REEDSyllabusalleges that the PRA “is unconstitutional as applied to the Referen-dum 71 petition because there is a reasonable probability that thesignatories . . . will be subjected to threats, harassment, and repri-sals.” Determining that the PRA burdened core political speech, theDistrict Court held that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the meritsof Count I and granted a preliminary injunction preventing release of the signatory information. Reviewing only Count I, the Ninth Circuitheld that plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on their claim that thePRA is unconstitutional as applied to referendum petitions in gen-eral, and therefore reversed.
Disclosure of referendum petitions does not as a general matterviolate the First Amendment. Pp. 4–13.(a) Because plaintiffs’ Count I claim and the relief that would fol-low—an injunction barring the secretary of state from releasing ref-erendum petitions to the public—reach beyond the particular circum-stances of these plaintiffs, they must satisfy this Court’s standardsfor a facial challenge to the extent of that reach. See
, 559 U. S. ___, ___. Pp. 4–5.(b) The compelled disclosure of signatory information on referen-dum petitions is subject to review under the First Amendment. Inmost cases, the individual’s signature will express the view that thelaw subject to the petition should be overturned. Even if the signer isagnostic as to the merits of the underlying law, his signature still ex-presses the political view that the question should be considered “bythe whole electorate.”
, 486 U. S. 414, 421. In eithercase, the expression of a political view implicates a First Amendmentright.Petition signing remains expressive even when it has legal effect inthe electoral process. But that does not mean that the electoral con-text is irrelevant to the nature of this Court’s First Amendment re-view. States have significant flexibility in implementing their ownvoting systems. To the extent a regulation concerns the legal effect of a particular activity in that process, the government is afforded sub-stantial latitude to enforce that regulation. Also pertinent is the factthat the PRA is not a prohibition on speech, but a
re-quirement that may burden “the ability to speak, but [does] ‘not pre-vent anyone from speaking.’ ”
, 558 U. S. ___, ___. This Court has reviewed First Amend-ment challenges to disclosure requirements in the electoral contextunder an “exacting scrutiny” standard, requiring “a ‘substantial rela-tion’ between the disclosure requirement and a ‘sufficiently impor-tant’ governmental interest.”
., at ___. To withstand this scrutiny,“the strength of the governmental interest must reflect the serious-ness of the actual burden on First Amendment rights.”