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An Analysis of Private Browsing Modes in Modern Browsers

An Analysis of Private Browsing Modes in Modern Browsers

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Published by Pascal Van Hecke
Paper by :
Gaurav Aggarwal
Elie Burzstein
Collin Jackson
Dan Boneh

Source: http://www.collinjackson.com/research/private-browsing.pdf

Abstract:
"We study the security and privacy of private browsing
modes recently added to all major browsers. We first propose
a clean definition of the goals of private browsing
and survey its implementation in different browsers. We
conduct a measurement study to determine how often it is
used and on what categories of sites. Our results suggest
that private browsing is used differently from how it is
marketed. We then describe an automated technique for
testing the security of private browsing modes and report
on a few weaknesses found in the Firefox browser. Finally,
we show that many popular browser extensions and
plugins undermine the security of private browsing. We
propose and experiment with a workable policy that lets
users safely run extensions in private browsing mode"
Paper by :
Gaurav Aggarwal
Elie Burzstein
Collin Jackson
Dan Boneh

Source: http://www.collinjackson.com/research/private-browsing.pdf

Abstract:
"We study the security and privacy of private browsing
modes recently added to all major browsers. We first propose
a clean definition of the goals of private browsing
and survey its implementation in different browsers. We
conduct a measurement study to determine how often it is
used and on what categories of sites. Our results suggest
that private browsing is used differently from how it is
marketed. We then describe an automated technique for
testing the security of private browsing modes and report
on a few weaknesses found in the Firefox browser. Finally,
we show that many popular browser extensions and
plugins undermine the security of private browsing. We
propose and experiment with a workable policy that lets
users safely run extensions in private browsing mode"

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Published by: Pascal Van Hecke on Jun 30, 2010
Copyright:Attribution Non-commercial

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08/26/2010

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An Analysis of Private Browsing Modes in Modern Browsers
Gaurav Aggarwal Elie Burzstein
Stanford University
Collin Jackson
CMU 
Dan Boneh
Stanford University
Abstract
We study the security and privacy of private browsingmodesrecently addedto allmajorbrowsers. Wefirstpro-pose a clean definition of the goals of private browsingand survey its implementation in different browsers. Weconductameasurementstudytodeterminehowoftenitisused and on what categories of sites. Our results suggestthat private browsing is used differently from how it ismarketed. We then describe an automated technique fortesting the security of private browsing modes and reporton a few weaknesses found in the Firefox browser. Fi-nally, weshowthatmanypopularbrowserextensionsandplugins undermine the security of private browsing. Wepropose and experiment with a workable policy that letsusers safely run extensions in private browsing mode.
1 Introduction
The four major browsers (Internet Explorer, Firefox,Chrome and Safari) recently added private browsingmodes to their user interfaces. Loosely speaking, thesemodes have two goals. First and foremost, sites visitedwhile browsing in private mode should leave no trace onthe user’s computer. A family member who examines thebrowser’s history should find no evidence of sites visitedin private mode. More precisely, a
local attacker 
whotakes control of the machine at time
should learn noinformation about private browsing actions prior to time
. Second, users may want to hide their identity fromweb sites they visit by, for example, making it difficultfor web sites to link the user’s activities in private modeto the user’s activities in public mode. We refer to this asprivacy from a
web attacke
.While all major browsers support private browsing,there is a great deal of inconsistency in the type of pri-vacy provided by the different browsers. Firefox andChrome, for example, attempt to protect against a localattacker and take some steps to protect against a web at-tacker, while Safari only protects against a local attacker.Even within a single browser there are inconsistencies.For example, in Firefox 3.6, cookies set in public modeare not available to the web site while the browser is inprivate mode. However, passwords and SSL client cer-tificates stored in public mode are available while in pri-vate mode. Since web sites can use the password man-ager as a crude cookie mechanism, the password policyis inconsistent with the cookie policy.Browser plug-ins and extensions add considerablecomplexity to private browsing. Even if a browser ad-equately implements private browsing, an extension cancompletely undermine its privacy guarantees. In Sec-tion6.1we show that many widely used extensions un-dermine the goals of private browsing. For this reason,Google Chrome disables all extensions while in privatemode, negatively impacting the user experience. Firefox,in contrast, allows extensions to run in private mode, fa-voring usability over security.
Our contribution.
The inconsistencies between thegoals and implementation of private browsing suggeststhat there is considerable room for research on privatebrowsing. We present the following contributions.
Threat model.
We begin with a clear definition of the goals of private browsing. Our model has twosomewhat orthogonal goals: security against a localattacker (the primary goal of private browsing) andsecurity against a web attacker. We show that cor-rectly implementing private browsing can be non-trivial and in fact all browsers fail in one way or an-other. We then survey how private browsing is im-plemented in the four major browsers, highlightingthe quirks and differences between the browsers.
Experiment.
We conduct an experiment to testhow private browsing is used. Our study is basedon a technique we discovered to remotely test if abrowser is currently in private browsing mode. Us-ing this technique we post ads on ad-networks and
 
determine how often private mode is used. Using adtargeting by the ad-network we target different cat-egories of sites, enabling us to correlate the use of private browsing with the type of site being visited.We find it to be more popular at adult sites and lesspopular at gift sites, suggesting that its primary pur-pose may not be shopping for “surprise gifts.Wequantify our findings in Section4.
Tools.
We describe an automated technique foridentifying failures in private browsing implemen-tations and use it to discover a few weaknesses inthe Firefox browser.
Browser extensions.
We propose an improve-ment to existing approaches to extensions in privatebrowsing mode, preventing extensions from unin-tentionally leaving traces of the private activity ondisk. We implement our proposal as a Firefox ex-tension that imposes this policy on other extensions.
Organization.
Section2presents a threat model for pri-vate browsing. Section3surveys private browsing modein modern browsers. Section4describes our experimen-tal measurement of private browsing usage. Section5describes the weaknesses we found in existing privatebrowsing implementations. Section6addresses the chal-lenges introduced by extensions and plug-ins. Section7describes additional related work. Section8concludes.
2 Private browsing: goal and threat model
In defining the goals and threat model for private brows-ing, we consider two types of attackers: an attacker whocontrols the user’s machine (a local attacker) and an at-tacker who controls web sites that the user visits (a webattacker). We define security against each attacker inturn. In what follows we refer to the user browsing theweb in private browsing mode as
the user 
and refer tosomeonetryingtodetermineinformationabouttheuser’sprivate browsing actions as
the attacker 
.
2.1 Local attacker
Stated informally, security against a local attacker meansthat an attacker who takes control of the machine
after 
the user exits private browsing can learn nothing aboutthe user’s actions while in private browsing. We definethis more precisely below.We emphasize that the local attacker has no access tothe user’s machine before the user exits private brows-ing. Without this limitation, security against a local at-tacker is impossible; an attacker who has access to theuser’s machine before or during a private browsing ses-sion can simply install a key-logger and record all useractions. By restricting the local attacker to “after thefact” forensics, we can hope to provide security by hav-ing the browser adequately erase persistent state changesduring a private browsing session.As we will see, this requirement is far from simple.For one thing, not all state changes during private brows-ing should be erased at the end of a private browsing ses-sion. We draw a distinction between four types of persis-tent state changes:1. Changes initiated by a web site without any user in-teraction. A few examples in this category includesetting a cookie, adding an entry to the history file,and adding data to the browser cache.2. Changes initiated by a web site, but requiring userinteraction. Examples include generating a clientcertificate or adding a password to the passworddatabase.3. Changes initiated by the user. For example, creatinga bookmark or downloading a file.4. Non-user-specific state changes, such as installing abrowser patch or updating the phishing block list.All browsers try to delete state changes in category (1)once a private browsing session is terminated. Failure todo so is treated as a private browsing violation. However,changes in the other three categories are in a gray areaand different browsers treat these changes differently andoften inconsistently. We discuss implementations in dif-ferent browsers in the next section.To keep our discussion general we use the term
pro-tected actions
to refer to state changes that should beerased when leaving private browsing. It is up to eachbrowser vendor to define the set of protected actions.
Network access.
Another complication in defining pri-vate browsing is server side violations of privacy. Con-sider a web site that inadvertently displays to the worldthe last login time of every user registered at the site.Even if the user connects to the site while in privatemode, the user’s actions are open for anyone to see. Inother words, web sites can easily violate the goals of pri-vate browsing, but this should not be considered a viola-tion of private browsing in the browser. Since we arefocusing on browser-side security, our security modeldefined below ignores server side violations. Whilebrowser vendors mostly ignore server side violations,one can envision a number of potential solutions:
Much like the phishing filter, browsers can consult ablock list of sites that should not be accessed whilein private browsing mode.
Alternatively, sites can provide a P3P-like policystatement saying that they will not violate privatebrowsing. While in private mode, the browser willnot connect to sites that do not display this policy.
 
A non-technical solution is to post a privacy seal atweb sites who comply with private browsing. Userscan avoid non-compliant sites when browsing pri-vately.
Security model.
Security is usually defined using twoparameters: the attacker’s capabilities and the attacker’sgoals. A local private browsing attacker has the follow-ing capabilities:
The attacker does nothing until the user leaves pri-vate browsing mode at which point the attacker getscomplete control of the machine. This capturesthe fact that the attacker is limited to after-the-factforensics.In this paper we focus on persistent state violations,such as those stored on disk; we ignore private stateleft in memory. Thus, we assume that before theattacker takes over the local machine all volatilememory is cleared (though data on disk, includingthe hibernation file, is fair game). Our reason for ig-noring volatile memory is that erasing all of it whenexiting private browsing can be quite difficult and,indeed, no browser does it. We leave it as futurework to prevent privacy violations resulting fromvolatile memory.
While active, the attacker cannot communicate withnetworkelementsthatcontaininformationabouttheuser’s activities while in private mode (e.g. websites the user visited, caching proxies, etc.). Thiscaptures the fact that we are studying the implemen-tation of browser-side privacy modes, not server-side privacy.Given these capabilities, the attacker’s goal is as fol-lows: for a set
of HTTP requests of the attacker’schoosing, determine if the browser issued any of thoserequestswhileinprivatebrowsingmode. Moreprecisely,the attacker is asked to distinguish a private browsingsession where the browser makes one of the requests in
from a private browsing session where the browserdoes not. If the local attacker cannot achieve this goalthen we say that the browser’s implementation of privatebrowsing is secure. This will be our working definitionthroughout the paper. Note that since an HTTP requestcontains the name of the domain visited this definitionimplies that the attacker cannot tell if the user visited aparticular site (to see why set
to be the set of all pos-sible HTTP requests to the site in question). Moreover,even if by some auxiliary information the attacker knowsthat the user visited a particular site, the definition im-plies that the attacker cannot tell what the user did at thesite.An alternate definition, which is much harder toachieve, requires that the browser hide whether privatemode was used at all. We will not consider this strongergoal in the paper. Similarly, we do not formalize proper-ties of private browsing in case the user never exits pri-vate browsing mode.
Difficulties.
Browser vendors face a number of chal-lenges in securing private browsing against a local at-tacker. One set of problems is due to the underlying op-erating system. We give two examples:First, when connecting to a remote site the browsermust resolve the site’s DNS name. Operating systemsoften cache DNS resolutions in a local DNS cache. Alocal attacker can examine the DNS cache and the TTLvalues to learn if and when the user visited a particularsite. Thus, to properly implement private browsing, thebrowser will need to ensure that all DNS queries whilein private mode do not affect the system’s DNS cache:no entries should be added or removed. A more aggres-sive solution, supported in Windows 2000 and later, is toflush the entire DNS resolver cache when exiting privatebrowsing. None of the mainstream browsers currentlyaddress this issue.Second, the operating system can swap memory pagestotheswappartitionondiskwhichcanleavetracesoftheuser’s activity. To test this out we performed the follow-ing experiment on Ubuntu 9.10 running Firefox 3.5.9:1. We rebooted the machine to clear RAM and setupand mounted a swap file (zeroed out).2. Next, we started Firefox, switched to private brows-ing mode, browsed some websites and exited pri-vate mode but kept Firefox running.3. Once the browser was in public mode, we ran amemory leak program a few times to force memorypages to be swapped out. We then ran
strings
on the swap file and searched for specific wordsand content of the webpages visited while in privatemode.The experiment showed that the swap file containedsome URLs of visited websites, links embedded in thosepages and sometimes even the text from a page – enoughinformation to learn about the user’s activity in privatebrowsing.This experiment shows that a full implementation of private browsing will need to prevent browser memorypages from being swapped out. None of the mainstreambrowsers currently do this.
Non-solutions.
At first glance it may seem that secu-rity against a local attacker can be achieved using virtualmachine snapshots. The browser runs on top of a vir-tual machine monitor (VMM) that takes a snapshot of the

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