of the FY08 budget did attempt, albeit in a constrained way, to move
away from this paradigm. That said, by extending the National Rural Employment
Guarantee Scheme (NREGS), it was not a clean break. 63
The NREGS was launched in February 2006 by the current government with the strong
support of the Left Front and is probably India’s most ambitious attempt to date to
alleviate poverty through direct state intervention. Its supporters argue, with considerable
justification, that over 200m Indians living in abject poverty cannot simply be abandoned
until policy measures aimed at improving their lot in the medium term have an impact.
Under the relevant act, the scheme guarantees in law 100 days’ employment in every
financial year to adult members of every rural household willing to do manual work in
return for the statutory minimum wage; the central government stands to meet the wages
cost in full plus three-quarters of the material cost and a proportion of the administrative
overhead with the balance falling to the state administration. If employment under the
scheme is not provided within 15 days of receipt of the application, a daily
unemployment allowance will be paid to the applicant, thus providing a strong incentive
for the local authorities to fill the jobs. The government aims to have the NREGS cover
all districts of the country soon.
When the scheme was first floated in 2004, it was criticised by many Indian and
international economists who claimed that: “If, as expected, the programme spreads
across the whole country, it will eventually cost India up to 2% of its GDP and between
10-20% of its annual budget. Yet it promises no investment in upgrading the skills of the
people it is designed to help. Nor does it invest in genuine rural infrastructure, such as
all-weather roads, proper electricity supply or new agricultural technologies. Such
investments would stimulate greater economic activity that would be much more likely
to create lasting employment for the rural poor.” 64 Additionally, they cite the difficulty
of avoiding “leakage” from the scheme as a significant proportion of the funding may
fail to reach its intended beneficiaries. 65

61
The Political Economy Of Development In India by Pranab Bardhan (Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1998)
page 78.
62
See Democracy and Distributive Politics In India by Pranab Bardhan (April 2005).
63
Under the 2007 budget NREGS, which is ultimately intended to cover the whole country, was extended from 200
to 330 districts and allocated INR120bn.
64
In Spite Of The Gods: The Strange Rise Of Modern India by Edward Luce (Little Brown, 2006) page 202. Mr
Luce goes on to suggest that NREGS “…is significant because it distinguishes India’s approach to poverty very
clearly from that of neighbouring China, which has preferred to create jobs indirectly by stimulating high (public
and private) investment in the economy”.
65
In a 2 January 2007 article entitled “Unreformed Politics” and published on the Financial Times website, T.N.
Ninan wrote that Congress “has revived its faith in the ‘hand-out’ politics that Indira Gandhi perfected, and which
her son had wanted to shed because only 15 per cent of the money reached the intended beneficiaries”. The
article goes on to ask: “…can a proper social safety net be financed if the government were to shut down
programmes and subsidies that don’t reach the poor? A basic programme may cost no more than 2 per cent or 3
per cent of GDP: but as in the case of other programmes, the constraint is not the money but the government’s
ability to correctly identify the needy beneficiaries”.
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For now, the jury should remain out over the impact of NREGS per se. At least it is now
coupled with programmes designed to root out through economic growth what Mahatma
Gandhi memorably described as “the worst form of violence” – poverty.

Demographics and urbanisation – make-or-break opportunities


The importance of making this interplay between government programmes and private
sector investment work is underlined by India’s demographics, most critically in the
short- to medium-term when over half India’s population will remain below the age of
25. Often portrayed simply as a “dividend”, the reality is considerably more complex.
According to the United Nations, India’s working age population (i.e. 15-64 year-olds) is
projected to surge by 150m over the decade from 2005 to 2015, to a total of 854m. This
is in contrast to China: there the growth of the working age population is decelerating to
the point where it is projected to start falling outright some time between 2015 and 2020
(Figures 66). In 2020, the average Indian will be only 29 years old, compared with an
average age of 37 in China and the US, 45 in Western Europe and 48 in Japan 66.
In an environment where the population of most other major economies is aging, the
availability of a rapidly expanding pool of young workers could and should be a major
advantage for India’s economy. However, the full benefits are only likely to be realised
if the new generation of workers is healthy and educated, and if the government succeeds
in addressing infrastructure, bureaucracy and labour market constraints in a manner
which facilitates the requisite level of job creation by the private sector.
Indeed, the stakes for the government are yet higher as population growth fuels a process
of urbanisation over the next decade which has previously been held back (see Box 24: A
legacy of anti-materialism) and is therefore really only just beginning. At present,
relative to GDP per capita an unusually low 30% of India’s population lives in the cities.
One of the strongest relationships in economic development is that urbanisation rises
with GDP per capita in a “hockey stick” fashion as cities provide large economies of
agglomeration for individual activity (Figure 67). Thus, if India’s GDP per capita
continues to grow at a double-digit rate, its urbanisation rate could rise to over 40% over
the next decade. According to the IMF (2007b), India will have eight of the world’s
thirty fastest-growing large cities between 2005 and 2020, while China is projected to
account for ten.

Figure 66. Projections of the working age (15-64) Figure 67. Urbanisation rate and GDP per capita in 2005
populations in India and China

Millions 120
UN Projections
1,200
HK
Urban population, % of total

100 Singapore
Brazil Korea UK
80 Russia Mexico US
France
900 Spain Italy
Hungary Japan
60 S. Africa
Indonesia
China 40 China
600 Thailand
India India
20 Vietnam

0
300 0 10,000 20,000 30,000 40,000 50,000
1975 1985 1995 2005 2015 2025 2035 2045 Nominal GDP per capita, US$

Source: United Nations and Lehman Brothers. Source: World Bank and Lehman Brothers.

66
Reddy (2007), citing projections made by the United Nations.
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Migration from the countryside to the cities can be a powerful source of productivity
growth for economies in which a large share of the labour force is initially under-utilised
in agriculture. In India 57% of the workforce is in the agricultural sector which
nevertheless produces just 18% of national output. The unemployment rate for
agricultural labour households is estimated at over 15% and many of those who do have
jobs appear to be under-employed. The clustering of people and firms in cities can boost
productivity and promote economies of scale in many ways: search and travel costs are
reduced; specialisation is easier; new skills, technology and innovations can be dispersed
faster; and competition is greater.
China provides a powerful example of the potential gains from urbanisation. There, the
urbanisation rate rose from 18% in 1978 to 28% in 1993 and then shot up to 44% by
2006. It has been estimated that the reallocation of under-utilised Chinese agricultural
labour to the cities added 1-2pp annually to average labour productivity over the past two
decades (Bosworth and Collins, 2007; and Heytens and Zebregs, 2003). India, where
labour productivity in industry and services is estimated to be four to five times higher
than that in agriculture, stands to make similar gains. In a recent study on India,
Bosworth, Collins and Virmani (2007) estimated that whereas workers moving from the
countryside to the cities enhanced productivity by 0.6pp over 1983-93 this had risen to
1.2pp by FY04; and, judging from China’s experience, it could double again over the
next decade.
And yet, India’s major cities are already facing considerable strain, with over half the
population of some metropolitan areas living in slums. According to Dr Rakesh Mohan,
Deputy Governor of the RBI, speaking on “Managing Metros” at a seminar in January
2006: “This has been caused by both faulty national economic policies that have
discouraged urban employment growth, particularly industrial employment, and by
rigidities that have inhibited urban infrastructure investment”. The latter may at least in
part be attributable to local governance structures which are rooted in the colonial era.
With the exception of the National Capital Territory of Delhi, these governance
structures place ultimate decision-making about urban planning and development
primarily in the hands of the state authorities, which have tended to be preoccupied with
the challenges of non-metropolitan areas (where, after all, the majority of the electorate
still resides) – see also Box 21: Economic growth and the law and Box 22: The centre
and the states.
According to Mayraj Fayim, a local government expert: “Over the past couple of
decades, India has seen the implementation and framing of efforts to modernise local
government and has also revealed in the course of these efforts a commitment to local
government that was hitherto a weak link in the Indian system. Nevertheless, it remains a
system in transition that has room for further evolution to match its prevalent ground
conditions.” 67 The Maharashtra state government announced plans in June 2007 to
engage private sector property developers in the redevelopment of the Dharavi district of
Mumbai, which is currently home to around 600,000 slum-dwellers. These plans are
important for the modernisation of Mumbai and its ambitions to become a global
financial hub (see Chapter 4: Developing the financial sector); but they are important
also as a test case for the ability of India’s local governance structures and systems to
address the challenges of urbanisation in the face of inevitable resistance.

67
“Local Government In India Still Carries Characteristics Of Its Colonial Heritage” by Mayraj Fahim (City Mayors
Government, 14 January 2006).
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The same is true – indeed, even more so ņ of even more ambitious and more important
proposals for Mumbai’s medium-term economic well-being centring on infrastructure
upgrading: the Maharashtra government is projecting expenditure of US$60bn on
infrastructure over the next decade, of which the authorities are hoping the private sector
will find all but US$9bn already earmarked by central government. 68 But, before
handing over its US$9bn, the government is insisting that Maharashtra repeal its Urban
Land Ceiling Act which restricts urban land holdings and which, together with rent
controls, is widely judged to have been a significant block on residential development in
particular for many years. The state parliament failed again in July to repeal the law
although, more promisingly, legislative moves are now afoot to scrap rent controls.
This legislative impasse underlines a fact that The Economist highlighted in its 1
September 2007 edition as perhaps the biggest single problem confronting urban
planners: “To redevelop Mumbai and its hinterland involves moving people. And since
in India third-world conditions are dignified…with first-world rights, this causes
blockages. The [300,000 squatters living around the “semi-retired” second runway] of
Mumbai airport, for example, have at least four representatives in Maharashtra’s state
assembly.” 69
Writing in the Financial Times on 13 August 2007 to mark the 60th anniversary of
India’s independence, Dr Amartya Sen commented: “…India also had…the problem of
government under-activity in fields in which it could achieve a great deal. There has
been a sluggish response to the urgency of remedying the astonishingly under-
emphasised social infrastructure – for example, the need to build many more schools,
hospitals and rural medical centres – and developing a functioning system of
accountability, supervision and collaboration for public services. To this can be added
the neglect of physical infrastructure (power, water, roads, rail), which required both
governmental and private initiatives. Large areas of what economists call ‘public goods’
have continued to be under-emphasised.” 70

Matching labour supply and demand


As Dr Sen suggests, just as pressing as the challenges posed by the demand for physical
infrastructure in urban and rural areas alike are those related to matching up supply and
demand in the labour market.
At the top end of the market, a study published in 2006 by India’s National Association
of Software and Services Companies (Nasscom) suggested that, of the 3m students
graduating from Indian universities each year, only 10-15% of general college graduates
and just 25% of engineering graduates are considered suitable for employment in the
offshore IT industry. 71 The projected consequence of this was a shortfall of 500,000
professionals by 2010. Commenting on the study, Nasscom president Kiran Karnik was
reported as saying: “While some young men… desperately look for work, employers
elsewhere look – with almost similar desperation – for appropriate people to fill tens of
thousands of vacancies. Our education system is not producing enough people with the
skill-sets our economy needs. This could seriously stymie India’s economic growth.” 72
According to industry body ASSOCHAM (Associated Chambers of Commerce and
Industry of India), skilled in-demand job-hoppers are increasing companies’ attrition
rates to more than 20% a year. This is not restricted to the software industry. News

68
Mumbai is India’s most populous city – conservatively estimated at 14m people. It is set to grow to nearly 25m by
2015 according to UN projections, making it the world’s second biggest city after Tokyo. The total population of
its wider metropolitan region of 438 sq km is already estimated at 18m, over half of whom live in slums.
Population density is around 34,000 persons per sq km, i.e. over seven times that of London and 15 times that of
Greater Los Angeles. Approximately 85% of the population (a number equivalent to the total population of
Norway) is estimated to use public transport every working day, with over 3m commuters a day from the suburbs
largely dependent on overloaded rail services where, at peak times, trains designed for a maximum of 1,700
passengers carry up to 5,000.
69
See “Maximum City Blues”; The Economist, 1 September 2007, pp45-6.
70
See “Can Life Begin At 60 For India” by Amartya Sen (Financial Times, 13 August 2007).
71
See Globalisation Of Engineering Services – The Next Growth Frontier For India (Nasscom/Booz Allen Hamilton,
August 2006).
72
See “Engaging India: Demographic Dividend Or Disaster?” by Jo Johnson (FT.com, 15 November 2006).
October 2007 82
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reports suggest that Hindustan Construction, an engineering firm, is bringing in civil


engineers from the Philippines to meet the demand.
Furthermore, even India’s elite institutes of management (IIMs) and of technology (IITs)
continue to struggle under government-imposed restrictions which significantly constrain
their ability to meet demand. These include: salary caps for professors which are not
competitive with private sector pay for comparable skills; government approval of
tuition and fees; tight budgets; a bar on setting up overseas’ campuses; and, most
recently, a legal requirement that 27% of places are “reserved for members of other
backward classes”. An employee at a call centre can make twice as much as a university
lecturer. Private institutions are exempt from these restrictions but can only make up so
much of the shortfall, especially if “feedstock” of the requisite quantity and quality is not
coming through the schools system.
Significant though the mismatch in higher education clearly is, it pales by comparison
with that between the education system and the organised sector farther down the labour
market. Here, the FY08 budget must look at least to begin to break what amounts to a
vicious circle. Despite notable improvements in basic education and literacy rates since
independence, independent estimates point to 20% of Indian children between the ages
of 6 and 14 not being in school. 73 The private sector can do – and is doing – a certain
amount in terms of post-school training; but the impact of those efforts will always be
limited where basic numeracy and literacy are in short supply. Unfortunately, while
training can be rolled out relatively quickly to upgrade basic skills, the sort of reform of
the education system that is required to inculcate those skills in the first place and meet
the school-leaver demands of both the private sector and the higher education system
cannot be achieved overnight. Indeed, corrective measures brought in now will only
really bring their full benefit to bear towards the latter part of the next decade.
There is no single explanation for low enrolment, widespread truancy and high drop-out
rates from basic education. However, one significant factor is the fact that working often
seems a better alternative to school because of major deficiencies in the provision of
primary education for the masses. The International Labour Organisation estimates that,
in consequence, there are around 44m child labourers in India. 74
The overall impact of this is a shortage of the very skills which would facilitate entry
into the organised sector of the economy, which is a key element in driving up economic
growth and sustaining it at double-digit levels.
To their credit, as the FY08 budget testifies, government ministers and senior officials
are well aware of the threat this poses to India’s medium- to longer-term growth.
Furthermore, they recognise that, while the private sector can be expected to pick up
some of the slack in secondary education at least, the main burden of redressing the
present shortcomings in rural areas in particular must rest with government – including
public sector initiatives for non-graduates to supplement what individual firms are
increasingly doing by way of apprenticeships.
Furthermore, where sound primary education is available, Indians are more than likely to
respond positively. As the Anglo-Indian writer and actor Sanjeev Bhaskar noted of his
visit to Mother Teresa’s Loreto Convent in Kolkata earlier this year: “As I spend the
morning playing with the kids and going through their English spelling homework with
them, it’s impossible not to… marvel at how education here is treated with such
reverence and respect. In India, children are desperately proud to wear a school uniform

73
For example, Unicef estimates that India’s literacy rates jumped from 52% in 1991 to 65% in 2001, although
there was some scepticism among experts as to what constitutes “literacy” (and, for that matter, “numeracy” in
this context), with absolute numbers of illiterates dropping for the first time in history and enrolments in
government-run primary schools increasing from 19m in 1951 to 114m by 2001. On the other hand, Unicef’s
report 2007 State of the World’s Children cites significant discrimination against girls and women in education,
reporting 190m illiterate females in India (despite improvements over the past 15 years or so) and a drop-out rate
from primary education of around 70% among girls.
74
For a more detailed resume, see “Engaging India: Investing In Education” by Amy Yee (FT.com, 13 December
2006).
October 2007 83
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and revere their books like holy artefacts, understanding that these emblems may be the
route to a more satisfying life.” 75
Assuming that the government has some success in addressing these challenges to
employability, there remains one major impediment which needs to be addressed if more
jobs are to be found in the lower-skilled reaches of the organised sector: labour market
reform. As the failure of successive governments to grasp this particular nettle readily
testifies, the politics of this are far from straightforward: Raghuram Rajan may well be
correct in suggesting that: “…achieving true labour market flexibility, while creating a
fairer, more growth-friendly environment for all workers – and not just the minority who
are currently in the organised sector – will require systemic change”. 76
One way or the other, without reform of India’s labour laws an estimated 10m trade
union members (of whom less than 15% are active) will continue to block employment
for significantly larger numbers of poor people by ensuring that demand for new hires, in
the absence of an ability to fire, remains way below potential. 77

Will the “Gini” stay in the bottle?


One should always be cautious applying to emerging economies socio-economic models
based primarily on industrialised western economies. This is perhaps especially so in the
case of India. Pavan K Varma suggests that: “…Indians have one quality which has
stood them in good stead: resilience. The quality is the product of centuries of experience
handling adversity. No foreigner can ever understand the extent to which an Indian is
mentally prepared to accept the unacceptable.” Thus, simply extrapolating from
established measures of income inequality such as the Gini coefficient may tend to
overestimate the likelihood of significant civil unrest should India fall short in its
objective of more inclusive economic growth.
That said, while arguably a special case, the recent intensification of Naxalite violence
offers a salutary warning to the Indian authorities both in Delhi and, more especially, in
those states where the threat is most rife. Nearly 300 people were killed by Naxalites in
the first four months of 2006, a level of violence which outstripped that in Kashmir for
the first time
The neo-Maoist Naxalites (named after a peasant uprising nearly 40 years ago in
Naxalbari, West Bengal) are today sufficiently well-organised and widespread that 76
out of 299 districts across nine states in eastern and central India are “badly affected”,
according to an official report (see Figures 68 and 69 for a comparison across India’s
states). While they almost certainly pose no existential threat to the state either now or in
the long run, in parts of some states they do run a de facto “parallel” administration.

75
See India with Sanjeev Bhaskar by Sanjeev Bhaskar (BBC Publications, 2007) p91. The book accompanies a
BBC TV series celebrating the 60th anniversary of Indian independence. Of the convent itself Mr Bhaskar writes:
“Here the people of [Kolkata] have taken the future into their own hands. While the school produces highly
educated women who will go on to play a huge role in the new Indian dream of prosperity and international
recognition, it also attempts to alter the very social fabric of the city that surrounds it. The Principal, a remarkable
Irish sister named Cyril Mooney, founded the programme in 1985 and today the school has 1400 children, half of
them from wealthy families who pay fees, and the other half from underprivileged homes who do not… [On] the
top floor of the building a special space is devoted to the Rainbow Project. Here, the city’s children are brought
into the school and taught basic maths, reading and writing skills… The genius of the scheme is that regular
pupils from the school (and not the teachers) teach the street children on a one-on-one basis, gradually enabling
them to join in with regular classes. It means that for many of the street children, understandably wary of adults,
their anxieties are assuaged by being helped by one of their peers…. The joy of this system is that the poor get
an education, and the older, wealthier kids learn about taking responsibility for the poor…”
76
See “From Paternalistic To Enabling” by Dr Raghuram G Rajan (Finance & Development, Sept 2006, Vol 43, No 3).
77
For example, The Economist reports that the Confederation of Indian Textile Industry (CITI) forecast in 2006 that,
following the roll-out of the WTO’s Agreement on Textiles and Clothing in 2005, the Indian textile industry stood
by 2010 to generate US$40bn in annual exports and to provide 12m additional jobs (i.e. on top of the 35m or so
which are currently largely bedded in the “unorganised” sector). However, in a letter to India’s finance minister,
CITI warned that this target would likely not be achieved if the industry remained unable to hire workers on short-
term (i.e. 5-6 month) contracts, arguing that – in contrast to the 100 days of paid employment guaranteed by
NREGS – many textile firms would be able to offer 150 days of employment if they were able to let surplus staff
go. See “Can India Fly? – Now For The Hard Part”, The Economist, 1 June 2006.
October 2007 84
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The extent to which the Naxalites are indeed motivated by what they see as socio-
economic injustice is not clear (although that undoubtedly plays a part). What is clear,
however, is that their actions are a significant disincentive to domestic and, more
especially, foreign investors who might otherwise bring much needed economic and
employment growth to some of the poorest parts of India, especially in the mining and
iron and steel industries, thereby prolonging the very conditions on which Naxalism
likely feeds. Consistent with this, the government has explicitly recognised that
Naxalism is more than just a law-and-order issue by advocating a two-pronged approach
in the affected areas, i.e. the immediate restoration of law and order and a short- to
medium-term boost to economic development. 78
Overall, according to the US government, in both 2005 and 2006 India lost around 1,300
lives to acts of terrorism, putting it second only to Iraq. Most of these deaths were in the
north and north-east and are attributable to nationalist and Maoist/Naxalite insurgencies.
However, the 11 July 2006 attacks in Mumbai, which killed 209 people and injured over
700, and the 25 August 2007 blasts in Hyderabad, which killed 43 and injured scores,
were salutary reminders that the major urban centres of India are not immune from
terrorist attacks; and that Islamic terrorism likely also poses a significant threat – even
though in neither case (nor with the February 2007 bomb which killed 68 on a train in
Haryana) has any group either claimed responsibility or been shown conclusively by the
Indian authorities to be responsible.
As noted in The Economist following the Hyderabad attacks, especially given the failure
of any organisation to claim responsibility, it is “uncertain… what the bombers might be
hoping to achieve: an end to the peace process between India and Pakistan; or perhaps to
commit just enough murder against an old enemy to keep their networks alive. Either
way the violence is worrying for India.” 79 (see Box 26: The economy and international
relations).

Figure 68. Gini co-efficient across Indian states (%) in Figure 69. Headcount poverty rates across Indian states
2004 in 2004

B ihar Punjab
Haryana Haryana
M adhya P radesh Kerala
Rajasthan West Bengal
P unjab Rajasthan
Gujarat Gujarat
Orissa Maharashtra
Uttar P radesh Tamil Nadu
Karnataka Karnataka
West B engal Uttar Pradesh
M aharashtra Andhra Pradesh
A ndhra P radesh Madhya Pradesh
Kerala Bihar
Tamil Nadu
Orissa

0.25 0.30 % 0.35 0.40 0 10 20 30 40 50


%

Source: Jha et al (2006) and Lehman Brothers. Source: Jha et al (2006) and Lehman Brothers.

78
For more background on Naxalism see “Countering Naxalite Violence In India, IISS Strategic Comments,
Volume 12, Issue 7 (August 2006).
79
See “Mad and Hyderabad”, The Economist, 1 September 2007, p46.
October 2007 85
Lehman Brothers | India: Everything to play for

It’s the economy…


However, the even larger challenge for the authorities is that even the vast majority of
poor Indians who are not attracted by the extremes of Naxalism, including those in the
major conurbations to which Naxalism has not (yet) spread, will become increasingly
unsettled at widening income disparities which are readily apparent nationwide in an era
of mass media and mass communications. To date, such dissatisfaction has been
reflected largely at the ballot box. But even in a society notable for individual and
collective resilience, it is by no means certain that that will remain the case.
Thus, for all the political challenges it presents, India’s political classes would do well to
heed the advice of the ancient Indian philosopher Mallanaga Vatsyayana who argued that
artha (i.e. sound economics) should always be the first priority as “the livelihood of men
is dependent on it alone”. 80
In India as elsewhere, therefore, the principal political challenge confronting central and
local government alike is presently – and will remain for the foreseeable future –
facilitating and ensuring inclusive economic growth, even if/when that involves taking
policy steps which risk short-term electoral unpopularity. Inevitably, there will be
compromises. But, provided politics do not stymie the ability of the private sector to
continue to drive high growth levels, India could lift its potential economic growth rate
to 10% or so over the next decade. We explain our reasoning in the final chapter, and
also discuss the implications for India’s financial markets.

80
See Being India by Pavan K Varma (Arrow Books, 2004) page 61.
Mallanaga Vatsyayana was a philosopher in the Carvaka tradition, a materialistic/atheistic school of thought
which is broadly classified alongside Buddhism and Jainism but which died out around the 14th century CE. He
is thought to have lived during the early part of the Gupta period, which lasted from 250 to 550 CE, and is most
famous – in the West at least – for his authorship of the Kama Sutra.
October 2007 86
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Box 26: The economy and international relations


India has long prided itself on being a “status quo” power with a “hands-off” foreign policy. However, the quest for
economic growth is set increasingly to test that positioning both regionally and globally.
The region…
That “India lives in a dangerous neighbourhood” (an oft-repeated observation which is often attributed originally to Henry
Kissinger) has been axiomatic for at least the majority of the post-independence/partition years. Despite “de-hyphenation”
from Pakistan, that is still very much the case. Pakistan itself is politically fragile; full-scale civil war has resumed in Sri
Lanka; Nepal remains unstable; and democratic rule was suspended in January in Bangladesh. Although, as the region’s
most stable country, India gains some benefit from its neighbours’ misfortunes in the form of higher foreign investment and
enhanced trade volumes, regional trade benefits which would otherwise accrue remain unexploited. Most notably, the South
Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC) has, to date, singularly failed to meet its objectives of increasing
economic and trade integration in the region – according to the World Bank intra-regional trade amounts to less than 2% of
South Asian GDP. Furthermore, access to energy sources – a high priority for India – in Iran (via Pakistan), Bangladesh and
(via Bangladesh) Myanmar continues to be problematic.
India’s traditional “non-interference” notwithstanding, economic imperatives and an associated need for regional stability are
now starting to shape policy. India is active behind the scenes in Nepal and is working with the military-backed government
in Bangladesh to deepen commercial ties and to combat terrorism. Bilateral negotiations launched four years ago with
Pakistan (including the landmark nuclear pact signed in February 2007) grind on despite repeated terrorist efforts to derail
the talks (notably the bomb attack on the Mumbai rail system in July 2006 which threatened major disruption to the city’s
critical infrastructure). Indian prime minister Manmohan Singh’s April 2007 offer of (non-reciprocated, if necessary) duty-
free access to the Indian market for the “least developed” SAARC members was another welcome step albeit one which will
yield little benefit without a significant reduction in non-tariff barriers.
...and beyond
However, as an aspiring global power, India has devoted more attention to relations beyond its immediate neighbourhood.
To date, much of this effort has been trade-related. India is now firmly established at the top table of the World Trade
Organisation (WTO), irrespective of the outcome of the Doha Development Round, and bilateral trade agreements are
currently in the pipeline with at least ten potential partners ranging from ASEAN via the EU to the US and Canada. But there
are signs that some of these relations could be set to move to new political and economic levels.
The highest profile to date has been the India/US civil nuclear agreement (which followed the 2005 US-India Defence
Framework). While Indian officials privately concede that its non-ratification, which remains a possibility at the time of
going to print, would have little direct impact substantively, they acknowledge that its symbolic significance – and,
therefore, indirect benefits – to bilateral relations more than justifies the continuing high-level commitment to it by both
parties. Explicit recognition of the importance of this deal lies in the EU’s moves to resume its own nuclear cooperation with
India – a focal point of A.P.J. Abdul Kalam’s 25 April 2007 speech when he became the first Indian president to address the
European parliament and when he proposed the setting up of an “India-EU renewable energy development programme for
taking up advanced R&D in all forms of renewable energy”.
Recent bilateral meetings among the leaders of China, India and Japan point to a range of economic and strategic
considerations underpinning a new – if still tentative – triangular balance in Asia (granted the considerable influence the US
continues to wield regionally). The improvement in the, still delicate, Sino-Indian relations was highlighted by Chinese
president Hu Jintao’s visit to India in November 2006 – although we see then premier Zhu Rongji’s January 2002 visit as in
many ways more important, marking a shift in economic relations which has already driven bilateral trade up from US$3.0bn
in FY02 to US$25.7bn in FY07. India overtook China as the top destination for Japanese aid in 2004 and Japan was the
fourth largest source of foreign direct investment in India in 2006. The commitment earlier this year by prime ministers
Singh and Shinzo Abe to a “strategic and global partnership” has yet to fill out substantively, despite the latter’s August
2007 visit to India, but is only likely further to invigorate economic ties over time.
In “The Argumentative Indian” (2005), the Nobel Prize-winning economist Amartya Sen wrote: “Intellectual links between
India and China, stretching over much of the first millennium and beyond, were important in the history of the two
countries…. [A] broader understanding of the reach of these relations… is important for a fuller appreciation…[of] the
continuing relevance of these connections, linked as they are with contemporary political and social concerns.” While talk of
a “new silk route” may be premature, deepening connectivity between China, India and Japan coupled with India’s strong
historical ties and strengthening contemporary economic links with the Middle East certainly make the emergence of such a
real possibility, with India very much at the hub. Ŷ

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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION AND MARKET IMPLICATIONS

In the preceding chapters we have examined the drivers behind the surge in India’s rate
of growth over the past two decades or so – particularly since the start of the 21st century
– and the factors which will determine whether that growth can be sustained, or even
improved upon, over the next decade. In particular:
• We have taken note of the growth accounting framework, as well as of statistical
techniques which extract the trend component from growth. However, while these
methods are useful to quantify what has happened to an economy, they do not
explain why: on their own, they are not very useful for forecasting the future.
• We have therefore coupled growth accounting with an examination of the policies
and reforms which have driven India’s growth acceleration hitherto, before
assessing whether the current momentum is likely to be maintained if not increased.
Previous growth accounting studies have suggested that India’s long-run potential
economic growth rate has generally risen over time, with most recent estimates ranging
between 7% and 9% (Figure 70). But our two-pronged approach strongly suggests that
even the upper end of this range likely underestimates the reality, such that growth of
10% is, in principle at least, attainable.

Figure 70. Past studies estimating India’s growth potential

Name of study Method used Estimation period Potential


Donde and Saggar (1999) Univariate approach na 6.3

Dhal (1999) Production function & na 8.0 – 10.0


Warranted growth
Goldman Sachs (2003) Growth accounting na 5.7
Rodrik & Subramanian (2004) Growth accounting 1960 – 2002 6.7
Deutsche Bank (2005) Regression na 5.5 – 6.0
IMF (2005) Hodrick-Prescott Filter 1970 – 2003 5.0 – 6.0
Virmani (2006) Growth accounting na 6.5
11th five year plan draft (2006) Simulation models na 9.0
Goldman Sachs (2007) Growth accounting 1971 – 2005 8.0
Ranjan et al (2007) Hodrick-Prescott Filter & 1981 – 2006 7.0 – 8.0
Warranted growth
Oura (2007) Growth accounting na 8.0 – 9.0
Source: See references at the back of the report.

Notwithstanding the strongly positive impact on growth which structural reforms to date
continue to impart and the remarkable ability of Indian business to work around the
various structural and systemic challenges which it faces, our optimism is contingent
upon India continuing along the path of structural reform. Thus it is that India has the
scope, in our judgement, to lift its long-run potential growth rate higher still to 10%.
A key reason for our optimism is that India’s economy is showing evidence of structural
changes, led by the business sector. In accounting for India’s growth acceleration we,
like others, find that stronger labour productivity growth has been a key driver. Also
encouraging is that India’s economy appears to be taking on many of the characteristics
exhibited by other large emerging Asian economies during the early stages of economic
take-off. Essentially, their take-offs involved the sort of dynamic interactions – or
virtuous circles – which have not occurred in India until recently, and hence which
cannot be isolated from its past using conventional, comparative-static, growth
accounting analysis. These virtuous circles work as follows:
1. Rising incomes, an increasingly open economy and stable macroeconomic
conditions stimulate demand – domestic consumption and exports –and imbue the

October 2007 88
Lehman Brothers | India: Everything to play for

private sector and foreigners with the confidence to engage in investment on a large
and growing scale.
2. Rapidly growing investment augments the economy’s productive capacity,
benefiting from economies of scale and putting downward pressure on prices,
obviating the need for macroeconomic policy to slow the economy in order to damp
inflation.
3. Sustained, rapid economic growth improves the public sector’s financial position,
thereby reducing the public sector’s claim on resources and freeing them up, in an
environment of downward pressure on interest rates, for further private sector
capital formation.
We see encouraging evidence of all three circles in India’s growth dynamic.
The importance of virtuous economic spirals in driving structural growth accelerations is
highlighted by the success of the East Asian economies. After isolating the episodes of
economic take-off for the Asian countries over 1955-2006, we find a moderately positive
relationship exists between the investment-to-GDP ratio and the growth in labour
productivity. 81 The relationship is more strongly positive in the case of India’s economic
take-off since FY94 (Figure 71). The relationship is also more strongly positive for those
countries which have experienced particularly rapid economic take-offs of 10% growth
or more (Figure 72). This supports our judgement that India still has much to gain from
creating an increasingly enabling environment for business, so that its strong
demographic and urbanisation trends work to maximum advantage. It also supports our
view that, when economies develop rapidly, there can be dynamic interactions resulting
in powerful increasing returns to scale which are often underestimated when forecasting
potential growth.
We see the following ten yardsticks as central to assessing whether policy is heading in a
direction consistent with a further lift in India’s potential growth rate to 10% or so.
1. Financial sector development: We estimate that further reforms, most notably
developing the corporate bond market, could add 1.0-1.5 percentage points to
India’s long-term GDP growth.
2. Fiscal consolidation: With favourable public debt dynamics, continued progress in
reducing the budget deficit can have large payoffs in boosting public savings. With
prudent fiscal policy, we project that India’s public debt-to-GDP ratio could decline
from 75% to about 60% by FY12.

Figure 71. Labour productivity and investment rate- I Figure 72. Labour productivity and investment rate-II

50 50 Asia (GDP<10%) Asia (GDP>10%) India


Asia India

2006-07 2006-07
Investment (% of GDP)

40 40
Investment (% of GDP)

30 30

20 20
1993-94 1993-94

10 10
0 4 8 12 0 4 8 12
Labour productivity (%) Labour productivity (%)

Source: CEIC, NSSO, WDI, IFS, ESRI, ILO and Lehman Brothers. Source: CEIC, NSSO, WDI, IFS, ESRI, ILO and Lehman Brothers.

81
The data are annual and the take-off periods are defined as when real GDP per capita grows by more than 3%
for at least five years (see Box 1: Economic take-off – definitions and drivers).
October 2007 89
Lehman Brothers | India: Everything to play for

3. FDI liberalisation: Relaxing restrictions in the banking, insurance and retail sectors
could provide major opportunities for development in finance and agriculture. In
particular, opening up the retail sector to foreigners could help India become a food
factory for the world.
4. Improving physical infrastructure and reducing bureaucracy: Because of these
constraints to business, India has failed to capitalise fully on its global comparative
advantages in labour-intensive industries. By relaxing these shackles on business we
judge that India’s exports-to-GDP ratio of about 50% could double in the next
decade, adding 1.5 percentage points to GDP growth.
5. Electricity supply: Among a range of “hard” infrastructure challenges, the
provision of electricity ranks high, with the added challenge of generating “clean”
power to sustain high growth levels while addressing climate change concerns from
which India stands to be significantly and adversely affected (see also 10 below).
6. Revitalising privatisation. Public ownership of companies remains excessive in
India. International evidence shows that this tends to stymie product market
competition since publicly owned companies are generally less incentivised towards
profit maximisation than their private sector counterparts and are more prone to
political influence and moral hazard problems. A key reform would be reducing the
dominance of public-sector banks.
7. Labour market deregulation: India’s labour laws need to be more flexible in order
for firms to increase employment and grow to exploit economies of scale.
Developing a stronger safety net could be an important catalyst for labour reforms.
The urgency is magnified by the need to ensure that India’s strong demographic
trend is a dividend and not a dilemma: with half the population under 25 years old,
the working age population is set to swell by 150m over the next decade.
8. Education and health reform: These two policy areas go to the heart of the
inclusive growth agenda by developing social services consistent with boosting
participation in the organised sector of the economy, especially among non-
graduates and in rural areas. They are key to employing the younger generation.
9. Managing urbanisation: State authorities in particular can facilitate addressing the
challenges of urbanisation by following the examples of New Delhi and, more
recently, Mumbai in allowing the private sector into urban redevelopment.
10. International relations: India is increasingly active in promoting closer ties with its
neighbours, including China, which stands to benefit the region as a whole
economically. More widely, India should continue to take a lead in multilateral trade
liberalisation against the threat of rising protectionism in the developed world.
Similarly, India has much to gain by setting a positive lead consistent with
sustainable growth in the post-Kyoto process.
These indicators sit at the top of a raft of issues that will need to be addressed by central
and local authorities in India if inclusive growth targets are to be met even though they
present major political challenges given the headwinds from vested interests and
democratic coalition-dominated politics. But there will be a new window for rejuvenating
reforms after the next general election, reinforced by a recognition of the potentially
serious consequences in terms of inclusive growth – given the strong trends of
demography and urbanisation – if the shackles on business are not eased.
In sum, India’s economy is nearing an important inflection point. It has the potential to
raise its economic growth rate to 10% or so over the next decade. In realising that goal,
continued structural reforms and prudent macro policies will be critical. India therefore
has “everything to play for”.

October 2007 90
Lehman Brothers | India: Everything to play for

THE OUTLOOK FOR THE INDIAN STOCK MARKET

SUMMARY
Supriya Menon Given the prospects for a sustained high rate of nominal and real economic growth
LBIE, Europe described elsewhere in this publication, the Indian stock market should perform very
44-207-102-4557 well over the medium to long term. Although multiples have risen recently, and are
supmenon@lehman.com reaching levels where the short-term potential for the market might seem lower than it
has been over recent years, continued growth in GDP and earnings should mean that
Prabhat Awasthi investors can still achieve solid returns (Figure 73); our modeling derives expected
LBSPL, India returns of between 12% and 20% over the next five years.
91-22-4037-4180 Before going into details of our approach to valuation, we first discuss the structure of
pawasthi@lehman.com the market.

Ian Scott Figure 73. The BSE Sensex total return daily since 2000
LBIE, Europe
44-207-102-2959
Index (31 Dec 1999=100)
iscott@lehman.com
350

300

250

200

150

100

50

0
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Source: Datastream, BSE, Lehman Brothers.

MARKET STRUCTURE
If, as we judge to be the case, India is to “take-off” to a higher growth trajectory, equity
markets have a vital role to play in the dynamic interaction of savings and productive
investments. India’s equity market infrastructure is quite developed relative to its stage
in economic development, as befits a country with a strong “equity culture”. Total
market capitalisation stands at US$1.1bn, on a par with the South Korean and Italian
markets. 82 As a proportion of GDP though, the Indian market, at 89% 83, stands above
most other large emerging markets such as China (43%), Brazil (68%), Mexico (41%),
Poland (44%) and Turkey (55%) 84, with Russia the exception (98%) (Figure 74).
Lehman Brothers does and seeks to do business with companies covered in its research reports. As a result,
investors should be aware that the firm may have a conflict of interest that could affect the objectivity of this
report.
Investors should consider this section of the report as only a single factor in making their investment decision.
This research report has been prepared in whole or in part by research analysts employed by foreign affiliates
of Lehman Brothers Inc. who, while qualified in their home jurisdictions, are not registered / qualified with the
NYSE or NASD.
PLEASE SEE ANALYST CERTIFICATIONS AND IMPORTANT DISCLOSURES INCLUDING FOREIGN AFFILIATE
DISCLOSURES ON PAGE 171 OF THIS REPORT.

82
BSE.
83
BSE.
84
As of end 2006. Source: World Federation of Exchanges.
October 2007 91
Lehman Brothers | India: Everything to play for

Figure 74. Market cap/GDP ratio for selected national equity markets
Stock market cap/GDP (end-2006)
Hong Kong 904%
Singapore 291%
Taiwan 167%
Malaysia 158%
Australia 145%
Russia 98%
Korea 94%
India (BSE) 92%
India (NSE) 84%
Brazil 68%
Italy 55%
Turkey 55%
Poland 44%
China 43%
Mexico 41%

Source: World Federation of Exchanges.

One clear demonstration of the developed equity culture is the sheer number of listed
companies in India. The Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) lists nearly 4800 companies,
more than are listed on either the NYSE (2280) or the London Stock Exchange (3256). 85

Figure 75. Number of companies listed by exchange


No. of listed companies (end-2006)
India (BSE) 4796
US (NYSE group) 2280
China (Shanghai SE) 842
Korea Exchange 1689
Hong Kong Exchanges 1173
Japan (Tokyo SE) 2416
UK (London SE) 3256
Germany (Deutsche Borse) 760
Malaysia (Bursa Malaysia) 1025
Brazil (Sao Paolo SE) 350

Source: World Federation of Exchanges.

There are two major exchanges in India. The Bombay Stock Exchange was founded in
1875 and obtained “permanent recognition” in 1956. The National Stock Exchange
(NSE) was established much later, in 1995. They have roughly the same market
capitalisation, with several companies listed on both exchanges (Figure 76).

85
End-2006, Source: World Federation of Exchanges.
October 2007 92
Lehman Brothers | India: Everything to play for

Figure 76. Stock market statistics


NSE BSE
Market capitalisation (INRbn) 42,588 45,091
Market capitalisation (US$bn) 1,071 1,133
Market cap % GDP (2006) 85% 89%
Volume (million-30 day average) 493.7 350.4
Value (US$m-30 day average) 2,697.9 1,222
Derivatives trading volume (options and futures-INRbn-30d avg) 494.9
Derivatives trading volume (options and futures-US$bn) 11.9
No. of companies listed 1283 4853

As of 6 September 2007, unless otherwise mentioned


Using current INRUS$ exchange rate of 40.7
Source: BSE, NSE, World Federation of Exchanges, Datastream, Bloomberg.

The turnover by volume is higher on the NSE than the BSE. Around US$2.7bn trades in
the cash market on the NSE each day, more than twice as high as the BSE. Derivative
trading is concentrated on the NSE (Figure 77). At the single stock level, US$6.3bn per
day is traded, the majority in single stock futures; index derivatives trading adds another
US$4bn a day. 86

Figure 77. Futures and options daily turnover on the NSE

Rs. billion
900
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
Apr-02 Dec-02 Aug-03 Apr-04 Dec-04 Aug-05 Apr-06 Dec-06 Aug-07

Source: Bloomberg, NSE.

The primary market is also active, with US$48bn of new issues over the past three years.
Net issuance (issuance adjusted for buybacks) was equivalent to 2.5% of market
capitalisation in August, down from 3.4% a year ago and a peak rate of 8% in the mid-
1990s, as shown in Figure 78.

86
30-day averages. Source: Bloomberg, NSE.
October 2007 93
Lehman Brothers | India: Everything to play for

Figure 78. Net issuance

12M Trail as % Mcap


8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
-1
90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07

Source: SDC, Bloomberg, Datastream, Lehman Brothers, various.

Compared with both Emerging and Developed Market universes, the Indian market is
well diversified. Five sectors have weights of more than 10%: Capital Goods, Consumer
Cyclicals, Energy, Financials and Technology (Figure 79). Financials, on the other hand,
constitute only 14% of market capitalisation in India, compared with 24% for both the
Developed Market index and Emerging Markets.

Figure 79. Breakdown of sectors by market cap for India, EM and World
India World EM
BASIC INDUSTRIES 8% 8% 13%
CAPITAL GOODS 10% 9% 6%
CONSUMER CYCLICALS 13% 12% 9%
CONSUMER STABLES 5% 8% 5%
ENERGY 16% 9% 21%
FINANCIALS & INSURANCE 14% 24% 24%
HEALTH CARE 4% 8% 1%
MEDIA 2% 3% 1%
TECHNOLOGY 12% 9% 6%
TELECOMS 9% 6% 10%
UTILITIES 7% 5% 5%

As of September 6, 2007.
Using BSE 500 for India, and FTSE indices for World and Emerging Markets
Source: BSE, FTSE, Lehman Brothers.

FUNDAMENTALS
The first fundamental question to address when analysing equities in a fast-growing
economy like India’s is whether the accelerated pace of growth has filtered through to
corporate profits. As we indicate in Figure 80, the 113% expansion in India’s nominal
GDP over the past six years has been associated with a 168% expansion in stock market
earnings. 87 On the face of it at least, strong economic growth has been reflected in a very
high growth rate for corporate profits.

87
BSE 30 companies.
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Lehman Brothers | India: Everything to play for

Figure 80. BSE 100 earnings and Indian GDP

Index (Q3 1999=100)


300

250

200

150

100

50
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Nominal GDP, Seasonally Adjusted BSE 30 Earnings

Last data point for GDP series is calculated based on the GDP growth estimate from Lehman Economics
Source: BSE, Datastream, Lehman Brothers, OECD.

The next question related to this rapid expansion in earnings is whether it has been
achieved with an efficient use of capital. As shown in Figure 81, returns have declined
slightly in the past year or so, but they remain well above the level achieved five years
ago and also above the returns achieved elsewhere in Emerging Markets.

Figure 81. Return on equity: India and Emerging Markets

%
30

25

20

15

10

5
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

India Emerging Markets

Source: FTSE, Worldscope, Factset, Lehman Brothers, Extel.

With these attractive returns available, it is not surprising that Indian companies have
been increasing their investment spending and thus, in contrast to other Emerging
Markets, have seen their capex-to-sales ratio expand steadily (Figure 82).

October 2007 95
Lehman Brothers | India: Everything to play for

Figure 82. Capex to sales ratio

%
12

10

2
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

India Emerging Markets

Source: FTSE, Worldscope, Factset, Lehman Brothers.

This increased spending on capex has contributed to a decline in the free cash flow of the
(non-financial) market as a whole (Figure 83).

Figure 83. Indian listed non-financial companies’ free cash flow

Index (July 2000=100)


8,000
7,000
6,000
5,000
4,000
3,000
2,000
1,000
0
-1,000
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Source: Lehman Brothers, FTSE, Worldscope, Exshare.

Further evidence that this expanded capex budget has been financed out of retained
earnings, rather than by debt, is given by the data in Figure 84. Indian balance sheets are
not heavily geared. Non-financial companies have a net debt-to-equity ratio of 28%
compared with Emerging Markets as a whole at 38%.

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Lehman Brothers | India: Everything to play for

Figure 84. Debt-to-equity ratio

Ratio
0.70
0.60
0.50
0.40
0.30
0.20
0.10
0.00
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

India Emerging Markets

Source: Lehman Brothers, FTSE, Worldscope, Exshare.

Indian companies’ sound balance sheet management is reflected in the Indian market’s
low Altman z-score. This number, which is used to predict corporate bankruptcy, ties the
strength of the balance sheet to sales and margins as well as the operational health of the
company. As Figure 85 illustrates, India’s score has not only improved rapidly but is also
the highest in non-Japan Asia. 88 However, much of this progress in creditworthiness has
been appreciated by the market.

Figure 85. India’s Altman z-score

2
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Source: Worldscope, Compustat, IBES.

Components of the Altman z-score:


EBIT/Total assets: This ratio is used to look at the relationship between assets and pre-
tax earnings and how these earnings are being created. A large and cumbersome balance
sheet can create lots of earnings. A small balance sheet that creates large earnings is
obviously a better option.
Sales/Total assets: This ratio is also comprehensive in that it looks at the relationship
between the asset base and sales. This criterion speaks to the way in which the short-term
portion of the balance sheet is optimised to create sales. Bloated receivables and/or
inventories in the top half of the balance sheet bring down the overall score.
Market value/Total liabilities: This is an interesting ratio in that it indicates the way in
which the market perceives the balance sheet. If the market perceives that the company’s

88
India’s Altman z-score of 5.95 compares to 3.33 for Asia ex-Japan, 2.79 in the US, and 2.35 in Japan.
October 2007 97
Lehman Brothers | India: Everything to play for

leverage is getting too high, it will punish the company by selling down ownership in it.
Thus a falling market value gives off a signal and produces a low Altman score.
Working capital/Total assets: This criterion speaks to the way the company handles its
cash and receivables relative to its payables, given the size of its asset base. It is an all-
in-one score of balance sheet management.
Retained earnings/Total Assets: This measure looks at the accumulated profits of a
company relative to the asset base. 89
As internal funds have been increasingly allocated to investment spending of one sort or
another, the pay-out ratio (defined as gross dividends paid relative to forward earnings)
declined from around 35% in 2004 to 22% currently (Figure 86).

Figure 86. India’s payout ratio

Ratio
0.40

0.36

0.32

0.28

0.24

0.20
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

BSE 30 BSE 100

Source: Lehman Brothers, BSE.

The fundamental underpinnings of the Indian market—earnings growth, high levels of


profitability and strong balance sheets—are very strong, by our analysis; however, the
next question to ask is: what is the market paying for these healthy fundamentals?

VALUATION
There are a number of ways of approaching the question of valuation for a market like
India. In the first instance, we review some of the market’s current trade multiples. The
market was recently trading at 18.7 times 12-month forward consensus earnings 90
(Figure 86); this is a high multiple both in terms of India’s historical performance and
relative to other global markets. The only other countries among the emerging markets
that currently trade at higher multiples are Argentina (30.3x), Chile (18.8x), and China 91
(24.9x).

89
For more detail, please refer to “The Credit Side of Equities in Asia ex-Japan”, Part 1; Paul Schulte/Justin Lau,
available on LehmanLive.
90
All multiples refer to the FTSE World indices
91
The FTSE World China index refers to H and B-shares only.
October 2007 98
Lehman Brothers | India: Everything to play for

Figure 87. Indian market 12-month forward consensus P/E multiple

Ratio
18

16

14

12

10

6
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Using FTSE India index


Source: Lehman Brothers, FTSE, IBES, Factset.

With the global Emerging Market index currently trading at 13.5x forward 12-month
earnings, the 32% premium accorded to the Indian market is towards the upper end of
the historical range (Figure 88). Several Indian corporates are executing new businesses
in step-down subsidiaries and P/E ratios do not reflect consolidated earnings in several
cases. Sometimes consolidation is not done because these subsidiaries are not yet
operational and sometimes because core business and subsidiary businesses are totally
different. A rough cut estimate shows that this could account for as much as 8-10% of
the valuation of the overall market.

Figure 88. India’s P/E ratio relative to emerging markets P/E ratio

Ratio
1.6
1.5
1.4
1.3
1.2
1.1
1.0
0.9
0.8
0.7
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Using FTSE indices for both EM and India


Source: Lehman Brothers, FTSE, IBES, Factset.

Viewed in the context of a risk premium (earnings yield less real bond yield) the Indian
market also looks slightly expensive. The current Indian market premium of 4.45%
compares with an embedded risk premium in Emerging Markets as a whole of 4.57%
(Figure 89).

October 2007 99
Lehman Brothers | India: Everything to play for

Figure 89. Indian and Emerging Market equity risk premiums (Static estimation*)

%
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
-2
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

India Emerging Markets

* The Equity Risk Premium is calculated as the difference between the earnings yield and the real bond yield
Source: FTSE, Worldscope, Factset, Lehman Brothers, IBES, Datstream.

Next, we endeavor to benchmark Indian sectoral valuation with those in the rest of the
Emerging Markets “space” and the multiples prevailing in the Developed Markets
(Figure 90). Relative to the Emerging Markets index, nine out of 11 sectors are more
expensive in India and only two have lower P/E multiples. A comparison of sectoral P/E
ratios reveals the widest gaps in valuations in the telecoms, consumer staples, capital
goods and technology sectors. Relative to the Developed Markets “space”, there are nine
sectors that currently trade on more expensive multiples in India.

Figure 90. Comparison of sectoral valuations


India EM World India EM World India
Forward PE Dividend Yield
Basic Industries 13.0 11.5 12.7 0.9 1.8 1.9
Capital Goods 21.2 15.1 15.4 0.8 1.4 1.7
Consumer Cyclicals 13.9 15.1 15.1 1.8 0.1 1.6
Consumer Staples 23.7 17.5 17.3 2.6 2.2 2.2
Energy 9.5 9.7 11.6 4.0 2.6 2.1
Financials 16.8 13.7 10.8 1.0 1.5 3.0
Health 19.0 16.9 15.4 1.3 1.0 2.2
Media 32.7 17.0 17.6 0.5 1.6 1.4
Technology 19.6 12.6 18.1 0.8 2.4 0.8
Telecoms 21.5 12.6 14.6 0.1 2.2 3.4
Utilities 18.1 15.4 15.4 1.4 2.3 3.1

Sector-Neutral 19.0 14.3 14.9 1.4 1.7 2.1

Source: Lehman Brothers, IBES, Factset, Worldscope, Extel, FTSE.

Thus, at first blush the Indian market appears expensively priced both on an absolute basis
and relative to other Emerging Markets. Yet these static comparisons do not take into
account the higher growth projected for the Indian economy. With such a fast growth
market it is important to value the future growth prospects, as uncertain as they are.

FACTORING IN FUTURE POTENTIAL


In factoring in the future growth potential of the Indian economy, we have appealed to
the Gordon Growth model, i.e., dividend yield plus growth equals the bond yield plus a
risk premium. Clearly the bond yield and dividend yield are known, so the key is the
future growth rate.

October 2007 100


Lehman Brothers | India: Everything to play for

If we assume that in the long-run earnings grow in line with nominal GDP growth, the
projections derived elsewhere in this report of approximately 15% long-run nominal
GDP growth, (real GDP growth of 10% and long-run inflation of 5%) suggest a risk
premium over the long run of about 8% (Figure 91).

Figure 91. Gordon growth model derived equity risk premium

Using: DY * (earnings growth) = Bond yield * RP

Dividend yield 1%
Nominal Economic Growth (proxy for earnings growth) 15.0%
RoE* (1-payout ratio) as proxy for earnings growth using RoE of 20% and
Retention ratio of 0.78 15.6%
Bond Yield (10-yr govt bond yield) 7.75%

Gives Risk Premium of 7.8% or 8.4%; rounding to 8%

Adding the risk premium to the risk free rate of 7.75% gives an expected total
return of about 16%pa.

We expect 12%-20% upside in the next 12 months


Source: Lehman Brothers.

An alternative approach to estimating the long-run earnings growth potential of the


Indian market is to make assumptions about the potential reinvestment rate for the listed
sector. Currently Indian listed companies are enjoying a return on equity (ROE) of
22.4%. This is above the long-run average of 20.2% (Figure 81).
If we assume that a long-run ROE of about 20% is achievable and also assume that the
current payout ratio / reinvestment rate split stays at 21% / 79% (Figure 86), then the
long-run expected growth rate would also be 15%, i.e., the same answer we derived
using projected nominal GDP growth rates.
Again plugging this into our Gordon Growth Model gives a long-run risk premium of
8%. So factoring in the long-run growth potential produces an expected total return of
16% (dividend yield + growth) and a generous risk premium of 8%. Assuming long-run
inflation of 5%, this suggests a long-run real return of 11%.
This risk premium is above most estimates of the long-run achieved premium in markets
such as the US and UK, as well as other studies on a global basis. But what of the risks
associated with investing in Indian equities?
In absolute terms, the volatility of monthly price moves in the BSE index shows a
declining pattern since 2000 (Figure 92).

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Lehman Brothers | India: Everything to play for

Figure 92. Volatility of monthly returns in India and Emerging Markets

%
12

10

2
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

India Emerging Markets

Measured as the 30-month standard deviation of monthly returns on the BSE 100 and FTSE Emerging indices
Source: BSE, FTSE, Datastream, Lehman Brothers.

This follows from a marked paring back of earnings volatility for both the BSE 100 and
BSE 30 (Figure 93).

Figure 93. Volatility of monthly earnings growth in India and emerging markets

%
10

4
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

BSE 100 BSE 30

Measured as the 30-month standard deviation of monthly earnings growth on the BSE 100 and BSE 30 indices
Source: BSE, Lehman Brothers.

However, from a portfolio perspective, the volatility of relative returns is key. In beta
terms, the market has become far more levered to both emerging and global markets.
The beta of monthly returns relative to global equities has picked up from 0.32 in July
1997 to 2.1 currently (Figure 94).

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Lehman Brothers | India: Everything to play for

Figure 94. Beta of monthly returns of the Indian relative to global markets

Ratio
3.0

2.5

2.0

1.5

1.0

0.5

0.0
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Measured as the 30-month rolling regression of monthly returns of the BSE 100 relative to the FTSE World index
Source: BSE, Datastream, FTSE, Lehman Brothers.

The sharp uptick in beta is unsurprising given the increased participation of foreign
institutional investors (FIIs) in the domestic market, as restrictions on investment have
been relaxed and the market is more mature. FII net inflows have increased tenfold, from
a weekly average of US$28m in 1999 to nearly US$300m in 2007 (Figure 95).

Figure 95. Net FII inflows

USD Millions
2,000

1,500

1,000

500

-500

-1,000

-1,500
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Measured weekly
Source: SEBI, Bloomberg, Lehman Brothers.

CONCLUSION
Thus, although current static multiples look high, if growth is achieved then stocks are
attractively priced even on a risk-adjusted basis. We expect Indian equities to outperform
developed and emerging market indices over a five-year horizon.

October 2007 103


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EQUITY ANALYSIS OF INDIVIDUAL SECTORS

TELECOMMUNICATIONS

Snapshot
Sundeep Bihani Industry market cap INR3749bn (US$95bn) Size estimate INR919bn, US$22.4bn
LBSPL, India (FY07)
852-2252-6181 Industry ROE 20-35% (FY07) 5 year historical CAGR 25.9%
sundeep.bihani@lehman.com Key listed companies Bharti Airtel Forecast CAGR 16.2% (FY07-12)
Reliance
Communications
Industry/GDP 2.56%
Current cap utilisation 70-75%

Source: Bloomberg, Lehman Brothers.

Figure 96. Price chart of key stocks in the industry (indexed to 100)
700

600

500

400

300

200

100

0
Aug-04 Feb-05 Aug-05 Feb-06 Aug-06 Feb-07 Aug-07
Bharti Rel. Com
Source: Bloomberg. Key stocks are defined according to market capitalisation.

Growth and leverage to higher Indian growth


The telecommunications sector has been one of the fastest-growing in India in 2002-07,
driven mainly by wireless expansion. According to the Telecom Regulatory Authority of
India (TRAI), at the end of March 2007, India had 165m wireless and 41m wireline
connections – a tele-density of 18%. Further monthly additions at 8m have already
outpaced connections growth in China. We expect sector revenue growth to remain robust,
driven by rapidly increasing disposable income, demographics (large population of young
people) and lack of alternate communication media in rural areas. We estimate a 9-10%
real GDP growth rate, combined with wireless spending rising from 1.4% to 2.3% of GDP,
to drive a threefold increase in total telephone connections over the next five years. We
expect this growth to be backed by about US$40bn of capital spending, mainly in rural
areas, in 2007-12, also creating significant employment opportunities and rural
productivity gains. Such robust growth should promote several new sectors in the
handset/equipment manufacturing, mobile content areas and asset/infrastructure services.
Meanwhile, household access lines have been stagnant as a result of low return on invested
capital (ROICs), although strong IT/ITES growth and global connectivity requirements
have driven robust growth in business access lines. We remain positive and expect stronger
consumer broadband growth driven by increased urbanization, falling PC prices and higher
education standards.
Structure
The Indian wireless sector is fragmented, with 5-6 wireless operators in every province
and no restrictions on new entrants, driven by the regulator’s desire for a pro-consumer
October 2007 104
Lehman Brothers | India: Everything to play for

environment and rural penetration growth. However, a combination of first-mover


advantage, rational pricing behaviour and superior execution has led to quasi-
consolidation, where the top four operators garner 75-80% of all new wireless
subscribers, leading to robust earnings growth. Because of strong operator backing by
cash rich conglomerates and international operators, we do not foresee any
consolidation. The government is now considering proposals to further stir-up
competition, which, if implemented, could dampen the strong earnings growth of the
larger operators in the medium term. Meanwhile, the wireline sector remains mostly
under government control, with private players focusing on the business and high-end
consumer space.
Competition
We rate Indian wireless operators globally competitive on both opex management and
capex efficiency. Comparisons with similar-sized operators reveal far lower cost per
minute and higher asset productivity. We believe the key driver has been a strong
competitive environment with tariffs being the lowest in the world. Bharti Airtel has a
cost per minute of US$0.011, 50% lower than operators in China and Indonesia.

Figure 97. Key parameters of some telecom majors


2006 Bharti China Mobile China Unicom Telkomsel
YE subscribers (m) 37.1 301.2 142.4 38.9
Cost per min (US$) 0.011 0.021 0.026 0.023
Subs per employee (k) 3.24 2.88 2.69 9.38
ROE 37% 22% 5% 55%

Source: Company reports.

Opportunity
We expect Indian telecom operators to focus primarily on India over the next few years.
In FY07-12, we expect industry revenues to grow at a 16% CAGR, with India emerging
as the second-largest telecommunications market by number of subscribers. Rural
wireless penetration is still below 10% and, with a population of roughly 700m, should
provide an excellent opportunity for these operators to leverage on India’s consumption
boom. In urban markets, we expect broadband growth to add another layer of revenues to
already high wireless usage. We believe that Indian wireless operators have been
successful in building low-cost business models that are likely to be exported and
replicated in other newly emerging markets as well as a few developed markets globally.
Risks
We would place industry growth risks into three buckets: 1) regulatory; 2) supply-side
resource constraints and 3) consumer spending slowdown. Given that telecom is a
regulation-heavy sector, any government attempts at tariff controls or mandatory
spending could cause a slowdown in capex investments, directly affect sector revenue
growth, and, indirectly, even affect potential GDP gains. Supply-side threats are more in
the form of spectrum, power and road infrastructure, all of which can drive up the cost of
service and keep services out of the reach of the rural user. The third bucket is a mild
wireless risk given low service tariffs, but can affect spending on broadband.
Key company profiles
• Bharti Airtel: Bharti is the largest private-sector integrated operator by revenue,
with more than 40m subscribers. Market cap – INR 1786bn.
• Reliance Communications: Reliance has 25m subscribers in India and owns FLAG
Telecom. The company was listed in March 2006. Market cap – INR 1197bn
• BSNL: BSNL (unlisted) is the government-owned fixed-line incumbent. It has a
wireline market share exceeding 90% and is India’s fourth-largest wireless operator.

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Lehman Brothers | India: Everything to play for

REAL ESTATE

Snapshot
Manish Gunwani Industry market cap US$ 50bn Size estimate* INR1620bn, US$40bn
LBSPL, India Industry ROE ~50% 5-year historical CAGR NA
91-22-4037-4182 Forecast CAGR NA
manish.gunwani@lehman.com DLF, Unitech Industry/GDP* 4%
Key listed companies
Current cap util Not Applicable

Source: Bloomberg, Lehman Brothers.


(* Much of the industry is unorganized, so these are our rough estimates)

Figure 98. Price chart of key stocks in the industry (indexed to 100)

250

200

150

100

50

0
Sep-06 Nov-06 Dec-06 Feb-07 Mar-07 May-07 Jun-07 Aug-07 Sep-07

Unitech DLF
Source: Bloomberg. Key stocks according to market capitalization.

Growth and leverage to higher India growth


The real estate sector is developing rapidly in India. The demand side has robust and
sustainable macro drivers across all segments:
• Residential: Accounting for more than 70% of the sector in terms of space,
residential segment growth is driven by urbanization and the migration of
households up the income curve. According to the National Council of Applied
Economic Research estimates, the number of urban households earning more than
INR 500,000 (about US$12,000) should more than double to 7.6m in 2006-10.
• Commercial: Rapid growth in IT/ITES services (manpower in the sector has
doubled in the past three years to 1.6m) is the main driver of Grade A commercial
office space demand. Jones Lang LaSalle, a property consultancy, estimates that the
absorption of office space in the top seven cities in India was 31.1m square feet in
2006.
• Retail: According to CRIS INFAC, the penetration of organized retail into the
overall market will increase from 3.5% in 2005 to 8% in 2010, thereby driving the
demand for mall space.
• Hospitality: According to CRISIL, the number of 5-star rooms is expected to grow
by 60% in the next four years with foreign tourist arrivals growing at 10% CAGR.

Structure
The real estate industry has historically been fragmented and opaque, but this is
changing:

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Lehman Brothers | India: Everything to play for

• Penetration of mortgage finance: Mortgage disbursals grew by 38% in FY2001-06


and have become an integral part of the buying process. This has helped reduce the
unaccounted “cash component” of transactions.
• Entry of foreign capital: Regulations governing foreign capital in the sector have
been relaxed, motivating developers to become transparent and improve corporate
governance.
• Change in legislation: In many states, strict laws like the Urban Land Ceiling Act
(which defines ceiling of land holdings in urban areas) have been repealed or
modified.
• Consumer preferences: Consumers are now willing to pay premium prices for
better amenities and a good brand. In response, most of the bigger developers are
scaling up geographically, which necessitates rigorous systems and processes.

Risks
• Macroeconomic risks: Since the sector forms a large part of the savings and capital
formation of the country, it is leveraged highly on GDP growth, interest rates, and so
on. At present, because of the steep rise in property prices in the past three years and
increase in interest rates, affordability has been affected and, consequently,
transaction volumes have dropped considerably.
• Slowdown in IT/ITES: A slowdown in the US-centric IT services industry could
severely affect the industry, especially the commercial segment.
• Underdeveloped financial markets: Mortgage loans require lenders with long-term
liabilities. However, the debt market in India is underdeveloped, preventing pension
funds and insurance companies from being active in the mortgage space. This could
hinder growth of mortgage finance and dampen demand.

Key company profiles


• DLF: DLF is the largest Indian real estate developer. With six decades of
experience, the company has been able to create a strong brand. It has sold
approximately 224m sq. ft. of developed area so far, mainly plots. It currently
possesses a land bank of about 10,500 acres with a saleable area of approximately
600m sq. ft. Although it is a pan-Indian player with a presence in 32 cities and
towns, about 51% of its land bank is in the National Capital Region (NCR) and
another 25% in Kolkata. Market cap – INR 1303bn
• Unitech: Unitech is the second-largest player in the Indian real estate market. Its
land bank is approximately the same as DLF’s, at 10,500 acres, but with a saleable
area of about 500m sqft. Unitech is a pan-Indian player with a presence in cities
such as Kolkata, Chennai, Gurgaon, Noida, Greater Noida, Varanasi, Agra. About
25% of its land bank is in Kolkata and another 20% in Chennai. About 22% of its
land bank is concentrated in tier-3 cities such as Varanasi and Agra. Market cap –
INR 515bn.

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STEEL

Snapshot
Prabhat Awasthi Industry market cap INR 1706.4bn Size estimate INR1209bn (FY07),
LBSPL, India US$ 27.9bn
91-22-4037-4180 Industry ROE 26.3% 5-year historical CAGR 16.1%
prabhat.awasthi@lehman.com Key listed companies Tata Steel Forecast CAGR 5 year NA
Steel Authority of India Ltd Industry/GDP [2007] 4.2%
JSW Steel Current cap util Not Available

Source: Bloomberg, Lehman Brothers.

Figure 99. Price chart for key stocks in the industry (indexed to 100)

350
JSW Steel
300
SAIL
250 Tata Steel

200

150

100

50

0
Apr-05 Aug-05 Dec-05 Apr-06 Aug-06 Dec-06 Apr-07 Aug-07

Source: Bloomberg. Key stocks are defined according to market capitalisation.

Booming economy and high Infrastructure spending should fuel growth


The Indian steel sector is growing strongly as a result of the booming economy and
heavy infrastructure spending. Sector revenue has grown at a CAGR of 16% in the past
five years.
Construction accounts for close to 60% and Autos 28% of total steel consumption in
India. Given that we expect Infrastructure and Autos to grow at a CAGR of 20% and
15%, respectively, the steel sector is poised to grow at a healthy pace.

Competition
The Indian steel industry is quite fragmented, with 5-6 primary players and a large
number of secondary producers. With prices determined by global markets, competition
in the local market is not of material impact in determining prices; the latter follow
global price trends.

Opportunities
According to National Steel Policy-1995, consumption of finished steel is expected to
grow at a CAGR of 7.5% to 110m tons in FY2020. All the major players have
announced large capacity expansion plans for the next 10 years to meet the increased
demand. With large increases in raw material prices (iron ore and coal) in the
international market over the past three years, Indian players look well placed to benefit
from their fully integrated structure (in terms of access to cheap iron ore and in some
cases coal). All the new capacities being announced have been assured of captive iron
ore mines. With the outlook for steel prices remaining firm, the steel industry is well
placed to reap the benefits of India’s growth.

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Risks
Any downturn in economic growth would likely have a direct negative impact on Indian
steel industry. Other potential risks to the sector are high-coking coal prices. India
depends on imports for low-ash, high-quality coal. Any negative surprise on that front
could slow the expansion plans of the industry.

Key company profiles


• Steel Authority of India Ltd (SAIL): SAIL is the largest steel manufacturer in
India with a capacity of 13m tpa. It has close to 30% of market share. It has
announced plans to increase hot metal capacity to 25m tpa with an investment of
more than INR 400bn by 2012. Market cap – INR 855bn
• Tata Steel (TATA): TATA steel is the largest private player in the steel sector in
India. It has a capacity of 6.8m tpa. With the acquisition of Corus it has become the
sixth largest steel producer globally with a capacity of 25m tpa. It has announced
plans to expand capacity in India by more than 20m tpa. TATA steel is one of the
lowest-cost producers of steel globally. Market cap – INR 518bn
• JSW Steel (JSTL): JSW steel is one of the best performing steel companies in India
with large capacity expansion plans in the pipeline. It has announced capital
expenditure of INR 80,000cr to expand capacity by more than 25m tpa in the next
10 years. Market cap – INR 140bn

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IT SERVICES

Snapshot
Harmendra Gandhi Industry market cap INR 4,122bn Size estimate US$39.7bn, INR1600bn
LBSPL, India US$ 103bn
91-22-4037-4181 Industry ROE 27.2% 5-year historical CAGR 32%
hagandhi@lehman.com Key listed companies INFO, TCS, WPRO, Forecast CAGR 23%
SCS,
HCLT,
Industry/GDP 4.36%
Current utilization 76%

Source: Bloomberg, Lehman Brothers.

Figure 100. Price chart of key stocks in the industry (indexed to 100)

350

300

250

200

150

100

50

0
Aug-04 Feb-05 Aug-05 Feb-06 Aug-06 Feb-07 Aug-07

Infosys Satyam Comp HCL Tech Wipro TCS


Source: Bloomberg. Key stocks are defined according to market capitalisation.

Bright growth prospects across verticals


The demand environment remains strong for Tier-1 companies in both offshore mature
verticals, including Banking, Financial Services and Insurance (BFSI) and Telecoms,
and newer verticals, including Healthcare and Technology, Media, Transportation &
Services (TMTS). Demand for off-shoring of IT services and Business Process
Outsourcing (BPO) is expected to grow by 20-25% in the next couple of years. Services
like Testing, Infrastructure Management Services (IMS) and Package Implementation
(PI) will continue to be the growth drivers for IT services off-shoring to India in next
three years.

Competition
The IT industry is globally competitive, with better margins and ROE than most
companies based in other parts of the world. However, there are MNCs like IBM and
Accenture setting up large scale centres in India and trying to match the price structure
of Indian companies.

Opportunities
Off-shoring demand for IT services and BPO looks set to grow at 25-30% as estimated
by Nasscom, McKinsey and other independent organizations.

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Risks
The industry is facing supply-side challenges as demand for engineers continues to rise
and average quality intake falls. Additionally, the macro-environment is not very
conducive: rupee appreciation continues to erode revenue and margin. Moreover,
companies may face pressure on volume growth and pricing if the US slowdown is led
by a slowing of BFS. Tax is another factor that could hurt the sector as Software
Technology Parks of India (STPI) benefits are to end in FY09.

Key company profiles


• Infosys: Infosys leads the IT services sector in India with strong margins (31%
EBIDTA margin in FY07) and growth rates (revenue CAGR of 42% in the past
three years). The company has a strong presence in large Fortune 1000 customers
and a significant training infrastructure with a capacity to train 20,000 people in one
year. Market cap – INR 1083bn
• Wipro: Wipro was one of the pioneers of IT outsourcing in India and has a well
diversified revenue base (70% from global IT services, 15% from Asia Pacific IT
services and products, and the rest from other businesses like consumer care).
Market cap –INR 671bn
• TCS: TCS has positioned itself as a low-cost service provider and has been able to
maintain good margins. It has also managed to attract and retain a large number of
employees in a highly competitive hiring environment. Its attrition numbers (after
adjusting for its non-standard reporting method) are better than the Tier-1 average
numbers. Market cap – INR 1034bn
• HCL Tech: The company has a diversified presence in BPO (14% of revenues),
Infrastructure Management services (13% of revenues), with the remaining revenues
coming from software services. Approximately 30% of revenues from software
services come from R&D services. Market cap – INR 199bn
• Satyam Computer: 42% of the company’s revenues come from Consulting and
Enterprise Business Solutions (CEBS), which involves the implementation and
support of Enterprise Resource planning (ERP) systems. Market cap – INR 296bn

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CEMENT

Snapshot
Satish Kumar Industry market cap US$ 21bn Size estimate US$13bn, INR520bn
LBSPL, India Industry ROE 24% 5-year historical CAGR 8.6%
91-22-4037 4183 (volumes)
satishku@lehman.com 5 year historical CAGR
32%
(revenue)
Key listed ACC Forecast CAGR 5 year 10%
companies (volumes)
Grasim industries Industry/GDP 0.6%
Ambuja cement Current cap utilisation 95% (FY07)
Ultratech cement

Source: Bloomberg, Lehman Brothers.

Figure 101. Price chart for key stocks in the industry (indexed to 100)

600

500

400

300

200

100

0
Aug-04 Feb-05 Aug-05 Feb-06 Aug-06 Feb-07 Aug-07

ACC Ambuja Cement Grasim Ind. Ultratech Cements

Source: Bloomberg. Key stocks are defined according to market capitalisation.

Growth and leverage to higher India growth


Demand for cement has grown at a healthy CAGR of more than 10% during the past
three years on the back of strong demand from end-users. Major demand drivers for
cement are as follows:
• Housing
• Infrastructure
• Commercial construction
• Industrial segments.
The Housing sector accounts for approximately 65% of cement demand, with the rest
equally shared among other sectors. Demand drops during the July-September monsoon
season and picks up after the rains stop.
We expect cement demand growth to remain strong in the next three years, mainly on
increasing government expenditure on infrastructure, increased corporate capital
expenditure and large-scale development of commercial real estate. Historically, growth
in cement demand has had a correlation of 68% with the sum of growth in gross fixed
capital formation (GFCF) and government expenditure.
Assuming GDP grows at 9% CAGR for the next five years and the investment to GDP
ratio rises to 38% by FY12, we expect demand to grow at a CAGR of 10% in the period.

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Competition
The cement industry is very competitive and there have been frequent price wars, mainly
because of lower demand. However, as demand has picked up since FY05, competitive
intensity has calmed.
In the past, the Indian cement industry was highly fragmented. However, there has been
consolidation recently. ACC Limited is the largest cement maker in the country,
followed by Ambuja Cement. Both companies are now controlled by Holcim, the Swiss
cement major. AV Birla Group controls the next two largest companies: Grasim
Industries and Ultratech Cement. The top 10 companies in the country account for about
75% of total installed capacity.

Opportunities
Cement is a cyclical industry. The past two years have been very positive for the
industry, but overcapacity may be on the horizon. Over the long term, cement demand
should continue to grow at a healthy pace in India and this is reflected in the acquisition
of capacities by large multinational players, like Holcim and Lafarge, in India.

Risks
As mentioned earlier, the industry is susceptible to cyclical downturns. However, a
structural threat could emerge if Indian GDP growth were to drop. For example, if GDP
CAGR for the next five years is 7%, then we would expect cement demand to grow at
8%, which would mean serious overcapacity in the industry and consequently a very
benign price outlook.

Key company profiles


• ACC ltd.: ACC is the largest and oldest cement manufacturer in India, with a pan-
Indian presence. It has total installed capacity of 20m tonnes per annum and plans to
take it up to 27m tonnes by 2009 end. Holcim international has a 41% stake in the
company. Market cap – INR 206bn
• Ambuja cement: Ambuja cement is the second-largest cement maker in the country.
Its current capacity is 17.5m tonnes per annum, which it has said it plans to take up
to 23m tonnes by 2009. Holcim international has a 35% stake in the company.
Market cap – INR 217bn
• Grasim Industries: Grasim is the flagship company of AV Birla group. It has an
installed capacity of 15m tonnes per annum, which it plans to increase to 24m
tonnes by end FY09. Besides cement, the company is also a world leader in Viscose
staple fiber (VSF). The company is also engaged in the business of chemical, sponge
iron and textiles. Market cap – INR 291bn
• Ultratech cement: Ultratech cement is also an AV Birla group company. The AV
Birla group acquired it from L&T in 2004. It has an installed capacity of 17m tonnes
per annum, which it plans to increase to 21m tonnes by end FY09. Market cap –
INR 121bn

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ENGINEERING GOODS

Snapshot
Satish Kumar Industry market cap US$ 58bn Size estimate US$15bn, INR600bn
LBSPL, India Industry ROE 27% 5-year historical CAGR 29.7%
91-22-4037-4183 Key listed companies BHEL Forecast CAGR 5 year 20%
satishku@lehman.com ABB India Industry/GDP 2%
Siemens India Current cap utilisation N.A.
Suzlon energy

Source: Bloomberg, Lehman Brothers.

Figure 102. Price chart for key stocks in the industry (indexed to 100)

1,000

800

600

400

200

0
Aug-04 Feb-05 Aug-05 Feb-06 Aug-06 Feb-07 Aug-07

ABB BHEL SIEMENSE Suzlon Energy

Source: Bloomberg.
Key stocks are defined according to market capitalisation.

Growth and leverage to higher India growth


India’s engineering goods companies are highly leveraged to growth in the economy.
The growth of this sector is driven by industrial capex and investment in infrastructure.
In the past five years the investment-to-GDP ratio has risen to 33% from 24% and this is
reflected in the growth rates of these companies. Another fillip for this sector has come
from the increased investment in infrastructure, especially power and roads.
Infrastructure investment is expected to continue to increase in India. If the investment-
to-GDP ratio remains strong, we can expect the sector to sustain its high growth rate.
Competition
These companies cater to requirements of industrial and infrastructure sectors. There are
companies making electrical equipment, construction equipment, mining equipment,
automation products and a host of other products. Although the electrical equipment
space is fairly competitive, there is not as much competition in mining equipment. In
addition, there are many global players in this sector. Companies like GE, Toshiba,
Hitachi and various Chinese companies compete with the Indian companies.
Competition is particularly intense in low-tech goods, such as low-voltage electrical
equipment.
Opportunities
Opportunities in this sector abound because of the strong industrial capex cycle and
continued investment in infrastructure. Industry is stretched for capacities, and margins
are also strong. Companies with access to high technology can benefit more as the end
users are moving towards higher technology. We also see opportunities emerging in the

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alternative energy space. There is much emphasis on the development of alternate energy
resources and there could therefore be opportunities across the value chain.

Risks
From a sector point of view, the biggest threat for the industry is a decline in industrial
capex or a slowdown in the investment in infrastructure for any reason.

Key company profiles


• BHEL (Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd.): The largest power generation equipment
maker in the country. About 65% of total installed power plants run on BHEL-made
equipment. The company is a public sector undertaking. Market cap – INR 910bn
• Siemens India: The Indian subsidiary of German giant Siemens AG. The company
is present in power equipment, medical devices, software services, automation
products and transportation systems. Market cap – INR 214bn
• ABB India: ABB India is a subsidiary of Swiss multinational ABB group. The
company is a market leader in power transmission and distribution equipments.
Besides the company also makes automation systems and products for industrial
consumers. Market cap – INR 256bn
• Suzlon Energy ltd.: Suzlon is one of the world’s largest wind turbine
manufacturing companies. It is a market leader in India with more than 50% market
share. The company also makes wind turbine gearboxes. Market cap – INR 380bn

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PHARMACEUTICALS

Snapshot
Saion Mukherjee Industry market cap INR 1467 bn, US$ 37 bn Size estimate US$12bn, INR516bn
LBSPL, India Industry ROE 20% 5-year historical 15%
91-22-8037-4184 revenues CAGR
saion.mukherjee@lehman.com Key listed companies Cipla, Dr Reddy, Ranbaxy Forecast CAGR 15%
Sun Pharma Industry/GDP 1.6%
Source: Capitaline, Lehman Brothers.

Figure 103. Price chart for key stocks in the industry (indexed to 100)

400

300

200

100

0
Aug-04 Feb-05 Aug-05 Feb-06 Aug-06 Feb-07 Aug-07

Cipla Dr Reddy Ranbaxy Sun Pharma


Source: Bloomberg. Key stocks are defined according to market capitalisation.

Indian pharmaceutical market


India is the fourth-largest pharmaceutical market in volume terms (around 8% of global
pharma volume) and 15th largest in value terms. The Ministry of Chemicals & Fertilizers
estimates the market at US$7.5bn. India is a very fragmented market with more than
20,000 registered units. It is mainly a retail-based branded generic market with 80% of
dispensing via pharmacy outlets. Typical of an emerging economy, acute therapy
dominates, with 75% of the market. The Indian pharmaceutical industry has had a CAGR
of 9.5% in the past five years, but in the past two years growth has accelerated to 14%.
New product introduction has been, and continues to be, a major contributor to growth.
Interestingly, the contribution from new product introduction to growth has not
diminished since the introduction of pharmaceutical product patents in January 2005.
The product patent regime limits the opportunity to reverse engineer and introduce new
molecules. This has forced companies to focus on launching novel formulations and
combinations. We expect the contribution of new product introduction to growth to
decrease over time. We expect industry growth to become more penetration-driven.
India’s Pharmaceutical industry looks set to mirror overall economic growth. We expect
the industry to grow at 12% over the next three years. Innovation (particularly NDDS,
combinations and new formulations), geographic reach and alignment of the product
portfolio towards the high-growth chronic segment look set to be key growth drivers. Key
participants in the domestic Indian pharmaceuticals market include Ranbaxy, Cipla,
GlaxoSmithKline, Nicholas Piramal, and Sun Pharmaceutical.
Indian Pharma—Addressing the global generic opportunity
According to the Ministry of Chemicals & Fertilizers, Indian pharmaceutical companies
export drugs worth US$4.5bn. Key export markets are the US, Western Europe and CEE
countries, including Russia. India has the most manufacturing facilities approved by the
USFDA outside the United States. Indian companies make the largest number of
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regulatory filings to the USFDA. Key exporters include: Ranbaxy, Dr Reddy’s, Cipla,
Sun Pharmaceutical, Lupin and Wockhardt.
Indian Pharma—Addressing the outsourcing opportunity
Some companies are focusing on research and manufacturing outsourcing. India is fast
evolving as an outsourcing destination given the abundance of product development,
manufacturing and medical skills available in the country. Since the product patent regime
was launched in 2005, India’s appeal as an outsourcing hub has strengthened. Indian
companies that have invested heavily in infrastructure and developing relationships with
the innovators include Nicholas Piramal, Divis, Dishman and Jubilant Organosys.
Company profiles
• Ranbaxy: Ranbaxy is the largest manufacturer of generic drugs in India with sales
of US$1.3bn (CY06). The company has ground operations in 49 countries, the
largest presence among Indian companies. The United States is the largest
geography, contributing 28% of sales. In terms of prescription drugs, Ranbaxy is the
11th largest generic company in the United States. The branded generic business in
emerging markets, including India, contributes 43% of total company revenues.
Ranbaxy has one of the largest R&D infrastructures in the country, with more than
1000 scientists. Ranbaxy spends roughly US$100m annually on R&D of which
US$25m is spent on innovation research. Ranbaxy files approximately 650-700
generic applications annually worldwide. On the innovation front, it has two New
Chemical Entities (NCEs) in clinical development. Market cap – INR 162bn
• Dr Reddy’s: DRRD is India’s second largest generic company in terms of sales.
DRRD’s key markets are the US, India, Russia and Germany. Exports currently
contribute 82% of base business revenues (FY07 ex AG and exclusivity upsides). The
branded generic emerging markets (including India) contribute 26% of base business
revenues. DRRD is the largest third-party API supplier in India, with sales in excess of
US$250m. It is also aggressively pursuing opportunities in Contract Research and
Manufacturing Services (CRAMS) by using its R&D and manufacturing skills and
infrastructure. The company has been active in M&A and much of its recent growth
has been acquisition-driven. DRRD has spent US$54m on R&D in FY07. Of this,
45% was on NCE research and specialty projects. DRRD has five NCEs in clinical
development. The company is also making investment in biologics; it currently
markets two biologics. DRRD has recently launched the first generic version of
monoclonal antibody Rutuximab in India. Market cap – INR 109bn
• Sun Pharmaceuticals: Sun Pharma is sixth largest company in the domestic market
and has a strong focus on the chronic therapeutic segment. Sun Pharma’s domestic
sales have consistently grown above the industry average. According to market
research firm CMARC, SUNP ranks number one in prescriptions in may areas. The
other key market for SUNP is the United States. Combined, the US and India
account for 85% of revenues. As in India, SUNP has delivered consistent growth in
the US via product launches and increasing distribution reach. SUNP has recently
hived-off and listed its innovation R&D entity, SPARC. Market cap – INR 191bn
• CIPLA: CIPLA is among the top three pharmaceutical companies in the domestic
market. The ORG IMS data put CIPLA’s retail market share just below 5%. CIPLA is
the largest anti-asthma player in the country with more than 70% market share in the
inhaler market. Worldwide, CIPLA is the third-largest inhaler manufacturer. CIPLA
continues to invest heavily on inhaler facilities. Anti-AIDS drugs are another forte for
CIPLA. It has now emerged as the largest generic ARV producer in the world. Exports
accounts for 50% of CIPLA’s turnover. Africa and the US are key export geographies.
In its export market, CIPLA follows a partnership-based business model. It does not
maintain its own front end. Rather, it supplies bulk and finished dosages to its partners,
who then market the products. Market cap – INR 142bn
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CONSTRUCTION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

Saion Mukherjee Snapshot


LBSPL, India Industry market INR 1769 bn, US$ 44 bn Size estimate US$70bn,
91-22-8037 4184 INR3000bn
cap
Saion.mukherjee@lehman.com
Industry ROE 14% 5-year historical revenues CAGR 21%
Key listed Larsen and Toubro, Forecast revenues CAGR (3 30%
companies year)
Nagarjuna Construction Industry/GDP 8.5%
IVRCL Infrastructure,
Hindustan Construction

Source: Bloomberg, Lehman Brothers.

Figure 104. Price chart for key stocks in the industry (indexed to 100)

1,600

1,200

800

400

0
Aug-04 Feb-05 Aug-05 Feb-06 Aug-06 Feb-07 Aug-07

L&T HCC IVRCL Infra Nagarjuna Cons

Source: Bloomberg. Key stocks are defined according to market capitalisation.

Indian construction industry


Construction is the second-largest economic activity in India, and spans across several
subsectors of the economy. The government has implemented policies which have
generated more than 8% growth on average for the past three years. Based on these
policies, 9-10% annual growth rate over the next five years seems achievable. The
average size of the industry in 2006 was INR3100bn (US$ 70bn).
Sector organization
Currently the sector consists of the following elements:
• Large corporate entities diversified into various sub segments of construction
industry such as L&T.
• Developers investing equity capital in construction projects such as GMR.
• Companies engaged in direct construction in specific segments such as HCC.
• Small construction firms.
The complexity and size of contracts should increase as infrastructure spending rises,
forcing the primary playing field to shrink to just a few larger, more experienced
companies. We expect smaller companies to find it difficult to move up the value chain
because of the lack of maturity and entry barriers in the sector, leading to consolidation
in the industry over time.

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Infrastructure opportunity
To sustain the GDP growth rate at 9% per annum in the medium term, investment in
infrastructure would have to be substantially augmented. According to the Government
Planning Commission, India would need about US$492bn invested (at 2006/07 prices) in
various infrastructure sectors during the Eleventh Five Year Plan (2007-12).

Figure 105. Proposed infrastructure spending 11th Plan

US$bn US$bn
Electricity 70.5 150.4
Roads and bridges 31.7 76.1
Railways 20.3 62.2
Ports 1.3 18.0
Airports 2.1 8.5
Telecom 22.5 65.1
Irrigation 32.1 53.1
Water supply & Urban Transport 15.6 48.6
Storage 2.3 5.5
Gas 2.1 5.0
Total 200.5 492.4
Source: Government Planning Commission’s consultation paper, 24 September 2007.

Furthermore, the investment in infrastructure would rise gradually from 4.7% of GDP in
2005/06 to 9% by 2011/12.

Risks
• User Financing: Infrastructure in coming years may have to be progressively
financed by user charges as the government does not have resources to fund the
entire expenditure
• Execution: The increasing size of projects could force companies to scale up,
testing their operational and human resources capabilities.
• Regulatory environment: The government can change the sector policies,
potentially adversely affecting the growth and industry dynamic.
• Raw material costs: Any increase in commodity prices would affect the margins of
construction companies.
• Interest rate risk: As the projects in this sector are highly leveraged, any sharp
increase in interest rates could adversely affect investment plans and, hence, the
growth opportunity for construction companies.

Private participation in infrastructure


Given the significant investment required in social infrastructure like health and
education, the central government has limited resources for investment in infrastructure.
Hence, private participation has a key role in the investments in infrastructure. In the past
decade, the Centre and state governments have awarded projects worth US$27bn through
the public private partnership (PPP) route. Most of the projects were awarded only in the
past three years. The Build-Operate-Transfer BOT opportunity that we expect over the
next five years is around US$ 130bn.

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Industrial capital expenditure


We project domestic industrial capex to more than double in FY07-09 versus the
previous three-year period. This growth would be driven by Indian companies’ capacity
utilization, which is at a 15-year peak, and their strong balance sheets, with debt-equity
ratios at all-time lows. The capex activity will likely remain robust across sectors,
notably Metals, Oil & Gas and Autos.

Company profiles
• Larsen & Toubro: L&T is the largest engineering and construction company in
India, with presence across many sectors, including oil & gas, petrochemicals,
metals and other process industries. In the huge infrastructure spending planned
across sectors L&T would qualify for most of the projects given its financial
strength and technical expertise. Market cap – INR 805bn
• Hindustan Construction Company: Hindustan Construction Company (HCC) is
one of the oldest construction companies in India, with a proven track record. HCC
has historically focused on high-end construction work, which has led to margins
that are higher than the industry average. HCC has until now preferred to watch
BOT from the sidelines and focused only on cash contracts and maintaining higher
margins. But infrastructure spending is moving towards a PPP model. HCC is
looking at partnering with financial investors for such projects. Market cap – INR
35bn
• Nagarjuna Construction: Nagarjuna Construction (NJCC) is the second-largest
construction company in India after Larsen & Toubro. NJCC has a diversified order
book, with a contribution of 45% from roads, 25% from buildings, 9% from the
hydropower and irrigation division, 6% from electrical division tapping transmission
and distribution. The company is further reducing risk in its order book by venturing
into exports. Market cap – INR 53bn
• IVRCL: IVRC has a predominant position in effluent treatment, water supply,
sanitation and irrigation-related projects. IVRC is aggressively pursuing
opportunities in roads and transmission and distribution (T&D). The contribution of
the roads sector to IVRC’s order book has increased from 9% in FY05 to about 30%
by fiscal 2007. Market cap – INR 55bn

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AUTO AND AUTOPARTS

Snapshot
Prabhat Awasthi Industry market cap US$40bn Size estimate INR1147bn (FY06),
LBSPL, India US$ 27.9bn
91-22-4037-4180 Industry ROE 22% 5-year historical CAGR 16%
prabhat.awasthi@lehman.com Key listed companies Tata Motors Forecast CAGR 5 year 15%
Maruti Suzuki Limited Industry/GDP [2006] 3.6%
Mahindra and Mahindra Current cap util Not Available
Bajaj Auto

Source: Capitaline, Lehman Brothers.

Figure 106. Price chart for key stocks in the industry (indexed to 100)

500

400

300

200

100

0
Aug-04 Feb-05 Aug-05 Feb-06 Aug-06 Feb-07 Aug-07
Bajaj Auto M&M MUL TTMT
Source: Bloomberg. Key stocks are defined according to market capitalisation.

Growth and leverage to higher India growth


The main categories in India’s auto industry are: 1) cars and utility vehicles (UVs); 2)
two-wheelers; 3) commercial vehicles; 4) tractors; and 5) auto ancillaries.
Sales of cars and two-wheelers depend on overall growth in incomes, which is related
directly to GDP growth. Car sales in India have been growing at a 5-year CAGR of
17.8%. We expect this rate to be sustained or even improved upon as GDP has been
growing at a progressively faster rate over the past five years. On our estimates, only 8.5
of every 1,000 people own a car in India. Given this low penetration, we believe that
domestic car sales in India could grow at a steady rate of 13% over the next seven years.
Two-wheeler volume sales have been growing steadily at a CAGR 13% for the past 15
years. Some 8.4m two-wheelers were sold in India in fiscal 2007. In the next five years,
we think two-wheelers could experience lower growth than in the past because: 1)
penetration levels have improved considerably; 2) more players are set to launch more
fuel efficient smaller cars; and 3) public transport infrastructure will likely improve.
Commercial vehicle sales depend on industrial production. With the swing in industrial
production, commercial vehicles move in a much more volatile cycle as Figure 107 shows.
With the strong expansion in industrial production, growth rates have been strong, with a
5-year CAGR of 27.5%. Although near-term interest rate hikes have had an adverse impact
on medium and heavy commercial vehicles (MHCV) sales, we expect that the growth rates
will pick up and remain strong, along with solid industrial growth generally.

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Figure 107. Volume sales growth rates for various Auto segments

(%)
80

60

40

20

-20

-40

-60
FY97 FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05E FY06 FY07
MHCVs Car 2 Wheeler
Source: Society of Indian Automobile Manufacturers.

Tractor sales have been relatively slow, with a 5-year CAGR of 4.2%, in line with
growth in India’s agriculture industry. We expect tractor sales to remain slow given
already high penetration and low growth rate in the agricultural sector.
Auto ancillaries leverage on overall growth in auto sales, which we expect to remain
strong in India. This industry is very fragmented. Many of these players will struggle to
scale up and we thus see the potential for M&A activity in this space.
Competition
The top three Auto OEMs in India (in terms of market share) in each of the segments
commercial vehicles, two-wheelers and cars command more than 80% market share.
New entrants, especially those from outside the country, find it very difficult to make
headway in India. The reason for this is that their products are mostly unsuitable for
Indian conditions and do not match Indian consumers’ needs. Moreover, India is
composed of a number of smaller markets with different local languages and cultures,
complicating matters further for outside entrants.
Opportunities
India has developed considerable expertise in manufacturing small cars. More than 80%
of the 1.2m cars sold in India are small. Many players, including Suzuki, Hyundai,
Renault, Nissan and Toyota have plans to develop India into small-car manufacturing
hubs. Two-wheel and commercial vehicle players are increasingly looking at exporting
their products to similar markets worldwide. Indians have been catching up on the
technology curve and have the expertise to compete on this basis.
Risks
Any downturn in economic growth would hurt India’s auto industry. Moreover, interest
rates and the availability of credit have a huge impact on auto sales as 90% of CVs, 80%
of cars and 60% of two-wheeler sales are acquired with financing.
Key company profiles
• Tata Motors (TTMT): TTMT is the market leader in commercial vehicles, with
more than 60% market share in commercial vehicles. It also manufactures cars and
has a nearly 15% market share in this area. It plans to launch (in 2008) the cheapest
car in the world with a price tag of US$2,500. Market cap – INR 267 bn
• Maruti Suzuki Limited (MUL): MUL is the market leader in cars, with a market
share of more than 50%. MUL has maintained a strong hold on the Indian market
over the past few years, despite the entry of new players. Market cap – INR 252 bn

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• Mahindra and Mahindra (MM): MM is a conglomerate. The parent manufactures


three-wheelers, tractors, UVs and LCVs (Light commercial vehicles). It has entered
into a JV with Renault to make cars. It also plans to develop MHCVs (Medium and
heavy commercial vehicles) and is also heavily focused on the Auto ancillary
business, with acquisitions in India and abroad. Market cap – INR 173 bn
• Bajaj Auto (BJA): BJA is the second largest player in the two wheeler space. It has
strong in-house R&D capability and has been able to obtain patents for its products.
It is also involved in the Life and General Insurance business and plans to de-merge
its various businesses into separate units. Market cap – INR 235 bn

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FINANCIAL SERVICES

Snapshot
Srikanth Vadlamani Industry market cap INR5,865bn Size estimate INR19,231bn
LBSPL, India (Outstanding advances
US$ 145 bn US$ 475bn
91-22-4037-4191 of the banking system)
srikanth.vadlamani@lehman.com Industry ROE 16% 5 year historical CAGR 24%
Key listed companies ICICI Bank, HDFC, Forecast CAGR – 5yr 23%
State Bank of India
Industry/GDP 6.1%
Current cap util NA

Source: Bloomberg, Lehman Brothers.

Figure 108. Price chart for key stocks in the industry (indexed to 100)

500

400

300

200

100

0
Aug-04 Feb-05 Aug-05 Feb-06 Aug-06 Feb-07 Aug-07
ICICI Bank HDFC State Bank

Source: Bloomberg. Key stocks are defined according to market capitalisation.

The growth opportunity


Strong economic growth is set to open significant opportunities for financial services.
We foresee growth in terms of product range as well as new customers.
Notwithstanding the current sluggishness, we expect retail banking to offer the biggest
growth opportunity. With continued demand for housing, we expect a secular increase in
mortgage financing. Another low-hanging fruit is the wealth management opportunities
being driven by the burgeoning middle class. Ancillary financial services, including
insurance, asset management and stock broking will likely be growth drivers, too. In our
view, however, the big opportunity lies in increasing the penetration of financial
services. Major players are already successfully running programmes tailored to target
hitherto ignored low-income segments. As players refine their delivery systems, we
expect this segment to be a major driver of growth for the sector.
In the wholesale/corporate segment, we believe that the Indian market will increasingly
mimic more advanced markets. We expect financial disintermediation in terms of
corporates directly tapping the bond markets – either Indian or foreign – to be a
significant trend. We recognize that the current nascent stage of the domestic bond
market will likely be an impediment, but we expect this to change in the medium term.
Concomitantly, we expect the structured finance market to develop, bringing fee-income
opportunities for the sector. We believe that growth in retail finance, especially in
mortgages, in the medium term will depend on a functioning structured finance/bond
market. This could motivate regulators to be proactive in developing these markets.
October 2007 124
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A more liberalized approach in allowing foreign money into the debt markets would
clearly be a material positive in providing liquidity to these markets. However, we
expect the regulators to be cautious in this area, taking only small steps.

Industry structure and its possible evolution


The industry is currently dominated by banks. We expect this to remain the case,
although we believe that non-banks with proven models and strong managements will
also thrive.
Among banks, the degree of concentration is low. This is primarily a legacy issue, as the
sector was once dominated by a large number of state-owned banks. We expect the state-
owned banks to continue to lose market share. However, we believe that there is enough
strength in their franchise to allow them to survive, albeit with a much lower market
share. A key trend we foresee in the state-owned space is the folding up of the smaller
state-owned banks into the top-5 groups.
One defining trigger of the industry structure could be the opening of the sector to
foreign players, expected after 2009. Given the regulatory regime in India, we would
expect acquisitions to be their preferred entry route. This could trigger a wave of
consolidation. However, we would not expect such a wave of consolidation to lower the
competitive intensity in the sector. On the contrary, we would expect to see a large
number of strong well-managed participants in the market for the long term.

Risks
Retail credit is seeing very strong growth and we expect this trend to continue. This
segment is relatively nascent in India and has not witnessed a full economic cycle.
Hence, a key risk could be bad loans coming in at a rate greater than what has been
priced into the product.
Growth in some of the emerging segments, including insurance, and asset management is
being driven largely by the uptick in the equity markets. Hence, any prolonged weakness
in the equity markets is a key risk for growth in these segments.

Key company profiles


• ICICI Bank. The ICICI group is the market leader in all the key growth segments:
retail finance, insurance, structured finance, asset management. Market cap – INR
1143bn
• HDFC group. The HDFC group has a presence in all the major segments of the
financial spectrum. The parent HDFC is a major player in the mortgage market,
while HDFC Bank has a presence in both retail and wholesale banking. The group
has a strong presence in insurance and asset management as well. Market cap –
INR 685bn
• State Bank of India: Currently the largest banking group in the country. The
company is poised to continue to be a major player in the Indian financial services
sector, because of the sheer scale of its franchise, with by far the largest branch
network, and a strong brand. The group is now building a strong presence in
insurance and asset management. Market cap – INR 1027bn

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CONSUMER GOODS

Manish Jain Snapshot


LBSPL, India
91-22-4037-4186 Industry market cap US$ 45bn Size estimate* INR750bn, US$18bn
manish.jain@lehman.com Industry ROE ~32% 5-year historical CAGR NA
Hindustan Unilever Forecast CAGR NA
ITC Limited. Industry/GDP* 2%
Key listed companies
Nestle Current cap util NA
Dabur

Source: Bloomberg, Lehman Brothers.


* Because a significant part of the industry is unorganized, these are our estimates for branded consumer goods
products.

Figure 109. Price chart for key stocks in the industry

130

120

110

100

90

80

70
13-Sep-06 13-Dec-06 13-Mar-07 13-Jun-07 13-Sep-07

Dabur Hindustan Unilever ITC Nestle India

Source: Bloomberg, Lehman Brothers.


Key stocks are defined according to market capitalisation.

Industry on an upward trend


The consumer goods industry in India is on an upturn, led by rising disposable income
and the changing lifestyle of the urban consumer.
The upturn has accelerated the top-line growth of almost all consumer goods players.

Figure 110. Accelerating growth momentum at HLL and ITC


Company Sales FY02-04 CAGR Sales FY04-07 CAGR
HLL (CY06) -2.9% 5.5%
ITC (FY07) 9.6% 18.2%

Source: Capitaline, Lehman Brothers.


(Note – average GDP growth in 2002-2004 was 6% while in 2004-2007 was 8.6%, CY06=FY07)

Low penetration should favour long-term growth. For example, even for a large and
mature category like shampoos, penetration is just 38%.

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Lehman Brothers | India: Everything to play for

Figure 111. Consumer goods – penetration by category

Category All India Urban Rural


Deodorants 2.1 5.5 0.6
Toothpaste 48.6 74.9 37.6
Shampoos 38.0 52.1 31.9
Instant Coffee 6.6 15.5 2.8
Toilet Soaps 91.5 97.4 88.9

Source: Industry data, Lehman Brothers.

Modern retail trade looks set to be a big factor in shaping the sector. According to
research agency CRIS INFAC, the penetration of organized retail into the overall market
will increase from 3.5% in 2005 to 8% in 2010. However, the impact of organized retail
on the margins of consumer goods companies will depend on the size of the producer
and the brand strength of the product involved.
Pricing power is returning. Pricing power seems to be returning in the consumer goods
industry after a tough period in 2002-2006. Some of the recent prominent price hikes,
like the 5-7% increase in soap prices by Godrej, have all been easily absorbed.

Risks
• Macroeconomic risks: Growth of the consumer goods industry has traditionally been
closely linked to growth in the economy. Furthermore, with a large portion of
demand coming from rural markets, any slowdown in farm incomes would put
pressure on industry growth.
• Rising raw material prices: Escalating costs of inputs such as vegetable oils, milk
and wheat, are becoming a challenge for most players in the industry.

Key company profiles


• HUL: HUL, part of the Unilever group, is one of the largest players in the Indian
consumer goods space. The company was the first entrant in the Indian organized
consumer goods space. HUL currently leads in most of the bigger categories,
including fabric care, personal hygiene, shampoos and skin care. HUL’s brands –
including Lifebuoy, Lux, Surf, Rin, Fair & Lovely, Pond’s, Sunsilk, Clinic,
Pepsodent, Close-up and Lakme – are household names across the country. Market
cap – INR 484bn
• ITC Limited: ITC Limited is one of India’s foremost private sector companies.
While ITC is a market leader in its traditional businesses of cigarettes, it is rapidly
expanding its presence even in its nascent businesses of packaged foods &
confectionery, branded apparel and greeting cards. Market cap – INR 714bn
• Nestle: Nestle India is a subsidiary of Nestlé S.A. of Switzerland and has been
present in the Indian markets since 1912. The company is a leader in the foods space
and its key brands include Maggi, Kit Kat, Milkmaid and Nescafe. In recent years it
has also introduced products of daily consumption such as Nestle Milk, Nestle Slim
Milk and Nestle Fresh 'n' Natural Dahi. Market cap – INR 128bn
• Dabur: Dabur is one of India’s leading consumer goods players in the health care,
personal care and food products. Some of the key brands include Hajmola, Promise,
Babool, Meswak, Vatika and Real. Market cap –INR 91bn

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Lehman Brothers | India: Everything to play for

NON-FERROUS METALS

Prabhat Awasthi Snapshot


LBSPL, India
Industry market cap INR1225bn Size estimate INR501bn (FY07),
91-22-4037-4180 US$ 12.2bn
prabhat.awasthi@lehman.com
Industry ROE 22.2% 5 year historical CAGR 26.5%
Key listed companies Hindustan Aluminum Forecast CAGR 5-year NA
National Aluminum Industry/GDP [2006] 3.6%
Sterlite Industries India Ltd Current cap util Not Available

Source: Bloomberg, Lehman Brothers.

Figure 112. Price for key stocks in the industry

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

0
Aug-04 Feb-05 Aug-05 Feb-06 Aug-06 Feb-07 Aug-07

Hindalco Nalco Sterlite Industries

Source: Bloomberg, Lehman Brothers. Key stocks are defined according to market capitalisation.

Economy set to fuel metal growth


This sector includes aluminium, zinc, copper and lead producers. Metals have been one
of the major beneficiaries of the burgeoning economy and heavy infrastructure
development. All metals have seen healthy growth in volumes in the past few years.
India consumed c.1m tons of Aluminium in FY06 with demand growing at a CAGR of
11.8% in FY2002-06. Electrical, transport and construction are the three largest consumers
of aluminium and account for nearly 71% of total consumption. Revenues for the sector
have grown at a CAGR of 29% in FY2002-07. The demand for the sector is expected to
grow rapidly on the back of high growth in all the three major consuming sectors.
Copper consumption in India grew at a CAGR of 8% to 437,300 tons in FY07 from
298,000 tons in FY02. Telecom and power together are more than 55% of total copper
demand. With Telecom sector coverage increasing rapidly and rising investment in the
power sector, we can expect a rapid growth in copper demand.
Zinc consumption in India has risen from 347,000 tons in FY04 to 460,000 tons in FY07
– a CAGR of 9.9%. The steel sector is the largest consumer of zinc, approximately 70%
of total demand, for galvanized products. We expect demand for zinc to remain firm on
the back of a booming economy.

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Competition
India’s non-ferrous sector does not have many players. But since prices are generally
linked to London Metal Exchange prices, industry structure has little effect on it. At the
same time, domestic/demand supply does affect prices in the short term.

Opportunities
India still has very low per capita consumption of metals relative to developed countries
or even China. With the economy expected to grow at a healthy rate and a construction
boom taking place, metal demand should also grow rapidly. Companies have announced
capital expenditure of US$11bn for the next five years. With healthy bauxite and zinc
reserves, we think Indian players are in a good position to take advantage of integration.

Risks
Any downturn in global economic growth would have a negative impact on the Indian
non-ferrous sector. In addition, any delays to power projects could affect smaller players
without captive plants.
Key company profiles
• Hindalco (HNDL): HINDALCO is the largest fully integrated aluminium producer
in India. It is also one of the largest producers of copper in India. It has announced
expenditure of more than INR 300bn by 2012 to expand its capacity. Market cap –
INR 211 bn
• National Aluminium Company (NALC): NALCO is the largest public sector unit,
with a capacity of 450,000 tpa of aluminium. It is working on capacity expansion
plans with an investment of INR 40 bn in the next two years. Market cap – INR
194 bn
• Sterlite Industries India Ltd (STLT): Sterlite has a presence in copper as well as
in aluminium and zinc. It owns a 51% stake in BALCO and a 65% stake in
Hindustan Zinc. Both these companies were acquired in the government’s
disinvestment programme. Sterlite has an option to buy the government’s remaining
stake in both companies. Market cap –INR 530 bn

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Lehman Brothers | India: Everything to play for

AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE INDIAN DEBT MARKET

INTRODUCTION
Jack Malvey, CFA Few global debt portfolios regularly employ Indian debt as of 2007. This will soon
1-212-526-6686 change.
jmalvey@lehman.com
During the coming decade of the “Teens”, India is set to become a mainstay of the
international debt portfolio choice set. And by the decade of the “Twenties”, if not
Joseph DiCenso, CFA
sooner, India will rank between the fifth and the tenth largest bond market in the world.
1-212-526-2288
jdicenso@lehman.com Given India’s coming prominence in the world debt markets, international debt investors
need to begin to prepare now to eventually include India in their portfolios. And given its
rapidly growing position in the world economy, a thorough analysis of global economic
and capital market prospects is impossible without a full consideration of India’s
dynamic role.
The strategic outlook for India’s economy is very bright indeed. But India’s prodigious
21st century growth will demand stout capital accumulation, an essential fuel for
sustained economic development. Capital will be supplied by hearty domestic savings
and by accessing the vast international financial markets. Both the accumulation and
optimal deployment of capital will be aided by India’s swift progression towards an
advanced capital market architecture, a process already well underway.
Reinforcing the promise of vigorous Indian long-term economic growth, the timing of
India’s full entry onto the world capital market stage could hardly be more propitious. A
century after a similar wave of globalisation, the late 20th and early 21st centuries will be
recalled for the exceptional pace of mainstreaming India, China and other populous
developing nations into the world capital markets.
On the verge of meeting all investment guideline requirements, Indian debt is about to
become a staple of international debt portfolios. Thanks to an ongoing revolution in asset
management philosophy in the pursuit of higher absolute total return and increased
negative correlations among asset class holdings, there has been an institutional investor
stampede to new investment vehicles. In particular, the embrace of geographic portfolio
diversification has become a favourite tactic, as evidenced by the outsized performance
of the emerging market (EM) debt class. Even with difficult global credit market
conditions in July and August 2007, the Lehman EM debt index has cumulatively
outperformed all other members of the world debt asset class during this decade with an
annualised 11.39% total return for this first decade of the 21st century (January 2000 to
31 August 2007).
A monumental milestone looms for the world capital markets and for India. Before the
end of the upcoming decade of the “Teens”, if not sooner, the combination of full rupee
currency convertibility and existing investment-grade rating status (Baa2/BBB-/BBB-,
Fx ratings by Moody’s/S&P/Fitch respectively in August 2007) will channel Indian
government, corporate, and securitised debt into widely used global debt index
benchmarks like the Lehman Global Aggregate Index (with more than US$2.0 trillion
run against it as of mid-2007) and facilitate the widespread use of Indian debt in
international portfolios.
Although the ownership of out-of-index securities can provide outperformance
opportunities for institutional investors with fewer portfolio constraints, many
investment mandates explicitly prohibit and/or limit the ownership of non-benchmark
index issues. The full internationalisation of local currency debt markets, as manifest by
their inclusion in widely used international debt indices, often serves as a spur to greater
product development such as new debt structures and securitisation; and it can lead to a
lower cost of debt capital, a deeper investor base, a faster rate of disintermediation and a
more efficient allocation of capital ņ all demonstrable contributors to economic growth.
October 2007 130
Lehman Brothers | India: Everything to play for

There is also ample evidence of a “virtuous index effect” in debt markets akin to the
equity price boost afforded to new company members of widely followed equity indices.
For example, on 1 January 2005 Lehman added eight new countries to its Global
Aggregate Index. Each new country handily beat the overall Global Agg benchmark’s
3.30% total return during 2005: Mexico (15.37%); South Africa (10.63%); Chile
(5.73%); Czech (6.11%); Hungary (8.97%); Poland (9.52%); Slovakia (6.11%); and
Slovenia (7.64%).

ON THE ROAD TO FULL GLOBAL DEBT CAPITAL MARKET INTEGRATION

A prerequisite: Full FX convertibility


As part of a managed floating currency regime, India maintains capital controls. On the
current account, there have been no currency conversion restrictions hindering buying or
selling foreign exchange since 1994 (though trade barriers still exist). So-called foreign
institutional investors (FII) enjoy convertibility to bring money in and out of the country
and buy securities; but the capital account also suffers from myriad quantitative
restrictions. Although local firms are able to take capital out of the country in order to
expand globally, households remain highly constrained in their ability to diversify
globally. 92
At a May 2007 India-Europe Investment Forum, Indian Finance Minister Chidambaram
suggested that the rupee would soon be fully convertible and underscored the de facto
convertibility already in place on the capital account. 93
Restrictions on currency hedging also constrain the full mainstreaming of Indian debt
into the international portfolios of global debt managers. Indian companies can currently
hedge using over-the-counter currency options, swaps and forwards; but turnover is low
because of rupee capital account restrictions. The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) is under
pressure to allow rupee futures trading following the listing of a non-deliverable futures
(NDF) contract in Dubai (which is settled in US dollars). See IRD1 <Currency> on
Bloomberg.

BUILDING THE INDIAN DEBT CAPITAL MARKET ARCHITECTURE:


A STRATEGIC PROCESS WELL UNDERWAY 94

Money markets: A functioning repo framework


The Indian Government bond market is the third largest in Asia (after Japan and South
Korea). Some of the key reforms introduced since 1992 include:
• The auction system for the sale of government securities was introduced in 1992;
• The Primary Dealership system was initiated in 1995;
• The Wholesale Debt Market segment has been set up at the National Stock
Exchange to promote transparency; and,
• Automatic monetisation through the issue of ad hoc T-bills was ended.
Over time, the degree of monetisation of deficits has fallen significantly, lowering long-
term inflation expectations and increasing appetite for longer-dated paper. As in
developed debt markets, the maturity profile of government debt has extended.
Still, the investor base remains narrow and state-run banks dominate the market. The low
duration of liabilities of banks limits their ability increasingly to absorb longer-dated
paper. And there is a need to broaden the investor base. Although the market has been

92
See RBI website FAQ: http://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/FAQView.aspx?Id=34
93
Address by Dr. Rakesh Mohan, Deputy Governor, Reserve Bank of India at the First Indian-French Financial
Forum in Mumbai on May 16, 2007. http://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/BS_ViewBulletin.aspx?Id=8478#ann3
94
See footnote 92.
October 2007 131
Lehman Brothers | India: Everything to play for

opened somewhat to international investors, Indian authorities remain cautious about


non-local institutional participation in the Indian debt market.
Further evidence of financial market deepening included new instruments, such as
collateralised borrowing and lending obligations (CBLO).

Key details
• Issuance norms and maturity profiles of other money market instruments such as
commercial paper (CP) and certificate of deposits (CDs) has been modified to
encourage wider participation ;
• Ad hoc Treasury Bills have been abolished and regular auctions of Treasury Bills
introduced;
• The RBI switched emphasis to setting prudent limits on borrowing and lending in
the call money market, encouraging migration towards the collateralised segments
and developing derivative instruments for hedging market risks;
• The institutionalisation of the Clearing Corporation of India Limited (CCIL) as a
central counterparty has been undertaken; and,
• The upgrading of payment system technologies has also enabled market participants
to improve their asset liability management.
These developments fostered lower volatility in call rates and narrower bid-ask spreads
in the call money market, allowing reforms in longer-term debt markets.

Indian government bond market reforms in the 1990s and the “oughts”
The 1990s witnessed a number of encouraging developments:
• An auction system for issuance of government securities was introduced;
• Statutory prescription for banks’ investments in government and other approved
securities has been scaled down from the peak level in February 1992 to the
statutory minimum level of 25% by April 1997. Focus has shifted towards the
widening of the investor base;
• Without unconstrained recourse by the Government to the Reserve Bank through
automatic monetisation of deficits and conversion of non-marketable securities to
marketable securities, the RBI gained more operational freedom;
• The RBI pursued a strategy of passive consolidation of debt by raising progressively
a higher share of market borrowings through re-issuances. This has produced a
critical mass in key maturities and has facilitated the emergence of market
benchmarks;
• Improvement in overall macroeconomic and monetary management resulted in
lower inflation, lower inflation expectations, and price stability, thereby promoting a
longer-maturity yield curve, now up to 30 years (Figure 113); and,
• The RBI strengthened the technological infrastructure for trading and settlement.

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Lehman Brothers | India: Everything to play for

Figure 113. Yield curve movement – SGL (Subsidiary General Ledger) transactions

% Mar-97 Mar-00 Mar-03


14
Mar-04 Mar-06 Sep-07
12

10

4
1 5 9 13 17 21 25 29
Years to maturity

Source: RBI, Reuters and Lehman Brothers.

More recent reforms in the “oughts” include:


• Intra-day short selling in government securities has been permitted among eligible
participants – i.e., scheduled commercial banks (SCBs) and primary dealers (PDs) –
in February 2006;
• Guidelines for trading in when issued “WI” market were issued by the RBI in May
2006;
• Short positions have been permitted beyond intra-day for a period of five trading
days, effective 31 January 2007;
• FIIs are now allowed to invest in government securities, subject to certain limits;
• Automated screen-based trading in government securities has been introduced
through a Negotiated Dealing System (NDS);
• A risk-free payments and settlement system in government securities through the
Clearing Corporation of India Limited (CCIL) has been set up;
• A Real Time Gross Settlement System (RTGS) is being phased in;
• Trading in government securities on stock exchanges for promoting retailing in such
securities has been introduced, permitting non-banks to participate in the repo
market; and,
• NDS-OM and T+1 settlement norms have been introduced.

A MID-2007 SNAPSHOT OF THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT BOND MARKET:


STYLISED FACTS, PERFORMANCE, AND GLOBAL COMPARISONS
After six rate hikes by the RBI since the beginning of 2006, the repo rate climbed to
7.75% as of early August 2007. As a result, Indian government debt returns were only
0.55% in the first half of 2007.
However, the Indian yield curve rallied significantly in July 2007, along with other
global government yield curves, in response to the upward reset of global credit risk
premia. In addition, slower second-half growth and falling inflation permitted a cessation
of interest rate hikes, even if only temporarily. This brought India’s 10-year rates down
to 30bp to 7.85% and raised the year-to-date total return for its government bond market
to 3.28% through 31 July. Over the same seven-month period, Indian government returns
outpaced US Treasuries (2.69%), euro governments (-0.32%), Japanese governments
October 2007 133
Lehman Brothers | India: Everything to play for

(0.19%) and Chinese governments (-2.55%) in local currency terms according to the
Lehman Global Family of Indices.
• Two-thirds of our Indian Government Index’s INR8.98 trillion market value resides
in short and intermediate paper, with the largest concentrations in the 7-10 year
sector (28%) and 10-20 year maturities (21%).
• This is a relatively long-duration index (6.02 years) compared to US Treasuries
(4.88 years); but it is only slightly longer than the worldwide average (5.85 years for
the Lehman Global Treasury Index) and very close to other major debt markets –
eurozone (6.06 years) and Japan (6.05 years).
• Without any prepayment-sensitive or callable securities in the Indian Government
Index, Indian Treasuries exhibit positive convexity: 0.64, in line with the Global
Treasury average of 0.70.
• In US dollar terms, Indian Treasuries represent a sizeable local market. If eligible
for inclusion in the Global Aggregate, then India would rank as the seventh largest
with a US$218.3bn market value, just behind Korea. (Note: The Lehman Chinese
Treasury Index is slightly larger with a US$256bn market value and the overall
Chinese bond market is approximately US$567bn). Still, India would account for
less than 1% of the US$24 trillion world bond market as measured by the Lehman
Global Family of Indices.

Figure 114. Lehman Indian government bond index: July 31, 2007

Total return (%) in INR


Market
Amount value %
outstanding (billion market Average Past 3 Past 6
(billion INR) INR)) value Duration Convexity coupon YTD months months
India Govt. index 8,624 8,976 6.02 0.64 8.56 3.28 4.40 4.16
Intermediate 5,503 5,900 66% 4.46 0.30 8.99 4.51 4.51 4.65
Long 3,121 3,076 34% 9.00 1.29 7.81 1.36 4.20 3.31
1-3 Yr 1,071 1,138 13% 1.89 0.05 9.46 4.77 3.38 4.67
3-5 Yr 1,101 1,210 13% 3.39 0.15 9.93 4.83 4.52 4.95
5-7 Yr 961 1,026 11% 4.65 0.28 8.47 4.76 4.84 4.82
7-10 Yr 2,371 2,526 28% 6.06 0.48 8.55 3.98 4.75 4.29
10-20 Yr 1,864 1,905 21% 8.06 0.94 8.05 2.68 4.64 4.11
20+ Yr 1,257 1,171 13% 10.53 1.86 7.45 -1.48 3.46 1.80

Source: Lehman Brothers Fixed-Income Research.

October 2007 134


Lehman Brothers | India: Everything to play for

Figure 115. Pro forma Lehman Global Aggregate and Multiverse Indices with India and China: July 31, 2007

Global Aggregate Index (all investment-grade) Multiverse Index (all quality tiers)
Market value % Market Market value % market
Ranking Currency bloc (US$bn) value Ranking Currency bloc (US$bn) value
Global Aggregate Index 24713 100% Multiverse Index 25692 100%
1 U.S. 9272 38% 1 U.S. 10,113 39%
2 Eurozone 7516 30% 2 Eurozone 7,639 30%
3 Japan 3891 16% 3 Japan 3,891 15%
4 U.K. 1388 6% 4 U.K. 1,403 5%
5 Canada 588 2% 5 Canada 588 2%
6 China 567 2% 7 China 567 2%
7 Korea 333 1% 6 Korea 333 1%
8 India 222 1% 8 India 222 1%
9 Sweden 166 1% 9 Sweden 166 1%
10 Australia 130 1% 10 Australia 130 1%
11 Denmark 110 0% 11 Denmark 110 0%
12 Taiwan 101 0% 12 Taiwan 101 0%
13 Poland 85 0% 13 Poland 85 0%
14 Mexico 71 0% 14 Mexico 71 0%
15 S. Africa 60 0% 15 S. Africa 60 0%
16 Malaysia 44 0% 16 Malaysia 44 0%
17 Hungary 39 0% 17 Hungary 39 0%
18 Singapore 36 0% 18 Singapore 36 0%
19 Norway 32 0% 19 Norway 32 0%
20 Czech 30 0% 20 Czech 30 0%
21 New Zealand 21 0% 21 New Zealand 21 0%
22 Slovakia 8 0% 22 Slovakia 8 0%
23 Chile 2 0% 23 Chile 2 0%
24 Hong Kong 0 0% 24 Hong Kong 0 0%

Asia-Pacific (US$bn) 4,778


India as % of Asia-Pacific ex-China 4.6%

China (US$bn) 567


India % of China 39.1%
China as % of Asia-Pacific 10.6%

Source: Lehman Brothers Fixed-Income Research.

• India will not soon represent a major share of the world bond market. From October
2006 to 31 July 2007, the Indian bond market grew at an annualised pace of 9.48%
and now constitutes 0.86% of the global fixed income choice set as measured by the
Lehman Multiverse Index. Looking longer-term, the Indian debt market grew at an
18.02% per annum rate from 1999 to 2006 per BIS data. At this pace and
incorporating a conservative 8.21% bottom-up growth forecast for the world debt
market, India would break 1% of the world bond market as measured by the Lehman
Multiverse Index by 1 January 2010 (1.07% exactly) and reach approximately 4.0%
by 2025. In dollar terms, the Indian bond market would swell from about US$331bn
in 2010 to nearly US$4.0 trillion by 2025, equivalent to the current size of the
Japanese government bond market.
• Launched on 1 October 2006, the new Lehman Indian Government Bond Index is
not inclusive of all Indian issuers, either in local rupee markets or globally. As such,
the BIS data set for international and domestic debt issuance/amount outstanding

October 2007 135


Lehman Brothers | India: Everything to play for

offers a more-detailed alternative for comparing this burgeoning market to its peers.
We have included a compendium of tables tracing the historical growth rate of
Indian debt as reported by the BIS. As shown in Figures 116-117, most of the
growth in Indian debt occurred in local markets.
- Local Indian debt outstanding has tripled so far this decade from just over
US$102bn in 1999 to US$326bn at the end of 2006. Of that tally, government
paper accounts for the vast majority, i.e., US$305bn. Note that in accordance
with Lehman Index rules such as minimum issue size (INR10 billion) and time
remaining-to-maturity (at least one year), the Lehman Indian Government Bond
Index captures only US$218bn or 72%.
- Indian corporate and financial institution debt is nascent but growing rapidly. In
2004, the local Indian debt market had only US$1.4bn in financial institution
paper compared with US$15.5bn at year-end 2006. Corporate debt doubled to
US$5.3bn outstanding over this same 2-year span.
- Based on its current size, India would represent only a small portion of Asia’s
local government bond markets (15%) and corporate bond markets (2.5%). In
concert with India’s rapid economic growth, this looks set to change in the early
21st century.

October 2007 136


Figure 116. International Indian debt in a global context: 1987-March 2007

March
(US$bn) 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
All issuers

4 October 2007
Global 1,055.9 1,171.6 1,335.3 1,644.7 1,853.0 1,921.0 2,107.3 2,529.4 2,846.8 3,258.0 3,629.3 4,411.8 5,468.2 6,490.2 7,594.6 9,270.1 11,705.4 13,940.5 14,610.5 18,448.9 19,567.6
Asia 20.5 21.2 20.7 23.7 28.0 33.5 42.6 59.9 72.0 108.1 140.0 143.6 142.8 140.1 135.3 154.6 177.6 213.6 243.7 291.6 308.3
India 1.8 2.2 2.7 3.3 4.3 4.1 3.0 3.3 3.7 4.4 5.9 5.7 4.8 4.3 3.9 3.4 3.4 6.5 10.7 20.0 26.7
Financial institutions
Global 394.1 464.0 537.6 641.3 693.6 690.5 903.9 1,124.0 1,358.2 1,723.9 2,072.0 2,674.0 3,574.1 4,410.1 5,314.1 6,625.7 8,522.2 10,353.6 11,100.2 14,349.5 15,314.5
Asia 7.0 7.5 7.3 8.7 11.1 13.1 18.2 26.7 34.6 55.9 73.9 71.0 67.3 62.9 55.6 66.4 82.9 107.2 128.5 164.3 177.5
India 0.9 1.1 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.0 1.7 1.3 1.4 2.4 4.0 7.2 11.9
Corporates
Global - - - - - - 518.1 548.0 548.5 552.5 575.3 649.2 781.4 923.9 1,101.0 1,245.1 1,474.6 1,608.5 1,544.5 1,885.6 1,940.0
Asia 14.1 21.8 26.3 38.0 49.4 50.3 49.2 48.8 49.1 52.9 55.9 62.7 68.3 75.8 76.7
Lehman Brothers | India: Everything to play for

India 1.5 1.9 2.0 2.8 3.9 3.6 2.7 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.0 4.1 6.7 12.7 14.8
Govt.
Global - - - - - - - 577.3 639.2 672.7 678.8 717.1 735.3 775.8 796.8 962.4 1,201.7 1,422.8 1,421.4 1,626.2 1,694.9
Asia 11.4 11.1 14.2 16.7 22.3 26.4 28.4 30.6 35.3 38.8 43.7 46.9 51.5 54.1
India No debt as reported by BIS

Source: BIS

Figure 117. Domestic Indian debt in a global context: 1989-2006


(US$bn) 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
All issuers
Global 14,182.0 16,384.0 17,915.0 18,682.0 20,229.9 22,782.5 24,809.4 25,761.7 25,372.3 28,054.5 29,780.7 29,656.6 30,120.5 33,887.7 39,549.1 44,515.0 45,474.4 50,285.5
Asia 275.0 302.6 321.4 387.8 439.2 508.7 596.1 674.4 525.2 782.7 949.0 1,023.1 1,150.0 1,422.9 1,677.0 2,121.3 2,544.9 3,140.6
India 57.4 67.9 45.2 51.3 55.4 63.5 70.6 81.2 75.2 85.7 102.1 113.6 130.2 155.8 203.2 249.5 279.1 325.7
Government
Global 7,028.2 8,051.7 8,839.7 9,178.2 10,036.7 11,280.7 12,215.3 12,630.1 12,172.6 13,144.7 13,714.9 13,221.2 13,345.3 15,681.8 19,164.6 22,096.0 22,143.9 24,008.5
Asia 164.8 169.6 162.1 197.3 224.8 248.6 272.8 298.7 243.8 341.7 466.8 526.1 595.3 776.5 982.4 1,304.7 1,587.6 1,942.4
India 56.9 66.6 43.0 47.1 52.2 60.8 65.6 77.9 72.4 83.5 100.0 111.5 128.2 153.7 200.4 245.3 268.0 304.9
Financial institutions
Global 5,359.2 6,329.6 6,932.9 7,248.9 7,781.8 8,946.9 9,842.9 10,235.6 10,299.2 11,471.9 12,266.8 12,498.7 12,675.7 13,869.3 15,557.2 17,212.2 18,070.9 20,530.2
Asia 59.5 66.7 78.6 98.5 108.0 131.0 162.2 168.3 130.8 168.1 166.2 176.6 197.0 269.2 317.4 406.1 521.5 712.1
India 0.5 1.4 2.1 3.8 2.1 2.1 4.9 3.2 1.7 1.0 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.8 1.4 7.3 15.5
Corporate
Global 1,794.6 2,002.6 2,142.4 2,254.9 2,411.4 2,554.9 2,751.2 2,896.0 2,900.5 3,437.9 3,799.0 3,936.7 4,099.5 4,336.6 4,827.3 5,206.8 5,259.6 5,746.7
Asia 50.7 66.3 80.7 92.1 106.4 129.1 161.1 207.3 150.6 272.9 315.9 320.5 357.7 377.2 377.2 410.6 435.8 486.2
India - 0.03 0.04 0.3 1.1 0.6 0.0 0.1 1.2 1.3 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.9 1.9 2.8 3.8 5.3

Source: BIS.

137
Lehman Brothers | India: Everything to play for

THE FUTURE
Thanks to its impressive modernisation efforts since the early 1990s, India has managed
to compress about a half century of US and European debt capital market development
into less than two decades. In our opinion, India will make even more rapid progress in
modernising its capital market over the next two decades. This process stands to be
marked by the following major milestones:
Unrestricted currency convertibility: Given their understandable need for ready
liquidity, most international debt funds operate only in those currency regimes which
allow the ability easily to buy and sell public securities. The eventual elimination of the
current dwindling currency controls, a prerequisite for membership in international debt
benchmarks like the Lehman Global Aggregate Index, will galvanise international
investor demand for Indian debt securities. Just as Asian central bank purchases of non-
local government securities have helped constrain US and European interest rates since
2003, increased international investor appetite for Indian debt securities should help
contain long Indian interest rates and benefit India’s economic growth engine.
Disintermediation of corporate borrowings from banking system to both local and
international debt investors: As the Indian banking system graduates from a loan
originator/holder to a more fee-based business model like its European and US large
bank counterparts, corporate issuers will turn to the public debt markets to finance their
expanding businesses. This will drive up the velocity of corporate origination, most
likely to a long-term growth rate above government supply. More important, especially
with non-Indian institutional investors increasing their participation in the Indian debt
markets, the aggregate supply of credit to the Indian economy will be enhanced, thereby
further aiding Indian economic growth.
Broad application of securitisation: Emulating the innovations of the past two decades
in more developed capital markets and assuming the implementation of the requisite
institutional legal and regulatory framework (eg, an appropriate bankruptcy code), the
broad application of securitisation techniques to consumer credit (credit cards, auto
loans), real estate loans (both consumer and commercial), and corporate credit (bank
loans, receivables, inventory and project financings) is set to spawn a tidal swell of
securitised origination. A second-order effect will be the bundling of these various
conventional and securitised debt products into Collateralised Debt Obligations (CDOs)
to meet the diverse cash flow, yield and total return objectives of both institutional and
retail investors located in India and around the world. As in the US and Europe, the
outstanding size of the Indian securitised debt market is destined eventually to surpass
the combined size of the treasury and corporate bond markets. Overall, this vast
liquefaction of both real and balance sheet assets through securitisation will help sustain
and even accelerate the pace of Indian economic growth.
Full derivitisation of the Indian debt markets: Moving beyond its impressive
inauguration in the government bond market, the full derivitisation of all asset class
components of the Indian market from governments through especially corporates
(mainly via Credit Default Swaps (CDS)) will facilitate liquidity in the underlying cash
markets as well as aiding hedging, risk control and innovation. By authoring a broader,
finer and more precise distribution of risks, this supporting derivative architecture should
help moderate periods of economic and capital market systemic turbulence. In turn,
smoother markets through time should help dampen business, consumer, and investor
uncertainties. In parallel, the resulting diminution of strategic risk premia also can help
boost the Indian economy.

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Lehman Brothers | India: Everything to play for

CONCLUSION
In tandem with its bustling economy, the Indian debt markets are destined to be
numbered as among the fastest growing in the world over the first quarter of the 21st
century, if not for the entire 21st century. Indian economic maturation, coupled with
greater global economic integration, render this burgeoning component of the world
fixed income choice set a compelling arena for asset managers looking to add portfolio
alpha through international diversification. Indian debt unquestionably will become a
regular staple of international debt portfolios. Global asset managers should already be
preparing for their inaugural allocation to the dynamic Indian debt market. And far more
rewarding than just studying the expansion of the international debt choice set, it is
gratifying to watch India rise to its rightful role in the world economy and capital
markets.

October 2007 139


Lehman Brothers | India: Everything to play for

MEASURING THE LONG-TERM TREND AND VALUE OF THE INR

INTRODUCTION
Craig Chan India’s moving into a new era of solid economic growth, through rising productivity,
+65 6433 6106 economic and financial reforms, and urbanization, should support a long-term
craig.chan@lehman.com appreciation trend of the Indian rupee. To gauge the path and fair value of the rupee, we
compare India with other economies that experienced similar investment-and
Francis Breedon productivity-driven booms during their “take-offs”. To measure the fair value of the
+44 20 7260 2144 Indian rupee, we use the Fundamental Equilibrium Exchange Rate (FEER) approach.
fbreedo2@lehman.com This technique will determine the INR Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER) level that
is consistent with macroeconomic balance. Changing the components of the model
Jim McCormick allows us to analyse INR valuation in different scenarios.
+44 20 7103 1283
jmmccorm@lehman.com Productivity booms and their REER impact
The correlation of productivity with real exchange rates is not “spurious” 95 . Higher
productivity leads to REER appreciation as highlighted through: (1) the Balassa-
Samuelson effect 96 ; and (2) rising cross-country broad productivity differentials. The
Balassa-Samuelson framework focuses on real exchange rate appreciation from higher
productivity growth in the tradable goods sector relative to non-traded goods in
developing economies. The positive sectoral productivity gap led by the tradable sector
leads to higher wages and pressures wages in the non-tradable sector higher to keep
salaries competitive. Because productivity growth is higher in the tradable sector than
the non-tradable sector, unit labour costs and, consequently, CPI inflation will rise faster
in the non-tradable sector. This will result in rising inflation for the overall economy,
causing the REER to appreciate. For India, our measures show that productivity growth
in the tradable sector 97 has risen faster than the non-tradable sector for three consecutive
years to 2006. The average tradable and non-tradable sector productivity in 2004 to 2006
was 6.3% and 4.5%, respectively. Wages have risen rapidly in both sectors, but strong
productivity in the tradable sector relative to the non-tradable sector may prolong the
upward wage pressures in the tradable sector. This could sustain upside inflation risks
and filter through to real INR appreciation.

Figure 118. India’s strengthening productivity should Figure 119. Japan productivity surges during take-off
support INR appreciation

% India-Asia productivity differential, lhs % y-o-y Japan REER (2000=100), lhs %


Index
8 INR REER,rhs 15 Labour productivity, rhs
120 12
4 10 Take-off from
100 around 1960
8
0 5
80
-4 0
4
60
-8 -5 0
40
-12 -10
20 -4
-16 -15 1964 1971 1978 1985 1992 1999 2006
1971 1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 2001 2006

Source: Lehman Brothers, BIS. Source: Lehman Brothers, BIS.

95
Cointegrating relationships between the real exchange rate, productivity, and real oil price using Johansen
(1988) and Stock-Watson (1993) procedures. NBER working paper series no. 8824.
96
Balassa, Bela, “The Purchasing Power Parity Doctrine: A Reappraisal,” Journal of Political Economy 72 (1964).
Samuelson, Paul, “Theoretical Notes on Trade Problems,” Review of Economics and Statistics 23 (1964).
97
We have taken agriculture, manufacturing, trade, transport, hotels, communications as tradables. Non-tradables
include electricity, construction, other services. We smooth out the volatility with a 5-year moving average.
October 2007 140
Lehman Brothers | India: Everything to play for

Another approach is to look at India’s broad cross-country productivity growth


differentials and its impact on the INR REER. Critics of the Balassa-Samuelson
approach claim that exchange rate appreciation is only partially explained by non-
tradable and tradable sector price differentials, and cross-country productivity has more
significant implications for the real exchange rate 98. The reason is that faster productivity
can increase aggregate demand, with consumption and investment picking up due to
expectations of higher future income and profits 99 . The theory adds that demand for
domestic goods due to wealth effects overwhelms the downward pressure exerted by
higher productivity upon the terms of trade, and so the real exchange rate appreciates.
The broad productivity differential between India and Asia 100 widened to 2.8% in 2006
from -3.6% in 2002 (Figure 118) and the Johansen cointegration 101 test shows no
spurious correlation of the two variables. Whether we take the Balassa-Samuelson or the
broad cross-country productivity approach, the strength of India’s broad productivity led
by the tradable sector supports a long-term INR appreciation path.
Productivity, REER and take-offs in Asia
Empirical studies show that countries have witnessed strengthening REERs during their
productivity booms, which was an inherent reason for their take-offs in the first place.
Japan’s economy began to take off at around the start of the 1960s with labour
productivity averaging 8.9% y-o-y in that decade (1.2% average in the ten years to
2006). The boom in productivity was led by the surge in domestic investment, with fixed
capital investment rising from 19.4% in 1955 to a peak of 36.4% in 1973. From 1960 to
1973, real GDP per capita saw a three-fold rise to US$20,479. During this period in
which Japan’s economy “took off”, the Japanese Yen real effective exchange rate
strengthened by 18% from 1964 to 1971 (BIS data only available from 1964), driven
largely by nominal FX appreciation (Figure 119). The Japanese Yen REER strengthened
by a further 22% from 1971 to 1973. But most of this is likely to have been from the
collapse of Bretton Woods in 1971, which led to broad US dollar weakness.
Japan, in our view, bears the closest resemblance to the current boom in India given
Japan’s capital account liberalisation. But even Japan’s capital account convertibility

Figure 120. India’s productivity growth strengthening Figure 121. India’s basic balance and trend basic
balance using the Hodrick-Prescott Filter

Index India REER (FY94=100), lhs % % of GDP


220 12 8 Basic balance Trend basic balance
Labour productivity, rhs
8 6
190

4 4
160
0 2
130
-4 0

100
-8 (2)

70 -12 (4)
1964 1971 1978 1985 1992 1999 2006 Jun-96 Jun-98 Jun-00 Jun-02 Jun-04 Jun-06

Source: World Bank. Source: Lehman Brothers, CEIC.

98
National Bureau of Economic Research working paper series no. 8824, Productivity and the euro-dollar
exchange rate puzzle, Ron Alquist and Menzie D.Chin.
99
Bailey, Andrew, Stephen Millard, and Simon Wells, “Capital Flows and Exchange Rates,” Bank of England
Quarterly Bulletin (Autumn 2001).
100
India’s productivity less the average productivity of China, HK, Japan, S.Korea, Singapore and Taiwan.
101
Hypothesis that at least 1 co-integrating vector between the REER and productivity differentials can be rejected
using the Johansen (1988) trace test.
October 2007 141
Lehman Brothers | India: Everything to play for

only began to move towards more significant liberalisation from 1960 to the 1970s and
was still relatively closed compared with India now.
Other parts of Asia including Taiwan, Singapore and China all saw solid productivity
and GDP per capita growth during their boom periods 102 , but capital accounts were
mostly closed. The TWD strengthened on both a REER and NEER basis during its take-
off period, but was volatile. Singapore’s REER weakened on relatively low inflation, but
appreciated on a nominal basis. Chinese authorities drove the CNY weaker throughout
most of its boom period to support exports 103 . But were it not for the heavy FX
intervention after China stepped up trade (WTO in late 2001) and capital account
liberalisation, China’s REER would have likely followed a similar path to Japan’s.

India’s productivity boom should lead to real INR appreciation


India’s growth acceleration is taking on key characteristics shown by other economies in
Asia (especially Japan) during the early stages of their take-offs. Those include the sharp
rise in India’s investment-to-GDP ratio, the acceleration in GDP per capita, the opening
up of the economy (trade-to-GDP) and surging productivity growth (see Chapter 2: India
rising).
India’s high productivity growth and investment boom looks set to continue. Labour
productivity, at 7.0% in 2006, is at the highest since 1988 and is supported by the
increase in gross domestic investment as a share of GDP to around 35% in FY07 (28.0%
in FY04). Ample sources of funds and healthy balance sheets are underpinning a boom
in investment. Other measures of the underlying strength of productivity include our
incremental capital output ratio – ratio of the investment rate to GDP growth – which has
fallen to under 4.0 in FY07 (more than 4.5 in early 2000). Total factor productivity from
FY81 to FY06 also accounted for 2.9% per year of the average 5.9% growth (see
Chapter 3: Accounting for India’s growth: Figure 26, Sources of economic growth).
These support our view that INR still has much to gain from the uptrend in investment
and productivity growth with strong demographic and urbanisation trends in its favour.
The strength of India’s productivity growth and rising differential with Asia (including
Japan) and against the US are likely to provide more support to our long-term INR
REER appreciation view. The INR REER is still only 7.3% stronger (1H 2007) than the
previous ten-year average (Figure 120), suggesting there is ample space for the INR to
appreciate further.

Figure 122. INR FEER shows INR undervalued Figure 123. INR FEER under FDI boom scenarios

Index Index INR FEER - FDI: 3yr 50% 7yr 20% grow th
INR REER (2000=100) INR FEER - FDI: 5yr 50% 5yr 20% grow th
125 INR FEER baseline 125

115 115

105
105

95
95

INR REER w eak relative to the FEER 85


85 Jun-96 Jun-00 Jun-04 Jun-08 Jun-12 Jun-16
Jun-96 Jun-98 Jun-00 Jun-02 Jun-04 Jun-06

Source: Lehman Brothers, RBI. Source: Lehman Brothers, RBI.

102
China 1978, Hong Kong 1961, Taiwan 1961, Japan 1960, Singapore 1965. Lehman Brothers estimates.
103
World Bank 1993,’ The East Asian Miracle, economic growth and public policy.’
October 2007 142
Lehman Brothers | India: Everything to play for

Vigilance on capital account liberalisation needed


There are risks to the long-term INR appreciation trend from unpredictable shocks such
as US credit market stress, a surge in oil prices, avian flu and politics. But there are also
major differences in the global financial market backdrop when comparing India’s
situation with the periods of take-off in the more developed parts of Asia. Globalisation
and the international flow of capital are much larger than a few decades ago. IMF data
show that net private capital flows from 22 industrial countries to 33 developing
countries accounted for close to 6% of GDP by the end of the 1990s from close to zero in
the early 1970s 104 . This could imply greater volatility for the INR as India moves
towards a market-determined exchange rate. A cautious approach to freeing up capital
movements is likely to be the key, given the scale of global capital flows, because having
to back-track on capital account liberalisation or creating FX policy uncertainty would
have negative implications. This is evidenced from Thailand’s capital account controls in
December 2006, which have led to a slowdown in net FDI 105. Reducing the vulnerability
of the INR as its capital account is liberalised will also depend on whether India is able
to meet most of its preconditions as recommended by the second Tarapore Committee
report (see Box 8: Recommendations on fuller capital account convertibility).

Modelling the fair value of the INR through our FEER estimates
With the productivity-driven long-term INR appreciation trend intact in our view, we
gauge the fair value of the INR REER through the FEER model 106. The FEER is a macro
balance approach that calculates the level of the INR REER that would align the actual
(structural) current account with the equilibrium current account. We judge the gap
between the actual and equilibrium current account balance as a trend 107 of the gap
between the structural current account and long-term capital flows (FDI, portfolio flows,
and reserve accumulation) called the Basic Balance (Figure 121). The structural current
account balance is then simply the actual current account adjusted for the state of the
economic cycle. Using income and price elasticities 108 for imports and exports of goods
and services (G&S) to India’s and the world output gap, we can calculate the exchange
rate level that closes the gap between the structural and equilibrium current account.
According to this calculation, India’s exchange rate (INR REER) in 1Q 2007 was
undervalued by 12.7% (Figure 122). This undervaluation dropped from a peak of 23.7%
in 4Q 2003 as a result of the fall in exports of goods and services relative to GDP.

INR FEER projections based on our assumptions


The flexibility of the FEER approach is that it allows us to implement scenario analysis
on INR valuation through changes in the underlying components of the model. Using
Lehman Brothers baseline economic assumptions over the next ten years, we take two
optimistic, but relatively conservative scenarios on FDI growth to gauge the impact on
the INR FEER – conservative, because net FDI accelerated by 116% in the past two
years to 1Q07. Our first scenario is FDI rising by an annual 50% y-o-y over the next
three years and 20% in the remaining seven years. This assumption widens the
undervaluation gap of the current INR REER to 17.4%. In our second scenario, where
we assume an annual 50% y-o-y FDI growth over the next five years and 20% in the
remaining five years, the INR REER undervaluation widens further to 28.1% (Figure
123). Although this is a static model in that the INR REER is unchanged through the
forecast period, this approach supports the case for further INR REER appreciation,
especially with India moving into a productivity- and investment-driven boom.

104
IMF, “Effects of Financial Globalization on Developing Countries: Some Empirical Evidence.” Eswar Prasad,
Kenneth Rogoff, Shang-Jin Wei and M. Ayhan Kose. March 17, 2003.
105
IMF Executive Board Article IV consultation with Thailand, March 23, 2007 noted that capital controls in the long
run are costly because they adversely affect investor confidence and capital market development.
106
See Introducing The Macro-Balance Currency Valuation Model, December 12, 2006 , Francis Breedon, Lehman
Brothers, Global Foreign Exchange. The approach taken is most closely related to Borowski and Couharde
(2003).
107
Using a Hodrick-Prescott Filter.
108
Source Lehman Brothers, IMF, IIM (Lucknow): 1.33 and 0.11 for income and price elasticity to imports
respectively; 2.47 and 1.498 for income and price elasticity to exports respectively.
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APPENDIX 1: COMMON ABBREVIATIONS

ABM Anti-Ballistic Missile (Treaty)


ADB Asian Development Bank
APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation
ARF ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASSOCHAM Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry of India
BIS Bank for International Settlements
BJP Bharatiya Janata Party
BOP Balance of payments
BRICs Brazil, Russia, India, China
BSE Bombay Stock Exchange
BSP Bahujan Samaj Party
CCIL Clearing Corporation of India Limited
CEO Chief Executive Officer
CFO Chief Finance Officer
CFSP (EU) Common Foreign and Security Policy
CPI Communist Party of India
CPI(M) Communist Party of India (Marxist)
Crore Ten million
CRR Cash Reserve Requirement ratio
CST Central Sales Tax
CTBT Comprehensive (Nuclear) Test Ban Treaty
CV Commercial vehicle
ECB External Commercial Borrowings
EM Emerging market
EU European Union
FDI Foreign direct investment
FII Foreign institutional investor
FRAs Forward rate agreements
FRBMA Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Act
FTA Free Trade Agreement
GDP Gross domestic product
HPAEs High performing Asian economies
IAEA International Atomic Energy Authority
IBRD International Bank of Reconstruction and Development (ie The World Bank)
ICOR Incremental capital output ratio

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IDFC Infrastructure Development Finance Company


IIFCL India Infrastructure Finance Company Limited
IIMs Indian Institutes of Management
IITs Indian Institutes of Technology
IMF International Monetary Fund
INC Indian National Congress (party)
IPR Intellectual property rights
IRDA Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority
ITIC International Trust and Investment Corporation
Lakh One hundred thousand
LAF Liquidity Adjustment Facility
MCA Model Concession Agreement
MD Missile Defence (formerly National Missile Defence or NMD)
MFN Most Favoured Nation
MRTPA Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act
MSS Market Stabilisation Scheme
MTCR Missile Technology Control Regime
Nasscom National Association of Software and Services Companies
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NCP Nationalist Congress Party (NCP)
NGO Non-Government Organisation
NPL Non-performing loan
NPT (Nuclear) Non-Proliferation Treaty
NREGS National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme
NRI Non-resident Indian
NSE National Stock Exchange
NYSE New York Stock Exchange
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OGL Open general licence
PE Private equity
PPP Public-private partnership
PPPAC Public-Private Partnership Appraisal Committee
R&D Research and development
RBI Reserve Bank of India
ROE Return on equity
SAARC South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation
SBI State Bank of India
SEBI Securities and Exchange Board of India

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SEZ Special Economic Zone


SIMI Students’ Islamic Movement of India
SMEs Small and medium-sized enterprises
SLR Statutory liquidity ratio
SOE State-Owned Enterprise
SSI Small-scale industry
TFP Total factor productivity
UN United Nations
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNGA UN General Assembly
UNSC UN Security Council
UP Uttar Pradesh
UPA United Progressive Alliance
UV Utility vehicle
VAT Value-added tax
WTO World Trade Organisation
y-o-y Year-on-year

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APPENDIX 2: ISSUES WITH INDIA’S MACROECONOMIC DATA

Data are seldom as good as the economist would like but, in India’s case, data problems
are severe. For example, as emphasised by Bosworth, Collins, and Virmani (2006), who
pay particular attention to the issue of data reliability 109 , because more than 40% of
India’s output is produced in the non-organised sector, the only reliable estimates of
output and employment are those made at the times of the quinquennial surveys of
households and small enterprises. The annual estimates between these surveys are
perforce based on interpolations or extrapolations of these survey data.
Revisions can therefore be substantial: the (upward) revision to 1993-94 GDP, for
example, was fully 9%. Moreover, substantial adjustments often have to be made to the
base data. For example, as noted by Bosworth, Collins, and Virmani (2006),
“…the censuses of 1971, 1981, and 1991 are believed to have produced solid
estimates of the overall population, but they grossly underestimated the worker-
population ratio (WPR) and thus the size of the total workforce. Visaria (2002)
discusses these problems and suggests the need for corrections on the order of
26 (1971), 15 (1981) and 12 (1991) percent to the reported figures. In contrast,
the quinquennial surveys appear to yield consistent estimates of WPRs, but to
underestimate the total population. Thus, estimates of India’s labour force are
typically generated by combining the survey-based estimates of the WPR for
four component groups (rural men, rural women, urban men and urban women)
with estimates of the corresponding populations, obtained from interpolating the
census data. As a result, reliable estimates of the total workforce are limited to
the years covered by the six quinquennial household surveys that were
conducted over the period of FY73 to 1999.”
Interpolation is one of the principal reasons why production functions can rarely be
estimated directly, by econometric methods: to the extent that any relationship between
output and inputs is found, it is as likely to be the result of the way that the data were
compiled as it is to reflect a genuine underlying relationship running from inputs to
output. The interpolation issue is also important in connection with dating the
fluctuations in economic activity: the perennial Indian debates about the precise timing
of the consequences of economic reform do not have a sufficiently sound basis in the
data.
Another serious practical problem concerns the treatment of depreciation in the
estimation of the capital stock. To the extent that the rate of depreciation is constant,
series for gross capital stock and for net capital stock will grow at the same rate. Hence,
while incorrect assumptions about depreciation will thereby introduce errors into
calculations that involve the comparisons of levels, such as rates of return on capital,
they will not introduce errors into the rate of growth calculations on which growth
accounting calculations depend.
However, when the rate of depreciation changes, assumptions about depreciation stand
to become important for growth accounting calculations too. Some capital, such as
information technology equipment, has a comparatively short life, for technological if
not physical reasons; whereas other components of the capital stock, such as buildings
and roads, last for decades or more. Hence if, as seems likely, short-lived capital
formation is becoming proportionately more important, the assumptions made about
depreciation become quantitatively important: to the extent that the depreciation of the
capital stock accelerates, the net capital stock will grow more slowly than will the gross.
Whether for this or for some other reason, estimates of India’s capital stock seem to be
uncertain: for example, the change of base to FY00 increased the figure for total industry

109
See Bosworth, Collins, and Virmani, A. (2006), especially pp. 9-16, who in turn draw upon Sivasubramonian, S.
(2004).
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investment in FY00 by 3%, which in turn had a major effect on estimates of the growth
of the capital stock since FY94 110.
In addition to such issues that are likely to be particularly important in India and in other
emerging economies, there are other, more general, issues. The twin problems of
aggregating the outputs of myriad firms and the self-employed in order to produce a
single measure of aggregate output, and of aggregating numbers of workers of many
different sorts and abilities in order to produce an index of labour input, are well known.
Generally they are noted by economic practitioners and thereafter ignored. But despite
their imperfections, these aggregate data are often adequate, at least in the advanced
industrial economies, for addressing a number of policy issues, such as inferring the
degree of inflation pressure in an economy from the gap between measures of output and
potential 111.

110
For further detail, see Bosworth, B., Collins, S.M. and Virmani, A. (2006), p. 12.
111
For an interesting and informed discussion of this use for the data in question, see Cotis, Elmeskov, and
Mourougane (1993).
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APPENDIX 3: THE RETURNS TO EDUCATION

Education helps to increase the productivity of, and thereby the return to, labour. Most
studies corroborate the increasing returns to education, particularly for women, and at the
secondary education level. However, estimating the return on education is far from easy.
It is usually estimated as the rate of return on “years spent in education”. Establishing a
relationship between education and earnings is also difficult, because it is necessary to
deal with issues such as the effect of omitted variables, measurement error, and family-
specific characteristics. Another limitation is that, in most developing countries, such as
India, people with higher education constitute only a small proportion of the total labour
force.
Notwithstanding these challenges, however, a number of studies have estimated the
private return to education using the Mincerian earnings model. The specification of the
model is as follows:

LnYi = β 0 + β1 S i + β 2 X 1i + β 3 X 2i + ε i
Where Ln Yi is the log of earnings of individual i,

S i measures years of completed schooling,

X 1i is a vector of observed characteristics of individual i,

X 2i is a vector of observed characteristics of the family,


and εi is the individual-specific error.

In such a specification, the coefficient on schooling, β1 , measures the rate of return to


each additional year of schooling (or to a particular level of schooling).
A number of studies have estimated the private and social return to education in India;
Kingdom (1998), for example, estimates that the private return to education was 10.6%
in India, and detailed analysis of these returns by gender, location, state and cross-
country has been estimated by various authors. We briefly review the key results below.
By gender, and rural vs urban

Duraisamy, P. (2002) estimates the private returns per year of schooling in India in 1993-
94 by gender and location (Figure 125). He estimates that the return to an additional year
of women’s education is higher than that of men at the middle, secondary and higher
secondary levels. At the secondary education level, the wage gain to women’s education
is more than twice that of men’s.
To estimate the impact of imperfect mobility between the rural and urban areas and the
difference in institutional factors, Duraisamy also estimates the return in rural and urban
areas separately. He finds that while the returns per year of schooling are higher in the
rural than in the urban areas for primary, secondary and technical diploma, the returns
for middle, higher secondary and college education are higher in the urban labour
markets than those in the rural areas.
Inter-state comparison

Inter-state returns to education have recently been estimated by Asaoka (2006), who
finds the highest primary rates of return among lower-income states, while the return on
tertiary education is highest among the high-income states (Figure 124). He also finds
that the private rates of return to university completion for men in urban areas in 16
states in 1993 were positively and significantly correlated with the state’s GDP per
capita.

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Figure 124. State-wise rate of return to education in India, 1993

Primary Secondary Tertiary


Gujarat 4.3 8.0 23.8
Tamil Nadu 4.4 10.9 22.7
Karnataka 4.8 13.1 21.2
Kerala 2.9 8.9 20.1
Punjab 1.5 6.8 19.5
Andhra Pradesh 4.7 11.5 19.1
Haryana 5.1 9.9 19.1
West Bengal 5.2 9.6 18.5
Maharashtra 5.6 10.8 17.4
Madhya Pradesh 5.4 10.0 15.8
Jammu & Kashmir 4.1 9.4 15.5
Bihar 6.5 7.7 15.0
Orissa 8.1 13.5 12.6
Uttar Pradesh 4.6 9.2 12.1
Rajasthan 3.9 9.8 11.9
Assam 5.9 15.2 4.3

Source: Asaoka (2006) and Lehman Brothers.

Cross- country comparison

A cross-country comparison of the private rate of return to education suggests that India
has one of the highest rates of return on secondary and tertiary education (Figure 126).
Private rates of return to secondary and tertiary education in India at 17.7% and 16.6%
respectively, are much higher than China’s at 13.0% and 15.0% respectively. In fact, in
most countries the returns have increased over time.

Figure 125. Private rate of return to education in India by Figure 126. Summary of private rate of return to
gender and location education

(%) All Men Wom en Rural Urban Country Prim ary Secondary Tertiary
Primary 7.9 6.3 3.8 8.4 6.3 Egypt, 1998 5 6 8
Middle 7.4 6.4 10.3 7 8 Indonesia, 1989 22 16 15
Secondary 17.3 16 33.7 19.7 16
Korea, 1986 - 10 19
Higher secondary 9.3 8.9 11.8 9 10.5
Philippines, 1988 18 10 12
College/University 11.7 12 9.1 11.4 12.3
Argentina, 1989 10 14 15
Technical
14.6 15 12 19.1 13.4 China, 1993 18 13 15
diploma/Certificate
India, 1993 7.8 17.7 16.6

Note: For Indonesia, the return is the social rate of return; while for India
secondary is the return on secondary school and tertiary is the return on
college/university.

Source: Duraisamy, P. (2002) and Lehman Brothers. Source: Allen, 2001; CRESUR, 2004; Hossain, 1997; Duraiswamy (2002) and
Lehman Brothers.
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APPENDIX 4: PHYSICAL ECONOMIES OF SCALE

Many, and probably most, economic processes are characterised by increasing returns to
scale – a doubling of all inputs more than doubles capacity – and are quantitatively
important 112 in contributing to growth, particularly in economies that grow quickly from
a small-scale base.
Economies of scale originate in a number of different ways, including from the laws of
geometry and of physics; technology; and from the interaction between indivisibilities
and the scale of output.
• Geometrical relations. In the (engineering) construction of many items of capital
equipment, the so-called “power rule” often applies: where the equipment is
volumetric, for example a sphere, the relationship between the area (A) of material
used to construct it and the volume (V) that it encloses is:
A = fV 2/3
To the extent that cost is (approximately) proportional to the area of material used, it
follows that cost varies as volume to the 2/3 power, so that a 10% increase in
capacity require only a 6.5% increase in expenditure. A similar phenomenon, albeit
with different parameters, applies to many other volumetric shapes, such as tubes
and cylinders: hence geometric economies of scale are to be found in a wide range
of products, from blast furnaces to engines to ships.
Economies of scale are even to be found in some areas of agriculture, which is often
cited as a classic example of diminishing returns, in such instances as, for example,
the application of more and more units of fertiliser to a given area of land. But even
in agriculture, some activities exhibit increasing returns to scale. For example,
suppose that land needs to be fenced in order to become productive. The cost of the
fencing is a linear function of the length of the fence: but the area enclosed increases
with the square of the length of the fence.
• Physical laws. The extent to which geometric economies of scale can be reaped
may be limited by the laws of physics. A container cannot be scaled up without limit:
the laws of physics governing the structural strength of a hollow body imply, for a
sphere for example, that if scaled up too far it would collapse under its own weight,
unless the walls were thickened. Thus in the case of a sphere, the economies of scale
would ultimately be limited to less than implied by the 2/3 “power rule”, although in
many cases the volume would nevertheless increase less than in proportion with the
amount of material used in its construction. Other physical laws can be important
too. For example, the maximum speed that a ship can be driven through water is
proportional to the square root of the length of the hull on the water line, giving rise
to the exploitation of economies of scale in shipping. Similarly with blast furnaces:
according to the physics of heat, the heat loss from a blast furnace is proportional to
its surface area, whereas the volume of metal that can be smelted is proportional to
the cube of its surface area, a source of increasing returns between fuel used and
output.
Moreover, geometric laws and physical laws may interact. In the case of a ship, for
example, the geometric property that a ship’s carrying capacity is approximately
proportional to the cube of the surface area of its hull combines with the laws of
physics governing the structural strength of a hollow body such that the cost of
building a ship varies approximately linearly with the surface area of its hull.
By contrast, some structures, such as bridges, exhibit decreasing returns to scale: if
all the dimensions of a bridge are altered by a factor Ȝ, its structural strength is

112
This appendix draws particularly on Manne, A.S. (1967), and on Lipsey, R.G. (2000).
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altered by (approximately) 1/Ȝ, and its weight, (and thereby the cost of the materials
used in its construction) by (approximately) Ȝ3.
• Technology. The effects of the combination of the laws of geometry and physics
taken together can on occasions be offset by technology. For example, the discovery
or invention of a new, stronger, material could permit a sphere to be scaled up
beyond the size at which it would normally collapse: in that case, the extent of the
economy of scale would also be dictated by the (extra) cost of the new material
relative to the older one. Similarly, the diseconomies of scale in structures such as
bridges could be reduced by using new, higher-strength, materials.

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APPENDIX 5: PROBLEMS WITH THE THEORY OF THE PRODUCTION FUNCTION

Perhaps the most severe problem in production function analysis is that of aggregating
investment data to produce a series for the capital stock, striking as it does at the heart of
the approach. Some economists consider the problem so severe as to render such capital
stock series economically meaningless.
To begin with, the function that is used in growth accounting calculations assumes that
production takes place under conditions of constant returns to scale, i.e. that a doubling
of all inputs results in a doubling of output. This assumption is “required” because,
without it, it cannot be assumed that the factors of production, labour and capital, are
paid their marginal products, and hence it cannot be assumed that the weights required to
be applied to labour and to capital in order to calculate their individual contributions to
output can be inferred from the data on the share of GDP going to wages (and thereby to
profits) as recorded in the national accounts. If, for example, returns to scale are greater
than unity, the last worker to be hired produces more output than the average; workers
(and capital) therefore cannot be paid their marginal products, because the sum of wages
and profits would exceed the value of the output they (collectively) produce. Conversely,
if the production function were to exhibit diminishing returns then, once wages and
profits had been paid, some output would be “left over”. The problem here lies with the
root assumption of constant returns to scale, which is empirically false: almost all
physical plant, and many service activities, exhibit powerful increasing returns to
scale 113.
A second problem with the production function approach is that the commonly used
Cobb-Douglas function assumes that technical progress is equivalent to an increase in
the supply and/or efficiency of labour – the assumption of “disembodied”, or “Harrod
neutral”, technical progress. In practice it is most unlikely that all, or even most,
technical change takes this form: a considerable amount of technical progress enters the
economy only through being embodied in gross investment. Information technology is
one obvious case in point: computer technology affects productivity not by being
invented, but by being brought into use.
Perhaps the most serious problem, however, is the so-called “aggregation problem”. In a
seminal article whose very title seems designed to strike unease in the minds of
practitioners of growth accounting – Aggregation in Production Functions: What
Applied Economists Should Know – Felipe and Fisher (2001) represent the problem as
being so severe as to be terminal:
“The pillar of these neoclassical growth models is the aggregate production
function, a relationship that is intended to describe the technological
relationships at the aggregate level. The problem is that the macro production
function is a fictitious entity. At the theoretical level it is built by adding micro
production functions. However, there is an extensive body of literature,
developed since the 1940s, which points out that aggregating micro production
functions into a macro production function is extremely problematic.” 114
These problems have been known for a long time. As Felipe and Fisher point out,
“As far back as 1963 … in his seminal survey on production and cost,
[Professor Sir Alan] Walters had concluded: After surveying the problems of
aggregation one may easily doubt whether there is much point in employing
such a concept as an aggregate production function. The variety of competitive
and technological conditions found in modern economies suggests that one
cannot approximate the basic requirements of sensible aggregation except,
perhaps, over firms in the same industry or for narrow sections of the
economy…”
113
Manne, A.S. (1967).
114
Felipe, J. and Fisher, F.M. (2001), p. 1.
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The response
To some extent, this catalogue of criticisms of the growth accounting method, and the
production function theory that lies behind it, may appear like what, in ice-hockey
parlance, is termed “piling on”. Perhaps understandably, practice has been to note the
objections, but then press on regardless: just as “you go to war with the Army you
have” 115, so has been the practice when studying the sources and caucuses of economic
growth.
Why, therefore, have economists persisted with growth accounting analyses, despite the
evident problems with the theory that purportedly underpins them? There are perhaps
three principal reasons:
1. Instrumentalism: To the extent that aggregate production functions appear to give
empirically reasonable results, why should they not be used?
2. Production functions are parables: some rationalisation can be provided for the
neoclassical production function parable, but the assumptions are extremely
restrictive.
3. For empirical applications (such as growth accounting and econometric estimation),
there is no other choice.
Not surprisingly, perhaps, critics such as Felipe and Fisher dismiss all three arguments,
the first on the grounds that instrumentalism is “indefensible on methodological
grounds”; the second because, in the light of the literature on aggregation, it “loses its
power”; and the third on the grounds that it is “a variant of the instrumentalist position
and also clashes with the results of the aggregation work” 116.
All of this suggests, with the benefit of hindsight, that it is perhaps pointlessly
complicated to conduct a growth accounting exercise on the assumption that a number of
implausible assumptions hold true, and then to seek to quantify the importance of
dropping each of them. Certainly that is the view of Burmeister (1980), who concludes
that:
“Perhaps for the purpose of answering many macroeconomic questions … we
should disregard the concept of a production function at the macroeconomic
level. The economist who succeeds in finding a suitable replacement will be a
prime candidate for a future Nobel prize.” 117
It is, in our judgement, more sensible in many cases simply to work directly with
adducing evidence (sometimes macroeconomic but more often microeconomic, from a
range of countries, both developed and emerging), on the potential importance of each of
a range of factors that contribute to economic growth, and thereafter to focus on how
important, quantitatively, each might be to a given country in a given period.

115
The full quotation of this observation by former US Secretary of Defense, Donald H. Rumsfeld, is “As you know,
you go to war with the Army you have. They’re not the Army you might want or wish to have at a later time.” See
US Department of Defense transcript December 08 2006
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2004/tment.r20041208-secdef1761.html
116
For a detailed discussion – and ultimate rejection – of each of these arguments, see Felipe and Fisher (2001),
especially pp.26-29.
117
Burmeister (1980) pp. 427-428.
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APPENDIX 6: LIMITATIONS OF THE “GROWTH ACCOUNTING” METHOD

The basic framework within which this issue is typically addressed was pioneered in the
1950s by Professor Solow (1957), in his seminal paper Technical Change and the
Aggregate Production Function. Solow took as his point of departure the fundamental
assumption that an economy can be represented by a function that relates the level of
output to the level of the employed labour force, the stock of capital, and the pace of
technical progress.
Solow assumed a comparatively simple, constant returns to scale, Cobb-Douglas
production function 118 which relates the level of output, Q, to the level of the (employed)
labour force, E, and the stock of capital, K, thus:

Q = A EĮ Kȕ (1)

The interpretation of the exponents Į and ȕ is as follows. A value of less than unity for
either implies a decreasing marginal productivity of the associated factor, i.e. a doubling
of that factor alone results in a less-than-doubling of output, as is generally to be
expected.
If the exponents sum exactly to unity, i.e. Į + ȕ = 1, as assumed by Solow, a doubling of
all inputs results in a doubling of output – the production function exhibits constant
returns to scale. A value for the sum of the exponents of less than unity implies
decreasing returns to the factors of production taken together, i.e. a doubling of both
factors results in a less than doubling of output. And if the exponents sum to greater than
unity, a doubling of inputs results in output more than doubling – increasing returns to
scale.
Then there is the matter of representing technical progress. To the extent that this can be
presumed fairly constant, equation (1) can be modified to incorporate it, in a constant
returns to scale production function, by a time trend term (ect):
Q = A EĮ K1- Į ect (2)
In principle, the values of Į, ȕ, and c can be estimated by estimating a regression
equation using data for (real) GDP, employment, and the capital stock. In practice,
however, estimating production functions for entire economies more often than not
proves problematic. While output and employment data tend to be measured relatively
accurately, with the result that a plausible relationship can often be found between GDP
and employment, the capital data often pose considerable problems: a plausible
relationship involving the capital variable is often impossible to find. This problem may
arise for a variety of reasons. Most data series for capital measure the stock of capital
rather than the flow of capital services that the stock provides. And reverse causality is
often at work, the capital stock term reflecting the fact that investment tends to be strong
when output is growing strongly, rather than the other way around.
Moreover, the very concept of an aggregate, whole-economy, production function is
dubious in an economy that is undergoing profound structural change in the way that
India has and is. Hence, we were not surprised that it did not prove possible to estimate a
meaningful production function for the Indian economy as a whole: most successfully
fitted production functions have been achieved using data for sub-sectors of economies,
usually the manufacturing sector or some part of it.
Given these difficulties in fitting an aggregate production function, most studies of the
determinants of economic growth instead employ the “growth accounting” method,
which side-steps the need to find statistical evidence of a relationship between inputs and
output.

118
For an exposition of Cobb-Douglas production function theory, see Archibald G.C., and Lipsey R.G. (1967).
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The growth accounting method starts from a production function such as (2) above, re-
expressed in growth rate terms, thus:
q = Įe + (1-Ȝ)k + c (3)

where lower case letters denote average annual rates of growth.


On the (powerful) assumption that the production function exhibits constant return to
scale, i.e. that a doubling of both inputs – labour and capital – results in a doubling of
output, and that labour and capital are paid their marginal products – two big
assumptions – the value of Į equals labour’s share of national product. This is a
convenient, if dubious, pair of assumptions, because it means that the value of Į, and
hence of ȕ = (1-Į), can be obtained by calculation from the national accounts, rather than
by econometric estimation.
The first such growth accounting calculation was performed by Robert Solow himself,
using annual US data for the years 1909 to 1949 for GDP and the two factors of
production, employment and the capital stock. Weighting the factors of production by
their respective shares in national income, Solow’s basic conclusion was that, together,
the (growth of) the two factors of production accounted for just 12½% of US GDP
growth during the 40-year period: the remainder of US output growth, some 83½%, was
attributed to “technical change” – also known variously as “the residual factor”, “the
residual”, or “total factor productivity growth”. Such a result is broadly typical of a wide
range of studies for other developed economies using the same basic method. 119 And
such too is the basic result of such a calculation for India – see Appendix 7 below.
The fundamental difficulty with such an approach, as Solow himself frequently stated, is
that concluding that some sort of unspecified deus ex machina – the “residual” – was
responsible for the bulk of GDP growth is not particularly helpful. By not making any
presumption about what was responsible for the greater part of economic growth, it
offers few clues about what might be the principal determinants of growth in the future.
Such problems apply equally to growth accounting estimates for India, especially as
structural change, which has been, and remains, particularly important in India’s
development process, is by assumption ruled out of the growth accounting process.

119
Another classic work, that applied the growth accounting method to the British economy, is Matthews, R.,
Feinstein, C., and Odling-Smee, J. (1982). For an exposition of the growth accounting method, see Denison
(1991); and for an interesting discussion of some of the principal issues involved, see Jorgensen, D. and
Griliches, Z. (1972).
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APPENDIX 7: GROWTH ACCOUNTING RESULTS FOR THE INDIAN ECONOMY

Over the 25-year period from FY81to FY06 120 as a whole, real GDP as measured in
India’s national accounts grew at an average of 5.9% per year, employment (e) by 2.0%
per year, and the capital stock (k) by 5.2% per year. Applying a Solow-type calculation
by taking the coefficients on employment and capital shares to be 0.7 and 0.3
respectively – the results are not particularly sensitive to the precise values used – yields
the following:
5.9% = (0.7 x 2.0%)*e + (0.3 x 5.2%)*k + c
= 1.4% + 1.6% + 2.9%
Thus, employment can be considered to have contributed 1.4 percentage points on
average to India’s output growth; capital 1.6 percentage points; and total factor
productivity growth 2.9 percentage points. Employment growth is thus reckoned to have
accounted for 24% of the overall growth of output; the capital stock 27%; and growth of
total factor productivity – the so-called growth “residual” – for 49%, very nearly half of
total growth.
A broadly similar calculation is reported by Bosworth, Collins, and Virmani (2006) 121,
who, on the basis of their adjusted data state that:
“… over the relatively long periods 1960-80 versus 1980-2004 [reflecting] the
widespread view that the performance of the Indian economy changed
significantly around 1980…nearly all of the output growth during the [pre-
1980] period is associated with increases in factor inputs. However, the post-
1980 acceleration is concentrated in improvements in the efficiency of factor
use, TFP.” [i.e. the ‘residual’] 122
Similarly, Dholakia, in his study of the Indian economy for the period 1960-2001,
reports that:
“During the pre-liberalisation period (1960-85), the main sources of growth of
Indian economy were the growth of labour input which accounted for 44% and
capital input which accounted for 32% of the overall GDP growth rate of 3.66%
per annum. Growth of total factor productivity contributed only 0.79 percentage
points or less than 22% of the overall growth rate during the pre-1985 period. In
the post liberalisation phase (1985 -2000), the total TFP growth in the economy
as a whole has turned out to be as high as 2.85 percentage points accounting for
48% of the overall GDP growth rate of 5.95% achieved.”
Unfortunately, such results are not by themselves particularly illuminating. It is not
helpful to be told that a major part of growth is unexplained. Accordingly, there has
developed a considerable so-called “growth accounting” literature – although not to date
particularly extensively for India – which seeks to identify at least the larger components
of the “residual”. The growth accounting method was pioneered by Edward Denison,
particularly in his monumental 1979 book Why Growth Rates Differ 123 , in which he
sought to quantify the principal sources of differences between post-war growth rates of
the US and a range of European countries. And similar investigations have subsequently
been undertaken for many economies, including Japan 124, South Korea 125, and India 126.
These studies generally seek, sometimes with great ingenuity – Denison was the master –
to quantify each of a number of influences on aggregate productivity growth suggested

120
We have extended the labour force data by a year to 2005-06 by assuming an annual labour force growth of
2.4% as given by Bosworth et al (2006) during 1999-2004.
121
Bosworth, Collins, and Virmani (2006), Table 3
122
Bosworth, B., Collins, S.M., and Virmani, A. (2006), p.17.
123
Denison, E. (1967) and Denison, E. F. (1979).
124
Kanamori, H. (1972); and Denison, E.F. and Chung, W. (1976).
125
Kim and Park (1985).
126
Dholakia (1974).
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by economic theory or offered by microeconomic evidence. Such influences include: the


(generally improving) quality of factor inputs; improved resource allocation (commonly
labour moving from low productivity activities (usually agriculture) to high productivity
sectors (usually manufacturing)); and ad hoc modifications to the production function to
allow for the possibility of increasing returns to scale.
An example of results from this sort of calculation is given in Figure 127 below.

Figure 127. Perhaps the most severe problem in production function analysis
Sources of Economic Growth, Total Economy, 1960-2005

Annual percentage rate of change Contribution of:


Output per Physical Total factor
Period Output Employment worker Capital Land Education Productivity
1960-04 4.7 2.0 2.6 1.2 -0.1 0.3 1.2
1960-80 3.4 2.2 1.3 1.0 -0.2 0.2 0.2
1980-04 5.8 1.9 3.8 1.4 0.0 0.4 2.0
1960-73 3.3 2.0 1.3 1.1 -0.2 0.1 0.2
1973-83 4.2 2.4 1.8 0.9 -0.2 0.3 0.6
1983-93 5.0 2.1 2.9 0.9 -0.1 0.3 1.7
1993-99 7.0 1.2 5.8 2.4 -0.1 0.4 2.8
1999-04 6.0 2.4 3.6 1.2 0.1 0.4 2.0

Source: Bosworth et al (2006) and Lehman Brothers.

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APPENDIX 8: STATUS OF INDIA’S BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL TRADE POLICIES

1998
December - India-Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement (ISLFTA). In operation since March 2000. While India has already
completed the tariff elimination programme in March 2003, Sri Lanka is scheduled to reach zero duty by 2008.

2003
March - India-Afghanistan Preferential Trade Agreement. India has granted concessions on 38 products, mainly fresh
and dry fruits, in return for concessions on eight items for exports to Afghanistan.
October - Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation between ASEAN and India. The Trade
Negotiating Committee is negotiating free trade in goods.
October - India and Thailand Framework Agreement for establishing Free Trade Area. The Early Harvest Scheme
covering 82 items for exchange of concessions between India and Thailand has been in effect since 1 September 2004.

2004
January - Agreement on South Asia Free Trade Area (SAFTA). The tariff liberalisation programme under the
Agreement was implemented on 1 July 2006.
January - MERCOSUR Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA). The PTA between India and MERCOSUR (Brazil,
Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay) will be operational after ratification by the legislatures of MERCOSUR countries.
February - Framework Agreement on Bay of Bengal initiative for Multi-sectoral Technical & Economic Coop.
(BIMSTEC). Signed by Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Thailand, with the aim of a free trade
area on goods with effect from July 2006.

2005
January - India-Chile Framework Agreement on Economic Cooperation. Successful negotiations resulted in a PTA
being signed on 8 March 2006.
June - India and Singapore Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement. The Early Harvest Scheme involves
phased reduction/elimination of all duty on products other than those on India’s negative list by April 2009. Singapore has
already eliminated all duty on products from India.

In negotiation
India-Korea Joint Task Force. India and Korea constituted a Joint Task Force for negotiating FTAs in goods, services and
investment. Four rounds of negotiations have been held so far.
India-China Joint Force. A Joint ˧ask Force between India and China has been set up to study in detail the feasibility of,
and the benefits that may derive from, the possible China-India Regional Trading Arrangement.
India-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) FTA. The first round of negotiations on the India-GCC FTA was held in Riyadh
on 21-22 March 2006.
India-Mauritius Preferential Trade Agreement. Currently under negotiation and likely to be finalised shortly.
India-Israel Preferential Trade Agreement. Negotiation process for a Preferential Trade Agreement has commenced.
India-South Africa Customs Union. The framework agreement aims to provide a mechanism to negotiate and conclude a
comprehensive FTA.Ŷ

Source: Ministry of Finance, Economic Survey 2006-07.

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APPENDIX 9: INDIA’S FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT POLICY AS ON 3 OCTOBER 2007

Sector % Cap Controls


Retail trading (except single brand 0 Sectors prohibited for FDI.
product), atomic energy, lottery
business, and gambling & betting
Private sector banking 74 Subject to Reserve Bank of India (RBI) guidelines. The cap is applicable only to private
sector banks that are identified by RBI for restructuring.
Non-banking financial companies 100 Various minimum capitalization norms for fund-based NBFCs
Insurance 26 2004/05 budget proposed raising it to 49 percent; however, this is not yet operational.
Telecommunications 74 For basic and cellular, unified access services, national/international long distance, V-sat,
and global mobile personal communications by satellite, subject to licensing and security
requirements and a lock in period for transfer of equity. Automatic route up to 49%. Beyond
49% needs approval from the Foreign Investment Promotion Board (FIPB)
74 For ISPs with gateways, radio-paging and end-to-end bandwidth. Automatic route up to
49%. Beyond 49% needs approval from the FIPB.
100 For ISPs without gateways, e-mail, voice mail, providing dark fiber. Automatic route up to
49%. Beyond 49% needs approval from the FIPB. Subject to divestiture of 26% of their
equity in favour of Indian public in 5 years. Subject to licensing and security requirements.
Broadcasting 100 Up-linking a non-news & current affairs TV channel
49 Setting up hardware facilities such as up-linking, HUB.
26 Up-linking a news & current affairs TV channel, cable network.
20 Direct-to-home & FM radio.
Courier services 100 For carrying parcels, packages and other items which do not come within the ambit of the
Indian Post Office Act 1898. No FDI allowed in the distribution of letters.
Establishment & operation of satellites 74 Automatic route not available. Approval via FIPB.
100 Manufacture of telecom equipment. Automatic route available.
Print Media 100 Publishing of scientific and technical magazines, periodicals, and journals.
26 Publishing of newspapers and periodicals on news and current affairs.
Airports 100 Greenfield projects. For existing projects, FIPB approval required for investments of more
than 74%.
Domestic airlines 49 Foreign equity participation up to 49% and investment by expatriate Indians up to 100%.
Subject to no direct or indirect equity participation by foreign airlines.
Housing and real estate 100 Residential & commercial premises, resorts, educational institutions, recreational facilities,
city and regional level infrastructure.
Petroleum (refining) 26 Cap applies to public sector units. Automatic route not available.
100 Cap applies to private Indian companies. Automatic route available.
Petroleum (other than refining) 100 Automatic route available. Includes market study and formulation; investment/financing;
setting up infrastructure for marketing in petroleum and natural gas sector.
Coal and lignite 100 For most activities in this sector.
Mining 100 Exploration and mining of diamonds and precious stones, gold, silver, and minerals.
Atomic minerals 74 Subject to guidelines issued by the Department of Atomic Energy.
Power 100 Generation (except atomic energy), transmission, distribution and power trading.
Defense and strategic industries 26 Subject to licensing and security requirements.
Coffee & rubber 100
Alcohol & brewing; cigarettes 100 Subject to license.
Trading 100 Automatic route available for wholesale/cash & carry trading, and trading for exports. FIPB
approval for trading of items sourced from small scale sector.
51 Single brand product retailing.
Floriculture, horticulture, animal 100 For tea plantations, restrictions apply, including approval from government, divestiture of
husbandry, aquaculture 26% in five years, and approval in case of change in land use.

Source: Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India.

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APPENDIX 10: KEY STATISTICS: INDIA

FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12

Gross Domestic Product


Nominal, US$bn 604 695 805 912 1187 1478 1761 2066 2415
Nominal GDP per capita, US$ 560 635 723 807 1033 1266 1486 1716 1975
Real GDP growth rate, % y-o-y 8.4 7.4 9.0 9.4 8.8 9.2 9.7 10.0 10.0
GDP by industry, % total
- Agriculture 22.1 20.2 19.7 18.5 17.5 16.7 15.9 15.1 14.4
- Industry 25.7 26.1 26.2 26.6 26.9 27.1 27.4 27.9 28.7
- Services 52.2 53.7 54.1 54.9 55.6 56.2 56.7 57.0 56.9
Gross domestic investment % 28.0 31.5 33.8 35.3 36.5 37.0 38.0 38.5 39.0
GDP
Gross domestic savings % GDP 29.7 31.1 32.4 34.2 35.0 34.9 35.6 35.7 36.0

Balance of Payments
Exports, US$bn 66.3 85.2 105.2 127.1 148.1 174.7 218.4 273.0 341.2
Top 3 export markets, % total:
US 18.2 17.3 16.8 15.2 - - - - -
UAE 8.0 9.2 8.3 9.6 - - - - -
China 4.6 6.4 6.4 6.3 - - - - -
Imports, US$bn 80.0 118.9 157.0 192.0 236.2 297.6 371.9 464.9 581.2
Merchandise trade balance, -13.7 -33.7 -51.8 -64.9 -88.1 -122.8 -153.6 -191.9 -239.9
US$bn
- % of GDP -2.3 -4.8 -6.4 -7.1 -7.4 -8.3 -8.7 -9.3 -9.9
Current Account, US$bn 14.1 -2.5 -9.2 -9.6 -16.8 -33.5 -44.3 -58.0 -75.7
- % of GDP 2.3 -0.4 -1.1 -1.1 -1.4 -2.3 -2.5 -2.8 -3.1
FDI inflows, US$bn 4.3 6.0 7.7 19.4 26.1 27.9 34.4 42.9 52.4
FDI outflows, US$bn -1.9 -2.3 -2.9 -11.0 -13.5 -14.4 -15.3 -18.5 -22.7
External debt, US$bn 111.6 123.2 126.4 155.0 - - - - -
- % of GDP 17.8 17.3 15.8 16.4 - - - - -
Foreign exchange reserves, 113.0 141.5 151.6 199.2 232.1 262.0 295.4 344.3 397.8
US$bn

Financial Market Indicators


Exchange rate, per US$ 43.4 43.8 44.6 43.6 38.0 35.6 35.0 34.0 33.0
Interest rate, %: 10 year bond 5.15 6.69 7.53 7.94 7.75 7.50 7.25 6.50 6.00
yield
Repo rate, % 6.00 6.00 6.50 7.50 7.75 7.75 7.00 6.50 6.00
Cash reserve ratio, % 4.50 5.00 5.00 6.00 7.50 8.50 8.50 8.50 8.50
Stock market, BSE Sensex 5591 6493 11280 13072 - - - - -

Monetary indicators
WPI inflation, % y-o-y 5.5 6.5 4.4 5.4 4.4 5.3 4.5 4.0 3.5
M3 money supply growth, % y-o-y 13.1 14.2 16.1 19.6 20.0 19.6 19.0 18.0 18.0
Non-food credit, % y-o-y 17.2 27.7 33.7 31.2 25.3 26.8 25.0 22.0 20.0

Fiscal indicators
General govt fiscal balance, % 8.5 7.5 7.4 6.1 5.7 6.0 5.4 5.2 5.2
GDP
General govt public debt, % GDP 81.5 82.4 78.7 75.3 72.5 71.0 67.4 65.0 63.0

Source: RBI, CEIC, Economic Survey and Lehman Brothers.


Note: All financial market indicators are fiscal year-end numbers.

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APPENDIX 11: CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS IN INDIA

1858 India comes under direct rule of the British crown after failed Indian mutiny.
1885 Indian National Congress founded as forum for emerging nationalist feeling.
1920-22 Nationalist figurehead Mahatma Gandhi launches anti-British civil disobedience campaign.
1942-43 Congress launches “Quit India” movement.
1947 End of British rule and partition of sub-continent into mainly Hindu India and Muslim-majority state of Pakistan.
Jawaharlal Nehru becomes first Indian prime minister.
1947-48 Hundreds of thousands die in widespread communal bloodshed after partition.
1948 Mahatma Gandhi assassinated by Hindu extremist.
The government issues the First Industrial Policy Resolution, reserving certain industries for the public sector. The Reserve
Bank of India is nationalised and becomes the central bank.
1948 War with Pakistan over disputed territory of Kashmir.
1950 The Republic of India is declared with the promulgation of the constitution. Dr Rajendra Prasad is elected the first
president.
1951 A draft of the First Five-Year Plan is published. It is primarily a public expenditure plan.
1951-52 Congress Party wins first general elections under leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru.
1956 The Second Five-Year Plan is presented to parliament and approved. It shifts emphasis to government-led
industrialisation.
1957 Stringent import and foreign exchange controls are imposed in response to the growing fiscal and balance-of-payments
deficits arising from the implementation of the Second Five-Year Plan.
The Congress party retains power in the third general election.
1961 The Third Five-Year Plan continues the investment patterns of the second plan, focusing on government-led
industrialisation.
1962 The Congress Party retains power in the third general election.
India loses brief border war with China.
1964 Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru dies. Lal Bahadur Shastri is chosen as the next prime minister.
1965 Second war with Pakistan over Kashmir.
1966 Lal Bahadur Shastri dies in Tashkent. Nehru’s daughter, Indira Gandhi, becomes prime minister.
Poor harvests trigger a food shortage and a BOP crisis. India devalues the rupee by 36% and receives food and monetary aid
under an IMF-World Bank programme.
1967 Indira Gandhi remains prime minister after the Congress party retains power in the fourth general election.
1969 Parliament passes the Bank Nationalisation Bill nationalising all domestically owned commercial banks. The Fourth
Five-Year Plan, placing greater priority on the agricultural sector than earlier plans, is adopted.
1970 The Monopoly and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, regulating the activities of business houses, comes into effect.
1971 Indira Gandhi continues as prime minister after the Congress Party wins the fifth general election.
Third war with Pakistan over creation of Bangladesh, formerly East Pakistan.
1971 Twenty-year treaty of friendship signed with Soviet Union.
1972 The government nationalises all insurance companies.
1973 The Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, controlling foreign investment in India, comes into effect.
1974 India explodes first nuclear device in underground test.

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1975 Indira Gandhi declares state of emergency after being found guilty of electoral malpractice.
1975-1977 Nearly 1,000 political opponents imprisoned and programme of compulsory birth control introduced.
1977 The state of emergency is lifted, and parliament dissolved. The Janata Party coalition wins the sixth general election,
and Moraji Desai is appointed prime minister. The targets laid out in the Fifth Five-Year Plan are abrogated by the new
government, which resorts to an annual planning mechanism.
1979 Moraji Desai resigns. Charan Singh leads a new coalition as prime minister but soon loses support, and parliament is
dissolved.
1980 Indira Gandhi returns to power in the seventh general election, heading Congress Party splinter group, Congress
(Indira).
Facing a significant BOP problem, India negotiates a loan from the IMF under its Extended Fund Facility. The Sixth Five-
Year Plan sets out a target annual growth rate of about 5%, which is achieved over the next five years.
1984 Troops storm the Golden Temple – the Sikhs’ holiest shrine – to flush out Sikh militants pressing for self-rule.
Indira Gandhi is assassinated by Sikh bodyguards. Her son, Rajiv Gandhi, is chosen as prime minister after the Congress
Party wins the ensuing elections.
1984 In December, a gas leak at the Union Carbide pesticides plant in Bhopal kills thousands. Many more subsequently die
or are left disabled.
1985 The Rajiv Gandhi government initiates modest liberalisation measures as regards industrial licensing and import and
export regulation. The Seventh Five-Year Plan sets a target annual growth rate of about 5%, which is achieved over the next
five years at the cost of increasing fiscal imbalance.
1989 Falling public support leads to Congress defeat in the ninth general election. A coalition of non-Congress parties comes
to power, and V.P. Singh is appointed prime minister.
1990 V.P. Singh resigns as prime minister after the BJP withdraws support. Chandra Shekhar leads a minority government
supported from the outside by the Congress party.
Muslim separatist groups begin campaign of violence in Kashmir.
1991 The minority government loses support, and new elections are ordered. Rajiv Gandhi is assassinated during the election
campaign by a suicide bomber sympathetic to Sri Lanka's Tamil Tigers. The Congress Party wins the tenth general election.
The new prime minister, P.V. Narasimha Rao, appoints Manmohan Singh as finance minister.
India faces a severe macroeconomic and BOP crisis, and the government responds with stabilisation measures and structural
reforms.
1992 The Eighth-Five-Year Plan, placing greater emphasis on private initiative in industrial development than any previous
plan, is adopted.
Hindu extremists demolish mosque in Ayodhya, triggering widespread Hindu-Muslim violence.
1993 Financial sector reforms, based on the recommendations of the Narasimham Committee, are initiated.
1996 Congress suffers the worst ever electoral defeat as Hindu nationalist BJP emerges as the largest single party in the
eleventh general election. The National Front coalition forms the government supported by the Congress Party. H.D. Deve
Gowda is chosen as prime minister.
1997 H.D. Deve Gowda resigns as prime minister and is replaced by I.K. Gujral. I.K. Gujral resigns, and fresh elections are
ordered after the government falls. The Ninth Five-Year Plan, prioritising agricultural and rural development, is adopted.
1998 The BJP secures a plurality in the twelfth general election, and heads a coalition government with A.B. Vajpayee as
prime minister.
India carries out nuclear tests, leading to widespread international condemnation.
1999 February Prime Minister Vajpayee makes a historic bus trip to Pakistan to meet Premier Nawaz Sharif and to sign the
bilateral Lahore peace declaration.
1999 May Tension in Kashmir leads to a brief war with Pakistan-backed forces in the icy heights around Kargil in Indian-
held Kashmir.

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The BJP-led coalition government falls, and in the ensuing elections, the National Democratic Alliance – headed by the BJP
– wins a majority in parliament. A.B. Vajpayee is chosen as prime minister.
2000 May India marks the birth of its bnth citizen.
2000 Liberalisation measures are initiated in the areas of insurance, consumer good imports, and domestic telephony.
US President Bill Clinton makes a groundbreaking visit to improve ties.
2001 April A high-powered rocket is launched, propelling India into the club of countries able to fire big satellites deep into
space.
2001 July Prime Minister Vajpayee meets Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf in the first summit between the two
neighbours in more than two years. The meeting ends without a breakthrough or even a joint statement because of
differences over Kashmir.
2001 July Mr Vajpayee’s BJP party declines his offer to resign over a number of political scandals and the apparent failure
of his talks with Pakistani President Musharraf.
2001 September The US lifts the sanctions it imposed against India and Pakistan after they staged nuclear tests in 1998. The
move is seen as a reward for their support for the US-led anti-terror campaign.
2001 December Suicide squad attacks parliament in New Delhi, killing several police. The five gunmen die in the assault.
2001 December India imposes sanctions against Pakistan to force it to take action against two Kashmir militant groups
blamed for the suicide attack on parliament. Pakistan retaliates with similar sanctions, and bans the groups in January.
2002 January India successfully test-fires a nuclear-capable ballistic missile - the Agni - off its eastern coast.
2002 February Worst inter-religious bloodshed in a decade breaks out after Muslims set fire to a train carrying Hindus
returning from pilgrimage to Ayodhya. More than 800, mainly Muslims, die in revenge killings by Hindu mobs.
2002 May Pakistan test-fires three medium-range surface-to-surface Ghauri missiles, which are capable of carrying nuclear
warheads.
War of words between Indian and Pakistani leaders intensifies. Actual war seems imminent.
2002 June The UK and the US urge their citizens to leave India and Pakistan, while maintaining diplomatic offensive to
avert war.
2002 July Retired scientist and architect of India’s missile programme, A.P.J. Abdul Kalam, is elected president.
2003 November India matches Pakistan's declaration of a Kashmir ceasefire.
2003 December India and Pakistan agree to resume direct air links and to allow overflights.
2004 January A groundbreaking meeting is held between the government and moderate Kashmir separatists.
2004 May Surprise victory for the Congress Party in the general elections. Manmohan Singh is sworn in as prime minister.
2004 September India, along with Brazil, Germany and Japan, applies for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.
2004 November India begins to withdraw some of its troops from Kashmir.
2005 April Bus services, the first in 60 years, operate between Srinagar in Indian-administered Kashmir and Muzaffarabad
in Pakistani-administered Kashmir.
2005 July More than 1,000 people are killed in floods and landslides caused by monsoon rains in Mumbai (Bombay) and the
Maharashtra region.
2006 February India’s largest-ever rural jobs scheme is launched, aimed at lifting around 60m families out of poverty.
2006 March The US and India sign a nuclear deal during a visit by US President George W. Bush. The US gives India
access to civilian nuclear technology while India agrees to greater scrutiny of its nuclear programme.

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APPENDIX 12: MAP OF INDIA

Jammu
and
Kashmir

Himachal China
Pradesh (Tibet)

Punjab
Uttaranchal
Arunachal Pradesh
Pakistan Haryana Sikkim
New Delhi Nepal Bhutan
Uttar Assam Nagaland
Rajasthan Pradesh
Meghalaya
Bihar Manipur
Bangladesh
Tripura Mizoram
West
Jharkhan
Bengal
Gujarat Madhya Pradesh Kolkata
Chattisgarh Myanmar

Orissa

Daman
Diu
Maharashtra
Dadar and
Nagar Haveli
Mumbai
Andhra Pradesh

Hyderabad

Goa Karnataka
Andaman and Nicobar
Islands

Bangalore
Chennai

Lakshadweep Tamil Nadu

Kerala

Sri Major Cities


Lanka Union Territories

Source: Lehman Brothers.

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Lehman Brothers | India: Everything to play for

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