Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Table of Contents
Preface ..............................................................................................................................................4
I. The Beast Within ..........................................................................................................................6
Objectives ..................................................................................................................................... 6
Introduction.................................................................................................................................. 6
How Primitive Are Our Brains? .................................................................................................... 7
War among Humankind’s Ancestors .......................................................................................... 9
Differences in Aggression between Males and Females ............................................................. 11
The Mental Mechanics of Aggression ....................................................................................... 14
Limits on the Beast...................................................................................................................... 16
Put Down the Marshmallow or You May Kill Again ................................................................ 16
The Innate Capacity for Peace.................................................................................................. 18
Conclusion .................................................................................................................................. 19
II. Taking Sides ...............................................................................................................................20
Objectives ................................................................................................................................... 20
Introduction................................................................................................................................ 20
“Minor differences” ..................................................................................................................... 21
Shibboleths: From the Old Testament to No Smoking ............................................................ 21
Identification Mechanism ........................................................................................................ 22
Who I Am Is Not You ................................................................................................................ 26
Group Formation Through Conflict ........................................................................................ 26
Enemies and Scapegoats ........................................................................................................... 27
The Stanford Prison Experiment .............................................................................................. 27
Collective Psychology ............................................................................................................... 29
The Purpose-Driven Strife .......................................................................................................... 30
Family at Arms ......................................................................................................................... 31
Euphoria and War Addiction ................................................................................................... 32
The Simple Life........................................................................................................................ 34
War as Fantasy ......................................................................................................................... 36
“If I look at the mass I will never act.” ......................................................................................... 38
Conclusion .................................................................................................................................. 40
III. A Soldier’s Story ........................................................................................................................42
Objectives ................................................................................................................................... 42
Introduction................................................................................................................................ 42
A Soldier’s Conscience ................................................................................................................ 43
Non-Firers Throughout History .............................................................................................. 44
Civil War Muskets ................................................................................................................... 44
A Soldier’s Fear ........................................................................................................................... 45
The War Inside: Psychiatric Casualties ..................................................................................... 47
The Weight of It ...................................................................................................................... 48
A Soldier’s Distance .................................................................................................................... 49
PSYCHOLOGY OF WAR RESOURCE | 3
by edited by
Jon Kern Daniel Berdichevsky
Columbia School of the Arts ‘07 Harvard University M.P.P. ‘05
University of Chicago ’98-‘02 Stanford University M.A. & B.A. ‘02
Dedicated to those who lives have been touched by war and to those who live only in memory.
DemiDec and The World Scholar’s Cup are registered trademarks of the DemiDec Corporation.
PSYCHOLOGY OF WAR RESOURCE | 4
Preface
“War! Good God, y’all. What is it good for?” In 1969,
soul singer Edwin Starr wailed those words to a world very
much in conflict. Mr. Starr’s own reply: “Absolutely
nothing! (Say it again now.)” Criticism of war is almost
universal; even the highest-ranking military commanders
acknowledge it to be a “last option.” If nobody likes wars, why do we keep fighting
them?
If you look at human history, you will notice war is all the rage. Wars have been fought on every
continent and in every century—and we have the written records of events to prove it. In 1976,
anthropologist Ashley Montagu detailed evidence of 14,500 wars over the last 5,600 years. That’s 2.6
wars per year. Corroborating Montagu’s research, Charles Burke stated in his 1975 book, Aggression
in Man, that there have been only 268 years of peace during the last 3,400 years of civilization.
Among the oldest professions in the world, then, is soldier.1
War is found on bookshelves as well as battlefields. It is at the center of Western civilization’s first
great work of literature, Homer’s The Iliad, written sometime between the 9th and 7th centuries
B.C.E. In the 6th century B.C.E., Chinese general Sun Tzu wrote The Art of War, a thirteen chapter
tome on warfare that army officers and business school graduates still cite today.2
The frequency and popularity of war have led people to wonder if it is inevitable. In his novel Blood
Meridian, Cormac McCarthy answers yes: “War was always here. Before man was, war waited for
him. The ultimate trade awaiting its ultimate practitioner.”i It is man’s destiny, he says, to wage war.
Some scholars believe humanity has a “propensity for warfare.”ii For them, war grows out of
something deep within human nature. Perhaps some gene in our DNA drives us to fight, inflaming
disagreements and mobilizing people to unite and inflict aggression on one another.
The problem with human nature is that you cannot see it. You can
observe and compare human behavior, but can only make guesses
or craft theories about whether war is actually natural. What may
seem natural to one person might feel artificial to another.
1
Think Saving Private Ooogg.
2
Sadly, no artist has written The War of Art, a how-to guide that teaches self-defense using brushstrokes.
PSYCHOLOGY OF WAR RESOURCE | 5
Over the next several chapters, we will consider the human species as well as human individuals.
Observing humanity as a whole will help us understand the factors that make violent conflict so
common and widespread. Examining individuals will show us what it takes to become a soldier and
what toll warfare takes on the individual.
More than some other fields, psychology engages in a constant dialogue with other disciplines. This
resource borrows from anthropology, sociology, zoology, neuroscience, and genetics—all informing
us, in their own ways, why we fight and what enables us to endure war.
The psychology of war tells us, in part, what it means to be human. No other animal on the planet
has invented positive things like the internet, subsistence farming, or the vibrating massage chair.3
Yet for all the progress humanity has made, we still find ourselves facing off in military conflict. We
still perpetrate barbaric acts such as genocides and mass murders.
Why have we been unable to escape war despite our material advancement and the collective wisdom
of our history and cultures? This is a troubling question for those who expect progress to lead to
peace.
War often divides the world not only into factions but into a black-and-white mentality. We take
sides, and we shout at each other from across the divide, refusing to acknowledge the many shades of
gray that lie between “us” and “the enemy.” The truth is that war is complex. War’s many roles:
participant, spectator, survivor, and victim, among others, reveal aspects of the human character that
will likely both thrill and horrify you.
War may or may not be good for absolutely nothing, but studying its psychology is certainly good
for at least one thing: to help you understand why war happens in the first place—and what it does
to the warriors.
Jon Kern
3
It is possible some dolphin invented a massage chair that fell to the bottom of the ocean.
PSYCHOLOGY OF WAR RESOURCE | 6
Sometimes people snap. Usually, the situation is not as public, nor the timing as crucial, as it was
with Zidane. Judging by television outbursts alone, though, it is not terribly unusual.
We commonly say of people under these circumstances, “he lost control.” This statement implies
that we need to control ourselves most of the time—that some beast thunders inside us, rattling the
cage of our better judgment. If we aren’t careful, if we don’t keep control, the beast runs loose.
Is a person simultaneously a walking zoo animal and a zookeeper? Read on to learn what experts say.
Objectives
By the time you complete this chapter, you should be able to answer the following questions.
Introduction
Life is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.” No, that is not Professor Snape; it is the audacious
pessimism of 17th century philosopher Thomas Hobbes. In his classic work, Leviathan, Hobbes
proposed that human beings are not inherently good, that we live in conditions of constant conflict,
and that only a strong central authority that rules using fear and power can keep society civil.
Hobbes might seem extraordinarily negative, but he did live through a time of tremendous violence
and upheaval. Before Leviathan came out, Hobbes witnessed two civil wars in England, the execution
of King Charles I, and a period of dictatorship under military leader Oliver Crowell.5 England had
become a country where Catholics fought Protestants. In turn, Protestants were pitted against each
other. Those who wanted to become more like Catholics fought those who wanted to distance
4
The only butting we’ve had at the World Scholar’s Cup involved a rogue umbrella.
5
Nothing helps create a cynic like really bad government.
PSYCHOLOGY OF WAR RESOURCE | 7
themselves further from the Catholic Church. Strict Protestants picked fights with others who didn’t
dress plainly enough. So when Hobbes described human existence as “the war of every man against
every man,” he was speaking from firsthand experience.
The French social philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau is often presented in contrast to Hobbes.
Rousseau theorized that “natural man” was a different creature than the people of his own place and
time.6 He felt human beings, without the conditions of developed society, would not have the urge
for murder and violence. He believed in the idea of the “noble savage”—asserting that “primitive”
people who lived off the land would care less about property and have fewer reasons to fight. 7
If Rousseau is right, and hostility a function of social conditions, then 19th-century Prussian military
theorist Carl von Clausewitz may have been right when he called war “a continuation of policy by
other means.”iii Perhaps war is just a negotiating tactic, one of many rational options for resolving
conflicts. But if Hobbes is correct, and the drive to war is an innate human quality, then Clausewitz
will have to eat his hat. We would not be able to consider war “a continuation of policy.” We would
have to call it the activation of a violent mindset that is ordinarily kept dormant.
So, from 17th-century England, 18th-century France, and 19th-century Prussia, we take you, naturally,
to 21st-century Africa—to meet the chimpanzee.
6
That is, 18th-century France. He died in 1778, just a decade before … [ominous horror movie music] …
7
Today, “savage” and “primitive” are offensive words, but Rousseau meant “noble savage” as a compliment.
PSYCHOLOGY OF WAR RESOURCE | 8
The carnage was over quickly. Afterwards, the raiding party of eight chimpanzees raced back to their
territory. Left behind was a beaten and broken chimp named Godi. He was never seen again.
We have just traveled back to 1974, when researchers witnessed the first ever recorded chimpanzee
murder.8 Before then, the common notion was that chimpanzees operated like Rousseau’s noble
savage. They lived in peaceful groups, caring for their young, with only a few struggles over food. To
pass the time, they would serenely groom each other in the shadows of the forest canopy.
So it was assumed—until a primatologist working with renowned zoologist Jane Goodall observed
the gang attack on Godi. Goodall was the first zoologist to study chimpanzees in their natural
habitat, starting in 1960 in the Gombe area of Tanzania. For 14 years, no one on her research team
observed any sign of chimps killing each other.9
After that day in 1974, Goodall and her team were left wondering: why would a group of chimps kill
another chimp? One team member, Dr. Richard Wrangham, recounted their observations in a book
he co-authored, Demonic Males: Apes and the Origins of Human Violence. Wrangham described how
the chimp gang systematically attacked individual males from their rival group. By1977, all the rival
males were murdered. The violent chimp gang had won.
So much for the noble chimpanzee. The gang members were not only violent, but they also were not
trying to win any sort of resource for their tribe. What they sought, and won, was status. They
proved their dominance in that area of the Gombe. With the rival males gone and the rival females
assimilated into their own tribe, they were now the sole chimp superpower.
Few animals are known to kill members of their own species for status, although many animals fight
for status within their own groups. Rams smash their horns together, giraffes swing their necks like
whips, and dogs bark and tug at the leash in your hand when they see another dog. Few animals,
though, use lethal force when battling for status. Usually, status fights have built-in safety measures,
courtesy of evolution. Giraffes, for example, have extra hard heads formed by calcium deposits.
Chimpanzees lack an inborn physical defense against attacks from rival tribes. They are helpless
against their rivals’ superior numbers and merciless, organized assaults. In this chimpanzee behavior,
8
While researchers have observed chimp murder, the first chimp murder mystery novel remains undiscovered.
9
These chimps must have been as silent and swift as ninjas.
10
With the exception, possibly, of sponges and sea cucumbers.
11
I used to hang bananas from my ceiling. It made for convenient snacking. – Daniel
12
The Chimp’s Guide to Women is a pretty worthless book.
PSYCHOLOGY OF WAR RESOURCE | 9
an example of same-species killing, Wrangham and Peterson saw a similarity to certain human
behaviors, from street gangs and mob hits to massacres, genocide, and war.
Now chew on this: genetically, we are more closely related to chimps than chimps are to gorillas.
That is part of why primatologists like Wrangham view chimpanzee behavior as a living look into the
origins of human behavior. We and chimps might have inherited our capacity for violence from our
most recent common ancestor.
The discovery of chimp murders shocked the primatologist community. It suggested the kinds of
behavior we associate with crimes, atrocities, and war have roots in evolution. If early humans were
like chimps, then society did not create war as Rousseau believed. Rather, war lived within us long
before we built complex societies. Score one for Hobbes.
Humans between 50,000 and 10,000 years ago were hunter-gatherers; they hunted and gathered
food.14 They had no farms or supermarkets to visit. Recent data suggests humans gathered more than
they hunted, mainly because gathering was safer and produced a higher yield of edible treats.15
According to archeological records, civilization did not take shape until 6,000 years ago, around the
same time humans began living in larger social groups. They built homes and grew food on farms,
watched over livestock, fashioned themselves clothing, and wrote things down. Early societies were
led by a single authority such as a chief, a king, or a council of elders. They were a part of the period
of human development known as the Neolithic Revolution, between 12,000 to 4,000 years ago.
Time for a speedy calculation: human society (loosely) as we know it has existed for only about 12%
of human history. Cave villages and rudimentary tools were around earlier, but the organized sort of
society we would recognize as civilization is just a baby, only six thousand years of age. Something
else existed six thousand years ago, too: violence.
There is clear evidence of warfare and other conflict during the rise of civilization. Australian
Aboriginal rock art dating back 6,000 years depicts figures in large groups, as many as 111, 16 hurling
spears and shooting arrows at each other. Evidence of warfare also exists in the fossil record.
13
a.k.a. the extreme beta version of humanity
14
Hunting and gathering can be surprisingly effective in my backpack.
15
Mmm, roots and bugs.
16
What a pleasantly specific number.
PSYCHOLOGY OF WAR RESOURCE | 10
Skeletons have been found with wounds only weapons can make. Some even have arrow tips still
lodged inside their bones.
Mass graves have been found in Germany and southern France. The grave at Talheim, Germany
predates the ‘official’ start of civilization: it is 7,000 years old. Inside lie the remains of 18 adults and
16 children, their skulls bearing marks and wounds from six different axes. A 4,000 year old mass
grave in Roaix, France, holds more than 100 bodies. The remains show evidence of arrow wounds.
These are the vicious attacks of Neolithic farming societies.
The evidence of warfare among older hunter-gatherers is far slimmer. No mass graves from that
period have been uncovered. Rock art older than 10,000 years rarely features human figures, let
alone figures engaged in combat. Still, archaeology scholar Lawrence H. Keeley claims prehistoric
hunter-gathers were also warriors. In his book, War Before Civilization: The Myth of the Peaceful
Savage, he cites evidence of hunter-gatherer tribes going on attack raids to steal food and supplies.
Keeley also points to pre-Neolithic skeletons that show signs of violent death. Whether or not
organized warfare existed among hunter-gatherers, he says, killing and ritual murder are in evidence.
Keeley and Fry have more in common than either party recognizes. 18 As Fry points out, the raiding
and ritual murder that Keeley cites is not equivalent to warfare. It is not organized aggression
sustained for a long period of time, and there is no evidence of returned violence. Hunter-gatherer
raids seem similar to the chimpanzee gang attacks, except that they are focused on gaining specific
resources, not merely eliminating competitors.
Keeley wins a point, too. While Fry says there is no direct proof of war among ancient hunter-
gatherers, he concedes humanity has a violent legacy. Even in his examples of “peaceful” tribes, he
describes murder, revenge killings, executions, and feuds. The bloodshed never rises to actual
warfare: the systematic clash of soldiers. But, systematic or not, these examples do prove that our
early ancestors did not fit the model of Rousseau’s noble savage.
The lack of warfare among hunter-gatherers is likely due to their “high degree of personal
autonomy.” iv They were social, but independent; they may have fought each other as individuals, but
probably not in large groups. Hunter-gatherer societies were largely unstructured with individuals
17
In that case, thanks for the wars, Hobbes.
18
For example, both Keeley and Fry mention Australian Aborigines; Keeley talks about how violent they are, while Fry
describes how they successfully avoid war through “judicial fights, duels, and the punishment or execution of
wrongdoers.” These are two professors who see the same shade of blue as two different colors.
PSYCHOLOGY OF WAR RESOURCE | 11
widely dispersed. Lacking social organization, they were unlikely to organize themselves for the
purpose of war. Hunter-gatherers were also nomads, meaning that they were geographically quite
mobile. When conflict arose, they could simply move, reducing their motivation to fight.
The reasons we engage in warfare go beyond individual psychology; they are a function of group
dynamics. Still, it takes certain aspects of our psychology and personalities to make us want to fight
in the first place.19 Whether we are warmongers or peacemakers, we want to know: what is the
human potential for violence, how does it get activated, and how we can manage it?
The United States Department of Justice also found the rate of female offender homicides remained
fairly stable in the thirty year period. This implies there may be biological or societal factors at work,
which prevent women from acting as violently as men, regardless of the overall violent crime rate.
There are also significant differences in the way women go about committing murder. In the United
States Department of Justice report, women who committed murder were more likely to kill
someone they knew than a stranger. They were unlikely to be involved in gang violence. Women
were also more likely than men to use covert weapons such as poison, rather than a blade. These data
points suggest that women’s patterns of violent behavior are quite different from those typical of
19
Case in point: you cannot make a bunch of sea cucumbers wage war.
20
Please note the word “stereotypically”; many women like sports, enjoy war movies, and can throw a mean punch.
21
On behalf of all men, I sincerely apologize. We can get dumb.
22
Not the study of geographic coordinates, as it may sound, but rather a study in which researchers observe a group of
individuals over a long period of time.
PSYCHOLOGY OF WAR RESOURCE | 12
warfare. Wars involve organized groups employing overtly violent weapons against strangers. Based
on this data, we may conjecture that women are less prone to waging war than men.
Not all our primate relatives are violent. The bonobo is a type
of primate that closely resembles a chimpanzee.24 In fact,
researchers did not even identify bonobos until the 20th
century, having assumed, based on the primates’ appearance,
that they were just smaller chimpanzees.
Primatologists do not know exactly why bonobos are less aggressive than chimpanzees. However,
evidence shows that, in bonobo social groups, males and females are codominant—they share power.
Male chimpanzees are always in charge, asserting power and hoarding resources through intimidation
23
According to one researcher, objections to having women on the front lines sometimes come from male soldiers—and
not always for the reasons you might think. It seems male soldiers can exhibit extreme aggressive behavior after seeing a
female comrade wounded, and some are concerned that their instinct to protect female colleagues might distract them
from the mission at hand.
24
Their name is very fun to say, and hard to say five times fast.
25
You can hear bonobo calls on YouTube. Search for “The Human Bonobo Project” and click on the first link.
PSYCHOLOGY OF WAR RESOURCE | 13
and threats. In bonobo communities, the highest ranking females have equal power to the highest
ranking males. A low status male respects a high status female.
Actually, female bonobos may have more power than their male counterparts. Female bonobos are
responsible for settling conflicts between groups. One female representative from each party will
greet the other through displays of affection and resolve the dispute. Additionally, the status of male
bonobos relies at least partially on the strength of his alliances with females. A male is more likely to
have power if his mother is alive, because she can organize other females to support him. By forming
peaceful social networks, female bonobos diffuse tension between groups—and their ability to work
together is more important than any individual power a male bonobo might possess.
Female hyenas hunt for food, and they also scavenge the remains
of dying or dead animals. Young hyenas (kids) drink their
mother’s milk, which means mother hyenas must hunt and eat
more to produce enough milk. This means keeping up their
strength in order to hunt and scavenge. Female hyenas are famous
for having very masculine appearances. Even the ancient Greeks
noted hyena males and females look more similar than the males
and females of other species. Animal biologists believe this
physical similarity results from high levels of testosterone in
female hyenas. Testosterone is a hormone, a chemical produced The U.S. Marines (a.k.a. the Jarhead Clan)
by the body, usually found in greater quantities in males. have made a concerted effort to recruit
female warriors.
26
Aren’t you glad you are not a hyena?
PSYCHOLOGY OF WAR RESOURCE | 14
When the limbic system receives a stimulus it sees as a threat, it signals the rest of the brain and body
to react. Whether that reaction is aggressive depends on the particulars of our unique limbic system.
Aggression that is premeditated (planned) also calls on other parts of the brain that control rational
behavior. Our brain, then, reacts differently to an unexpected threat than to an expected one.
Different parts of the limbic system are at work.
27
Remember nature and nurture? They tend to get in the way of nice, easy psychological conclusions.
PSYCHOLOGY OF WAR RESOURCE | 15
People’s moods also depend in part on chemicals called neurotransmitters. Siegel found that two
particular neurotransmitters, dopamine and norepinephrine, increase our potential for aggression.29
Both occur naturally in our brains, but foreign substances can also make us act more or less
aggressive. For instance, high levels of opioid drugs, such as certain painkillers, inhibit aggression.
When the brain receives the impulse for aggression, two things proceed: that aggressive impulse is
expressed within the brain, telling us we are feeling aggressive, and then we decide whether or not we
are going to act. Unlike Siegel and Victoroff’s cats, humans do not always respond impulsively to an
aggressive impulse. One cannot simply press a button and make a person lose his temper.
Evidence from Holland and South Africa suggests testosterone may make people more sensitive to
aggressive impulses. Men and women given extra testosterone were more likely to perceive facial
expressions as angry. They were more likely to see other people as aggressive—whether or not they
actually are.30 It seems testosterone creates interference between the thinking and feeling parts of the
brain, making it harder to act rationally in an emotional situation.
When researchers increased the testosterone levels of a group of healthy young women to male levels,
the women had trouble recognizing others’ emotions, including fear, disgust, and especially anger.
28
Some would say that the American invasion of Iraq after 9-11 was an example of defensive aggression.
29
They are also necessary to produce the feeling of love.
30
You are also more likely to go bald.
PSYCHOLOGY OF WAR RESOURCE | 16
Together, these findings suggest that testosterone elevate a person’s perceptions of a threat while
lowering his or her ability to make accurate judgments about the nature of that threat. Even if the
threat is real—like someone approaching us with an angry face—testosterone may prevent us from
correctly assessing the degree of anger or recognizing if the person has gone from angry to scared.
If people with higher testosterone levels are more likely to perceive threats, one would think we could
also prove them more likely to engage in conflict. However, it is not so easy to prove this cause-and-
effect scenario in humans, most likely because there are other body chemicals working along with
testosterone. For example, experiments that have shown testosterone to be a direct cause of aggressive
behavior have required a second condition: a lack of the chemical cortisol.
Cortisol is a hormone the body produces under conditions of stress or anxiety.31 It helps the body
cope with adverse conditions. Mix high testosterone with low cortisol levels, and you have a recipe
for violent outbursts. A study of boys in a delinquency program found boys were more likely to act
aggressively if their testosterone were increased—but only if they had low cortisol levels. If a boy had
higher cortisol levels, the increased testosterone did not make him more likely to behave violently.
Therefore, it seems cortisol is able to diminish the effects of testosterone.32 When cortisol is present
in medium to high levels, extra testosterone does not produce extra aggression. When cortisol is
lacking, extra testosterone increases aggressive behavior. We can extend this conclusion to mean that,
among people with high testosterone levels, those whose bodies have a lower-than-usual response to
stress—producing less cortisol—may be likelier to act violently. If their bodies are not responding
normally to stressful situations, they might also be more fearless or reckless than their peers. This
could make them more likely to start or continue a fight when others would back off.
The blueprint for our bodies, including our limbic system, neurotransmitters, and hormones, is
found in our DNA. Therefore, how we respond to emotions has roots in our genetic code. Genes we
inherit from our parents can affect how we feel and behave. One of the most notable genetic findings
related to aggression involves a gene that leads to the production of the brain enzyme monoamine
oxidase A (MAOA). High levels of MAOA have been found to reduce aggressive behavior.
The interaction between social, chemical, and genetic factors makes it difficult to assign
responsibility for violent behavior to any one of them. Frustrating as this complexity may be, there is
also a wonderful fact at its center. Because there are few absolutes where human behavior is
concerned, practically every person has a chance to redeem himself from the negative effects his
genes, body chemistry, and social circumstances might create.
31
If you find yourself freaking out before an exam, your body is probably busy producing high levels of cortisol.
32
Like dumping water on a fire. Sssssss.
PSYCHOLOGY OF WAR RESOURCE | 17
this researcher proceeded to leave the room—and left you alone with a plate stacked high with more
marshmallows than your stomach could hold?33
Researchers have actually conducted such an experiment, beginning at Stanford University in the
1960s. Developed by psychology professor Walter Mischel, it tests willpower and, specifically, how
well a person can delay gratification. It turns out many people cannot control themselves for long.
Many subjects chose to eat the single marshmallow immediately, or would simply begin devouring
the entire pile. It is hard to blame them, though. The test subjects were only four years old.
In the following years, Mischel found that the children who could delay impulse gratification at four
grew up to score better on tests, get better jobs, and have fewer problems with drugs and crime. The
study proved willpower can have a great impact on our ability to thrive in society. Everyone has
aggressive or harmful impulses at times, but it is largely to our advantage to control them.
When children who do not learn patience grow up, they are more likely to do or take what they want
through violent means. There is an indirect linkage between candy consumption and violence.
Candy does not cause aggression, but children allowed to eat candy seem to have less willpower—
that is, to lack self-control—as adults.
The willpower you have at age four may predict your success in life, but willpower can also be
learned. You can train yourself to improve your ability to delay gratification.34 The key to self-control
is being able to focus your attention strategically—to adjust how you frame, or perceive, an object,
situation, or environment. Mischel coached some of his subjects on willpower—for example, by
having them imagine the marshmallows were something less appealing. By framing the
marshmallows that way, the subjects could sometimes prevent themselves from indulging in them.
In later studies, Mischel proved that context affected aggression. In the early 1990s, he examined a
number of different social situations at an American summer camp. He found that campers were
selectively aggressive. A camper who would lash out at his counselors would not necessarily attack his
roommates. One who picked on fellow campers might be respectful to his counselors.
Mischel found that aggression follows if-then patterns. There does not seem to be one recipe for
aggressive behavior; where, when, and how a person expresses aggression depends on his unique
psychology and context. If Daniel has a problem with authority, he will be aggressive to his
counselors. But if his parents are visiting him at camp, then he may not act aggressive in front of
them. If Rita wants to build up her self-confidence, then she will pick on other kids. But if there are
counselors present, then she might not do so. We can surmise from Mischel’s findings that, in a
battle, a person’s aggressiveness would likely increase significantly.
33
Jackpot!
34
Supplies: table, plate, marshmallows, and assistant with stun gun. Do not try this at home.
PSYCHOLOGY OF WAR RESOURCE | 18
Many of us live in societies where the violent aspect of human nature tends to receive more attention
than the peaceful aspect. Perhaps this is because stories about conflict and struggle are more exciting.
There are many war movies, but few peace movies. According to Fry, whom we discussed in the
section on warfare in early humans, cultural beliefs bias how we perceive ourselves. If we believe
humans are naturally warlike, we are more likely to perceive ourselves as aggressive—whether or not
we truly are.35 We can only conjecture about the effects of such perceptions on our actions, but it is
possible believing humans are warlike becomes a self-fulfilling prophesy; believing we are designed
for war, we end up starting wars.
Fry disagrees with Keeley on the origins of war, but they agree on a fundamental point: the majority
of human experience is peaceful and cooperative.36 Most of the time, we behave civilly. We have
dinner with our families. We do our chores and go to school or work. Yet war seems to rule on the
grand scale of recorded history; wars have been fought on every continent in nearly every year of
recorded time. Though periods of peace receive less space in history books, they tend to occur more
frequently, and in more places, at any given minute of any given day.
Aggression is likely inherent to human beings, as it is to other animals. Our brains are designed to
experience aggressive impulses, and to send those impulses to other parts of our bodies. After all,
aggression is useful; it allows us to defend and assert ourselves. Even Fry, who makes the case for
peace, admits “certain types of aggression and associated behaviors, but not warfare, were favored by
natural selection.”viii Aggressive humans may have been better at hunting, and at intimidating others
in order to gain resources. Those behaviors would have helped aggressive humans survive and
reproduce, so it makes sense aggression would survive in the human population to the present day.
But humans also need cooperation in order to survive and thrive. Maintaining peaceful relations
within a family or community, and cultivating peaceful relationships with nearby communities,
keeps people safe and allows them to make progress. Thus, the elements of our psychology that
promote harmony can be considered just as natural as those that make us aggressive.
35
According to WNYC, in the 1980s only 1 in 3 people said war was inevitable. Today, the percentage is much higher.
Though not a scientific measure, these results do show that attitudes about human nature and war can and do change.
36
Peaceful and cooperative doesn’t mean serene or happy. Living in peacetime has stresses and annoyances all its own.
PSYCHOLOGY OF WAR RESOURCE | 19
Conclusion
Humans have been aggressive creatures since our early ancestors first roamed the Earth; this means
aggression is a natural impulse, but it can be controlled. No doubt, Zidane played soccer aggressively
every single game. Only once, however, did he attack another player. That head butt does not prove
that Zidane was an uncontrollably violent person; it was just a poor decision.
When governments decide to wage war, they are channeling the human capacity for aggression to
suit their agendas. They are not being impulsively violent, since war requires rational planning and
some level of public approval. In essence, we have as much capacity to be peaceful as to be aggressive.
Whether we choose to wage war or keep peace depends on the values and power structures in our
societies. If we value peace, we will structure our society around it. If our government perceives a
threat or an opportunity to gain through warfare, it may go to war. 37
Chimpanzees, humans’ closest living genetic relatives, exhibit male dominance and deadly
hostility. Bonobos, who are similar to chimpanzees, are more peaceful.
In nearly all societies, men are more likely to commit acts of crime or violence than women.
The first evidence of war-like aggression and killing between human beings dates to the
Neolithic period and the founding of the first towns and settled communities.
A region in the brain called the limbic system controls emotional responses like anger, fear,
and joy, and causes behavior by regulating brain chemicals called neurotransmitters.
Testosterone has been linked to aggressive behavior, especially combined with low cortisol.
Genetic factors can also influence a person’s chances of acting aggressively.
Though warfare is common in history, the majority of human experience has been peaceful.
37
The really confusing situations are when governments claim they are going to war in order to maintain peace.
PSYCHOLOGY OF WAR RESOURCE | 20
Objectives
By the time you complete this chapter, you should be able to answer the following questions.
Why do people form and join groups and defend those groups?
How does being a part of a group change the way an individual thinks?
Introduction
In the early 1990s, in the country now known as Bosnia and Herzegovina, near the Adriatic Sea in
Europe, group identity was a dangerous issue.ix In the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union,
Bosnia was in search of a new identity. The country to which Bosnia belonged, Yugoslavia, was
experiencing what we now call Balkanization: a violent breakup along ethnic lines.
The Croat ethnic group called for independence and self-rule. The Serb ethnic group aimed to join
with another part of Yugoslavia, Serbia, and create a larger country based on Serbian identity.
Bosniaks, a third, mostly Muslim ethnic group, supported the Croats.
As tensions mounted, each ethnic group tried to set itself apart from the others. Bosniaks began using
more Islamic expressions, while Serbs, according to one war reporter, began “dusting off words from
the fifteenth century,” reviving old vocabulary to make their speech more ethnic.x Where once there
was one language called Serbo-Croatian, now there were three: Bosnian, Serbian, and Croatian.
Between 1992 and 1995, these divisions erupted into the Bosnian War, centered in the capital city
of Sarajevo. Practically the entire city became a war zone, with battles occurring on the street, in
backyards, and along riverbanks. When it was over, over a hundred thousand people were dead and
1.8 million had lost their homes. 66% of those dead and wounded, including 83% of the civilian
victims, were Bosniaks, against whom the Serb armies were particularly prejudiced.
Soldiers were not the only ones wreaking violence on the region; many neighbors and friends became
enemies and killers overnight. The Bosnian War is one of the many ugly chapters in human history.
Ethnic tensions had led to ethnic war. Group identities had fractured a country and cost many lives.
38
I am sorry, I still say “soccer.” I can’t help it.
39
When the Clippers win a game, which is admittedly a rare event, I don’t say, “They won!” I say, “We won! – Daniel
PSYCHOLOGY OF WAR RESOURCE | 21
“Minor differences”
The 20th-century Austrian psychologist Sigmund Freud wondered why people who have much in
common often separate themselves into distinct groups. Freud called this tendency in human beings
the narcissism of minor difference.xi Recent findings suggest the greatest genetic difference between
two human beings is around 1%, meaning that in strict genetic terms, we are all alike—yet we are
drawn to distinguish ourselves from other people.
Freud saw the human tendency to exclude others as a safe way for us to express our desire for
conflict. The problem is that dislike for others can lead to harmful and even devastating conflicts,
such as the Bosnian War. The more intense the dislike, the more potential there is for warfare.
The narcissism of minor difference illustrates the two sides of warfare, one being cooperation
between members of a group and the other being aggression towards an excluded, disliked group.
War would never occur without the hatred of others, but neither would it occur without the
fellowship of soldiers.
As with the Bosnian Muslims who took to using more Islamic expressions or the Croats who dusted
off their 15th Century dictionaries, people use words to signal and reinforce their membership in a
group. This includes groups they already know they belong to.
As tensions rose prior to the Bosnian War, “the Serbs, Muslims, and Croats each began to distort
their own tongue to accommodate the myth of separateness.”xiii In the absence of difference, they
sought to create some through language. To emphasize their individual ethnic identities, these
groups created shibboleths for themselves.
40
For example, there may be more kinship among flutists than among all the members of an orchestra. You define
yourself as a flutist because that is the minor difference separating you from other rows, and, let’s face it, it would look
silly if you blew into a violin. Each member of the group in turn defines his membership this way. If one flutist would
look silly blowing into a violin, imagine the whole row.
41
Don’t try this on college applications, however, listing all the groups you don’t belong to.
42
Likely it’s an image of someone old pretending to be young.
PSYCHOLOGY OF WAR RESOURCE | 22
The Gileadite sentries had to figure out some way to determine who was one of them and who was
an enemy. While the Ephraimites spoke their same language, they did have an accent. They could
not pronounce the sh sound. So the guards at the river asked each person who came their way to
pronounce shibboleth, which in the Hebrew of the time meant the part of a plant containing grain. If
someone couldn’t pronounce the sh, he or she was slaughtered on the spot.
Identification Mechanism
Small actions and casual statements do much to establish our identities within groups. It may seem
absurd, and certainly it is terrifying, to think how you pronounce a word could cost you your life.
We use such indicators, however, on a daily basis.
Think of how you talk with your friends. Think of all the concepts, ideas, phrases, slang, topics,
gossip, and people you need to know to fit in. How strange would it be to meet someone who didn’t
know what the Internet was? What if your father couldn’t remember your brother’s name? Wouldn’t
you suspect something is wrong with him?
Our daily lives are composed of streams of information. From these streams, we fish out certain bits,
and from these bits of information, we can deduce much about who we are and who others are to us.
If you are a Los Angeles Clippers fan and you meet someone who also claims she is a Clippers fan,
you expect her to know who plays on the team. If you run into someone who is in the school play
with you, you expect to see him at rehearsal.
PSYCHOLOGY OF WAR RESOURCE | 23
At the same time, if you see someone at school whom you’ve never seen before, you might be
suspicious. If he’s young, perhaps he is a new student. But if he’s older and doesn’t seem to have a
reason to be there, you might come to more apprehensive conclusions.
This process of finding a reason for being there is a key aspect of human psychology. As in the film
High School Musical, we figure out what groups are around us (jocks, nerds, fashionistas, goths, etc.),
what groups we want to be a part of, and what groups we are a part of (this includes family). We also
notice who is different and who doesn’t fit. Depending on how included you are, you have different
feelings about the people in a group.43
Psychologists Paul Shaw and Yuma Wong call this process the identification mechanism. They assert
that this ability to identify with others who belong to the same group has an evolutionary benefit. It
was biologically formed over the thousands of years of human development to ensure we aid our
family’s survival, seek protection with friends, and recognize foreign threats. According to their
theory, your reaction to the suspicious stranger at school is in part directed by the deeper structures
of your brain. The same is true for your camaraderie with your Scholar’s Cup teammates.
Shaw and Wong use the example of xenophobia to explain how ordinary behavior is a manifestation
of rooted psychology. Studies of infants show their fear of strangers is “governed by built-in
preparedness.”xv Their level of fear increases when 1) the stranger stares, 2) the stranger moves
suddenly or comes closer, and 3) the interaction happens in an unfamiliar setting or context.44
These three stranger behaviors conform to how predators act in the wild. The implication is that our
innate fear of these behaviors is an evolutionary reaction to danger signs that a predator is near.
We can control these reactions, just like we can control whether we take a marshmallow when no
one is looking, but the underlying desires or emotional reactions still exist.
Looking at the table reproduced from Shaw and Wong’s book The Genetic Seeds of Warfare (on the
following page), you see the different factors acting on an individual’s psyche. How we think is
organized by the world itself—the options provided to us and the experiences available for us—and
how we perceive the world—how we react to those options and feel those experiences.
Like the infrastructure of a city shapes your understanding of it, there are mental infrastructures that
help shape your understanding of the world. The various mental infrastructures of life usually work
without you even noticing them. You travel down roads of choice, over familiar bridges connecting
one action to another, never thinking about the ideas and questions not even on your mental map.
Surface structures are the general pool of information that constantly surrounds us, from pop culture
like advertisements and song lyrics to the political and economic theories talked about in the news.
Societal infrastructure is how communities and groups are organized, from the different forms of
national government (democracy, dictatorship, etc.) to the different social groups at school.
Cognitive infrastructure refers to the sets of ideas people use to process information, from moral and
religious codes to assumptions and instinctive beliefs.
43
That’s why your parents can embarrass you, but your friends’ parents can make you laugh and embarrass your friends.
44
Doctors would be much less scary if they were treating you at home.
PSYCHOLOGY OF WAR RESOURCE | 24
Neural infrastructure is the design of the human brain, such as how the limbic system is designed to
make people experience emotion. While the basic neural structures are consistent from person to
person, genetics, conditioning, and life experiences can create differences in how these structures
work in different individuals.
That feeling of foreignness is stronger than just the mere awareness of difference. It comes in the
form of identifying with or not with, in deciding what is ‘us’ vs. ‘them,’ ‘I’ vs. ‘the other’.
Such feelings can have profound effects, as in the Bosnian War. How they come about, according to
Shaw and Wong, is a result of three mental processes: reification, heuristics, and emotions.
Reification is the process by which abstract, general concepts become concrete to us. Through
reification we are “capable of sorting vast quantities of unorganized, piecemeal perceptions and
stimuli into categories.”xvi We take our experiences of fellowship or commonality and elevate these
experiences and give them meaning. When we hear that someone is also a big fan of Star Wars, we
receive this as important information. We recognize in this fact a whole set of assumptions.
Reification can also help us transfer our feelings for an element of a group to the group as a whole
(e.g. I like Yao Ming so I’m a fan of the Houston Rockets) or our attachment to a place into
something symbolic of that place (e.g. I’m from China so I’m a Yao Ming fan).
Once gingerbread hearts45 have been reified, they no longer are just cookies. They are totems of your
heritage, symbols of your family. To fight for gingerbread hearts is to fight for your mother, father,
grandmother, sisters, brothers, and everything you hold dear.
45
My family baked lots of gingerbread hearts. Yours probably didn’t, because they don’t taste very good.
PSYCHOLOGY OF WAR RESOURCE | 25
Heuristics are “mental rules of thumb for valuation and decision making.”46 These rules can be
gained from experience or passed down from others. xvii Through heuristics we are able to place value
and make judgments about the concepts we reify and the shibboleths we hear. When we meet that
fellow Stars Wars fan, we know we can trust her to understand our Wookiee call.
Heuristics help “reduce uncertainty and ambiguity which the mind must otherwise confront.”xviii
They are generalizations that may not fit a given situation, but help us cope with a changing world.
Heuristics is perhaps a fancy way of saying assumptions. However, more than the average assumption,
a heuristic rule is an element of a person’s identity. These are the judgments that help you to decide
whom to trust, whom to hang out with, whom to love. On the opposite side, if your heuristics have
“attached negative meanings” to certain markers, “they help identify groups considered dangerous.”xix
Emotions have been implied in both our analysis of reification and of heuristics. How we feel—a
product of chemical reactions in our brains and bodies that occur fractions of a second before we
have time to think about our feelings—plays a crucial role in the decisions we make. Emotional
reactions “directly enhance the effectiveness of the identification mechanism by providing emotively
charged motivation for action.”xx
This does not mean emotions are solely impulse. They can become ingrained in our minds by the
very processes of reification and heuristics. In essence, these three work together, reinforcing a total
perception of the world and the individuals who inhabit it.
Shaw and Wong’s identification mechanism is critical to grasping how small disputes can symbolize
large conflicts and how persistent violence can be traced to individual stories. For wars to occur,
massive numbers of people must be made into singular forces opposing one another. A dispute
between one Serb and one Croat, or a family of Serbs and a family of Bosnian Muslims, can spin ever
wider until whole communities are changing their languages and joining up against their foes. The
psychological process of identification is how armies get and keep their soldiers on the front lines.
46
Heuristics can be stereotypes. Just because we use these “rules of thumb” doesn’t mean they’re accurate or appropriate.
47
Setting up a competition between girls and guys is much more effective, because these two communities already feel
different and separate.
PSYCHOLOGY OF WAR RESOURCE | 26
A large family boarded the subway near City Hall. Three generations, at least. Brothers and sisters
fighting for attention. An older couple smiled at their redheaded grandchildren. Any New Yorker
could tell these were tourists. They treated the subway poles like toys and stared at the maps.
The family overtook the car like hot wind when you crack the door to an air-conditioned room.
They flooded it with their own conversation. “Are we going the right way?” “We’re going to Times
Sq.” “I think so.” “See here…” “Let’s get off.” “This goes to 42nd St.” “Is this the red line?” “Oh,
Times Sq. is 42nd St.” “Everyone stay!”
At 34th St., the family exited, still yelling at each other. The normal New York quiet returned.
Relationships formed because of a common enemy are termed antagonistic cooperation.48 However,
they are difficult to maintain. The threat to group unity is victory. Once the common enemy is
defeated, the unifying bond that formed the group is lost.
48
When super-villains work together to defeat a mutual enemy, such as when the Sandman and Venom joined forces in
Spider-Man 3, you get a case of antagonist antagonistic cooperation
PSYCHOLOGY OF WAR RESOURCE | 27
In his classic novel 1984, George Orwell imagines a state, Oceania, which uses the constant threat of
war with its neighbors to unify its population and control its citizens. By keeping the country always
at war, the government maintains its power and can impose strict rules on its citizens.49
The philosopher George Sorel saw class warfare as a means to unify and mobilize the working class—
in his view, poor people could use rich people as their common enemy.
Groups in search of structure will also “search The Language of the Enemy
for enemies” to create unity and cohesion, as the
Labeling a person or a group “the enemy”
ethnic groups in Bosnia did after the collapse of can have a powerful effect. The word
the Soviet Union. Outside conflict or creates an immediate critical judgment. It is
competition may not even be originally present worth paying attention to how this word is
when the clamor for conflict begins. “All that is used around you. It may reveal emotions
necessary is for the members to perceive or to be and tensions you hadn’t noticed before.
made to perceive an outside threat in order to ‘pull themselves together,’” as Coser states.xxii
Freud viewed the phenomena of scapegoats a natural extension of the narcissism of minor difference.
He described how scapegoats “have rendered most useful services” by being the target of ill will.
Without scapegoats, members of a group might turn on one another.
When a sports team is doing badly, fans often focus on one player or on the coach as the scapegoat.
They call for the player to be traded or for the coach to be fired.
The presence of a scapegoat—and the seductiveness of finding one—attracts hostile behavior and
sentiment. What is acceptable behavior toward ‘the other’ differs from what is acceptable to ‘us.’
Once one has an enemy in sight, the conventional rules seem to melt away.
This can happen surprisingly easily. Thanks to one famous experiment, we can see how easily people
can go from antagonistic feelings to antagonistic actions.
49
Some critics accused the Bush Administration in the United States of using the vague War on Terror for its own
political benefit—for example, to help it win the 2004 Presidential Election.
50
The term comes from an ancient practice for the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur. The original scapegoat was an actual
goat, who was sacrificed in a ceremony to purge the sins of an entire village.
PSYCHOLOGY OF WAR RESOURCE | 28
Zimbardo wanted to see the effect being in prison had on people. Earlier that summer he had taught
a class on “The Psychology of Imprisonment.” For this purpose he devised the Stanford Prison
Experiment, or S.P.E., to see how normal, average folks would respond to the stress of being in
prison. He would take volunteer test subjects, randomly split half into guards and half into prisoners,
and put them in a fake prison built in the basement of Stanford’s Psychology Department.51
The research staff had put procedures in place to protect the prisoners. Guards were instructed to
inflict no pain and not act abusively or violently. At the same time, they were told to dominate and
dehumanize the prisoners. During a videotaped orientation, Zimbardo told the guards their job was
to take away the prisoners’ sense of individuality, to strip them of their sense that they were people.
He wanted the prisoners, for clinical reasons, to feel totally powerless.
The guards took to their roles. With their sunglasses on, they stripped prisoners with zeal, shouted at
them, and ordered them about.52 They harassed anyone who mouthed back. They obnoxiously
pushed the force of their authority in the face of the prisoners and expected to be obeyed.
By the morning of the second day of the experiment the prisoners were rebelling. They had
barricaded themselves in their cell and were taunting the guards. The guards called in reinforcements
and were able to quiet the rebellion. They put the main organizers in solitary confinement. They
offered the best behaved prisoners extra food, more comfortable living conditions, and better
treatment. This had the effect of splitting up the prisoners.
Less than 36 hours in, the first prisoner snapped. He began to scream and cry uncontrollably. But he
was told he was not allowed to quit. His nervous breakdown only worsened. Eventually, by the end
of the second day, he was allowed to leave. Prisoner #8612 would later say, “I felt totally helpless.”
51
The prison has since been replaced by a Thai take-out cafe there.
52
Being able to look someone in the eye is an important way to connect with him or her.
PSYCHOLOGY OF WAR RESOURCE | 29
On the fourth day, prisoner #819 asked to leave to see a doctor. Zimbardo agreed. On their own, the
guards trotted the rest of the prisoners into the hallway and organized them to chant in unison
“Prisoner #819 did a bad thing.”53xxiii Upon hearing this chant, #819 changed his mind. He wanted
to stay and prove he could be a good prisoner. Not until Zimbardo reminded #819 of his actual
name could he break from the psycho-drama of the simulation.
In very little time, the “prisoners” and the “guards” had formed new identities based on what group
they belonged to. The prisoners had become obedient wrecks, either conforming with great
willingness or disintegrating into puddles of hopelessness.
The researchers—yes, research was still happening—found that the guards had divided into three
types. A third were “tough but fair”, following the rules to the letter. A third became “good guys”,
doing small favors for prisoners and not punishing them. The final third, however, truly took to the
power of their roles. Typified by one guard nicknamed “John Wayne,” they displayed a reckless,
cowboy-like attitude toward the prisoners’ health and well-being. They were “hostile, arbitrary, and
inventive in their forms of prisoner humiliation.” xxiv
Guards did not fight or argue with each other, despite their different attitudes. They showed up
consistently on time and never excused themselves from the experiment. Prisoners, however, became
isolated and withdrawn from each other. At one point, given the chance to get a fellow prisoner out
of solitary confinement by giving up their own blankets, many simply chose to keep their blankets.
By the fifth or sixth day, the researchers discovered guards were growing increasingly cruel. At night,
when they thought no one was watching, they were heaping on the prisoners even more vicious and
degrading treatment. Eventually, a visiting researcher saw what the experiment had become and
called for Zimbardo to call it to an end. This outside voice woke up his conscience and he did so
immediately.
In an interview with one of the “guards” two months later, the man expressed shock at how he had
behaved toward the prisoners. Away from the simulation, he had become “dismayed” by his own
cruelty. He said, however, that “while I was doing it I didn’t feel any regret. I didn’t feel any guilt.”xxv
Collective Psychology
The Stanford Prison Experiment created a context that permitted the young men put in charge to
violate their own moral codes. One could try to excuse them on the grounds that the whole
experiment was a performance. But even if the guards thought they were acting, they displayed a
willingness to do to real harm. They could see they were upsetting the prisoners, yet they continued.
Worse, as they witnessed the harm they were causing, the guards actually became more aggressive.
Zimbardo saw this as deindividuated aggression. Because they were working as a group, the guards
became liberated from personal responsibility. For the same reason, when a firing squad is used to
execute someone, more than one person fires at the same time—that way, no one person feels
responsible for the death.
The psychologist Donald Dutton writes of “personality factors” common to populations that
commit genocide and people who commit torture.xxvi In those circumstances, you often find approval
53
This seems like a rather benign criticism. The emotional reaction of #819 is a testament to the potency of conformity.
The need to be a member-in-good-standing with your group can tap into a deep and painful nerve.
PSYCHOLOGY OF WAR RESOURCE | 30
from leaders or other authority figures and a collective willingness to go along with the offending
action. The thrill of power overwhelms the conscience when abuse is approved from above.
Not everyone needs to agree for there to be a sense of group approval. The people who disagree must
only go along with what is happening. If they don’t stand against the offending behavior, they are in
some way giving it social acceptance as long as the stay a part of that society.
Dutton cites “authoritarianism, strong in-group conformity, and out-group devaluation” as the
factors that permit moral disengagement.xxvii This could well describe the guards of the prison
experiment. In it, there was to be strict obedience to figures of authority and a clear chain of
command (authoritarianism). The guards all followed the conventions of their group and supported
one another (strong in-group conformity). And the guards humiliated the prisoners, stripping them
of any sense of having rights and power on their own (out-group devaluation). 54
To generate conflict, a fundamental antagonism must be present. This antagonism can come about
effortlessly out of nothing just by flipping a coin and saying “heads you’re a guard, tails you’re a
prisoner.” But, to get individuals to act on this antagonism, incentives need to be provided. The
strongest incentives are often group conformity and leadership approval.
Knowing who you are not is only a compelling motivation if it comes with a sense of identity of who
are and what you should be doing. Otherwise, all you get is a fleeting moment on a subway where
two people share a grin and then go back to being strangers.
The war pushed aside other worries and created a unifying bond that brought Americans closer in
their shared patriotism. Once the war was over, the goodwill predictably went away. As Samuel
Kaplan, a professor of sociology at Swarthmore College, stated:
“America went to bed with a great victory and woke up with a victory that no longer seems so great
and a world filled with problems that we basically aren’t able to do anything about.”xxix
Upon awakening from war, one finds the old animosities have not been healed. War is a temporary
panacea, a euphoria of the moment—like falling in love. The fissures that exist in the domestic life of
a country will stay sealed only so long as its sons and daughters are fighting in a foreign land.55
54
I doubt my high school wanted to create a situation like the Stanford Prison Experiment when they handed us Blue
and Gold t-shirts. However, at least the prisoners and guards showed some real team spirit. Handing out costumes is not
enough. A certain kind of collective psychology must be present to get individuals to behave as one. “Gold team
member” is not a role with clear expectations or an associated set of conduct. “Prison guard” is. Also, while we were given
t-shirts and separated into teams, we were not given specific instructions by any authority figures or any reasons to want
to compete with the opposite team. In fact, many teachers would tell us they thought the Blue/Gold idea was silly.
55
And sometimes not even that long.
PSYCHOLOGY OF WAR RESOURCE | 31
Yet even though the relief provide by a scapegoat does not last, the practice continues. To
understand why wars occur, despite the awareness of the suffering and horror they create, we must
understand war’s tremendous psychological appeal.
Family at Arms
In Jarhead, a memoir of life as a Marine
sniper during the Gulf War, Anthony
Swofford explains what first brought him
into the Corps: “I joined the Marine Corps
in part to impose domestic structure upon
my life, to find a home.”xxx
The sense of camaraderie and solidarity that is literally drilled into soldiers gives them a sense of self-
worth. Even in groups that are unpleasant to be a part of, the S.P.E. prisoners, for example, the need
to feel valuable is strong. When #819 was told he was “bad,” he had an immediate emotional need to
prove his value, even at the detriment to his own health.
The desire to prove one’s worth, particularly for the sake of one’s friends, is one of the main causes
people fight for when they fight in a war. Whether they joined because of a draft or for the soldier’s
salary or because they were coerced into it, once they have shared the intimacy of battle they carry a
new purpose: to defend their brothers and sisters in arms.
56
Of course, they don’t all say it in English.
PSYCHOLOGY OF WAR RESOURCE | 32
In World War II, soldiers were given surveys asking them for what purpose did they fight. “Hatred
of the enemy, personal and impersonal, was not a major element in combat motivation,” concluded
the War Department's Information and Education Division.57 As Coser explains, after having read
all the data, “Combat motivation was a compound of many elements, of which loyalties to the group
of ‘buddies’ was apparently the most important.”xxxii
These collegial, supportive emotions even extend to civilian populations, despite their lack of
organization and training. When under attack, ordinary citizens band together. Domestic disputes
are stilled as a wave of harmony pulls everyone in.
Such a wave of good relations was seen during the Gulf War in Israel, which Iraq bombed in
response to a United States led invasion. One Israeli interviewed on American television described
the kindness brought about by foreign aggression:
Israelis have become so much more polite to each other. There is friendliness, ‘please’ and
‘thank you.’ It is a wonderful feeling.xxxiii
Certainly, Israelis also felt terror and concern for their safety. But out of the sense of danger came a
renewed sense of identity with their fellow Israelis, a stronger kinship.
Similarly, the Bosnian War, like many other ethnic conflicts, helped establish greater ties within the
ethnicities in conflict. Even though many Serbs and Bosnian Muslims had grown up together, the
violence between these groups naturally shifted their relationships. Former trusts were shattered as
people found they could only count on those in their own ethnic group.
Wars are not started to make new friends and family. But they do make strangers into brothers,
comrades, and buddies. People like Anthony Swofford join armies and end up in wars out of the
basic human need to find a place they can call home.
In fact, while anti-war songs may go down in history, pro-war songs often chart better when a war is
just beginning. Recuperating from a leg wound suffered in Vietnam, Staff Sergeant Barry Sadler
wrote “Ballad of the Green Berets” with author Robin Moore.58 The song topped the charts for five
weeks in 1966, just as the Vietnam War was escalating. It was the number twenty-two song for the
decade, meaning it was the one of the most played and purchased song in the entire 1960s.
Sadler performed the song on TV shows and his photo graced the album cover. With lyrics like
“These are men, America’s best” and “Men who fight night and day,” the song clearly endorsed the
war. It even ends with a dead green beret leaving a message for his newborn son to follow in his
father’s footsteps. This was meant to highlight the pride individual green berets felt.
57
After World War II, the War Department of the United States became the Department of Defense. Why do you think
it was renamed?
58
Type “Ballad of the Green Beret” into Google and you can find videos of Sadler singing the song.
PSYCHOLOGY OF WAR RESOURCE | 33
War itself can be an exciting for those who confront its risks and dangers. Beyond the network of
comrades, there is the pulsing buzz of being close to the edge of mortality, where your decisions
matter because they can save or cost a life. The thrill-seeking aspect of war’s “psychological appeal,”
is often treated like a nasty secret few want to admit.xxxv It can seem obscene to say that, despite its
awfulness and misery and death and destruction, war can feel awesome.
Often, the narcotic of war is merged with actual narcotics. Ishmael Beah, who served three years in
the state army during Sierra Leone’s civil war, tells of how he was given cocaine, “brown brown” (a
mix of gunpowder and cocaine), and unknown white capsules to help him mentally get through
combat raids. These chemicals were meant to enhance his aggression and deaden his conscience.
The effect of these drugs, both the war and the others, was to transform Beah and his fellow soldiers
into violence-seeking addicts. Their appetite for ferocity and carnage could not be blunted. At one
point, Beah’s lieutenant gave him and others in his company over to an organization focused on
rehabilitating African soldiers. They were taken to a hospital where there were also ex-rebel fighters.
59
Book titles that are also sentences: yea or nay? Personally, I like them.
PSYCHOLOGY OF WAR RESOURCE | 34
Soon, the two sides were clawing at one another, desperate for blood. By the time hospital officials
broke up the fight, six people had been killed. Beah and his troops laughed. As Beah described it,
“We needed the violence to cheer us after a while of boring travel.”xxxviii
Beah, like Hedges, was reflecting on his experiences to try to understand his own hunger and
attitude. He had grown from a reluctant soldier into a creature hungry to experience brutality.
Solomon’s opponent-process theory accounts for this simultaneous push and pull of war’s
exhilaration.60 The psychic pain and subsequent pleasure of negative behaviors show how different
emotional experiences can exist. After time, however, the pain can get worn away by the pleasure
until the mind is left with only a dull contentment at the horror it perceives.
Georges Sorel was a Marxist French philosopher writing around the turn of the 20th century. In his
Reflections on Violence, he advocated for a class war to animate the revolutionary spirit of working
men and women. To Sorel, violence was instrumental and fundamental. He did not think people
would be motivated to see their class interests without the vigor of direct conflict.62
Through “acts of violence,” the proletariat (or working class) and the bourgeoisie (or capital-holding
class) would recognize their incompatibility. They would be forced, in Sorel’s view, to adopt the
order and discipline found in armies and the solidarity found among brothers-in-arms.
60
It is after all a theory often used to explain addiction.
61
Before they were colors, toffee and coffee were simply foods. It was easier to tell them apart.
62
Sorel doesn’t sound like he’d be fun in gym class. He’d probably pick his kickball team by punching half the students
and then playing with whoever didn’t hit him back.
63
Yeah, in their hospital beds.
PSYCHOLOGY OF WAR RESOURCE | 35
Sorel talked a good game, but mostly he wanted workers to go on strike—that is, to unite and refuse
to work until their demands were met. But he was also willing to sanction more than that. When
Vladimir Lenin led an armed revolution in Russia in 1917, Sorel excused the slaughter, championing
the moment as an emblem of his violent vision. The fascists of early 20th Century Europe looked to
Sorel as a mentor, and he in turn defended their use of violence to achieve power.
When Italian fascist leader Benito Mussolini echoed Sorel by saying “War alone brings all human
energies to their highest tension and sets a seal of nobility on people who have the virtue to face it,”
he was speaking of the bombs-and-guns kind of war.xli The fascists merely expanded on Sorel’s
central idea that war could be a tool to forge in people a noble purpose.
Any materialist class goals, such as the redistribution of wealth or improvements in the workplace,
were ultimately less interesting then the energizing call to fight. The fight itself became the thing to
value. It, and only it, elevated the working class from the meanness of necessity to the poetry of
ancient warriors. In Sorel’s idealized picture of conflict, “proletarian violence, carried on as a pure
and simple manifestation of class struggle, appears thus as a fine and heroic thing.”xlii
“Pure and simple” were concepts that echoed throughout Reflections on Violence. Ambiguity and
complexity were attitudes to fear because they could reduce the will to act.64 The ability of conflict to
make stark contrasts and reinforce divisions can be prized in times of psychological confusion.
Conflict thus simplifies situations into basic binary choices: with or against, proletariat or
bourgeoisie, us or them. By creating
binary situations, you can promote binary Easy Access to Information
options—either x or y—that limit the One of the advantages of the present over the past
range of choice. Many studies have shown is that we now have greater access to information.
that people are often happier with fewer If we want to know why students are protesting in
choices than with more choices. Iran, we can research the topic on the internet. We
can even find conflicting opinions we must sort
The Stanford Prison Experiment worked out. Before we even start our research, however,
this way. Prisoners may have been given we have personal filters that inform us which
seventeen rules, but really they were given information sources we trust and which ones we
only two choices: obey or don’t obey. To don’t. In a free society, the antagonisms we feel—
the sides we pick and the conflicts that result—can
not obey led to punishment, thus
manifest indirectly in how we select whom to listen
reducing their incentive-based choices to and whom to follow.
down to one.
Military organizations, as Sorel understood, also impose very rigid systems of authority on their
members. In the military, you know who is in charge at all times. You are told where to sleep and
when to wake up and how to dress. You have a code of conduct. You are given daily instructions on
what to do and how to behave. Any disobedience is punishable.
64
Athletes (and coaches) commonly use conflict to motivate and energize themselves and their teams. Listen to NFL
football players and they’ll often talk about how “no one believed in them” except their teammates and fans.
PSYCHOLOGY OF WAR RESOURCE | 36
While some might bristle at such restrictive control, many flourish under the guidance of military
order. They find the absence of complexity comforting. As Anthony Swofford put it: “loving the
Corps is uncomplicated.” You do what you are told and, in return, it “always waits up for you.”xliv
No doubt simplicity has its advantages in war. Extra seconds lost in thought could prove hazardous
when bullets are zipping overhead. But, while it may be a tactical necessity, such a mentality has
psychological consequences.
“The structure of the military accustoms you to a world without ambiguity,” note psychologists
Laurie Slone and Matthew Friedman, who counsel returning veterans and their families.xlv That lack
of ambiguity is not only codified in the authoritarianism of military life, it can also manifest in the
ideologies people employ in war. As Chris Hedges states, “In mythic war we fight absolutes.”xlvi
Soldiers can take on the Bush outlook of “for” or “against.” The full spectrum of colors fades, raising
the contrast to pure black and pure white.
Soldier Henry Metelmann explained what happens if the color contrast on a person’s metaphorical
monitor goes on the fritz. Metelmann was a German fighting against the Russians in World War II.
During a pause in a battle, two Russians appeared out of a foxhole. Metelmann went over to them
and started a conversation, as if they were only taking a break between classes.
The Russians asked if they could retrieve some identification tags from three Russians soldiers that
Metelmann had killed when he leapt into their foxhole. Metelmann agreed. The Russians found
some photos on their comrades’ bodies. “We all three stood up and looked at the photos,” recounted
Metelmann. Then the enemies shook hands, “one patted on my back,” and they parted ways.
Metelmann left the frontlines for over an hour and when he returned the Germans were victorious.
Asking his fellow Germans, pleased with their triumph, Metelmann tried to find out what happened
to the Russians he had spoken with. “Oh, they got killed,” he was told.
“I was sadder that they had to die in this mad confrontation than my own mates,” confessed
Metelmann. His brief exchange with the Russians had the effect of shading them with new
dimensions of color. They were human now. No longer could he see them in the blunt light of black
and white. The burst of hues from a handshake, a few pleasant words in broken languages, and a pat
on the back was enough to leave Metelmann haunted by the memory of these men. xlvii
War as Fantasy
Sorel, for all his praise of violence and foolish associations with fascists, never showed an awareness of
what war is. In Reflections on Violence, he wrote
Everything in war is carried out without hatred and without the spirit of revenge; in war the
vanquished are not killed; non-combatants are not made to bear the consequences of the
disappointments which the armies may have experienced on the field of battle; force is then displayed
according to its own nature.xlviii
What Sorel was probably describing was the war he wished people would fight. But this war without
hatred or revenge, where people are “not killed” and non-combatants are treated justly, is a myth.
Sorel believed strongly in the power of myths, narratives that frame a fight or struggle as absolutely
necessary and guaranteed to provide victory for the myth follower. To Sorel, myths are “not
PSYCHOLOGY OF WAR RESOURCE | 37
descriptions of things but expressions of a will to act.”xlix They are idealized depictions of what should
be, clung to by impassioned minds the way a stubborn puppy will not let go of a sock. “People who
are living in a world of myths are secure from all refutation,” Sorel wrote.l
Frequently, at the start of a war there is a myth. Often, there are several, and they exist on all sides.
Sometimes these myths are noble, and sometimes they are total falsehoods.
The myth for America and Britain in World War I was that it was “the war to end all wars.” History
soon proved that untrue. The Vietnam War escalated in 1964 after it was reported that the North
Vietnamese had attacked a U.S. destroyer ship in the Gulf of Tonkin, a report that has been widely
discredited since.65 Even the Trojan War began with the myth that Helen had been abducted by the
Trojans, when in fact she had run off with them to escape her husband.
Not all myths are insidious. The Declaration of Independence begins with the mythic line “We hold
these truths to be self-evident,” as if the words need no explanation beyond saying them aloud. Yet
few people (except maybe some women) would argue that the next phrase—“all men are created
equal”—was anything less than the highest of human principles at the time.
People fight to make their myths into reality. That is the plain and awkward fact of it. We start wars
over ownership of empty islands. We travel halfway across the world to fight in the grandiosely titled
Operation Enduring Freedom, the official name of the American invasion of Afghanistan in 2001.
How these myths are generated has only grown in sophistication. In October of 1990, during the
build-up to the 1991 Gulf War, a young woman spoke before the U.S. Congress. Nurse Nayirah was
a fifteen-year-old volunteer at a Kuwaiti hospital. With a clear voice, she spoke of atrocities
committed by Iraqi soldiers. She told a shocked nation that she had witnessed Iraqis throw sick
babies out of windows just to see them die.
The horrendous claim created a stir among Americans. At that moment, it was not yet clear if
America would defend its ally Kuwait. The news that the
country would be going after morally abominable thugs who
wantonly murdered defenseless babies gave clarity to the war
cause. Suddenly, people had an image of a wrong their
soldiers could right.
Cut to more than a year later. The Gulf War had ended long
ago, quick and victorious. The memory of that success had
faded into nostalgia. That was when a human rights
organization revealed that “Nurse” Nayirah was actually the
daughter of the Kuwaiti ambassador to the U.S. Her
testimony had been coached by an expensive political public
relations firm. The claim about Iraqi soldiers harming
defenseless babies has never been verified.
65
A U.S. destroyer shot a North Vietnamese boat on August 2nd, 1964. On August 4th, two U.S. destroyers fired at
targets they thought they spotted on radar. No wreckage or people were recovered, however. Even though that same day
the captain of the destroyer told officials in Washington, D.C. that they likely fired at non-existent targets, a belief spread
that the ship had been attacked. After a frenzy of outrage over this pseudo-Pearl Harbor, Congress and the President
agreed to send more troops to Vietnam.
PSYCHOLOGY OF WAR RESOURCE | 38
When an individual is stirred by a deep belief, we call it a myth. When a public relations firm trains a
girl with a false identity to spread rumors, we call it propaganda. Information constructed and
presented with the goal of influencing how people think and feel is propaganda.
A coordinated effort to boost morale for conflict is common to modern warfare. These are immense
enterprises, mobilizing hundreds of thousands of people to support an armed cause. The more
enthusiasm for the war, the better. The military encouraged Barry Sadler to record “Ballad of a
Green Beret” because it knew the value of encouraging people that the Vietnam War was a
worthwhile fight.
The universality of myth as a tool of war does not mean that wars only happen because people were
manipulated into imaging conflict. Fantasies need not be deceptive for them to alter how a person
thinks.
At the opening of Jarhead, Swofford tells of how when he and his sniper platoon heard the United
States may go to war against Iraq they watched nothing but war movies for three days: Apocalypse
Now, Platoon, Full Metal Jacket. This was months before “Nurse” Nayirah, before Americans at
home had been given much reason to care why the Gulf War should be fought.
The snipers simply were giddy and excited to think they could join these fictional characters as
veterans of combat. It did not matter that the message of these films was that “war is inhumane and
terrible.”li For Swofford, no stylized image of violence or dramatic reveal of military misconduct
could possibly be anti-war. His myth glorified the warrior. He wanted to go to war. He wanted the
carnivorous rush, the vivid waking hallucination of carnage. He wanted the “rush of battle”—the
sense that every moment matters—that only soldiers ever truly experience.
Instead, he got the tedium of blistering Arabian heat and the privilege of cleaning portable toilets.
For these days in the forest, Beah lived in a world of the purest kind of myth. He stayed hidden
inside his fantasy, even as he made it a reality he did not want to see.
66
“If I look at the mass I will never act.”
One of the results of large, collective enterprises is that their scale dwarfs most people’s imaginations.
War movies focus on a few soldiers, who stand in for the many. When we hear just the numbers—
8.5million soldiers in World War I, 100,000 to 110,000 people in the Bosnian War—our minds
stumble over them. They lose meaning. Two—the number of Russian soldiers Henry Metelmann
met in World War II—can seem more significant than 10.6 million, the total number of Soviet
soldiers lost in that war.
66
This is a quote from Mother Teresa, a Catholic nun who devoted her life to the poor, hungry, and sick in India.
PSYCHOLOGY OF WAR RESOURCE | 39
Paul Slovic, a professor of psychology at the University of Oregon, explains the concept of psychic
numbing. It is the “turning off of feeling” when overwhelmed by the enormity of a tragedy.liii It was
first pointed out by Robert Lifton in his analysis of how rescue workers at Hiroshima managed to
keep doing their jobs in the aftermath of the first atom bomb.
Slovic specializes in decision research. Working with others, he has documented in experiments how
“statistical lives” fail to make the emotional impact that “identified lives” do.liv One experiment asked
people to donate to a charity that helped impoverished Africans. If the researchers provided just the
story of one impoverished seven-year-old girl, they received on average twice the donation as when
they explained hunger only in terms of statistics.67
Numbers by themselves do not cause psychic numbing. Numbers greater than one do. A separate team
of researchers in Israel asked people to donate to help one sick child or eight sick children. These
questions were posed separately, so no one was asked to compare the needs of the eight to the needs
of the one.68 Those asked to donate to one child gave on average twice as much as those asked to
donate to eight.
Hearing a number greater than one apparently decreases the empathetic spirit of giving. Empathy is
the ability to imagine what someone else is feeling. To learn more, these same researchers (Tehila
Kogut and Ilana Ritov) repeated Slovic’s experiment, but added the story of a second child.
Separately, each child’s story received the same average amount in donations. When the two stories
were combined, offering the option of donating to both children, the average amount dropped. The
needs of two impoverished children turned out to be less than the needs of one.
While these experiments looked at feeling versus thinking reactions in cases of charity, they hint at
implications for the psychology of warfare. When leaders order soldiers to war, they likely cannot
67
Here are a few of the statistics given. “Food shortages in Malawi are affecting more than 3 million children. More than
11 million people in Ethiopia need assistance.” Here is the first line from the girl’s story, which also included a photo.
“Rokia, a 7-year-old girl from Mali, Africa, is desperately poor and faces a threat of severe hunger or even starvation.”
68
These researchers, in another experiment, offered people a choice of donating to one child in a group of eight or
donating to the remaining seven children. Given this situation, 69% of respondents chose the group. When having to
make a specific choice between the needs of many and the needs of few, people do go with the many.
PSYCHOLOGY OF WAR RESOURCE | 40
imagine the vast numbers of the enemy as equaling actual human beings. The headcount of an army
or the casualty figures returning home can reduce the strength of the identification mechanism
In democratic countries, where popular opinion can affect the decisions of those in power, how
strongly the people identify with the military can shape the policies of conflict. To other soldiers,
those sent off to war are sons and daughters, brothers and sisters. To others, these brave men and
women can become a blur of numbers. The sheer mass of the military leaves each face—and each
death—out of focus. For a better picture of what is really happening, you must make sure each
person means something to you.
Conclusion
In the first chapter, we learned that nomadic hunter-gathers were less likely to engage in war than
geographically stable communities. From this chapter, we can see that without tightly bonded large
groups, hunter-gathers would have had neither the ability nor the motivation to start wars.
Because of the narcissism of minor difference, human beings draw ‘us’ vs. ‘them’ distinctions,
forming connections and disconnections at the same time. Conflict can then amplify these
connections and disconnections. Such conflict draws the in-group closer together. Had my high
school administrators understood this, they could have turned Blue t-shirts against Gold t-shirts into
an epic collision.69
There are several key points to remember from this discussion of mental behavior of groups.
The narcissism of minor difference is the tendency of groups of people to view themselves as
different from others based on small distinctions.
Different structures act on how we perceive the world, which affects the choices we make.
People who are in conflict with each other will join together to work to defeat a common
enemy. This is called antagonistic cooperation.
The object of conflict is usually a scapegoat, a target chosen for the ease with which it can be
blamed for other people’s problems. This deflects responsibility from those within the group.
The Stanford Prison Experiment found that the social context of a situation could lead
people to commit acts they normally would not consider appropriate.
The behavior of individuals within groups can be quite different than their behavior as
separate individuals. Collective psychology has the power to transform how individuals think.
69
First, each t-shirt color would have needed a central myth. Perhaps the Blues could have been the children of parents
who went to college, while the Golds could be the children of immigrants with no education. To harden each team’s
hostility, rumors could be spread: how the Blues took all the best bagels during lunch period, how the Golds slapped
chalk dust all over Blues’ leader’s grandmother. Upon hearing such news, a current of aggression would crackle in every
Blue heart. A calculus book would be thrown in the common area, starting a brawl. No one would know who threw the
book. Both sides would blame the other. A riot would follow. Now there would have been some pugnacious school spirit.
PSYCHOLOGY OF WAR RESOURCE | 41
Conflict, including war, has the ability to give purpose and direction to people’s lives.
Soldiers find family structures within the military, developing extremely close emotional
relationships with their brothers- and sisters-at-arms.
War can seem exciting to soldiers and to the people of nations in conflict. Some even become
addicted to the exhilaration or to the nonstop news coverage.
Wars generate powerful myths to help explain why such conflict occurs.
Propaganda is information constructed and presented with the goal of influencing how
people think and feel. Propaganda is commonly employed to convince people to fight wars.
Human beings have difficulty feeling emotional attachments to statistics or numbers. Using
them leads to psychic numbing, lowering the emotional response to the problems of others.
Priming occurs when the context of a situation activates or deactivates certain feelings.
Without scapegoats, how would people deal with the frustrations in their lives?
What does the Stanford Prison Experiment tell us about how people come to commit acts of
atrocity or acts commonly considered moral repugnant?
Does the term “evil” have real meaning, given what you have learned of human behavior?
Do people feel more excitement at the thought of war then they are willing to admit?
How can we overcome the effects of psychic numbing that limit how much we feel for our
soldiers and our enemies?
PSYCHOLOGY OF WAR RESOURCE | 42
Objectives
By the time you complete this chapter, you should be able to answer the following questions.
Introduction
Alvin York’s success as a soldier testified to his sharp-shooting. Back in Tennessee, he had won local
competitions for marksmanship and had been an avid hunter. Yet not all of his accomplishment can
be taken as tribute to his physical ability. There is also a mental component to success in war.
To observe the will and mental resilience of a soldier, look no further than the Alvin York of World
War II. Audie Murphy was 5 feet 5.5 inches tall. He was so short his height had to be expressed in
decimals. When he first enlisted, he weighed 110 pounds.
Murphy originally tried to break the rules and join the U.S. Marines in 1942 at only 16. They had
none of him. He tried the Air Force, and they too turned him down. The Navy took its turn to say
no. His desire to fight finally led him to the Army, which looked the other way and accepted him.
Cut to France in January 1945. Murphy is now legitimately 18. He has earned promotions for valor
and bravery, been given his own company, and even grown another inch. He and the 19 men left
from his regiment of 128 are defending the Colmar Pocket, a strategically valuable section of France.
The temperature is well below freezing (-10 degrees C or 14 degrees F). Two feet of snow pad the
earth. An onslaught of German soldiers is rumbling Murphy’s way. With tanks. And artillery.
It was a scene from a movie. (It literally would become that, as Murphy starred as himself in a film
about his war experiences, To Hell and Back, once he returned home.) Unfortunately for the
Germans that day, Murphy was the star and they were the extras.
PSYCHOLOGY OF WAR RESOURCE | 43
Murphy told his men to take hidden positions where they could fire at
the Germans. He would fire off weapons at the front position until out
of ammunition. Then, like Wolverine, he charged at the enemy.
Jumping into a shot-up American tank, he used the tank’s machine gun
to destroy a full squad of German soldiers. Oh, yeah, the tank itself was
on fire. Sitting in this flaming death trap, just waiting to explode, Audie
Murphy repelled six tanks and 250 infantrymen for nearly an hour all by
himself.
Because of his daring and courage, the United States won a decisive
victory. Murphy would gain the Medal of Honor. He went home with
28 U.S. medals, five from France, and one from Belgium.
Audie Murphy was a heroic soldier because of sheer force of will. He did
what other soldiers could not. And not because of Hulk-like size or wizardly powers. Physical gifts
are unnecessary. The mental strength, the exceptional psychology of those who spring to life when
death is nearest: this is the quality that makes a soldier into the star of his own movie.
Soldiers like this are unique. One of the defining characteristics of heroes is they are rare. A teenager
defeated the enemy by jumping into a burning tank! Beneath that story, though, is another, one that
is only starting to be told.
A soldier’s story must confront the dark, troubling realities of war. People have been plucked from
the middle of their lives—from friends, family, snooze alarms, and breakfast cereal dinners—to fight,
to kill men (and sometimes women) whom they have never met. These realities present psychological
battles as intense as any on the battlefield itself.
A Soldier’s Conscience
In World War II, only 15 to 20% of American soldiers reported
actually firing at the enemy. The great majority were non-firers, men In World War II, only 15 to 20
who went into combat but never used their weapon. That means at
percent of American soldiers
said they fired at the enemy.
most one out of every five men was actually trying to kill the enemy.
This figure comes from S.L.A. Marshall, a U.S. Army Brigadier during World War II. An Army
historian in the Pacific, he eventually became the official U.S. historian of the conflict in Europe.70
He and a team of historians interviewed thousands of soldiers in more than 400 infantry companies,
often right after their encounters, spanning both European and the Pacific battlefields.
The survey data shocked Marshall. Why were these men putting themselves at risk to die—from
bombs, tanks, or the stray bullet—when so few of them were willing to fight? The answer: they were
70
The nice thing about being the Army’s official historian is that you do fewer push-ups.
PSYCHOLOGY OF WAR RESOURCE | 44
there for their “buddies.” They were at war to support their friends. But they did not want to shoot
their enemies. Marshall concluded:
“The average and healthy individual—the man who can endure the mental and physical stresses of
combat—still has such an inner and usually unrealized resistance towards killing a fellow man that he
will not of his own volition take life if it is possible to turn away.”lvi
From this conclusion, Marshall helped develop a training plan to increase a soldier’s willingness to
kill. The plan worked. The rate of soldiers willing to shoot at the enemy would grow: up to 55%
during the Korean War, only a few years after World War II, and up to 95% by the Vietnam War.
How the U.S. Army reprogrammed its soldiers will be discussed later in this chapter. For now, let’s
continue to examine what happens to the human mind when it stands “at the vital point”.
In the battle at Rosebud Creek in 1876, American soldiers expelled 25,000 rounds for 99 causalities
(dead or wounded) among the Native American warriors they faced. That’s 252 rounds per hit, even
worse than the rate at Wissembourg. Either the U.S. soldiers were uniformly terrible shooters and the
Native Americans faster than bullets, or the combatants were working to avoid inflicting death.
The strongest record of non-firers comes from the American Civil War.
71
Wow.
72
Getting shot at is scary. One point of shooting can be to scare off the enemy. Displays of aggression can be forms of
theater intended to intimidate more than to harm. That’s why people scream in fights and why some warriors put battle
paint on their faces. If you can scare your opponent away through display and posture, you can win without fighting.
PSYCHOLOGY OF WAR RESOURCE | 45
Loading the musket was when a rifleman was at his most vulnerable. Packing a bullet into the
chamber meant standing still while you poured gunpowder down the barrel and then crammed the
bullet deep down into it. This left you an easy, stationary target. If your musket was malfunctioning,
there was no benefit to bothering with this perilous procedure.
To find some many loaded muskets was odd. More than 95% of the time with a Civil War era
musket was spent in loading it. To fire, all one needed was a quick squeeze of the trigger. Many
soldiers probably fell before they could raise their weapon. But it is also possible that, having loaded
their weapon, some of the soldiers did not fire.
That is the conclusion of Lieutenant Colonel Dave Grossman, a former psychology professor and
professor of military science. Aside from his academic credentials, Lt. Col. Grossman was a soldier of
twenty years in the United States Army. Grossman, noting that nearly a quarter of the muskets were
triple loaded, hypothesizes that soldiers would feign shooting and reload their muskets to maintain
their instructed formations. With commanders watching from afar and the “mutual surveillance” of
one’s fellow soldiers, as Ardent du Picq called it, even if a soldier did not fire, he would still have to
act as if he had.lvii This would include unnecessary reloading.
We cannot be certain how long soldiers at the Battle of Gettysburg held onto their muskets before
firing or how many refused to fire. The American Civil War, however, lent itself to unique
discouragements to killing. The identification mechanism for the soldiers was divided. Yes, they
could see themselves as Union or Confederate, or cling to the identities of the states they served. But
only a few years earlier their enemies had been their brothers and fellow patriots. Before the war, the
men they were meant to kill had been as American as they were.
Many in the Union Army did not even want to fight. They had been drafted. Often the draft
provoked intense criticism and public riots. Many only stuck around in the army because of the
steady pay and food. Under such circumstances, a soldier’s motivation could easily decline.
Given the risk reloading posed, there must have been powerful, compelling reason for a soldier to
reload his weapon, especially when it seemed unlikely he would fire it. That the reason would be to
avoid killing is consistent with Marshall’s data, Mater’s stories, and Ardant du Picq’s questionnaires.
A Soldier’s Fear
73
One musket was loaded 23 times. The bullets were practically spilling out of that one.
PSYCHOLOGY OF WAR RESOURCE | 46
In The Art of War, Sun Tzu cautions that “on the day they are ordered
out to battle, your soldiers may weep.”lviii One of the most respected
generals in China is announcing that before battle his men are crying.
That hardly sounds like the roughest, toughest army in the world.
Fear is inherent to war. But the more a person fights, the less afraid he
becomes. That’s the conclusion reached by Israeli military psychologist
Ben Shalit. Shalit asked Israeli soldiers who had experienced combat what
terrified them the most in war. He discovered a “low emphasis” on dying
or getting injured and a “great emphasis” on “letting others down.”
Anxiety over doing a good job was greater than anxiety over safety.
Sun Tzu drew the same conclusion twenty-six hundred years earlier. “Soldiers in desperate straits lose
their sense of fear,” he states in The Art of War.lx When the “vital point” is a moment of attack or
extreme threat, such as what Audie Murphy faced, anxieties can be replaced with aggressive clarity.
Yogendra Singh Yadav is an Indian soldier who fought against Pakistan in 1999. His company was
sent on a mission to take out three Pakistani controlled bunkers high up on a cliff. Yadav volunteered
to lead the charge. Alone, he climbed a 100 feet of ice to reach the bunkers. On the climb, he was
shot three times but kept climbing. At the top of the cliff, he ran into a storm of bullets. Ignoring the
danger, he threw a grenade to disable one of the bunkers. A second bunker started firing at Yadav,
wounding him again. He charged this bunker too and, with his bare hands, eliminated the four
armed men inside. The rest of his battalion was able to take the third bunker without him.
Soldiers like Yadav and Murphy were no different than those Sun Tzu saw crying before the coming
battle. In a battle, concerns about injury are replaced with concerns that boost a person’s nerve.
Soldiers think of who and what they are fighting for. They think of their cause or of their lost
friends. They are absorbed in—and lifted by—the moment.
The same was true in the grisly United States Civil War. The veterans of battles like Gettysburg
frequently rejoined the army voluntarily after their time in the army had expired. This was true even
of those drafted into the army, who had not wanted to serve in the first place.lxi
Time and time again in wars, you find men willing to return to combat, although it means personal
risk. In his memoir Goodbye, Darkness, William Manchester describes why he left a hospital bed to
join his Marine company for the World War II campaign at Okinawa:
“It was an act of love. Those men on the line were my family, my home. They had never let me down
at I couldn’t do it to them. I had to be with them, rather than let them die and me live with the
knowledge that I might have saved them.”lxii
The fear for your own safety may not disappear completely. In war, however, it is overwhelmed by
even stronger emotions. The affinities and sense of purpose in a military company has the power to
push a single person to accomplish feats he would have previously felt were superhuman.
PSYCHOLOGY OF WAR RESOURCE | 47
As the chart on the next page shows, mental exhaustion accumulates the longer a person is in
combat. While at first a soldier’s performance improves as he learns more about the battlefield, the
stress builds over time until most soldiers are no longer capable of holding together. The few soldiers
that can withstand this stress are the ones prone to aggression. They are more likely to have the
psychopathic characteristics of those who enjoy violence and lack sympathy or remorse for others.
The study has been supported by data from other wars. Israel has an exceptionally trained army in
which both men and women are required to serve. The country also has been particularly open about
the psychological issues faced by their soldiers. In the Arab-Israeli War of 1973 (also known as the
Yom Kippur War or Ramadan War), which lasted only 20 days, almost a third of their reported
casualties were for psychological reasons. In the 1982 Lebanon War, Israeli psychiatric casualties
were twice the number who perished in the incursion of Lebanon that lasted a little over 3 months.lxiv
The typical psychiatric casualty has symptoms ranging from hysteria to depression. If the symptoms
are severe enough, a soldier may be discharged or forced to recover under medical supervision.
psychological trauma than life without air raids. (Of course, the rates of physical trauma were much
higher.) The human mind can apparently adapt to the constant risk of losing one’s life.74
No, it is the taking of life that is much harder for the human mind to accept.
The Weight of It
In Goodbye, Darkness, Manchester begins his memoir with a harrowing
account of “one of my worst recollections.” He describes the death of “I’m sorry.”
the first man he ever killed. - William
h
The victim was a Japanese soldier. Manchester burst upon him, a sniper in his hideout. The harness
of the sniper’s rifle became tangled, preventing him from raising his arms in self-defense. Manchester
missed with his first shot and hit him with his second. Even as the man died, Manchester kept firing.
He stared at his victim. He wrote that, as he did, “A feeling of disgust and self-hatred clotted darkly
in my throat.”
Left alone with the corpse, Manchester began to shake, tears pouring out. In a voice hoarse with fear,
he found himself apologizing, saying “I’m sorry” again and again.lxvi
The guilt carried by a soldier who recognizes what he has done—the weight of it—is the heaviest
psychological burden. That is why psychopathic personalities are best able to handle the sustained
trauma of combat. Their disorders prevent them from fully feeling guilt or shame.
Grossman describes a conversation he had with a veteran of World War II, Paul, a man who had
since grown older and built a life at home. “He talked freely about his experiences and about
comrades who had been killed.” When Grossman asked Paul about those whom he had killed, the
old man would reply that “usually you couldn’t be sure who it was that did the killing.”
But there was a moment with Paul when he held a long pause. From out of the well of his memories,
he pulled up… something. Grossman could not be sure what. All Paul would say was, “But the one
time I was sure…” before trailing off to dam up his tears.
“It still hurts, after all these years?” Grossman, himself a former soldier, asked in amazement.
Sun Tzu wrote of how a soldier’s day might begin with tears, but in the rush of battle the fear
vanishes. He did not bother to include how the tears come back at night.75
What any soldier confronts “in the vital point” is known only to him. The evidence shows that in
that moment an individual comes up against a mental resistance to the act. Perhaps this resistance
causes him to fake firing. Or perhaps he overcomes this resistance and follows through on his job as a
soldier. Either way, resistance to killing seems to be part of our cognitive infrastructure.
Defying this resistance seems to be a form of psychological violence inflicted on the self. It leaves
soldiers with many of the most painful memories they carry from war.
74
This does not mean that threat of loss of life is an acceptable condition for people. It still causes tremendous stress,
which is both physically and mentally harmful. What the Rand study found is that while the mind does bend in these
conditions, it is not likely to break.
75
Granted, it’s The Art of War, not The Art of After War.
PSYCHOLOGY OF WAR RESOURCE | 49
In the final chapter of Jarhead, Swofford touches on a moment when he could have shot two Iraqi
soldiers but did not, due to orders. “I think that by taking my two kills the pompous captain handed
me my life, some extra moments of living for myself or that I can offer others.”lxix In Swofford’s
words, you hear why scores of soldiers through the centuries have chosen to be non-firers.
Manchester’s story shows that the fear of the harm you will do to others is not lost even in desperate
straits. Because of the context of war, however, even with the fear of the destruction you create, you
are still able to create that destruction. How is this context created?
A Soldier’s Distance
To go from a firing percentage among soldiers of 15 to 20% in World War II to 55% in the Korean
War to 95% in the Vietnam War is a remarkable achievement. In fewer than 25 years, American
soldiers became five to six times more likely to shoot at the enemy.
Neither the Korean War nor the Vietnam War was as popular as World War II. Neither war featured
the dire consequences or vengeance motivation of Nazi Germany’s domination of Europe or Japan’s
attack on Pearl Harbor. Yet a far greater percentage of soldiers were ready to put human lives at risk.
Using his findings about non-firers, Marshall developed training methods to boost the firing rates of
American soldiers. Clearly Marshall knew what he was doing. He had found that a number of factors
can affect the willingness to attack and kill in war. Most of these relate to the concept of distance.
The most devastating weapons all work from great distances. The atomic bomb. Nuclear missiles.
The longbow.76 Not only are the destructive abilities of bombs and missiles and even longbows
significantly greater than guns and clubs and fists, they also offer psychological advantages that
increase the likelihood a soldier will use them.
Look at the difference lethality of a sniper’s rifle and soldier’s gun. From January 7 to July 24 1969,
U.S. Army snipers accounted for 1,245 confirmed kills in Vietnam with an average of 1.39 bullets
used per victim. Without the use of such special weapons, it took an average of 50,000 rounds to kill
one enemy soldier. That’s 1.39 bullets compared to 50,000 rounds of ammunition.
The myth of the sniper is that she needs only one bullet to do his job. The truth is that she needs one
bullet and a unique mindset to accomplish her task. As Swofford, the former U.S. Marine sniper,
explains, “The sniper requires thousands of bullets and thousands of hours of training per kill; he
needs senior snipers… beside him at the rifle range.”lxx It is this training that allows his weapon to be
so efficient. It is the person behind the gun—not the gun itself—that gets credited for the kill.
76
Okay, so the longbow doesn’t quite compare to an atom bomb.
PSYCHOLOGY OF WAR RESOURCE | 50
A sniper never gets close enough to see his victim’s fear, smell the panic as it perspires down his face.
He is far removed from the sensations of battle, staring down small figures through the powerful
magnification of the rifle scope. His field of vision effectively shrinks down to just the thin crosshairs
floating before his eye. Woe to the figure that ever aligns with those slight sight lines.
Turning a human being into a tiny dot lessens the weight of killing. The more a soldier can convince
his mind that the people against whom he wars are not actually people, the better able he is to carry
out his deadly work. When Alvin York took
out a platoon of Germans, he described Less Human than Human
thinking of it as if he were back in Tennessee Given the importance of distance to success in
shooting turkeys. war, one can see the rhetorical value of
offensive or derogatory speech. Racial, ethnic,
If he can literally dehumanize his enemy, a or religious slurs and insults comparing the
soldier drastically increases his capacity to enemy to animals—such as dogs or insects—
function as a killer. The same way children has psychological value. They break down the
can reduce their desire for marshmallows by sense of shared humanity between those who
face each other in battle.
imagining they are something they do not
want, a soldier can affect his behavior—control or release his impulses—by cognitively restructuring
the enemy as something permissible to attack.
Cognitive restructuring is a phrase borrowed from the social psychologist Albert Bandura. This is not
exactly the same as brainwashing. After all, the children still knew they were in a room with
marshmallows, and soldiers still know that people stand at the other end of their weapons. The
restructuring merely needs to affect perception just enough in the moment of choice.
Bandura writes, “The conversion of socialized people into dedicated combatants is achieved not by
altering their personality structures, aggressive drives, or moral standards. Rather it is accomplished
by cognitively restructuring the moral value of killing, so that it can be done free from self-censuring
restraints.”lxxi This forms the psychological conditions that allow the soldier to push through the
barrier of conscience and pull the trigger.
77
I admit this is not very profound.
PSYCHOLOGY OF WAR RESOURCE | 51
unrecognizable. Look out a plane window and you can barely see people at all.
During an aerial bombing, the plane crew doesn’t have to think about the human beings on the
ground. They are far removed from the physical sight of destruction. At most, they watch explosions
pop on the ground like upside-down fireworks. When a sailor watches the green blips on a sonar
screen, she can avoid confronting what those green blips represent.
In a tank, soldiers can look at television monitors that show the world outside. That way, they can
stay near the controls that operate the tank. An Israeli tank gunner found that not having to look
directly at the enemy improved his experience of combat: “I see someone running and I shoot at
him, and he falls, and it all looks like something on TV. I don’t see people.”lxxii
For some maximum range weapons, no one needs to be around to take responsibility for the harm
they cause. Land and sea mines are set by explosive units. They then can be triggered by
unsuspecting victims long after the people who left the mines are gone. In countries where mine
warfare was common, ordinary people are injured by mines years later. For example, mines placed in
the ground in Cambodia in the 1970s are still wounding farmers to this day.
A soldier does not need to be that far away to work at maximum range. The gunner in his tank was
able to see that his targets were people—but because they were on a television screen, they were more
like characters in a video game. Many devices can achieve a technological distance, regardless of the
room between combatants. Grossman describes how looking through night-vision sights provides “a
superb form of psychological distance by converting the target into an inhuman green blob.”lxxiv
The distance that a sniper normally works at is long range. Here, the shooter can see the target, can
distinguish human forms, but is largely unable to perceive wounds or get a good look at a face.80 To
hit a target from this range a specially designed weapon is always needed.81
78
On the other hand, screen images of people can also bring us closer together. Television, film, and the internet allow us
to learn about and even talk to people all around the globe who in the past we might never have known existed.
79
Here’s a scary thought. This is likely the range at which nuclear weapons would be launched.
80
If you’ve played certain video games, you’ve probably seen what it’s like to shoot a target from long range.
81
America’s wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have seen the rise of a new weapon: the improvised explosive device, or IED.
IEDs are makeshift bombs, often constructed out of spare parts, that are left by the sides of roads or in populated areas.
Often, they require a remote trigger to detonate. IEDs can work from great distances and can destroy vehicles, creating a
useful gulf between the user and the victim.
PSYCHOLOGY OF WAR RESOURCE | 52
Air-to-air combat takes place at long range. Pilots can see each other, but they can’t spot expressions
A colonel in the U.S. Air Force described such combat as “very clinical, very clean, and not so
personalized. You see an aircraft; you see a target on the ground—you’re not eyeball-to-eyeball with
the sweat and the emotions of combat. I think it’s easier in that sense—you’re not so affected.”lxxv
Compare that “uneasiness” to Manchester’s reaction after he saw his bullet tear through the Japanese
sniper. His tears. His apology. When you have no distance, it becomes difficult to deny you are to
blame for taking a life. Manchester is not alone in his reaction. A Green Beret told a story of
stumbling into an ambush in Vietnam. He came across a boy “between the ages of twelve and
fourteen” who spun around to reveal his weapon. Instinctively, the Green Beret “fired the whole
twenty rounds at the kid.”lxxviii Once his gun was out of ammunition, he let it fall and began to cry.
When soldiers are close enough to look their targets in the eye, they cannot help but relate to them.
This is when non-firers are made. In Italy during World War II, a group of American soldiers
hopped into a ditch to escape from artillery fire. Once inside, they found themselves pressed against a
group of German soldiers doing the exact same thing. “It was a feeling that this was not the time to
be shooting one another,” one of the Americans later explained. “They were human beings, like us,
they were just scared.”lxxix
Soldiers, even enemy soldiers, share a common experience. The sounds, the fears, the orders, the
friendships, the losses: they are the same no matter how different the uniforms might look. When an
experience like escaping from artillery fire is shared, momentary unity forms, built from antagonistic
cooperation. The new antagonist is the war itself.
Because of the intimacy of such an attack, use of an edged weapon is given its own category of
distance. Knife range consists of any attack with a sharp-edged weapon, such as a sword, knife, or
bayonet. While sword play can look elegant on stage or screen, in the frenetic chaos of battle, such
methods take on a brute, blind hacking. An Australian soldier serving in World War I described a
bayonet attack as “just berserk slaughter.”lxxx These are wounds inflicted in such proximity that the
victim’s blood can stain aggressor’s skin.
PSYCHOLOGY OF WAR RESOURCE | 53
Such savagery is often avoided in modern warfare. Rarely have bayonet charges recorded causalities in
the last 100 years of armed combat. If such a maneuver is even tried, the result is usually surrender
before a cut is made. The revulsion to edged-weapon assaults appears instinctive. A German
infantryman said that when he struck with his bayonet, “it turned around in your hand of itself.”lxxxi
He would unconsciously turn his rifle into a club before using the knife on the front.
At knife range and hand-to-hand combat range, a soldier can feel his violence. The pressure and the
fury ripple up the arms as the deed is done. There is little separating the killer from his act. He
knows exactly what he has done, and the memory of that will stay with him forever.
Grossman says taking a life by hand-to-hand combat is “not a natural act.”lxxxii Yet, for centuries,
much of war was this intimate. It is likely war has created far more psychiatric casualties than history
has let us remember.
The very concept of duty connotes a specter of authority. One is required to fulfill the obligation of
duty to satisfy the expectations of a superior or group. Just by using the word duty, the figure of
authority is introduced.
That need turns out to be very strong, Yale psychology professor Stanley Milgrim discovered.
Milgrim, a high school friend of Zimbardo, wanted to test if people would follow an order they
believed would harm someone. He expected around 1% would remain obedient if they thought they
were hurting someone.82
The Milgrim Experiment was first conducted in 1961. In it, a random volunteer was told he would
be helping educate someone by giving the man—‘the learner’—electric shocks if the man incorrectly
answered a question. The shocks were administered by pressing a button which connected to a wire
attached to the man in a separate, unseen room. In truth, there were no electric shocks and ‘the
learner’ was in on the experiment.
Of the 40 volunteers, 65% (26) kept pressing the button until ‘the learner’ fell completely silent.
Had he been knocked unconscious? Had he died? The volunteers had to have wondered. The final
shock was supposed to be 450 volts, as powerful as a jolt from an electric eel. But only one volunteer
refused to administer shocks over 300 volts. Despite the presumable agony of the unseen learner,
people were willing to continue to hurt him as long as the researcher told them to do so.
Milgrim would repeat his experiment a number of times, inserting variations to discover new
reactions. He found physical proximity to the learner affected the volunteer’s willingness to apply a
shock. The closer the volunteer was, the less he would comply. When the volunteer had to grab and
hold the learner’s arm on to an electrified plate, only 30% of the participants reached the final shock.
People, however, don’t obey just anyone’s commands, and neither do soldiers. Shalit reports that in a
1973 Israeli study, the primary factor in making sure soldiers had the will to fight was “identification
with the direct commanding officer.”lxxxv Some desire to submit must be present.
Ideally, for the persons of authority, their influence is internalized by their followers. Otherwise,
firing rates only go up when a person of authority is present. U.S. military training developed the
role of the drill sergeant to instill the voice of authority into the personality of the soldier. Look at
this sample from a drill sergeant’s speech:
From this time on, I will be your mother, your father, your sister, and your brother. I will be your best
friend and your worst enemy. I will wake you up in the morning, and I will tuck you in at night.lxxxvi
In these few words, the drill sergeant touches upon the psychological appeal of the family-at-arms
(“your mother, your father, your sister, and your brother “) and of the pure and simple way of life
(“your best friend and your worst enemy”). The drill sergeant offers to become—no, he commands
that he is—all the family a soldier will need and the only important relationship in his life.
82
Even an optimist like Stanley Milgrim can make pessimistic discoveries.
PSYCHOLOGY OF WAR RESOURCE | 55
Once he has distilled all authority into his person, the drill sergeant can begin conditioning behavior.
Conditioned behaviors are learned forms of conduct built from repeated training exercises.83 They
teach the brain to react automatically to certain situations or stimuli. Like priming, this works at a
level of thought pre-decision making.
Instead of soldiers feeling like they must choose to fire at the enemy, they merely react to the
stimulus of seeing the enemy and fire automatically. The Green Beret in Vietnam who fired twenty
rounds into one “kid” pulled his trigger the instant he saw a designated enemy holding a weapon.
This was at least in part a reaction drilled into him by his training and conditioning.
If a soldier can become one with the crowd, he can gain in courage and lose his own conscience.
Paul, the old World War II veteran, told Grossman that in battle “usually you couldn’t be sure who
it was that did the killing.” Not knowing with certainty whether you or one of your buddies
wounded the enemy helped to ease Paul’s mind. Only when he was absolutely sure that a death had
been at his trigger did the tears form.
83
If this resource were about the Psychology of Hairstylists, you would be reading a different definition of conditioning
behavior.
PSYCHOLOGY OF WAR RESOURCE | 56
effect,” explains Shalit. “The effect of the crowd seems to be much like a mirror, reflecting each
individual’s behavior in those around him and intensifying the existing pattern of behavior.”lxxxviii
This mirror effect can be made more powerful the more bonded the crowd is and the more closely
the crowd works together. Just as the guards in the S.P.E. found themselves acting in a manner they
thought alien to themselves, a conscience-stricken soldier can find himself pulling the trigger when
his individual psyche is woven into the group mind.
Lost within the crowd or directed by an authority figure, people can add emotional distance to their
actions. They do not feel as guilty over choices that they do not consider their sole responsibility.
The crowd or the leader allows people to assign motivations for their actions to someone else.
This diffusion of responsibility can liberate a soldier from internal self-censuring mechanisms,
producing a deindividuated aggression effect. The decision to fire—to aim, to kill—is easier to make
when it does not feel like a personal choice.
Even one extra person can weaken the resistance caused by individual responsibility. Snipers work in
teams of two: one to spot and one to shoot. That way, the decision to kill is never made alone.
The sniper aligns his target in his sight while the spotter does the same. They work as one, although
only half the pair has the gun. In the moment of hesitation, right before the squeeze of the trigger,
the sniper can hear the spotter begin “his soft, religious chant: Fire, fire, fire.”lxxxix
Words are tools that help frame our feelings and actions. By constructing and adjusting the
assumptions that shape how we perceive the world, words can prime our brains for certain behaviors.
Just through what we say, we can create emotional distance between ourselves and others.
The language we use to describe who we fight has a great impact on our willingness to attack them.
Just take any sentence in this resource guide that uses the word “target,” and replace “target” with
“person.” Now take that sentence and replace “person” with the name of your best friend. There are
different emotional charges to shooting a “target” and shooting your best friend.84
Words are integral to the identification mechanism. They help a soldier frame a boat full of people as
an enemy ship. When the ship is destroyed, the mind can sidestep thinking about the people inside.
Maximum range and long range weapons often get to fire at targets or planes or coordinates on a
map. The right choice of words can create that same sense of distance.
84
At least, I’d hope so. Otherwise, you need to get yourself a new best friend.
PSYCHOLOGY OF WAR RESOURCE | 57
Throughout past wars, racial, ethnic, or religious slurs (which will not be printed here) have been
used in replace of an enemy’s true name. They help to dehumanize the opponent. In mocking an
enemy’s race, religion, ethnicity, and culture, a soldier stops looking at that enemy as an equal.
The most infamous incident of the Vietnam War was the My Lai Massacre. A unit of the United
States Army killed hundreds of unnamed Vietnamese civilians, the majority of them women,
children, and elderly. The slaughter was led by Lieutenant William Calley, one of the chief officers of
a platoon. According to report, Lt. Calley said, “I want them dead,” indicating a large group of
civilians rounded up by his troops.xci When his men did not know how to react, he proceeded to fire
at the civilians himself. The soldiers then followed him in the carnage.
After the incident, Lt. Calley spoke of thinking of the Vietnamese, even non-combatants, as “I don’t
know—pawns, blobs, pieces of flesh.”xcii Calley had genuine difficulty attaching the word people to
his enemy. In his use of language, he could avoid the moral weight of taking another’s life because he
refused to think in terms of human life.
In all my years in the army I was never taught that Communists were human beings. We never
conceived of old people, men, women, children, babies.xciii
Calley reclassified his targets as less than human. That made it acceptable to treat them inhumanly.85
The response to protect or seek revenge—often they can be muddled together—is a powerful
motivation to fight and to accept what is necessary in the heat of war. In his 1949 Studies in Social
Psychology in World War II: The American Soldier, sociologist S.A. Stouffer’s reported that 44% of
American soldiers in World War II said they’d “really like to kill a Japanese soldier” but only 6% said
the same about Germans.xcv The attack on Pearl Harbor created resentment and hostility. Those
feelings found outlet in the violence of war. Since Germany had not led a direct strike against
America, they escaped the same fierce rage.86
If a soldier can envision the enemy’s guilt, see a reason why the enemy must be punished, he creates a
moral distance, separating the enemy from the soldier’s concept of goodness. This can boost his
readiness to take aggressive action. Vengeance for the death of friends, especially fellow soldiers, is
often the extra trigger that pushes a soldier into combat mode.
85
That he was in a position of authority also allowed My Lai to happen. Not every soldier in his unit likely shared
hisdegree of hate, but many of them still went along and obeyed his order. Later, only Lt. Calley would be convicted of
war crimes for My Lai. He served just three years of house arrest out of a life sentence.
86
The Holocaust was rumored, but not an established fact, during World War II.
PSYCHOLOGY OF WAR RESOURCE | 58
Then he saw an explosion toss his friend “This time it’s personal.”
Josiah into the sky. Beah crawled
through the swamp to reach him. He This quote became famous in the tagline to the movie
Jaws: The Revenge (apparently, in the three previous
watched as the water in Josiah’s eyes
Jaws films the shark was strictly professional when it
“was replaced with blood that turned his came to eating people). However, the theme of
brown eyes red.” This was when Beah vengeance awaking dormant abilities in a protagonist
stood up. His commanding officer has long been around. In The Iliad, Achilles refuses to
yanked him back into the mud, away fight against Troy until his lover Patroclus is killed by
from the bullets, and yelled at him to the Trojan prince Hector. Peter Parker doesn’t use his
shoot. Beah then spotted his friend spider powers until he loses his Uncle Ben. This may
be a common theme in literature, film, and comic
Musa lying nearby, “too relaxed” and books, but it is also grounded in reality. People do
covered in blood. That was when he respond differently to situations once they’ve
stood and shot his first man. A thirst for become personal. A private connection to a tragedy
vengeance consumed him: can open up more powerful emotional reactions.
Every time I stopped shooting… and saw my two lifeless friends, I angrily pointed my gun into the
swamp and killed more people.xcvi
When the enemy attacks (or when you attack the enemy), a moral distance appears, cognitively
restructuring any resistance to using lethal force. The conscience’s revulsion at killing moves to the
enemy who is trying to harm you. Framing yourself as the victim of someone else’s aggression frees
up the mind to respond with violence.
The vengeance response can relate to an event in the far past or the immediate past. It can even be
projected into the future, if a person imagines an attack will come.
The psychologists Sloane and Friedman repeatedly speak of how modern American soldiers are
trained to be “aggressive, forceful, and ready to act in an environment where the focus is kill or be
killed.”xcvii The point of this training is not to explain to soldiers the concept of self-defense. The
repetition of this idea conditions soldiers to apply their inward disgust at killing to the enemy before
applying it to themselves. If people think their enemy is willing to kill, then they become more
willing to kill the enemy. We are less likely to grant mercy when we do not expect it in return.
During World War II, a Japanese officer tried to instill the thirst for vengeance in his men using a
myth. Colonel Masonobu Tsuji wrote to the soldiers he commanded that “When you encounter the
PSYCHOLOGY OF WAR RESOURCE | 59
enemy after landing, think of yourself as an avenger come at last face to face with your father’s
murdered. Here is the man whose death will lighten your heart of its burden of brooding anger.”xcviii
The colonel wanted his troops to believe the American enemy had murdered their own fathers. This
fabricated story would then get them to fight harder by fortifying their purpose in war and devaluing
their opposition as father-murdering maniacs.
Vengeance widens the scope of conflict to an epic scale. No longer is a battle about just those
fighting it. It now includes the memory of the lost and a noble self-righteousness.
The more a soldier sees himself acting not for his own needs but for the good of a noble cause, the
more committed he is to the fight, and the less doubt and self-reflection he has about his own actions
or their consequences. The soldier becomes just a small, solitary part, joined in an objectified
struggle. Here, the cause itself acts like a crowd, the soldier losing his individual identity within the
super-personal ‘noble cause.’ Becoming a mere representative of righteousness, he no longer fights for
selfish reasons.87 He does not need to gain personally as his actions in the conflict are for the good of
the cause itself. He may even go so far as to sacrifice himself for his cause.
Moral distance can inflate the righteousness of a struggle. Soon, the conflict becomes more prized
than the people fighting it. As humanity becomes forgotten, basic morality can often be lost.
87
An objectified struggle not only makes an individual see himself as a representation, it also makes him see his enemy as
one. Lt. Calley, for example, viewed the Vietnamese as representatives of Communism and not as human beings.
88
The event or reason used to justify a war is called a casus belli, which is Latin for occasion for war.
PSYCHOLOGY OF WAR RESOURCE | 60
adrenaline levels remain high (thus producing more testosterone), his body could achieve these
neurochemical conditions.
The distancing techniques people use to become psychologically more comfortable with carrying out
a lethal act could also make the brain more chemically suitable to pursuing aggressive impulses.89
Conscience at a Distance
Even at a distance, a resistance to killing persists.
Research done by the United States Air Force determined that 1% of its fighter pilots in World War
II did nearly 40% of the air-to-air combat strikes and that a majority of its pilots never even tried to
shoot anyone down. Even with physical distance between a soldier and the enemy, most soldiers
would rather not carry the weight of it.
To counteract this imbedded opposition, the military has used myth and behavioral conditioning to
create more psychological distance. Consider the U.S. Marines, with their unofficial slogan, “To be a
Marine you must kill.”c A soldier joining the Marines must accept this mythology in advance.
Even after all the training, psychological conditioning, and technological buffers, there still are
reports of soldiers who resist killing—such as a Marine sniper who said, “You don’t like to hit
ordinary troops, because they’re usually scared draftees or worse… The guys to shoot are the big
brass.”ci Empathy is still possible through the sniper rifle’s lens. A soldier may feel required to kill, yet
would still rather target someone important enough to justify it.
As shown in the chart, whether a person tries to kill his enemy is a complex calculus based on
distance, the diffusion of responsibility, and the value of the target. The decision depends on the
interaction of all these factors in that long, haunting moment just before the target lives or dies.
Soldier 2.0
Warfare is an evolving process, and the warriors it demands change over time. Tank drivers, infantry
and pilots have replaced knights and archers. We will examine three categories of modern soldiers.
During the three years Beah spent as a soldier in the state army, he
celebrated his thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth birthdays.
Nearly everyone he fought alongside was also a child.
89
Studies have yet to be done examining cortisol levels in soldiers as they experience combat.
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The use of child soldiers is an unpleasant but common reality of war. The practice is not new.
Ancient Sparta used children as young as seven in military campaigns, often as a form of early
training. The British Navy used youths as cabin boys and ‘powder monkeys’ prepping cannons
during the ocean battles of the 18th and 19th century. Children even assisted and fought during the
American Revolution and the American Civil War.
Today, child soldiers are most common in Africa. They have constituted more than a quarter of the
troops in at least nine conflicts in Africa over the last 20 years. But there have also been child soldiers
in Latin American countries like Colombia and in Asian countries such as Sri Lanka or Nepal. In
Burma, as known as Myanmar, tens of thousands of children have been recruited into military roles.
According to the magazine Foreign Policy, more than 70 military organizations in 19 countries
around the world have recruited and used child soldiers between 2004 and 2007. These armies of
coercion have no limits as to whom they’ll drag into war. Girls represent as much as 40% of some
armed groups.90 Girl soldiers have fought in forty wars in the last two decades.
The quandary with child soldiers is that they are both victims, often abducted from their families or
forced into service after watching everyone they know lost to conflict, and dangerous aggressors. A 14
year-old gunman was the first to kill a NATO troop in Afghanistan. The Taliban’s fighters include
8,000 children, according to 2009 estimates. These child soldiers, much like the boy shot by the
Green Beret, are shown little mercy despite their youth.
Beah himself killed scores of people. “I felt pity for no one,” he confessed many years later. The war
changed his joyful smile into a frightened sneer. He thought his “heart had frozen”.
How should we treat such soldiers, innocent-faced killers stolen from their childhood? Likely
traumatized before they even see combat, these children often have no family outside of their military
comrades. After going through a six-month rehabilitation center, Beah watched as a companion at
the center had to be sent back to his army since none of his relatives would take the wild boy back.
What happens to children raised on violence and bloodshed as they grow older? After 9-11, many of
the Taliban leaders of Afghanistan claimed they had served as child soldiers in Afghanistan’s struggle
against the Soviet Union’s occupation during the 1980s. The world could be watching its future
warlords take shape among today’s child soldiers.
90
It’s a twisted sort of girl power these armies employ.
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The first kamikaze attack occurred in November 1944, nearly three years after America joined the
war. It was a sign of desperation—Japanese generals were increasingly afraid the enemy would
achieve its objective, an invasion of their island homeland. Americans at war and back home were
frightened and fascinated by these men who would use their own lives as weapons.
Such men were a small part of the Japanese army. Yet they became its
most lasting icon. And, in many ways they were successful. In the Facing an enemy who uses his
Battle of Okinawa, fought on land, in the air, and at sea, some 2000 own life as a weapon causes
kamikaze slammed their explosive planes into more than 300 ships,
great anxiety for a soldier.
killing over 5000 Americans in the most devastating naval battle in U.S. history.
For any war to begin, soldiers must be willing to risk their lives. The choice of self-sacrifice has likely
been made by a few in combat since the time of clubs and arrows. Audie Murphy’s brazen assault,
carried out with help from a flaming tank, certainly did not exhibit much concern for self-safety.
Yet to put one’s life at risk and to give one’s life away deliberately feel like two significantly different
choices. Perhaps it is because the second choice suggests not only that a fighter does not fear death,
but that he in fact relishes or desires it.
The Science study suggests suicide terrorists are motivated by the same circumstance and drives that
affect normal soldiers. Though educated, they often come from countries suffering from
underemployment—few decent jobs are available. On top of that, they most commonly come from a
“youthful and relatively unattached population.”ciii These are idle people, looking for meaning. The
bonding qualities of conflict are therefore appealing. These men (suicide terrorists are
overwhelmingly male) find purpose in a grand ideological or territorial struggle. They meet
charismatic trainers who provide them heuristics with which to order the world. They share with
their fellow fighters the unifying bond that all are ready to give their lives to the cause.
The extremism of their (potential) actions creates a rallying point. As “minor differences” go, the
active willingness to give up one’s life—to use one’s life as a weapon—is pretty significant. A pride is
generated by being among the few to believe in carrying out such an action. Before any of them go
out and perform a sacrificial operation, he makes a “formal social contract, usually in the form of a
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video testament,” a lasting demonstration of adherence to the group’s identity.civ He knows he will
live on in the memory of his terrorist friends.
As these suicide terrorists train together, they become a substitute family unit. A group of 39
unmarried recruits to a Pakistani terrorist organization all reported they believed sacrificing
themselves would protect their “family” in the future.cv The Science study concluded that “a critical
factor determining suicide terrorism behavior is arguably loyalty to intimate cohorts of peers.”cvi
Their family-at-arms is built around the idea of suicide terrorism, but they pursue the same
psychological motives that pulled William Manchester from a hospital bed back to his company.
The same psychological processes are at work in suicide terrorists as with any soldier. What makes
their acts seem so heinous is not how they carry them out, but that they usually employ
asymmetrical warfare. They do not go after military targets; they go after civilians. Their attacks are
not designed to win on a battlefield. They are designed to traumatize civilians.
Wars no longer feature clear boundaries. Fighters can dress as supermarket shoppers. Violent assaults
can happen at the airport. The suicide terrorist aims to turn the whole world into a war zone. The
success of this mission depends on how the world responds to feeling threatened. If those targeted by
the terrorists begin to live in fear, these brand new combatants have achieved the first of their goals.
In the past, the restrictions on peacekeepers made them heavily armed non-combatants. In the
Bosnian War, United Nations peacekeepers from the Netherlands watched as atrocities were
committed against Bosnian Muslims. Instead of being able to intercede, the concern was that if they
shot a Serbian fighter they would start an international incident.
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The use of non-aggressive, security-oriented missions has only grown since then. The African Union,
an organization of various African countries, has sent soldiers to guard refugee camps and to oversee
transitions as dictatorial governments leave power. Because the African Union tries not to take sides,
it does not employ its troops on behalf of any one state or rebel group. They can only be deployed to
watch over those caught in the crossfire.
Neutrality is a central concept of peacekeeping forces. They must be in the war zone to serve and
protect the lives of the non-combatants who live there. They need to, on some level, put those lives
ahead of their own. Recent wars, however, have shown a need for hybrid armies that must keep the
peace while also engaging in raids and aggressive missions to hunt the enemy. America’s wars in Iraq
and Afghanistan call on troops to do both types of operations. However, many of the civilians being
defended have difficulty seeing the American soldiers as neutral since they first arrived as invaders.
The soldiers assigned to this dual task must grapple with new psychological complexities. They must
identify not only with their combat comrades, but with the residents whose land they occupy, whose
culture, appearance, and practices are likely similar to those of the enemy. And to achieve the
peacekeeping aspect, they also need the residents, who look at them as foreigners, to identify with
them. Battlefield aggression and out-group hostility must be precariously and rigorously controlled,
as the battlefield and out-group identification can shift daily. The self-censuring restrictions of these
peacekeeping hybrid soldiers are an intricate set of rules that are still being written and rewritten.91
How a soldier is framed—neutral, selfless, heroic, greedy—greatly affects the success of any military
campaign. If an army seems interested primarily in gain for its native country, it might not receive
cooperation from the natives.92 At the same time, how a soldier sees himself affects how he conducts
his mission. If he frames himself as neutral peacekeeper, working to earn the trust and respect of
those he claims to protect, he stands a much better chance of turning these civilians into allies.
War’s psychological dynamics are changing as the role of armed conflict evolves in the 21st century.
Conclusion
War is a social context that provides psychological distance from violent acts. Yet, even in war,
people face strong mental and emotional resistance to performing their responsibilities as soldiers,
specifically the duty to kill the enemy. Soldiers exist in a state of internal conflict, pulled by their
duty to the military, duty to their fellow soldier, duty to their conscience, and the will to survive.
In his introduction to On Killing, Lt. Col. Grossman captures the inherent irony in being both a
soldier and a human being. Writing of non-firers, he expresses mixed emotions:
As a soldier who may have stood beside them I can’t help but be dismayed at their failure to support
their cause, their nation, and their fellows; but as a human being who has understood some of the
burden they have borne, and the sacrifice that they have made, I cannot help but be proud of them
and the noble characteristic they represent in our species.cvii
The personal battle between the “soldier” and the “human being” can be as ferocious a conflict as
any faced by those in the military. The traumatic memories of war are themselves combat wounds. In
91
The current buzzed about name in politics for this hybrid war/peacekeeping mission is “smart power.”
92
See: Avatar.
PSYCHOLOGY OF WAR RESOURCE | 65
chapter 4, we look specifically at the psychic causalities created by war. Meanwhile, there are several
key points to remember from this investigation of the psychology of soldiers at war.
Historically, many soldiers in wars—even World War II—did not fire their weapons.
The fear of letting one’s fellow soldiers down is the key motivation during war.
The longer soldiers are at war, the greater the chance they develop psychological problems.
The weight of killing another person can be a tremendous burden for a soldier.
To make the act of killing more psychologically acceptable, a soldier employs tactics that
create distance—physical, emotional, cultural, or moral—between him and the victim.
Often in war, the language of soldiers allows them to dehumanize the enemy.
Child soldiers, who have been used throughout history, show the effectiveness of behavioral
conditioning, group mind, and dehumanization on young, developing minds.
A recent development in warfare is the rise of suicide terrorism, where individuals are willing
to kill themselves to facilitate an attack, frequently against civilians.
Is stepping into a battle while refusing to fire at the enemy an act of bravery or of foolishness?
Why are non-firers so rarely depicted in stories or movies if they are so common?
Is the pain of killing another person the result mainly of cultural learning?
Is it good to come up with ways to reduce the psychological trauma of going to war?
If all killing were done using remotely-operated robots or machines, would that increase or
decrease the number of people killed?
At what age or at what level experience does a “child” soldier become an “adult” soldier?
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Objectives
By the time you complete this chapter, you should be able to answer the following questions.
Introduction
To look at the psychology of war and not discuss the effects of combat that linger after the bombs
and bullets have been put back in storage seems obscene. A soldier’s experiences are trunked up in his
mind and carried home to be unpacked and repacked throughout the rest of his life. This is a heavy
cargo of blurred faces, piercing noises, and friends lost to history’s violence.
The idea that returning home from war can be more difficult than war itself appears so often in
literature about combat that it can seem like a cliché. Yet the psychological turmoil that faces those
who have fought is undeniable. Nearly every soldier returning home will have psychological
symptoms, according to psychologists Laurie Sloane and Matthew Friedman.93 The former
psychology instructor and soldier Lt. Col. Grossman writes, “Within a few months of sustained
combat, some symptoms of stress will develop in almost all participating soldiers.”cviii The severity of
post-war psychological issues varies from individual to individual. But no soldier is left untouched.
Psychological distress is the legacy of war. The more openly we admit that, the better we as a society
can assist returning soldiers in their recovery.
93
Their statement of “nearly every” should make you recall the Swank and Marchand study.
PSYCHOLOGY OF WAR RESOURCE | 67
Of the four myths described by Sloane and Friedman about returning from war, half relate to
accepting change. Myth 1 is “My relationship with my partner and family will be the same when I
get home from war.” Myth 2 is “My life will be the same as it was before I left for war.”95 After the
upheaval of military service, returning to civilian life requires readjustment and renegotiation. cix
Often, a soldier has had no opportunity to reflect on his time in combat until leaving that time
behind. Not until Ishmael Beah found himself at the Benin Home and began meeting with Esther
did the emotions of his days as a soldier return to him.
Beah’s unconscious transformed his memories into dreams of “faceless gunmen” and one dream
“that involved lots of people stabbing and shooting one another, and I felt all their pain.” Within
these dreams, his impressions of combat are clearly being expressed, even though he is not addressing
actual circumstances. While he could not yet confront openly what he had done and witnessed as a
child soldier, his brain still recorded the emotions and episodes that it had sensed. These stored up
memories and feelings sink into the psyche of every soldier. For the ones who have seen direct
combat or have even killed, the sensations re-imagined by the unconscious are even more intense.
Battlemind
The psychological needs of a war zone differ from the psychological needs once a soldier has returned
to the community. A useful mindset in conflict area can become harmful in the context of peace.
Obviously, a soldier does not want to treat friends and family as he would treat the enemy.
94
Notably, there are no munchkins.
95
Myths 3 and 4 are “All I need is the love and support of my family to get through any post-deployment difficulties”
and “Every returning service member wants a large welcome home party.”
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To make soldiers aware of this difference and to help them in their adjustment, the United States
Army developed Battlemind training. Created under the guidance of Colonel Carl Castro at the
Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, Battlemind is an acronym, each letter standing for a
something good on the battlefield that can be damaging at home.
The first T in Battlemind is for targeted aggression. The ideal in war is that aggression is only
expressed at the enemy. While that may not always be the case, soldiers are certainly given outlet and
directive to use aggression in a manner would rarely be consider appropriate away from combat.
The second T refers to tactical awareness. Soldiers are constantly on guard for attack, especially in
contemporary wars where they are a target even when they are on their base or driving down a road.
Bringing that mentality to relative safety of home-life can make one seem paranoid. Returning
soldiers can feel “keyed up,” perpetually anxious and uneasy, searching out dangers where none exist.
L is for lethally armed. Soldiers carry guns more commonly and openly than is usually acceptable in
a non-combat setting. Some soldiers97 become deeply attached to their gun. As Beah said, in a fight
he gripped his gun for “comfort.” The association of gun with a source of comfort can remain
imbedded in some soldiers. This is what happened to Audie Murphy. Guns always pose a potential
risk, however, especially when people without proper training have access to them.
E is for emotional control. Whether the product of training or the unconscious suppression that
happened with Ishmael Beah, emotions experienced during war are often held in check. Immediately
after Manchester cried “I’m sorry,” he had to return to battle. There may be no opportunity for a
soldier to deal with his emotions, as feelings are set aside for the sake of the next mission. Soldiers
become so accustomed to not engaging their feelings that they forget how to express them, even
where they would be safe to do so. Sloane and Friedman describe this as becoming “emotionally
96
Reading out these letters this way feels a little like Sesame Street for soldiers.
97
And, apparently, Gilbert Arenas.
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detached, numb, or uncaring.”cxi Battlemind training is intended to remind soldiers that once they
are home they will need to open up to maintain their previous relationships and build new ones.
M stands for mission operational security, a jargon-y military way of saying soldiers should not
reveal details about their assignments.98 If the wrong piece of information is leaked, it could put lives
at risk. The need for secrecy is not as great outside the world of war strategies and battle tactics. A
grocery list is not classified information. Much like reliance on buddies and emotional control, the
pressure to keep things private can pull a soldier away from his social attachments at home.
The I is for individual responsibility, which is the internalized form of accountability. As much as
they might try to avoid it, soldiers can’t often help but feel responsible for actions and events that
happened during war. While this strengthens the bonds that unite armies, platoons, and friends,
away from the war this can develop into crippling guilt over those lost or killed.
The N in Battlemind is for non-defensive driving, a method for driving in hostile environments. On
civilian roads, the driver seems aggressive and inconsiderate.
Finally, D is for discipline. Similar to A for accountability, the focus on discipline is a reminder that
the attitudes absorbed in the army may be too much for home life.
Battlemind is specifically intended for soldiers trained in the U.S. Armed Forces to aid them in
readjusting to life away from war. Often, the prescriptions deal with issues brought on by the Army’s
own training. It highlights the degree of transformation generated through military service. Even if a
soldier never suffers from a severe psychological concern, he will still face mental and emotional
challenges from having been a part of war.
What Sloane and Friedman are saying is that for war veterans mental distress is the new normal.
That stress can manifest as a variety of symptoms, including many of the behaviors covered under
Battlemind. These are customary reactions, Sloane and Friedman suggest. Veterans need not worry
about seeking medical help for them unless they persist for six to eight weeks.
98
If you want to sound like you’re in the U.S. Army, next time you tell your friends a secret, swear them all to “mission
operational security.”
PSYCHOLOGY OF WAR RESOURCE | 70
The physical consequences include restlessness and trouble sleeping, a loss of appetite, and
headaches. Nightmares and reoccurring thoughts of war are very to be expected. Beah likely suffered
through war zone reactions when he first came to Benin house.
Because the mind does not leave the battlefield as easily as the body, veterans often have difficulty
concentrating the first few months they are back. Ordinary tasks, dull and monotonous to begin
with, can seem pointless since they lack the charge of mortal danger.
The dark emotions of war—the anger and the sadness and the grief—pass through the mind, yet the
soldier may want to cling to them, twisted mementos from his time away. Often a sense of isolation
develops as the soldier feels out of place because his experiences have changed how he perceives
things. “This may make you doubt yourself or mistrust others,” warn Sloane and Friedman.cxiii
Frankly, these are feelings that pass through many of us from time to time. For the returning soldier,
they happen to all focus on the event of war and they happen to occur all at once. This combination
can lead to nervousness or even panic that this condition will never change. Hopelessness follows.
Yet none of these reactions are unusual. While they may lead to inconsiderate behavior, they make
sense. Nearly every soldier will live through war zone stress. The vast majority will recover.
Excessive anger can manifest as emotional outbursts or physical disputes. The wildness of these
eruptions can scare friends and family, putting loved ones in danger. However, they also can feel
energizing and justified, a flush of the sense of power sometimes found on the battlefield. They can
even think they are above the old rules they lived by. As Swofford explains, “The problem with living
through war is the false sense that after combat you are untouchable.”cxiv
While much of the military is monotonous waiting, the days in combat can provide a rush. Like
Chris Hedges, there are soldiers that become addicted to the hyperawareness and heightened
intensity of battle excitement. Back home, they chase after experiences that give them that old charge
of adrenaline, perhaps never finding anything as sweet and satisfying as the war once was.
Anger masks other emotional issues. Until a soldier can overcome the boiling, seething energy of his
anger, he can’t confront the buried feelings that make him so combustible.
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Guilt
Soldiers can become overwhelmed by remorse, especially if they’ve killed. Back home, they can feel
they don’t deserve the benefits and beauty found when the world is at peace. Away from combat, the
conscience can grow in volume from a low gut rumble to a motor-mouth scream.
Sometimes a soldier can see specific choices he could have made differently. He can picture what he
wished he done. By revisiting and rewriting the past, the veteran imagines friends he should have
saved and enemies he should have avoided killing. Such revisions of memory are the result of
hindsight bias. A soldier can become lost in them.
Depression is not an unusual condition. Studies indicate 17% of Americans will experience it at
some point in their lives. Returning soldiers have to be monitored carefully since expected
withdrawal and detachment behavior can seem like depression. The new normal can frequently be
misdiagnosed as a problem situation, and it can even conceal when things have gone truly wrong.
Traumatic grief is another disturbing difficulty for returning soldiers. While grief is felt by nearly all
who leave war with friends injured or dead, some forms of grief can grow excessive. With traumatic
grief, the soldier focuses on a specific loss, clinging so tightly to the memory of the deceased he
recreates his friend’s passing over and over again in his mind. Essentially, the trauma sufferer stops
living in order to become a permanent griever.
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There are three indicators for PTSD: re-experiencing symptoms, avoidance and a state of emotional
numbness, and hyper actions or responses. For a confirmed diagnosis, a veteran must display one
consistent re-experiencing episode, three signs of avoidant or numb behavior, and two markers of
intense, hyper reactions. Likely every soldier returning from war will face some of these problems.
Doctors only treat the condition as a potent case of PTSD when multiple symptoms occur together.
PTSD can take over a life. It is like a virus in a computer, degrading the memory, preventing the
programming from functioning right. For a person with PTSD, some days she just cannot power up
in the morning. She wants to move forward, work on the next project, when out of nowhere a
flashback knifes through her mind, making her re-experience the trauma that spawned her condition.
Because of the flashbacks, nightmares, and memories, she can never really leave the war—its specific
moments of carnage. She can still hear the final shouts of a fallen comrade or taste the debris kicked
up by the explosion that just missed ripping her apart. It is like an awful war movie is playing inside
your head—only you are the star of the movie. At any second, your mind might leap back into it.
As the traumatic memories take over, sufferers of PTSD withdraw from friends and family—and
from themselves. Many feel that the walking cinema they have become is no longer deserving of
friendship and love. This means she might push away attempts to help her. In chapter II, we looked
at psychic numbing as a temporary response to information about tragic events. With PTSD, a
person goes through a prolonged psychic numbing—an effort not to feel anything at all—as she tries
to break away from painful feelings she cannot control.cxvi
The positive news is that 60% of people with PTSD will recover with
or without treatment.
99
PTSD can also occur in people who have lived through a devastating accident, suffered through childhood violence, or
survived a serious car crash.
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served. The wide disparity in these numbers may be due to the lack of knowledge about the disorder
at the time. Many people likely did not receive the proper diagnosis.100
Another reason for misdiagnosis results from how PTSD can work on the mind. Doctors consider
there to be three classes of the condition: chronic PTSD, PTSD in remission (with occasional
relapses), and delayed onset PTSD.
The sad reality is that almost no soldier will ever completely escape his or her war trauma.
Physical Wounds
The psychological pain of war can also be paired with tremendous physical injuries. Men and woman
can lose limbs, become paralyzed, or have disfiguring scars. More and more veterans must learn to
live with substantial changes to their body and appearance, the result of improved medical
techniques that can save people from injuries that in the past were fatal.
Being a casualty does not cause greater psychological damage than the ordinary experiences of a
soldier. Often, it’s the physical injuries suffered by friends that can lead to psychological issues (like
guilt or traumatic grief), as they feel responsible for not doing enough to protect their buddies.
There are certain injuries which can directly cause behavioral problems. Traumatic brain injuries
(TBI), which occur in 60 to 80% of blast victims, can affect mood and self-control.101 Like a
concussion, no bruise may be visible as the wound occurs in the brain. But because of this unseen
damage, a person can seem depressed or wildly aggressive. Only through specific medical tests can a
soldier know if these symptoms are the result of TBI or psychological reactions to battle.
100
Because traumatic events also cause other problems, there is an 80% chance that someone with PTSD will also have at
least one other psychological issue. This can confuse diagnoses.
101
Traumatic brain injuries are a recently classified injury that can easily go undetected. The result of shockwaves
rippling through the brain, TBI are common now due both to the new techniques used by combatants in their war zones
and because advances in helmets and armor have allowed people to survive blasts that in the past would have been fatal.
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How we care for veterans, not just as individuals but as a society, can do much to heal their wounds,
both of body and of mind.
The name of any war is typically followed by two dates: one before the hyphen saying when the war
began and one after the hyphen saying when war officially ended. That is one of the nicest features
about wars. You know when they are over.
When a soldier must face the internal combat of psychological trauma, it is possible no date will
follow the hyphen. Soldiers have watched their friends fall. They have felt the blast of hate in enemy
fire. Worst of all, they have seen and caused the deaths of strangers, some of whom night have been
innocents caught in the crossfire.
How can all that pain just be taken away? If it were to disappear, where would it go?
Even medical specialists offer no easy cures. Sloane and Friedman write that veterans must “learn to
handle” the psychological pressures built up from war—and suggest that “you may need to learn to
live with some of your guilty feelings”—but they never offer any plan for learning these things.cxvii
Sloane and Friedman do direct soldiers to seek help from a “chaplain, counselor, or therapist”. There
is something to that. Like war itself, the struggle to overcome war cannot be undertaken alone.
Community, which plays a key role in launching wars, turns out to be the best hope for salvation
from the experience of fighting in them. Soldiers desperately need social groups to provide them with
a sense of meaning and support.
The actions and choices made in war can work like grenades that have exploded inside the people
who made them, filling them with psychic shrapnel. Our communities, however, can help carry the
weight of this pain. The challenge for veterans is to not withdraw into their anger, grief, and guilt
and cling to their psychic wounds. The challenge for society is to embrace and support them.
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Not every soldier will need this help. Few may ask for it.102
When told of a plan to invade Rome, Cineas, who worked for the king,
asked what would be the use of this victory. Pyrrhus replied that he
would possess the wealth of Italy.
Cineas inquired what the king would do next after taking Rome.
Pyrrhus said he would then be in position to conquer Sicily, adding
more to his wealth and dominion.
Pyrrhus told Cineas that with such land and power he could dominate Macedonia and all of Greece.
Imagining he now ruled over all the Mediterranean, Pyrrhus told his philosopher, “Then we shall
celebrate and relax in pleasant company, sharing the secrets of our thoughts with boon companions.”
Cineas looked at his king. “Then why go to war when we can take such pleasures right now?”
This apocryphal tale has been carried down through the centuries as a lesson to those who lust for
war. What goal is worth the blood, the nightmares and the horror, the lingering suffering of war?
Why and when should we break the peace if peace is our aim in the end? What cause justifies a
leader sending men and women to a distant land to risk their lives?
Conclusion
War changes everyone and everything. That is part of its appeal. Go to war and you test your
character. Stand and fight and you discover who you are. Return home someone new, someone
stronger. Like any education, the lessons a soldier brings home will last her entire lifetime. Like any
education, there will be some lessons she will wish she hadn’t learned.
A person’s experiences of war, even the most banal of them, likely will remain with her for the rest of
her days. The triumphs and friendships will always inspire her. The traumas and lived nightmares
will always haunt her. But people are resilient. They can and most often do find ways to live with
their past. Often, it is the darkest lessons from which we learn the most wisdom.
102
Because of the culture of the military, which emphasizes discipline, strength, and self-reliance, many soldiers have a
hard time asking for help. Added to that may be feelings of guilt that make a soldier feel he doesn’t deserve people’s care.
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It is impossible to know for certain what conflicts and hostilities the future will bring. When we
understand the cost of war—how deep the debt is in the simple number of human lives affected—we
can form a more complete picture of what war can truly bring us.
There are some key points to recall from this review of psychological issues facing returning warriors:
Everyone returning from war can expect a period of readjustment. Their lives will have been
altered, and they will have to get reacquainted with both the old and new at home.
The experience of combat and hostile fire will leave every soldier with stress symptoms.
People can try to suppress their emotional experiences, but cannot escape them.
Armed forces acknowledge that military service will transform the way a soldier thinks and
behaves. That is why they create coping strategies such as Battlemind.
If war zone stress reactions, aggressive feelings, adrenaline addiction, guilt, depression, or
grief continue past six months after returning from a war zone, treatment is recommended.
Soldiers can feel survivor guilt for having lived when their buddies did not.
Without treatment, 60% of PTSD suffers recover and return to a normal life routine.
Soldiers who suffer from war-related psychological conditions can find the strength of their
symptoms diminish the more social support they receive.
To what length should societies adapt to treat and care for the needs of returning veterans?
What must be gained from a war for the human cost to be worth the fight?
Do you think people are properly educated about the psychological costs of war?
“After War” is the name of this chapter. Could these words ever apply to society as a whole?
PSYCHOLOGY OF WAR RESOURCE | 77
Works Consulted
Atran, Scott. Genesis of Suicide Terrorism. Science 299: 1534-1539 March 7, 2003.
Beah, Ishamel. The Making, and Unmaking, of a Child Soldier. The New York Times January 14th, 2007.
Coser, Lewis. The Functions of Social Conflict (New York: The Free Press, 1956).
Craig, Ian W. The Importance of Stress and Genetic Variation in Human Aggression. BioEssays 29: 227-236 2007
Craig, Ian W. and Kelly E. Halton. Genetics of Human Aggressive Behavior. Human Genetics 126:101-113 June 9, 2009.
Dutton, Donald. The Psychology of Genocide, Massacres, and Extreme Violence (Westport, CT: Praeger Security
International, 2007).
Ehrenreich. Barbara. Blood Rites: Origins and History of the Passions of War (New York: Henry Holt and Company,
1997).
Freud, Sigmund. Civilization and Its Discontents (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2005).
Fry, Douglas P. Beyond War: The Human Potential for Peace (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).
Gat, Azar. War in Human Civilization (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).
Gates, Scott and Simon Reich. Think Again: Child Soldiers. Foreign Policy. May 2009. [web exclusive]
Grossman, Lt. Col. Dave. On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society (New York: Little,
Brown and Company, 1996).
Hedges, Chris. War is a Force the Gives Us Meaning (New York: Anchor Books, 2003).
Keeley, Lawrence H. War Before Civilization (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).
LeShan, Lawrence. The Psychology of War (New York: Helios Press, 2002).
"Mischel’s Marshmallows". RadioLab. Narr. by Jad Abumrad and Robert Krulwich. WNYC. 3/9/2009.
“New Normal?” RadioLab. Narr. by Jad Abumrad and Robert Krulwich. WNYC. 10/19/2009.
Orwell, George. 1984 (New York: Signet Classic, 1992).
Shaw, R. Paul and Yuma Wong. Genetic Seeds of Warfare: Evolution, Nationalism, and Patriotism (Boston: Unwin
Hyman, 1989).
Siegel, Allen and Jeff Victoroff. Understanding Human Aggression: New Insights from Neuroscience. International Journal
of Law and Psychiatry 32: 209-215. 2009.
Sloane, Laurie B., PhD and Matthew J. Friedman, MD, PhD. After the War Zone: A Practical Guide for the Returning
Troops and Their Families (Philadelphia, PA: Da Capo Press, 2008).
Sorel, Georges. Reflections on Violence (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
Sovic, Paul. “If I look at the mass I will never act”: Psychic Numbing and Genocide. Judgment and Decision Making, Vol.
2, No. 2, April 2007, pp. 79-95.
Swofford, Anthony. Jarhead (New York: Scribner, 2003).
Terburg, David, Barak Morgan, and Jack van Honk. The Testosterone-Cortisol Ratio: A Hormonal Marker for Proneness to
Social Aggression. International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 32: 216-223. 2009.
Tzu, Sun. The Art of War (Minneapolis, MN: Filiquarian Publishing LLC, 2006)
Wahlund, Katarina and Marianne Kristiansson. Aggression, Psychopathy, and Brain Imaging—Review and Future
Recommendations. International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 32: 266-271. 2009.
Wrangham, Richard and Dale Peterson. Demonic Males: Apes and the Origins of Human Violence (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Company, 1996).
PSYCHOLOGY OF WAR RESOURCE | 78
Even when he isn’t writing for the World Scholar’s Cup, he likely
remains huddled over his laptop. When he manages to escape the
gravitational force of his keyboard, he enjoys performing improv,
visiting his local farmer’s market, and thinking appropriate thoughts
while telling inappropriate jokes.
Daniel is pictured here at a shaved ice shop named Guppy House, celebrating a Clippers victory.
Ten years ago, Daniel had the chance to visit Kosovo and observe firsthand (guided by a local family)
some of the damage from the ethnic conflicts of the 1990s. The visit ended with him and his friend
Sasha hiding in the back seat of a very old Mercedes, being smuggled into Montenegro.
i
As quoted in Blood Rites, Barbara Ehrenreich (Henry Holt and Company, 1997), p.117.
ii
From Genetic Seeds of Warfare, Paul Shaw and Yuma Wong (Unwin Hyman, 1989), p. 2.
iii
As quoted in Ehrenreich, p.7.
iv
See Beyond War by Douglas Fry (Oxford University Press, 2007), p.97.
v
See Demonic Males by Richard Wrangham and Dale Peterson (Houghton Mifflin Company, 1996), p.211.
vi
See “A not-so-sweet future” from the News Centre at Cardiff University (Oct. 1, 2009): http://www.cardiff.ac.uk/news/articles/a-notsosweet-future.html
vii
See Fry, p.31.
viii
See Fry, p.109.
ix
See War Is a Force That Gives Us Meaning, Chris Hedges (Anchor Books, 2002), p.32.
x
See Hedges, p.33.
xi
See Civilization and Its Discontents, Sigmund Freud (W.W. Norton & Company, 2005), p. 108.
xii
See Freud, p. 108.
xiii
See Hedges, p.33.
xiv
See Hedges, p.34.
xv
See Shaw and Wong, p.78.
xvi
See Shaw and Wong, p.95.
xvii
See Shaw and Wong, p.97.
xviii
See Shaw and Wong, p.97.
xix
See Shaw and Wong, p.97.
xx
See Shaw and Wong, p.99.
xxi
See Coser, p.110.
xxii
See Coser, p.104.
xxiii
Watch the video of the prisoners chanting these words at: http://www.prisonexp.org/psychology/31
xxiv
These descriptions of the three types of guards in the S.P.E. come from the Stanford Prison Experiment website: http://www.prisonexp.org/psychology/33
xxv
Watch the “Post-Experimental Interview” video at: http://www.prisonexp.org/psychology/40
xxvi
See Dutton, p.140.
xxvii
See Dutton, p.140.
xxviii
As quoted in The Psychology of War by Lawrence LeShan (Helios Press, 2002), p.96.
xxix
See LeShan, p.96.
xxx
See Jarhead by Anthony Swofford (Scribner, 2003), p.145.
xxxi
From Henry V by William Shakespeare, Act IV, Scene 3.
xxxii
See Coser, p.58.
xxxiii
See LeShan, p.75.
xxxiv
See Hedges, p.84.
xxxv
See LeShan, p.123.
xxxvi
As quoted in LeShan, p.78.
xxxvii
See Hedges, p.3.
xxxviii
See “The Making and Unmaking of Child Soldier” by Ishmael Beah (New York Times, January 14, 2007): http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/14/magazine/14soldier.t.html
xxxix
See Hedges, p.182.
xl
See Sorel, p.78.
xli
As quoted in LeShan, p.17.
xlii
See Sorel, p.85.
xliii
From address given by President George W. Bush as quoted in an article on CNN.com (November 6, 2001): http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/11/06/gen.attack.on.terror/
xliv
See Swofford, p.145.
xlv
See After the War Zone by Laurie Sloane, PhD, and Matthew Friedman, PhD (Da Capo Press, 2008), p.77.
xlvi
See Hedges, p.22.
xlvii
The entire Henry Metelmanm story and quotes come from On Killing by Lt. Col. Dave Grossman (Little, Brown and Company, 1996), p.158-159.
xlviii
See Sorel, p.106.
xlix
See Sorel, p.28,
l
See Sorel, p.29.
li
See Swofford, p.6.
lii
See Beah [from NYTimes.com].
liii
See “If I look at the mass I will never act” by Paul Sovic (Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 2 No. 2, 2007), p.90.
liv
See Sovic, p.88.
lv
Sample questions as quoted in Sovic, p.89.
lvi
As quoted in Grossman, p.1.
lvii
As quoted in Grossman, p.23.
lviii
See chapter IX, maxim 28 from The Art of War by Sun Tzu (Filiquarian Publishing, LLC, 2006), p.54.
lix
Shalit’s different responses about what frightens soldiers is as quoted in Grossman, p.52-53.
lx
From chapter IX, maxim 24 in Tzu, p.53.
lxi
As quoted in LeShan, p.97.
lxii
As quoted in LeShan, p.97.
lxiii
As quoted in Grossman, p.44.
lxiv
Figures cited from Grossman, p.43.
lxv
From Grossman, p.56.
lxvi
Story from Manchester’s memoir as quoted in Hedges, p.174-175.
lxvii
Story as quoted in Grossman, p.89.
lxviii
Manchester as quoted in Grossman, p.88.
lxix
See Swofford, p.257.
lxx
See Swofford, p.123.
lxxi
As quoted in Dutton, p.109.
lxxii
As quoted in Grossman, p.170.
lxxiii
As quoted in Grossman, p.161.
lxxiv
See Grossman, p.169.
lxxv
As quoted in Grossman, p.110.
lxxvi
As quoted in Grossman, p.111.
lxxvii
As quoted in Grossman, p.112.
lxxviii
As quoted in Grossman from Soldiers by John Keegan and Richard Holmes, p.115.
lxxix
As quoted in Grossman, p.118.
lxxx
As quoted in Grossman, p.125.
lxxxi
As quoted in Grossman, p.123.
lxxxii
See Grossman, p.131.
lxxxiii
A study by Kranss, Kaplan, and Kranss referenced in Grossman, p.143.
lxxxiv
As quoted in Grossman, p.142.
lxxxv
As quoted in Grossman, p.144.
lxxxvi
As quoted in Grossman, p.318.
lxxxvii
As quoted in Grossman, p.151.
lxxxviii
Both observations by Shalit as quoted in Grossman, p.151-152.
lxxxix
See Swofford, p.135.
xc
See Swofford, p.98.
xci
As quoted in Grossman, p.145.
xcii
As quoted in LeShan, p.38.
xciii
As quoted in LeShan, p.38.
xciv
As quoted in Grossman, p.155.
xcv
As quoted in Grossman, p.162.
xcvi
For all quotes on this page related to Ishmael Beah’s story, see Beah’s article from The New York Times [from NYTimes.com].
xcvii
See Sloane and Friedman, p.59.
xcviii
As quoted in Grossman, p.165.
xcix
See Coser, p.112.
c
See Swofford, p.247.
ci
As quoted in Grossman, p.174.
cii
See Genesis of Suicide Terrorism by Scott Altran, (Science 299), p.1535
ciii
See Altran, p.1537.
civ
See Altran, p.1537.
cv
See Altran, p.1537.
cvi
See Altran, p.1537.
cvii
See Grossman, p.xxxiii
cviii
See Grossman, p.48.
cix
For a full description of each of the four myths, see Sloane and Friedman, p.41-47.
cx
See Sloane and Friedman, p.58.
cxi
See Sloane and Friedman, p.60.
cxii
See Sloane and Friedman, p.79.
cxiii
See Sloane and Friedman, p.73.
cxiv
See Swofford, p.83.
cxv
Quoting from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder in Grossman, p.282.
cxvi
In fact, Sloane and Friedman use the term “psychic numbing” to describe a symptom of PTSD, see Sloane and Friedman, p.154.
cxvii
See Sloane and Friedman, p.104-105.
cxviii
Retold from the description of the story in War in Human Civilization, Azar Gat (Oxford University Press, 2008), p.438.