(1) Leung Yee vs.

Strong Machinery

FACTS:

1. Compania Agricola Filipina (CAF) bought rice-cleaning machinery from Frank L. Strong Machinery.
2. CAF executed, in favor of F.L. Strong Machinery, a chattel mortgage upon the machinery including the
building of strong material in which the machinery was installed.
3. About that same time, CAF executed another mortgage upon the building, this time in favor of Leung Yee.
4. CAF sold to F.L. Strong Machinery the land wherein the building stood but the Deed did not make any
reference to the building. Since then, the Machinery Company has always been in the possession of the
building.
5. Upon failure of CAF to pay the indebtedness secured by the mortgage, Leung Yee secured judgment and
levied execution upon the building which was in the possession of F.L. Strong.
6. F.L. Strong Machinery set up its claim upon the building and demanded its release from the levy.
7. The sheriff sold the property at public auction to the Leung Yee, who was the highest bidder at the
sheriff's sale.
8. Action was instituted by Leung Yee to recover the possession of the building from F.L. Strong.
9. The trial judge, relying upon the terms of article 1473 of the Civil Code, gave judgment in favor of the
machinery company, on the ground that the company had its title to the building registered prior to the
date of registry of the plaintiff's certificate.

ISSUE:

Whether the trial court is correct in ruling in favor of F.L. Strong Machinery on the ground that it had its
title to the building registered prior to the date of Leung Yee’s certificate.

HELD:

No. The case was correctly decided in favor of F.L. Strong Machinery but not because of paragraphs 1 or 2
of Art. 1473.

Paragraph 1 of said Article applies to personal property which the disputed building is not. The mere fact
that the parties to the mortgage executed a chattel mortgage upon it does not change its character as a
real property.

Paragraph 2 applies to real property and states that the real property shall belong to the person acquiring
it who first recorded it in the registry. The registry here referred to is, of course, the registry of real
property, thus, the annotation or inscription of a deed of sale of real property in a chattel mortgage
registry cannot be given the legal effect of an inscription in the registry of real property. Hence, it cannot
be said the paragraph 2 of Art. 1473 applies in this case.

The applicable provision in this case is paragraph 3 of Article 1473 which applies to real properties when
there is no entry made.

CINDY B. CAYANAN PROPERTY – A ATTY. JANNET REGALADO

Thursday 6pm-9pm
(2) Davao Saw Mill Co. vs. Castillo

FACTS:

1. The Davao Saw Mill Co., Inc. leased a piece of land for its operation from Castillo.
2. The lease agreement provides that upon the expiration of the lease, ownership to all improvements and
building introduced thereto by Davao Saw Mill shall pass to Castillo.
3. On the land, the sawmill company erected a building which housed the machinery used by it. The
machines were placed and mounted on foundations of cement.
4. However in Davao Light & Power Co., Inc., vs. Davao, Saw Mill Co., Inc., a judgment was rendered against
Davao Saw Mill and its machinery was levied upon as personal by the sheriff.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the machines are personal.

Are they not real property based on par 1 Art. 344 for being mounted on foundations of cement?

Are they not real property based on par 5 of Art 344 for being used in connection with any industry or trade
being carried on in the land or building and which are expressly adapted to meet the requirements of such
trade of industry.

HELD:

Yes the machines are personal and not real.

They are not real properties under paragraph 1 because they are not analogous to the kind of immovable
- land, road or building - contemplated in said paragraph.

They are not real properties under paragraph 5 because said provision requires that the owner must have
intended for the machines to be used in connection with the industry or trade being carried on in the
building or land. In this case, it is the lessee who had that intention not the owner.

CINDY B. CAYANAN PROPERTY – A ATTY. JANNET REGALADO

Thursday 6pm-9pm
(3) Standard Oil Co. vs Jaranillo

FACTS:

1. Gervasia de la Rosa, Vda. de Vera executed a chattel mortgage over both her leasehold interest and the
building erected on the leased land in favor of Standard Oil Co.

2. Standard Oil presented the mortgage document to Jaramillo, the register of deeds, for the purpose of
having it recorded in the book of record of chattel mortgage.

3. However, Jaramillo was of the opinion that the interests appearing in the mortgage are not personal.

4. Standard Oil filed a petition for mandamus to compel the register of deeds to record the chattel
mortgage.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the register of deeds may be compelled to register as chattel mortgage properties
appearing to be real?

HELD:

Yes. Although the registration of real properties as chattel mortgages would be ineffective against third
parties and would not change the character of the properties, it is for the courts to make such
determination and not the register of deeds. It is the duty of deeds to accept the estimate placed upon
the document by the petitioner and to register it, upon payment of the proper fee.

CINDY B. CAYANAN PROPERTY – A ATTY. JANNET REGALADO

Thursday 6pm-9pm
(4) Board of Assessment vs Meralco

FACTS:

1. The City Assessor of Quezon City assessed Meralco for real property taxes on its steel towers.
2. The steel towers hold the insulators wherein the electric transmission wires which carry high voltage
current are fastened. These steel towers are attached to a square metal frame by bolts

ISSUE:

Are the steel towers real properties based on paragraphs 1, 3 or 5 of Article 415 of the Civil Code?

HELD:

No.

The steel towers or supports in question, do not come within the objects mentioned in paragraph 1,
because they do not constitute buildings or constructions adhered to the soil. They are not construction
analogous to buildings nor adhering to the soil. As per description, given by the lower court, they are
removable and merely attached to a square metal frame by means of bolts, which when unscrewed could
easily be dismantled and moved from place to place.

They cannot be included under paragraph 3, as they are not attached to an immovable in a fixed manner,
and they can be separated without breaking the material or causing deterioration upon the object to
which they are attached. Each of these steel towers or supports consists of steel bars or metal strips,
joined together by means of bolts, which can be disassembled by unscrewing the bolts and reassembled
by screwing the same.

These steel towers or supports do not also fall under paragraph 5, for they are not machineries,
receptacles, instruments or implements, and even if they were, they are not intended for industry or
works on the land. Petitioner is not engaged in an industry or works in the land in which the steel supports
or towers are constructed.

CINDY B. CAYANAN PROPERTY – A ATTY. JANNET REGALADO

Thursday 6pm-9pm
(5) Philippine Refining Co. vs Jarque

FACTS:

1. On varying dates the Philippine Refining Co., Inc., and Francisco Jarque executed three mortgages on the
motor vessels Pandan and Zaragoza. These documents were recorded in the record of transfers and
encumbrances of vessels for the port of Cebu and each was therein denominated a "chattel mortgage".
2. Neither of the first two mortgages had appended an affidavit of good faith. The third mortgage contained
such an affidavit, but this mortgage was not registered in the customs house until May 17, 1932, or within
the period of thirty days prior to the commencement of insolvency proceedings against Francisco Jarque.
3. Later, Francisco was declared insolvent and as a result all of his properties were assigned in favor of Jose
Corominas.
4. Philippine Refining Co. petitioned for the foreclosure of the mortgages but this was declined because of
the assignment and the defectiveness of the mortgages.
5. To gloss over its failure to comply with the requirements of a good chattel mortgage by the Chattel
Mortgage Law, Philippine Refining contends that the documents do not constitute chattel mortgage.

ISSUE:

Whether or not vessels are considered personal property.

HELD:

Yes. Vessels are considered personal property under the civil law. Since the term "personal property"
includes vessels, thus, they are subject to provisions of the Chattel Mortgage Law.

CINDY B. CAYANAN PROPERTY – A ATTY. JANNET REGALADO

Thursday 6pm-9pm
(6) Sibal vs Valdez

FACTS:

1. By virtue of a writ of execution issued by the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, the sugar cane planted
by Leon Sibal was attached and sold to the defendant Emiliano J. Valdez.
2. Within one year from the date of the attachment and sale, Sibal offered to redeem said sugar cane and
tendered payment but Valdez, contending that the sugar cane is not subject to redemption, refused to
accept the money and to return the sugar cane to the Sibal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not sugar cane is real property, therefore, subject to redemption.

HELD:

No. Although standing crops and the fruits of trees not gathered and trees before they are cut down are
considered as part of the land to which they are attached, the immovability provided for is only abstract
and without reference to rights on or to the crop acquired by others than the owners of the property to
which the crop is attached. . . . The existence of a right on the growing crop is a mobilization by
anticipation, a gathering as it were in advance, rendering the crop movable and the right acquired therein.

Our jurisprudence recognizes the possible mobilization of the growing crop. Hence, the sugar cane in
question is considered as personal property.

CINDY B. CAYANAN PROPERTY – A ATTY. JANNET REGALADO

Thursday 6pm-9pm
(7) Republic vs. Vda de Castillo

FACTS:

1. Respondents are the registered owner of Lots 1 & 2 Psu -119166.

2. Republic sought to annul their titles contending that the land covered by the titles have always formed
part of Taal Lake and being of public ownership cannot be subject to private registration.
3. Respondent’s defense:
a. Action has prescribed
b. Accretions on the bank of a lake belong to the owners of the estate to which they have been added
c. Open and continuous possession of the land by the respondent

ISSUE:

Whether or not private parties may own the disputed lots?

HELD:

No. The lots in question are public in nature and are outside the commerce of man. They cannot be
acquired by prescription nor does possession of it will divest it of its public character. And although
accretion on the bank of a lake belong to the owners of the estate to which they have been added, there
is no accretion to speak of in this case because the increase in the area of the land is due to the occupants
who filled up the lots with shells and sand to make it habitable and compatible to their duck-raising
livelihood.

CINDY B. CAYANAN PROPERTY – A ATTY. JANNET REGALADO

Thursday 6pm-9pm
(8) Mendoza vs Navarette

FACTS:

1. When the father of both the petitioner and respondent died, he left them a parcel of land which was
partitioned as follows:
1/4 to Eugenia Aquino (2nd wife of their father)
3/4 to Domingo Mendoza (petitioner)
0 to Maria Mendoza – Navarette (respondent) because she fully renounced and
waived her share
2. However, before Eugenia Aquino died, she sold her share to Maria Navarette.
3. It was later discovered that the respondent applied an application for Free Patent and caused the whole
lot to be titled in the name of ‘Leoncio Navarette married to Maria Mendoza.’
4. Petitioner moved for the nullification of the titles on the basis that the registered owners are not the real
owners of the land and that petitioner has been in the open, public, adverse and exclusive possession, in
the concept of an owner, of the ¾ portion thereof.
5. Respondent’s defense:
a. Action is barred by prescription for being filed more than 10 years after the application for Free
Patent and registration.
6. Trial court ruled that prescription does not run against co-owners in a co-ownership, thus, judged in favor
of petitioner and denied the respondent’s motion to dismiss on the same ground.
7. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the trial court and ruled that action for nullification on the
ground of prescription should have been brought 4 years from the issuance of the title.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the title of the respondent which was based on a Free Patent upon the land is valid?

HELD:

No. The trial court is correct for ruling in favor of the petitioner but on the wrong grounds because
whatever co-ownership existed between the parties was terminated when they executed the deed of
extrajudicial settlement.

The title is void because it was based on a Free Patent which, if issued over a private land, is null and void.
A homestead patent, once registered under the Registration Act becomes indefeasible as a Torrens title
only if the land patented, after requirements of the law had been complied with, was a part of public
domain. If it was a private land, the patent granted and the Torrens title issued upon the patent are null
and void.

CINDY B. CAYANAN PROPERTY – A ATTY. JANNET REGALADO

Thursday 6pm-9pm
(9) Martinez vs Court of Appeals

FACTS:

1. Petitioner are the registered owner of the disputed parcel of land.

2. Respondent in his official capacity has ordered the removal of the dikes built therein by the petitioners
contending that the land used to be a stream, therefore public domain.
3. Petitioner relies on the indefeasibility of a Torens title of certificate.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a Torrens certificate of title gives the petitioner ownership over a public domain.

HELD:

No. The Land Registration Court has no jurisdiction over non-registerable properties, such as the disputed
property which forms part of the public domain, thus it cannot validly adjudge the registration of title in
favor of a private party. It is useless for the appellant now to allege that she has obtained certificate of
title their favor because the said certificate does not confer upon them any right to the stream in
question, inasmuch as the said stream, being of the public domain is outside the commerce of men and,
therefore not subject to appropriation.

CINDY B. CAYANAN PROPERTY – A ATTY. JANNET REGALADO

Thursday 6pm-9pm
(10) MIAA vs CA

FACTS:

1. In March 1997, the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) issued Opinion No. 061 to the
effect that the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC) withdrew the exemption from real estate tax
granted to MIAA under Section 21 of its Charter. 
2. Hence, the City of Parañaque imposed real estate tax upon MIAA and published the auctioning for public
sale the airport lands and buildings.

ISSUE:

Whether or not airport lands and buildings of MIAA may be alienated in a public auction.

HELD:

No. The Republic remains the beneficial owner of the properties. MIAA itself is owned solely by the
Republic. At any time, the President can transfer back to the Republic title to the airport lands and
buildings without the Republic paying MIAA any consideration. As long as the airport lands and buildings
are reserved for public use, their ownership remains with the State. Unless the President issues a
proclamation withdrawing these properties from public use, they remain properties of public dominion.

In a nutshell, the Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are properties devoted to public use and thus are
properties of public dominion. As such, they are inalienable, hence, they are not subject to levy on
execution or foreclosure sale, and they are exempt from real estate tax.

CINDY B. CAYANAN PROPERTY – A ATTY. JANNET REGALADO

Thursday 6pm-9pm
(11) Republic vs. Court of Appeals

FACTS:

1. Enrique Cosalan, private respondent, applied for the registration of a parcel of land which has been in his
and his predecessor-in-interest’s possession since time immemorial. This was evidenced by the
Application for Free Patent filed by his mother who claimed to have been in possession of the property for
25 years prior to her application and that she inherited the land from her father who had been in
possession of the same for 60 years.
2. However, his mother’s application for Free Patent was declined not for lack of merit but because Section
45(b) of the Public Land Act No. 2874 requires judicial proceedings for the perfection of her title.
3. The present application of Enrique Cosalan is now being opposed by the Republic on the ground that the
said land is forest land or forest reserve and is not capable of appropriation regardless of how long it may
have been possessed by the private party unless such land is reclassified and considered disposable and
alienable.
4. Trial Court granted registration and was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, hence, the appeal to the
Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not forest lands can be appropriated by private ownership?

HELD:

Yes. Despite the general rule that forest lands cannot be appropriated by private ownership, it has been
previously held that while the Government has the right to classify portions of public land, the primary
right of a private individual who possessed and cultivated the land in good faith much prior to such
classification must be recognized and should not be prejudiced by after-events which could not have been
anticipated. Government may, by reservation, decide for itself what portions of public land shall be
considered forestry land, unless private interests have intervened before such reservation is made.

In a nutshell, because the land is possessed by the applicant and his predecessor-in-interest since time
immemorial, the land is presumed to never have been part of the public domain or that it had been a
private property even before the Spanish conquest.

CINDY B. CAYANAN PROPERTY – A ATTY. JANNET REGALADO

Thursday 6pm-9pm
(12) Philippine National Bank vs. Court of Appeals

FACTS:

1. Even before 1972, private respondent Nildefonso Montano was already the tenant of the land covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-117562.
2. The owner of the land from whom he leased it sold the property to Crisanto dela Cruz and Pepita
Montano.
3. In 1978, the new owners mortgaged the property to PNB.
4. On October 12, 1984, PNB extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage and was the only bidder at the public
auction sale. Thus, on the same day, a Certificate of Sale over said lots was issued in favor of PNB.
5. Because the property was not redeemed within one year, PNB became the absolute owner of the same
and was granted a writ of possession.
6. Nildefonso Montano moved to dissolve the writ on the ground that the bank was made aware of the
claim of the tenant against the land owner and that the issuance of said Writ in PNB’s favor would work
grave injustice to him and violate his rights under P.D. 27, P.D. 36, P.D. 583, and other laws and legal
issuances on land reform
7. Trial Court granted the tenant’s motion and this was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Hence, PNB
appealed to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not PNB’s title to the land entitles him to a Writ of Possession.

HELD:

No. Although the subject property has been consolidated or confirmed in its favor, it is still not entitled to
a writ of possession, as the same may be issued in extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage only if
the debtor is in possession and no third person had intervened. Such requisite is evidently lacking in the
case at bar, as it has been established that private respondent Montano has been in possession and finally
adjudged as the tenant on the landholding in question. 

Under Art. 428 of the Civil Code, the owner has the right to dispose of a thing but this is subject to
limitations established by law. Furthermore, leasehold relation is not extinguished by the alienation or
transfer of legal possession of the landholding. Hence, PNB was only substituted to and acquired the
right, title, interest and claim of the mortgagor to the property as of the time of the levy. In this case, the
only remaining right of the mortgagors is the right to be paid a reasonable price for the land they owned
as mandated by P.D. 27. That is the only right which petitioner PNB acquired as the new absolute owner
of the land.

CINDY B. CAYANAN PROPERTY – A ATTY. JANNET REGALADO

Thursday 6pm-9pm
CINDY B. CAYANAN PROPERTY – A ATTY. JANNET REGALADO
Thursday 6pm-9pm