incorporating

Israeli Bomb Fallout

Detection in New Zealand

Cock-up? Yes
Conspiracy? No
says Owen Wilkes

In this issue:

** Israeli fallout in NZ ••• Fact or Fiction?

** Fallout monitoring in NZ
** Editor's Note on Israeli bomb test
** PR Comment: "Fighting" the Resource War
** The Harewood flight data saga continues
** Waihopai visited in November
** North West Cape changes hands • report from Perth
** Conference: Peace, Power and Politics
 Introduction:
Nuclear Testing and New Zealand's role in Fallout Detection -
Two articles by Owen Wilkes

How d id South Africa get nuclear weapons? There has been suspicion for over a decade that
South Africa and Israel were co-operating, exchanging raw materials for technical help, and perhaps
even testing nuclear weapons together, Because of de Klerk's admission that SA "had" the bomb, and
compelling evidence that Israel has long had a stockpile of nuclear weapons (though Tel Aviv has never
confirmed this), proliferation attention has focussed recently on these two countries and their possible
nuclear association,

Issue Number 30 of Peace Researcher (December 1991) contained an article about an alleged test
of an Israeli nuclear bomb in 1979, A New Zealand laboratory played a role, albeit a short one, in that
episode by claiming to have detected radioisotopes from a nuclear test and then reversing itself. Bob
Leonard concluded that the reversal was probably due to a cover-up motivated by pressure from the
United States which stood to be embarrassed if the test were proven,

Owen Wilkes looked more closely into the issue, conducting interviews with some of the
scientists who were involved in 1979, and obtaining key technical reports, The first article below
reports his findings and conclusion that a cock-up, rather than a cover-up, best explains New Zealand's
involvement i n the incident Owen's second article reports on the background of fallout mOnitoring in
New Zealand and around the globe, Members of the Anti-Bases Campaign and the peace movement in
genera1 will be interested in what this report reveals about current and past New Zealand involvement in
monitoring for nuclear lests about which we have known little or nothing (except for project 'Longbauk'
at Woodboume),

'The prototype of a crude atomic device comparable io the Nagasaki bomb was developed by
the early 1960s, and thejirst test was conducted in a joint Israeli-French operation in the
Pacific offNew Caledonia in 1963. With a French naval ship doing the monitoring, the
relatively low-yield bomb was droppedfrom a French Air Force plane. The Americans and
British thought it was a French test."

An BCIl-Menashe. 1992. Profits oj'War; Sheridan Square Press, NY. p, 205

"Just before dawn on the stormy morning of September 22, 1979, the clouds over the South
Indian Ocean suddeniy broke and an American satellite was able to record two distinctive
bright/lashes of light within afraction 0/ a second - probable evidence 0/ a nuclear explosion.
The nu.clear detection satellite, krwwn as Vela, had seen similar /lashes of light on forty-one
previous occasio/lS, and in each case it was subsequently determined that a nuclear explosion
had taken place.

"Former Israeli government officials, whose iF!formation on other aspects of Dimona' s

activities Iu:ls been corroborated, said that the warhead tested that Saturday morning was a
low-yield nuclear artillery shell that had been standardized/or use by the Israeli Deje/lSe
Force, The Israeli sources also said the event captured by the Velasatellite was rwt thejirst
but the thi.rd test of a nu.clear device over the Indian Ocean. At least two Israeli Navy ships had
sailed to the site in advance, and a contingent of Israeli military men and nuclear experts -
along with the South African Navy - was observing the tests."

Seymour M, Hersh. 1991. The Samson Option·, Israel' $ Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy.
Random HOllS!:, NY, p, 271.
 3

Israeli fallout in NZ ••••

Fact or Fiction?
Cover-up or Cock-up?

by Owen Wilkes

In 1979 New Zealand fll'llt claimed to have detected, then denied having detected. fallout from a
covert nuclear test in the Indian Ocean. In trying to explain such a strange political event there are
generally two possible possibilities - a conspiracy or a cock-up. In the December 1991 Peace Researcher
(No. 30) Bob Leonard suggested there had been a conspiracy to cover-up the evidence on behalf of the
nuclear club.

This article looks at the events in more detail, and concludes that cock-up provides a simpler
explanation than cover-up.

TIre Event

In October a US 'Vela' satellite detected the distinctive double flash of an atmospheric nuclear
explosion between South Africa and the Antarctic. Initially it was suspected that South Africa had
carried out Since then an impressive arra y of evidence has been gathered to suggest that it was a
a test.
nuclear test carried out by Israel with South African help. The test was carried out undet heavy cloud
cover which should have hidden the tell-taie flash from satellites, but at the crucial moment there was a
gap in the clouds. The evidence has most recently been described by Seymour Hersh in The Sampson
Option, a book about Israel's nuclear arsenaI.1

A couple of months later the NZ Institute of Nuclear Sciences (INS) announced it had detected
fallout from the test. The news was reported worldwide. On the very same day the NZ National
Radiation Lahoratory (NRL) announced it had failed to detect any such fallout. A few days after that the
INS announced that more careful examination of its samples failed to confirm the presence of fallout,
other than that from earlier French and Chinese tests.

For Bob ail this reeked of cover-up. The original "confident" report by Or G,J. O'Buen, director
of INS, was ooderruined by "doubt sown" by the NRL. The conflict was further "fuelled by NRL
announcing that it was undertaking scientific measurements as distinct from its u.suaI health-hazard
detemlinlltioas". Or O'Brien then mysteriously "seernedto disappear" from the scene, "having been
replaced as commentator ... by 'all intelligence officer'''. Bob wondered if this intelligence officer was
an American or a New Zealander? Why didn't INS defend its results in the face of attack from NRL?
The answer was simple. "Big Brother" andIor "Big Brother's Big Brother" probably muzzled NZ's
research establishment to "avoid embarrassillg the ouclear club".

Bob concluded that the incident did 1101 reflect well on the NRL, which was "maintaining a
consistently pro-nuclear stance" as evidenced by its "failure to see any serious problems with French
Iluclear testing at Moruroa, and more recently, its advice to Mc Boiger on nuclear-powered ships".

A cock-up?

If there W1S a oo!lllpimcy to cover-up thenl! must have been !I quite comprehensive one, involving
several quite independently-minded scjentj81.� and administrators in two government depamnents and at
leas! one Il);liversily.
4

The cock-up theory is much simpler, but not half as exciting. According to this theory there was
no fresh fallout detectable over New Zealand. INS made a mistake in initially announcing they had
detected fallout NRL made no mistakes and detected nothing. INS then did more careful checks, and
decided that whatever was in the first sample must have been contamination. End of story.

What really happened?2

Atmospheric nuclear explosions fascinate scientists, for all sorts of reasons. After the
announcement by the US of a possible nuclear explosion in the South Indian Ocean scientists all over
the world scrambled to find evidence for or against the explosion having occurred.

Amongst these were the scientists at the'INS, which in those days was regularly monitoring
rainwater and seawater for radionuclides indicative of recent nuclear tests. INS was part of the NZ
Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (DSIR) and was doing this for scientific reasons. INS
took 30 litres of rainwater, collected over the previous three months, and extracted the so-called 'rare
earth elementf with an ion exchange column. These rare earths are notoriously difficult to separate ont,
but they are the ones which would most convincingly indicate a recent nuclear test because they have
half-lives of oniy a dozen or so days. Once separated out the various 'fractions' were tested for beta
radiation. One fraction contained about 0.02 pieo-curies (10-12 curies) per litre of rainwater, equal to one
atom disintegrating every 25 minutes. This is a very small amount, and to get meaningful results INS
had to measure each sample for days on end. It was found that the radioactivity was decreasing at a rate
consistent with that of lanthanum-14O, a 'daughter' formed from the radioactive decay of barium-14O.

On the morning of 14 November the scientist who had done the measurements went public with
his results, against the advice of several other INS staff. The others were suspicious because be had ouly
been able to identify barium-14O, and according to the laws of fission if barium is present then cerium
and yttrium should also be present. These however could not be detected.

NRL had also been hunting for fresh radionuclides. Coincidentally, on the very day of the INS
announcement NRL announced that they had failed to find any fallout indicative of the presumed
nuclear explosion. Since French testing began, NRL has maintained what is probably the third largest
network of fallout monitoring stations in the world; covering much of the southeast Pacific. NRL is part
of the NZ Department of Health, and in order to ddtermine whether any hazard to health is present they
than
concentrate on the radionuclides most dangerous to heaith - strontium, ceSium and iodine - rather
those which most clearly indicate whether a recent nuclear test has happened NRL samples the fallout
in air by sucking air through a filtet paper, then measuring the radioactivity on the filter paper. In their
search for fallout from the 1979 event NRL tested its collections from Fiji, Samoa, Tonga, Cook Islands,
Auckland, Wellington, Holdtika and Christchurch. They also tested rainwater. Their most careful tests
were supposedly twice as sensitive as those of lNS. They found nothing.

The phone rang all day at NRL on 14 November. First off the mark'was the Christchurch Star.
TV-J was next. All the media sensed a big story. About mid-afternoon Dick Dole, science attache at the
US Embassy, phoned up to try and get to the bottom of it. According to a memo for the file in the NRL
archives he stressed how important it was to know once;and for all if South Africa had the bomb. He
wanted to keep in touch with NRL.

in view of the discrepancy between their results and those of INS, the NRL decided to re-run their
measurements. This time they put all their samples together to make one big sample, equivalent to
40,000 cubic metres of sampled air, and they left it in a gamnta spectrometer for three and a half days.
They still got a nil result.

INS also decided to re-run their measurements. They 'milked' a new sample of the supposed
lanthanum from the barium-14O·they had previously separated out, but this time they got a nil result.
They also kept on testing their original sample, and found that it did not decay to zero, which lanthanum-
140 should do (because it is relatively short-lived). This indicated that the radiation they were picking
up must have come from some form of longer-lived contamination. They then put their samples into an
alpha-ray counter. Nothing conclusive was found, and INS concluded that no fresh fallout had been
found.

At no stage did either NRL or INS claim that no nuclear explosion had taken place. All they said
was they were unable to find any fallout attributable to a test on 22 September 1979.

The INS and NRL results were communicated by the NZ Government to the UN General
Assembly and appended to a report by the Secretary General. A covering lerter by the NZ representative
at the UN noted that "scientific evidence and research in New Zealand does not verify reports that South
Africa, or any other country, detonated a nuclear device .,. on or around 22 September 1979".J

Both INS and NRL subsequently took steps to improve their Capability for detection of any future
covert tests. Initially, NRL couldn't obtain stronger pumps to sample greater volumes of air, but they
did put out bigger pans to collect larger samples of rain., Later on they acqnired much more powerful air
pumps. Whereas formerly they could sample only 4 cubic metres of air per hour, they can now sample
that much in a minute.4 The INS began sampling rainwater at one-month intervals instead of the
previous three-month intervals, and they increased the diameter of their collector from 30 cm to a metre.

There was one other possible opportunity for detecting fallout from the test. Professor Dick Ban
at Massey University was collecting sheep thyroids and sending them to a Professor van Middlesworth
at the University of Tennessee for measurements of iodine-131. This is a short-lived isotope, and it is
concentrated very efficiently in thyroids, thus offering a sensitive means of detecting fresh fallout. Van
Middiesworth had been analyzing thyroid radio-iodine levels worldwide for a number of years. No
increase in iodine 131 was detectable in the NZ thyroids collected immediately after the test.s

Intelligence agencies take an interest

A few days after the newsmedia interest died doWn, NRL was visited by an American, a Colonel
McBride, from the US Air Force.6 He had been part of a team that had been flying an NKC-135
(military B-707) aircraft back and forth across the Indian Ocean and (if NRL staff memories are
accurate) the Tasman Sea trying to pick up traces of the supposed test He said they had failed. He
spent a couple of days at NRL, inspecting their results, examining their eqnipment and talking to their
staff. He took some of tlle NRL filter-paper residues back to the US for further analysis, and promised
to send NRL any equipment it needed for more precise measurements in the future. After he left NRL
never heard from bim again, and there seems to be no correspondence about his visit in the files. He
may have been the 'intelligence official' quoted by the US journal Science (30 November 1979; see PR
No. 30, p. 11) as saying that the INS scientists were embllITSSsed by the publicity given to their
preliminary findings.

INS staff remember several Americans being brought out to the Institute in a US Embassy
limousine for discussions with the director about the results.

Interest by NZ intelligence agencies is harder tq document. Collecting information about foreign

nuclear tests is the job of the NZ External Assessments Bureau, known in 1979 as the Externsl
Intelligence Bureau. They have no monitoring facilities of their own, but they analyze, for example,
DSIR seismological data in order to prepare excellent annual summaries of French underground testing.'
Undoubtedly on this occasion the EIB also analyzed the INS and NRL data to form an intelligence
assessment of the presumed Israeli lest. By analogy with other EIB operations of this sort,S we can be
sure the assessment was shared with foreign intelligence agencies.

Wily wasn't fallout detected?

Given that it is possible to detect even tiny amounts of fallout, it seems incredible that no-one was
able to detect any from the Israeli test. However it seems that in this case several factors combined to
minimize the amount of fallout which was transported around the globe. The nuclear weapon itself was
almost certainly very small - probably only an 8-inch nuclear artillery shell. This would not generate a
large quantity of radionuclides. According to American intelligence sources it was probably exploded
near sea-Ievel- probably on a barge.9 This would limit the amount of radionuclides which would rise
into the upper atmosphere. The test was carri ed out in heavy weather to blind the Vela satellltes. This
would cause most of the radioactivity to get 'rained out' of the atmosphere before it drifted morc than a
few kllometers downwind.

NZ fallout monitoring today

Since the 1979 event New Zealand has made considerable reductions in its fallout mOnitlJrir'g
network. French atmospheric testing ceased in 1974, but the full NRL network was maintained for
another ten years to determine if there was significant venting to the atmosphere from the underground
tests. By 1985 it was evident that no such venting was taklng place, and by the end of 1985 Pacific
radioactivity levels had declined below the level of detectability. Therefore in 1986 the NRL closed
down all its Pacific stations except the Rarotonga one, and reduced its NZ network to two sites Kaitaia
�

and Hokitika.

NRL monitoring is now directed towards detecting any influx of radioactivity into the South
Pacific from any source, rather than just the French tests. While the network has been reduced, the
detection sensitivity of the remaining stations has been increased considerably by sampling larger
volumes of air and subjecting the filter papers to higher resolution g amma spectroseopy.

INS bowed out of fallout monitoring in 1982, and ceased monitoring rainfall and seawater in that
year10 In the light of Seymour Hersh's evidence that a lest did take place however, an INS scientist rc­
examined the old data in October this year. He tried a new approach. It had been noticed that each
series of Moruroa atmospheric tests in the early 70s had been followed by an increase in the ratio of
promethium-147 to cesium-137 in seawater. So Or Neil Whitehead tried plotting the ratio right through
to 1982. Sure enough, there is a very slight bump on the grsph about a year after the presumed Israeli
test - although nothing definite enough to confirm there was a test.

Professors Bait and van Middlesworth have now both retired, and no-one is mOnitoring radio­
iodine in thyroids now. Professor Balt thinks this work ought to be continued, so that we have reliable
and consistent data for determining the effects of any future Chemobyl-type accident on New Zealand.

ConcillSiollS

All the evidence indicates that relevant New Zealand institutions - the NRL and the INS (and
probably the EIB!) saw the September 1979 event as a challenge, and made quite strenuous attempts 10
find evidence for it being a nuclear test. There is no evidence for any cover -up, although there seems to
be less documentation in the old files than one could have hoped for.

The only way anyone could be led to believe there had been a cover-up would be by relying 011
the qnite inadequate contemporary media coverage of the whole affair. The newsmedia were very ready
to sensationalise the original spurious detection of fresh fallout and the apparent contradiction between
NRL and INS results, but did not bother 10 report the quite painstaklng subsequent efforts made by NRL,
INS and Massey University 10 detect evidence for the 1979 test

Detailed examination of tbe incident indicates that INS made a cock-up, one which cansed them
considerable embarrassment but which had no sinister overtones. NRL emerges from the episode with
its reputation untarnished. In the light of this pedlaps we should look afresh at the NRL. Is it
'pro-nuclear' at all? I don't believe it is. If the so-called Atklnson report on the hazards of French
testing at Momma is looked at objectively, I think it will be seen as the analysis which could be €bIe
gi ven all the obstacles put in the scientist's way by the French. The NRL carried out quite exhaustive
 7

monitoring for possible radioactive releases from US nuclear ships when they used to visit New Zealand.
The fact that they reported no radioactive releases I think is because there were none.

Why was New Zealand unable to find radioactivity from the Israeli test? It might be concluded
that fallout monitoring is simply a less sensitive method for detecting nuclear tests than are America's
Vela satellites.

Since 1979 the NRL has improved its overall detection sensitivity, and would probably have a
better chance now of detecting fallout from any further Israeli tests in the South Atlantic, particularly
given that the background radioactivity from earlier tests is now so low.

US ability to detect covert southern hemisphere tests has also been considerably improved, with
three new stations in New Zealand contributing to this improved capability. These are described in the
following article.

Notes and references

L Seymour M. Hersh. 1991. The Sampson Option: Israel, America and the Bomb. Random, Faber.
Hersh quotes an Israeli source as saying there were three tests, oniy one of which was detected by
Vela. This is probably incorrect. Other technical evidence such as the hydroacoustic Signal and
the travelling ionospheric disturbance (or TID) indicated only one test.
2. This section is based on conversation with staff and former staff of both institutions, on reports
submitted to the UN General Assembly, and on the INS annual report for 1979.
3. UN General Assembly N34I674/Add.l, 26 November 1979.
4. See the excellent NRL report Radioactive Fallout in the South Pacific: A History, Part 2,
Radioactivity Measurements in the Pacific Islands, by K. M. Mathews, 1992.
5. According to personal correspondence with Prof. Ban.
6. Presumably from AFTAC (see following article).
7. These are, unfortunately, not publicly released, but a couple of them have fallen into our hands.
They contain information and analysis not available anywhere else.
8. Which will be described in a future article.
9. TI1is would account for the strong hydroacoustic signal picked up by US Navy submarine
detection installations.
10. INS results were .summarized in their annual reports.

Fallout monitoring in New Zealand

by Dwen Wilke s

I t i s not widely known that the U S and Britain each maintain their own fallout monitoring
facilities in New Zealand, and that the Americans boosted their monitoring efforts in New Zealand after
the presumed Israeli nuclear test described in the previous article. Although not secret these monitoring
activities are certainiy unpubUdsed, and they constitute a category of foreign quasi-military aetivity
which has so far gone unnoticed by the peace movement in New Zealand.

US Global fallout monitoring

The US Government operates two glob al networks to monitor fallout from its own and other
nation's nuclear tests and nuclear accidents. One of them is concerned with environmental and health
effects and is relatively unsophisticated. The other is concerned with gathering intelligence information
about nuclear capabilities of other nations. It is quite secret, but from what little we know it seems to be
much more sophisticated,

US monitoring for environmental reasons

Since at least 1952 the US has been running a global a network of air sampling stations to detect,
identify and quantify radionuclides from foreign nuclear lests, Although done primarily J()r
health/environmental reasons, it seems that the information is also fed into the US intelligence
community, Such monitoring is an intelligence resource, providing infonnation about numbers,
locations, times, and sizes of nuclear explosions as well as information about the conslmction and
composition of the nuclear devices used,

Since fallout is mostly transported in a west-to-cast direction most of the US sites were initially
spread along the west coast of the Americas, from the Arctic almost to the Antarctic, Originally these
stations were run bythe US Navy, but in 1963 they were taken over what by what was then called the
Health & Safety Laboratory (HASL) of the US Atomic Energy Commission, It is now called the
Environmental Monitoring Laboratory (EML) of the US Department of Energy (DoE), 'HIe DoE is a
successor to the AEC, and both organisations have been and are responsible for developing, testing and
assembling all US nuclear weapons and gathering intelligence about foreign nuclear weapons, The
network IOday goes under the name of SASP (Surface Air Sampling Program),

SASP is complemented by an airborne sampling progranl using U-2 spy-planes originally and
later a convert.ed B-57 bomber. Very high altitude sampling was and is carried out by means of a series
of balloon launchings, Since 1977, with French atmospheric testing baving ceased in 1974, the airborne
and balloon sampling has been confined to the northern hemisphere 1 Earlier on however, Australia was
an important host for high rutinlde monitoring, 'Miball' balloons were launched by the AEC from 1960
to 1974 at Mildura,

US monitoring for i ntelligence purposes

Finding out about foreign nuclear activities is of course seen by the US as one of the most vital
missions for its intelligence community, and an enonnous amount of effort is devoted 10 it The
organisation primarily responsible for gathering nuclear intelligence is located within the USAF and is
known by the intentionally misleading acronym AFTAC (Air Force Technical Applications Centre), It
is AFTAC which analyzes the data from the Vela satellites which first detected the Israeli test AFTAC
also operates nuclear explosion detectors on the missile early warning satellites monitored at Nurrungar
in South Australia, AFTAC operates highiy secret seismic arrays for detecting underground tests - as at
the 'Oaktree' secret base in Alice Springs, not to be confused with Pine Gap, It was AFTAC which
fonnerlyoperated the very secret 'Longbank' base at Woodboume near Blenheim for electronic spying
on French atmospheric tests, AFTAC also monitors fallout using devices far more sophisticated than the
filter-paper suckers of the EML. Amongst its more sophisticated devices are samplers which liquefy
large quantities of air to allow separation out of the 'noble gases' which can provide important
information about the inner workings of foreign nuclear bombs or the reactors making plutOnium for
bombs, (Because radioactive noble gases have almost nil impact Oil health no great care is takell to
prevent their release from reactors,) TIle USAF Strategic Air Command flies a variety of sampling
aircraft on behalf of AFTAc' Some of these sample at very .
high altitudes, Others can collect seawater
samples, just in case any nation tests underwater. 2

TIle US Strategic Air Command operated U-2 radionuclide monitoring flights from Sale RAAF
base in the late 1950s and considered operating them from New Zealand ill 1961.3

US spies 011 British Iluclear tests - from NZ

The tirst American fallout monitoring attempts in New Zealand began secretly in 1954 and in
1956 caused a minor diplomatic incident Apparently the Americans were trying to collect fallout from
the British nuclear tests in Australia, As revealed ill !brmerly secret Government files,4 in 1956 the NZ
External Affairs Department somehow found out that the US Embassy had secretly been monitoring
 9

fallout from its premises on Customhouse Quay. In response to a diplomatic inquiry the Embassy
admitted that Ihey had been exposing gummed films to Ihe air to trap fallout - ralher like catching flies
on flypaper - for later analysis in Ihe US. They hoped that New Zealand did not intend publicizing Ihe
activity. New Zealand, ever obliging, replied in a diplomatic note on 16 July that "The Embassy may be
assured that it is not Ihe New Zealand Government's intention to publicise this activity". From what
little we know about this incident it would seem to be spying for intelligence purposes rather than
monitoring for health reasons. It seems clear that the US was spying on Ihe British nuclear tests in
Australia - which would account for anglophi!e New Zealand being so concerned about it.

Public concern about the consequences of atmospheric nuclear testing began to mushroom in
1954 after Ihe disastrous first hydrogen bomb test at Bikini in March, when Japanese fisherfolk aboard
Ihe Lucky Dragon Number 5 were severely irradiated by fallout. (The plight of Rongelap islanders
didn't reach public consciousness until later). New Zealand began makeshift monitoring of fallout in
1952, when nuclear weapons were first tested in Ihe southern hemisphere - by Britain in Australia. In
1957 the US Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) requested New Zealand assistance in monitoring global
fallout as part of what Ihey felicitously called the 'Sunshine Project'. In 1958 the NZ Instirute of
Nuclear Sciences signed a contract wilh Ihe US AEC, in which it undertook to monitor strontium-90 and
other fallout in Hun Valley rain in rerum for US$ 1 3,000 worlh of equipment. All reswts were to be
published except any 'restricted data' as defined by Ihe US.5 The contract lapsed in 1960, by which time
it may have become clear that Britain would not be doing any more nuclear testing in Australia.

Britain s pies on its own tests -from NZ

Monitoring of fallout began in new Zealand in 1955 when the UK Atomic Energy Authority
(UKAEA) established a monitoring station within Ohakea RNZAF airbase. The UKAEA is entirely
responsible for developing, building and testing British nuclear bombs, and this station was obviously
established to monitor fallout from British tests at Maralinga in Australia. Such monitoring would give
an indication of how much information olher nations could galher by downwind monitoring of the tests,
and also help improve analysis of data from Britain's downwind monitoring of other nation's tests.

The Ohakea station, part of a worldwide British network second only to that of Ihe US, has
operated from 1955 up until the present. As far as we know it is a relatively primitive set-up, sampling
rainwater by the "funnel-in-bottle" method. The samples are collected by the NZ Meteorological Service
and sent to Ihe UKAEA for measurement. Measurements of strontium and cesium are published,6 and,
for all we know, other radionuclides of more intelligence significance may also be measured.

us resumes monitoring in NZ - io spy on Israel?

In 1979 Ihe US inielligence community was obviously frustrated by its inability to determine
whelher or nO! a bomb had been exploded to the south of South Africa in September. A demonstrated
US inability to detect covert tests could lead to a collapse of confidence in Ihe partial nuclear test ban
treaty and other non-proliferation arrangements. If Soulh Africa had a workable bomb this had
important consequences for US policy toward southern Africa.

Beginning in 1982 the EML extended and strenglhened its SASP network in Ihe soulhern
hetnisphere, and began to spread the stations longitudinally as well as latitudinally. In particular two
stations were established without fanfare in New Zealand, as well as stations in Australia and
Antarctica.' Undoubtedly this was a response 10 their (and New Zealand's!) inability to detect fallout
from the October 1979 event, although there seems to be no official statement to this effect on the public
record. Concern about possible testing by Brazil or Argentina may also have played a part. In 1987 the
EML established a third station in New Zealand, as well as another in Antarctica and one in the
Falklands. By ! 989 they had 11 stations in Ihe norlhem hemisphere, and 19 in the southern,s indicating
a strong concern about possible alJp.ospheric nuclear testing in the southern hemisphere.

The first two NZ stations at Invercargill airport and oh Ihe Chatham Islands are operated by the
,

NZ Meteorological Service under contract to EML.

 Invercargill station began sending in data in April 1983 and the Chathams one in September.
They have been up and running ever since. In 1987 a further station was set up at the NZ Institute of
Nuclear Sciences in Lower Hull All three stations are part of what EML calls RAMP - the Remote
Atmospheric Measurements Program - which is itself an extension of SASP.9

US still monitoring in NZ

All three stations are still operating. Each consists of an air sampler, an aulomated gamma
spectroscope and a small satellite transceiver. A relatively unskilled local operator has merely 10 remove
a filter paper four times month from file air sampler and insert it into a slot in file spectroscope. From
there on everyfhing is automated, and the operator does need to intervene. The spectroscope collects
sufficient information for identification of the radionuclides and a rough estimate of file amounts
present. The meaurements are electronically transferred to the transceiver. and automatically transmitted
up to a US satellite called Argos. The satellite relays the data to EML facilities in the US.

The spectroscope itself is not particular accurate, and better identifications can be done with morc
sophisticated but non-automated instruments. However the combination of a relatively simple
spectroscope with near-immediate data transmission means that the network functions as a kind of
intelligence early warning system. If unexpected fallout were discovered. EML would require local
operators to begin sampling at much shorter intervals. Ofllerwise-undetected nuclear tests might be
picked up by this network, giving file US plenty of time to fly in more sophisticated fallout monitoring
equipment for positive detection of the event and even identification of file type of nuclear explosive
used. The high de gree of automation reduces any chance of operators faking or fudging file data.

Are they foreign spybases?

Neither the American nor file British stations appear 10 be covered by any government -to­
government agreement. They are apparently operated under informal agreements between the US EML,
and file respective NZ organisations - file RNZAF, the Meteorological Service (and presumably now its
SOE successor) and file INS (now file Crown Research Institute of Geological and Nuclear Sciences).
This is a situation comparable to fIlat of the French "Doris" station established by agreement a couple of
years back between file French space agency CNES and NZ TeJecom without file NZ Government being
consulted or informed. In the case of Doris, once this simation became known to file NZ Government it
was sufficient reason fot file NZ government to require France to remove file station. It appears that
similarly irregular arrangements made by file US or Britain are not viewed wifll equal disfavour.

The foreign monitoring stations are not publicized, but they are np! secret either. At least some of
the data from both file US and file British stations is freely available, but we have no way of knowing
how much data of intelligence significance rafller fIlan health significance is withheld.

In the case of file EML data it seems at least some of the data reduction is undertaken by Sandia
Laboratories. This is probably the intelligence connection. Sandia does large amounts of data reduction
on behalf of AFTAC. At least some New Zealanders involved in fallout monitoring regard the US
stations in New Zealand as an intelligence operation or an 'early warning' system, in particular because
of the satellite telemetry equipment. which allows for nea,r-instanl recovery of data.

At presentfllere seems little reason for the peace movement to oppose fIlese foreign installations
as long as fIleir prime role is to collect healfll and environmental data. We should be aware, however,
that they do have an intelligence role.

It is curious that tile US has been allowed to maintain two intelligence facilities in New Zealand
and install a third during a period when intelligence cooperation between file US and New Zealand had
supposedly ceased.
 11

References and Notes

l. EML publication 434.

2. See chapter 9 of 1. T. Richelson's The US Intelligence Community. Ballinger. 1989.
3. NZ National Archives. AAOQ, W3305 74/29, vol I.
4. Now in the NZ National Archives. See AAOQ W3305, 74/29, vol. I.
5. All according to a file in the NZ national Archives, SIR-I, 74/27/6. vol.
6. NRL publication 198912, pp. 2-3.
7. EML already had stations in American Samoa and Easter Island for monitoring French fallout.
8. EML publication 541, August 1991.
9. EML-497 shows the Chathams and Invercargill sites as being part of RAMP. By the time EML
524 came out [date?] these two were no longer RAMP. Whether this means the automated
telemetry equipment was removed or not is not certain.

I thank Owen for the diligent research reported in the two preceding articles. Owen makes a
reasonable case that isotopie evidence of the 1979 test was not found by NZ scientists despite vigorous
attempts to obtain it. But I am somewhat puzzled about the isotope promethium-147. It is mentioned
oni), once in Owen's first article, as part of the oniy piece of evidence that suggested a test did occur in
! 979: th e promethiumlcesium ratio as plotted by Or Whitehead at INS. A "very slight bump" on his
graph would presumably be due to either a rise in Pm-147 relative to Cs-137, or to a drop in the latter
with the Pm-J47 relatively constant. It seems curious that Pm-147 was not mentioned earlier as possible
evidence for a test if in fact it did increase relative to Cs-137, the most likely situation with fission
products from a bomb test.

I remain very sceptical about the American role in this incident and their motivation in seeking
objective data about the "Israeli test". An impressive amount of independent evidence that a nuclear test
did take place was amassed in 1979 (see article in PR No. 30). That evidence was dismissed as
inconclusive by a Whit!; House science panel. The political pressures on the panel must have been
considerable in light of the embarrassment that the US administration would have suffered if the test had
been proven to be real. I1 would be naive to believe that those pressures did not extend 10 the New
Zealand govemmenlin 1979.

U S science panels are susceptible to political pressures and bias as revealed in the case of a blue­
ribbon panel investigation of the Challenger shuttle disaster. In that case a whitewash of NASA's
careless management of the major safety aspect� of the shuttle programme appears to have been averted
primarily through the persistence of one panel member, physicist Richard Feynman.

Given the probable physical circumstances of tbe alleged nuclear test, as described in Owen's
article, it is understandable !hat telltale radioisotopes were difficult to detect in the South Pacific. But
the apparenliack of any supportiog isotope data from the extensive US global monitoring network is
curious to say the least.

I leave the reader with this question to ponder: If the New Zealand INS or NRL data had provided
clear isotopic evidence of a nuclear test, what actions might US intelligence agencies have taken in view
of the concern of the US government about any confirmation of an Israeli/South African bomb? ! doubt
they would have rushed to the media or scientific journals with the news.

- Bob l..eonard

------- --"
---�.� "
12

Peace ResearcherComment:

"Fightingtl the Resource War

"Of all the possible causes of a nuclear world war, the most likely is the escalation of a conflict in
the developing world." That was the judgement of "The Gaia Peace Atlas" in 1988 (p. 129). Such a
conflict was seen as possibly escalating to involve the supelpOwers. While "supelpOwer". or at leas!
major industrial power, confrontation seems less likely in the short to medium term as the culmination of
this scenario, the long-term dangers of growing instability and potential chaotic conflict have perhaps
even multiplied.

If one "supelpOwer" no longer exists, the collapse of the Soviet Union leaves a volatile mixture of
ethnic, nationalist and resource competition. Yugoslavia's diSintegration points to an ominous future for
Eastern Europe and ultimately also Western Europe if such warfare cannot be contained.

Widening escalation from a regional conflict, because of its chain reaction effects, could still start
even a world war. But it seems more likely these days that the pattern of chain reaction would be more
drawn-out, complex and diversified rather than a rapid rise to full-scale global war. Compounding
regional conflicts would instead eventually drag all down in a slide to oblivion.

IndiaIPakistan rivalry, flare-up between the two Koreas, race war in South Africa, explosion in the
Mldrlle East - it is easy to draw dark scenarios. Dr Christopher Andrew, a history professor at
Cambridge University who specializes in histories of security and intelligence services, has warned the
West that, "Threats to peace since the end of the Cold War are more numerous and demanding forfhe
intelligence community than the Cold War had become... " (The Press, 13 Feb 1993). He referred
specifically to fhe danger of a madman with a nuclear bomb' like Or No in the James Bond movie.
Andrew wants more spies to help defuse this sort of danger. He went on to say fhat nuclear proliferation
was unstoppable and that, "There are [sic] a series of time bombs ticking away in the Third World".

On one level, these are sober, rational fears. Andrew, however, pointed to the causes of instability
as a population explosion in the developing world and growing wealth disparity of fhe northern and
southern hemispheres. WHilefhese are also sober rational concerns, their reported expression echoes the
fears offhe besieged affluent, that 20% of the planet's human population who consume 80% of its
resources.

It was back in 1968 that Lord Snow, certainly no radical but a person who voiced some beart-felt
human concern, wrote eloquently about "The State of Siege", the laager mentality, which people in fhe
West were adopting. Having just travelled round Europe and North America, he had found people
everywhere turning inwards, wifhdrawing into enclaves. Yet the problems of food and population were
looming before people's eyes - on the television screen anyway. Snow appealed for a massive
international effort to deal with the challenge.

As Andrew now warns, so did Snow 25 years before. But the laager mentality has worsened. In
1972 the British Royal Institute of International Affairs set up an expert study group to look at the
resource problem. A closely related publication in 1975 for the Royal Institute, entitled "The Politics of
Scarcity: Resource Conflicts in International Relations" by Philip Connelly and Robert Periman, called
for co-operation between rich country importers and developing country exporters. Although written
from a "top-dog" viewpoint by a BP Oil public relations co-ordinator and the director of a private
commodities research company, this study appealed in its conclusion tofhe idea "that the plight of the
worst-placed countries may act as a catalyst which brings together all the other actors involved" (p. 145)0

In 199 1 in Aotearoa/NZ, we were graced by the presence of Sir James Eberle, hrought here
courtesy of the Public AdviSOry Committee on Disarmament and AmlS Control (PACDAC). Sir James
 13

told us that Western security pacts like ANZUS would be aimed at grinding the Thlrd World poor into
the dust and plundering their resources. Not long before his visit, Eberle was head of the Royal
lnsthute ...

Resisting the resource war is an imperative if humankind and civilization are to survive. Among
other things, this means constantly challenging the development mindset characteristic of those who
purport to be leaders. Prime Minister Bolger has declared that only constant expansion of NZ's
economy can solve unemployment' (Radio 3ZB, 17 Feb 1993). That assertion is idiotic' - constant
expansion to infinity? The present industrial system is founded on a ntindless prentise - infinite growth
is possible i n a fInite environment. The absurdity compounds in the attempt to increase. endlessly, the
size of the econontic cake so that we can supposedly allocate more goods and services to those suffering
deprivation. The oniy answer is a fairer allocation of existing resources and production to meet
e veryone ' s needs equitably.

Overpopulation may well induce increased competition for scarce resources and greatly increase
the risks of war (see Peacelink, No. 100/101. Feb/March 1992). Resource competition means a
hardening of attitudes along nationalist, ethnic, religious, and regional lines - and the resulting
3ntagonisms. But the central problem is that our econontic system is obviously unsustainable and
increasingly allocates resources for the overconsumption of a smaller and smaller minority. Only radical
change, a transformation of justice, participatory democracy and sustain ability can avert the realization
of our worst nightmares.

- Dennis Small

Off BaSil
The Harewood Flight Data Saga Continues •..

We continue to report on our attempts to obtain flight data for two reasons: I) We want the data
and expect that many of you would like to know about numbers and kinds of American military aircraft
visiting Christchurch airport, and 2) we tltink you should know just how difficult it ha.� become to
""
obtain, under the Official Information ACt. routine information collected and held by a State Owned
Enterprise (SOE).

Since our last report in March a year ago we had our file temporaril y closed by Omhudsman
Tollemache, who was not reappointed to her post and left in mid-year. Her closing (If our tile secmed to
liS a bit premature and was probabJy caused by her leaving thc Ombudsman post rather t!lan a lack of

merit in our case. She advised us to write to the Airways Corporation \(l ask j(lr their reasons j()r
offering to charge us $ 1500 set-up fee (to write a simple computer program) and $300 a month for the
flight data,

So we wrote to AirCorp and got the expected answer: they were bound and determined t(l treat us
as a commercial customer, and that was that.

Having disposed of thal formality, we wrote again to the Ombudsman and asked that the fairness of
the charges be considered in the lighT of provisions of the O!ticial Infornlation Act and its intent. Chief
Ombudsman John Robertson took up the case and wrote to the chief executi ve of AirCorp asking for a
14
breakdown of charges quoted to us. It seemed significant that Robertson mentioned "negotiating the set
up fee" with AirCorp. Our reading of the Cabinet guidelines on charging for OlA services (26 February
1992) revealed nothing about negotiating charges. Charges are supposed to be based on actual costs
incurred in providing the information.

A letter dated 1 7 March 1993 from the Ombudsman's office in Auckland dealt with " actual costs".
A report from Airways to the Ombudsman indicated we would be charged $ 1 20 per hour (GST
exclusive) for database programming plus $40 per hour for computer time. We were asked to respond to
this new offer. Since we would have no way of knowing how much the monthiy charges would be
under the newly offered charging regime, a commitment to accept data under that scheme had a good
chance of landing us with a bill for hundreds of dollars; a total hourly rate of $ 1 60 plus GST appeared to
us to be unreasonable.

We have decided to try to obtain the "source data" from AirCorp, an alternative option suggested
by Ms Tollemache. This would mean that we would obtain a lengthy printout of all flight data at
Christchurch Airport and be able to extract the American flights of interest to us. We have written to the
Ombudsman and AirCorp to explore this new option.

,
An important lesson in this time-consuming exercise is that it has become more diffi�'IlIt, and in
some cases more expensive, to obtain information because of "SOEization". Former government
agencies that have become state owned enterprises are expected to operate like businesses and earn a
profit Airways Corporation has demonstrated its ability to make a buck - its profit was $5.8 million for
the 1 5 month period ended 30 Jone 1 992 (about 1 1 . 1 % annualised).

AirCorp is a monopoly SOE which administers airport services, including air traffic control,
around the country. About a year ago AirCorp faced a legal challenge to big increases in airways
charges to small airlines (The Press, 26 December 199 1 , p. 3). Four small alrlines balked at up to 1 10%
increases imposed by the corporation without consultation in October 1 990. They said it "had abused its
monopoly i n setting charges that breached previous agreements". The courts agreed. The airlines'
refusal to pay the increases was upheld b y a court ruling, and the High Court in Wellington dismissed
the corporation' s appeal.

-Bob Leonard

*"In evaluating the merits of our case we have referred to several key sections in a new book entitled
Official Information in New Zealand by Eagles et al., and the provisions of the Cabinet Guidelines on
charging (the latter available from the Ombudsman's office). Anyone who has problems using the
Official Information Act should study these resources. The book is a detailed analysis of every aspect of
the OIA and relevant portions of the Ombndsman Act.

Waihopai visited in November

The forbiddingly secure (it lacks a moat) spy-fortress in the Waihopai Valley near Blenheim
continues to operate as it has since 1 989. Officially labelled the Defence Satellite Communications
Unit, Bienheim, the Waihopai satellite spy base was paid a visit by thirty protesters on the weekend of
1 3 - 1 5 November. They came from Wellington, Dunedin and Christchurch. It was small by the
standards o f earlier actions, but it was national in representation. A presence of that kind can always be
deemed successful because it calls attention to a government operation that is clearly in violation of the
N alrobi Convention on Telecommunications which Aotearoa signed in 1982.

The large white dome covering the 1 8-metre diameter satellite dish can be seen for many
kilometres up and down the valley. Although the dome prevents us from determining exactly which
 15
geostationary satellite it is poiming aI, we can be reasonably sure that it is listening to communications
to and from an Inteisat over the equatorial Pacific, 1be dome serves another function and that is to
protect the dish from protesters, It has been the target of paint bombs and hand-thrown bullshit in !he
past

Perhaps we can blame Owen Wilkes for the dome, Before the base was bnilt it was said by retiring
GCSB director Colin Hanson that there would be no dome over the dish, that it would "blend with the
surroundings", But Owen !hen described how the peace movement wonid be able to determine its
satellite target with certainty by a little angle measurement

Our actions in November were low-ke�, We were able to walk up to the front gate and hold our
information session while police and GCSB * perso!l!lel looked on passively from inside the fences,
Many of the visitors were new to the base so we concentrated on explaining what the place was all
about We were also able to walk completely around the high secnrity perimeter fences, One comical
additio n 10 each of the several video cameras located on poles around the grounds is a washer-wiper
combination fitted to the lens, At a past demo the cameras were rendered useless with liberal doses of
cow dung flung over the fences with good effect. Unfortunately we had no dung this time to lest the
wipers, The cameras were apparently not in use as they sat motionless on their pivots,

We may have ourselves to thank for the security measure& that keep us at bay and that have cost us,
the taxpayers, a tidy sum, Features include the outer chainiink fence topped with barbed wire with a
multi-stranded electric fence immediately inside, It is hard to imagine why they bothered with !he
electric fence: perhaps it's a psycbological barrier. The low hunky buildings are now equipped with
cameras, supplementing the perimeter ones, At night the place can be well lighted,

Late on tile rainy night of our recent visit we drew attention to our presence out at the road and
enjoyed the spectacle of Fort Waihopai transformed from dismal bleakness to brilliant illumination -
they even floodlit !he white dome, A police van qnickly exited the front gate and zipped around to the
back in antiCipation of rear-guard action which never came,

Why protest at Wailiopai ?

Here is what Owen said in Peace Researcher No, 17 (February 1988):

"The peace movement is mostly agreed about the undesirability of Tangimoana, Tangimoana
amongst other things is contributing to targeting of US naval weapons, There is no question of
Waihopai doing this. It is no! part of any nuclear war system,
"Yet in some ways Waihopai is worse. Tangimoana is at least eavesdropping on military
operations - ships and aircraft, and maybe SUbmarines, If there were a Soviet submarine
soooping round Aotearoa, Tangimoana might detect it. aut Waihopai doesn' t even have the
justification of spying on other nations' aggressive military activities, It will be spying 011
ordinary people, people who are trying to bring independence to their own countries, people
who are campaiguing for a nuclear-free Pacific, It will lislen to microstates trying to negotiate
with superpowers, grassroots businesses that are trying to fend off multinational takeovers,
Tangimoana implicates us in nuclear war preparations, Waihopai implicates us in undermining
the privacy, secnrity, independence and sovereignty of our neighbours in the South Pacific,"

Many things in the world have changed since Owen wrote those words, BUI our government
continues to spy on its Pacific neighbours and contribute to a Western intelligence network from which
Aotearoa was formally excluded along with suspension from ANZUS. Obviously the exclusion has only
worked one way, Successive NZ governments have not had the will or the fortitude to stand up to !he
"punishment" and dish (Jut a littie of their own - by terminating intelligence activities and facilities that
probably do little to benefit us or our neighbours, but may do considerable harm.
- Bob Leonard

* Government Communications Security Bureau

16
North West Cape, Australia ­
A Change of Command

By Mark Delmege, Perth

(Note: Some months ago we were informed of significant changes in the use and command structure
at the huge American communications base at North West Cape. C-141 Starli/ters that visit
Christchurch also go to Learmonth near the Cape on their militarylintelligence logistic support
rounds ofmajor American bases i1l Australia. This article is based on investigation by Mark at the
request of/he ARC i1l Christchllrcn. We thank Mark very much for this report)

*
I rang John O'Callaghan in Canberra (in September 1992) about the changes taking place at the
North West Cape military communications base.

He believed the hand-over .to Australian control stemmed from a US reassessment of its global
needs in 1989 following the demise of the cold war, and the decision in 1988 by the Australian
Government to base submarines on the West coast.

He sald that now that the US Navy uses satellite communications for contact with its submerged
submarines, NW Cape, with its VLF (Very Low Frequency) transmitters is "useful but not essential" to
its needs. However, the Australian Navy, which has for sometime had access to NW Cape. is dependent
on the base for its VLF communications.

O'Callaghan explained that the change was initiated by Prime Minister Bob Hawke in 1 990 with
negotiations being taken up by Defence Ministers Kim Beazley and his successor Robert Ray with US
Secretary Cheney in 1992.

Australian commander Chris George took charge on October 1 , 1992 . The base has been run by a
civilian contractor under Australian Navy control since December. Five companies tendered f()r the job.
The use of a civilian contractor is the first by the Navy and is a cost cutting venture that will probably be
repeated for other Navy operations.

O'Callagl!an sald VLF takes up 90% of the communication traffic rerouted through the base. VLF
will continue to be used by the US and other "allies" and for the privilege the US will pay a significant
percentage of the base's running costs.

The Australian military uses the high frequency (HF) channels at the Cape for "tactical and short
range" communications. These have been used by Australian forces operating in the Gulf and earlier by
the Americans during their wars in the Asia Pacific region. Australian reliance on HF at the Cape has
been greater than that of the US for some time. (HF facilities may also play an intelligence role.)

o 'Callaghan would not discuss operational matters but did indicate that Australian forces would
also continue to use the satellite facilities at the base [these may include Fleet Satellite Communications
(FLTSATeOM), the Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS), and an SSR-l antenna] .

Under the new arrangejllents all 350 US military personnel (from a high of 700 some year ago)
were to be out by the end of 1992. Australian military personnel were to reduce from 50 to 40 and
Australian civilian employees from 150 to about 100. O'Callaghan said efforts are being made to
employ all of the current 92 civilian employees who want to stay on.

From the sale of about 140 houses in Exmouth, formerly reserved for US military personnel, 78%
of the profits will be ploughed back into the Exmouth community. Fourteen houses will be reserved for
the US Air Force staff at the nearby solar observatory. This is a joint facility run by the US Air Force
and an Australian administration. (Solar activity is monitored for, among other reasons. prediction of
solar effects on particular communications frequencies.)
 The US will continue to own the navy picr until such lime as a huy-back arrangement can be made.
At present it is used only a few days per year to assist in fuel deli veries jilr the base generators and
sometimes during exercises. However, use may increase as commercial acti vity picks up in the area.

Nearby Learmonth airfield will stay as a bare base facility. The weekly Air Mobility Cnmmand
(formerly MAC) flights of Starlifters providing logistic support may continue for a while but should he
greatly reduced from 1993. These tlights are routed via Richmond air base i n New South Wales to other
US bases including Nurrungar and Pine Gap and all pass through Christchurch Airport in their passage
either to or from the US.

Regarding the operation in 1993 of the Austral i an satellite spy base near Geraldlon (companion
station to the GCSB Waihopai station near Blefiheim), when asked if this may have had anything to do
with the US willingness to leave NW Cape, O'Callaghan said he "couldn't say".

*
John O'CaUaghan is Assistant Secrela ry , Special Communications Projects t(lT the /\lhtralian
Navy.

NEW ZEAI..A ND
AFTE.R
ANZUS
CONFERENCE
The nrst Peace Power and Politics Conference was held in 1 968 at the
height of the Vietnam War. It represented a major turning point in
thinking at that time.
&aaly twenty nve years later. the conference IS happening agoin,
bringing together a wide range of people interested in positive, progres­
sive change.
This conference will challenge old thinking and offer a radical
vision for New Zealand after ANZUS. Through local and overseas
speakers, workshops, films and more it will provide an exciting oppor­
tunity to develop and enlarge on the strategies that will set New
Zealand's foreign policy agenda over the coming years.

Queen's Birthday Weekend,

4�7 June 1 993,
Wellington College of E.ducation
re Who"o" 0 Ako Pal Ki re Upoko 0 Te 11<"
FUMer information to (oflow: Enquiries to: Peace, Power & Politics Orgamsing
Comminee, ·P.O.Box 9314, Wellington, Aotearoo. Phone and (ax: (041 ]82 8 1 2 9

PTO... for details

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