Revelations on the GCSB -the cover is

partially lifted on NZ's secretive electronic

spying agency _ Nicky Hager reports from Wellington

The dome over the dish at Wahopai, the Government Communications Security Bureau
(GCSB) satellite spying station near Blenheim

Military first priority at Operation Deep Freeze according to top

US official. (See media release on back page.)
In this issue: page
• New Zealand's electronic spies: some of the secrets come out 2
• GCSB plans public relations stunt 4
• GCSB job vacancies 5
• The French testing programme 7
• New Zealand m i litary cooperation with Indonesia 9
• The Mutual Assistance Programme 10
• Waihopai Case - Appeal for funds 11
• New Zealand and the atom bomb during and after World War I I 12
• USAF Detachment detached from Harewood 14
• US Embassy censored flight data sheets 14
• 40th Anniversary of Operation Deep Freeze - Demo photos 15
• CIA File 18
• Spooky Bits 19
• Time for NZ's intelligence links to reflect reality 21
 NEW ZEALAND'S ELECTRONIC SPIES:
SOME OF THE SECRETS COME OUT
The Government Communications Security Bureau
(GCSB) has recently lost a 16 month 11ght with the
Chief Ombudsman and been forced for the 11rst time
to release details of its internal structures. The new
information shows the four divisions which make up
the headquarters, indicates their functions, and gives
the names oflhe four divisional directors.
The GCSB is New Zealand's largest intelligencc
organisation, which spies on other countries'
communications using sophisticated electronic
eavesdropping equipment at its two stations: Waihopai
in the northern South Island and Tangimoana in the
Manawatu. I t is part of a five nation 'signals
intelligence' alliance controlled by the United States's
National Security Agency (NSA). The alliance has
existed since the late 19405 when the lIKUSA
agreement was signed. but this is the first information
about the internal structures to be released in NC\\i
Zealand.
The reluctant GCSB originally refused to release any
of the information. which is contained in unclassified
internal stalT bulletins. These bulletins were requested
in 1993 under the Official Inl(mllation Act. but when
the GCSB eventually released them almost every
meaningful \\ord had been deleted in heavy black pcn.
The ChicfOmhuJsman agreed to investigate the case,
beginning months of negotiations during which the
GCSB alternately stalled and turned up with new
arguments to try to justify withholdin!l al l the
int(lrIllation. Fvcntually the Chief Ombudsman told the
GCSB Director Ray Parker that he did l1\1t accept his
arguments. Parker was asknl to reconsider his deciSion
and release more information.
j Figure /
I Director GSCB
I
I . I
Dir of Operations Dlr of Technology
Operations Technology
Division Division
Page 2
By Nicky Hager
The new information since released shows that the
GCSB has internal structures almost identical to the
Canadian lJKUSA agency, the Communications
Security Establishment (CSE). They probably closely
resemble thc other three allied agencies too (The NSA.
Britain's Government Communications Headquarters.
and Australia's Defence Signals Directorate).
The inl(lrIllation released under the Otlicial lnformation
Act allows the organisational plan shown in Figure I
to be constructed. It shows the Director supported by
an OtTice of the Director, which was only established
in May this year. lInder the Director are the ")ur large
divisions:
* {2jL<eratlons DivisjQ!l. which will cover all the
intelligence operations of the GCSB: interception. code
hreaking, translation and report writing.
*
Technolilgy Division, which was tormed in December
1994 by amalgamation of the prcvious Engineering
Division and Information Processing Division. It will
cover all the GCSB's technical statf and specialist
computing sta ll who support the high-tcch spying
operations.
* Corporate�.SS;J.y��)J}isi:jQIJ. which was formed in
May 1995 by an amalgalllation ofthe previolls Support
Services Division and Polic} and Plans iJivision. It
covers all the administrative. Iin;}nciaL pcrsonnc! and
policy work "flhe (;(,,)Il.
* LnfQrlllatiQ!LS)���J.�11_�_S.t;1.;Jlxity_flh�i1>iQIJ. which covers
th e non-intelligence fu nctions of the (j(,SB: inspect ing
Ne\-\' Zealand embassies and government offi ces f(-n
bugs Ctechnical security') ens ll ring that New Zealalld
Office of the Director I
,
Dir of Corporate Dir of Information
Services Systems Security
I I
Corporate Services
Division
Peace Researcher
Figure 2

Governmellt of Canada - Telepholle Directory, December 1994

222E NA TlONAL DEFENCE

MINISTER'S OFFICE Director of LawIDetenca Direc;or 0 H Sergen .. 991-7182(8)

LCoI 0 Couture .. . ......... 9954585 Director P M Osboma .. 991·7108(S)

MGen G R Peal1(es Building Deputy Judge Advocate GeneralIMateriel POLICY AND PLANS
101 Colonel By Drive Capt(N) C F Blair ................. 992-8044 Director General 0 E Wateriall. 991-7247(S)
Ottawa K1A 0K2 Secretary 8 Grant . ................992-4114 Director Strategic Planning
G 0'8nghl . 991·7417(S)
Chief Military Trial Judge Director Corporate Policy 0 LindJey . 991·7242(S)
Col G LBrais . . . . . . . . 992-520 t
Minister . . . . . . .

Secretary G Hicks. . ............. 992-0125

Hon oavid Coll enette .996-3100 ADMINiSTRATION
Executive Ass! 0 Costello ..... , ......996-3100 ACMTJ LCoI J S T Pitzul . ... . . .. . 992-0117
Director General M Finner 991·7246(S)
. . . .

Sr Advisor/Policy R McCauley ........ 996·3100 Chief Court Reporter ewo P Crowder .. 996-2604
Director Human Resources
Director of Communications J Williston . 99&-3100 PH lelebvre 991-7445(S)
CHIEF REVIEW SERVICES
.

Special Assl C Bergeron . ... 996·3100 Director Administration and Finance

Admin Ass! H Gordon . ..... 996-3100 MGen M Terreau . ...995-8561 o Drew ... 991·7420
Admin Asst .992 0363 ·

TECHNOLOGY
DIRECTOR GENERAL PROGRAM EVALUATION
Director General M MacArlhur 99 1-7 178(S )
P C Sklppon . 992 -4717
.

DEPUTY MINISTER OF Special Asst 0 G A Ruddick . . . .. 991-7 197

Dlfector Teiecommuntcatlons and Computer
. . .

Secretary. , ..........992-4717
NATIONAL DEFENCE
Prowam Evaluation Directo�s 99 1 - 8603 (S}
N J Black.. ......... .. . ...... 996-4534
Services W Bailey.
Director engineering S Gauthi er . 991-7149{S)
Deputy Minister J E 3rowel! .. 995-45i5
Fi. R Fowler .... .......992-4258 Capt(N) P J Child .. 996-0344
Executive Ass! Col K A Coulter. .992-1893 Or A A Ciarn . ...995-�8S6 . . INFOS :::;C
Special Ass\ K J Namiesniowski .......996--03S3 Col W 8 Fox .. 995-8185 Director General A Pickering .... 991-7176(5)
Slaff Officer C A Proctor. ....996--5106 Co! A P Humphreys . .995-0338 Oirector lNFOSEC Evaluation and Engineering
Admin Ass! C Gibb . ............... 996-8976 Col A W St rynadka . ... 995-4514 Gr oup ') McKerrow . 99 1-7215(8)
Secretary G Goneau ................996--8536 Program Evaluators R&D Coordbator P Devlin 991 71 74(3) ·

Admin Services Unit Supr 0 Robi . . ... 996-30S0

.
M Glustien. .. 998-1 492 Head. lNFOSEC Systems and Equipment
. 992-4259
. . . .

Admin Control Clerk C Adam .

H Hubley . . ... 996-5654- T McKenzie. . ... 991-7503(S)
Driver Cpl P Tlsseur. 996-1698 LGoI R A Jones .................. 995-1902 Head, INFOSEC Standards and Evaluation
S M3diJl.
. . . . . . . . . . • . . .

ReceptIOnist (Evening) l Guilmain .....996-8976 Leol J 3 Y'.llap D . ... , . . . . 996- 4509 991-7 220(3)
Spociaj Project Officer Director iNFOSEC Suppor1 Group
E E Milbum .. 995-7958 L 8elanger. .. 991-8798(5)
Manager, IN,:::OSEC Control
C Caidwell . 991-8808(5)
CHIEF OF THE DEFENCE STAFF DIRECTOR GeNERAL AUDIT
National Central Office ot Records (NCOR)
GENE PAL INOUIRI::: S .. . .. 995-73.�1
G Nolan.. 991-880 4(5)
J G Van Adel . 995-7792.17341
Chief of the Defence StaH Director Audit Program Development
Manager iNFOSEC Program 3upport
Gen A J G D de Chastelain .........992-5054
P A Cardarell i ........ 995-864017341
8 La:-narre 991 -879 1( 5)
Admin Asst C Keams-O'Hara
Director Audit Policy and Evaluation Manager. Electronic Key Management. . ...992-3330
Systems
Executive AssI Col D M Jurkowski .. 992-5054 3 Greaves ................... 991-8714(S)
l D Stephens. .
Secretary 10 Executi ve Ass! F Morin. .. 992-5054
. ..... 995-539517S41
Director Regional Audit Operations Manaoer. Canadian Key Management S ys t em
SlaH Officers M Ouellette . . . .. 991-8701 (S)
R Jolicoeur .. ... ... . . . . 995-7841 . .

Cdr J EHarper
.

.... 992-0435 CKMS User Services .... 991-8600(F)(S)

Director Special Examinations and Inquiries
Maj C l Cotter. .. 996-5713
S J Davis .... . ...992-548315-7841 National INrOSEC Custodian and Dislribulion
Aide-de-c:<.mp/C DS
. . . . . . . . _

Director Review Official Languages AutMonty G Dionne ..... ..991-8823

lCdr S R Moors ....992-8566 CSE INFOScC Custodian
A'Director T C leteHier . . ..992-0270f5-7341
M 8rundige . 991-8800( S)
JUDGE ADVOCATE GENS�l Manager, INFOS :::C Services
BGen P G Sau tet ... ....992-3019/6-8470 R A Eng lish . 991·7471{S)
Secretary K Landan ......996-8470 INFOSEC Services Advisor
COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY M R::Jsp:es;;h . 991-7554(8)
Deputy Judge Advocate Gi) '1 eraVAdvisory ESTABLISHMENT R Sp0cial Projects Manager
Capt(N) W A Reed .996-4812 W rledden . 991-7497(3)
SecretaryS Oujay. . 99 6-4812 Manager, iNFOSEC Client Services
R l Slovens..
.

Director 01 law/Advisory Confederahon H,,�ghls 931-7532(8)

Gdr P J Coroan . . . 99,-7058 719 Heron Road Head. INFOSEC System Consultation
Director of Law/International Ottawa K1G ?l4 J :::lIis 991-7470(S)
leo! K S Car1er . . . ......992-0011 Head, INFOSEC System Consultation
Director of Law/Operations and Training R Hysert .. . ................ 991 · 740 7
Gdr M H MacDougall . . ......992-0090 GENERAL ENQUJRI'::;:S ... Head, INFOSE:C Operational Services
K 3all 991.7 50 1(8)
Deputy Judge Advocate GeneralJLiligatian CSE Head. INFOSEC Client Support Services
Col R A McDonald . ....996-5723 Chie,f 991-'7241(3) o Ocl'"ies 991-7543(3) CS::: A
Secretary M Warden. ....996-5723
. Director lega l Services 0 Akman. 991- 7243(S) GO'/Hnment S.xure Telephone Network
Director 01 Law/Milita�y Justice (GSTN) . . ..... ......... 991-8600(3)
Cdr J G Rycroft . 9%-0283 SIG!NT PRODUCTION MJ.!lJQer. IhFOS::::::: Industrial ?rograms and
Director of Law/Security, Intelligence and Director ',-;enB�at C W Hi;'!wson . 991-7233($) Initi.J'.iveg
Proseculions Executve Stafl O:k:er 0 J Abbot! 991·6508(5) V Muolo. 991·7556(S)
lCol J C Holland. .995-6321 Director Customer Services Man;qN, INFOSEC industrial Prograns
Director of Law/Claims M F White 991-8760(S) o Canners. 991-7520(3)
LCol J J 8 Pinsonneault ........... 992-9061 Head Cus tomer Relations Section Manager. Canadian Industrial TEMPEST Program
Director of LawIHuman Rights and K Woolner . 991-sn1(S) J O'Callahan . ............. 991-7493($)
Information Cdr 5 j Slytha . ... ..992-0012
. Head, Customer Relations Uni!· J�OHQ Man3g'H, Cryptographic Endorsement and
T Larson .
. Asses�;me_'lt Program
Deputy Judge Advocate Generalflegis1ation Head. J Pwe lich 991-7530(5) SIGINT
Col A F Fe"ske . ................ 992-0785 Se-dlon Manager, Trusted Pr oducts Evaluation Pro gram
Secretary L Collin . ... 992-0785 E Watson. 991-8761(5) W M1CL]od . 991-7418(S)
Director oil awlLegislation, Superannuation and Head. Military/lAC Support Manager. INFOSEC Standards and Initiatives
Finance J fl3110n .. .... . . . 991-8755
. D Kirn;)ton . 991 ·7409{S)
Leol P J Olson ..992-1759 Director M 8 Pearl. 991 ·8746{S) INFO::lEC SECURE FACSIMILE. 991-7411(F){S)
Qire<:!or 01 law/Property. . .. 992-0023 DirKtor N R E Srule . 991- 7140( 5) Library. . 991-"i138 .

Peace Researcher PageS

government communications cannot be intercepted by
overseas equivalents of the GCSB ('communications
security') and s i m ilarly ensuring that government
computer information cannot be intercepted ('computer
security' ).
F i gure 2 shows page 222E of the Government of
Canada Telephone Directory, covering the Canadian
CSI'. Apart from Policy and Plans still being separate,
it shows that the GCSB has adopted exactly the same
structures as the allied agency.
The Canadian directory shows us something else: how
. absllrdly secretive the GCSB has been and continues
to be. The organisational details which the GCSB
Figure 3
Director GCSB
Director of Operations
Director of Technology
Director of Corporate Services
Director of Information Systems Security
Officer in Charge, Waihopai Station
Officer in Charge, Tangimoana Station
fought so hard not to release are incl uded without any
fuss at all in this publicly available d irectory. The sky
did not fal l down. I ndeed the Directory shows the
names of every manager and section throughout the
entire Canadian organ isation, rem i n d i n g us how
secretive the GCSB remains despite this recent release.
The new GCSB information includes the names of the
directors and the Officers in Charge of the two GCSB
stations. These are shown i n Figure 3. Unlike the SIS
situation, there is no law prohibiting publication of
GCSB staff member's names. It is hard to understand
why the GCSB fought so hard to avoid releasing this
kind of innocllous information .
Since releasing this information the
GCSB has i n formed the
Ray Parker Om budsman ' s Office that it has
W.H. Tucker definitely gone as far as it is prepared
W.M. Spring to. The GCSB staff say that no more
N.A. Fryer information will be released. Given
J.A. Bralldon that they have not been prepared even
C. Waite to go as far as a Canadian telephone
N. Catley directory, it is to be hoped that the
Om budsman wi 11 force out more yet.

Gcse PLANS PUBLIC RELATIONS STUNT

The GCSB is planning to release
the first ever publicity publication
about itself before the end of the
year. It is obviously hoping to be
seen as "mqre open" with the
ending of the Cold War. This
j{lllows the example of Britain's
MI5, which produced a glossy
public relations publication in July
1993. cover i n g its hi story,
functions, organi sation and
staffing.
The reason for the GCSB
publ ication, l i k e the MI5 olle
before it, is certainly not some 11l'\\/­
found belief in openness. It is more
l i kely a sign of the opposite.
Hav i n g been forced by the
Ombudsman - struggling all the
way - to release new information
about itself, the GCSB is now
taking defensive action to try to
avoid that happen i ng again. It
clearly hopes that by producing its
new publ ication it will give the
impression it has already adapted
to the post-Cold War world and so
defuse pressure for releasing more
substantial informatioll.
It is not known precisely what is in
the publ ication, which is still in
draft form within the GCSB, but it
can be expected to present
prominently all the information
recently released under the Official
Information Act (sce story above),
com b i ned with padded out
rewritings or the scraps of general
inj(mnation which have already
been placed on the public record.
For example, it will explain in lots
ofdetail the GCSB's various (non­
intoll igence) security functions.
There is l i ttle prospect of il
conta i n i n g s i g n i fi cant new
i nformation. For example, it is
very unlikely that it will go as far
as the MI5 publ ication did and
disclose, even in general terms,
who the targets of its interception
are. However it probably w i l l
follow the MI5 publication i n being
expensively produced, with lots of
white space to pad out its length.
The aim w i l l be headlines and
editorials welcom ing the GCSB's
'new openness' (giving it the credit
f(),. the information prized out by
the Ombudsman ) . U n c r i t i cal
journalists will be encouraged to
write about the responsiveness of
the GCSB to the changed world
situation, while accepting that "of
course" it must still have secrets to
perform its rde. In other words,
the aim is to maintain the current
level of almost total secretiveness.
The publication is a public relations
stunt, a i m i n g to keep the
O m b udsman and ( n ot to be
forgott e n ) the first M M P
government elected next year off
the GCSB Director ' s back. The
GCSB should not be allowed to get
away with that.

Page 4 Peace Researcher

 JOB VACANCI ES
The Government Communications Security Bureau wants YOU!
The GCSB i s advert i s i ng for
personnel. I n August four places
for aspiring spooks were advertised
at Canterbury University. Each
situation calls for a different area
of expertise. And together they tell
us quite a bit about the GCSB. The
job descriptions [see the copies
reprinted here1 are in enough detail
to i n d i cate that ABC's
protestat i o n s about G C S B
functions have a great deal of
justification.
If you are an engineer wanting to
join the GCSB, you'll need to be
fam i l iar w i t h cryptographic
techniques. This may wel l be a
requisite for work to protect NZ
communications, but since you
need to be k n o w l edgeable on
telephone, facs i m i le, HF,
microwave and satell ite systems,
and given what we already know
about Waihopai and Tangimoana,
it is likely that breaking systems,
not making them secure, is going
to be your game.
Good at languages? Got an interest
i n international relations? And
most of a l l, can you relate
" s i g n ificant patterns and however, is in a different ball game.
connections in written texts"? I n T h i s person w i l l have the
that case you might well get a job opportunity to play the Internet.
sussing out the bounders and Plenty of people do this hours a day
deviants who are u n sport i n g and don't even ask for payment!
enough t o c o m m u n i cate i n a And it could be a job where you
foreign language. (Don't be too genuinely work to make New
concerned if you made the mistake Zealand communications secure
of majoring i n French or some trom hackers.
similarly politically incorrect lingo
- GCSB will send you on a course On the other hand, it m ight bc just
where you can learn to l isten in on i n tru d i n g on other peop l e ' s
the real foe.) business l ike many of the other
G C S B jobs. If you are a nosy
A computer programmer with a bugger who has an i n terest i n
broad range of s k i l l s ean also l i ste n i ng to other peop l e ' s
become a SIGINT spook. Nothing c o m m u n i cations, G C S B i s
too out of the ord i n ary here, probably the place for you.
a l though not every eomputer
programmer needs to be involved You could justify wanting to work
with network security issues. I n there on the grounds that they state
Australia a few years ago, when the their organisational purpose to be
Defence S i gn a l s Di rectorate prote c t i on of New Zealan d
(GCSB's sister organisation) was Government communications, and
recru iti ng, potential computer the collection of intelligence for the
emp loyees were offered the good of us all. Be warned however,
opportunity to work with the fastest that as well as having an interest in
computers in the world (at NSA d e l v i n g i nto other peopl e ' s
headquarters). Nothing mentioned business, you must have excellent
about that here. qualifications that will convince
them that you will be able to be
A computer secur ity anal yst, very good at it.

GOYERNr.1ENT C0l\1i\1UNICATI0I"iS SECURITY BURE.\U

FUNCTIONS AND RESrONSlRIUT1ES

111e Government Commuuic:lliollS Seem;t: Bureau (GCSO) i.o; estJ.olished 10 provitl<:: inr"nllalilln. advice and as i t n
s s a ce \0 the New
Z<!a!aml Government and g,(Jv<:mm<!'II\ Jepnrtments and orgnni:4ltiollS on:

Commun.ic:r!ions Security: Computt.!f SJ!1:11rity: Technical :-X-cmilY. an,j Sign;).!:; tllte!!igence

The Commllnic.1tions S ecurity and Comp uter Sl."f:urity fUllctions re l ate 10 tile protect iol1 of inronnation UL1! is processed, stored or
communicated hy dt.."ClIonic or similar means :md include:

rhe formulation of comfnlmicalinns security mul computer �ecHrily rnlicy, the promnlgnlirm of st.1ndDrd;<; Dwl th e pmvi;<;ion of mn/mal,
advice and a�sl$tance to Government depnrtmc'l1ls imd authorities, Inelnding tht:! New Zenl:md "met! forces, nn muller!! related to Ihe
:'k."'Curityand inlezntyof officinJ infonnntiOll, the l� or co mpromise nf\\.flich could ,ulversely aITl!ct n.1lional security, and
h ;he rr�vi.�ion of �{h:ice as required hy Government dcp<"rrhuo.:l11S and aulhorir i ..:� in rdation to .<;en:;;it!ve infonnation which. ;:tHhouglt
unrelated (0 n:-rtionai security, requires protection from \ll1aulhon� disclosure for privncy,1inaneial or other (C!lSOIlS.

c tt
l11e Signals intelligence fuu tio is {a providl! foreign sig.nals intelligence to m�t the nntion:rl intelligence requin:ments of tire New
Zealand Governmel1t.

TIle Technic.11 Sc!"Cttnty (tinction i� to provido:: def<:llCe ag:liusl eavesdrorrillg and other fonns of tcchnic."ll .1tLlck against New 7..ealanu
Government premises worlJ·....'uc.

Peace Researcher Page 5

 GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY BUREAU
WELLINGTON, NEW ZEALAND

POSITION PROFILE
ENGINEER

An Engi neer will N:: ill feceJll g"I<Iu.nte in eit her telecommunic:ltioos or ek-ctrical and deetrol1ic eng in eerin g. A good knowlcJge of RF
engineering, radio propagation. and anal og engineering would he an adviUllnge. Familiarity with cryptogrnphic leehniques woukl also be an
atlvantnge.

A knowledge nf glohal teiecommuniC<llions systems {inclllding tc!t:phone. f.,c;;imile,

.1nu Cable carrier :<>ystems is required.

!\ gorni kno wlcJge of the MS·DOS. UNIX, aud UNLX opt:ruting sy�tcm5 is requin.:d. Some programming ahility in oolh low level
languages and C/C++ would be :1n advolltnge.

A knowledge of microcon!rnilcr;; ,10d J )SP princi ple; and COInp<1ncnt5 is reqnird. Prngnllumiu!1 C:'<pt:riCllCC ill thC$c technologies t,1,1Juld be
an adv::l.Illage.

POSITION PROFILF.
L1NG\IIST I RESEARCHER

A Lingui!:URC"'...e:u-cher will poS.�CS.1 at miHimnm 11.11 ul\lkr�mdHa(C tl1!2.ft.'C in :-;:\lIdics of one or mOte rorei!!!l !aHgu.12O:S. Alkm:ltivd Y.:t
� '
Ung\li;,tiRe�rther \\-;I! holJ a dC!!f<!e ill international polilical or r!C-nn omic �!wJie$ and b.: cOInpctl'111 ill al !c:l �t �!lC fiJrcign langll.1ge.
Superior ahil ity in Engl i�h comf'O�ilinl\ will 0.:: �:�cTltial.

A ting.lli�un.ese.'rcher w il l 11.1:-;0 po<;:'1C�<; a Jcmolllllmhlc in Ct:rcs! in New Zc:!I:lI1u!'! inhmwlional rci:l! iolls , [\lIU sh ow skill in i dcntifying anJ
relalillg signific..'Ult patterns and connections in 1A1il to:n \<:''\t�.

F:lIn i iiarilY ....;111

. compu lt!f word procC5.'1ing h..-chniqw.:s V.1[1 Pc hdl'Jill.

POSITION PIlOF1LF.
COMPUTER rROGR'\M�lER

A Computer Pro grammer mast have hnd hfOOd c:'(pcneTlce wilh C .'IIIU C ....... . A hro.-"1J knowk'1:Jp,t!: nflJNIX. M::;�D()S, and Winuows i5 al�o
reqnin..-d. Experience ofX·Window!'> and a know lcJge of the POSIX pmgrammillg .�fRIldllnJ would he 1111 lIuV<UlL'lge.

She or he shou[u have some knowledge of modem compuh:r networking !t.'CiJnojogics. ind1UJin):!; TerfIJ> and U1C OSI flC\Wnlk principl es and
prolo.::oL<;, ;\ knowledge of the ISO X.400 and X.500 stambnls ;1l10 network .'>eCl I rlly iSSlIe:; would ht: all advalltage.

Knowledge and experience of dnlnhll!'e de velopmen t anu rdald R.AD appJ ic.'ltiollS wO\llJ also he an advanl..1ge.

POSITION PrtOflLE
COMPUTER SECURITY ANALYST

A Computer Security (CO�USF.C) Alla lyst will nave a minimum of an undergraduate dcp.ree in Computer Studies. lie or she will [UlVl: a
broad knowledge o(the MS--OOS. WindowS". UNIX. anu NoYell com puter opcrnting systems aud sho\lld as a m inimwn be able: 10 p rogram
in 33Sembler or C.

The COMPUSEC Analyst must bI'l rami liar wilh modem computer networking sy.o:tClIIS, including L\N h:c!UJology, the: lnternci. and OSI·
based network!! and should have an appreeiation of UlI: prillcipie.'1 or FircWllIIs. Mlli!guards, ant.! Tmstcd TIlird Parties (TfPs).

Familiarity with the vttlnernbilities in.iu.'Tent in modem computer sy�lcms aJld tilt: princ ip les of computer St.'Curity. and ;m awarene.'IS of Ule
tlccr edital i on :md risk arllll ysis proccs.."Cs would he VllhlOhk

!\ knowledge ofsymme!rie MU as)m metri c crypcogmphy princ ip!es would �ho he �11 :lUVOnl:l!!e.

Page 6 Peace Researcher

The French Testing Programme
The French Testing Programme engineer at MOrtiroa
admitted during a recent press briefing that it would
be "technically possible" for French authorities to
reduce the number of nuclear tests at the atoll from 8
to 3 or 4.
This betrays an understanding that a nuclear test may
involve the detonation of more than one device. The
technique of cheating on the number of announced tests
by detonating simultaneously more than one device
has previously been used by the United States and
fanner Soviet Union.
French m i l itary authorities originally wanted to
conduct 20 tests at Moruroa and Fangalaufa, but
President Chirac announced a programme of 8 tests to
ensure the safety and reliabil ity of French systems, and
to allow computer simu lation techniques for the
continued development of nuclear weaponry to be
perfected.
Twenty was the number of tests which France had
indicated it wanted to conduct before it signed a
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), but after
consu ltation with h i s advisers, President Chirac
announced that there would be eight tests. The number
eight was presumably a compromise which would
allow the m i litary to do what they wanted without
having to detonate more than three devices at a time.
The definition ofa single "test" in the Partial Test Ban
treaty allows for simultaneous explosions, provided
they fall within a circle of diameter two ki lometres
and providcd they are all detonated within a period
less than a tenth of a second. For large underground
explosions this requires the use of multiple shafIs, but
if the explosions are smal l enough they can be
detonated within a single shaH i n a configuration
known to the Americans as a "string of pearls".
France is at the last stage of developing a ne'Vv warhead
for the M45 submarine-launched bal l i stic m issile
(SLBM). A final test is needed to complete 1he process
of "certification". The final test of the TN75 warhead
is supposed to measure accurately the yield of a
production- l i n e warhead and demonstrate that it
conforms to m i litary specifications. This test will be
the first of the series and wi 11 be carried out on
Fangataufa. It has been French policy for some time
to conduct full-scale tests on Fangataufa, an admission
that there is no place left on Moruroa to make another
large cavity far enough away from all the others.
Peace Researcher
by Peter Wills
France is also plann i ng a new warhead for next
century's MS SLBM, but without continued testing it
is likely that this missile will have to be equipped with
an existing certified warhead. Advances in computer
simulation techniques are reducing greatly the number
oftes! explosions which need to be carried out during
the development phase of new warheads, so it is
possible that a small number of low-yield tests could
suffice to satisfy weaponeers that their basic design
functions as expected, By classifying tests as those
needed to refine simulation programmes, Chirac was
able to c laim i n h i s announcement, not without
dupl icity, that none of the planned series of eight tests
would be of new warheads.
A new version of the Exocet-style ASMP nuclear­
armed air-launched cruise missile is being developed
in France. The mil itary i ndustry has been trying to sell
the government this weapon as a way of delivering a
new variable-yield wonder warhead. If development
of this low yield warhead is curtailed, the new missile
will have to be equipped with an existing warhead and
it will be perceived i n military circles as falling far
shol1 of its proper potential.
Low yield warheads, deliverable by small, accurate
cruise missi les, arc under consideration for tactical use
in "conventional" conflicts by the United States, Russia
and Britain, as well as France. In this context, "Iow
yield" means less than the equivalent of about one
thousand tonnes (a kiloton ne, kT) of conventional high
explosive. The appeal to mil itary planners oflow yield
nuclear weapons is that they can he used conveniently
to hit localised targets with concentrated firepowcr.
They are "useable" nuclear weapons whose destructive
power is not so large as to put them in the category of
the "unthinkable". Some nuclear artil lery shells, back­
pack atomic mines, nuclear ba:r;ookas and air-ta-air
missiles dep loyed by the United States as early as the
1960, were of this sort.
France's low yield "ol1der weapon is planned to be
programmable so that the explosive power can be
selected Just before delivery to target. It would be
imposs ible to develop such a weapon without any
further testing, so this provides one of the strong
motivations to conduct a series of tests before a CTBT
comes into force.
It is difficult to determine whether the purpose of any
of the planned Pacific tests will be to obtain design
Page 7
 parameters for development of the low, variable-yield
warhead. France has declared that none of the tests
will be "to prepare new miniaturised weapons", but
this may simply mean the "preparation" will come later.
I n any case, the tests are supposed to guarantee that
France will have "the same destructive capacity when
its current weapons are obsolete". According to a report
in the German magazine Spiegel, France is stil l in tbe
process of perfecting the process of "fusion boosting"
which is needed for miniaturisation of weapons. I n
any case, France has demonstrated a determination to
continue with the design and deployment of new
weapons even after testing has ceased. France interprets
. the recent indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty as giving the nuclear powers the
right to keep their weapons forever.
Much ofthe testing needed to obtain data for feed ing
into computer simulation programmes consists of low
yield explosions in which the triggering and initial
stages of a nuclear chain reaction are investigated.
Compression of radioactively depleted fissile material
into a variety of supercritical configurations is studied
with a view to obtaining an "equation of state" which
should allow the behaviour ofthe material under a wide
range of conditions to be calcu lated. (On this basis the
commander at Moruroa is able to think of himself as
an experimental physicist rather than a weaponcer.)
The U S Defense N u c l ear Agency has recently
contracted to buy the equation of state data wh ich the
Russians systematically gathered on fissile materials
over the decades of Soviet testing. One can surmise
that the contract excludes sale oflhe data to other parties
such as France. Thus it is possible for the Americans
to allow the French access to some of their computer
simulation codes, as they in fact have, without fear that
the French would be able to take maximum advantage
of them.
Even the most sophisticated computer simulations are
thought to be capable of use only for the refinement of
existing weapon designs. They can be used, once
properly cali brated against test data, to reduce the
number oftests that need to be conducted in the process
of developing a new warhead, but they cannot
confidently elim inate the need for tests altogether. The
current series of tests may be used by France to become
capable of completing design of low yield warheads
without further testing, but the CTBT is likely to make
such an ambition more difficult to achieve.
III the current series of tests it may be possible to find
sj'lecific parameters that allow the design of separate
versions (of different yields, say 1 00, 200, 500 and 1 000
Tonnes TNT, i . e . up to I kT) of the low-yield warhead
to be refined after a CTBT is signed, presuming the
Pagel!
CTBT will disallow explosions of any nuclear yield
above zero, which is the current official position of
both the U S and France. It is possible that weapon
design could be completed to the satisfaction of military
planners by using computer simulation techniques.
Nuclear engineers use experiments of extremely low
nuclear yield as safety checks to make sure that
weapons do not detonate when one charge in the array
of high explosive detonators used to start the nuclear
chain reaction goes off. The success or failure ofthese
expe r i m e nts, one category of "hydro-n u c l ear
experiments" (HNEs), is determined by the measured
yield of the explosion. A relatively unsafe weapon
could result in a HNE yield of considerable size. For
some time Russia was lIsing this "whoops" factor to
justify a relatively high threshold for the CTBT.
An HNE is a nuclear explosion in which the chain
reaction does not proceed very far and the yield is very
low (much less than a ful l weapon yield). The yield of
an HNE can be as Iow as 0. 1 kg TNT-equivalent (i.e.
0.0001 T, or 0.0000001 kT) which is not much more
than the explosive used by a safe-breaking burglar.
Controlling the progress of a chain reaction is exactly
what must be achieved in the design of low-yield
warheads and so the distinction between HNEs and low
yield weapon tests is ultimately semantic. (The United
States announced recently that it has not conducted any
HNEs since 1991 when a testing moratorium was
declared.) France could classify some detonations as
HNEs and thereby justify not announcing them at all.
International seismic detection systems have a lower
limit of about I kT, so a series oflow yield experiments
or tests is unlikely to be noticed even if the tests are
not hidden behind larger explosions which are set off
at the same time.
New Zealand should join Indonesia in calling for a ban
on all nuclear explosions and a ban on the simulation
of nuclear explosions. We should seek a verification
regime for the CTBT which is as strict as that which
has been imposed by the United Nations during the
disarming of I raq. Fifty years after their invention, all
existing nuclear weapons should be d ismantled and,
by international agreement, all means of creating them
should be outlawed.
Peter Wills is a theoretical biologist in the
Department of Physics and Centre for Peace
Studies, University of Auckland He was a co­
founder of Scientists Against Nuclear Arms in
New Zealand and is currently the chairperson
of Greenpeace New Zealand
Peace Researcher
 New Zealand Military
Cooperation with Indonesia
by Joe Buchanan, Researcher with Peace Movement Aotearoa
New Zealand maintains various m i litary contacts with
the I ndonesian Armed Forces. Links have grown as
the New Z e a l and Government seeks defence
relationships with ASEAN states outside the Five
Power Defence Arrangement. Both countries station
defence attaches i n their embassies and our armed
forces participate in the occasional joint exercise (e.g.,
the SELINDO series of naval exercise involving New
Zealand Navy frigates and other vessels, the KAKADU
2 exercise i n 1 995 with Australian, New Zealand and
Papua New G uinea forces and the recent ELANG
SEBRANG A i r Force exercise.)
Numerous I ndonesian m i l itary commanders have
visited New Zealand. The Commander-in-Chief of the
Indonesian Armed Forces, General Try Sutrisno, visited
shortly before the Dili massacre in East Timor in 1 99 1 .
Just after his visit to New Zealand, General Sutrisno
called unarmed East Timorese protesters shot by
Indonesian forces in Dili "ill-bred people" who "have
to be shot". The New Zealand government had just
announced that sixty places were available to train
I ndonesian sold iers i n New Zealand. After an
investigation into the massacre began, Try Sutrisno
declared "Once the investigation is accomplished, we
will wipe out the separatist elements who have tainted
the government's dign ity". Try Sutrisno is now Vice
President of Indonesia. H is successor General Feisal
Tanjung visited in 1 994. Air Chief Marshall Rilo
Pambudi v i s ited i n early 1 995, just prior to the
announcement of the Elang Sebrang air exercise in
Indonesia in August this year.
According to the New Zealand Defence Force, the key
elcment i n (he New Zealand/Indonesia m i l itary
relationship is the Mutual Assistance Programme
(MAP). MAP is New Zealand 's overseas m i litary aid
programme. MAP links with Indonesia began in 1 973.
I n 1 99311 994 Indonesia received the second largest
share of military aid received by the six ASEAN nations
(after Malaysia, a Commonwealth country). The
Mutual Assistance Programme is drawn up under a set
ofprinciples relating to mi litary usefulness; there is no
consideration of human rights issues.
The New Zealand Army trains Indonesian tacticians,
small arms instructors and i nfantry officers. The Navy
trains Indonesian personnel a( the dockyard in Auckland
and the New Zealand Air Force provides training to
Peace Researcher
the Indonesian Air Force.
A4 Skyhawk aircraft were sold to Indonesia i n the late
1 970s by the U S . The Indonesians now have 28 A4
Skyhawks designated as ground attack aircraft. The
Canberra Times, quoting an Indonesian journalist'S
sources in the Indonesian Air Force, reported that
Indonesian Air Force Skyhawks were used in bombing
missions in East Timor during the 1 983/84 offensive
specialising in incendiary, cluster and anti-personnel
bom b i n g . Other sources reported that s i m i l ar
information was received by an Australian Defence
listening post in Darwin.
New Zeal a n d ' s S kyhawks exer c i sed w i th the
I ndonesian Air Force for the first time i n 1 979. The
RNZAF has trained Skyhawk technicians since 1976,
and trains officers at the RNZAF Senior Command and
Staff College. Forward Air Controllers, who direct
bombing missions, were trained in NZ in 1 987.
Indonesian marine patrol p ilots are trained in New
Zealand under MAP by way of a contract with Air New
Zealand to use their Boeing 737 simulator in Auckland.
These pi lots fly Indonesia's radar survei llance planes,
modif ied 737s described by their manufacturer as
smaller versions ofthe USAF AWACS. Three ofthese
aircraft were purchased by Indonesia from the US in
1 983. The NZ Navy also trained eight Indonesian naval
personnel on our inshore patrol craft in 1 986.
The NZ Defence Force a l so r u n s an o n go i n g
programme of lectures and training in military dentistry
for the Indonesian Armed Forces. When questioned
by relatives of Kamal Bamadhaj, a New Zealander
murdered by troops in East Timor in 1 99 1 , Foreign
Affairs Minister Don McKinnon claimed that military
cooperation with Indonesia was restricted to dental and
health care, "i( has nothing to do with weapons". The
same year, cOllrses in small amlS shooting and Skyhawk
maintenance were offered to Indonesia.
Every second year sinee 1 973, a NZ Army officer trains
at the I ndonesian Army Staff College before being
appointed as Defence Attache in Jakarta. In 1 978, while
NZ trained the Indonesian military, the government sent
a RNZAF Hereulcs to East Timor, carrying m i l k
powder and m i lk biscuits for East Timorese made
refugees by Indonesia's campaigns.
Page 9
 Exercise Elang Sebrang
Exercise Elang Sebrang 2 (the first exercise Elang Sebrang, the only previous air exercise with Indonesian
forces, was held in 1979) was a RNZAF exercise held in Indonesia in August 1995. The exercise involved
95 RNZAF personnel from No. 75 Sqnadron who deployed to Indonesia on the 27th of August. The
exercise involved "the generic tasks of maritime atlack and air-to-surface attack" (Warren Cooper,
Minister of Defence).

The exercise took place at Tentara Nasional Indonesia Air Force Base Pekanbaru, at the new Indonesian/
Singaporean air weapons range in Sumatra, from August 28 to September 6.

Elang Sebrang is the first Air Force exercise with Indonesia in 16 years. It has been added to a series of
exercises conducted during the VANGUARD deployment, an annual series of visits and exercises held in
South East Asia. The VANGUARD deployment is a major exercise series held with members of the Five
Power Defence Arrangements (which includes Australia, Britain, Malaysia, New Zealand and Singapore). I n
the past New Zealand aircraft have transited through Indonesia as part o f this deployment.

The Mutual Assistance Programme

New Zealand has engaged in a few military exercises
with Indonesia, in particular the Selindo series of
Naval exercises and the Elang Sebrang air exercise.
However most ongoing links have been under the
Mutual Assistance Programme (MAP).
MAP i s part of the New Zealand Defence Force's
International C om m itments Programme, which
i n c l udes overseas train i ng, overseas v i s its and
conferences, overseas exercises, overseas postings and
the Mutual Assistance Programme.
The programme began in 1 973, with Fiji receiving the
largest share of MAP assistance. At present MAP
participants are Papua New Guinea, Western Samoa,
Vanuatu, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Niue, Fiji, Tokelau,
Cook Islands, Malaysia, Brunei, Singapore, Indonesia,
Thailand and the Philippines. Kiribati and Tuvalu have
said that they are keen to take part in future MAP
activities. According to NZDF their participation has
been hampered by lack of funding. Programmes in
Vanuatu, Solomon Islands and the Cook Islands were
developed with funds previously allocated to Fij i ,
during the period when defence ties were suspended
after the coups.
.,. to contribute to the effectiveness and self�reliance
ofthe forces of cooperating countries without entering
into any operational commitments;
� to faci litate opportunities to the NZDF to gain
experiences in training and operat i n g in tropical
environments;
.,. to faci l itate visits to New Zealand by elements of
the security forces of the MAP countries for the
purposes of exercising and training with the NZDF;
and
... to provide support for the Australian Pacific Patrol
Boat programme. (NZDF Corporate Plan)
Accord ing to the NZDF the MAP is drawn up under
the following principles:
o assistance should accord with thc needs and
requirements as perceived and requested by each MAP
country;
o New Zealand assistance should not compete with or
supplant assistance from a third country;

The NZDF l ists the objectives of MAP as:
... To support N ew Zealand foreign p o l icy by
maintaining and strengthening bilateral relations in the
defence field with countries with whom New Zealand
has a common interest in regional security;
o programmes should as far as possible operate within
a flexible and informal framework rather than on the
basis of formal agreements and rol l ing long-term
programmes;
o emphasis should be placed on the principle of

Page 10 Peace Researcher

mutuality and, to this end, New Zealand has sought
opportunities for two way contacts i n the form of
exercises and training exchanges;
o priority should be placed on the development of
individual and collective professional skills rather than
the provision of equipment;
o the MAP should not be used as a vehicle for the
donation of expensive items of equipment;
o long-term staff attac hments from New Zealand
should be carefully evaluated to ensure they are cost­
effective and mutually beneficial.
The programme is orientated towards training rather
than prov i s io n of e q u ipment. Programmes are
developed from requests by other countries, i n
consultation w i th d i plomatic m issions, and are
coordinated with Australian programmes. Around 30-
40 MAP personnel are in New Zealand at any one time,
with 75% of those being trained by the New Zealand
Army.
Presently 23,000 person-days training is provided in
New Zealand for around 220 MAP students. Twelve
MAP instructors are seconded to other countries on
two year tours of duty, with another 45 short-term
attachments for an average of three weeks.
Most training takes place in armed forces institutions
although some courses are contracted to civi lian
organisations (such as language training at polytechnics
or the use of Air New Zealand' s Boeing 737 simulator
i n Auckland for training Indonesian marine patrol
pilots).
C i v i l aid work also takes place under the MAP
programme, often alongside the NZDF ' s overseas
exercise programme. C i v i l aid i s development
assistance of a non-mil itary nature, but is justified as
faci litating m i litary activities. Lieutenant Colonel Peter
Bowser described the MAP training and civic assistance
tasks as creating "enormous goodwill" which "ensures
that when we ask to hold an exercise in those countries
the answer i s yes" (Army News, 4 Sept 1991).
According to Army News ( 5 May 1993), "In return for
civil aid, the New Zealand Defence Force receives
a s s i stance i n land c l earances, trai n i n g areas,
accommodation, liaison with local communities and
transport assistance".
Some civil aid tasks are appropriate for the m i litary.
For example the d isposal of unexploded ammunition
in the Solomon Islands by Army engineers, but most
involve construction or relief work which has no
Peace Researcher
obvious relevance to the m i litary. Civic aid tasks are
often conducted as joint projects with the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and Trade's Overseas Development
Aid Programme.
Occasionally, MAP civic aid tasks are reciprocated.
For example, n i-Vanuatu engineers at the school of
military engineering built an obstacle course for the
Scouting Association at Levin i n 1991.
The consequences of New Zealand m i litary training
were demonstrated dramatically in F ij i . Before the
military coups Fiji accounted for 38% of the NZDF
programme effort. In the year preceding the coup, 188
Fijian soldiers were trained in New Zealand, and many
others by NZ i nstructors in Fij i . Most of these were
"subsequently posted to Lebanon or the S i nai"
(Ministry of Defence Annual Report, year ended 31
March 1987).
Mil itary contacts were suspended in the wake of the
coups, and resumed i n 199 3 . Some l i n k s were
maintained between the forces through both countries'
deployments to the Sinai.
WAI HOPAI CASE - APPEAL
FOR F U N DS
The court case against four ABC protestors who were
arrested at Waihopai in January is still pending. [See
Peace Researcher March 1995 for details] The
hearing was set for August 29, but illness of the
presiding judge meant the case did not proceed and
a new date has yet to be set. I n the meantime a legal
b i l l of $1500 has already been run up by the
defendants, and financial contributions towards
payment would be greatly appreciated. (Two of the
defendants are students and one has only temporary
empJoyment.)
We are really appreciative ofthose people who have
already helped out.
One of the reasons for employing quality legal
assistance is to ensure that defendants who were
acting in good faith as police liaison people do not
get convicted of trespass. (Two people were arrested
for approach ing the police to negotiate long after
the protestors had moved away. ) It is very important
for future police/protest interaction to establish that
people delegated to negotiate with police must not
be subject to arrest.
Any size contributions welcome. Please send them
to ARC BOX 2258, Christchurch.
Page 71
 NZ A N D TH E ATOM B
A N D A FTE R WORLD WAR
[This article sum marises a paper Owen presented to
the Kia Kaha conference i n May 1 995. Much detail
and comment of interest has had to be omitted.
Quotations are d irectly from Owen's text.]
I n 1 926 New Zealand established the Department of
Scientific and Industrial Research, headed by British­
born physicist Or Ernes! M arsden. It concentrated on
agricultural and mineral resources work, but scientific
leaders were determined to play a significant part in
WWll when i t began.
In 1 939 NZ physicists were invited to become involved
in radar projects and eventually a variety of radars was
designed and built in th is country. Marsden spent
considerable periods overseas and on one trip learned
about the US-British Manhattan Project to develop the
atomic bomb. He believed in the potential filr peaceful
nuclear energy, and in the opportunity for NZ scientists
to acquire valuable experience, and offered some of
NZ's best physicists to Britain for the project.
The Manhattan Project, in large pal1 resulting from
British intiative, got under way i n 1 942. It had 3 palis
- procuring Uranium 235, procuring Plutonium 239,
and designing, building and testing a weapon. The US­
British relationship "was characterised by repeated
episodes of mutual distrust and deception" and the UK
was a subordinate partner although it played a key role
in developments.
In April 1 944 M arsden 's offer of seientists " as taken
u p by B r i ta i n . /\pparcntly n e ither C a b i net nor
Parliament was inh>r!1led that New Zealanders were to
help build an atomic bomb - only the Prime Minister
and Minister of Scientillc and Industrial R esearch were
told. Two people went to Berkcley, and olle or both
worked later at Oak Ridge separation facil ity where
the U235 for the Hiroshima bomb was produced.
Three scientists joined the Montreal Projcct, which was
sited at Chalk River in Canada, and aimed to develop
heavy water reactors. The emphasis here became more
on potential postwar development, and this project was
important in Britam's later nuclear capability. There
were 6 New Zealanders in a team of about '10. (The
Canadian Cabinet was also not told Canada was helping
build an atom i c bomb.) In early 1 945 another NZ
scientist joined each team.
Page 12
MB D U RI NG
0
Owen Wilkes
The US and UK attempted to gain control of potential
uranium supplies and initial searches for the m ineral
were carried out on the West coast ofihe South Island.
The prospecting petered out in 1947 with a brief revival
in the mid 1 950s. Marsden also established an atomic
energy group in New Zealand.
The motivation of the NZ scientists was mixed. It was
an exciting job, on the frontiers of science, but most
did not remain in atomic physics, and most did not
realise how destructive the bomb would be. One said
in 1 987 that he had been motivated by the desire to
deteat the Japanese, and regretted the nuclear arms race,
but ironically, according (0 Owen Wilkes, he had
worked on the Montreal Project which "had more to
do with postwar prol iferation that with defeating the
Japanese" .
In this country the news media virtually ignored NZ
participation in the atomic bomb development. But
there was considerable debate amongst the scientists.
Onc official history statcs that the New Zealanders
agreed with US scientists who f,,,ned an uncontrolled
nuclear arms race. Two signed a petition to the British
Prime Minister seeking control of atomic energy by
the United Nations. Marsdcn reported that senior NZ
scientists wallted the same. \vith free exchange of
information.
Nationalistic mil itary policies i{,lIowing WWII made
this impossible [and led to the famous atom bomb spy
episodes 1 . F�ritain set up its own nuclear research
establishment at Harwcll and in January 1 947 made a
secret decision to build its O\vn bomb. NZ "continued
to serenely and apparently unquestioningly support
Britain" with scientists sent to Barwell. ( 5 worked there
in 1 947.)
In 1 947 the Harwcll Director suggested NZ and
Australia build a graphite reactor. Marsden pushed this
proposal, which had Lincoln, near Christchurch, as a
proposed site, and would have produced radioisotopes
for medical use and agricultural research . There was
l ittle enthusiasm amongst scientists or govemment. Part
of the promotion may have been aimed at absorbing
Australasian scientists, who knew too much, into
peripheral areas.
At this stage Britain desperately wanted Australian sites
Peace Researcher
for the t e s t i n g o f A-bombs and m i s s i l e s , b u t
Washington d istrusted Australian security and wanted
Australia kept out of the nuclear club.
NZ's involvement in nuclear bomb-making took a new
turn in 1 949 with an on-again-off-again project to make
heavy water for the British bomb programme. Heavy
water could b e acquired by an electolytic process using
vast amounts of electricity, or fractional distillation
using vast amounts of heat energy. In 1 952 a project
based on the Wairakei geothermal field was in ful l
swing. In July 1 953 a nuclear accident at Chalk River
warned that heavy water technology had dangers, and
the NZ effort col lapsed, although plans for a geothermal
power station continued. A year later the nuclear project
was revived, then stopped once more.
NZ gained a power station, but one which does not
operate at ful l efficiency because it was designed with
the nuclear programme in mind. It is clear from official
files that Cabinet and scientists were aware the project
was related to the making of nuclear weapons.
National Archives also reveal two other weapon-related
proj ects that were suggested to N Z because they
required large amounts of cheap electricity. A document
marked 'Top secret' reveals that the UK contemplated
asking this country to host a gaseous diffusion plant
for separating uranium isotopes and increasing Britain's
output of U ra n i u m 2 3 5 . And in 1 94 8 NZ was
approached by Britain about building a giant supersonic
windtunnel for aerodynamic testing of missiles which
were to be flight tested at Woomera. It seems the origins
ofthe Manapouri power station lie partly in government
consideration of backing for British nuclear weapons
development. "It is still somewhat startling to discover
that all these proposals were being discussed behind
the backs of ordinary New Zealanders in the early
1 950s. New Zealand was more involved in the Cold
War than the public ever real ised."
With the collapse of the heavy water scheme this
country's direct scientific involvement in nuclear
weapons development seems to have finished. There
was involvement in other ways - for instance, mil itary
support for nuclear tests at Maralinga and Christmas
Island.
"At first glance New Zealand's tiny role in the gigantic
wartime project to build the bomb seems a historical
curiosity of no significance .... Even so, it is worth
remembering just how close the timing was for the
Hiroshima bomb." The USAF was running out of cities
suitable to try the bomb on. The US knew the Japanese
were trying to persuade the Soviet Union to mediate a
surrender. And Washington was keen to finish the war
Peace Researcher
before Moscow entered it. "All in all the timing was
quite critical if America's $2 b i l lion investment was
not going to be wasted . . . Who knows whether there
might have been a fateful further delay of another week
or two at Oak Ridge if the resourceful Kiwis had not
been there to keep the calutrons going?"
"Much of the nuclear proliferation that fol lowed over
the [postwar1 decades can be traced back to the Chalk
River reactors - which the New Zealanders worked on."
The Soviet Union, India, France, and Israel all made
use of Chalk River d iscoveries, and plutonium from
there ended up in US nuclear weapons. Britain used a
graphite process designed by a New Zealander at
Harwell.
I n the 1 950s this country was offered a research reactor
by the United States, but turned it down. I n 1 957 the
Institute of Nuclear Sciences was established, and in
the same period, the National Radiation Laboratory.
Both "became involved in very important monitoring
of fallout from nuclear testing. The monitoring results
contributed to b u i l d i ng u p concern about the
environmental damage done by testing. New Zealand
became the main source of data on the effects of French
nuclear testing."
"It is hard to see that New Zealand gained anything
from its postwar participation i n the British bomb
program me, apart from a geothermal power station
running less efficiently than it ought to be . .. Certainly
New Zealand scored none of the advantages that
Marsden had been hoping for."
In 1 944 it was not easy to see the factors that in
hindsight make it questionable whether NZ should have
got involved in the A-bomb programmes. "But I think
it is fair to be very critical of New Zealand for
continuing to send scientists to Harwell after 1 945, and
for even considering participation in heavy water,
gaseous diffusion, or missile windtunnel studies after
the war. . . New Zealand scientists should have refused
to participate, and they should have educated their
political leaders on why New Zealand should have
refused to participate."
FRENCH lEAD
ARMS TRADE
I n 1 994 France became the leading arms dealer to
third world countries. It sold U S $ 1 1 .46 b i l l ion
worth of weaponry while the value of United States
sales fel l to US $6. 1 6 billion.
Page lJ
 USAF Detach ment detached from Harewood
There is one less chunk of the American military at
Christchurch Airport: USAF Detachment Two has
decamped. But before you celebrate, we must tell
you that the Starlifter flights continue. The flights
are now serviced by US Navy personnel. This is an
interesting turn of events. In the past if you asked the
Navy anyth i n g about A i r Force operations at
Harewood, they denied all knowledge. This, despite
the fact the US Air Force and the American Embassy,
and indced the NZ government, consistently claim
1 that every Starl i fter or Galaxy flight is d i rectly
involved in the Antarctic program. Like it or not, the
Navy will now have to pay some attention to Air Force
movements at Harewood.
We would not expect the Navy to be very happy about
their new service and stevedore role for the Air Force.
I nterservice rivalry is serious business. in the US
m i litary. The Navy now has the inglorious job of
loading and u nloading cargo, and ferrying Air Force
flight crews to their hotel accommodation. Some
Navy personnel are housed in barracks at the airport.
US Embassy censored flight data sheets
The flight data sheets provided by the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and Trade, which allow us to monitor
American Air Force use of Christchurch Airport, were
missing the :'mission numbers" for each flight until
we decided to query this practice. We knew of the
mission numbers because data sheets received in the
past directly from the US Air Force contained them.
We wrote to M FAT and asked why the data sheets
were being censored. Their very next set ofdata sheets
appeared with the mission numbers intact and with
the following sentence in the cover letter:
"These [flight] details include mission numbers since
the US Embassy has agreed to their release."
US Navy Hercules flight data
We were del ighted to see in our latest packets of MFAT flight data that they are now including records
of US Navy Antarctic flights of the LC 1 30 Hercules. This means that our records of U S mil itary and
government flights will be much more complete from now on and that we will be able to determine a
proper annual ratio of Antarctic to mil itary/intelligence fl ights, as we did back in the mid- 1 980s.
Page 14
The former Air Force Detachment consisted of
officers and enlisted personnel who were based i n
Christchurch and operated year-round to serve both
the Starlifter m i l itary/inte l ligence flights and the
flights devoted wholly or in part to the Antarctic
programme. For those who have observed the
movements of the Starlifters at Harewood, the dark
blue air force van and pickup truck were fami l iar
sights. Prior to each flight arrival they would be driven
out of their warehouse storage building, onto the broad
aircraft taxi/parking area and across to the main
runways where they would await the arrival of the
Star! ifter. We have yet to observe whether the Navy
has taken over the role of flight accompaniment.
The signs on the former Air Force warehouse have
been changed. A c o u p l e of years ago they
"demil itarised" good old MAC, the M i litary Airlift
Command. It became the Air Mobility Command.
The AMC insignia now appears on one corner of the
large new Navy sign. But US Air Force identification
is absent. The profi le ofthe Air Force at Deep Freeze
is less obvious - but the flights go on.
This rather m inor incident is interesting in that it
reveals consu ltation between the NZ and U S
governments in the operation of our own Official
I n formation Act. We assume that the data are
provided to MFA T under provisions of the Deep
Freeze Agreement of 1 960, the only known agreement
covering US Air Force operations at Christchurch
Airport. It is not surprising that the US government
would retain an interest in any public release of the
data. But it is puzzl ingjust why embassy officials, i n
their wisdom, decided to deprive us o f the mission
numbers. The numbers are not essential in analysing
the fl ight data, but they can be useful in confusing
cases in which the data entries arc unclear or
incomplete.
now available
Peace Researcher
 40 years of Operation Deep F reeze -
22 years of P rotest against the US Military
at Christc h u rch International Airport

Police overwhelm hapless protester at the National demonstration at Harewood, March 1 973

Security forces guarding against invasion at Wcedons, SF of Christchurch, during National

demonstration. March 1 97 3 . Wcedons is the site of the l J S Navy radio transmitter for
Operation Deep Freeze.

Peace Researcher Page 15

 The Spies Picnic, a demo against the Pine Gap Starlifter flights at Harewood, October 1 986

Demonstration outside US Navy and Air Force warehouses, I larcwood, October 1 987

Keystone Kiwi cops responding to massive invasion force at the N ational demo, October
1 988

Page 76 Peace Researcher

 International Touching the Bases TOllr visits the Totem Pole and Operation Deep Freeze,
Harewood, November 1 990

Moana Cole and Ciaron O ' Reilly of the Catholic Worker v i gil in the US Air Force area at
Harewood on Hiroshima Day 1994. They were arrested for trespass minutes later.
--------�

Different Perspective on the

Balkans Quagmire
We have a copy of a manuscript entitled "US Covert Activity in the Balkan Quagmire" by Robert S . Rodvik,
a Canadian. At 30 typed pages with 54 references. it is too long for publication in Peace Researcher. But it's
a solid piece of work, well researched and written. This article is for those with a particular interest in
a detailed, and decidedly different, analysis of the civil war in the Balkans - different in that Rodvik
challenges the standard western media depiction ofthe Serbs as the bad guys in Ibis tragic confrontation.

We don't necessarily endorse Rodvik's analysis in its entirety. but we recommend it to anyone who wants to
be better informed on the issues, including the complex historical background of the greater Balkans region.

On request, w e will send a copy of the article for the cost of copying and postage - approximately $2.50 via
surface mail within NZ.

Peace Researcher Page 17

 CIA F I LE
JAPAN NOCS CIA
"After dropping polite warnings to the CIA about the
need to rein in the activities of 'certain businessmen' -
warnings the C I A duly ignored - Japan 's P u b l ic
Investigative Agency decided to play hardball. They
h ired thugs to bust up the homes and offices of the
[agents] causing the CIA in a panic to recall the entire
team, withdrawing 'assets' that had painstakingly becn
kept in place for as long as 1 5 years." [In These Times,
· reported in Briarpatch, June 1 995.]
Japan's security agency learned in 1 989 that the CIA
had a team of 1 3 officers in Japan under 'nonofficial
cover' (NOC) collecting classified information about
foreign technology and trade secrets. The NOC agents
pose as businessmen (or women) instead of being
stationed under diplomatic cover.
The episode explains why reports at the beginning of
this year indicated that the CIA had almost halved the
number of informants it had in Japan. The Kyodo News
Agency stated that there were now about 60 agents there,
down from more than 1 00.
In These Times claims that the CIA "currently maintains
1 1 0 nonofficial cover officers worldwide, a key part
of the agency's economic intell igence apparatus". It
lists some of the corporations who act as covers for the
officers.
It seems unlikely that the number of NOC operatives
is anywhere near this low. Economic intell igence is a
top priority for the major spook agencies. Mother .Iones
stated in an article in June this year that there were
about 30 NOC agents in France alone. In February 7lme
magazine reported intell igence officials as saying
"several hundred NOCs are now in the field, and the
number is growing" [20 February 1 995]. Jt also reported
that NOC activity is more dangerous than working
under diplomatic cover, and that it cost the CIA as much
as $3 million to set up an officer as a corporate executive
in Tokyo.
CIA HITMAN
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists [July!August 1 995]
reports that there are new demands for the closure of
the School of the Americas at Fort Benning, Georgia,
after yet another CIAlinformer!torturer has been
revealed as a graduate ofthat institution. Colonel Julio
Roberto Alpirez, is accused of torture and murder,
including the k i lling of a US citizen. He is (amongst
other things) an omcer in the Guatemalan army, an
Page 18
intelligence official, and was an informant on the CIA
payroll. According to Tim Weiner of the NY Times
News Service, Alpirez "received tens of thousands of
dollars a year for his information" [Today, 27 March
1 995J.
Some accounts ofthe case report a "cowboy mentality"
amongst CIA officials in Guatemala unchanged from
the worst years of the Cold War. The CIA provides
Guatemalan intell igence with up to three U S $ m i l lion
each year. In April the Acting Director of the CIA told
Congress that murderous acts sponsored by renegade
governments were on the decline. Does this mean the
CIA is withdrawing its support for t h i rd world
thuggery?
NEW CIA D IRECTOR
John M Deutsch was sworn iu on 1 0 May 1 995, as
head of the US intelligence community, and D irector
of the CIA. He had been Deputy Secretary of Defense
since March 1 994. Deutsch was born in Brussels and
became a US citizen in 1 94 5 . He was a Professor of
Chemistry and has worked in energy research, on
various military scientific bodies, and the President's
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. Deutsch is also
a member of an intriguing organisation named the
Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government
Secrecy. [One wonders which part gets priority.] This
information has to be believed - it comes from the CIA
Home Page on Internet. How much does it llQt tell us?
BLAME THE PRESIDENT - NOT THE CIA
In a Guardian Weekly review [9 July 1995] Christopher
Andrew's latest book is said to lay much of the blame
tor the blunders of US intelligence on the presidents.
Fred Hall iday, reviewing ' For The President' s Eyes
Only' states that "in many cases, not the least Pearl
Harbour, it was the president's inability properly to
interpret the information supplied to him that led to
foreign policy failure". Similarly, covert action has not
been the result of some run�.way i n te l l igence
community, but " . . .the responsibility lay with the
presidents themselves. For all the manicured deniability
in which they indulged from Truman onwards, it was
the US presidents who organised coups and bribery and
stimulated disinformation and opposition movements
in target countries". Halliday says the book provides
some correctives to the temptation to see the modern
history of US intell igence as one of almost "unrelenting
incompetence" . In a few cases " ... CIA information was
responsible for major policy b lunders".
Peace Researcher
 BUT I NCOMPETENT NEVERTHElESS
Four other books reviewed in the G W [2 July] all show
that in the case of supermole Aldrich Ames, the agency
most defi n itel y and explicitly demonstrated gross
incompetence. One superior labelled him lazy and
unfocussed. He was clearly alcoholic, prone to drunken
b inges, was short of money, and lost valuable
intelligence documents. He was given a highly sensitive
job (head i n g the Soviet branch of the agency ' s
counterintelligence group) despite all the evidence that
he was a mediocre, even slovenly, worker. Yet he was
able to carry shopping bags ful l of classified material
out of the Langley headquarters, and hand them to
Soviet contacts i n Washi ngton restaurents. H e
consigned at least ten deep-cover US agents to a bullet
behind the ear (and whatever else they were subjected
to). He compromised the entire US intelligence war
against the Russians. It doesn't take many blunders like
this to suggest the US (and everyone else) would be
better off without the CIA.
B URGLARS OR BUGGERS?
At the end of June the office of the Combi ned
Beneficiaries Union in Auckland was broken into. Most
ofthe communications equipment was removed. Some
trouble was taken to disconnect the handpiece of one
ofthe telephones and leave it on the centre of an empty
desk. President of the CBU, Frank Clarke, believes this
was meant as a warning to cool down campaigns against
state housing and social welfare policy. The police
believe it was a '·professional" job. At a "Fair Deal"
rally previo u s ly, another act i v i st had stacks of
documents stolen from his van.
NSA ACCUSED
Last April a U S Congressman released an anonymous
letter which he stated came from a US National Security
Agency employee. The letter said that there had been a
cover-up of alleged killer Julio Alpirez' s links with U S
intelligence [,ee CIA File], and that the NSA and the
Pentagon destroyed incriminating documents. The FBI
found no evidence of document shredding but is
unlikely to have had much access to NSA records. The
hunt for the employee who leaked information is likely
to be much more comprehensive.
DIFFERENT SPOOKS - SAME COVER-UPS
In Germany an inquiry has started into an operation by
the country ' s fore i g n inte l l igence agency, the
Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND). A few weeks bcfore
Peace Researcher
Will THE PENTAGON TAKE OVER?
Over the last six years the US military has begun to
rely much more on its own Defense Inte l ligence Agency
for human spies. The CIA oversees the intelligence
targets of these military agents, but the operations are
much more under the control of a new organisation
formed from the merging of the Air Force, Army and
Navy intelligence groups. I n Panama, Somalia, and
Haiti, officers from the D1A are said to have played a
significant part in securing intelligence vital to planned
m i l i tary operat i o n s . M i l itary s p i e s are more
knowledgeable about the information needs for military
purposes, and according to one former officer, are
"patriots" not trailors being paid for information. They
have also had their fail ures. Before this year's
reorganisation into one group,the US Army, Navy, and
Air Force had about 1 ,000 operatives compared to the
CIA's 5,000. But the Pentagon has 1 3,000 intelligence
analysts, about nine times the number in the CIA, and
it controls most of the US $28 b i l l ion intelligence
budget [Time magazine, 29 May 1 995].
e l ections were held i n August 1 994, the media
announced a decisive blow against organised nuclear
crime with the seizure of 360 grams of plutonium at
Mun ich airport. The heist was in fact an elaborate sting
operation in which Gennan inte l ligence agents actively
procured the plutonium and enticed the sellers to bring
it to Germany. This meant the breaking of a variety of
security and safety procedures, and questions were
raised about both this and whether the operation was
politically motivated. The intelligence oversight
committee ofthe German parliament was not satisfied
by the answers it was given, and an official investigation
was launched . Bernd Schmidbauer, co-ordinator ofthe
BND, insisted no German agents were involved, but
has been proved to have lied. The Kohl Government is
detemlined to prevent BND files 011 the case being made
available to the enquiry, and have accused the Green
Party . allowed to sit on the intelligence oversight
committee for the first time in 1 994 · of leaking state
secrets. Different nationalities - same old cover-ups. It
m ight be nice to have an i nt e l l i gence oversight
committee though! [From Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists, July/August, 1 995]
MORE GERMAN SPIES
A German magazine has quoted a former KGB General
as saying that the KGB recruited a top agent from the
BND in 1 972. The magazine Focus asserts that the
agent provided Moscow with details of operations by
Page 19
West German intelligence and other western agencies,
and has sti l l not been traced. I n August Federal
prosecutors arrested a man and charged him with
passing secret documents from the West German
President's office to the KGB at the height ofthe Cold
War. [Christchurch Press, 2 1 August 1 995]
S P I ES VERSUS POSTlES
When the Canadian Union of Postal Workers applied
to see all the files that CSIS, Canada's spy agency, had
on their union, they were told CSIS had 3,979 pages of
documents. But only 1 ,720 pages were released, mostly
newspaper clippings and union information. There were
2 8 I pages of "partially severed" Royal Canadian
Mounted P o l i c e S ec u r i ty S e r v i c e reports and
correspondence. The material covers the period from
1 965 to 1 98 5 . CSIS maintains it has no files from 1 985
to the present. But a neo-Nazi who was a C S I S
informant was working i n Toronto's giant Gateway
postal plant in 1 989 just prior to the last CUPW strike.
[Briarpatch, June 1 995]
BLACKOUT
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists [July/August 1 995)
reports that secret mil itary programmes in the United
States avoid the environmental standards that everyone
else must meet. The reason is that the Environmental
Protection A gency has no-one with the security
clearance necessary to review 'black' programmes. But
additionally, the Director ofthe EPA's Office of Federal
Activities has stated that his staff cannot recall ever
being requested to review the environmental impact
statement for a black programme.
WALL COlLAPSE SURPRISED THE EAST
Markus Wolf, who headed East Germany's foreign
intelligence service from 1 953 to 1 986, has said he was
surprised by the disintegration of the Berlin Wall,
suggesting that the spooks of Eastern Europe were no
better at pred icting dramatic events than their cousins
in the West. Wolf was convicted of treason in 1 993,
butthis year his conviction was overturned on the basis
that he had served his own country. He says East
German spies were betrayed by Gorbachev whom he
had expected to make a deal with the German
Chancellor to ensure there were no prosecutions
[Christchurch Press. 1 8 July 1 995).
WHITE SOUTH AFRICA'S D I RTY TRICKS
Under the government of F W de Klerk there was a
clandestine campaign to undermine the African
National Congress, involving kil lings, intimidation, and
propaganda. Former government spies and security
agents have gone pub I ic, under an amnesty, to reveal
details of government sanctioned violence, nasty tricks
Page 20
and media manipulation against political opponents.
de Klerk has admitted "unconventional methods" were
used to combat "ANC terrorism" up to 1 990, but says
projects after then were not sanctioned, a claim disputed
by some former officers. [ Vancouver Star 1 4 July 1995]
AND MORE FROM S H I N BETH?
The Sydney Morning Herald [26 August] reports that
Israe l ' s internal security agency "has launched a
campaign for greater leeway in interrogating suspected
terrorists following an upsurge in Palestinian suicide
bombing ... " The campaign has been backed by the
Prime Minister and Minister of Police. Last issue of
Peace Researcher reported that a Shin Beth officer had
tortured an Islamic militant to death. How much more
leeway can they be given?
TERRORISM REWARDED
A senior French intelligence officer who was involved
in the scheme to sink the Rainbow Warrior has been
made a Grand Officer ofthe Legion of Honour, France's
second highest order. Major-General lean-Claude
Lesquer commanded the French secret service agents
who bombed the Greenpeace ship in Auckland Harbour
in 1 98 5 .
CYBERWAR TIM E
A recent edition of Time [2 1 August) writes up a
scenario where the year 2000 sees Iran launch a war
against the USA, not with rockets and tanks, but with
computer viruses and e lectro-magnetic pulses that
would take out vital chunks of the U S economic
infrastructure. The Pentagon is taking the possibility
of a "cyberwar" seriously, and setting up units and
think-tanks to organise defensive strategies. And
according to this report. the NSA is researching ways
to infect enemy computer systems, and the CIA has
clandestine programmes to insert viruses or faulty chips
into weapons destined for potentially hostil e countries.
Time reports that the Bush Adm i nistration had a
proposal to disrupt Iraqi computers that controlled
financial transactions, but the CIA opposed this. A CIA
national intell igence report has concluded that there
have been no clear attacks on the American m i litary's
computer faci lities, but foreign intelligence services are
already probing US computers.
NEW JAPANESE INTElliGENCE AGENCY
Japan 's Defence Ministry is asking for more funds next
year to set up a new intelligence agency that will employ
up to 2,000 people. The intention is to make Japan less
dependent on intell igence information from other
countries. Japan currently has a strong working
relationship with the United States and hosts a number
of US spy bases on its territory.
Peace Researcher
 TI M E FOR NZ'S I NTELLIGE NCE LINKS TO REFLECT REALITY
I n a recent article i n the New Statesman, Patrick
Fitzgerald examines the intel ligence relationship of
Britain and the United States, and concludes " ...the fact
that Whiteha l l cannot bring itself to contemplate
breaking its transatlantic l i nk does not augur well .
Britain's intell igence priorities surely lie in the same
direction as its econom ic future: in Europe. The sooner
Whitehall and Cheltenham stop flogging their dead
Trojan Horse, the better". [ 1 6 June, 1 995]
One could sim ilarly state that New Zealand's hoary
fixation with UKUSA intell igence links does not augur
well. We have the same "fatefu l and fatal obsession",
and our intelligence priorities have got to be drastically
revised. We dissociated ourselves from "where Britain
goes, we go" after the Suez debacle, but the Security
I n t e l l i g e n c e Service and the Government
Communications Security Bureau were initiated under
British tutelage, and have remained as branch offices
of her majesty's secret services ever since. In a post­
Cold War world where the major powers are slowly
but surely re-aligning their interests, New Zealand must
do the same.
The New Statesman article argues that Britain's future,
and therefore that of its intelligence services, lies i n
Europe, and that its interests differ from those o f the
United States. As Britain moves towards Europe, and
New Zealand reorientates more within Asia and the
Pacific, our interests also differ with those of Whitehall,
and never did much coincide with Washington 's.
industry which drove at least one British manufacturer
out of business.
In New Zeal and the i m p l ications of econom i c
espionage have been almost totally overlooked.
Multinational negotiations, currency movements and
commodity price developments are now considered part
of the intelligence brief to ensure that the ' economic
well-being' of states is protected. This fosters intense,
nationalistic rivalry, and it is very hard to imagine New
Zealand 's interests being safe-guarded in the UKUSA
context.
Former Australian Secret Intelligence Service officers
have said that their organisation carried out operations
that gave privileged information to British companies
and disadvantaged Australian ones. I n 1 99 1 a middle
ranking British officer said that intercepted arms trade
information was being fed to companies in the United
Kingdom so they could secure contracts. It is likely
that the private American corporations who are
involved in the management of the huge Menwith Hill
spy station have access to huge volumes of the most
privileged information.
New Zealand's vulnerability to trade and financial
pressure or manipulation has always been high; our
small electron ics and energy businesses are totally
exposed. We should be much more aware of the
i m p l ications of the i n terception of commercial
information.

According to Fitzgerald " ... it is in the commercial
field that Whitehall's 'Trojan Horse' routine really starts
to run into trouble. Economic intell igence has been a
growing preoccupation in intelligence circles for years,
and the British and Americans increasingly find
themselves in different camps." He cites a series of
CIA covert operations against the European computer
Intell igence services here, operating fac i lities l i ke
Waihopai, which pass on the information they intercept
to their British and American colleagues, must be
continuously and closely supervised to ensure that what
they are doing is really in the interests of this country
and not the interests of the big brothers. At the moment
this is not even a matter for debate . .

Abo ut Peace Researcher

Peace Researcher i s published quarterly b y the Anti-Bases campaign, Christchurch. The editors are Warren
Thomson and Bob Leonard. Our journal covers a range of peace issues with emphasis on foreign m i litary bases
and intelligence topics. Contributed articles will be considered for publication based on subject matter and
space requirements. We are particularly interested in reports of original research on peace topics in Aotearoa
and the wider region of Australasia and the Pacific. Our address is:

Peace Researcher
P.O. Box 2258
Christchurch
Aotearoal New Zealand

Peace Researcher Poge 2 7

 MEDIA RELEASE - 24 September 1 995, Christchurch, New Zealand

US adm its to 40 years of US m i litary occupation of C h ristchurch

A i rport - Deep Freeze celebrations should be cancelled
Celebrations for the 40ili anniversary ofOperation Deep
Freeze should be cancelled, The top US government
representative of the National Science Foundation
(NSF), Dr Charles Paul, has admitted that the US
Antarctic program has been primarily a m i litary
mission, S c ience is only the third priority after
commercial ( The Press 23/9/95, front page). The NSF
is a civilian government agency that runs Operation
Deep Freeze.
"New Zealanders have been cynically misled for 40
years about the real motivation behind Operation Deep
Freeze," says Bob Leonard, spokesperson for the
Christchurch Anti-Bases Campaign. "We demand that
the City Counci l -
I ) i m m e d i at e l y c a l l a halt t o t h e Deep Freeze
celebrations, and
2) launch an inquiry into all aspects of US m i litary
involvement in Operation Deep Freeze,"
Spokesman Bob Leonard says that the Anti-Bases
Campaign supports civilian scientific activity in the
Antarctic and the operation of a Christchurch support
base for international Antarctic programmes on the lee.
But U S Navy and Air Force involvement must cease.
Their involvement violates the spirit ofthe international
Antarctic Treaty"
Dr Paul's forthright revelation vindicates over 20 years
of campaigning by the peace movement that Operation
Deep Freeze has always been a cover for U S m i litary
operations. But we cannot support Dr Paul 's call for
expanded U S Air Force support for the NSF. The US
Air Force regularly violates the heart of our Anti­
Nuclear Law by carrying covert cargoes through
Harewood enronte to and from US intelligence bases
at Nurrungar and Pine Gap in Australia. The flights
are covered by the infamous nuclear "neither confirm
nor deny" policy.

BASE DECEPTI O N :
The US Military at Christchufch Airport
A new ABC video now available
Christchurch ABC has produced a J 5 minute video which shows why the Unitcd States military presence at
Harewood A i rport mMS! be eliminated. The video dispells the myth that the mil itary serves only as logistic
support for O peration Deepfreeze, and explains that the majority of flights service US intelligence-gathering
faci lities at Nurrungar and Pine Gap in Australia. The documentary also looks brielly at some ofthe protests
which have taken place at the base over its 40 years of operation,

Copies of "Base Deception" can be purchased from ABC for $ J 5 including postage" Send cheques to ABC, Box
2258, Christchurch

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