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Presidential Administration

Presidential Administration

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ARTICLE
PRESIDENTIAL
ADMINISTRATION
Elena
Kagan
TABLEOF
CONTENTS
I.
NON-PRESIDENTIAL
MECHANISMS
OF
ADMINISTRATIVE
CONTROL
.....................
2253
A.
Congressional
Control
.......................................................................................................
2255
B.
Self-Control
........................................................................................................................
2260
C.
Interest
Group
Control
.....................................................................................................
2264
D
Judicial
Control
................................................................................................................
2269
II.
PRESIDENTIAL
ADMINISTRATION
-
SOMEBACKGROUND
AND
HISTORY
........
2272
A.
Early
Eff
orts
.......................................................................................................................
2274
B.
The
R
eagan
Era
................................................................................................................
2277
C.
A
Postscript
.......................................................................................................................
2281
III.
PRESIDENTIAL
ADMINISTRATION
IN
THECLINTON
YEARS
.................................
2281
A.
Tvo
Examples
....................................................................................................................
2282
B.
Techniques:
R
eview,
D
irectives,
and
Appropriation
....................................................
2284
i.
Review
............................................................................................................................
2285
2.
Directives
.......................................................................................................................
2290
3.
Appropriation
................................................................................................................
2299
C.
Scope
and
Lim
its
..............................................................................................................
2303
D
Causes
and
R
esponses
.....................................................................................................
2309
E.
Comparisons
and
a
Prediction
.......................................................................................
2315
IV.
ASSESSING
PRESIDENTIAL
ADM
INISTRATION
............................................................
2319
A.
Constitutional
Questions
.................................................................................................
2319
B.The
Case
for
Presidential
Adm
inistration
....................................................................
233!
.
Accountability
...............................................................................................................
2331
2.
Effectiveness
..................................................................................................................
2339
C.
Objections
and
Lim
itations
.............................................................................................
2346
C.ongress
.........................................................................................................................
2346
2.
Experts
...........................................................................................................................
23523.
Constituencies
...............................................................................................................
2358
V.
ENHANCING PRESIDENTIAL
ADMINISTRATION
THROUGH
LEGALRULES
.........
2363
A.
The
N
ondelegation
D
octrine
...........................................................................................
2364
B.
Judicial
R
eview
.................................................................................................................
2372
i.
Chevron
Review
............................................................................................................
2372
2.
H
ard
Look
Review
.......................................................................................................
2380
CONCLUSION
...............................................................................................................................
2383
2245
HeinOnline -- 114 Harv. L. Rev. 2245 2000-2001
 
PRESIDENTIAL
ADMINISTRATION
Elena
Kagan"
ThisArticle
examines
a
recent
and
dramatic transformation
in
the
relationship
betweenthe
President
(and
his staff) and
the
administrative
state.
ProfessorKagan
argues
that
President
Clinton,building
on
a
foundationPresident
Reagan
laid,
increasinglymade the
regulatory
activity
of
the executive
branch
agencies
into
an
extension of
his
own
policy
andpolitical
agenda.He
did
so,
primarily,
by
exercisingdirective
authority
over
theseagencies
and assertingpersonal ownershipof
their
regulatory
activity
-
demonstratingin
the process,
againstconventional
wisdom,
that
enhanced
presidential
control
over
administration
can
serve
pro-regulatory objectives.
ProfessorKagan
offers
a
broad
though
not
unlimited
defense
of
the
resulting
system
of
"presidentialadministration"
against
legal
and
policyobjections.
Thisform
of
control-
ling
agency
action,
she argues,comports
with
law
because,
contrary
to
the
prevailing
view, Congressgenerally
should
be
understood
to
have
left
authority
in
the
President
o
direct
executive
branch
officials
in
the exercise
of
their
delegated
discretion.
In
addition,
and
relatedly,
this
formof
controlling
agency
action
advances
core
values
of
accountability
and
effectiveness,
givennotable
features
ofthe
contemporary
administrative and
political
systems.
In
comparison
withother forms of control
over
administration,
which
continue
to
operate,
presidential
administration
renders
the
bureaucratic
sphere
more
transparent and
responsive
to
the
public
and
more
capable
of
injecting
energy
as
well as competence
into
theregulatory process.
Professor Kagan
concludes
this
Article
by
considering
ways
in
whichcourts might promote
presidentialadministration
n
its
most
beneficial
form
and
scope,
discussing
inparticularpotential
modifications
to
the nondelegation
doctrineand
two
judicial
review
doctrines.
T
he
history
ofthe
American
administrativestate
is
thehistory
of
competitionamongdifferent
entities
for
control
of
its
policies.
All
three
branches
of
government
-
the
President,
Congress,
and
Judici-
ary
-
have
participated
in
this
competition;
so
too
have the
external
constituencies
and
internalstaff
of
the
agencies.
Because of
the stakes
of
the
contest
and
the strength
of
the claims
and weapons
possessed
by
the
contestants,
no single
entity
has
emerged
finally
triumphant,
or is
ever likely
to
do
so.
Butat
different
times,
one
or
another
has
come
to
the
fore
and
asserted
at
least
a
comparativeprimacy
in
settingthe
di-
rection
and
influencing
the
outcome of
administrative
process.
In
this
time,
that
institution
is
the
Presidency.
We
live
today
in
an
era
of
presidential administration.
*
Visiting
Professor,
Harvard
Law
School;
former
Deputy Assistant
to
the
President
for
Do-
mesticPolicy
and Deputy
Director
of
the
Domestic Policy
Council.
In
my
former
position
at
the
White
House,
I
participated
in
some of the
administrative
actions discussedin this
Article.
I amgrateful
to
David
Barron,
Dick
Fallon,
Charles
Fried,
Phil
Heymann,
Howell
Jackson,
Larry
Les-
sig,
John
McGinnis,
Dan
Meltzer,
Frank
Michelman,
Martha
Minow,Todd
Rakoff,
David
Shapiro, Anne-Marie Slaughter,
DavidStrauss,
Bill
Stuntz,
and
Cass Sunstein
for
very
helpfulcomments,
to
participants
in
workshops
at
the
Boston
University
School
of
Lawand
Harvard
Law
School
for
stimulating
discussion,
and
to
Maura
Dalton,
Norina Edelman,
Dave
Gunter,
and
David Morenoff
forexcellent
research
assistance.
2246
HeinOnline -- 114 Harv. L. Rev. 2246 2000-2001
 
PRESIDENTIAL
ADMINISTRATION
This
assertionmay
seem
jarring
tothose
whohaveimmersedthemselves
in
the
recentwork
of
constitutional
lawscholars
on
the
re-
lationship
betweenthePresidency
and
the
administration.
Inthis
work,
scholarshave
debated
the
constitutional
basisfor
a
fully"uni-
tary
executive"
-
otherwise
put,
asystem
in
whichall
of
what
now
counts
as
administrative
activity
is
controllableby
thePresident.
1
Be-
cause
Congresshasdeprived
(or,
in
the
view
of
the
"unitarians,"
un-
constitutionally
purported
to
deprive)the
President
of
such
plenary
au-
thority
in
one
obviousrespect
-
bycreatingtheso-called
independent
agencies,
whose
headsthe
President
may
not
remove
at
will
-
the
common
ground
of
thisdebate
is
that
the
current
systemof
admini-
stration
is
not
strongly
unitary.
And
because
thismuch
is
common
ground,
the
participants
in
the
debate
largelyhavefailed
to
register,
much
less
to
comment
on,
therecent
trend
towardpresidential
control
over
administration
generally.
For
administrative
lawscholars,
the
claim
of
presidentialadmini-
stration
may
seem
puzzling
for
a
different
reason.
Thesescholars
-
concerned
as
they
are
withthe
actual
practicesof
administrative
con-
trol,
as
carried
out
in
executive
branch
as
wellas
independent
agencies
-
may
well
have
viewedtheclaim
as
arguable,
thoughperhaps
pre-
mature,
if
made
ten
or
fifteen
years
ago,
when
President
Reagan
or
Bush
was
in
office.
Inthefirst
month
of
his
tenure,Reagan
issued
an
executive
order
creating
a
mechanism
by
which
the
Office
of
Man-agement
and
Budget
(OMB),an
entity
withinthe
Executive
Office
of
the
President
(EOP),would
reviewall
major
regulations
of
executive
branch
agencies.
As
Reagan'sand
then
Bush's
terms
proceeded,andthe
antiregulatory
effects
ofthissystem
of
review
becameincreasingly
evident,
administrative
law
scholars
took
part
in
a
sharp
debate
about
its
propriety.
2
Withthe
advent
of
theClinton
Administration,
how-
ever,
this
debate
receded.
Although
President
Clinton
issued
his
own
executive
orderproviding
forOMBreview
of
regulations,
the
terms
of
this
order
struck
mostobservers
as
moderatingthe
aggressiveap-
proach
to
oversight
of
administrationtaken
in
the
Reagan
and
Bush
I
See
generally
Steven
G.
Calabresi
&
Saikrishna
B.
Prakash,
The
President'sPower
to
Exe-
cute
the
Laws,
104
YALE
L.J.
541(1994);
Martin
S.
Flaherty,
The
MostDangerous
Branch,
io5
YALE
L.J.
1725
(I996);
Lawrence
Lessig
&
CassR.
Sunstein,
The
Presidentand
the
Administra-
tion,
94
COLUM.
L.
REV.
1
(1994);
Geoffrey
P.
Miller,
Independent
Agencies,
1986
Sup.
CT.
REV.
41.
2
See
generally
Christopher
C.
DeMuth
&
Douglas H.
Ginsburg,
White
House Review
of
Agency
Rulemaking,
99
HARV.
L.
REV.
1075
(1986);
Thomas
0.
McGarity,
Presidential
Control
of
Regulatory
Agency
Decisionmaking,
36
AM.U.
L.
REV.
443
(987);
Alan
B.
Morrison,
OMB
Inter-
ferencewith
Agency
Rulemaking:
TheWrong
Way
To
Write
aRegulation,
99
HARV.
L.
REV.
1059
(1986);
Robert
V.
Percival,
Checks
Without
Balance:Executive
Office
Oversight
of
the
Environ-
mental
Protection
Agency,
54
LAw
&
CONTEMP.
PROBS.
127
(iggi);
Peter
L.
Strauss
&
Cass
R.
Sunstein,
The
Role
of
the
President
and
OMB
in
Informal
Rulemaking,
38
ADMIN.
L.
REV.
181
(1986).
2247
2001]
HeinOnline -- 114 Harv. L. Rev. 2247 2000-2001

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