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(Slip Opinion)
OCTOBER TERM, 2009Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as isbeing done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has beenprepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.See
United States
v.
Detroit Timber & Lumber Co.,
200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
M
C
DONALD
ET AL
.
v
. CITY OF CHICAGO, ILLINOIS,
ET AL
.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FORTHE SEVENTH CIRCUITNo. 081521. Argued March 2, 2010Decided June 28, 2010Two years ago, in
District of Columbia
v.
Heller
, 554 U. S. ___, thisCourt held that the Second Amendment protects the right to keepand bear arms for the purpose of self-defense and struck down a Dis-trict of Columbia law that banned the possession of handguns in thehome. Chicago (hereinafter City) and the village of Oak Park, a Chi-cago suburb, have laws effectively banning handgun possession byalmost all private citizens. After
Heller
, petitioners filed this federalsuit against the City, which was consolidated with two related ac-tions, alleging that the Citys handgun ban has left them vulnerableto criminals. They sought a declaration that the ban and several re-lated City ordinances violate the Second and Fourteenth Amend-ments. Rejecting petitioners argument that the ordinances are un-constitutional, the court noted that the Seventh Circuit previouslyhad upheld the constitutionality of a handgun ban, that
Heller
hadexplicitly refrained from opining on whether the Second Amendmentapplied to the States, and that the court had a duty to follow estab-lished Circuit precedent. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, relying onthree 19th-century cases
United States
v.
Cruikshank
, 92 U. S. 542,
Presser
v.
Illinois
, 116 U. S. 252, and
Miller
v.
Texas
, 153 U. S. 535 which were decided in the wake of this Courts interpretation of theFourteenth Amendments Privileges or Immunities Clause in the
Slaughter-House Cases,
16 Wall. 36.
Held:
The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded.567 F. 3d 856, reversed and remanded.J
USTICE
A
LITO
delivered the opinion of the Court with respect toParts I, IIA, IIB, IID, IIIA, and IIIB, concluding that the Four-
2 M
C
DONALD
v.
CHICAGOSyllabusteenth Amendment incorporates the Second Amendment right, rec-ognized in
Heller,
to keep and bear arms for the purpose of self-defense. Pp. 59, 1119, 1933.(a) Petitioners base their case on two submissions. Primarily, theyargue that the right to keep and bear arms is protected by the Privi-leges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and thatthe
Slaughter-House Cases
narrow interpretation of the Clauseshould now be rejected. As a secondary argument, they contend thatthe Fourteenth Amendments Due Process Clause incorporates theSecond Amendment right. Chicago and Oak Park (municipal respon-dents) maintain that a right set out in the Bill of Rights applies tothe States only when it is an indispensable attribute of
any
civi-lized legal system. If it is possible to imagine a civilized countrythat does not recognize the right, municipal respondents assert, thatright is not protected by due process. And since there are civilizedcountries that ban or strictly regulate the private possession of hand-guns, they maintain that due process does not preclude such meas-ures. Pp. 45.(b) The Bill of Rights, including the Second Amendment, originallyapplied only to the Federal Government, not to the States, see,
e.g., Barron ex rel. Tiernan
v.
Mayor of Baltimore
, 7 Pet. 243, 247, but theconstitutional Amendments adopted in the Civil Wars aftermathfundamentally altered the federal system. Four years after the adop-tion of the Fourteenth Amendment, this Court held in the
Slaughter-House Cases
, that the Privileges or Immunities Clause protects onlythose rights which owe their existence to the Federal government,its National character, its Constitution, or its laws, 16 Wall., at 79,and that the fundamental rights predating the creation of the Fed-eral Government were not protected by the Clause,
id.
, at 76. Underthis narrow reading, the Court held that the Privileges or ImmunitiesClause protects only very limited rights.
Id.,
at 7980. Subse-quently, the Court held that the Second Amendment applies only tothe Federal Government in
Cruikshank,
92 U. S. 542,
Presser,
116U. S. 252, and
Miller,
153 U. S. 535, the decisions on which the Sev-enth Circuit relied in this case. Pp. 59.(c) Whether the Second Amendment right to keep and bear armsapplies to the States is considered in light of the Courts precedentsapplying the Bill of Rights protections to the States. Pp. 1119.(1) In the late 19th century, the Court began to hold that the DueProcess Clause prohibits the States from infringing Bill of Rights pro-tections. See,
e.g., Hurtado
v.
California
, 110 U. S. 516. Five fea-tures of the approach taken during the ensuing era are noted. First,the Court viewed the due process question as entirely separate fromthe question whether a right was a privilege or immunity of national
3Cite as: 561 U. S. ____ (2010)Syllabuscitizenship. See
Twining
v.
New Jersey
, 211 U. S. 78, 99. Second, theCourt explained that the only rights due process protected againststate infringement were those of such a nature that they are in-cluded in the conception of due process of law.
Ibid
. Third, somecases during this era can be seen as having asked . . . if a civilizedsystem could be imagined that would not accord the particular pro-tection asserted therein.
Duncan
v.
Louisiana
, 391 U. S. 145, 149,n. 14. Fourth, the Court did not hesitate to hold that a Bill of Rightsguarantee failed to meet the test for Due Process Clause protection,finding,
e.g.,
that freedom of speech and press qualified,
Gitlow
v.
New York
, 268 U. S. 652, 666;
Near
v.
Minnesota ex rel. Olson
, 283U. S. 697, but the grand jury indictment requirement did not,
Hur-tado, supra.
Finally, even when such a right was held to fall withinthe conception of due process, the protection or remedies affordedagainst state infringement sometimes differed from those providedagainst abridgment by the Federal Government. Pp. 1113.(2) Justice Black championed the alternative theory that §1 of the Fourteenth Amendment totally incorporated all of the Bill of Rights provisions, see,
e.g.
,
Adamson
v.
California
, 332 U. S. 46, 71 72 (Black, J., dissenting), but the Court never has embraced that the-ory. Pp. 1315.(3) The Court eventually moved in the direction advocated byJustice Black, by adopting a theory of selective incorporation bywhich the Due Process Clause incorporates particular rights con-tained in the first eight Amendments. See,
e.g.
,
Gideon
v.
Wainright
,372 U. S. 335, 341. These decisions abandoned three of the charac-teristics of the earlier period. The Court clarified that the governingstandard is whether a particular Bill of Rights protection is funda-mental to our Nations particular scheme of ordered liberty and sys-tem of justice.
Duncan, supra
, at 149, n. 14. The Court eventuallyheld that almost all of the Bill of Rights guarantees met the re-quirements for protection under the Due Process Clause. The Courtalso held that Bill of Rights protections must all . . . be enforcedagainst the States under the Fourteenth Amendment according tothe same standards that protect those personal rights against federalencroachment.
Malloy
v.
Hogan
, 378 U. S. 1, 10. Under this ap-proach, the Court overruled earlier decisions holding that particularBill of Rights guarantees or remedies did not apply to the States.See,
e.g.
,
Gideon, supra,
which overruled
Betts
v.
Brady
, 316 U. S.455. Pp. 1519.(d) The Fourteenth Amendment makes the Second Amendmentright to keep and bear arms fully applicable to the States. Pp. 1933.(1) The Court must decide whether that right is fundamental tothe Nations scheme of ordered liberty,
Duncan
v.
Louisiana
, 391
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